

THE SECURITY OF THE HOMELAND (A NATIONAL GUARD PERSPECTIVE)

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE SECURITY OF THE HOMELAND
(A NATIONAL GUARD PERSPECTIVE)**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Army transformation have created vulnerability in our nations Homeland Security (HLS). Since September 11, 2001, on average, 40% of the National Guard is deployed. Statistically, transforming the National Guard while engaged in the GWOT does not allow for adequate time to support transformation while securing the Homeland. The Army Force Generation (ARFGORGEN) cycle was designed to be the process to synchronize transformation, mobilization, and Homeland Security. The ARFORGEN does not take into account state mission requirements as they relate to actual personnel and equipment availability. The Guard has been securing the Homeland overseas and at home for over 371 years. The demands of the Global War on Terrorism are stretching the Guard to the extent that they can no longer provide operational relief for the Army abroad or at home.

SECURITY OF THE HOMELAND (A NATIONAL GUARD PERSPECTIVE)

The Global War on Terrorism began a fundamental change in the Army National Guard. Not only did the Global War on Terrorism require Army Guard participation, it also marked the beginning of Army Guard Transformation. As the demands of the Global War on Terrorism continue for the Army Guard (Guard), the Guard continues to accept the challenges in support of the federal war fight while mitigating risk for its Homeland Security mission. Arguably, the current members of the Guard are the most experienced since Vietnam. They are experienced in combat and in Homeland Security. An informal poll of National Guard students from the Army War College Class of 2008 yielded that 90% of every guardsman with 10 or more years of service has served in support of a national disaster. 60% of these guardsmen have combat experience from Iraq or Afghanistan. Despite the increased operational tempo, retention in the Guard has never been stronger. In 2006, Guard retention was 118%.¹ These statistics alone allude to the Guard being trained and very dedicated. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) demands, coupled with transformation, have had a significant affect on the Guard's ability to execute Homeland Security missions.

This paper will discuss the affects of mobilization, transformation, and the Army Force Generation cycle on security of the Homeland. The traditional use of the Guard has changed. The Guard is becoming a more relevant and modern force for the states and the Army. Recently the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Report dated January 31, 2008 stated:

...reserve units are integrated into military strategy according to their capabilities; not on the basis of their being active or reserve...Different components and units possess capabilities making them particularly useful for certain types of missions. One prominent example of this differentiation is found in homeland defense and civil support, as is recognized by the Department of Defense in its *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*...the White House report on Hurricane Katrina recommended that “the National Guard [and] other reserve components . . . should modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions...the reserve components are too valuable a skilled and available resource at home not to be ready to incorporate them in any Federal response planning and effort...should be made to leverage Reserve civilian skills in disaster relief efforts...almost five years after the September 11 attacks, DoD has not done enough to leverage the considerable resources resident in the reserve components to enhance the nation’s preparedness and ability to respond to a catastrophic event...there is a consensus that the reserve components are particularly well-suited to performing homeland missions and need to have a more central role in the Department of Defense’s homeland efforts...”²

The future concerns of the Guard may vary from state to state; however, every state is affected by transformation, mobilization, and ability to execute Homeland Security. The Army Force Generation (ARFGORGEN) cycle was designed to be the process to synchronize transformation, mobilization, and Homeland Security. The effectiveness of ARFORGEN is a subjective judgment. Though it enables predictability of unit deployments, the unit availability window has had a tendency to move forward in time resulting in a “come as you are” deployment that has an adverse affect on Homeland Security.

Since September 11, 2001 the Army National Guard has participated in many Federal and State Missions concurrently. The following information details National Guard support throughout the United States and direct support for the Global War on Terrorism abroad.

