Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects
Abstract
The Bush Administration has outlined a strategy of tailored deterrence to define the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security policy. There has been little discussion of this concept, either in Congress or in the public at large. This leaves unanswered questions about how this strategy differs from U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War and how it might advise decisions about the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. During the Cold War, the United States often modified, or tailored, its nuclear targeting doctrine, its nuclear weapons employment policy, and its nuclear force structure to enhance or maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent posture. In some ways, the Bush Administration's concept of tailored deterrence follows the same pattern, using assessments of an adversary's society and values to identify a range of targets that might be threatened, and adjusting U.S. war plans and force structure to enhance the credibility of U.S. threats to destroy these targets. However, tailored deterrence differs from Cold War deterrence in that it explicitly notes that U.S. nuclear weapons could be used in attacks against a number of nations that might have developed and deployed chemical and biological weapons, even if they did not possess nuclear weapons. Hence, the new policy seems more of a change in "who" we will deter than it is a change in "how" we will deter. Congress may review the concept of tailored deterrence, either as a part of its oversight of nuclear weapons policies and programs, or as a part of a broader debate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 28, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA478836
Entities
People
- Amy F. Woolf
Organizations
- Library of Congress