

Coalition Logistics: The Way to Win the Peace, The Way to Win the War

**A Monograph
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Abstract

COALITION LOGISTICS: THE WAY TO WIN THE PEACE, THE WAY TO WIN THE WAR
by MAJ Hollie J. Martin, US Army, 101 pages.

The need for security assistance through coalitions and logistics remains important for achieving success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and in the US Government's (USG's) promotion of democracy. Coalition or international logistics are even more important today than in the past.

Considering the constraints of the current, complex, adaptive, operational environment, coalition logistics allow the nation to maintain international involvement while bolstering cooperation with friends and allies. In order to maximize the benefits of international cooperation through military assistance programs, scholars, politicians, national and international leaders, military planners, and logisticians must continually assess foreign policy goals and devise long-range plans that integrate and leverage resources.

History reveals coalition logistics as a critical capability in securing peace and claiming victory. This study focuses on three stability and support operations that involved the US military and international partners: post-World War II Germany, Haiti, and East Timor.

Leaders who examine the shortfalls of US support capabilities, as evidenced by history, can determine how coalition logistics capabilities can lessen the burden of support. Focusing on security assistance, the work highlights the USG's practices for bolstering military capabilities of allies and provides insight for future developments. Further, this monograph highlights strategic and operational level implications for coalition logistics that apply to developing a concept of support, integrated planning, and today's security environment.

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INTRODUCTION

The need for security assistance through coalitions and logistics remains imperative for achieving success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and in the US Government's (USG) promotion of democracy. The current National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy demand US military engagement on the world stage with coalition partners.¹ Coalition or international logistics are even more important today than in the past due to the capabilities they bring when considering the resource requirements of the GWOT.

In balancing these global engagement requirements with limited personnel and equipment, international resources allow the nation to maintain international involvement in a constrained environment with limited personnel and resources while bolstering cooperation with friends and allies. Military assistance, as a part of security assistance to foreign governments, allows the USG to leverage the strategic link between coalition partners and logistics as it prosecutes the GWOT and attempts to prevent future conflict. In order to maximize the benefits of international cooperation through military assistance programs, scholars, politicians, national leaders, military professionals, and international leaders must continually assess foreign policy goals and devise plans that integrate and leverage the aspects of international logistics.

Joint Publication 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, defines logistics as “the process of planning and executing the projection, movement, and sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of operating forces in the execution of national security policy.”² Problematically, the doctrine offers no clear definition of coalition logistics. However,

¹The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 8-17, 35-42; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), iv, 6-8, 10-13, 14, 16, 23.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), v.

this policy defines host nation, allied, and coalition support as key elements of the logistic system. At best, the publication suggests that “multinational (allied and coalition) forces often require some support beyond their organic capabilities” and leaves allied and coalition support as careful considerations and competing demands for an operation.³ For the purposes of this monograph, coalition logistics “includes all forms of executed or planned collaborative support of military forces by allies.”⁴ In theory, multinational forces provide support for their own forces. However, in practice, this paradigm requires shared responsibility in conflict resolution through a multitude of security assistance venues and partnerships.

History reveals coalition logistics as a critical capability in securing peace and claiming victory. An examination of past coalition operations where the USG implemented security assistance demonstrates the important aspects of international logistics. This study focuses on stability and support operations that involved the US military and international partners.⁵ Specifically, this monograph examines past stability operations that involved types of security assistance in cooperation with USG agencies, international institutions, foreign governments, the US Army, and coalition partners.

An analysis of national and foreign policy themes from 1940 to present illustrates military assistance as a powerful tool within the scope of foreign assistance. In general, foreign

³Ibid.

⁴Wayne H. Gustafson and Richard Kaplan, *A Survey of Coalition Logistics Issues, Options, and Opportunities for Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), v.

⁵US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Appendix K, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations; available from http://www.sigir.mil/reports/QuarterlyReports/Jan06/pdf/App_K_-_January_2006.pdf; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007; and Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 1-2. Appendix K, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” Providing further detail, Field Manual 3-07, considers activities such as peace operations; foreign internal defense (to include counterinsurgency); security assistance; humanitarian and civic assistance; support to insurgencies; support to counter drug operations; combating terrorism; noncombatant evacuation operations; arms control; and show of force as types of stability operations.

assistance is composed of economic, humanitarian, and military programs that assist other countries and international organizations.⁶ Over the past decade, the USG embarked upon numerous stability and support activities in its pursuit of democratizing states. In his final NSS released in 1999, President Clinton emphasized the promotion of democracy and human rights around the globe as one of three goals for the nation.⁷ During the 2000 Presidential Campaign, then Governor George W. Bush rejected the Clinton administration's use of the military to promote democracy as "permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties."⁸ Yet, in practice stability and support operations such as security assistance and peace operations seem necessary to bolster the security capabilities of other nations that do not have the defense resource base required of today's security environment.

The events of 11 September 2001 clearly illustrated the need for stability and governance of weak and failing states. As a result, President Bush's 2002 NSS acknowledged the changes in the security environment and "reaffirmed the essential role of American military strength."⁹ Today, the US Army finds itself engaged in stability and support operations building the defense capabilities of Afghanistan and Iraq. US commitment to these operations and the GWOT remains paramount. Perhaps today, the potential value of foreign aid through security assistance is greater than ever.

In order to mitigate the effects of emerging global threats, a reexamination of the use of US military force for security assistance is required. Rather than relying heavily on the military

⁶James D. Blundell, Sandra J. Daugherty, and Lori J. Johnston, *Security Assistance: Adapting to the Post-Cold War Era* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, September 1996), 1.

⁷Lawrence J. Korb and Michael Kraig, *Strategies for US National Security: Winning the Peace in the 21st Century: A Task Force Report of the Strategies for US National Security Program* (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, October 2003), 2; available from <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/archive/SNS03.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 17 January 2007.

⁸Citadel News Service, George W. Bush: A Period of Consequences, 23 September 1999; available from <http://citadel.edu/pao/addresses/presbush.html>; Internet; accessed on 27 October 2006.

⁹The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 1.

instrument of power to influence conflict resolution, USG officials need to proactively engage traditional allies and invest resources to build the capacity of other potential allies. With the aim of full use of available capabilities, diplomatic, political, military, economic, and institutional officials require an understanding of the ways that the elements of national power can be used in combination with the use of military power to accomplish international objectives.

Security assistance, a broad term that encompasses American military assistance to foreign countries, plays a key role in supporting the NSS. Depending on the ends outlined in the NSS by the executive branch, the objectives pursued through security assistance span across diplomatic, economic, military, political, and information instruments of national power. Within this broad context, security assistance links strategic aims to foreign policy goals through international logistics.

Considered a tool of foreign policy and a part of the international relations between countries, coalition logistics bleeds across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of logistics. Just as the three levels of war are organized hierarchically--strategic, operational, and tactical--logistics is separated into three corresponding levels.¹⁰ Strategic logistics primarily deals with developing and preserving the national military or military related infrastructure to include technology, industry, inventory, storage, and transportation. In today's security environment, strategic logistics includes operational facets such as strategic mobility for power-projection platforms and coordination with the logistics systems of foreign forces.¹¹

Thus, strategic logistics involves international cooperation and is linked to the security assistance program. Strategic logistics requires the USG to coordinate the assistance of foreign governments to achieve strategic aims. Spanning across strategic, operational, and tactical

¹⁰Moshe Kress, *Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations* (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 17.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 21-24.

logistics, international logistics deals with “acquiring and transportation of weapons from the buyer to the seller, as well as subsequent supply, maintenance, and training support to keep the equipment operating.”¹² Today’s complex operational environment makes both the identification and coordination of logistics requirements more difficult than in the past. However, international logistics remain a vital tool in the USG’s implementation of the NSS.

From an operational perspective, the US Security Assistance Program gives the USG and international partners a variety of ways to achieve their security objectives. The components of the US Security Assistance Program include: the Military Assistance Program (MAP); the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET); Foreign Military Sales (FMS); Foreign Military Sales Financing; Commercial Sales; and the Economic Support Fund (ESF).¹³ Considering these types of stability operations, coalition partners allow the US military to augment capabilities while simultaneously strengthening international relations. Sharing the burden of logistical support strengthens global partnerships during conflict resolution and reinforces international cooperation.

By studying stability and support operations related to security assistance, scholars, politicians, international and national leaders may leverage the strategic link between the elements of national power and the field of international logistics. Further, the study of security assistance and its relationship to international logistics is relevant today considering international cooperation in the GWOT. This topic will remain important for the success of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the future. Finally, this study illustrates that coalition logistics, although difficult to manage, remain essential to achieving success in the long term implementation of foreign policy.

¹²Craig M. Brandt and Ernest R. Keucher, eds., *Military Assistance and Foreign Policy* (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Department of the Air Force, Air University, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1989), ix.

¹³*Ibid.*, 3-5.

This monograph examines the strategic link between the military instrument of national power and security assistance. History exposes the critical nature of coalition or multinational logistics; however, leaves a clear definition to the interpreter. Focusing on security assistance, the work highlights the USG's practices for bolstering military capabilities of allies and provides insight for future developments. Further, this study aims to highlight strategic and operational level implications for international logistics that apply to today's security environment.

POST WORLD WAR TWO GERMANY

US Foreign Policy towards Western Europe: NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, came into effect on 24 August 1949. This treaty made the United States an active participant in Western Europe's defense planning and programs. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) provided the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) material support to achieve effectiveness. In *Sinews of War*, James Huston described the success of NATO as "dependent on effective and immediate materiel assistance from the United States."¹⁴ In coordination with the national security goals and Germany's economic recovery, the USG saw the need to furnish arms to the nations of Western Europe.

Considering the impact of the Marshall Plan and its reliance on economic development, the logistics requirements for military assistance streamlined the stability efforts of the USG. Through a coordinated defense plan, the "Western Powers," using available means, were able to accomplish mutual defense through assistance and interaction between themselves.¹⁵ As a result of coordinated production and supply and standardization of equipment, the partners strengthened

¹⁴James A. Huston, *Army Historical Series: Sinews of War, 1775-1953* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 603.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

their collective military potential. Through military assistance, the United States expected reassurance from the alliance should assistance be necessary. The efforts of NATO included a coordinated effort in determining the security requirements of each country. Each country created a list of minimum deficiencies concerning each of its services. Then, a delegation of US observers to the Western European Union, known as the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), designated a dollar value for each priority.¹⁶

In Europe, the JAMAG played a crucial role in implementing the MAP. As the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) formed with its divisions, USG and military leaders recognized the shortfalls that existed between the logistics requirements and actual capabilities. Because the USG placed its initial focus on creating combat units, serious shortages of service troops and critical equipment necessary to support combat units existed. For this reason, international logistics considered each nation responsible for the logistical support of its own forces.¹⁷ This relationship still exists today, is a part of joint doctrine, and results in a lack of flexibility within the supply system. Albeit SHAPE offered recommendations for an improved over-all supply organization, no organization overcame the reality of shortages in operational reserve stocks. From an international logistics perspective, the shortfalls of supplies and equipment highlight the importance of the MAP and the FMS program in peace and war.

Integrated Multinational Planning and Operation Eclipse

Allied planning for stability and support operations in Germany began in March 1943. Despite the gap between a defined policy towards Germany and military objectives, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) to

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., 602-603.

draft contingency plans for a sudden German collapse or surrender. The directive resulted in Operation Rankin.¹⁸ Hence, planning for stability operations in Germany took shape well in advance to the war's end or the stabilization of Germany.

The German Country Unit (GCU), the principal postwar planning organization, was part of the G-5. In 1944, the GCU planned postwar operations as a multinational team. Comprised of 150 British and American officers, this team brought a combined perspective to postwar deliberations.¹⁹ At the national level, integrated or multi-agency planning was absent at the time. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing Germany at national, regional, and local levels. As an element of the staff, the GCU served as a component to train military government detachments for specific stability and support related tasks in an effort to prepare for Germany's postwar security environment. According to Harold Zink, the official historian for the U.S. High Commissioner of Germany, the GCU "actually succeeded in drafting a series of plans which had a considerable bearing on the actual occupation of Germany."²⁰

In preparation for the occupation of Germany, planners addressed three "cases" under which Rankin might be executed: a rapid collapse of resistance; a sudden German decision to retreat to pre-war borders; and unconditional surrender.²¹ Planners regarded the unconditional

¹⁸Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., "Planning for Treatment of Postwar Germany, 1943-1946" (Thesis, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1972), 141; in Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Chapter 6: Waging Peace: Eclipse in Postwar Germany and Iraq," Williamson Murray, ed., *A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2004), 127-128, 156. The directive put the responsibility for Germany's situation in the hands of the War Department until 1949. Secretary of State Byrnes co-opted the use of the military in stability operations by appointing the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas to develop occupation policy.

¹⁹Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York, NY: Macmillan Co., 1947); and Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955* (Princeton, NJ: Dr. Van Nostrand, 1957), 20. As discussed in McCreedy's, "Waging Peace: Eclipse in Postwar Germany and Iraq," Zink evidently was a member of the German Country Unit at one time. Zink's book, *American Military Government in Germany* is dedicated to "Brother Officers on the Board of Editors, German Country Unit, SHAEF;" quoted in McCreedy, 157.

²⁰Zink, "The United States in Germany, 1944-1955," 20; quoted in McCreedy, 157.

²¹Oliver J. Fredericksen, "The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953" (Frankfurt, Germany: Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1953), 189; quoted in McCreedy, 157.

surrender of Germany as the most likely scenario. Planners named this case as Rankin-C and finalized a draft of this plan at the end of October 1943.²² Perhaps the most important aspect of preparatory planning with multinational partners was building the staff organizations capable of planning for stability and support operations.

Initially, planning for peace and the occupation of Germany required a multinational effort to coordinate the actions of both the USG and Great Britain's government. Shaping postwar stability operations largely relied on policy goals of the countries conferring the peace. However, as Major General C. A. West, Deputy G-3 of COSSAC, told his staff, "We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems."²³ In his guidance, Major General West directed his staff to focus on topics such as armistice terms, disarmament, displaced persons, prisoners of war, martial law, disposal of captured war material, and coordination of movement and transportation. Further, he required a multinational effort in planning and preparing for the occupation of Germany.²⁴

As the occupation of Germany loomed, the commanders and their staffs planned for postwar operations. Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces (SHAEF) modified previous plans from Rankin-C and added greater detail creating a new plan known as Talisman. As compared to the Rankin-C plan, the Talisman plan included detailed force movements and positioning of forces. The Talisman plan also assigned specific missions to various commands.²⁵ Like Rankin-C, Talisman also addressed details about "disarmament, disposal of war material, control of German

²²Ibid. On 30 October 1943, the Rankin-C draft was issued as a planning directive to the US First Army Group and the British Twenty-First Army Group.

²³Major General C. A. West, Memorandum, "Operation RANKIN-C;" 14 January 1944; quoted in Frederiksen, 36; and quoted in McCreedy, 157.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., 64-67, 69; and Frederiksen, 60-61; and McCreedy, 157. Rankin-C called for 25 divisions; Talisman increased the requirement to over 39.

prisoners of war, care of Allied prisoners of war, and denazification” as the essential postwar tasks.²⁶

Talisman plans articulated the designated zones of occupation for after resistance ended. Prior planning for the zones of responsibility included the British zone of occupation in the north and American zone of occupation in the south. The designated army groups gained responsibility for “four military districts in each zone to set the conditions for transition to Tripartite Control.”²⁷ As designated in the plans, the Supreme Commander presided over Berlin as a separate district. Another facet of Talisman anticipated a requirement for redeployment of “surplus US and British forces not required for occupational duties in Germany” from ports in France.²⁸ Thought to be compromised, Talisman later became Eclipse.

The G-4 Annex for Operation Eclipse provided evidence of integrated logistics planning. As designated in plans for Eclipse, the G-4 Annex directed the individual armies to “disarm German ground, air, and naval forces” in their respective zones and “turnover the captured equipment to the Advanced Section, Communications Zone (COMMZ) for storage or disposal.”²⁹ Further, OPLAN Eclipse directed the COMMZ to operate and maintain lines of communication in Germany while it continued to provide administrative and logistics support. Problematically, the Twelfth Army Group had responsibilities for the lines of communication that lay outside their area of responsibility in Germany.³⁰

Perhaps better advanced planning and coordination with international partners would have facilitated a more efficient transportation system within designated areas of responsibility.

²⁶McCreedy, 131.

²⁷Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, “Operation ECLIPSE: Appreciation and Outline Plan,” Section I, para 67-70, Section VI, Task 6; 10 November 1944; quoted in McCreedy, 158.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Twelfth Army Group, *Operations Plan, Operation Eclipse*, Annex 6, “Administration and Disarmament,” Second Draft, 27 February 1945, Archival Collection, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

³⁰Ibid.

In planning, logistics support requirements must be balanced with available capabilities to determine if a shortfall exists. In shortfall areas, coalition partners can provide critical capabilities that enhance overall mission accomplishment. Thus, early identification of shortfall areas allowed planners flexibility and time to coordinate for additional assistance in areas lacking support capability.