2002

Natural Disaster/Force Protection	6,600
Airport Security	7,271
Operation Noble Eagle (CONUS Installation and Chemical Plant Protection)	10,707
Balkans/Multinational Force Observers (Egypt)/Guantanamo Bay	2,784
Operation Iraqi Freedom	139
Operation Enduring Freedom	7,476

2003

Natural Disaster/Force Protection	4,500
Operation Noble Eagle (CONUS Installation and Chemical Plant Protection)	23,089
Balkans/Multinational Force Observers (Egypt)/Guantanamo Bay	5,837
Operation Iraqi Freedom	34,583
Operation Enduring Freedom	12,881

2004

Natural Disaster/Force Protection	2,500
Operation Noble Eagle (CONUS Installation and Chemical Plant Protection)	19,925
Balkans/Multinational Force Observers (Egypt)/Guantanamo Bay	5,803
Operation Iraqi Freedom	59,573
Operation Enduring Freedom	22,012

2005

Natural Disaster/Force Protection	2,200
Hurricane Support	50,000
Operation Noble Eagle (CONUS Installation and Chemical Plant Protection)	8,726
Balkans/Multinational Force Observers (Egypt)/Guantanamo Bay	4,884
Operation Iraqi Freedom	78,638
Operation Enduring Freedom	17,605

2006

Natural Disaster/Force Protection	2,800
Operation Jump Start (Border Mission from California to Texas)	5,166
Hurricane Support	6,435
Operation Noble Eagle (CONUS Installation and Chemical Plant Protection)	1,639
Balkans/Multinational Force Observers (Egypt)/Guantanamo Bay	3,494

Operation Iraqi Freedom	62,499
Operation Enduring Freedom	15,378

2007

Natural Disaster/Force Protection	1,500
Operation Jump Start (Border Mission from California to Texas)	5,349
Operation Noble Eagle (CONUS Installation and Chemical Plant Protection)	460
Balkans/Multinational Force Observers (Egypt)/Guantanamo Bay	3,934
Operation Iraqi Freedom	38,912
Operation Enduring Freedom	8,637

Aggregate number of soldiers deployed in support of OIF/OEF exceeds 230,778.³

In 2005 alone, the Guard had approximately 95,000 soldiers deployed in OIF/OEF and 50,000 soldiers deployed to the Louisiana Disaster Area (LDA) for Hurricane Katrina and Rita relief support. It is clear that the Army relies heavily on the Guard in large scale conflicts and Homeland Security. The Guard, the oldest component of America's armed forces, has contributed to every major military war or conflict in the nation's history. For example, 19 Army Guard divisions were deployed in World War II; 138,000 Army Guardsmen were mobilized for the Korean War; 30,000 Guardsman were mobilized for Vietnam; over 63,000 Army Guardsmen were called up for the 1991 Gulf War.⁴ In 2007/8, President Bush and Department of Defense (DoD) plan to mobilize another 12,000 Army Guardsman in support of OIF. Governors across the nation are speaking out against President Bush's plan to order over 12,000 National Guard soldiers to Iraq later in 2007/8. Other states have also critiqued President Bush's use of the National Guard. Florida Sen. Bill Nelson said "...he is worried that Iraq has made his state unprepared to handle a hurricane."⁵ New York Gov. Eliot Spitzer released a report showing his National Guard has only a fraction of mission critical equipment needed to respond to a terrorist attack.⁶ Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano said "...the

deployments could impact how her state fights wildfires.”⁷ Before the Global War on Terrorism, the full compliment of a state’s Guard was always available. Now, availability is a concern.

Homeland Security / Homeland Defense

The strategic plan to secure our Homeland involves more than the traditional term of “Security”. The following is the mission and strategic goals from the National Strategy for Homeland Security published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) dated October 2007:

Mission

We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.

Strategic Goals

- Awareness -- Identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts and disseminate timely information to our Homeland Security partners and the American public.
- Prevention — Detect, deter and mitigate threats to our homeland.
- Protection — Safeguard our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property and the economy of our Nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.
- Response — Lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.
- Recovery — Lead national, state, local and private sector efforts to restore services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.
- Service — Serve the public effectively by facilitating lawful trade, travel and immigration.

