

On Conflict Transformation in Iraq: Democracy and its Effect on Stability

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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This study examines the effects of democratizing Iraq in relation to the stability of the state. The international relations theory of the democratic peace states that democracies do not fight one another. Elements of the theory have been applied to Iraq to seek democracy there in order to produce greater stability. Therefore, the purpose of the study was to discover what causal linkages exist between democratization and stability in Iraq. The level of violence in Iraq gradually increased as Iraq progressed from the first national elections in January 2005 to a constitutional referendum and then subsequent elections in December 2005 based on the ratified constitution. The former Sunnis elites turned increasingly to insurgency and sectarian conflict as electoral democracy deluded their wealth and power while transferring these to the Shiite and Kurdish majorities. Shiite areas became more stable as they assumed more political and economic power in the country enabled by elections and stipulations of the constitution favorable to Shiites. The research shows that establishing elements of democratic governance at the local level first has a greater chance of stabilizing states in governmental transition rather than starting from the national level. Population security is required while conducting regime transition to ensure relative neutrality in ethno-federalist states. Democratic reform does not in and of itself create stability in states experiencing internal conflict and can even exacerbate such conflict. A republican peace is more viable for stabilization in the short term as opposed to pursuing a liberal democratic peace in societies that have not developed the appropriate institutions. Nevertheless, Iraq can increase stability now by conducting local and provincial elections to enable legitimate regional leadership. This initiative can also eliminate the disproportionate representation currently retained by Shiite and Kurdish parties that came about after Sunnis boycotted elections who feared a tyranny of the majority.

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this monograph is to determine what effect the development of democracy has had on the stabilization of Iraq since the fall of Saddam's regime in April of 2003. The study is separated into six main sections. In the introduction, I frame the contextual background, why the research is relevant, define terms, and review the literature that addresses the international relations theory of the democratic peace. The second section covers the research methodology followed by the two main sections of the monograph that are divided between the period in Iraq before the January 2005 elections and afterward through the end of 2006. The last two sections discuss the findings of the study as well as the implications and recommendations for improving state building and counterinsurgency operations in general and in Iraq specifically.

Background

"In war the result is never absolute.... The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found... at a later date."¹ When Carl von Clausewitz wrote this in the early 1800s, as part of his famous work *On War*, Clausewitz's view of warfare was intellectually neutral. In order to construct a theory of war it was necessary for him to take an essentially amoral approach. States would fight, lose or gain territory and power but could always attempt to change the result later when conditions were different. There was no expectation that warfare between any particular states could be completely eliminated. Clausewitz's attitude of inevitability toward perpetual war is one of the greatest controversies

¹Peter Paret, Michael Eliot Howard, and Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80.

about his work. Nevertheless if victory in battle is only an initial and transitory state of affairs, how do we find a better peace as the more desirable and durable objective in war?²

Often citing the emergence of Germany and Japan as American allies in the aftermath of World War II, contemporary US policy makers have pursued the democratization of subdued belligerents as a means of proving Clausewitz's theory wrong by creating a final result in war. In fact, this is not a new phenomenon in American policy but has taken on new significance with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Policy makers in the United States have disagreed on whether such a policy should be enacted in a preemptory or reactionary fashion. However, there has been large agreement that if war is joined that a new democratic regime should be installed in place of the former belligerent government. President Bush stated that the democratization of Iraq was a war aim at least a month before the war started in March of 2003.³

The US government views the establishment of democracy in Iraq as an inherent task on par with the programs enacted in Germany and Japan after World War II and more recently in Bosnia and Kosovo. This is reflected in the policy statements of the US administration and the coalition military forces' strategy that includes the facilitation of democratic governance. In fact, democracy is also a major factor in US soldier motivation as the democratization of Iraq is equated with American ideals of freedom and the desire to improve the life of the average Iraqi.⁴ However, relatively little scrutiny has been paid to exactly how the process of democratization in Iraq is affecting the successful termination of the conflict to stabilize the country.

The democratic peace theory or simply the democratic peace, as it is known in social science literature, forms the basis for the current US National Security Strategy. The proposition

²Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev'd ed. (New York: New American Library, 1974), 426.

³"The President Discusses the Future of Iraq," [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030226-11.html>.

⁴Leonard Wong, "Combat Motivation in Today's Soldiers: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute," *Armed Forces and Society* 32, no. 4 (Jul 1 2006), 659.

essentially states that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another. Therefore the democratization of Iraq should not be seen solely as an inherent good transplanted from our own free society but rather as a means to an end. Transforming Iraq into a democracy will ensure that Iraqis and Americans never go to war against each other again. At the same time, the idea of a democratic peace has been significantly augmented in the US National Security Strategy. The strategy states that creating other democracies will expand the community of peaceful nations and encourage other countries to become democracies. In other words, the idea of the democratic peace in the National Security Strategy is used as a prescriptive proposition and not just a descriptive idea. So by creating democracy in Iraq, other democratic governments will ultimately develop in the neighboring countries of the Middle East region. These new democracies will not only be at peace with each other but also will suppress and eliminate terrorist movements on their soil or eliminate their support for such violent groups.⁵

The development of democratic institutions in Iraq has already been cited as inspiring democratic movements across the Middle East. While there may or may not be a causal linkage between these events in the short term, the overall US strategy is straightforward. Democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan will enable the emergence of democratic societies in the Middle East. Since the policy views democracies as more stable than other forms of government, and opposed to terrorist acts, such governments will suppress terrorism on their soil. These developments will then eventually create victory in the War on Terror.

Not only does the democratic peace drive the strategy of the United States in the War On Terror, as a means of creating stable democracies in the Middle East, but it has also become a major "pillar" in the US strategy for victory in Iraq.⁶ However, the democratic peace theory is a

⁵George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America [2006]*, (New York: Novinka Books, 2006).

⁶National Security Council, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (2005).

state-based proposition. It does not specifically address the effects of establishing democracy in countries experiencing internal conflict, but it is used now in the policy context of stability in Iraq.

There have been selective examinations of the democratic peace in relation to post-conflict resolution but almost exclusively in cases where a cease-fire was negotiated between warring parties.⁷ In other words, the elite power centers normally either endorse or tacitly agree to outside intervention as a precondition for implementing major political reform in the subject state. For example, Bosnia and Kosovo were not occupied to implement a stabilization plan until the various warring parties had agreed to an armistice. One of the major advocates of the democratic peace proposition, Bruce Russett, has cautioned against the forcible implementation of democratic government since the use of military force is inherently unpredictable in terms of its long-term effects. Better that democracy is nurtured indirectly rather than directly planted and hurriedly executed. The risks of this policy are that it can potentially create future conflict in the potentially chaotic phase of transformation in nascent democracies.⁸

Why This Research is Important

The promotion of democracy throughout the world is the foundation of US National Security Strategy. It states that creating democracy in Iraq and other in countries in the world will ultimately achieve victory in the War on Terror. Therefore understanding how democracy affects stability in Iraq, as the current focus in the War on Terror, is critical if we are to bring the Iraq War to a successful conclusion and to better prepare ourselves for potential future conflict.

⁷Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, (New York: Norton, 2001), 200.

⁸Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Michael E. Brown, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 301.

Literature Review

The major proponents of the democratic peace find that democracies do not fight one another (Russett, 1993). However, it is generally accepted that democracies *do* regularly fight non-democracies. The expectation for proponents of the democratic peace is that over time the growth of democratic governments worldwide will eventually vastly reduce or even eliminate the incidence of interstate war. These findings have led other researchers to examine more closely the particular countries cited as evidence for the democratic peace.

Other social scientists find that evidence for a democratic peace is primarily found among mature, liberal democracies that are interconnected (Doyle, 1996). There is evidence that democracies are more stable than other states and even that transitions to democracy should be relatively free of conflict (Russett, 2001). However, Russett asserts such transitions should not be imposed from the outside since military force is a blunt instrument that can produce undesired effects (Russett, 2005). Snyder and Mansfield have focused on these undesired effects in their research and suggest that states transitioning towards democracy are in fact the most prone to go to war (Snyder and Mansfield, 1995). Not only is their tendency for democratizing states to engage in interstate war but there is also a propensity for internal conflict as well (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005). This finding is critical because Iraq's sectarian conflict can be viewed as a form of interstate warfare. Iraq is an amalgamation of various groups that were actually separate before the British created the modern Iraqi state in the aftermath of World War I. While these groups may live within the same borders they can view each other as separate "nations" within the same political state. Barnett finds that internal security is a precondition for transitioning to democracy and prefers the idea of a "republican peace" as opposed to attempting liberal democracy up front. Gradual transitions to liberal democracy through a republican approach appear to have to a better chance of success over time (Barnett, 2006).