Inter-Agency Cooperation Concerning Coalition Logistics

In planning Operation Eclipse, there was little interaction concerning interagency players such as the Departments of State and Treasury. Further, beyond general policy discussion, “there assuredly was no interagency process” in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to fully coordinate how various approaches applied in accomplishing strategic goals concerning Germany.³¹ General Clay considered stability and support planning as “one-dimensional” concerning interagency aspects as evidenced in his comments that:

As I look back, I find it amazing that I did not visit the State Department or talk with any of its officials . . . No one at that time advised me of the role of the State Department in occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out.³²

Considering the civil-military cooperation thought to be necessary by the USG for stability and support operations, the military took the lead in international logistics execution with the MDAP. Whether or not the Department of Defense taking the lead is the most effective practice in reinstituting civil administration, the US Army executed multiple tasks concerned with restoring basic services and demilitarizing the German military in postwar Germany. The

³¹McCreedy, 129.

³²Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950), 6. Accordingly, in early 1945, Eisenhower selected Clay to oversee military government operations as his deputy. Before departing for Europe, Clay met with the President, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to receive instructions.

logistics aspects of stability and support operations concerning the tasks at hand were phenomenal.

In May 1945, General Eisenhower, Commander, US Forces European Theater, received the first formal guidance for the conduct of stability operations as JCS 1067.³³ JCS 1067 provisions directed the US Army to occupy Germany and treat the Germans as defeated enemy. Further, occupation forces exercised “limited control over the economy and the distribution of goods and foodstuffs to levels necessary to prevent disease and unrest.”³⁴ At the outset, JCS 1067 lacked clearly defined strategic goals with regard to various USG agencies and the War Department.

As a result of an inadequate, integrated approach, the USG gained no immediate results from the MDAP in reconstituting the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In *Sinews of War*, James Huston stated:

Most foreign aid delivered during Fiscal Year 1950 had already been scheduled under previous programs. Fiscal Year 1950 was half gone, and supply action had not even begun. Foreign requirements reported by preliminary survey teams could not be reprogrammed until the State and Defense Departments agreed upon criteria. The military assistance advisory groups could contribute little to reprogramming for fiscal year 1950 in the time left to them after their arrival in foreign countries. Procedures still had to be worked out for meeting all the administrative problems involved in such a complex undertaking.³⁵

In consequence, the USG’s disjointed approach to achieving an overall end-state resulted in the delayed reconstruction of the FRG defense capacity. As indicated, the military assistance

³³Ibid., 19.

³⁴Ibid.; and Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 101-102, 208-214. For the text of JCS 1067/8: Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 157-172. The history of JCS 1067 “Directive to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)” is lengthy and complicated. “The first version was sent to Eisenhower on 24 September 1944. It was presented to the European Advisory Committee in January 1945 as the American proposal for a policy for occupied Germany. Following Yalta, the directive underwent a number of revisions and was ultimately issued to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces on 14 May 1945, as JCS 1067/8.”

³⁵Huston, *Army Historical Series: Sinews of War, 1775-1953*, 612.

advisory groups determined the requirements to rebuild the FRG's security capacity. However, the USG's budget process for allocating resources disallowed the timely fulfillment of critical requirements. Absent a long-range predictive foreign assistance budget and plan for capacity building across all facets of restoring civil-society, the USG struggled to fulfill the tasks associated with long-term national security goals. Hence, the USG required an integrated approach to synchronize national policy goals with the critical requirements requested through the MDAP.

Concerning international logistics, the USG sent assistance groups to the countries designated to receive aid as outlined by the MDAP. In general, these military assistance advisory groups (MAAG) consisted of Army, Navy, and Air Force sections. For each MAAG, one senior officer of the respective service or a designated senior member acted as section chief.³⁶ The section chief worked for the US ambassador or minister in a designated country, but on questions concerning military programming, supply, and other related questions, the section chief reported to the Joint US Military Advisory Group for Europe in London.³⁷ Depending on the strength or weakness of the relationship between the Departments of State and Defense, the MAAG functioned accordingly. The MAAG executed its tasks under the Ambassador or Minister and streamlined operations with the economic or technical assistance mission. The operational entity formed the Country Team.³⁸

Within the sphere of interagency cooperation, the MDAP operated efficiently to a point. However, if a country was receiving both economic and military assistance, one agency having the majority of interests performed the functions of both. This was problematic because military assistance programs crisscrossed with other forms of foreign assistance "intended to contribute to

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., 612-613. Section chiefs were authorized direct communication with the ambassador, respective military departments in Washington, and corresponding components of the recipient country's armed forces on matters affecting their service.

³⁸Ibid.

the strength, stability, and well-being of the countries concerned.”³⁹ In an effort to coordinate all assistance within the aided country, a chief of diplomatic mission coordinated all activities of US representatives to simplify the various types of assistance under the Mutual Security Program. As a result of competing demands and uneven objectives, the MDAP ran “at least eighteen months behind--about the lead, time for initial procurement of items most difficult to manufacture.”⁴⁰

In war devastated Europe, allied leaders quickly realized the fallacy of war, that problems would be solved with the end of hostilities. The inextricable connection between domestic and international politics proved important in war’s aftermath. With forces deployed around the globe over a four year timeframe, people demanded from politicians the immediate return of the troops. Germany’s reconstruction did not begin immediately following the allied occupation of Germany. Insofar as the reconstruction of Germany, the occupied leaders faced the challenges of security, war reparations, civil administration, humanitarian relief for refugees, democratization, and reconstruction. Although stability and support operations began as a disjointed effort between USG agencies and allied partners, national leaders saw the link between national security and the vital necessity to reconstruct Germany and pledged long-term commitment to rebuilding Europe’s economy.

The North Atlantic Treaty made the United States an active participant in Western Europe’s defense planning and programs. The MDAP provided NATO material support to achieve effectiveness. The efforts of NATO included a coordinated effort in determining the security requirements of each country. In Europe, the JAMAG played a crucial role in implementing the MAP. As a result of the USG placing its initial focus on creating combat units, serious shortages of service troops and critical equipment necessary to support combat units

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

existed. For this reason, each nation was responsible for the logistical support of its own forces. The national responsibility concept still exists today.

From an international logistics perspective, the shortfalls of supplies and equipment highlighted the importance of the MAP and the FMS program in peace and war. Planning for stability operations in Germany took shape well in advance to the war's end or the stabilization of Germany through efforts of the GCU. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing Germany at national, regional, and local levels. Initially, planning for peace and the occupation of Germany required a multinational effort to coordinate the actions of both the USG and Great Britain's government.

Shaping postwar stability operations largely relied on policy goals of the countries conferring the peace. In planning Operation Eclipse, there was little interaction concerning interagency players such as the Departments of State and Treasury. Considering the civil-military cooperation thought to be necessary by the USG for stability and support operations, the military took the lead in international logistics execution with the MDAP. As a result of an inadequate, integrated approach, the USG gained no immediate results from the MDAP in reconstituting the FRG. In consequence, the USG's disjointed approach to achieving an overall end-state resulted in the delayed reconstruction of the FRG defense capacity. Absent a long-range predictive foreign assistance budget and plan for capacity building across all facets of restoring civil-society, the USG struggled to fulfill the tasks associated with long-term national security goals.

Hence, the USG required an integrated approach to synchronize national policy goals with the critical requirements requested through the MDAP. Concerning international logistics, the USG sent assistance groups to the countries designated to receive aid as outlined by the MDAP. These military assistance advisory groups (MAAG) executed tasks under the Ambassador or Minister and streamlined operations with the economic or technical assistance mission.

To finish, within the sphere of interagency cooperation, the MDAP operated efficiently to a point. However, if a country was receiving both economic and military assistance, one agency having the majority of interests performed the functions of both. Despite military planning efforts for post-conflict operations, the USG struggled in determining the fate of the FRG. In the immediate post-war period, the USG discounted the importance of developing the FRG focusing on domestic issues. Eventually, the USG grasped the significance of the FRG and dedicated resources committing to long-term US national security objectives.

HAITI

US Relations with Haiti and Security Assistance

Current US relations with Haiti rely heavily on security issues concerning illegal immigration, drug trafficking, political instability, and security cooperation. In the past, US relations with Haiti dealt mostly with proximity, history, and demographics. As a result of Haiti's close proximity to the United States, the USG showed a continued interest in creating economic stability and a functional democratic government in Haiti. From the 1990's to 2000, US foreign relations with Haiti primarily focused on creating economic stability and democracy. According to Haiti's country profile, "the United States serves as Haiti's primary partner for both exports and imports."⁴¹ Further, in 1994, the USG took an active role in Operation Uphold Democracy and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to restore President Aristide to power and stabilize a democratic government. Haiti's security situation and record of political instability remained a concern to the United States after Uphold Democracy; however, most of the USG support for Haiti dwindled as the 1990s ended.

⁴¹Department of State, Library of Congress--Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Haiti, May 2006; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 18 February 2007.

The USG remained somewhat involved in supporting Haiti with foreign aid and security assistance for the remainder of the 1990s; however, in 2000 US foreign policy towards Haiti shifted away from its policy of democratization. Until 2000, the USG participated in the UN support mission for Haiti; however, in 2000 President Clinton signed legislation suspending economic aid to include military assistance to Haiti.⁴² Based on USG doubts and international pressure from the Organization of the American States (OAS) and the UN over the legitimacy of Haiti's elections and other political concerns, the USG renounced the US Support Group in Haiti. Several congressional concerns contributed to the decision to end economic aid including security assistance funding.

In her Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief, *Haiti: Issues For Congress*, 21 November 2001, Maureen Taft-Morales described the cost of peacekeeping efforts, holding of democratic elections, cost and effectiveness of US assistance, economic policy and role of US business, security and human rights concerns, and narcotics trafficking. All of these issues amplified the 106th Congress's decision to withdraw support for Haiti.⁴³ Focusing on the negative effects of remaining in Haiti rather than the positive, the Congress influenced President Clinton's decision not to continue support for Haiti. The withdrawal of economic assistance to Haiti highlighted the relationship between domestic policy concerns and foreign policy actions.

The events of 11 September 2001 altered the USG's perspective concerning the US foreign policy agenda. Instead of immediately bolstering security assistance towards Haiti, the USG focused on the containment of global terrorism and Islamic extremism in other parts of the world. Emphasizing the threat of ungoverned space, global terrorist threats with unconventional

⁴²Colonel Joseph F. Napoli, "Capacity Building for Latin America and the Caribbean: PKO and the Case of Haiti" (Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2005), 2; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil250.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 7 January 2007.

⁴³Maureen Taft-Morales, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, *Haiti: Issues For Congress*, 21 November 2001; available from <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB96019.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 6 January 2007.

weapons, and weapons of mass destruction, the Bush Administration chose to focus on Afghanistan and then Iraq. Until February 2004, the USG “was not willing to undertake” in long-term involvement “while its focus was elsewhere.”⁴⁴

President Bush decided on 25 February 2004 that the situation in Haiti required US security assistance. As a result of “increased armed rebellion, the limited effectiveness of the Haitian National Police, and insecurity in Port-au-Prince brought on by increased armed pro-government gang activity,” the USG committed resources to Haiti.⁴⁵ The deterioration of Haiti’s political and security mechanisms left the US Embassy, its personnel, and facilities in an unstable environment. In order to prevent further instability, the USG, in cooperation with the UN, renewed its commitment to Haiti’s future. Warily, the USG decided to intervene with a small force “to achieve narrow and limited objectives to stabilize the country,” while encouraging the UN and western hemisphere countries to take an interest in Haiti’s long-term stabilization and future.⁴⁶ As of February 2007, the USG continued to commit financial resources in support of the UN mission, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Through economic aid, specifically peace keeping and other security assistance, the USG continued to strengthen its relations with Haiti.

International Cooperation Despite National Responsibility

Although both NATO and Joint doctrine describe logistics as a national responsibility, the reality continued to evolve during operations in Haiti. When transitioning from Multi-National Force (MNF) control or Multinational Interim Force (MIF) control to a UN resolution mission, national responsibility for sustainment is an unrealistic expectation. In order to leverage

⁴⁴Napoli, 2.

⁴⁵Department of State, Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Letter on Haiti, 25 February 2004; available from <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/29949.htm>; Internet; accessed on 14 January 2007.

⁴⁶Napoli, 2.

partnerships and strengthen international cooperation, it is essential for the interim commander to work with coalition partners to determine requirements while preparing for follow-on mission support. As indicated in Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow, full cooperation with other Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, USG agencies, the UN, Non-governmental organizations (NGO), and others is essential to success.

After Operation Uphold Democracy, the transition to JTF-190 facilitated the transfer of control to the UNMIH. Throughout the transition, Major General Kinzer held operational control of the other national contingents of the UN force. Also, General Kinzer ensured that US forces remained completely under a US chain of command. A one-week staff training program took place in early March to ease the transition from the MNF to UNMIH. The training program afforded critical leaders in the UNMIH headquarters an opportunity to devise a common operational picture for the mission, area of operations, rules of engagement, and operating procedures.⁴⁷

During the transition to full UN control, a MNF operated in Haiti in order to meet the requirements of joint and coalition partners. The MNF commander established a Joint Logistics Support Command (JLSC) that functioned as a coordination tool to bring all of the various DOD agencies and coalition forces under one support system.⁴⁸ A Presidential Executive Order directed the JLSC to provide support to the coalition forces.⁴⁹ Under the direction of the Foreign

⁴⁷John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1995-1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 165.

⁴⁸US Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Mission In Haiti: The Military Perspective In the Service of Peace* 31 March 1995-29 February 1996 (Carlisle, PA: Government Printing Office, 1996), 24. One of the conditions for the "Commanders' Conditions for Transition was that a Logistics System [was] in Place and Functioning."

⁴⁹Philip M. Pugh, Jr., "A Historical Analysis of Multinational Logistics and the Concept of National Responsibility in Coalition Military Operations" (Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 55-56. Operating under the President's Executive Order, "an emergency drawdown of military department inventory of stocks under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) for emergency assistance programs or support under Section 502 of the FAA for peacekeeping (PK)," enabled coalition forces to receive support until the UNMIH took responsibility.

Assistance Act (FAA), the MNF requested “any US item in the federal supply system against a 50 million dollar draw down authority.”⁵⁰ Coalition partners submitted requests through the US manager for stocks and property (PBO) in Haiti to the MNF J4. The MNF J4 validated and forwarded each request through the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) to the DOD. As supplies were issued, the gaining nation assumed ownership. After the UN assumed responsibility for UNMIH, most of the MNF equipment remained in Haiti to support the UNMIH.⁵¹

As demonstrated, the FAA strengthened international cooperation in support of peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Further, enacting the provisions of the FAA, the MNF commander implemented a valuable tool in support of the transition to the UNMIH. Establishing support in the interim allowed for a seamless transition for follow-on forces and illustrated the importance of the FAA. At the strategic level, the USG used the FAA as a tool to shape coalition operations. Likewise, the US DOD Haiti Planning Group played a crucial role in shaping the transition to the UN. With the assistance of other government agencies, the DOD Haiti Planning Group devised an intricate “interagency checklist for restoration of essential services.”⁵² US Agency for International Development (USAID) led interagency efforts for all critical service areas, with minimal DOD [primarily Army unit] support. By providing resources for partners who might otherwise not be able to participate, the USG leveraged its own resources in cooperation with the UN and other organizations to share the logistics burden associated with stability and support operations.

“National responsibility” concerning logistics does not enhance international cooperation. In his monograph entitled, *A Historical Analysis of Multinational Logistics and the Concept of National Responsibility in Coalition Military Operations*, Major Philip Pugh discussed the

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Conrad Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won” *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 29-30.

implications of national responsibility. In his Haiti section of the paper, Major Pugh included an interview from Canadian officer, Major Francois Vaillancourt. Major Vaillancourt described the different “options” in which UN operations are commonly supported as follows:

One option is to have one nation control all the logistics for an operation. Though this is usually the most efficient option, it is not always acceptable, nor is one nation always capable or willing to perform this role. The second option is to make logistics a shared responsibility, both in terms of logistics elements deployed and logistics personnel on the force headquarters staff. The final option is to decentralize logistics planning and operations if the operation is dispersed over wide areas in different regions.⁵³

For Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow, coalition partners shared responsibility for UNMIH and MINUSTAH, respectively. Thus, both operations reflected the “second option” mentioned above. Although the USG chose to provide the majority of logistics support capability in the initial stages of both stability and support missions, the UN facilitated the coordination for shared responsibilities thereafter.

From the outset, UN units were required to be self-sufficient for thirty to ninety days upon arrival in Haiti. The US military provided much of this support until UN services were established. UN contingents were also responsible for maintaining their own equipment.⁵⁴ For both UN operations, a joint logistics node, the JLSC or the Joint Logistics Centre (JLC), acted as the support coordination center for participating nations. In the initial phases of the operation, the UN expected each nation “to provide at least some of its logistical support and to be self-sufficient for a temporary period.”⁵⁵ Some nations do not possess self-sustaining capabilities; therefore, not all nations who pledged support participated. This happened for both UN missions in Haiti.

⁵³Major Francois Vaillancourt, “UNMIH Logistics 1996-1997 and Force Protection,” interview by Dr. Robert Baumann, tape recording, 10 January 2000, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; quoted in Philip M. Pugh, Jr., 57.