- Organizational Excellence — Value our most important resource, our people. Create a culture that promotes a common identity, innovation, mutual respect, accountability and teamwork to achieve efficiencies, effectiveness, and operational synergies.⁸

Many of these missions are inherently Guard missions. The Guard is a major resource at the state level to enhance an effective Homeland Security capability. Homeland Security is defined as, “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”⁹ Additionally, the strategy clarifies the purpose of Homeland Security...”to effect preparation for catastrophic natural and man-made disasters, while not homeland security per se, can nevertheless increase the security of the Homeland.”¹⁰ The Guard is a component of the DoD and conducts missions outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS also discusses Homeland Defense. In the most current NDS dated March 2005, the number one attribute for a domestic capability is “Defense of the Homeland.”¹¹ Homeland Defense is defined as activities that represent the employment of unique capabilities at home, at varying levels, and to contend with those circumstances that surpass the capacities of civilian responders.¹² America was founded on the premise of limited government and federalism. Inherently, “the trust and responsibility”¹³ to protect American citizens reside in the capabilities of the state and local emergency medical services, law enforcement, fire, and public health.

The Guard is considered a first responder in domestic emergencies. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) enables the Guard to respond more quickly and effectively in the event of a Homeland Security crisis, providing the soldiers and equipment are available. EMAC is a national disaster relief agreement

ratified by Congress in 1996, but agreed to by individual states.¹⁴ EMAC is an agreement between states to support one another as a result of a declared disaster. Immediately following a devastating incident, states need the ability to assist their citizens as quickly as possible. EMAC states and territories have streamlined the request, reimbursement, and response time by agreeing to help each other in the event of a natural or manmade disaster ahead of time. A key component to EMAC is the availability of soldiers and equipment. Availability of soldiers and equipment due to Federal and competing State missions stresses EMAC as demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina and Rita in 2005. Some states have additional requirements to support or participate regionally with other special capabilities such as the following:

- * CERFP - Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package. There are 12 validated CERFP's nationwide. They are comprised of established Guard units with a Federal mission, but dedicated to the CERFP mission for a specific period of time. CERFP capabilities are Search and Rescue, Decontamination, Medical, and Command and Control.

- * Civil Support Teams (CST's) – There are 55 CST's nationwide. This is a Joint capability with the Air Guard to detect Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological threats. The CST's are dedicated solely to their mission. They have no dual "Guard" mission; however, the soldiers and airmen come from traditional Guard units. CST's are usually used at public events with mass attendance. These types of events may be considered targets for an attack with Weapons of Mass Destruction.

- * CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) – This type of unit is a developing capability. CCMRF are brigade size elements located regionally

throughout the United States. The CCMRF are a rotational pool of Active and Guard forces with a secondary responsibility to respond to a disaster once the state first responders are exhausted. This is a large capability exceeding 3000 soldiers per CCMRF.

The Guard would appear to be in a very good position to take the lead military role in Homeland Security. At a minimum, they are a critical component. War will require the participation of the citizen soldier unless our nation considers a conscript program. The Guard's involvement in the Global War on Terrorism, especially at home, must continue to evolve as the threats evolve. The Guard also understands the unique requirements of the local community. This relationship needs to be nourished and further developed making the Guard a more viable first responder. There are 3000 Guard armories located throughout the United States. Each armory has the capability, legal authority, and structure to support their community or state. In the event of a situation threatening lives or infrastructure, the Guard can provide local or neighborhood experts. These experts have a detailed knowledge of streets and ally ways for search and rescue operations or mass evacuation. They also have knowledge of drainage systems, concrete water ways or washes, bridges, and schools that may assist additional first responders. Guardsmen also work at domestic high value targets such as banks and government buildings. These Guardsmen are a critical source of first hand information. The world's global war on terrorism has engaged Guardsman at home and in OIF/OEF. Homeland Security directly competes with OIF/OEF, and there are few ways to mitigate the competition. Mitigation comes with a price. The price is the risk of being fully capable of supporting American citizens at home.