For the purposes of studying the Iraqi road to democracy, the literature that focuses on countries transitioning from autocracy to democratic government is of prime importance. In particular, how does democratization affect the stability of the country itself? The focus of the research is therefore on intrastate conditions rather than international relations yet still concerned with how the interstate theory of democratic peace is applicable to Iraq's current condition.

Terms Defined

The following terms are used throughout the study: democracy, stability, security, and economic pluralism. In order to maintain continuity between the quantitative and qualitative measures of democracy and stability, democracy is defined as it is in the Department of Defense (DoD) quarterly reports to Congress entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq." In these reports democracy was established by enacting the following elements: elections, holding a constitutional referendum, and forming a unity government. While it is highly debatable as to whether achieving these procedures constitutes democracy, these are the indicators used by the DoD measurement scheme that claim causal linkages with stability and security. Therefore, the study will focus on each of these events in Iraq's recent history in a time-phase analysis. A stable state is one that has representative government, a growing economy, enforces the rule of law, and provides public services. Security is the foundation for a stable state that ensures freedom from non-criminal violence towards people and property, access to critical health care, and provides essential sustenance (see figure 6).

The two most important terms to define are democracy and stability. The US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq defines the Iraqi democracy as one that is a "constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and ...(is not) a safe haven for terrorists." With regard to Iraq, the US government has defined an increasing level of democracy in terms of specific events such as holding elections and the constitutional referendum. This is supported by the Victory Strategy definition of Iraqi democracy that emphasizes the constitutional referendum

and assembly elections. The same Strategy defines security and stability in Iraq as one that denies sanctuary to terrorists and certainly implies the absence of sectarian violence.

While this defines democracy from the US point of view it is also important to examine Iraqi perspectives on democracy. In serving as the democracy advisor to the CPA in early 2004, Larry Diamond found that the majority Shiite population tended to see democracy almost purely as majority rule. This stands in contrast to the more general definition of democracy that says, “rule by the people.” The latter definition is further clouded by the fact that Iraqi nationalism is often characterized in terms that are favorable to the particular sect that voices it. For example, the statement “we are all Iraqis” could imply that “we” is not necessarily all inclusive of either identity or one’s opinion. A military officer deployed to Iraq noted that local advisory councils, established under military or CPA purview, did not necessarily view themselves as the peoples’ representatives. In fact, most of the particular citizens did not even know who their council representative was since the members expended no effort to solicit the concerns of the people. They wanted to renew the old patronage system, reinforced by the Saddam regime, in which governmental representatives at each level received handouts that were distributed to relatives and other supporters.⁹ The point of this discussion is that a local characterization of Iraqi democracy will depend on the local actors, coalition efforts, and will vary widely from place to place. More specifically, the democratization of Iraq was pursued mostly from the national level so this is the primary focus of the study while acknowledging the fact that some coalition forces did attempt some form of democratization at the local level first. Particular approaches in southern and northern Iraq are explored within this study.

Economic pluralism is an unofficial military term that primarily refers to the development of a market economy when conducting stability operations, such as in Bosnia. In effect its

⁹Combat Studies Institute, *Interview with Lt. Col Kevin Farrell* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 7.

intention is to create interconnected markets within a given area. However, this particular definition is more useful in economies that are not dependent on a single, disproportionately large commodity such as oil. In this study, economic pluralism denotes equal distribution of a country's wealth based on its economic base. In Iraq, over seventy percent of the economy is generated from oil export profits; therefore working for the government can be just as important as having representation within the government, if not more so.¹⁰ This concept is important in understanding how certain political actions have economic effects on particular segments of society to include de-Baathification and the elimination of the old Iraqi Army. It is also related to the social science concept of political economy.¹¹

METHODOLOGY

The hypothesis is that the development of democracy in Iraq directly contributes to security and ultimately a stable country. So where major indicators of democratic development have occurred we expect to see marked reductions in violence against both security forces and civilians where sectarian violence is thought to be the causal factor.¹² The following events will be used as the major indicators for democratic progress in Iraq since they have been frequently cited by both political and military leaders as marks of success in the Iraq campaign: (1) transfer of sovereignty and end of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Ambassador Paul Bremer

¹⁰The open source CIA fact book reports that up to 95% of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings was based on oil until recently.

¹¹Political economy is the branch of social science that deals with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services and their management.

¹²Increased coalition troop presence can result in fewer attacks in a given area. Coalition force levels have remained relatively static since the start of the war (exceptions include reduction in force in the north after departure of 101st Airborne in 2004 and overall steady decline in British forces in the south. US forces were increased for election security and marginally to address sectarian violence Baghdad). Therefore, levels of violence will be assessed primarily at the national level since the democracy indicators are national in nature. US troops were often moved from place to place to address increases in violence in other parts of the country so their relative movements can tell us something about the connection between security and the effectiveness of democracy in the overall stabilization of Iraq.

on 28 June 2004, (2) Iraqi National Conference selection of acting national assembly on 18 August 2004, (3) transitional government elections on January 2005, (4) Constitutional Referendum on October 15, 2005, (5) National Assembly elections on December 15, 2005, and (6) the elected assembly seated in Parliament as of May 20, 2006 which officially ended the transitional government (see figure 2).

The independent variable of the study is democracy, as characterized by the DoD indicators above, and the dependent variable is stability. Stability will be examined primarily in terms of security as it relates to levels of non-criminal violence in the country. So relevant indicators include violence against Iraqi and coalition security forces as well as sectarian violence. Attacks against critical infrastructure are also examined since these are assumed to be attempts to destabilize the Iraqi government. Using the indicators listed above, the study will examine relative levels of violence over these event periods and, in particular, towards whom the violence has been directed. Examples include sectarian violence among different ethnic and religious sects plus coalition and Iraqi security forces. As we progress sequentially to each democratic indicator, we should expect to see reduced amounts of sectarian violence, as well as fewer attacks against coalition forces and the eventual isolation of violence to that is normally characterized by extremist groups. This is based on the US assertion that democracy will isolate terrorist elements from the general population.¹³ The distinction is that the terrorist is assumed to be ideologically immovable and will continue attacks until killed whereas the insurgent is willing to accept some form of accommodation. Additional indicators include the prevalence of internally displaced persons and refugees living outside the country. In addition, the relative

¹³Todd Bullock, "Democratic Institutions Key to Stable Iraq, U.S. Officials Say," *US Mission to NATO (State Dept)*, January 20, 2006. US policy statements suggest that terrorist elements in Iraq are equated with extremists who are not reconcilable (Al Qaeda in Iraq the most obvious example). While some insurgent groups may employ terrorist acts they are not necessarily seen as extremists and are considered reconcilable (e.g., former Baathists hoping to return to power).

distribution of government and security force jobs in relation to population group ratios is an indicator of economic pluralism.

Due to the fact that the Iraq War is still ongoing and not yet completed history, the study suffers from a lack of comprehensive data with which to adequately quantify the varying aspects of security in Iraq. For example, while some data exists to distinguish between sectarian and non-sectarian attacks, the final figures are subjective and it is not feasible to disaggregate the original data from these figures. In these cases, violence figures are often only identified as attacks against civilians in general.

The study primarily relied on numerical data from two sources. The first source is a quarterly report sent to Congress from the Department of Defense that began in July of 2005. The second source of data is the Iraq Weekly Status Report published by the Department of State that started the same time. As a result, qualitative analysis was used almost exclusively during and prior to the elections of January 2005. As more systemic and concurrent data on Iraqi security and stability became available in mid-2005 more data analysis was conducted. However, qualified analysis was still the predominant method for the study.