⁵⁴Pugh, 63.

⁵⁵Ibid., 58.

An analysis of UN operations in Haiti provides insight into the challenges and benefits of international cooperation through security assistance. Similarly, when the US military went back into Haiti in 2004 for Operation Secure Tomorrow, the importance of standing up a joint logistics support node again proved essential. Initially, the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) worked with the UN to establish a logistics network. From lessons learned in Uphold Democracy, General Hill, US SOUTHCOM's Commander, instituted certain practices in MIF operations to streamline coalition logistics practices. Although, a much smaller US military force was committed due to the USG's priority for support to the GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq, these logistics practices ensured vital support for follow-on operations.⁵⁶ General Hill's experience as the JLSC Commander during Uphold Democracy paid dividends for a smooth transition again. With his knowledge of resource management, logistics practices, and unity of effort, General Hill understood the importance of standing up the JLSC to facilitate US forces, the UN, coalition partners, and interagency support to resolve the crisis.⁵⁷

Although a shortfall existed concerning logistics support due to resource constraints, the US MIF element established initial support operations before turning over command and control to the Brazil command element. The transition to the UN MINUSTAH mission scheduled for 1 June 2004 did not occur until 25 June 2004 because of a delay in the arrival of Brazilian forces.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Napoli, 16.

⁵⁷Ballard, 139. General Hill acted as the JLSC commander for Operation Uphold Democracy. When General Fisher arrived for UNMIH, the decision had been made to focus all the logistics aspects of the operation under one Logistics Support Command. With the JLSC, General Fisher had a single coordination node for all logistics and one manager to ensure that the various needs of all portions of the MNF were met fairly and efficiently. General Fisher noted that this organizational change was "an excellent decision that brought plenty of experts and the right degree of command to the [logistics] effort." He also recommended that a general officer's leadership within the Logistics Support Command was critical to success.

⁵⁸Napoli, 12.

Further, the UN established the UNJLC in Haiti on 29 June 2004, four days after Brazil accepted the mission.⁵⁹

Participation in UN Missions: Multinational Logistics and Operations

For the first UN mission in Haiti, US military support operations were critical to mission success. When participating in the UNMIH, the US military acted as the lead nation and worked in cooperation with the UN entities to meet the multitude of requirements using the UN logistics system. With regard to stability and support missions, including peacekeeping and security assistance, combat service support is critical for sustaining operations. These types of missions are logistics heavy due to the complexity of the requirements for all coalition parties and the supported nation involved. In turn, operational logistics leaders need to possess a “detailed understanding of the UN logistics system” to provide efficient support.⁶⁰

For operations in Haiti, it was “necessary to deploy with the appropriate equipment and capability for self-sustainment in accordance with the UN guidelines for contributing nations.”⁶¹ To fill the gaps in logistics coverage during Operation Uphold Democracy and the transition to UNMIH, the MNF commander used the logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP). Due to the proximity of the United States to Haiti, the US Army extensively used contractors to provide logistics support.⁶² In the future, contract support for UN missions and coalition partners may not be a viable solution due to oversight requirements, the length of operations, and the costs to provide support for long-term operations as illustrated by the 2004 UN mission. Limitations in

⁵⁹United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, Bulletin 1 UNJLC Haiti; available from http://photo.unjlc.org/ImportedObjects/23017#h2_306, Internet, accessed on 13 January 2007. The UN Joint Logistics Centre website provides a wealth of information on specific missions. In the Archives section of the webpage, the operations in Haiti, for MINUSTAH contain information on several operational logistics topics.

⁶⁰US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 11.

⁶¹Ibid., 10.

⁶²Ibid.

logistics capabilities today signify an even greater need for international cooperation and an understanding of the UN logistics system.

During Operation Uphold Democracy, leaders faced significant challenges when operating under UN guidelines. The participating nations possessed different logistics requirements due to their unique capabilities and equipment. Further, the UN rules required forces to arrive in Haiti “with a 90-day sustainment capability during the initial phases of the mission.”⁶³ Problematically, UN replenishment does not support initial stockage levels or on-hand capabilities to meet the needs of forces incapable of maintaining ninety-day requirements. Therefore, the UN required nations to requisition supplies as required. Perhaps, the demand-driven process worked best considering the various needs of coalitions and other agencies. However, when national elements misunderstood the implementation of the system, they experienced significant delays for replacement of critical supplies.⁶⁴

Another significant peculiarity of UN operations was the relationship of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and his role in system execution. Under UN missions in Haiti, the UN Secretary-General (SYG) appointed the force commander from the nation that provided the most military personnel to the operation. Similarly, the UN field administration and logistics division (FALD) of the UN appointed the CAO. Within the UN organizational structure, the CAO and the force commander operated as equals with respect to positions. Though the commander of forces generally retained authority for the employment of military forces, the CAO retained budgetary control for resources.⁶⁵ Therefore, the commander and staff ensured detailed planning and worked closely with the CAO to meet those requirements to support operations.

⁶³Ibid., 17-18.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Pugh, 56. Generally, the CAO provides approximately 95 percent of the logistical support for the multinational force.

During the UNMIH, the CAO scrutinized support requests and forwarded approved requests for support to the FALD of the UN headquarters.⁶⁶ Further complicating the coordination of coalition support, the CAO and the chief logistics officer (CLO) acted as primary logistics managers for overall support and control of daily UN logistics functions, respectively. The CLO, a military officer on the UN headquarters staff, established and operated the UN field and maintenance area. Acting within the maintenance support arena, the CLO validated all requirements for the various components participating in the operation. After validating the requests, the CLO passed them to the CAO for funding and procurement. In effect, the CLO controlled the activities of the logistics elements in the logistic element of the consolidated logistics base.

Organized into a force logistics group (FLG), all capable national contingents provided resources for a consolidated maintenance support.⁶⁷ For the UNMIH, participating national contingent incapable of self-support arranged support agreements with other nations willing to provide resources. Because many nations arrived in Haiti without any logistical sustainment capabilities, the UN sought support agreements, donations, and local procurement of necessary equipment.⁶⁸

Operations in Haiti reinforced the need for international cooperation through support agreements. During the UNMIH, the UN coordinated all support given to other nations and approved reimbursement to contributing nations who engaged in support agreements. If the UN disapproved of the support provided, the UN would not reimburse the contributing nation. As stated in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions:*

⁶⁶Pugh, 58. The FALD is primarily responsible for managing logistical support to UN led peacekeeping operations. The FALD acts as the principal advisor to the UN special representative to the secretary general (SRSG), manages the entire mission budget, and appoints the CAO.

⁶⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 30 December 1994), 54; and Pugh, 61.

⁶⁸Pugh, 59.

The UN approach to business is to buy only what it needs, when they need it and nothing more. Rarely does the CAO approve the purchase of backup or stockage of anticipated required items. The leader who attempts to be proactive and plan for future events or operational stocks that requires the expenditure of UN funds may become frustrated with the system. They will find that the UN is an event and not a time driven organization.⁶⁹

Under the UN logistics system, other support activities such as providing for transportation, morale and welfare activities, and local purchasing posed significant challenges. In effect, the inefficiency and misunderstandings of proper procedures resulted in the delay of capacity building in support of the mission. The operational arrangement required the supplying nation to record all support provided and work extensively with the CAO for reimbursement.

Due to the problems with this type of demand driven system, in 1996 after conducting a critical review of operations, the UN revised its logistics support mechanism organizing its logistics functions under the UNJLC.⁷⁰ In March 2002, the UN institutionalized the UNJLC Concept as a UN Humanitarian response mechanism, under the tutelage of the World Food Program (WFP), by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASG-WG). Using this operational logistics node, the US worked with the UN during the MINUSTAH operation under a dissimilar logistics structure than during Uphold Democracy. The UNJLC fixed some of the logistics coordination problems faced during previous missions in Haiti, yet other challenges remained concerning nations with capacity shortfalls.

Operation Uphold Democracy fit within the US Army's definition of stability and support operations because it involved peacekeeping and security assistance related tasks. In using the military as an instrument of national power, the USG took the lead enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UN SCR) 940. By participating as a member of the international

⁶⁹US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions*, vol. 3, *The US Army and United Nations Peacekeeping* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, July 1995), 84.

⁷⁰United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, About UNJLC; available from <http://www.unjlc.org/about/>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007.

community, the USG promoted its own security interests and legitimately acted as a member of a multinational coalition. With the US military's continued support to Haiti, other nations and agencies gradually took on more important roles. Specifically, the UN began to take a more active role.

In general, military operations restored stability to Haiti; however, when the last American troops left Haiti in April 1996, the situation there deteriorated. Consequently, most US policy goals went unrealized without a long-term USG commitment of resources. Unwilling or unable to commit resources, the civilian agencies that replaced military forces failed to achieve long-lasting results.

The events of 11 September 2001 altered the USG's perspective concerning the US foreign policy agenda. Instead of immediately bolstering security assistance towards Haiti, the USG focused on the containment of global terrorism and Islamic extremism in other parts of the world. Emphasizing the threat of ungoverned space, global terrorist threats with unconventional weapons, and weapons of mass destruction, the Bush Administration chose to focus on Afghanistan and then Iraq. However, the deterioration of Haiti's political and security mechanisms left the US Embassy, its personnel, and facilities in an unstable environment. In order to prevent further instability, the USG, in cooperation with the UN, renewed its commitment to Haiti's future. Through foreign aid, specifically, peace keeping and other security assistance, the USG continued to strengthen its relations with Haiti.

Although both NATO and Joint doctrine describe logistics as a national responsibility, the reality continued to evolve during operations in Haiti. When transitioning from MNF control or MIF control to a UN resolution mission, national responsibility for sustainment is an unrealistic expectation. In order to leverage partnerships and strengthen international cooperation, it is essential for the interim commander to work with coalition partners to determine requirements while preparing for follow-on mission support. As indicated in Operations Uphold

Democracy and Secure Tomorrow, full cooperation with other DOD agencies, USG agencies, the UN, NGO, and others is essential to success.

During the transition to full UN control, a MNF operated in Haiti in order to meet the requirements of joint and coalition partners. In both US transitions, the interim commander established a joint logistics support node to bring all of the various DOD agencies and coalition forces under one support system. As demonstrated, the FAA strengthened international cooperation in support of peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Establishing support in the interim allowed for a seamless transition for follow-on forces and illustrated the importance of the FAA. At the strategic level, the USG used the FAA as a tool to shape coalition operations.

National responsibility concerning logistics does not enhance international cooperation. For Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow, coalition partners shared responsibility for UNMIH and MINUSTAH, respectively. Although the USG chose to provide the majority of logistics support capability in the initial stages of both stability and support missions, the UN facilitated the coordination for shared responsibilities thereafter. From the outset, UN units were required to be self-sufficient for thirty to ninety days upon arrival in Haiti. As a result, some nations who lacked self-sustaining capabilities withdrew assurances to participate in Haiti. The US military provided much of this support until UN services were established.

An analysis of UN operations in Haiti provides insight into the challenges and benefits of international cooperation through security assistance. Similarly, when the US military went back into Haiti in 2004 for Operation Secure Tomorrow, importance of standing up a joint logistics support node again proved essential. Although, a much smaller US military force was committed due to the USG's priority for support to the GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq, these logistics practices ensured vital support for follow-on operations.

For the first UN mission in Haiti, US military support operations were critical to mission success. When participating in the UNMIH, the US military acted as the lead nation and worked

in cooperation with the UN entities to meet the multitude of requirements using the UN logistics system. With regard to stability and support missions, including peacekeeping and security assistance, combat service support is critical for sustaining operations. These types of missions are logistics heavy due to the complexity of the requirements for all coalition parties and the supported nation involved.

Lastly, during Operation Uphold Democracy, leaders faced significant challenges when operating under UN guidelines. The participating nations possessed different logistics requirements due to their unique capabilities and equipment. Another significant peculiarity of UN operations was the relationship of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and his role in system execution. Therefore, the commander and staff ensured detailed planning and worked closely with the CAO to meet those requirements to support operations.

EAST TIMOR

US Relations with East Timor and Security Assistance

Current US relations with East Timor favor supporting its transition to a stable and prosperous democracy in Southeast Asia.⁷¹ Previously, US policy towards East Timor largely favored Indonesian control from 1975 until the mid-1990s. Timor-Leste, formerly known as East Timor, gained nation status in May 2002. With support from the international community through the United Nations, Timor-Leste's transition to independence occurred as a result of persistent international cooperation. Although not a strong democratic country, Timor-Leste continues to work in cooperation with the international community, its neighbors, and the United States to realize its national potential.

⁷¹Department of State, Eric G. John, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, "East Timor: Instability and Future Prospects," 28 June 2006; available from <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/68425.htm>; Internet; accessed on 16 December 2006.

With the recognition of human rights abuses and the Indonesian military's involvement in the atrocities in Timor-Leste, the USG shifted US policy goals in Southeast Asia away from Indonesian favor towards Timor-Leste. Despite its involvement in providing security assistance through military assistance programs to Indonesia, the USG continued to support Indonesia's control over Timor-Leste until the mid-1990s.⁷² The USG reluctantly supported Timor-Leste's cause during the Clinton Administration. However, the international community criticized Indonesia for failing to control the violence and atrocities within its territory. As a result of continued militia violence and media exposure, the US policy towards East Timor developed as the international community increasingly took notice.

The USG provided support through military assistance and capacity building during the UN International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) mission. Subsequently, the United States worked with the international community throughout stability, support, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations to help East Timor gain independence and strengthen its state institutions. The USG coordinated assistance through numerous bilateral donors and allies throughout UN operations in Timor-Leste and currently assists through economic assistance and bilateral agreements. From 1999 to present, the USG provided over \$500 million in foreign assistance through the UN missions in Timor-Leste.⁷³ Of the total support provided for assistance, approximately \$32.4 million was dedicated to peacekeeping and military assistance for fiscal years 2001 through 2006.⁷⁴

Current US relations with Timor-Leste and its neighbor, Indonesia, continue to develop in cooperation with the UNMIT. The USAID office in East Timor focuses on three main areas:

⁷²Rhoda Margesson and Bruce Vaughn, CRS Report for Congress, *East Timor Potential Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 4 May 2005); available from <http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/foreign%20policy/PDFS/EastTimor.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 17 October 2006. US relations with East Timor in the past were closely associated with US relations with Indonesia and Jakarta's former control over the territory.

⁷³Department of State, Eric G. John.

⁷⁴Margesson and Vaughn, see table, pg 5.

democracy and governance, economic growth and development, and health care. In addition to security initiatives through the UN, US aid programs focus on “developing a self sufficient free market economy, developing basic public services, supporting good governance through an emerging democratic political system, and post-conflict democracy initiatives.”⁷⁵ US aid continues to promote the economic and political development of East Timor by supporting independent media, civil society organizations, and political parties. Also, US assistance in East Timor aims to strengthen electoral processes, build judicial institutions, and bolster governmental capability.⁷⁶ Under its current circumstances, East Timor remains at risk and needs long-term support from the international community and other agencies capable of investing in its future.

International Cooperation Despite National Responsibility

As indicated, existing military doctrines describe coalition logistics as a national responsibility. During Operation Stabilise, however, this concept again proved unrealistic. In order to accomplish the INTERFET mission, coalition partners relied heavily upon one another to maximize limited logistics and resource capabilities. A capacity sharing focus, rather than one of self-sustainment, proved invaluable to the transition from INTERFET control to UN peacekeeping forces. With a role to support INTERFET coalition forces, the US force component experienced the practice of shared responsibility first hand providing support to bolster other national forces in the initial stages of the conflict. For the first time in history, US forces assumed a strictly supporting role for an operation.⁷⁷

With the support of international partners particularly--Australia and Portugal, and many others including: New Zealand; United States; United Kingdom; Thailand; Malaysia; Singapore;

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷James F. Glynn, “Operation Stabilise: U.S. Joint Force Operations in East Timor” (Monograph, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2001), 13.

China; Korea; Brazil; and Angola, the defense forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) advanced at a constant rate.⁷⁸ The UN played a major role in coordinating the INTERFET mission to restore stability to East Timor for Operation Stabilise.

INTERFET provided initial security to East Timor, but critical planning and cooperation for the follow-on mission of stability, security, transition to civil authority, and reconstruction seemed lacking. Although the UN accepted responsibility from INTERFET forces, a comprehensive requirements assessment in coordination with the East Timorese took time to develop. In trying to establish credible and effective security forces, the UN encountered challenges while trying to coordinate security and institutional capacity building assistance.⁷⁹

The UN identification of requirements for East Timor's future slowly evolved, but was not well coordinated with Timor-Leste's government. A concerted planning effort through an inter-agency coordination element for the UN could have facilitated the early identification of East Timor's requirements. An integrated multinational planning team could have focused on immediately coordinating resources to meet East Timor's capacity building requirements.

Leading the operation, Australia struggled with the requirements of rapidly deploying forces and sustaining operations. While preparing for UN Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET) operations, Japan played a crucial role donating over \$100 million in support of operations.⁸⁰ Japan's financial aid through a UN trust fund allowed critical assistance that facilitated the early establishment of stability and support operations.