Army Force Generation Cycle

The Army's overarching answer for OIF/OEF deployment predictability, training, and equipping is the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. The ARFORGEN is designed for both the active (AC) and reserve components (RC). The RC ARFORGEN has enabled the National Guard to program mobilizations well in advance. It also allows for Homeland Security missions. It is unrealistic to accommodate the Homeland Security window based on training and transformation requirements. As the Guard modernizes into a modular force, the ARFORGEN ensures the Guard is trained, ready, and available for the Federal war fight. After September 11th (9/11), the National Guard transformed into an operational reserve instead of a strategic reserve. As an operational reserve the Guard is part of the plan to support the GWOT. The Honorable Ronald James, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs said it best about the Guard as an Operational Reserve and ARFORGEN,

Let us implement ARFORGEN across the entire force, Active Component (AC) and RC. Assured access to the RC also relieves some of the intolerable stress building on the AC. In addition, it makes the RC more operational and the total force – truly “Total.” ...The resources necessary to make ready units will have to continue and be sustained. There are three critical readiness components to operationalizing the Guard and Reserve on a sustained basis – personnel, training and equipment.

The ARFORGEN enables the Guard to be a viable force provider not only as individuals, but more importantly, as members of the Army's modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's). There are 44 BCT's in the AC and 16 BCT's in the Guard with a mission of 28 BCT's in the near future. The ARFORGEN model assists the Guard with more predictable deployment cycles that enable additional training for transformation, family time and civilian employment.

Year one and two are individual training years; year three is platoon/company level proficiency; year four is company/battalion level proficiency; year five is the deployment year. Essentially, years one through three appear to be the most reasonable to dedicate to a Homeland Security mission. The reality of ARFORGEN is during year one, the soldier is not going to do much of anything. At most, this is a retention year. Years two-three are dedicated to training in support of transformation. Year two and three are also voluntary mobilization years. Guardsman can volunteer for subsequent mobilizations with other units and states that have committed to providing a capability in support of the GWOT. This greatly reduces the available pool of National Guard soldiers to conduct Homeland Security missions. Year four is preparation for deployment, and year five is the actual deployment year. Ultimately, Guard availability is limited and the ARFORGEN does not adequately account for equipment or personnel availability. This is largely due to OIF/OEF participation. It appears the Global War on Terrorism and Army transformation have created a vulnerability in the states' ability to adequately plan and train for Homeland Security. At a minimum, both are having an adverse affect on training and equipment readiness.

Transformation

With the current consistent deployment rate of Guardsmen, transformation does not presently allow for the adequate training to support the Army's transformation and Homeland Security plans. Additionally, states have missions in addition to natural disasters that require Guard's personnel and equipment participation. Some examples are as follows:

* Operation Jump Start (OJS) is the border mission in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. There are over 3000 Soldiers and Airmen stretched along the 1200 mile border between the United States and Mexico.

* Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) was the immediate response to 9/11 in the US. The Guard was deployed to military bases, bridges, chemical locations, and other potential targeted locations. ONE consisted of thousands of Guard soldiers from numerous states.

Many of these soldiers deployed in support of OEF immediately after their ONE duty. ONE transformed into the establishment of the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA). During the development of the TSA, the Guard was deployed to selected airports. Their duties included bag screening, walking patrols, and mounted patrols. The Guard remained at the airports until May 2002. State missions are very diverse. History has shown the Guard involved with fires, floods, earthquakes, riots, tornados, and security. These types of operations have become more frequent and maximize the capabilities of the Guard. State missions such as these compete with the Army's need for the Guard.

The Armies Combatant Commands also compete for the Guard. The Guard deploys rotational units in support of the Global War on Terrorism most frequently to United States Central Command (CENTCOM). The Global War on Terror is also a threat at home. The United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is the National coordination entity for the defense of the Homeland. USNORTHCOM develops contingency plans, some of which include the Guard. Guard availability fluctuates due to requirements overseas. Exercising these contingency plans, is

increasingly difficult when soldiers and leaders are deployed or attending other federal required training.

USNORTHCOM assists states and organic State Emergency Agencies, with plans to protect citizens and infrastructure. Ultimately, it is the states' responsibility to insure the safety and security of its citizens. Natural disasters are part of the Federal Homeland Security plan; however, each state has contingency plans as first responders in support of civil authorities. It is unlikely that a Governor would immediately rely on USNORTHCOM or assume Federal intervention after a natural disaster. In most cases, DoD intervention is validated and military support committed to support the lead federal agency. For a state plan to be effective, their plan takes into account their available organic force structure and equipment. The Guard falls under USC Title 32 (under Governor control) and USNORTHCOM falls under USC Title 10. The State Governors have command of their Guard unless they are federalized. It is increasingly difficult to exercise contingency plans when soldiers and leaders are deployed or attending other required training.