FROM TOPPLED REGIME TO THE JANUARY 2005 ELECTIONS

This portion of the study will use time-phased analysis starting in southern Iraq from early 2003, followed by northern Iraq starting in the same time frame, and then the Baghdad region by January 2005. The purpose is to determine if the development of democracy led to the stabilization of these areas, destabilized them or had no appreciable effect. Comprehensive data on the state of stability in Iraq prior to July 2005 is marginal at best and is primarily confined to either numbers of attacks per week throughout the country or by Iraqi province. Focusing on the security aspect of stability, the data are normally confined to three categories: (a) attacks against coalition forces, (b) against Iraqi security forces, and (c) against Iraqi civilians in general. The

provinces with the least amount of attacks have historically been those in southern Iraq followed by northern Iraq.¹⁴ However, one of the limitations with the data is that it tells us who is being attacked but not who is doing the attacking. The study's mainly qualitative analysis will first examine the south of Iraq, administered chiefly by the UK, followed by northern Iraq where then-Major General David Petraeus was initially in charge as the commander of the primary unit there, the 101st Airborne Division. Lastly, the study examines the series of Shiite uprisings led by Moqtada al-Sadr and the affect of democracy on Sadr's movement.

The UK in southern Iraq

Southern Iraq has a predominantly Shiite population and has not suffered from the sectarian divisions that have affected other parts of Iraq where different sects live amongst on another. Throughout the rest of the country, attacks on coalition forces still occur but ethno-sectarian tensions form the basis for violence against Iraqis.¹⁵ So has violence been lower in southern Iraq simply because it is mostly composed of Shiites, who form the majority of Iraqis overall, or has democracy played a role in maintaining relative stability with respect to security in the south?

Unfortunately, quantitative and even qualitative data are more rare for southern Iraq since its relatively low-level of violence has not garnered the same attention as that of the Sunni concentrated areas. The consideration of the Shiite south serves as a useful control group for this study since this region contains a large, mostly homogenous portion of the total Iraqi population where sectarian violence is therefore essentially absent. In an interview with British Army Major Neal Croft, who was stationed in Iraq from March to September 2004, Croft said that the greatest portion of the violence in southern Iraq was generated by tensions between rival Shiite factions.

¹⁴Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006).

¹⁵Ibid.

Other violent attacks were likely conducted by a combination of criminals, possibly Iranian-inspired groups, and lastly a diminishing number of former regime loyalists.¹⁶ Having established Shiite factional fighting as the main source of instability, this study then looked at British efforts at democratization to determine if this had a causal effect on stability as it relates to the level of non-criminal attacks in southern Iraq.

In May of 2003, British forces prepared for local elections starting in the city of Umm Qasr intending to use ration cards as a means of determining eligible voters. In the spirit of republicanism, the UK forces endorsed local political leadership to begin the task of building a representative government in the form of a Basra provincial council.¹⁷ However, Ambassador Bremer barred all commanders from holding local elections for fear that undesirable elements might come to power and because he had insisted to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that Iraq was not ready to hold elections at least until the summer of 2004.¹⁸ While Sistani reluctantly agreed to delay elections, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) decision to do this caused general ill will toward the coalition, particularly among the Shiite population who had the most to gain from open elections. As examined later in this section, Moqtada al-Sadr would take advantage of this grievance later in 2004 as one means of building support for his faction.

Examining security levels in Basra province, the number of daily attacks remained relatively steady at between 5 to 10 attacks per day from the summer of 2003 through the elections of January 2005. There was a slight increase in violence during the Sadr-inspired

¹⁶Neal Croft, "Discussion of Insurgent Forces in South-East Iraq," Personal Communication with MAJ Neal Croft, Royal Army (2007), 2. This last group found support among a Sunni area located near the Kuwaiti border that has experienced a reduction in total population thereby further eroding its base of support.

¹⁷Refer to study's literature review on Michael Barnett's idea of a republican peace.

¹⁸Larry Jay Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 2005), 45. Al-Sistani is Iraq's most revered Shiite religious leader who also wields significant political influence in Iraq as the broker of the Shiite political unity list. Bremer's rationale for delaying elections was to build time for more moderate, secular groups to organize and gain constituents. Unfortunately, many of these groups lacked legitimacy with the majority of Iraqis since they were often led by former exiles or were seen as puppets of the US.

uprisings of April and August however, the number of attacks returned to average levels afterwards. After the elections the level of violence continued to decline further in Basra.¹⁹ Maintaining the assumption that competition between Shiite factions is the major source of violence, this lends further evidence that the January elections and further power sharing agreements between the Shiite parties mollified the overall generators of violence in the Basra region. In fact, Iraqi open electoral processes would have similar effects on other Shiite areas in Iraq as well. This is explored later in this study.

The Basra provincial council, established by the UK, provided an initial framework for power sharing between the local political groups. One of the power sharing agreements that reduced violence between the competing Shiite factions was the control and distribution of oil and the profits it generates. With the largest oil fields in the Shiite areas in the south, as well as quick access to the shipment ports near Basra, Iraq's greatest source of oil wealth could be easily administrated to appease each group. The ratification of the Iraqi constitution in late 2005 permitted oil revenues to be distributed first within the region from which the oil was pumped. Thus economic pluralism in the Shiite factions helped to further alleviate tensions among them. This occurrence was also due to another feature of Iraq's democracy known as federalism.²⁰

The enshrinement of federalism within the Iraqi Constitution contributed significantly to the process of stabilization in southern Iraq as the Shiite factions realized greater control over the area and in particular its vast oil wealth. With the right of primary control over the oil fields, both legal and sometimes illicit, the Shiites in the south have retained significant power and influence within the central government and in their dominant region in the south. Therefore federalism and electoral democracy have consolidated Shiite power in southern Iraq but most importantly it

¹⁹Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress."

²⁰The Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq is the primary example of more formalized federalism in Iraq while the Shiite south is more a loose association of cities and provinces with de facto control over the local resources.

has distributed power among the Shiite factions to the point where only a low level of violence occurs. However this development in the south, and similar developments in the Kurdish north, has had nearly the opposite effect in the largely Sunnis areas of Iraq. The effect of the consolidation of Shiite and Kurdish power on the Sunnis in northern Iraq is examined in the following section.

Petraeus, Nineveh Province, and the Sunni Elites

The following sub-section examines how then-Major General David Petraeus, the commander of the 101st Airborne Division, governed Nineveh province from May 2003 to his departure in February 2004 and why the environment changed in the months after his unit left.²¹ His area of operations contained an extremely diverse population but was relatively quiet during the division's tenure there. Therefore, why was it fairly stable at that time and why did it become increasingly unstable after Petraeus left?

From the fall of Baghdad in April of 2003 to June 28, 2004, the United States served as the provisional government of Iraq. Centralized control arguably did not take place until Ambassador Bremer assumed the reins of the Coalition Provisional Authority on May 6, 2003. Prior to Bremer's assumption of control, the local administration of the country largely fell to the various coalition division and brigade commanders on the ground. Many of these officers wanted to conduct local elections as soon as possible in order to transfer power back to the Iraqis. The US commander in Najaf saw elections as an implied task with the President's stated goal of making Iraq into a democracy.²² Bremer put these elections on hold but Petraeus' unit was given an exemption. The reasons for this decision are explained below in addition to how both local and national elections are key indicators in measuring stability in Iraq.

²¹Petraeus was appointed commanding general of all multinational forces in Iraq in February 2007.

²²Larry Jay Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 2005), 45.

Northern Iraq is home to a large Kurdish population, primarily situated to the north and east of Petraeus' initial area of operation, where the Kurds actively supported and collaborated with US efforts to topple the Saddam regime.²³ A large Sunni Arab minority, which generally benefited from Saddam's regime, also populates the north of Iraq. The fact that Sunnis have been a majority in Nineveh province was partly due to Saddam's Arabization program to move more Arabs into the area in the 1980s. Additional ethnic and religious groups in northern Iraq also include Christian Assyrians, Shiite Arabs, and Turkmen.

Petraeus saw the electoral process as a means of building a legitimate government to replace the old totalitarian regime. He was the only commander able to secure an exception from Bremer to conduct "selective" elections for his assigned area of Mosul and the surrounding province. In reality, Petraeus was essentially complete with the first round for a provincial council election when Bremer arrived in country. Several other elections took place in Mosul and the surrounding towns through July resulting in the selection of mayors and other local government officials.²⁴

Petraeus practiced what he referred to as "selective democracy." Recognizing that elections open to the entire region's electorate were potentially divisive to Nineveh's diverse and divided population, Petraeus developed a system where each ethnic and religious group was represented in a 24-member provincial council. He selected candidates from the groups in relative terms to their population size but not in an overly mathematical way. By developing caucuses among a group of 250 delegates, each faction was allowed to vote for their own representative on the council. What was most important about this initiative was that Petraeus

²³The 101st Division would later accept responsibility for the majority Kurdish areas as well.