⁷⁸Sukehiro Hasegawa, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste, Responsibility to Rebuild: Challenges Faced in Capacity Building of State Institutions and Security Agencies in a Post-Conflict Country, An International Conference on Emerging Challenges in Peacekeeping Operations, New Delhi, India, 6-8 February 2005; available from <http://www.unmiset.org/UNMISetWebSite.nsf/e4899f58093d136749256f0a003f1073/83a71bdbcef5ded949256fc70003f03f?OpenDocument>; Internet; accessed on 13 November 2006.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid. Japan's assistance facilitated the participation of peacekeeping forces from smaller, developing countries within the region. Further, once the UN peacekeeping forces brought the violence under control, Japan decided to join the UN force sending a corp of self-defense force engineers to assist with transportation infrastructure improvements.

Considering the instability of East Timor prior to its independence, the UN played a major role in coordinating the logistics support after the transition from INTERFET. In short, national responsibility for logistics was not possible because of the force capacity and funding limitations imposed by the USG.⁸¹ This required the US force contingent to rely on other nations and the UN for support. Similarly, US forces infused critical support to ensure coverage of Australia's shortfall areas particularly in airlift, communications, and intelligence capabilities.⁸² Operation Stabilise reinforced the need for interdependent relationships between coalition partners, despite the concept of coalition logistics as a national responsibility.

Providing unique capabilities, the USG encouraged support for the Australian lead role and demonstrated the US willingness to work towards a solution in support of East Timor. By providing military and other security assistance to allies, the USG actively pursued international cooperation while further developing its relations in Southeast Asia. Specifically, after the transition to UN mission control, the US contributed contract support to provide logistic support for F-FDTL requirements.⁸³ Providing critical capabilities to Australia during the INTERFET transition, the US military worked in partnership to allow for a smooth transition to the UNTAET mission and subsequent UN missions. In order to leverage partnerships and strengthen international cooperation, it was again essential for the interim commander to work with coalition partners to determine requirements while preparing for follow-on mission support. As indicated in Operation Stabilise, full cooperation with coalition partners, as well as other agencies, was essential for success.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Bjornar Lunde, "The Role of Relatively Small-Scale Force Contributions in Multinational Operations" (Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 18, 38-45.

⁸³Hasegawa. The contract support provided for Timor-Leste included waste management and catering support until 1 April 2005. At the time of the conference in New Delhi, the USG projected support future operations with a five-person US Army mobile training team (MTT) to conduct "staff operations training" in March 2005.

During the UNTAET mission, the UN coordinated support through the UNJLC. The UNJLC “intensified coordination and pooling of logistics assets among UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF.”⁸⁴ With security maintenance and long-term capacity building as goals for Timor-Leste, the UN endeavored to effectively coordinate with international development organizations and institutional agencies to meet the objectives outlined in numerous UN SCRs. Throughout UN operations in East Timor, development partners contributed many types of assistance central to the F-FDTL’s development. The types of support contributed by participating nations included advisors, training, logistics support, equipment, vehicles, vessels, and infrastructure.

In his remarks at an international conference on emerging challenges in peacekeeping operations on 6-8 February 2005, in New Delhi, India, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Sukehiro Hasegawa stated:

The primary challenge is the lack of capacity of the F-FDTL to absorb the assistance provided; they have limited ability to maintain donated equipment and there is a significant capability gap in terms of management and administration of personnel and equipment. The current lack of a robust policy framework continues to create difficulties for international advisors in terms of being unable to ensure the guidance being provided will complement the long-term objectives of the Government of Timor-Leste.⁸⁵

Mr. Hasegawa’s above remarks indicated the issues associated with East Timor’s fragile democratic state concerning its defense force organizations’ ability to maintain equipment. In terms of national responsibility, a nation in its genesis cannot reasonably be expected to ensure its own logistics functions. Therefore, Mr. Hasegawa’s statement also reflected a lack of planning for East Timor’s resource requirements. In determining a nation’s requirements, a thorough assessment for force determination should include the functions or tasks required to accomplish internal and external security; an organizational structure; the personnel and equipment required

⁸⁴United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, UNLC Brief Description; available from http://www.unjlc.org/about/unjlc_brief_discription/view?searchterm=East%20Timor; Internet; accessed on 10 January 2007.

⁸⁵Hasegawa.

for all functions or tasks that will be required of the forces; the training and education requirements for the force; and a resource plan (funds and recruiting) to accomplish force development.

Participation in UN Missions: Multinational Logistics and Operations

In the initial stages of the INTERFET mission, Australia provided the US forces most of their required logistics support. The support included the pre-positioning of forces in Darwin, Australia on a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) base. According to Colonel Randolph Strong, commander of US forces East Timor:

[Australia] quickly 'spun up' to support the influx. I think that's maybe one of the good success stories of this deployment--that we were initially able to go into an established staging base, in an environment where we were very much welcomed; and where it was easy to get logistic support and telephone support on the base.⁸⁶

US forces established this as a communications and logistics node, an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), until the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) established ports of entry at East Timorese airfields and opened a seaport. Both the distance over which US supplies traveled and the initial security situation in East Timor demanded an ISB within the theater. According to Marine Corps Brigadier General Castellaw, the Commander of U.S. International Forces East Timor, "Darwin, Australia, ultimately served as the ISB, but it evolved slowly [as a command and control center] as the demands on the under-strength USFOR INTERFET logistics section forced significant prioritization of its efforts."⁸⁷ According to Major Glynn, prior to INTERFET operations there were no standing logistics agreements amongst the coalition, the joint force, or its sourcing components. This meant that the US forces J-4 staff constituted support agreements

⁸⁶Randolph Strong, Commander of US forces East Timor, interview by Bill McPherson, 12 May 2006, The East Timor Tapes; available from <http://www.gordon.army.mil/AC/Fall/Fall%2000/strong.HTM>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007.

⁸⁷Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, USMC, Commander, US Forces INTERFET, telephone interview by Major James F. Glynn, 29 November 2000; quoted in Glynn, 20, 55.

while simultaneously establishing an in-theater logistics system.⁸⁸ After ADF secured ports of entry in East Timor, a US INTERFET force contingent of approximately 200 personnel deployed to East Timor to support operations.⁸⁹

According to the initial plan, the ADF was “to build out carefully from Dili and, by early October, Baucau airfield toward the east had been secured and troops had carried out patrols and operations in a number of provincial towns and cities.”⁹⁰ According to Eric Schwartz’s report to the National Intelligence Council, the Australian Defence Force, INTERFET included 22 nations, about 10,000 personnel, with the Australians contributing just over half of the force with three infantry battalion groups, headquarters and support units and maritime and air assets.⁹¹ Because Australia contributed the majority of forces, the UN designated Australia as the lead nation. With regard to the transition from INTERFET to the UN mission UNTAET, Australia continued to play a key leadership role in transitioning the force. Further, the government of Australia continued to “serve, in many respects, as the backbone of the operation.”⁹² In sum, INTERFET and UNTAET created the breathing space for the myriad of capacity building tasks such as “institution-building, from repair of infrastructure, to stabilization of the economy, to establishing representative government, where none had existed.”⁹³

Placed in charge of the US force element in East Timor, Colonel Randolph Strong commanded the US INTERFET force element and worked with coalition partners to support the effort. Throughout his command, Colonel Strong worked with no international organizations; however, worked mostly with US defense organizations including Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The US Army provided Soldiers from the 86th Signal Battalion, 11th Signal Brigade,

⁸⁸Glynn, 20.

⁸⁹Ibid.; and McPherson.

⁹⁰Eric Schwartz, *Report for the National Intelligence Council*, December 2001, 9-10; available from <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/schwartz.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 15 January 2007.

⁹¹Ibid., 10.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., 11.

96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and 322d Civil Affairs Brigade. According to Colonel Strong, there were also some individual Soldiers deployed to East Timor from the 25th Infantry Division, cooks from 45th Support Group, and mechanics from US Army Alaska. Basically, the US Army forces that participated were from different organizations and comprised a multidimensional support force. Another part of the US force component included the Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific from the commander-in-chief, Pacific. In sum, the 86th Signal Battalion from Fort Huachuca, Arizona was the only large organization in East Timor, the rest of the force contingent consisted of Soldiers from many different organizations and US defense forces.⁹⁴

As the contingent commander in East Timor, Colonel Strong organized the US forces nearly simultaneously as they deployed to East Timor. In his experiences, he provided support to the Thai, French, and British Forces. One logistics challenge he described in his interview involved the British forces move to Atauro Island. Colonel Strong explained:

The Brits had a company of Ghurkas that got moved to Atauro Island and we, the United States, provided a significant amount of logistics support to them through our heavy-lift helicopters and sealift capability.⁹⁵

Within the US force capabilities, the airlift assets provided essential support to ensure the Australian lead INTERFET mission was a success. Using the US airlift assets allowed rapid transportation of supplies, personnel, and equipment in East Timor where ground lines of communication were inadequate for swift movement.

Colonel Strong also stated that as Commander of the US East Timor ground forces, his mission was to provide specific support requested by the Australians. The US forces provided the support to Australia in four main areas:

1. Communications support through the 86th Signal Battalion, 11th Signal Brigade;

⁹⁴McPherson.

⁹⁵Ibid.

2. Intelligence support through the Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific and Commander in Chief Pacific;

3. A civil-military operations center that interfaced between the Australian-led INTERFET headquarters, private voluntary organizations, and nongovernmental organizations such as CARE, OXFAM, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, and the World Food Program; and

4. Heavy-lift helicopter support.⁹⁶

In so far as multinational forces, Colonel Strong worked with nearly fifteen other countries, each provided different kinds of support. For instance, the French provided a hospital in Dili and two ships that moved supplies from Darwin to Dili and from Dili to Suai. The British provided a company of Gurkha Soldiers and the initial security in the Ambeno Enclave and follow-on security in Atauro Island. Italian forces provided a replenishment ship. The Germans provided three or four C-160 aircraft, air-medical-evacuation capability to fly medical evacuees from Dili back to Darwin, Australia for care. The New Zealanders provided ground forces that worked side-by-side with the ADF along the border and secured Dili. The Koreans provided a security force for the easternmost part of East Timor. The Thais contributed with a force element as well as the Filipinos. Not only did the Australians provide the majority of the INTERFET forces, they also afforded a hospital. The Norwegians imparted assistance to the civil military operations center. With their working knowledge of UN organizations and private organizations, the Norwegians proved invaluable.⁹⁷

⁹⁶Ibid.; and Craig A. Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to Operation Stabilise," *Military Review* (January/February 2001): 3-7. "Heavy-lift helicopters were initially provided off the Navy ship USS Belleau Wood. Eventually it left and was replaced by USS Peleliu. Finally the lift support was done by contract helicopters provided through Army Materiel Command and a corporation called Nine Corps."

⁹⁷McPherson.

The relationship with the US forces in East Timor worked well overall considering the complexity of the forces. Within the scope of logistics, however, the relationship during mission execution proved volatile as it had in the planning for the operation. Logistics operations were complicated by the small size of the forces involved, the dimensions of the theater, and the extended supply lines. Although contract support provided gap coverage for certain logistics functions during the INTERFET stability and support mission, there were significant shortfalls in support areas that had to be coordinated with the ADF to ensure all force elements could continue operations. As the US Forces INTERFET Commander, General Castellaw stated:

Inordinate amounts of support equipment had to be used by each service to fulfill their responsibilities to support their relatively small contribution of forces. Pragmatism prevailed and, while service components maintained responsibility for logistical support, receipt and distribution were centralized under the J-4.⁹⁸

During both the INTERFET mission and the follow-on UN mission, logistics support continued to be a challenge for the INTERFET commanders. Because of support capability limitations, the commanders faced significant challenges in providing basic support functions. Considering the logistics challenges, the INTERFET commanders astonishingly achieved a combined effort using all available coalition assets to achieve the UN objectives. With a mutual understanding for the operation, the spirit of cooperation continued until the INTERFET forces relinquished control to the United Nations.

By 1999, President Habibie faced significant pressure from the international community and offered East Timor the options of autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or complete independence. With UN SCR 1246, the UN oversaw East Timor's self-determination process. In the wake of declaring independence, pro-integration militias escalated violence in East Timor. With a massive humanitarian crisis looming, the UN SYG pressed President Habibie for

⁹⁸Castellaw, quoted in Glynn, 17.

Indonesia to meet its responsibilities, as previously agreed, to maintain security and order in East Timor. Unable to meet its commitment, the Indonesian government agreed to allow UN peacekeepers into East Timor.

Thus, the UN asked Australia as a regional leader and member state to build and lead the MNF. Under a unified command structure, Australian Defense Force Major General Peter Cosgrove accepted the responsibility of command for INTERFET. The INTERFET forces worked diligently to establish control of the security situation in East Timor. In order to allow UN follow-on operations to establish a legitimate government in East Timor, the USFI provided US assets that bolstered the capabilities of international forces where shortfalls normally exist.

Previously, US policy towards East Timor largely favored Indonesian control from 1975 until the mid-1990s. With support from the international community through the United Nations, Timor-Leste's transition to independence occurred as a result of persistent international cooperation. Although not a strong democratic country, Timor-Leste continues to work in cooperation with the international community, its neighbors, and the United States to realize its national potential.

With the recognition of human rights abuses and the Indonesian military's involvement in the atrocities in Timor-Leste, the USG shifted US policy goals in Southeast Asia away from Indonesian favor towards Timor-Leste. As a result of continued militia violence and media exposure, the US policy towards East Timor developed as the international community increasingly took notice. The USG provided support through military assistance and capacity building during the UN INTERFET mission. Subsequently, the US worked with the international community throughout stability, support, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations to help East Timor gain independence and strengthen its state institutions.

The UN played a major role in coordinating the INTERFET mission to restore stability to East Timor for Operation Stabilise. INTERFET provided initial security to East Timor, but critical planning and cooperation for the follow-on mission of stability, security, transition to civil

authority, and reconstruction seemed lacking. Although the UN accepted responsibility from INTERFET forces, a comprehensive requirements assessment in coordination with the East Timorese took time to develop.

Leading the operation, Australia struggled with the requirements of rapidly deploying forces and sustaining operations. The UN identification of requirements for East Timor's future slowly evolved, but was not well coordinated with Timor-Leste's government. A concerted planning effort through an inter-agency coordination element for the UN could have facilitated the early identification of East Timor's requirements.

Operation Stabilise reinforced the need for interdependent relationships between coalition partners, despite the concept of coalition logistics as a national responsibility. Providing unique capabilities, the USG encouraged support for the Australian lead role and demonstrated the US willingness to work towards a solution in support of East Timor. The US military worked in partnership to allow for a smooth transition to the UNTAET mission and subsequent UN missions. In order to leverage partnerships and strengthen international cooperation, it was essential for the interim commander to work with coalition partners to determine requirements while preparing for follow-on mission support. As indicated in Operation Stabilise, full cooperation with coalition partners as well as other agencies was essential for success.

During the UNTAET mission, the UN coordinated support through the UNJLC. With security maintenance and long-term capacity building as goals for Timor-Leste, the UN endeavored to effectively coordinate with international development organizations and institutional agencies to meet the objectives outlined in numerous UN SCRs. Throughout UN operations in East Timor, development partners contributed many types of assistance central to the F-FDTL's development.

As indicated, existing military doctrines describe coalition logistics as a national responsibility. During Operation Stabilise, however, this concept again proved unrealistic. In order to accomplish the INTERFET mission, coalition partners relied heavily upon one another to

maximize limited logistics and resource capabilities. With a role to support INTERFET coalition forces, the US force component experienced the practice of shared responsibility first hand providing support to bolster other national forces in the initial stages of the conflict.

In terms of national responsibility, a nation in its genesis cannot reasonably be expected to ensure its own logistics functions. Therefore, a comprehensive assessment of the needs and tasks associated with East Timor's requirements and long-range planning for those East Timor's resource requirements could have facilitated a more integrated attempt for development and capacity building. In terms of East Timor's force determination, the UN did not work extensively with Timor-Leste's government in the beginning.

In the initial stages of the INTERFET mission, Australia provided the US forces an abundance of logistics support. The support included the pre-positioning of forces in Darwin, Australia on a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) base. US forces established this as a communications and logistics node, an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), until the ADF established ports of entry at East Timorese airfields and opened a seaport. Both the distance over which US supplies traveled and the initial security situation in East Timor demanded an ISB within the theater. Within the US force capabilities, the airlift assets provided essential support to ensure the Australian lead INTERFET mission was a success. Using the US airlift assets allowed rapid transportation of supplies, personnel, and equipment in East Timor where ground lines of communication were inadequate for swift movement.