Mobilization

As previously mentioned, the Guard's availability to exercise and execute Homeland Security missions are affected due to being a Global War on Terrorism force provider. Depending on what year the state falls in the ARFORGEN, there are individual and collective training requirements that also must be met. These training requirements are a Guard priority. Fortunately, many of the individual tasks serve a dual role in Global War on Terrorism and Homeland Security training. The conflict comes when the personnel and/or equipment are not available for training. This lack of

availability is largely due to OIF/OEF mobilizations as in the case of the Arkansas National Guard, 39th Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The 39th BCT is scheduled for their second deployment in less than three years.¹⁵

Guard equipment is in demand as well as Guard soldiers. Guard equipment is not only used for training for the war fight, but also used to support Homeland Security missions. Guard units, particularly combat and combat support organizations, do not have required equipment to sustain post deployment training levels and Homeland Security support. The lack of new equipment in support of Army transformation is having an adverse affect on Guard readiness. One issue is that equipment is left in OIF/OEF. The Guard has adopted the Army's new equipment philosophy of stewardship in lieu of equipment ownership. It is very clear to see the impacts of equipment availability during training and state emergencies. Guard units may have to conduct extended post mobilization training which directly affects the unit arrival date in theatre. Essentially, if equipment is not available for training, then it would certainly not be available for Homeland Security.

The current Guard transformation process is not solving the equipment availability problems. 16 Guard BCT's are transforming into modular formations under an accelerated program for organization.¹⁶ The National Guard mission is 28 BCT's, which is a reduction from the original 34 Guard BCT's. Unfortunately this accelerated program is for manning and training only. Guard BCT's are not programmed for equipment until 2009.¹⁷ LTG Clyde Vaughn, Vice Chief for the National Guard and Director of the Army National Guard included in the 2008 National Guard Posture Statement that the Army Guard will achieve 90% of transformation for the 28 BCT's by

2013.¹⁸ The lack of equipment in question varies from state to state, but on average most states are left with a mere 40% of there required mission essential equipment¹⁹.

Lt Gen H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau said,

...As was painfully obvious in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, equipment shortages translate directly to the speed with which the National Guard can respond to a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. The lack of equipment makes it take longer to do that job, and the lost time translates into lost lives and those lost lives are American lives...²⁰

The Nebraska National Guard is short approximately 7,500 pieces (\$80 million worth) of equipment ranging from night vision goggles to tractor trailer trucks. Most all of this equipment has been destroyed, damaged, or left in Iraq.²¹

Additionally, Senator Nelson from Nebraska wrote to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)

Robert Gates,

... Our increased dependence on these citizen-soldiers for their service in OIF and OEF has, unfortunately, caused a severe equipment shortage, which will weaken the Guard's ability to fulfill its missions safely and successfully...The National Guard's equipment shortage has been exacerbated by units leaving equipment in Iraq after activation. As more and more units are called up for active duty, more equipment is being left behind in Iraq. In addition, at the request of DoD, state Guard units are completing additional pre-mobilization training, which results in weapons shortages as equipment is shuffled among armories nationwide...furthermore, as you know, the National Guard's role is not isolated to serving in OIF and OEF; it is also critical to domestic disaster relief and homeland defense operations. However, due to the equipment shortages caused by units' deployments abroad, the Guard units remaining in the United States have inadequate equipment with which to respond to domestic disasters...²²

In May 2007, numerous tornadoes touched down in six southwest Kansas counties, devastating the small town of Greensburg. A Greensburg administrator estimated that 95% of the town of 1500 was destroyed.²³ Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius (D) said, "The state is missing vital National Guard equipment because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Usually the state has approximately 70-80% of its

equipment at any given time, but it currently has just 40-50%.” She added, “that these shortages will just make recovery that much slower.” Equipment left in theatre is a major issue. This decreases unit readiness and does not allow the Guard the ability to cross-level necessary equipment for deploying units.