²⁴Kirsten Lundberg, "The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq," *Kennedy School of Government Case Program* Harvard University, no. C15-06-1834.1 (2006), 16.

was able to get all of the parties to agree to this form of representation.²⁵ This appears to have been a major contributor to a relatively low level of violence in the Mosul area. In an area with Sunni Arab, Shiite Arab, Kurdish, Christian, Turkmen, and Yazidi communities, the 101st Division's area of responsibility was among the safest in the country until the unit left Iraq in February 2004. While stopping short of full electoral democracy, Petraeus' approach that emphasized deliberation and representation greatly mollified potential political grievances.²⁶

Petraeus' most controversial decision was to reintegrate former Baathist members of the Saddam government while ensuring that they renounced their former allegiances to the old regime. Realizing that government jobs were the major source of employment in the country, he not only allowed vetted former Baathists to participate in the provincial council but Petraeus also established a veterans employment center to find jobs for the thousands of now unemployed Iraqi soldiers. This initiative became increasingly important after Ambassador Bremer's decision to completely disband the Iraqi Army on May 23, 2003.²⁷ The latter choice was to lay the seeds for wider Sunni rejection of the evolving plan for the new government of Iraq by mid-2004.

The Sunni elites were essentially disaffected as a group with the orders to disband the army, implementation of widespread de-Baathification, and shuttering of many state-owned enterprises. Since the two main centers of power in Iraq were the army and the state bureaucracy, these decisions ensured that the Sunnis were not only eliminated from political power but also from economic wellbeing as other options for employment and sustainment were almost non-existent at the time. This was particularly evident in the case of de-Baathification, a program that was run by Ahmed Chalabi who was even chastised once by Bremer for pursuing the policy too forcefully. Bremer officially placed the Iraqi Governing Council in charge of the purge program

²⁵Ibid., 14.

²⁶Deliberation and representation are elements of republicanism as cited by Michael Barnett.

²⁷Ibid., 36.

in November 2003. This date coincided with a spike in violence within the 101st Airborne Division's area of responsibility. Petraeus noted that as these decisions were made in the opening phases of the provisional Iraqi government that his efforts in the north became increasingly discredited as the former Sunni elites saw that reconciliation with a rising Shiite-majority government was not forthcoming.²⁸

On June 28, 2004, the same day that sovereignty was passed to an interim Iraqi government, the Sunni governor of Nineveh province was assassinated. While it is unknown exactly who killed him and for what motivation, the effect of the assassination was to polarize sectarian tensions within the provincial council. In the unruly process of picking a successor for the former governor, almost all of the Sunni members of the council quit in protest. This left the council without adequate representation for the Sunni-majority province of Nineveh.²⁹ This action had the larger effect of moving the Sunnis, as a sect, into the insurgent camp or at the very least obtaining tacit support for their actions as Sunnis resorted increasingly to violence in response to their loss of power and influence.

Sadr, the Sunnis, and Elections

Moqtada al-Sadr, a rival to fellow Shiite cleric al-Sistani and leader of his own militia force, staged two major uprisings against the coalition and interim Iraqi government in April and August of 2004. It was not until early October 2004 when Sadr's so-called Mahdi Army finally ceased organized attacks, in particular in his stronghold at Sadr City in eastern Baghdad. The purpose of this section is to examine what effect the January 2005 elections had on Sadr's use of

²⁸Ibid., 39.

²⁹Senate Armed Services Committee, *Advance Policy Questions for Lt. Gen David Petraeus: Nominee to be Appointed General and Commanding Officer of Multi-National Forces, Iraq*. January 23, 2007. After the December 2005 governate elections, there were only 2 Sunnis on the 41-member provincial council for Nineveh.

violence to include the nature of the elections themselves, and why the Sunni population mostly boycotted them.

Sadr was able to use the visible presence of coalition forces and the existence of the CPA as tangible evidence of a foreign occupation that did not intend to give power to its people.³⁰ In one of al-Sadr's revolts, he took advantage of the CPA's decision to use coalition appointees for a new Baghdad city council. Sadr organized a large rally with supporters who carried signs specifically protesting this move and the lack of fair representation it created.³¹ So the Mahdi militia was partially motivated, at least by pretense, by the perception that their local government would be composed of American marionettes. Sadr took advantage of a perceived deliberate delay in elections by the CPA and interim Iraqi government to galvanize support for his violent move for power.³²

After each major uprising Sadr was able to go free and maintain his militia albeit in a grossly reduced manner after suffering major casualties. However, other than the promise not to seize or kill Sadr he gained very little from these confrontations other than some measure of respect from many Iraqis that found common cause with his struggle against the "occupier."³³ He did not gain any additional political power as a result of his efforts and the sacrifices of his followers. However, Sadr's violent bid for power did finally payoff when Sistani brokered a cease-fire and a political rapprochement that allowed Sadr to join the political process while keeping his militia.

³⁰Major Sadr uprisings occurred in April and August of 2004 primarily in the Najaf area, Sadr City in eastern Baghdad, and to a lesser extent in the Basra region.

³¹David L. Phillips, *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco*, (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 2005), 171.

³²Sistani had insisted on early elections but the CPA was able to gain his assent to a delay to meet Bremer's centralized national elections. Sadr took advantage of the Shiite discontent over this issue.

³³Interestingly, Sunnis engaged in their own uprising in Fallujah in late 2004 and sent Sadr a message of moral support to which he reciprocated.

In October 2004, Sadr agreed to the final armistice that allowed his faction to participate in the January 2005 elections while Sadr himself was not allowed participate. Realizing he could now assert real political power, Sadr was motivated to finally assent to diplomatic resolution of his goals versus violence. The agreement also allowed for the start of the economic revitalization of Sadr City and other areas dominated by Sadr's forces.³⁴ He also realized that he could establish a new patronage network within the Iraqi government itself without decisive US intervention since the US had already transferred sovereignty to an Iraqi government. In fact, when appointed later, his supporters backed the new Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki whose government approved the Sadrist control of the Iraqi Health Ministry. This move solidified both political and economic power for Sadr and his supporters. Violence was no longer necessary since it had essentially won him some measure of the political power that he had sought albeit at great cost to his militia members.

Statistics published as part of an article in the Army's professional journal claimed a causal linkage between jobs programs and the reduction of violence, within acceptable criminal levels, in Sadr City starting October of 2004 (see figure 1). The argument was that earlier cease fires with Sadr's forces were transitory because the residents of Sadr city saw no compelling reason to completely stop the attacks since their quality of life had not improved. While there is certainly some evidence that greater economic opportunity pulled many insurgents off the streets there are greater indications that the reduction in violence was achieved as a result of the cease-fire terms and the impending elections that brought Sadr political and economic power.

³⁴"Militia to Disarm in Sadr City Peace Deal: Plan could End Weeks of Insurgent Battles," [cited 2006]. Available from <http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=CNN.com+Militia+to+disarm+in+Sadr+City+peace+deal++Oct+9%2C+2004&expire=1&urlID=11901135&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2004%2FWORLD%2Fmeast%2F10%2F09%2Firaq.main%2Findex.html>.

Therefore, the violence likely stopped because Sadr ordered a cessation to the fighting and not because the work projects divided the locals' allegiance from Sadr.

The elections in Iraq have also been described as analogous to the 'decisive point' in conventional combat operations. There is a potential link between a decline in the insurgency and terrorist threat to the conduct of elections exploited by the infusion of economic programs such as mass public works projects.³⁵ While there is evidence that the January 2005 elections contributed to stability in largely Shiite areas of Iraq, there are also indications that the elections further divided the Sunni and Shiite communities.

The general election on January 30, 2005 was the most important indicator acknowledged in the development of an Iraqi democracy. Unfortunately, the clearest measure of a deficiency in the election was the sectarian evolution of the political parties. As a result, the voting itself was also characterized by sectarianism among the three main sects of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. This identity characterization even affected smaller groups such as Assyrians and Turkmen. The CPA and some of the expatriate Iraqis made efforts to create non-sectarian parties; however, these parties only gained a small share of the final vote.³⁶

In advancing the idea and mechanics of democratic government itself, US military units undertook extensive democracy training projects at the local level but were eventually eliminated. The 1st Cavalry Division conducted democracy classes in Baghdad from their arrival in March 2004 until the CPA made the decision to stop military involvement in such training by August of 2004. As a result, the governance area of focus in counterinsurgency for the division had little remaining emphasis. The stated reason for the decision was that the military should not be

³⁵Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (07 2005): 4-17. The focus of the article was on the Shiite district of Sadr City.