The US force element of INTERFET worked with nearly fifteen other countries in support of the mission. The relationship with the US forces in East Timor worked well overall considering the complexity of forces. Within the sphere of logistics, the arrangement of operational control proved exponentially challenging and proved volatile as it had during the planning stages of the operation. Support operations were complicated by the size of forces, the scope of the theater, and the time and space arrangement impacting supply lines. During both the

INTERFET mission and the follow-on UN mission, INTERFET commanders tackled logistics challenges stemming from capability limitations and the provision of basic support functions.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES

Effects of Domestic Policy on Foreign Assistance

From a historical perspective, the different executive and legislative practices described in each case study provided examples of whom and how US foreign policy was implemented. As evidenced in each of the three case studies, the shifting of foreign policy follows with the NSS objectives set during the elected administrations. In balancing national security issues with foreign affairs, the pendulum swings back and forth between legislative bodies depending on the USG's priorities. This swing back and forth is nothing new concerning foreign policy.⁹⁹

By 1945, the US, with its military might and industrial economy, acquired its position as a central actor on the world stage. As the Roosevelt and Truman administration prosecuted World War II, foreign policy goals took shape based on the threat of the spread of communism. With a strategy of containment, the importance of security assistance took a different approach.¹⁰⁰ The transition of security assistance allowed the USG to sell surplus property left in Europe. By

⁹⁹See Appendix D this monograph for a discussion on the interplay between US domestic and foreign policy and practices used by executive and legislative branches.

¹⁰⁰Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *Foreign Aid by the U.S. Government, 1940-1951* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), 2, 35-38; Whitney H. Shepardson, United States in World Affairs, Council of Foreign Relations 1938; quoted in Huston, *Outposts and Allies*; Department of the Army, *Annual Report of the Army Service Forces for Fiscal Year 1945* (Washington, DC: Army Service Forces), 63-74; and James A. Huston, *Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1988), 131. After declaring Victory in Japan, President Truman terminated the Lend-Lease Program and security assistance transitioned to support peacetime defense preparations. The Lend-Lease Program was the mechanism for furnishing military equipment to allied nations throughout the war. For the fiscal years 1940-1945, the USG directed a total of 95 percent of all foreign aid to the Lend-Lease Program. Of the aid offered to other governments, the total value of supplies and equipment amounted to approximately \$49.1 billion--28.6 for Britain and the dependencies, 10.8 billion for the Soviet Union, 2.6 billion for France, and 5.1 billion for all other recipients. Goods and services furnished to the United States by foreign governments as "reverse lend-lease" amounted to \$7.8 billion. Prior to the termination of the Lend-Lease Program, security assistance completed the process of evolution from private loans to government loans to government grants. Except for continued assistance to China, the program required that foreign assistance return to a cash or loan basis.

selling surplus equipment to European countries, the USG focused on the redemption of economic value rather than the serviceability of the equipment. Instead of losing resources already invested in the defense of Europe, the USG chose to resell the equipment, rather than transport it back to the United States.¹⁰¹

In the immediate post war years, America's foreign policy through assistance became known as the Truman Doctrine. Concerned with security against communist aggression, the USG shifted from demobilization efforts to maintaining large forces overseas. Security concerns led the USG to extend alliances, assist with the build-up of friendly powers, and maintain American military advisory groups in many noncommunist countries.¹⁰² In coordination with the State Department and other agencies within the USG, foreign military aid continued to dominate army logistic policies, as the USG entered the postwar period. In fact, transfers of surplus property and lend-lease goods continued to supplement the security of over fifty countries in the period between 1 July 1945 and 31 December 1946. Security assistance--including cash loans, transfers of goods and services on terms of deferred payment, and grants in money in kind--totaled \$14.3 billion.¹⁰³

As far as European assistance, the Marshall Plan established a means of enabling the economic recovery of Europe. By December 1947, the Truman administration focused on the Marshall Plan as an effective tool for the NSS of containment against Soviet communism.¹⁰⁴ Initiated in 1948, the Marshall Plan dispensed over \$13 billion toward the reconstruction of

¹⁰¹Department of Commerce, v, vi.

¹⁰²Huston, *Outposts and Allies*, 87.

¹⁰³Brookings Institution Library, *Major Problems in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1947), 165-166; and Department of the Army, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 126. Although \$7.8 billion of the total assistance amount was spent in that time, the commitment remained to grant other assistance in succeeding years.

¹⁰⁴The analysis of Policy Planning Staff Document 1, 23 May 1947, in Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1947-1949*, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983); and William H. Mott, IV, *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 134.

Europe in only four years.¹⁰⁵ A combination of humanitarian concern, a strategic effort to contain Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and the need to restore European markets for US goods inspired the Marshall Plan. Further, the Marshall Plan became a “blueprint” for early aid programs in developing countries.¹⁰⁶

Due to the issues with surplus military equipment and supplies in Europe, the program was redesigned in the early 1950s and geared toward bolstering foreign governments to allow for containment of communism and deterrence. The Mutual Security Administration (MSA) replaced the Marshall Plan and provided “primarily military aid and defense support and secondarily, economic and food aid.”¹⁰⁷ The shift in policy occurred as a result of aggressive Russian actions with regard to Greece and Turkey, exploding an atomic bomb, and the Berlin Blockade in the immediate post war years.¹⁰⁸ The MSA’s economic development was geared to stop the expansion of communism through the MDAP and instituted the military and defense aid program.

US foreign policy transformed through a series of legislation and policy documents as evidenced by the Lend-Lease Act, the Marshall Plan, and the National Security Council (NSC) 68. These policy documents solidified the NSS and the USG’s involvement in foreign affairs. After 1950 and the passing of the MDAP Act, economic recovery of Europe lost its focus. When Congress passed the MDAP Act, the nature of assistance shifted away from economic recovery and towards a defense focus in the interests of national security. Although incomplete, by 1953, the economic recovery of the European nations lost emphasis. President Truman saw the need to reestablish a peacetime force to contain communist Russia and deter a Soviet threat. Through the

¹⁰⁵Paula Hoy, *Players and Issues in International Aid* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press Inc., 1998), 16-17.

¹⁰⁶Ibid. “The Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) administered the Marshall Plan.”

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 16.

¹⁰⁸Huston, *Outposts and Allies*, 134-135.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the USG implemented its peacetime solution--build the capacity of Europe to defend itself against a Soviet threat.¹⁰⁹

Eventually, the North Atlantic Treaty powers admitted Germany and Italy to NATO; however, this process took over five years of debate and negotiation. In 1955, NATO leaders made the FRG a member and allowed German units to participate in the defense of Europe against communist Russia.¹¹⁰ Through security assistance, the USG provided critical stability and support that enabled the FRG to regain its defense posture.

Throughout the Cold War, the USG focused on a containment strategy; however, security assistance often took indirect approaches to meet foreign policy and national security objectives. Harold A. Hovey provided a thorough review of the Cold War security assistance program in *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices*. In his comprehensive study, Hovey defined postwar policy for military assistance throughout the Cold War not just involving Europe, but for other areas of the globe.¹¹¹ Undoubtedly, the USG designed the MAP, grants of equipment, the Military Assistance Training Program, and the Military Sales Program as tools to bolster the defense programs of countries seeking stability and self-protection.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹Huston, *Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953*, 608. Insofar as the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and its indoctrination to NATO, France denied any suggestions for reconstituting German divisions or a general staff. However, Jules Moch, the French Defense Minister, suggested that the Germans integrate into a unified European Army.

¹¹⁰Ibid. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden of Great Britain found the solution in reinvigorating Germany and Italy through the Western European Union.

¹¹¹Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1965), 306. Harold A. Hovey provided a detailed explanation of the inner workings of policy with security assistance programs. Chapter 1 provides a definition of military assistance, USG postwar policy, and the MDAP. Chapter 5 covers military assistance to Europe and NATO costs. Chapter 8 describes economic impacts, military contributions to economic development, and trade-offs between economic and military aid. Chapter 9 covers the USG's administration of the MAP. Chapter 10 explains grants of equipment. Chapter 11 reviews the Military Assistance Training Program and discusses the costs and benefits of training. Chapter 12 provides a description of the Military Sales Program ranging from different types of sales through the organization of sales. Chapter 13 summarizes Congressional support and control over military aid. Chapter 14 describes the MAP and why it is criticized. Chapter 15 provides Hovey's own conclusions about the MAP. Finally, Chapter 16 discusses whether or not the USG should end the MAP and his views on the subject.

¹¹²From the years following World War II through 1965, the security assistance program reflected the shift in domestic and international policies. Different pieces of legislation attempted to reform the program during that time. Legislative reform occurred as a result of economic and military budget concerns

Yet, another work emphasized military assistance during the majority of the Cold War. In *Military Assistance in Recent Wars*, author Stephanie G. Neuman determined that both the US and the Soviet Union played major roles in the evolution of military assistance programs. Through her examination of the superpowers and their competitive roles, Neuman posited that “military assistance is a potent weapon of policy, used or withheld with great effect by the superpowers.”¹¹³ Further, her study of eight wars illustrated the importance of US involvement in rivalry with the Soviet Union and the uses of military assistance in creating stability throughout the world. Finally, Neuman’s examination showed that the US used foreign assistance to gain an advantage over the Soviet Union and perhaps prevented any conflicts in the Third World “from escalating to the point at which open hostilities between the two superpowers might occur.”¹¹⁴

Whereas the US NSS focused on containment of communism in the Truman Doctrine and throughout the Cold War, the Clinton Doctrine of “democratic enlargement” attempted to focus on four areas. As scholar Douglas Brinkley stated, the enlargement blueprint focused on four points:

1) to strengthen the community of market democracies; 2) to foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible; 3) to counter the aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy; and 4) to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.¹¹⁵

In dealing with threats, the Clinton Administration examined countries relevant to the US domestic policies on a case-by-case basis. Both the Haiti and East Timor case studies illustrate how the USG pursued the foreign policy objectives set by the Clinton Administration. Reluctant

generated by different administrations. Each President took a different approach towards the security assistance program. However, the security assistance program remained an important tool of US foreign policy in the pursuit of national security objectives.

¹¹³Stephanie G. Neuman, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers, The Washington Papers*/122/with a foreword by Ernest Graves (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1986), viii.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” *Foreign Policy* 106 (spring, 1997), 116; available from <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/106/democraticenlargement.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 14 January 2007.

to intervene militarily, the Clinton Administration pursued intervention or peacekeeping operations. Both Haiti and East Timor stability and support operations lacked long-term commitment of military force and resources. While in comparison, President Truman directed assistance programs towards the revitalization of Europe and the FRG to thwart the spread of communism in the aftermath of total-war.

Complexity of the Operational Environment

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar struggle that formerly existed, the USG realized the importance of proactive involvement in foreign affairs. Because the US wants to remain influential in the world, the USG continually works to build coalitions and alliances to secure America's most basic interests. Today the US world position demands what Sir Halford Mackinder called the "landsman" mentality, which emphasizes inseparability, interconnection, and equilibrium. This view, known as globalization, relies upon mutual dependence rather than separateness. James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode presented the recognition and "acceptance of this geopolitical reality and of the constraints" as fundamentally important in redesigning today's foreign policy.¹¹⁶

Besides theories on globalization, democratization continues to play a role on the US NSS agenda. Within political theory, democratization is defined as "the evolutionary process of democratic norms, institutions and practices and the dissemination of them within and across national and cultural boundaries."¹¹⁷ What does this equate to for security assistance? Democratization is founded on the principle assumption of liberalism--that no democracies have ever fought a war against each other. In theory, democratization seems to translate to less war or less use of the military for stability; however, in practice democratization, the building of

¹¹⁶James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, "Back to Basics: US Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade," *Parameters* (spring 2000): 51-56.

¹¹⁷Taylor and Francis Group, *Democratization*, vol. 13; available from <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/13510347.asp>; Internet; accessed on 13 November 2006.

democratic-like nation-states equates to a lengthy process of security assistance, reconstruction, and economic development in the affected state.

Global partners understand the benefits of democratic-like states, but may not agree with the same ideals held by the US. Therefore, without common interests, international partners may not want to invest in the long-term security assistance processes required to achieve the full effects of stabilization. Wavering support from the international community, particularly traditional European allies, reduces the legitimacy and effectiveness of the USG in the eyes of the American public and diminishes the nation's ability to fully realize the benefits of multilateral cooperation.¹¹⁸ Gaining the legitimacy and support of traditional western allies remains crucial to US public opinion. Therefore, when committing the military to security assistance activities, the USG considers international opinion imperative even when deciding for unilateral action.

The global security environment after World War II allowed the USG to focus on NATO and promoting democracy and free markets in a containment strategy. With fewer actors in terms of foreign policy, the USG focused on strengthening partners and furthering US interests. In the 1990s, the Clinton Administration focused on the promotion of democracy; however, there were a greater number of actors after the Cold War faded. "We live in an era without power blocs in which old assumptions must be re-examined, institutions modernized and relationships transformed," Albright, noted in December 1996.¹¹⁹ In some ways, the Clinton Doctrine still focused its foreign policy agenda on Cold War threats. President Clinton created the NATO alliance's Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994, an agreement among NATO's current members intended to ease the orderly process of democratic enlargement. The PFP focused on admitting new members to NATO while modernizing the organization.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York, NY: Vintage Books Edition, A Division of Random House, Inc., January 2004), 144-158.

¹¹⁹Douglas Brinkley, 121.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 122.

Considering background, the immediate years following World War II were much different from those of the 1990s.¹²¹ No longer focusing on a bipolar world, the operational environment with more global players defines an increasingly complex system. Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen discussed the facet of interaction in *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*. Taking into account a change of interaction patterns, not only was the world more connected in the 1990s than in the aftermath of World War II, but also technological advances introduced both increased possibility and greater uncertainty.¹²² Especially in terms of communications and the media, public opinion in the 1990s mattered more than in the past because the possibility of exposure increased.

Yet, in other ways, the Haiti and East Timor case studies demonstrated the reality of the post-Cold War operational environment taking shape. In reality, the environment that the Clinton Administration and the USG operated in was more complex and the increased interaction of players resulted in increased uncertainty. With a greater number of players participating in the UN, the possibilities for interaction increased. Axelrod and Cohen define interaction as essential to the framework of the system because the events of interests within that system arise from the interactions of its agents with each other and with artifacts.¹²³ Further, the US strategy to achieve democratic enlargement largely shifted from a defense to an economic focus. In complex adaptive systems, there are many actors who “interact in intricate ways that continually reshape their collective future.”¹²⁴

In contrast, the USG focused on World War II Germany’s stability and support operations in cooperation with NATO partners. Alas, the operations in Haiti and East Timor

¹²¹See Appendices A, B, and C this monograph for detailed background summaries on Post WWII Germany, Haiti, and East Timor, respectively.

¹²²Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Perseus Books Group, 2000), 73.

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Ibid., xi.

gained momentum under UN auspices. In each of the three case studies, different partnerships or interactions played critical roles in shaping the outcome of actions and participation. Whether or not all partners had the same common goal or represented self-interests can be debated; however, the evidence for existence of a complex environment speaks loudly.

Integrated Planning for the Long-Term

For each of the three case studies, some amount of planning occurred for post-conflict or stability and support operations. The amount of planning for postwar Germany occurred over at least a two year period of time as evidenced by the formation of the GCU, the principal postwar planning organization that was part of the G-5. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing Germany at national, regional, and local levels. Initially, planning for peace and the occupation of Germany required a multinational effort to coordinate the actions of both the USG and Great Britain's government.

In so far as integration of other agencies in logistics planning for postwar operations, the G-4 Annex of the plan for Talisman, later Eclipse, identified tasks for the allocation of resources. Concerning the planning process and integration with other agencies, attempts were made by the US military and War Department leaders to synchronize planning for war's aftermath with the Departments of State and Treasury; however, little cooperation occurred. Perhaps this was due to volatile nature of US strategic interests as war ended.

Considering the civil-military cooperation thought to be necessary by the USG for stability and support operations, the military took the lead in international logistics execution with the MDAP. As a result of an inadequate, integrated approach, the USG gained no immediate results from the MDAP in reconstituting the FRG. In consequence, the USG's disjointed approach to achieving an overall end-state resulted in the delayed reconstruction of the FRG defense capacity. Absent a long-range predictive foreign assistance budget and plan for capacity building across all facets of restoring civil-society, the USG struggled to fulfill the tasks

associated with long-term national security goals. Shaping postwar stability operations largely relied on policy goals of the countries conferring the peace. The synergy of the NATO alliance in combination with the policy and legislative actions that transformed helped shape a long-term plan for Germany's revitalization through security assistance.

Hence, the USG required an integrated approach to synchronize national policy goals with the critical requirements requested through the MDAP. Concerning international logistics, the USG sent assistance groups to the countries designated to receive aid as outlined by the MDAP. These military assistance advisory groups (MAAG) executed tasks under the Ambassador or Minister and streamlined operations with the economic or technical assistance mission.

In contrast to postwar Germany, the planning efforts for Haiti occurred in a shorter duration and were more integrated between the US military and other players. In cooperation with the UN, the USG worked together with international partners and US government agencies. In the near term, the integrated approach worked well to synchronize the actions necessary to meet overall objectives. As demonstrated in the case study, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) strengthened international cooperation in support of peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Further, enacting the provisions of the FAA, the MNF commander implemented a valuable tool in support of the transition to the UNMIH.