The Army procures new equipment to support the war fight and for transformation. Some of this new equipment is critical to Homeland Security. These factors account for an average of 40% of authorized equipment needed for training, future deployments, and Homeland Security missions.²⁴ This equipment is also used to reduce post mobilization training time. This training is largely dependant on training with the right equipment prior to mobilization. Some of the main types of equipment are trucks (FMTV – Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, HMMWV – Highly Mobil Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles), radios, crew served weapons and night vision devices.²⁵

According to the Government Auditing Office (GAO), New Mexico is the State in the worst condition with only 34% of available equipment.²⁶ The state in the best condition for Homeland Security is Idaho with 100% of required equipment.²⁷ These percentages may be misrepresented due to the type of structure a state is authorized. A state’s authorized force structure allowance of 3000 positions consisting of units with a low density equipment will not have the same problems as a larger state with diverse units and a force structure allowance of 16,000 positions. The average National percentage is 53% of available equipment. Some Guard units are not only unable to support their Homeland Security mission, but are also training to deploy back to OIF. This is the case for Pennsylvania’s 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). The 56th SBCT is scheduled to deploy in late 2008 and lack of equipment is a major training

issue.²⁸ Pennsylvania currently has 49% of their required equipment. They have insufficient equipment to cross-level necessary shortfalls.

Reset

During ARFORGEN years one through three, the Army National Guard will ReSet their Force Structure. ReSet is the new term for modernize in support of modularity. For a unit to modernize, they must turn in old equipment and receive new equipment. This equates to turning in and receiving thousands of property lines. Concurrently, soldiers will retrain for new military occupational skills (MOSQ) for the new (incoming) force structure. ReSet also equates to the increased individual training requirement which, for the most part, is phased training over multiple years. Phased training is not new to the Guard. It is a common constraint due to Guard school funding, seat availability, and being a citizen soldier. This methodology delays individual and unit or collective readiness.

The Guard is required to mobilize in year five of the ARFORGEN. The Guard must arrive at Mobilization Stations (MOBSTA) or Power Projection Platforms (PPP) at company level proficiency before they deploy. If a Guard unit does not display company level proficiency, their pre-deployment time period may be extended effecting the overall mobilization period. The revised Mobilization/Demobilization Policy for Reserve Component dated March 15, 2007 signed by Under Secretary of Defense Dr. David Chu, placed restrictions on the RC deployment window.²⁹ The pre-existing policy had limitations which would have precluded the RC from being available for continuous tours of duty. Specifically, the new policy limited involuntary mobilizations for one year with a four year dwell time. What was not clear in the policy was implementation guidance

which was later provided by 1st United States Army (1USA) in coordination with the National Guard Bureau. To streamline the Guard mobilization process and reduce the post mobilization training requirements, the state's Adjutant General validates individual mobilization requirements and select collective battle drills. This training is nicknamed the 40/11. 40 individual tasks and 11 battle drills. Collectively these tasks are in excess of 120 tasks. Essentially, the Army reduced post mobilization training (Title 10) but increased pre-mobilization training (Title 32). The Army's plan had to meet the Global War on Terrorism requirements and stay within the parameters of the new RC Mobilization Policy. Under the best circumstances (no civilian job conflicts or family problems), it is very unlikely to meet the pre-mobilization training requirements and fully ReSet a Guard unit. As previously discussed, soldiers typically become qualified at beginning level (10 level) in ARFORGEN year three or four. This leaves very little time for noncommissioned officer training (30 or 40 level training) or officer professional development. In some cases, MOS qualification is complete in ARFORGEN year one or two. In either scenario, leader or sustainment training is required, and in many cases, the Guard has not been fielded the new equipment on which they were just trained.

States are conscious of the Federal mobilization requirements and especially how they affect their ability to support their Homeland Security mission. The very same issues that plague the Guard for OIF/OEF support exist for the Guards' Homeland Security mission. The only difference is instead of supporting a Combatant Commander; the Guard is supporting their Governor and State. The National Guard has been training for war and Homeland Security missions for many years. Multi-

echelon Cold War training also served as the basis for Homeland Security training. Maneuver training, individual training, or simulation exercises enabled the National Guard to execute state specific emergency response plans. Force Structure demands on the Guard will not be able to support the ARFORGEN cycle with the current 12 month deployment criteria and Homeland Security requirements. More and more, Guard soldiers and units are deploying well off the ARFORGEN cycle not only with BCT's but also as individuals.