³⁶The sectarian nature of Iraqi politics has persisted to the present time. Sistani recently rebuffed US attempts to gain his approval for a new cross-sectarian political alliance. He continued to refuse any political moves that appear to dilute Shiite unity.

involved in areas of civilian governance.³⁷ This became the purview of the CPA and the civilian administrators alone. Regardless of the motivation for ceasing military involvement in democracy training, the unintended effect was to create a top-down effort in the development of democracy in Iraq rather than from the bottom-up. With reduced involvement at the local level, many Iraqis reverted to traditional forms of governance that included tribal leaders and clerics. This further eroded what power sharing mechanisms could have been created at the local level and thereby potentially have contributed to the means of stabilization.³⁸

During the preparations for the January 2005 elections, the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES) was selected to help manage them. This is a non-profit group that had extensive experience holding elections under UN auspices in other parts of the world. The foundation decided to construct an election regime where there was only one district for the whole country so that seats would then be allocated to each party based on proportional representation no matter where they voted.³⁹ The positive aspect of this approach was that it had the greatest potential for ensuring that all political groups had an opportunity to be allocated a seat in the assembly. In other words, if someone wanted to establish a party espousing one particular agenda they could then reach anyone else in the country that shared these views. IFES thought this system would also help ameliorate potential sectarianism. It was surmised that single districting would force cross-sectarian political connections as different groups vied for allies in the power sharing negotiations that occur in parliamentary systems.⁴⁰ However, this did not happen and resulted mostly in Shiites and Kurds negotiating for relative power while the Sunnis were largely left out. Starting with a proportional representation at the national level only seemed

³⁷David Chiarenza, "Conduct of Iraqi Elections: January 2005," Operations of 1st Cavalry Division in Southern Baghdad, Personal Discussion with MAJ Chiarenza (2007), 2.

³⁸Larry Diamond, "Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned," *Current History* 105, no. 687 (Jan 2006), 34.

³⁹Iraqis living outside the country were allowed to vote in selected locations.

⁴⁰Mark E. Black, "Planning for Iraqi Elections: Jan-Oct 2004," Discussion of Perceived Impact of Elections on Stability in Iraq with MAJ Black, Civil-Military Operations Officer (2007), 2.

to intensify sectarianism while marginalizing political diversity at the local level. In other words, by making the vote at the national level first the average voter is more likely to pick a party that simply represents his basic identity. Conversely, beginning with a local election allows voters the opportunity for direct interaction with candidates who can potentially represent their interests regardless of sect.⁴¹

Provincial elections were held in conjunction with the interim assembly vote in January 2005. These elections, coupled with many Sunni parties' decision to boycott the election, resulted in some parts of Iraq being represented by individuals that did not reflect the majority of the population in a particular area. For example, the Diyala province, which is mostly Sunni, received nearly all Shiite representatives in the provincial council and a Shiite governor, thus antagonizing the Sunni population.⁴² This is another example of how voting at the national and provincial levels first galvanized sectarianism at the local levels.

Local elections conducted nationwide were also rejected as an option since this would overwhelm the available coalition and Iraqi security forces. Sequential local elections across the country were also considered but deemed infeasible since it was thought that insurgents could then mass against each locality as voters went to the polls.⁴³ So the method of voting in Iraq in 2005 was driven not only by the perceived superiority of the national, single-district system but also by the inability to secure local elections throughout the country. This evidence gives further credence to the idea that security is a precondition for developing governance so that local elections can begin first, followed later by provincial and then national level elections.

Carothers and Ottoway find that early elections in post-conflict situations often lead to the empowerment of extremists and sectarian divisions as citizens return to familial or

⁴¹Diamond, "Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned," 37.

⁴²Multi-National Force Iraq, "Media Roundtable," (2006), 3.

⁴³Black, "Planning for Iraqi Elections: Jan-Oct 2004," 1.

confessional groups for greater security.⁴⁴ There is also evidence to suggest that Ambassador Bremer was ambivalent about early elections for precisely this reason. The price in patience and concession making with Iraqi political stakeholders was largely paid for naught as the security situation became worse over time.

Major David Chiarenza, who served as the election officer in southern Baghdad noted that there were large-scale attacks against polling stations on election day and that, in the aftermath, prepared assault positions were found in exclusively Sunni-majority neighborhoods.⁴⁵ The data shows that, in the month prior to the elections, levels of violence were at about 2,000 attacks for the month. During January, violence spiked at around 2,900 attacks. From February to May of 2005 the number of average attacks returned to levels similar to December 2004 but then steadily increased in all categories afterward (see figures 3 & 4).

The major Sunni political parties decided to boycott the January 2005 elections in large part due to their fear of a Shiite and Kurdish ‘tyranny of the majority’ that would seek vengeance against them for Saddam’s Sunni favoritism and deprive the Sunnis of any future political and economic power. Sunni insurgent groups deliberately targeted voters and hoped to de-legitimize the interim government in the process. It has been estimated that Sunnis make up about 20 percent of the Iraqi population, however, only about 5 percent of the eligible electorate voted for Sunni parties. In the Sunni dominated Anbar province only about 2 percent of those eligible actually voted.⁴⁶

In sum, the Shiite uprisings led by Moqtada al-Sadr were eventually quelled by the promise of increasing Shiite power enabled by the looming national elections of January 2005. The Shiite leadership vigorously pressed open electoral democracy as it was imbued with

⁴⁴Laura Secor, "Ballot Insecurity," *The American Prospect* 15, no. 7 (Jul 2004), 11.

⁴⁵Chiarenza, "Conduct of Iraqi Elections: January 2005," 1.

⁴⁶Larry Jay Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 2005), 325.

international and national legitimacy and benefited the greater numbers enjoyed by the Shiite population. By contrast, the elections and the method of voting selected by IFES directly alienated the Sunni political parties and led them to boycott the election which fractured the democratic process and stoked the Sunni insurgency. Alternatively, the elections mollified the Shiite variant as they saw it as the means of assuming power.

POST JANUARY 2005 ELECTIONS TO DECEMBER 2006

The previous section of this study focused on specific events and areas of Iraq over time. This section is more general, seeks patterns nationally on security and stability while focusing on Sunni areas of Iraq due to the preponderance of violence in these areas that includes Shiite vs. Sunni sectarian conflict. Having completed a primarily qualitative analysis of democracy's impact on stability in Iraq thus far, the availability of numerical data from the DoD, DoS, and GOA starting in mid-2005 permitted more quantitative research. With the exception of the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis in mid-2004, the January 2005 election was the first significant democratic event highlighted by DoD measures of stability and security.⁴⁷ Therefore the state of stability in Iraq after the elections should provide the most useful information with which to judge democracy's impact since it includes major, subsequent democratic events such as the constitutional referendum and national assembly elections.

Noted previously, al-Sadr led a series of uprisings against coalition forces starting in April of 2004 and ending in October of the same year. With the conclusion of the Sadr-inspired assaults late in 2004 and the initial consolidation of Shiite political power from the elections, we can infer that the violence afterwards was mostly attributable to Sunni insurgents and related terrorist elements. The other indicator that supports this inference is that the vast majority of

⁴⁷The GAO figures are amalgamations of DoD, DoS, and DIA numbers and are presented by individual months rather than compacted time periods as in the DoD reports (contrast figures 3 & 4).

attacks are directed against coalition forces with Iraqi security forces a distant second. Both of these groups are targets of the Sunnis because each is seen as a tool of their removal from power. After Sadr, the number of Shiites attacking coalition and Iraqi forces was quite small since coalition-engineered elections brought Shiites to power and Shiites were over-represented in the new security forces. The major exception is violence perpetrated by Shiite death squads against Sunni civilians.⁴⁸

In the two months after the January 2005 elections, the average number of total attacks somewhat decreased overall in the country. The number of attacks against civilians remained relatively constant in the 6-month period after spiking in January. The spike may be attributable to the greater exposure of civilians to violence while they were in line waiting to vote, as discussed in the previous section. However, starting in March, the average number of total monthly attacks gradually increased through October of 2005 when it actually exceeded the peak levels reached during the January elections (see figure 4). Significantly, October was when the national referendum was held on the Iraqi constitution. Most Sunni politicians rejected the document and there is evidence that elements of the pending constitution contributed to destabilization.⁴⁹

The Sunnis vigorously opposed two critical aspects of the constitution. First, the document allowed the local regions that extracted the oil to collect sales revenues before the federal government. The Sunni areas of Iraq possessed less than 20 percent of the country's proven oil reserves and almost none of its current operating capacity. Second, the proposed constitution permitted provinces to form regional governments. This was a compromise measure

⁴⁸Shiite so-called 'death squads' began operating in 2005, particularly as the first Shiite Minister of the Interior tacitly supported many such groups. The squads became more prominent after the February 2006 bombing of the mosque in Samarra, sacred to Shiites, as the larger Shiite population became more supportive of the militias for either real or perceived local security necessity.