Establishing support in the interim allowed for a seamless transition for follow-on forces and illustrated the importance of the FAA. At the strategic level, the USG used the FAA as a tool to shape coalition operations. Likewise, the US DOD Haiti Planning Group played a crucial role in shaping the transition to the UN. With the assistance of other government agencies, the DOD Haiti Planning Group devised an intricate interagency checklist for restoration of essential services. The USAID led interagency efforts for all critical service areas, with minimal DOD support.

However, considering the NSS and the absence of resource commitment for long-term strategic goals, the US military's efforts in Haiti went largely unrealized. In the long-term, the USG failed to dedicate resources to meet overall objectives as evidenced in the US military's return to Haiti for Operation Secure Tomorrow in 2004. Although international cooperation was evident in the planning and execution for Haiti's future, long-term focus and commitment to democracy faltered as did commitment for security assistance.

Concerning the Australian led mission in East Timor, integrated planning between multiple agencies within the USG and international partners played a crucial role in determining requirements for the INTERFET mission. Specifically, INTERFET participants from the US military and Australian Defense Forces began contingency planning well in advance of operations. The success of the INTERFET mission relied on long-term contingency planning by Australian and US forces. Those plans could not be put into action until the UN, and in particular the US, exerted sufficient pressure on Indonesia to agree to the international force.¹²⁵

In the near term, the US Army and other DOD services played a crucial role in planning to meet short-term objectives. However, the planning focused on the short-term support of Australia in accomplishing its goals rather than the rehabilitation of East Timor. Left to the UN and others, East Timor's future appeared uncertain swimming in a sea of interagency confusion between the UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international participants as the UNTAET mission took control. Absent coordination between all agencies, an integrated approach in planning was inadequate. As evidenced in the stability and support operations that followed the INTERFET mission, the UN failed to work with the Timor-Leste leadership to determine resource requirements.

¹²⁵Marian Wilkinson, "How Cosgrove Led his Warriors for Peace," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 January 2000; available from <http://www.etan.org/et2000a/january/22-31/31howcos.htm>; Internet; accessed on 12 January 2007.

International Cooperation and Harnessing Requirements

During World War II, the United States and its allies realized the important roles of allies and logistics. Sharing the burden of the resources required to sustain operations allowed coalition partners to further strengthen alliances in working and accomplishing a common purpose.

Winston Churchill reflected on the importance of the American and British coalition in a speech at Harvard entitled *The Price of Greatness is Responsibility*. In this speech Churchill commented, “nothing will work soundly or for long without the united effort of the British and American peoples.”¹²⁶ After the same horrific war, General Dwight D. Eisenhower commented, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”¹²⁷ Hence, two distinguished war leaders highlighted the fundamental role of coalitions and the decisive nature of logistics.

Security assistance to other nations gained renewed impetus due to the USG’s ability to influence the security and stability of war-torn Europe. With a standing coalition of partners and a “Europe first” attitude after the war, Europe’s stability and reconstructed economy became a priority. Under the auspices of the Grand Alliance, USG leaders worked in concert to build the security of Europe while simultaneously boosting the European and American economies.

Realizing the needs of allies allowed the US to support the security goals of European and Asian nations. With a strong economy and the ability to meet global logistics challenges, the USG established a policy for furnishing military equipment to allies. This policy evolved as “one of the most far-reaching developments in American military affairs.”¹²⁸ As the war ended in Europe and the USG defined its containment strategy, the US military devised the requirements

¹²⁶Winston Churchill, “The Price of Greatness is Responsibility,” Speech at Harvard University, 6 September 1943, 4; available from <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=424>; Internet; accessed on 25 October 2006.

¹²⁷Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in Hawthorne Daniel, *For Want of a Nail: The Influence of Logistics on War* (New York, NY: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), xii.

¹²⁸Huston, *Outposts and Allies*, 128.

for the FRG's defense capabilities. Through advisor groups known as the MAAGs, the US military facilitated the process for capacity building in Germany with regard to American grand strategy.

The NATO alliance facilitated cooperation; however, left logistics to individual countries. In reality, the US provided a tremendous amount of support for assistance through legislation and funding. Willing to assist Europe with defense capabilities, the USG committed to supporting Germany and other NATO partners. Ironically, joint and NATO logistics doctrine focuses more on the operational and tactical levels of logistics in warfare, rather than the strategic level necessary to achieve an overall end-state. At the strategic level, international cooperation is vital to success.

Concerning Haiti, the USG took the lead role in Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. The MNF evolved as a cooperative partnership through the aid of both advisor groups and security assistance; however, no long term plan existed to ensure stability and development occurred. Although the operations in Haiti from 1994 to 1997 provide an illustrative example of international cooperation, the USG's commitment after the UN took control of the peacekeeping mission slowly dwindled. The case study documented the necessity in providing coalition partners crucial logistics support during the transition to UN control for operations. Partner nations in some cases lacked the capabilities for sustaining long-term operations away from their own countries. Moreover, the US military provided security assistance through the UN to those nations to abrogate shortfalls in capabilities.

For both US missions in Haiti, the term "national responsibility" again proved unrealistic. Although both NATO and Joint doctrine describe logistics as a national responsibility, the reality continued to evolve during operations in Haiti. When transitioning from MNF control or MIF control to a UN resolution mission, self-sustainment for many coalition partners was an unrealistic expectation. In order to leverage partnerships and strengthen international cooperation,

it was essential for the interim commander to work with coalition partners to determine requirements while preparing for follow-on mission support.

For Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow, coalition partners shared responsibility for UNMIH and MINUSTAH, respectively. Although the USG chose to provide the majority of logistics support capability in the initial stages of both stability and support missions, the UN facilitated the coordination for shared responsibilities thereafter. From the outset, UN units were required to be self-sufficient for thirty to ninety days upon arrival in Haiti. As a result, some nations who lacked self-sustaining capabilities withdrew assurances to participate in Haiti. The US military provided much of this support until UN services were established. As demonstrated, the FAA strengthened international cooperation in support of peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Establishing support in the interim allowed for a seamless transition for follow-on forces and illustrated the importance of the FAA. At the strategic level, the USG used the FAA as a tool to shape coalition operations.

As indicated in Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow, full cooperation with other DOD agencies, USG agencies, the UN, NGO, and others was essential to success. In the strategic sense, the requirements of coalition partners were not identified early enough to mitigate the effects. Not knowing the capabilities of coalition partners and other non-governmental agencies in advance disallowed logisticians the ability to anticipate requirements and coordinate for capacity shortfalls as quickly as possible.

In working with coalition partners, the UN, and other agencies, the case study illustrated the need for logistics systems knowledge concerning UN procedures and familiarity with key players. Both of these issues caused turmoil throughout operations in Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow. Further, the US military's lack of knowledge concerning interagency and non-governmental operations was evident particularly in Uphold Democracy. Training and education could remedy the lack of knowledge of interagency and non-US agencies to some extent. The

case study illuminated the need for training in UN procedures and familiarity with other non-governmental agencies.

During the transition to UN control, a MNF operated in Haiti in order to meet the requirements of joint and coalition partners. In both US transitions, the interim commander established a joint logistics support node to bring all of the various DOD agencies and coalition forces under one support system. Similarly, when the US military went back into Haiti in 2004 for Operation Secure Tomorrow, the importance of standing up a joint logistics support node again proved essential. Although, a much smaller US military force was committed due to the USG's priority for support to the GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq, these logistics practices ensured vital support for follow-on operations.

In contrast, the INTERFET mission in East Timor and the subsequent transition to UNTAET illustrated repeated issues with international cooperation and logistics. In this particular case, the US specifically participated in support of Australia's lead role. During Operation Stabilise, the concept of national responsibility again proved unrealistic. In order to accomplish the INTERFET mission, coalition partners relied heavily upon one another to maximize limited logistics and resource capabilities. With a role to support INTERFET coalition forces, the US force component experienced the practice of shared responsibility first hand providing support to bolster other national forces in the initial stages of the conflict.

INTERFET provided initial security to East Timor, but critical planning and cooperation the follow-on mission of stability, security, transition to civil authority, and reconstruction seemed lacking. Although the UN accepted responsibility from INTERFET forces, a comprehensive requirements assessment in coordination with the East Timorese took time to develop. The UN identification of requirements for East Timor's future slowly evolved, but was not well coordinated with Timor-Leste's government. A concerted planning effort through an inter-agency coordination element for the UN could have facilitated the early identification of

East Timor's requirements. An integrated multinational planning team could focus on coordination of resources to meet East Timor's capacity building requirements immediately.

Providing unique capabilities, the USG encouraged support for the Australian lead role and demonstrated US willingness to work towards a solution in support of East Timor. By providing military and other security assistance to allies, the USG actively pursued international cooperation while further developing its relations in Southeast Asia. Specifically, after the transition to UN mission control, the US contributed contract support to provide logistic support for F-FDTL requirements.¹²⁹

Providing critical capabilities to Australia during the INTERFET transition, the US military worked in partnership to allow for a smooth transition to the UNTAET mission and subsequent UN missions. In order to leverage partnerships and strengthen international cooperation, it was again essential for the interim commander to work with coalition partners to determine requirements while preparing for follow-on mission support. As indicated in Operation Stabilise, full cooperation with coalition partners as well as other agencies was essential for success.

During the UNTAET mission, the UN coordinated support through the UNJLC. The UNJLC "intensified coordination and pooling of logistics assets among UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF."¹³⁰ With security maintenance and long-term capacity building as goals for Timor-Leste, the UN endeavored to effectively coordinate with international development organizations and institutional agencies to meet the objectives outlined in numerous UN SCRs. Throughout UN operations in East Timor, development partners contributed many types of assistance central to

¹²⁹Hasegawa. The contract support provided for Timor-Leste included waste management and catering support until 1 April 2005. At the time of the conference in New Delhi, the USG provided support for future operations with a five-person US Army mobile training team (MTT) to conduct "staff operations training" in March 2005.

¹³⁰United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, Brief Description.

the F-FDTL's development. The types of support contributed by participating nations included advisors, training, logistics support, equipment, vehicles, vessels, and infrastructure.

Conclusions

As illustrated by the comparative analysis, coalition logistics remains an important topic. Due to the shifting interplay between domestic security and foreign policy agendas, the implementation of security assistance remained crucial to international cooperation. Each of the three case studies highlighted the importance of strategic and operational level coalition logistics. The level of commitment to security assistance varied with the goals and policies set by the respective US NSS strategies. In practice, the role of advisory groups remained important as did organizational planning elements responsible for coordinating resources.

Considering context, the security environment depicted by the case studies allowed representation of the transition from a Cold War bi-polar world to an increasingly complex, interconnected world. Focusing on interaction, the new world represented a shift in the global environment in that the 'old world' was less complex with fewer actors and less exposure. Further, the author described the security environment in the immediate post-Cold War years as uncertain with more global actors and a higher propensity for media exposure.

In terms of integrated planning for long-term operations, the analysis recognized that the US military focused primarily on the long-term requirements in postwar Germany and for short-term requirements in Haiti and East Timor. During preparation for and during the postwar reconstruction efforts in Germany, the US military planned for follow-on operations with coalition partners. In terms of integrated planning with other USG agencies, postwar Germany illustrated minimal effort leaving the military responsible for interagency planning and resource allocation until the NSS shifted its focus. For the operations in Haiti, the US Army focused primarily on planning for decisive operations and an overall end state to achieve stability and promote democracy. Lacking a long-term strategic focus to truly establish democracy resulted in

a short-term planning focus. For East Timor, the same short sighted planning focus occurred although the case highlighted a greater concern for integrated planning with Australia, the UN, NGOs, and other DOD agencies.

Finally, the analysis recognized the need for international cooperation despite doctrinal limitations of national responsibility. In practice, coalition operations require shared responsibility and early identification of capability shortfalls. In order for the USG to maximize the resources of coalition partners and share the burden of support, the author identified the need to identify requirements and capabilities well in advance of operations. Further, the case studies highlighted the need for familiarity and knowledge in UN logistics procedures and familiarity with interagency and NGO practices. These themes highlight the significant challenges for today's operational environment. The following section proposes recommendations to aid in the development for the future requirements of a complex security environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The potential value of foreign aid through security assistance is greater today than ever. In order to mitigate the effects of emerging global threats, a reexamination of the use of US military force is required. Rather than solely relying on the military instrument of power in its traditional, decisive form, the US Army through international cooperation and security assistance continues to prosecute the GWOT. In the preventive sense, capacity building requires a commitment to long-term stability and support operations. In the past, capacity building through security assistance allowed the USG to invest minimal resources over periods of time to ensure the stability of other nations. USG officials need to proactively engage traditional allies and invest resources to build the capacity of other potential allies in support of the GWOT, but also for the future. This section provides recommendations and areas for further research.

In order to provide recommendations, the author introduces coalition logistics practices currently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq to shift the context from past to current coalition

logistics operations. These current practices demonstrate the current reality of stability and support operations in practice. Further, the author uses the GWOT assessment section to allow for continuity and demonstrate the relevance of why and how coalition logistics are imperative to winning the peace and winning the war.

Global War on Terrorism Assessment

Today in Afghanistan and Iraq the US military revitalizes concepts that existed until after the Vietnam War. Lest forgotten, counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, the role of military advisor groups (MAGs), and civil operations and revolutionary development support (CORDS) in building capacity resurge from the memories of Vietnam.¹³¹ These capabilities slowly dilapidated after the Vietnam War ended. Although not completely dissolved, the majority of these capabilities defaulted to reserve component units or remained in small numbers within Special Forces units. Choosing the decisive fight as its priority for the Cold War, the priority for MAGs, studying COIN, and CORDS frittered away as better technology allowed for precision, speed, and high intensity weaponry. Nevertheless, the civil affairs, MAGs, and other security assistance capabilities continued to play a role in building the capacity of nations in the periphery of US national security interests.

Today in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Army revitalizes the practices of COIN, civil affairs, and MAGs among a number of other stabilization and reconstruction tasks. Since December 2002, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have operated in Afghanistan under

¹³¹Historynet.com, "CORDS: Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam," as told by Brigadier General Philip Bolte, U.S. Army (retired); available from http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3943936.html; Internet; accessed on 12 January 2007. Brigadier General Bolte was at the heart of civil operations and revolutionary development support as the US province senior advisor..

the control of the US-led Coalition.¹³² As NATO forces provide security, the other members of the International Community (IC) facilitate the reconstruction efforts and allow the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to support the needs of the population. Having successfully been introduced, US forces work in partnership with NATO partners to establish “a measure of stability” to localities through patrolling, monitoring, influence, and mediation.¹³³

As of 2 December 2006, the US Army shifted “thousands of combat troops into advisory positions with Iraqi Army and police units, especially in the capital, in their latest attempt to bring sectarian violence under control.”¹³⁴ At the time, the US Army already had assigned between 4,000 and 5,000 troops to about 400 training teams. With the intent of bolstering Iraqi security forces, the US Army goal was “to create platoon-size teams of 20 to 30 advisers for each Iraqi battalion.”¹³⁵

Focusing on capacity building in the midst of turmoil and transformation, the US Army, other DOD partners, and coalition partners employ PRTs, Military Transition Teams (MTTs), Border Patrol Transition Teams (BTTs), Police Transition Teams (PTTs), and Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) while tackling the challenges of COIN operations and rebuilding

¹³²NATO, OTAN, International Security Assistance Force, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Background. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 22 December 2005; available from <http://www2.hq.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounders/BackPRT.htm>; Internet; accessed on 12 January 2007. One of the major PRT tasks for the NATO forces is to monitor, assess, advise and support Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities in close coordination with United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), SSR lead-nations and bilateral programs. Problematically, this “task” equates to several tasks.

¹³³Ibid.

¹³⁴Thom Shanker and Edward Wong, “U.S. Troops in Iraq Shifting to Advisory Roles,” *The New York Times*, 5 December 2006, 1; available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/world/middleeast/05strategy.html?ex=1322974800&en=87e5da1b51c808c6&ei=5088partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007.

¹³⁵“The larger teams would also have communications specialists capable of such tasks as calling in air strikes and medical evacuations, Pentagon officials say. American officers in Iraq say expanding the teams could also allow trainers to work more intimately with Iraqi soldiers, down to the company level. The teams would also be able to watch more closely for sectarian biases and human rights abuses.” Ibid.

nations.¹³⁶ In the struggle for stability of the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi security forces continue to face significant challenges particularly in administrative and logistics areas.

In the November 2006 issue of *National Defense Magazine*, writer David Axe described some of the logistics challenges in Iraq. For the 10th Iraqi Army Division, Axe stated:

The 10th Division is capable of planning and executing its own missions, but usually operates alongside British forces. The division, a light infantry formation, has four brigades each with two line battalions of 800 troops apiece, plus engineer and bomb disposal companies. Small divisional attachments including signals troops and military police are just now standing up with foreign assistance. There are currently no organic logistics troops.¹³⁷

While some of the shortfalls directly hinge upon resources, others directly regard the lack of capabilities to perform logistics functions such as maintenance and transportation. Building legitimate forces is not an easy task and encompasses not only equipment and personnel resources, but leadership and training to execute the requisite logistics functions. Some of these issues look all too familiar concerning the concept of “national responsibility” defined in US military and NATO doctrine. Once again, can government officials and military leaders reasonably expect a new government to establish legitimate security forces without resources?