The individual mobilization requirements are a result of our "system" at work. The National Guard Bureau through Forces Command receives a request for forces without a designated military occupational skill. The request is a capability request in order to keep existing combat structure engaged and not remission combat forces to other requirements such as Force Protection, Convoy Security, and In Lieu of Military Police operations. As operations in OIF continue to develop, there is a perceived capability imbalance translated into a personnel shortage.

In order for Multinational Forces Iraq to continue progress, it is imperative for forces to remain engaged and other forces brought into country with capabilities to execute missions other than typical war fight missions. Since the Guard had non-deployed combat arms or maneuver structure, "in lieu" missions became a norm. A New York Times article called these types of units "Swiss Cheese Units."³⁰ Unfortunately, they were correct. This type of sourcing also effected subsequent requirements that included deployments and Homeland Security.³¹ The Army may not have considered structure and manning as separate issues. Ultimately, the new mobilization policy restarted the National Guard mobilization clock. As states

coordinated their units for mobilization in accordance with the ARFORGEN, individuals were still volunteering for other mobilizations. This means National Guard soldiers were mobilizing back to back and were not available for Homeland Security missions. If these types of capabilities are a requirement, why has the structure not been validated through requirement determination process during the Total Army Analysis? The current tempo does not allow for training in support of ARFORGEN and transformation. All indications are that the bill payers are the 54 states and territories being less capable to secure the Homeland.

Conclusion

There are a several ways to mitigate readiness shortfalls that support Global War on Terrorism and State Mission training, while sustaining an adequate Homeland Security posture. One is to identify who owns Homeland Security. There is no law or Congressional mandate that clearly identifies a primary proponent for Homeland Security. Our nation's strategies include both Homeland Security and Defense missions. It is not clear who has ultimate responsibility between the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense. It is assumed that the Department of Homeland Security has proponentcy; however, the Department of Defense is the best resourced for the mission.

Additionally, as previously stated, the National Guard is the best organization to take the lead in securing the homeland, but again, there is no official tasking. What is clearly needed is a rebalancing or growth of the force to accommodate the combat structure required overseas and Homeland Security mission. After all, they are basically the same soldiers. The same type of rebalancing or growth must occur to

ensure that the equipment necessary for the war fight (in support of transformation) and Homeland Security are available within the states. This takes money and coordination at the highest levels. Equipment is only the surface issue. Equipment requires maintenance; maintenance requires parts; parts require calibration, etc. Additionally, Guard units selected to mobilize must be allowed to fully transform before soldiers are allowed to volunteer for a follow on deployment. The Guard has the option to “pass back” missions. This is frowned upon by senior leadership. Mobilizations are also used as an incentive for states. States that “sign-up” for mobilization missions are in reality, signing up for resources and equipment. Those states receive the new equipment and additional training funds. The equipment typically arrives post mobilization or in theatre. Ideally, if the equipment arrived in the parent state prior to mobilization or returned with a deployed unit, the new equipment or a portion thereof may be used for training in support of the ARFORGEN cycle and better prepared to execute Homeland security.

Proportionately, security of the Homeland must be raised to the same levels as OIF/OEF. This means money for equipment, individual training, and multi-echelon exercises. State missions do not disappear if a unit is deployed. The ARFORGEN does not take into account state mission requirements as it relates to actual personnel and equipment availability. The Guard perpetuates the phenomenon that they have done much more, with much less. The Guard does not like to say “no.” The Guard could have said “no” as a strategic reserve; they simply can’t as an operational reserve. There is little doubt that the Global War on Terrorism and Army transformation has stressed the AC and RC of the Army. Equally to blame is the ARFORGEN cycle. The ARFORGEN is a great concept, but under resourced and inadequately manned. The

Guard has been securing the Homeland overseas and at home for over 371 years.

The demands of the Global War on Terrorism are stretching the Guard to the extent that they can no longer provide operational relief for the Army at home.

Endnotes

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