⁴⁹"Iraqi Sunni Leader Rejects 'Rigged' Referendum Results," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile* (Oct 26 2005), 1.

to the Kurds who wanted to maintain a similar level of autonomy to that which they had prior to the fall of Saddam. In fact, the latter measure was also opposed by the Shiites who saw this as a threat to their newfound majority but was later supported by some Shiite parties who saw the benefit of a region in southern Iraq similar to that of the Kurdish area.⁵⁰ Both of these developments alarmed the Sunnis who saw this as a potential encirclement of the Sunni areas of Iraq by two “petrol-states” on either side with a majority Shiite and Kurdish national government. There was a clause in the referendum that would have defeated the constitution as written if at least three provinces voted against it by a two-thirds margin. However, just two weeks before the referendum, the Kurds and Shiites in government changed the law to require a two-thirds vote of all registered voters to reject rather than just two-thirds of the actual votes. Sunnis, even backed by the UN representative, opposed this because security concerns in Sunni areas meant that they would not be able to deliver all registered Sunnis to the polls.⁵¹ In fact, their fears were justified because they were not able to get the required votes in three provinces so the referendum was passed which only further embittered the Sunnis. The similar spike for attacks in October as compared with January 2005 adds evidence to this assertion (see figure 4). The October constitutional referendum was quickly followed by the December 2005 election that coincided with a similar spike in total attacks after a slight drop in November.

The purpose of the election of December 2005 was to elect a new assembly under the Iraqi constitution as validated in the October referendum. In contrast to the January 2005 elections, the Sunnis voted en masse, apparently rejecting the previous boycott as Sunni political and religious leaders encouraged voting. Why the change? One of the key reforms in the December 2005 election regime was the replacement of the single-district scheme in lieu of a

⁵⁰The Fadhila party, a group associated with Sadr, was the most prominent supporter of this measure. SCIRI, backed by Iran, also supported it.

⁵¹Anonymous, "UN Condemns Iraq Charter Change," *BBC News*, October 4, 2005.

provincial system that ensured a minimum number of national assembly seats for each province. The previous system allowed Shiites even more advantage with their greater numbers throughout the country while marginalizing Sunni majorities within certain provinces. This small but important change was key to securing Sunni confidence to vote and to prevent the retrenchment of the results in the elections from January.⁵² Many initial assessments called the newfound Sunni participation as evidence of growing security, as this would separate the Sunni-based insurgency from the populace and therefore their base of support. However, DoD statistics showed no decline in the levels of attacks against Iraqis and coalition forces through 2006 (see figure 3).

The vast majority of violence was still centered in the areas where the majority of Sunnis reside. Therefore, with the amelioration of the Sadr-inspired Shiite uprisings and the coalition seizure of Fallujah by the end of 2004, there was still a gradual and sustained increase in violence through 2005 and into 2006. This appears to indicate a polarization of the Sunni population as the elections and constitution were seen as evidence of a continued Shiite consolidation of power along with similar moves in the north under the Kurdish regional government.

The growing intensity of the insurgency in the Sunni areas after the December 2005 elections has been attributed to a possible strategy of “talk and fight.” So while it benefits some Sunni insurgents to destabilize the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government through force, others were able to use the accumulation of Assembly representation to advance their agendas politically and to acquire at least limited forms of influence and wealth.⁵³ Members of the National Assembly are well paid and likely support a large portion of their extended families in Iraq where

⁵²Larry Jay Diamond, "Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned," 34. However, the provincial election results of January 2005 remained unchanged. The Iraqi government has yet to announce a date for new provincial elections.

⁵³Andrew F. Krepinevich and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *The War in Iraq: An Interim Assessment*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2005), 136. Figures for unemployment among individual sects were not available.

unemployment is currently estimated at 48 percent by UN figures. So, with Iraq still heavily dependent on oil revenues and government positions for permanent employment there may also be an insurgent strategy to “regain some wealth and political influence, plus fight.” Individual representatives, to include Sunni and Shiite, have been known to direct or modify actions by Iraqi security forces.⁵⁴ While it is unknown as to the level of coordination between Sunni members of the assembly and the insurgents themselves, the evidence suggests they moved into the same camp as the conflict became more sectarian in nature starting at the end of 2005.⁵⁵ If Sunnis decided, in part, to join the political process to create their own measure of economic pluralism there was also some attempt by the Iraqi government to achieve the same effect through de-Baathification.

Efforts to scale back de-Baathification actually started just a few months after Ambassador Bremer initiated them in late May of 2003. General Petraeus and other officials had informed Bremer that the decision was potentially putting American lives at risk since the de-Baathification and disbandment of the Iraqi Army would undoubtedly anger those affected causing them to resort to violence. These efforts continued until the end of 2006 when Prime Minister Maliki made another offer to allow other former Baathists to return back to their same positions in the Iraqi civil services.

In analyzing the available DoD and GAO reports there is no discernable effect that de-Baathification reforms had on levels of security and stability in Iraq. The inability to find such evidence is reinforced by the fact that there is no known measure available that shows exactly how many former Baathists, in particular Sunni elites, have returned to their jobs either in the

⁵⁴Kirk Semple and Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi and Omar al-Neami contributed reporting from Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Dhuluiya, "Iraqi Demands a Pullback; U.S. Lifts Baghdad Cordon," *New York Times*, Nov 1 2006, p. A.1.

⁵⁵In December 2005, a Sunni member of the Assembly suggested that he had communicated with members of the insurgency and that they had agreed not to hinder the elections.

Iraqi Army or the civil bureaucracies. There are many Shiites and Kurds in the Iraqi government that still oppose reformation of the de-Baathification laws thereby possibly nullifying whatever pronouncements that the leadership has made.⁵⁶ The National Security Council briefing of January 2006 listed a previous assumption that a so-called national compact would be able to co-opt former Sunni elites that were cashiered. The new assumption cast doubt on whether a national compact could be achieved and put more emphasis on “piecemeal” reconciliation of former elites.⁵⁷ Therefore attempts by the Iraqi and US governments to achieve economic pluralism by reintegrating former elites have apparently not been successful on the whole. The reasons for this still are unclear; however, with security still at poor levels one can infer that a comprehensive compact will not occur until former elites feel that they can return to their former jobs in relative safety for themselves and their families.

The sectarian distribution in the Iraqi security forces is another indicator for democratic development because it shows how well economic pluralism is progressing in the country. Unfortunately, figures for sectarian affiliation in the Iraqi security forces are not available because it is not officially tracked. In fact, even asking such questions of Iraqis is considered offensive. As a result, the evidence for sectarian distribution is circumstantial at best. Currently, the Iraqi National Police force is thought to be over 90 percent Shiite.⁵⁸ Local Iraqi police forces are normally recruited from the areas in which they live so we can assume that they are relatively proportional to the various groups within the population. Distribution within the Iraqi Army itself is even more difficult to discern particularly with respect to relative numbers of mid-level officers, generals, and senior enlisted members of the service. A mostly Sunni officer class

⁵⁶Paul Richter, "The Conflict In Iraq: Split Over De-Baathification; Iraq's Delay On Reconciliation Frustrates U.S.; Shiites Block An Effort To Include Ex-Members Of Hussein's Party In Government Service.; Sunnis Would Benefit," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb 24 2007, p. A.1.

⁵⁷National Security Council, *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review* 2007, 11.

⁵⁸Edward Wong, "US Faces Latest Trouble with Iraqi Forces: Loyalty," *International Herald Tribune*, March 6, 2007.

dominated the old Iraqi army well beyond the estimated 20 percent of the general population that Sunnis are estimated to represent in Iraq. So even if the Iraqi Army now possesses a 20 percent share of the more senior ranks in the force, those who are unhappy with their former dominance could still affect security levels in Iraq. What would be more useful is any data that shows Sunnis with less than 20 percent of relative senior positions within the Army. While the circumstantial evidence available for the Shiite dominance of the national police might allow us to infer similar dominance by Kurds and Shiites in the Iraqi army there is no credible evidence for this. In other words, if the Sunnis have been given even less than their fair share of senior army positions then Sunni support for the insurgency could be less about misrepresentation and more about their perception of humiliation by the actions of the Shiites.⁵⁹

What is more telling in the near term about the Iraqi army is its ability to function despite sectarian tensions. There is cursory evidence that some officers have difficulty commanding members of their particular force that are not in their sect. However the army has not shown significant fragmentation or partisanship but the national police have.⁶⁰ In 2006, Shiite parties gained control of most of the Iraqi ministries and in many cases these ministries became strongholds of partisan actions. The first Shiite Iraqi interior minister supported, either directly or tacitly, the formation of revenge groups that conducted raids against Sunni neighborhoods. In fact, there is even evidence that actual members of the national police participated in such violent acts.⁶¹ Since that time, the new minister of interior has reportedly fired numerous members of the police and other interior ministry positions in an attempt to reduce sectarian loyalties amongst the

⁵⁹Richter, "The Conflict In Iraq: Split Over De-Baathification; Iraq's Delay On Reconciliation Frustrates U.S.; Shiites Block An Effort To Include Ex-Members Of Hussein's Party In Government Service.; Sunnis Would Benefit," A.1.

⁶⁰Peter Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 222. Peter Galbraith notes that in March 2006 the Ministry of Defense was obliged to warn Baghdad residents to beware police or army units (at least people appearing to be so) detaining people without apparent cause.

⁶¹Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War*: (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 473.

national police, which is an arm of interior ministry. Nevertheless sectarian loyalties remain a destabilizing problem in the Iraqi security forces and will likely remain so as long as there is disproportionate representation.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

On January 10, 2007, the White House released a summary of the New Way Forward strategy for Iraq. This strategy listed several suppositions that were used prior to the strategy change and the latest assumptions that replaced them. Among the prior suppositions was the idea that “political progress will help defuse the insurgency and dampen the violence.” The new replacement assumption cited security as a *pre-condition* for political and economic progress in Iraq.⁶² This is evidence that the findings of this study support the basis for the recent change in strategy. While a democratic Iraq might ultimately be achieved, basic security levels in public safety and economic fairness must be accomplished so that political reform can have the greatest chance for success. Care must be taken so political reforms do not, in and of themselves, create security problems in the post-conflict phase. A balance between the competing groups must be found up front.

In the earlier stages of the Iraq War the US tended to disregard the sectarian divisions within Iraq ostensibly for the reason that recognition of such splits would simply reinforce them. While recognizing that Saddam’s regime used poison gas against Kurds in the 1980s and repressed a Shiite-based rebellion in southern Iraq after the Persian Gulf War in 1991, these actions were not largely seen as evidence of ethnic or sectarian conflict. Rather Saddam and his inner circle were viewed as a cabal of parochial jailers that, once eliminated, would free a captive

⁶²National Security Council, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," 35.

Iraqi population.⁶³ One of the most visible symbols of this opinion was the creation of a deck of 55 cards representing the regime's most wanted that included Saddam as the ace of spades. The implication was that with the capture or death of this small group of super elites that Iraq could peacefully transition to a democracy in the mold of Romania after Ceausescu was overthrown in 1989. This characterization resulted in the application of a false societal construct onto Iraq after Saddam's defeat and created a liberation mindset rather than one focused on internal stability and state building.⁶⁴ Sectarianism was further amplified by the decisions to institute widespread de-Baathification, elimination of the old Iraqi Army, and the shuttering of many state-run businesses. The decisions were made without apparent consideration for the tribal and confessional connections of these institutions.

For the UK's efforts in southern Iraq, there is evidence to suggest that political and economic democracy has contributed to stability. Democratic gains have helped contain violent action between rival Shiite groups in the south. The UK shepherded a republican process by which new political centers were brought to power to achieve a relative equilibrium that helped to contain the propensity for violence.⁶⁵ This minimization of bloodshed in southern Iraq was aided by the fact that the former Sunni elites were essentially eliminated from power, which completely opened the opportunities for Shiites who had no power before. The caveat is that this may be a transitory situation as rival Shiite parties could vie for power later after deciding to settle in the interim. As long as Iraqi political parties retain personal armed wings outside the purview of official Iraqi security forces, the threat of continued instability exists.

⁶³Walter J. Boyne, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, what Went Wrong, and Why*, (New York: Forge, 2003), 304.

⁶⁴Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 151.

⁶⁵It is important to note that the British did not attempt to engineer political norms, thereby mostly avoiding the charges of meddling that the CPA suffered. The downside was that some secular groups, in particular those with former expatriate representation, faced intimidation by rival political groups with militias.

Sadr finally agreed to a more permanent cease-fire in October 2004 that significantly reduced attacks on coalition forces in many Shiite areas. Greater stability was owed to two critical factors. The first was al-Sadr's realization that the United States had finally agreed to open elections for January 2005, which would clearly favor the majority Shiite population of which he was a major religious and political figure. The second factor was that the Iraqi interim government agreed to co-opt al-Sadr into the political process which would give him significant influence in the Iraqi Assembly itself.⁶⁶ These factors, and the substantial losses to his militia by coalition forces, clearly gave al-Sadr more incentive to try electoral democracy rather than continue to assert his agenda through violence. In fact, the looming election was propitious timing that allowed Sadr the opportunity for both political and economic power of which he had little prior to the negotiated armistice.

General Petraeus' success in northern Iraq is firmly rooted in the ideals of republicanism. By attempting to reintegrate the former Sunni elites and usher in new roles for those previously left out, Petraeus created new governmental structures to which the local people agreed. He emphasized deliberation and carefully engineered "selective" elections that ensured representation while carefully balancing the different groups so that the process earned legitimacy. However, the Nineveh "republic" broke down when the former Sunni elites saw that the new central government would not have same approach as Petraeus. The Sunni provincial governor assassination brought the new republican experiment to an end.

Daniel Byman informs us that creating a democratic nation with strong ethnic and sectarian divisions is extremely complex. Since majority rule is one of the underpinnings of democracy, entrenched sectarian societies might ensure that minorities never achieve some

⁶⁶Sadler, "Militia to Disarm in Sadr City Peace Deal: Plan could End Weeks of Insurgent Battles," Within the Sistani-sanctioned Shiite United Iraqi Alliance political group, Sadrist are the second largest party.

measure of political majority.⁶⁷ Minority groups therefore have reason to fear a tyranny of the majority. US strategy often emphasizes that Iraq's constitution includes provisions for the protection of minority rights but, there are key elements of the constitution that provide evidence to the contrary for the Sunni population. The main issue is the stipulation for regional governments and its relation to the control of oil wealth. Since Sunni majority areas contain less than twenty percent of Iraq's proven oil reserves, and almost none of its developed reserves, the Sunnis see the constitution as a means not just of political isolation but also economic deprivation. The evidence for this assertion seems borne out in the steady rise in violence with the approval of the constitution in the referendum of October 2005 (see figure 4).

Federalism has been touted as a way to keep states together while simultaneously accounting for the rights of minorities. Conversely, ethno-federalism has also been shown to lead to majority bullying and minority marginalization in the larger governmental process.⁶⁸

Lebanon's power sharing system has been cited as just one example of the limitations of such an ethno-federal system. Benjamin Reilly also finds no example of a long-term democracy outside the developed world that has used proportional representation, as Iraq did in January 2005.⁶⁹ The implication seems to be that by dividing power among different sects proportionally, particularly when such groups are mixed, the elected officials feel obligated only to represent those of their sect. This phenomenon might be why Reilly also finds that single-member systems may have a greater chance of success in ethnically divided societies than do proportional representation.⁷⁰

Legitimate political economy is a "first-order" issue after conflict. The failure to fully understand how de-Baathification, dismissal of the Iraqi Army, and shuttering of state-owned

⁶⁷Daniel Byman, *Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 8.

⁶⁸Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 383.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 171.

⁷⁰The US uses a type of single-member electoral system.

businesses affected the Sunnis elites and their families led to the exacerbation of post-conflict tensions and gave motivation for the former elites to join the insurgency. Covey uses the metaphor of recognizing whose “ox will be gored” by the peace process.⁷¹ This was especially true for an Iraq that did not have a viable private sector into which former elites could move.

Since Iraq’s economy is based almost solely on oil revenues, the country’s political democracy and economic pluralism are intrinsically linked. So, any reduction in political representation and government positions for a given group means a proportional decrease in economic prosperity. There are very few options for non-governmental employment in Iraq and therefore, Sunni losses in political power have related effects on their economic power. In addition, Iraq’s tribal society reinforces this sectarian division by almost ensuring that wealth distributed initially within a given sect will mostly stay within it.⁷²

One of the stipulations of the New Way Forward plan articulated by President Bush was that the Iraqi Government would soon announce plans for local and provincial elections. As cited in this study’s research, local elections have been shown to help develop local leaders and build democratic values from the bottom up. Across most of Iraq, local and district councils were established by the CPA starting in mid-2003 in lieu of community elections. Diligent work by the CPA to ensure responsible representation in the district and provincial councils, albeit without elections, was seriously degraded by these groups’ lack of resources. Oftentimes even the council members worked without pay.⁷³ The apparent powerlessness of the councils, as well as their total dependence on the CPA, made them illegitimate in the eyes of many Iraqis and this contributed to

⁷¹Eds. Covey, J., Dziedzic, M., Hawley, L., *Quest for Viable Peace*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 57.

⁷²There are some tribes in Iraq that have Sunni and Shiite branches. However, this fact does not appear to have significantly affected the Sunni and Shiite divide in the country.

⁷³Francis Fukuyama, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 184.

the rise of sectarian-based centers of political power in the country. As of this writing, the Iraqi government had yet to announce plans for local and new provincial elections.

The democratic peace is an international relations theory and so not explicitly for application in regards to intrastate conflict. However, Iraq is a state that is composed of essentially three different “nations.” The Kurds and the Shiites accepted electoral democracy as implemented in the new Iraqi government, but the Sunnis have not accepted it and are apparently clinging to their autocratic past. At the same time, there is significant evidence that the Kurds and Sunnis made political decisions that deliberately undermined Sunni power in general and therefore convinced many Sunnis that sharing power within the new Iraqi government was not practicable. Insurgency became most Sunnis preferred course of action. In this context, Iraq’s internal warfare resembles Mansfield and Snyder’s critique of the democratic peace with nascent Shiite and Kurdish democracies at war with a fractured Sunni nation in Iraq. The failure to effectively manage the transition of democratic governance led to war.

In the final analysis, all three of the primary democratic events in Iraq led to increased violence and greater instability in Iraq. The two main elections in 2005 and the constitutional referendum resulted in greater attacks during the period of voting followed by gradual and sustained increases in attacks against US and Iraqi security forces as well as civilians. By the time the permanent national assembly was seated in May of 2006, the level of violence in Iraq was greater than it had ever been during the entire duration of the war. The study’s hypothesis is therefore disproved. The efforts to democratize Iraq from the national level resulted in greater instability and did not help stabilize the country.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Larry Diamond provides an important recommendation for building legitimacy through representative government: go local first. As explained previously, the first election system used

in Iraq was at the national level.⁷⁴ IFES was influenced in this decision partly by the military's estimate that polling stations for local elections could not be adequately protected. Securing local elections in a sequential basis was also rejected since this would take too long and it would make insurgent attacks easier as they concentrated on each local election, trying to de-legitimize them. However, one election official stated that it was not possible to secure every polling station but it was more important for Iraqis to have a sense that their elections were free and fair. This was termed "political security" as opposed to physical security, but this idea seemed to ignore the reasons for which Sunni groups planned to disrupt elections.⁷⁵ The fact that mostly Sunni political parties planned to boycott the January election was dismissed as part of 'freedom of expression' rather than addressing the source of the grievance in which the system that greatly favored the Shiite majority played a major part. The US should press the Iraqi government to immediately draw up plans for the execution of provincial council elections subsequently followed at the local level. The lopsided Shiite representation in the provincial councils must be corrected quickly in order to eliminate this Sunni insurgent political grievance.

The US Army's new doctrinal manual for defeating insurgent groups states that, "...Army counterinsurgency operations must address the legitimate *grievances* insurgents use to generate popular support (emphasis mine)."⁷⁶ Therefore while the Army's doctrinal lines of operation help form the basic approach to counterinsurgency, the latent or extant grievances of any insurgent group must be accounted for in the political transition plan. In his 1964 classic work on counterinsurgency, David Galula advocated local elections as a means of isolating

⁷⁴Diamond, "Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned," 34.

⁷⁵Secor, "Ballot Insecurity," 11.

⁷⁶*FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), 100. (see figure 5); The five primary 'logical lines of operation' provide a generic template for applying counterinsurgency strategy. However, the basic grievances that motivate insurgencies must not be overlooked. Pursuing elections in a linear fashion, as part of a 'governance LLO' may exacerbate problems rather than alleviate them.

insurgent factions from the ground up.⁷⁷ By empowering local leaders first, the town and provincial politicians can build a foundation of support that has a greater chance of creating cross-sectarian government and create more wide-ranging legitimacy. This has the greatest chance of ameliorating potential insurgencies by forcing disparate groups to work together at the grass roots level.

Former elites are normally the most important group to account for in regime transition. Not only can they become organizers of insurgency, but also proponents within the new government for belligerent policy against their neighbors. Therefore while reconciliation might be distasteful to those groups that suffered under the previous elites, some compromise must be made in distinguishing bona fide criminals from others that can be reintegrated into the society. South Africa stands out as a model example of how the former white-minority government was moved out of power in a comprehensive reconciliation plan, which resulted in relatively little bloodshed and no insurgency.⁷⁸ The US needs to move the Iraqis forward towards greater reconciliation that reintegrates former elites within the government bureaucracies, Iraqi security forces, and state-run organizations such as the oil ministry. Failure to do so will only perpetuate a major insurgent grievance.

The current US Army doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency does not view civil security as a pre-condition in order to progress across all 'lines of operation' to defeat an insurgency or, in post-conflict situations, the prevention of rebellion. The security of the population is listed as a combined task with "combat operations" and overall is on par with the additional efforts, which includes establishing governance (see figure 5). There is evidence to suggest that the initial troop levels selected for Iraq and Afghanistan were based on concerns

⁷⁷David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1964), 143.

⁷⁸Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (Dec 2002), 531.

about the security of US troops and the idea that a large foreign presence in these countries would be inherently counterproductive.⁷⁹ However, if this line of thinking predominates it will hamstring all further attempts to allocate the proper resources to secure the population and then build solid progress towards economic and political reform. Therefore security should serve as the foundation for each “line,” or focus of stability operations, to have the best chance for lasting success (see figure 6). While it is too late to correct the lack of troops in the initial invasion now, the enhancement of forces currently on the ground is critical for the security of the population. The political reforms recommended in this study have little chance of success without the level of security required to achieve them.

This study has shown how the rapid imposition of a liberal democracy can consolidate political stability within the majority group but also, at the same time, polarize minority groups and lead to civil conflict. Michael Barnett offers an alternative view from the dominant liberal democratic peace proposition. Barnett emphasizes the principles of deliberation, representation, and constitutionalism as part of a ‘republican peace’ that can help build state legitimacy. These approaches provide viable alternatives to efforts such as hurried, open elections that can cause renewed warfare in post-conflict situations.⁸⁰ A stable transitioning state in Iraq can be successfully achieved through a republican approach founded on human security combined with an emphasis on representative local governance, the reconciliation of former elites, and economic pluralism.

⁷⁹Fukuyama, "Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq," 148.

⁸⁰Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace Stabilizing States After Conflict," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 87-112.

APPENDIX




Figure 1 (from “The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review*, 2005)




Figure 1 (from Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, DOD, 2005)




Figure 2 (from Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, DoD, 2006)

Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners Compared with Progress in Developing Iraqi Security Forces




Figure 3 (from GAO: Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, January 2007)




Figure 4 (from US Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency)

Achieving & Maintaining a Stable State
Designing Counter-Insurgency




Figure 5 (Security as the Foundation for State Stability)

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