In order to effectively establish the security capacity in Iraq, the Iraqi military forces require more than training, funding, equipment, and people. An assessment of the requirements, current capabilities, and shortfalls is not sufficient in order to account for the myriad of other issues at the tactical level concerning accountability and responsibility for issued items. Problems with accountability of issued items have compiled into a significant loss in accountability for the

¹³⁶John Koopman, Chronicle Staff Writer, “Putting an Iraqi Face on the Fight, U.S. Goal: Turn Battlefield Over to Iraqi’s by Year’s End,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 21 May 2006; available from <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/05/21/MNGURIVCFU1.DTL>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007.

¹³⁷David Axe, “Equipment Shortages Undermine Iraqi Army,” *National Defense Magazine* (November 2006); available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/November/Equipmentshorta.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 January 2007. A dearth of vehicles plus a broader lack of logistical support means the 10th Division is incapable of sustaining operations away from its bases for more than a few hours, according to one British Army officer. This effectively limits it to urban operations in Basra and short sorties from a handful of rural installations. Iraqi navy and air force units in the south suffer from their own logistical problems.”

Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Government. In order to achieve long lasting results in these areas, the US Army, coalition partners, and Iraqi military personnel will need a values based training approach, consistent advising, and commitment to building Iraq's security.

Concept of Support and Further Research Recommendations

In a broad sense, a concept of support examines requirements versus capabilities and determines shortfall areas. This section provides recommendations meant to rectify shortfall areas determined through the comparative analysis of the project. Further, through the analysis sections of the case studies, other areas were determined for further research. The author acknowledges that at the time of this study, there are ongoing efforts being made to rectify the numerous challenges within the sphere of coalition logistics.

First, to meet the requirements demanded by the NSS, the DOD should further explore the capacity building capabilities of the US Army. Currently, the force structure does not support the civil affairs, logistics, engineer, explosive ordnance, or MAG capability required of today's environment. The future force design should inculcate the plan to grow the skills required for a future, relevant force required for the GWOT and beyond. Concerning capacity building, logisticians, in particular, need an understanding of what role they fulfill concerning MAGs. In turn, the DOD should provide training for these roles.

Second, the joint community should train logisticians to meet future needs. For logisticians, the skills required should include, at a minimum: international partner capabilities training, force design training and the role of the MAG, contract support training, UNJLC training, interagency logistics practices, and NGO familiarity training. In addition, logisticians need a knowledge base in culture and languages, coalition practices, and transition operations. During transition operations, logisticians must work with coalition and host nation partners to identify requirements based on needed capabilities and design a long-range plan to resource

newly designed forces. Armed with these requisite skills, logisticians can better integrate with coalition partners and other key players while supporting operations and preparing for future operations.

Third, logistics leaders, at all levels, must understand the role of the complex environment in planning and execution. Training subordinates on the interaction of multiple players and external factors that influence the logistics system provides an appreciation for the operational environment. Leaders must train subordinates on the reality of today's environment focusing on interconnectivity and the media's impact. The planning process must build a systems approach into the mission analysis process to allow commanders and staffs to grasp the interaction of the multinodal system in requirements determination. In balancing requirements with available capabilities, planners should also account for the needs of coalition partners keeping in mind that stability and support operations typically require more support than decisive operations.

Fourth, military planners should consider a long range vision rather than an end-state when determining the overall objectives of a campaign. The term "end-state" implies mission accomplished at the end of combat operations. In the recent past, defining an end-state borrowed the assumption that the end of decisive combat operations equated to the accomplishment of the USG's objectives. In order to truly define mission accomplishment, the term end-state should be replaced with the term "vision" for the particular country being developed. Further, the vision would be defined as the overarching goal for the particular country being developed. An example of this would be: Country X's Vision equates to a free nation with a functioning government and institutions capable of supporting its population.

Fifth, replace the term "national responsibility" with "shared responsibility" in all doctrinal publications. The term national responsibility has outlived its usefulness. Further, when conducting transition operations in support of capacity building, add coalition logistics concepts to include transition operations with the inclusion of coalition partners. Doctrine should include

within the concept the immensity of the resources required to build security forces with logistics capabilities and the inculcation of values based training for host nation capacity in a weak or failed state. Two significant challenges that need to be addressed in training forces are accountability and responsibility. A values based approach for capacity building should be integrated from strategic through individual level.

Sixth, logistics planners must coordinate with coalition partners in advance to reduce contract support requirements in the transition phase. Limited resources require a better unity of effort in forecasting logistics requirements. In order to meet the shortfalls when operating in a constrained, complex environment, prior coordination with coalition partners would allow for greater flexibility. In the future, contract support may not be economically feasible and as always should never be assumed as a reliable method of support. Contract support may ultimately depend on available funding, the host nation's infrastructure, or security situation. Further, when analyzing the requirements of an operation to meet the overall vision for the host nation, logistics planners must consider the resources required to meet near term and long term objectives. By devising a long-range resource allocation plan, the overall vision for requirements may be better realized as capacity building is a long term project.

Finally, the logistics community should leverage web-based training resources and technology. Leaders should encourage subordinates to broaden individual logistics knowledge through on-line learning experiences such as the UNJLC training program, degree programs, and certification programs. Further, the joint logistics community should consider devising a shared community of practice web-site available to coalition partners and DOD logistics professionals. Information could be shared to exchange ideas and knowledge within the coalition logistics arena. At a minimum, the DOD should invest in a web-site with the Australian, British, Canadian, and American (ABCA) coalition partners with a goal of expanding to other Caribbean Command (CARICOM) and NATO members.

In closing, further topics for research might include integrated planning, organizational requirements for MAGs, logistics requirements for rebuilding a nation's defense, and the future of the US logistics corps with regard to security assistance. Currently, the entire concept of stability and support operations is being developed due to current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not only will the practice of international logistics require further research, but the concept of capacity building will remain relevant as well.

Final Thoughts

Leaders who examine history can better determine the shortfalls of US military logistics and determine how coalition logistics can fill those gaps in winning the GWOT. Further, decision makers who examine coalition logistics as not only an imperative for winning the war, but also for winning the peace may find solutions to problems by developing coalition logistics and determining how coalitions and logistics link tactical to strategic levels of war. Today's complex operational environment makes both the identification and coordination of logistics requirements more difficult than in the past. However, international logistics remain a vital tool in the USG's implementation of the NSS. Today, more than ever, coalition logistics is important.

Committing military force typically makes the situation worse before conflict resolution is truly realized. Ideally, a national and international commitment exists to restore order and stability. In reality, restoring an affected area is much more complex. Without a measure of security, reconstruction operations in the country or the affected region cannot be guaranteed. Often, USG officials do not clearly define the overall end state when forces are committed; therefore, the desired outcome is left open for interpretation of those expected to resolve the conflict. Perhaps the most important aspect of guaranteeing security is to examine the capacity, or the means, required to fulfill the desired vision of the country interacted with both in terms of the US foreign policy agenda and the NSS.

In balancing global engagement requirements with limited personnel and equipment, international resources allow the nation to maintain international involvement in a constrained environment with limited personnel and resources while bolstering cooperation with friends and allies. MAGs, as a part of security assistance to foreign governments, allow the USG to leverage the strategic link between coalition partners and logistics as it prosecutes a strategy and attempts to prevent future conflict. In order to maximize the benefits of international cooperation through military assistance programs, scholars, politicians, national leaders, military professionals, and international leaders must continually assess foreign policy goals and work as a team to devise plans that integrate and leverage the aspects of international logistics. Coalition logistics are essential to winning the peace and require long-term resource commitment and security assistance.

APPENDIX A

POST WORLD WAR II GERMANY--BACKGROUND

Prior to the war's end in Europe, the Grand Alliance tentatively outlined areas of responsibility for surrendered territories in Eastern Europe. Allied policies and responsibilities for security zones evolved through cooperative interaction between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Through a series of meetings at Casablanca in January 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and Potsdam in August 1945, members of the Grand Alliance developed functional agreements that outlined the unconditional surrender terms and disarmament of Germany, the destruction of Nazism, the punishment and treatment of war criminals, reparations and economic reform, disposition of eastern German borders and occupation zones, and population transfers.¹³⁸ Despite the dialogue and agreements made between allied members prior to Germany's surrender, cooperative arrangements slowly unraveled as the German territory yielded to allied forces.

The deepening tensions in the alliance were evident in Winston Churchill's correspondence to USG leaders such as President Roosevelt and General Eisenhower. In his correspondence to President Roosevelt dated 1 April 1945, Winston Churchill stressed the fear of giving the Soviet Union too much power in Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Churchill saw Berlin as "of high strategic importance" from a political standpoint and remained concerned that Russian armies would not only overrun Austria and Vienna, but try and capture Berlin.¹³⁹ Churchill expressed his concern with Russia taking Berlin. He believed that Russia would use Berlin as a

¹³⁸Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945-46* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 3; quoted in James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 3.

¹³⁹Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy: The Second World War*, Vol 6, Chartwell Edition, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflon Company, 1983), 464-465.

negotiating tool and impress upon the other allies Russia's overwhelming contribution to the common victory.

Waffling on an original agreement with Marshall Stalin, Winston Churchill tried to convince US leaders that "should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it."¹⁴⁰ As Germany's surrender took shape, Great Britain realized the implications of ceding Eastern Germany to Russia and began to waver on its original agreements. With tension mounting and the occupation of Germany looming, the alliance shifted and a communication of ideas turned into a chasm of uncertainty.

Victory in Europe occurred soon after Churchill communicated his doubts to American leaders. As the war culminated, the alliance began to come apart simultaneously. Although the alliance did not come apart suddenly, the transition between World War II and the resumption of normalcy in Germany was both discomforted and unpredictable.¹⁴¹ In war devastated Europe, allied leaders quickly realized the fallacy of war, that problems would be solved with the end of hostilities. In reality, "logistical problems, for example, were, if anything, greater than before."¹⁴²

The inextricable connection between domestic and international politics proved important in war's aftermath. With forces deployed around the globe over a four year timeframe, people demanded from politicians the immediate return of the troops. To further explain the issues involved with full-scale mobilization, leaders faced the challenge of disposing of mountains of excess equipment that piled up in 1944 and 1945 both domestically and abroad.¹⁴³ In order to return the national economy to its previous condition, leaders took supplies and materials meant for war and converted them back to meet mounting shortages of civilian goods. Rapid

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1981), 28.

¹⁴²Huston, *Army Historical Series: Sinews of War, 1775-1953*, 560.

¹⁴³Ibid.

reconversion of military surplus also illustrated the link between domestic and international politics. In *Sinews of War*, James Huston stated:

Beyond the immediate problems of liquidating the war machinery and cleaning up the battle areas, it would become increasingly clear in the years ahead that problems assumed to be purely political would have their military facets. U.S. foreign policy commitments would be effective only to the extent that a military establishment was at hand to support them.¹⁴⁴

The previous quote demonstrates the tension between domestic politics and reconstructing Germany. With President Truman calling for the rapid redeployment of forces, Germany in ruins, and a mounting tension with allied partners, especially Russia, the USG's commitment to the reconstruction of Germany seemed a dim possibility. With over fifty cities and towns destroyed and the European theater capitulating, Germany lay in disarray. Even the current alliance responsible for its reckoning reluctantly accepted the responsibility to restore Germany to a livable condition. Accounting for Germany's fragile state, Alan Moorehead, in *Eclipse*, described the demise of Germany and its surrender:

The Germany in which we found ourselves traveling at the end of April presented a scene that was almost beyond human comprehension. Her capital lost and almost razed, and nothing to give that ash-heap significance beyond a name, a history and the presence of a lunatic who was about to make his last gesture to a colossal vanity—his death. Around us fifty great cities lay in ruins, or at least in partial ruins. Many of them had no electric light or power or gas or running water, and no coherent system of government.¹⁴⁵

With no viable government in place in Germany, and no leadership to organize the chaotic aftermath of total war, Germany's future rested with the alliance responsible for its destruction. In an effort to convince USG leaders of the threat presented by Russia, Winston Churchill corresponded with both President's Roosevelt and Truman on his fears of a power vacuum in Eastern Europe. His concern was that a communist Russia would try to exploit the

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Alan Moorehead, *Eclipse* (New York: Van Rees Press, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1945), 273-285. 'Total Eclipse' section of the book and Chapter 18, 'The Surrender' describe the utter destruction of Germany; Chapter 19 describes the liberation of Denmark; Chapter 20 describes the aftermath of the war.

situation in all of Europe and dominate its economic recovery for its own gains rather than Western Europe's recovery. To stop the spread of communism while keeping Russia in check, Prime Minister Churchill was initially unable to convince President Truman of the nature of the threat. However, Stalin's actions spoke loudly to finally convince the American leadership that Germany's reconstruction was paramount to not only the economic recovery of Europe, but also the containment of communist ideals throughout Western Europe.

Germany's reconstruction did not begin immediately following the allied occupation of Germany. In reality, Western allies assumed their respective sectors of responsibility and Russia theirs. Berlin was divided among the US, France, Great Britain, and Russia. Insofar as the reconstruction of Germany, the occupied leaders faced the challenges of security, war reparations, civil administration, humanitarian relief for refugees, democratization, and reconstruction.

The spectrum of post-conflict issues in the immediate postwar period shaped the actions of allies. The Western allies pursued stability and support operations in Germany "by demobilizing the German military, holding war crimes tribunals, helping construct democratic institutions, and providing substantial humanitarian and economic assistance."¹⁴⁶ Over a period of time, the FRG developed into a viable democratic state with a strong economy. Despite uneven development throughout its assigned sectors, the FRG resulted from the combined efforts of the US, Great Britain, and France, over several years.¹⁴⁷ Although stability and support operations began as a disjointed effort between USG agencies and allied partners, national leaders saw the link between national security and the vital necessity to reconstruct Germany and pledged long-term commitment to rebuilding Europe's economy.

¹⁴⁶James Dobbins, et al., 8.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 8-9.

APPENDIX B

HAITI--BACKGROUND

Haiti's history is marked by long-term instability. In over 200 years of its existence as a nation, there have been at least "21 constitutions and 41 heads of state of which 29 were assassinated or overthrown."¹⁴⁸ In essence, most of Haiti's problems stem from political and economic instability. Ranked the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti's limited resources further exacerbate problems concerning overpopulation and unmonitored environmental decay.¹⁴⁹ Haiti's recent history brought considerable attention to the international community.

Concerning Operation Uphold Democracy, the Haiti crisis evolved over a period of three years beginning with a military coup on 30 September 1991, in which President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown and exiled to the US. For nearly three years, the military government led by Lieutenant General Cedras resisted the international communities' efforts to return Aristide as the President. Further resisting the efforts to restore the legitimately elected government, Lieutenant General Cedras allowed human rights abuses and promoted repression of the Haitian people. By January 1992, over 14,000 Haitians traveled by boat to the US in order to flee worsening conditions.¹⁵⁰

Resisting UN's efforts to step down, General Cedras faced international actions. On 16 June 1993, the UN passed UN SCR 841 which called for an embargo on petroleum and arms

¹⁴⁸US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 2.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰US Atlantic Command, Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti (Norfolk, VA: OC Incorporated, May 1997), 2; and Commanders in Chief, US Atlantic Command (USACOM), Executive Level After Action Report "Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti" [CD-ROM] (Norfolk, VA, 1997), 1-13. With regard to the refugees, Pugh described the policy of "repatriating these refugees created political problems for both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Political pressures forced President Clinton to eventually reverse his policy of repatriation. This reversal led to a flood of refugees to the US who were eventually sheltered at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." Pugh, 54-55.

sales to Haiti and froze overseas financial assets that belonged to the Haitian government, its officials, and businesspeople. The embargo was supposed to prevent Haiti's illegitimate government from receiving any benefits from Haitian assets. After the sanctions went into effect, representatives from the elected Aristide government, the Cedras-led government, the UN, the OAS, and the US met to negotiate a settlement agreement.¹⁵¹

On 3 July 1993, the involved parties reached an agreement that called for General Cedras's resignation and the military to defer authority to the officially elected Aristide government. The agreement would also lift the UN imposed sanctions immediately upon President Aristide reclaiming the presidency. This action was supposed to occur 30 October 1993; however, General Cedras and his military leaders reneged on the settlement conditions that would restore the elected president.¹⁵²

General Cedras's resistance was met with additional hostility from the international community. In response, the UN passed UN SCR 917 on 6 May 1994, which demanded the resignation of Haiti's military leaders, instituted a global trade embargo, and imposed other restrictions on finance and travel.¹⁵³ Again, the military government did not step down. Therefore, on 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council passed UN SCR 940, which authorized:

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors

¹⁵¹Heather J. Warden, "Winning the War': Planning for Integrated, Synchronized, and Simultaneous Operations" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 19.

¹⁵²Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatly, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti--A Case Study* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1996), 10-11; and US Atlantic Command, 1-2.

¹⁵³US Atlantic Command; and United Nations, Security Council Resolution 917," *Operation Uphold Democracy: U.S. Forces in Haiti*. [CD-ROM], 1994; and Hayes and Wheatly, 14.

Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States.¹⁵⁴

Because UN SCR 940 promulgated the threat of military invasion by the United States of America and a MNF, President Aristide returned to lead Haiti. The MNF, comprised of US forces, battalions from the Caribbean community, and Bangladesh, prepared the way for transition to an international peacekeeping operation under UN auspices.¹⁵⁵ Subsequently, UN SCR 940 established the mandate for the UNMIH charging the mission members to assist the democratic government of Haiti in connection with:

sustaining the secure and stable environment [established by the MNF], the establishment of an environment conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections, protecting international personnel and key installations, and the creation of a Haitian police force.¹⁵⁶

Operation Uphold Democracy fit within the US Army's definition of stability and support operations because it involved peacekeeping and security assistance related tasks. In using the military as an instrument of national power, the USG took the lead enforcing UN SCR 940. By participating as a member of the international community, the USG promoted its own security interests and legitimately acted as a member of a multinational coalition. As the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) transitioned its mission to UN control, US forces remained a part of the MNF in Haiti, but became known as Joint Task Force (JTF)-190.

As the situation became more stable, the US Army took more of a supportive role as part of the UN mission. Due to his displayed understanding of logistics requirements, Brigadier General James T. "Tom" Hill, USA, became the commander of JTF 190.¹⁵⁷ General Hill ensured a relatively smooth transition for the control of US forces in Haiti by facilitating crucial logistics

¹⁵⁴United Nations. Security Council. *Resolution 940*, 31 July 1994; available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed on 21 February 2007.

¹⁵⁵US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 2.

¹⁵⁶United Nations, *Resolution 940*.

¹⁵⁷Ballard, 164.

support for ongoing multinational operations. From January 1995 until 31 March 1995, JTF 190 acted primarily as a transition force to facilitate follow on forces under the UNMIH.

On 31 March 1995, Major General Joseph W. Kinzer took command of the UNMIH. US troops made up about 40 percent of UNMIH's 6,000 person MNF.¹⁵⁸ General Kinzer assumed responsibility for the US forces and the UNMIH and enabled all required coordination for both the UN and USACOM. The transition to full UN control shifted the US Army's role in Haiti. With the US military's continued support to Haiti, other nations and agencies gradually took on more important roles. Specifically, the UN began to take a more active role. Further, the US military forces in Haiti shifted "from combat forces in a security role, as had been the case within the MNF, to support forces providing the logistics for other national contingents."¹⁵⁹

In general, military operations restored stability to Haiti; however, when the last American troops left Haiti in April 1996, the situation there deteriorated. Conrad Crane described "conditions approaching those that existed in the early 1990s."¹⁶⁰ Consequently, most US policy goals went unrealized without a long-term USG commitment of resources. Unwilling or unable to commit resources, the civilian agencies that replaced military forces failed to achieve long-lasting results. Lack of resource commitment was further intensified by the fragile state of the Haitian economy, judicial system, and the political leaders hampering reform.¹⁶¹ Both US officials and the UN criticized the results of subsequent elections and admitted the failure of their policies

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 165; and Kevin C. M. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," *Parameters* (Autumn, 1996): 69-80; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/benson.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 January 2007.

¹⁵⁹Ballard, 165.

¹⁶⁰Crane, 30.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

towards Haiti. In particular, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan disapproved rekindling the mission there.¹⁶²

Despite continued rhetoric by US public and international officials, the conditions in Haiti again reached the point of humanitarian crisis. The UN decided to intervene after a three-week uprising in Haiti as rebels seized control of the central and northern portions of the island and threatened to seize the capital, Port-au-Prince. On 29 February 2004, the UN signed UN SCR 1529 establishing a MIF to stabilize the country for ninety days and prepare conditions for a follow-on MINUSTAH.¹⁶³ President Jean-Bertrand Aristide resigned his office and this time left the country seeking exile in South Africa. Upon Aristide's departure, an international peacekeeping force comprised of 3,600 troops from the US, Canada, Chile, and France, partially reinstated stability to Haiti. The MIF eventually consisted of 3,700 personnel: 2,000 from the US, 900 from France, 330 from Chile, and 530 from Canada.¹⁶⁴

The UN subsequently issued UN SCR 1542 on 30 April 2004 which transferred responsibility to the follow-on UN force for the MINUSTAH.¹⁶⁵ Led by Brazil, the UN force took

¹⁶²General Accounting Office, GAO-01-24, *Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be Linked to Performance-Related Conditions* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2000); "Haiti is Nightmare for US," *Charleston Post and Courier*, 5 October 2000; "Haiti's Disappearing Democracy," *New York Times*, 28 November 2000; and "Annan Urges End to UN Mission in Haiti," *New York Times*, 29 November 2000.

¹⁶³United Nations, Press Release SC/8015, *Security Council Authorized Deployment of Multinational Force to Haiti, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1529*, 29 February 2004; available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8015.doc.htm>; Internet; accessed on 13 February 2007; Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Fact Sheet, *UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 30 April 2004); available from <http://www.state.gov/p/io/fs/2004/48612.htm>; Internet; accessed on 13 February 2007; Napoli, 16; and United Nations, Monthly Summary of Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, February 2005; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/contributions>; Internet; accessed on 11 February 2007.

¹⁶⁴For a detailed Background narrative on MINUSTAH see United Nations, *Haiti--MINUSTAH--Background*; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/missions/minustah/background.html>; Internet; accessed on 11 February 2007; United Nations, Monthly Summary of Contributors; and Napoli, 16

control on 25 June 2004 with twenty nations contributing to stabilization efforts in Haiti. Only four US service members were part of the follow-on UN force. As of the transition from the MIF peacekeeping mission to MINUSTAH, the rebels still controlled the rural areas of Haiti.¹⁶⁶ Since MINUSTAH began in 2004, the UN has adopted several resolutions to extend the stabilization mission in Haiti: UN SCRs 1576, 1601, 1608, 1658, 1702, and 1743.¹⁶⁷ UN SCR 1743, dated 15 February 2007, emphasized the role of regional organizations in the “ongoing process” of Haiti’s stabilization and reconstruction and beckoned that MINUSTAH continue to “work closely with the OAS and the CARICOM.”¹⁶⁸ Based on its involvement since Operation Uphold Democracy, the UN will most likely continue stability and support operations in Haiti in the future.

¹⁶⁵United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1542, 30 April 2004; available from <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Haiti%20SRES1542.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 15 February 2007.

¹⁶⁶Jeffrey H. Fargo, “Haiti: Nation Building in Haiti-Again?” *Hoover Digest*, no. 3 (2004); available from <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3020711.html>; Internet; accessed on 4 January 2007.

¹⁶⁷United Nations, Haiti--MINUSTAH--UN Documents; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/res.html>; Internet; accessed on 17 February 2007.

¹⁶⁸United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1743, 15 February 2007; available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/240/92/PDF/N0724092.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed on 22 February 2007.

APPENDIX C

EAST TIMOR--BACKGROUND

Portugal governed East Timor for nearly 400 years until mid-1975. After Portugal withdrew from East Timor, Indonesia invaded the island on 7 December 1975.¹⁶⁹ Since Indonesia invaded the territory, various militias seeking East Timor's independence fought with the Indonesian military (TNI). Starting in 1982, at the agreement of the UN General Assembly, consecutive Secretaries-General conducted repeated talks with Indonesia and Portugal, determined to resolve the self-government issues of East Timor. The fighting between East Timorese guerilla groups and the Indonesian government continued as a significant separatist movement with no international refutation until 1998. The ensuing political and often gory struggle continued until the international community recognized the atrocities occurring in East Timor.

The continual verve of repeated incidents of human rights violations by the Indonesian government continued to gain media attention. Throughout the 1990s, the Indonesian military implemented "forced integration and resettlement, as well as gratuitous killing" in an effort to control the population.¹⁷⁰ Continual repression of the population through cruel and violent acts against the separatists contributed to the further discontent of the population with the Indonesian

¹⁶⁹United Nations, East Timor--UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) Background; available from <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 January 2007. "In 1974, Portugal sought to establish a provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine the status of East Timor. Civil war broke out between those who favored independence and those who advocated integration with Indonesia. Unable to control the situation, Portugal withdrew. Indonesia intervened militarily and integrated East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. The United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia's withdrawal."

¹⁷⁰Glynn, 7.

government. During the same time frame, the Asian financial crisis erupted from late 1997 and subsequently President Soeharto resigned on 28 May 1998.¹⁷¹

As the political environment changed, the new Indonesian government brought in a fresh East Timor perspective along with a period of uncertainty. The new climate of Indonesian politics from May 1998 onward allowed reform both inside and outside Indonesia concerning East Timor's independence.¹⁷² Likewise, global recognition of the mayhem in Indonesia brought pressing awareness to the UN. As a result, the Indonesian government faced condemnation for its inability to control the situation. Further, in the face of global criticism, the UN pursued economic sanctions against Indonesia.

By 1999, President Habibie faced significant pressure from the international community and offered East Timor the options of autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or complete independence. Under UN pressure to resolve the problem of East Timor's self-determination, both the Indonesian and Portuguese governments signed an agreement on 5 May 1999.¹⁷³ In order to carry out the process, the UN Security Council passed UN SCR 1246 (1999) authorizing the establishment of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. As stipulated in the

¹⁷¹Frank Frost and Adam Cobb, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, "The Future of East Timor: Major Current Issues," Parliamentary Library, 24 May 1999; available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp21.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 January 2007. During the 'Dili massacre' on 12 November 1991, over one hundred people were killed by Indonesian security forces. This incident brought international focus on the situation in East Timor and the continued political impasse concerning Indonesia's presence. Perhaps the Dili massacre was "a turning point" in the conflict. (1) East Timor brought visibility to the problem of Indonesia internationally and diplomatically, thus the international arm of the East Timorese guerilla movement gained momentum. (2) While the guerilla resistance had lost legitimacy, the East Timorese people participated in civil resistance. (3) The security environment within East Timor deteriorated and clashes occurred between East Timorese and recent immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. Indonesian government attempts to resolve internal security problems continued to attract international attention and criticism, for example when the resistance leader Jose 'Xanana' Gusmao was captured in 1992.

¹⁷²Stephen Sherlock, "Indonesia's Dangerous Transition: The Politics of Recovery and Democratisation," Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, Research Paper no 18, 1998-99, 28 April 1999; available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-1999/99rp18.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 January 2007. Indonesia's transition process is analyzed in this Research Paper.

¹⁷³Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, "The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 125-126.

agreements, “after the vote, UNAMET would oversee a transition period” pending the outcome of the decision of the popular consultation.¹⁷⁴

With UN SCR 1246, the UN oversaw East Timor’s self-determination process. On voting day, 30 August 1999, the East Timorese people rejected proposed autonomy and started the process of transition on the road to independence.¹⁷⁵ In the wake of declaring independence, pro-integration militias escalated violence in East Timor. The violence resulted in many killed and over 500,000 displaced persons, many of whom fled to western Timor.¹⁷⁶ With a massive humanitarian crisis looming, the UN SYG pressed President Habibie for Indonesia to meet its responsibilities as previously agreed to maintain security and order in East Timor.

Unable to meet its commitment, the Indonesian government agreed to allow UN peacekeepers into East Timor. On 15 September 1999, the UN Security Council adopted UN SCR 1264 which authorized the establishment of a Chapter VII, multinational peacekeeping force to enter East Timor as soon as possible.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the UN asked Australia as a regional leader and member state to build and lead the MNF. The MNF, known as INTERFET, assumed the following tasks:

to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil[] this mandate.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴United Nations, UNTAET.

¹⁷⁵More than 78 percent of East Timor’s voting population chose independence despite widespread violence by pro-autonomy Indonesian backed militia groups. Ibid.

¹⁷⁶Glynn, 7; and Military Periscope, United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNTAET), November 2004; available from http://apps.militaryperiscope.com/Peacekeeping/ShowGroup.aspx?group_id=156; Internet; accessed on 30 October 2006. Glynn stated that nearly a quarter-million refugees fled East Timor. Whereas, Military Periscope claimed 500,000 displaced persons fled East Timor.

¹⁷⁷United Nations, Security Council. *Resolution 1264*, 15 September 1999; available from [http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/1999/99sc1264.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1264.htm); Internet; accessed on 14 January 2007. Peace enforcement force applies to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and addresses “actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” or peace enforcement. Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses peacekeeping, or the “pacific settlement of disputes.”

¹⁷⁸United Nations, *Resolution 1264*.

Under a unified command structure, Australian Defense Force Major General Peter Cosgrove accepted the responsibility of command for INTERFET. The first elements of the MNF arrived in East Timor on 20 September 1999.¹⁷⁹ The same day the UN created INTERFET, President Clinton established a US force contingent in support of East Timor. US Forces INTERFET (USFI), deployed “in a clearly supportive capacity” with “a few hundred people,” and conducted “the work that a mission like this would need America to do--the airlift, some of the internal transportation, the communications, the intelligence, some of the engineering work.”¹⁸⁰

The INTERFET forces worked diligently to establish control of the security situation in East Timor. From 20 September 1999 until 25 October 1999, the USFI worked in cooperation with nineteen other international partners during Australia’s Operation Stabilise.¹⁸¹ Further, the USFI provided distinct capabilities to include: C-130 and heavy lift helicopters for logistics support; intelligence through Trojan Spirit II, electronic surveillance, counterintelligence, and analytical personnel; communications through tactical satellite terminals, long-haul satellite communications, data networks, and voice switching; and civil affairs support with a civil-military affairs operations center (CMOC).¹⁸² In order to allow UN follow-on operations to establish a legitimate government in East Timor, the USFI provided US assets that bolstered the capabilities of international forces where shortfalls normally exist.

On 25 October 1999, the UN Security Council adopted UN SCR 1272 which instituted the UNTAET. The UNTAET assumed “overall responsibility for the administration of East

¹⁷⁹Collier, 3.

¹⁸⁰The White House, “Remarks by President upon Departure from Auckland, New Zealand,” 14 September 1999; available from <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/091499-remarks-by-president-upon-departure-from-auckland.htm>; Internet; accessed on 16 January 2007.

¹⁸¹Glynn, 8.

¹⁸²US Forces INTERFET, After Action Report (USFI AAR), Part I, “Executive Overview (11 February 2000), 1. Part II, contains the detailed individual lessons learned; quoted in Collier, 3; and Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET; quoted in Glynn, 9.

Timor” and allowed an integrated approach “to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.”¹⁸³ UN SCR 1272 decided further for:

- (a) A governance and public administration component, including an international police element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers;
- (b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;
- (c) A military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers.¹⁸⁴

The transition from INTERFET to UNTAET occurred in March 2000. Upon assumption of authority for East Timor’s transition, UNTAET focused on several tasks. These tasks included “providing security and maintaining law and order; establishing a civil administration; developing social services; coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; reconstruction and development assistance; and helping to establish the conditions for sustainable development.”¹⁸⁵ By 1 January 2001, the UNTAET mission expanded to include forty-seven countries, including the US, participating with “7,765 military personnel, 1,389 police, 124 military advisors, 888 international civilian personnel, and 1,767 local civilian staff.”¹⁸⁶

Until East Timor gained full independence on 17 May 2002, the UNTAET provided transition assistance under subsequent UN SCRs 1319, 1338, and 1392. Finally, the UNTAET prepared to transition to UNMISET as East Timor elected President Xanana Gusmao and signed into force the Constitution on 22 March 2002.¹⁸⁷ With specific preconditions met for a hand-over to a legitimate government, the UN Security Council adopted UN SCR 1410 (2002) on 17 May 2002, establishing the UNMISET.¹⁸⁸ The UNMISET allowed for continued presence and

¹⁸³United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1272, 25 October 1999; available from <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/9931277E.htm>; Internet; accessed on 14 January 2007.

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵Larry Nicksch, Lois McHugh, and Rhoda Margesson. CRS Report for Congress, *East Timor Situation Report* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 9 July 2001); available from <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-RL30975.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 17 October 2006.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷United Nations, UNTAET.

¹⁸⁸United Nations. East Timor--UNMISET—Background; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html>; Internet; accessed on 18 January 2007.

development in East Timor throughout the post-independence period. Further, the UN utilized a milestone approach to gradually withdraw from East Timor while supporting the East Timorese government in the areas of stability, democracy and justice, internal security and law enforcement, and external security and border control. Subsequent UN SCR relevant to UNMISET included resolutions 1473, 1480, 1543, 1573, and 1599.¹⁸⁹

The UNMISET peacekeeping mission culminated in May 2005; however, the provisions of UN SCR 1599 established the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) to conduct a successive political mission until 20 May 2006.¹⁹⁰ Through the UNOTIL, the UN further developed the stability of East Timor's critical state institutions and strengthened the internal and external security mechanisms of the territory. However, in May 2006, the UN Security Council extended the UNOTIL political mission several times under successive resolutions. With the security situation deteriorating in Timor-Leste, the UN Security Council worked in concert with the government to control an escalation of violence stemming from "societal fissures and violence between and among various factions of the police and military services."¹⁹¹ Under UN SCR 1690, President Gusmao took action to stabilize the security situation and invited international security forces from Australia, Portugal, Malaysia, and New Zealand to restore order in the country.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹United Nations, East Timor--UNMISET--UN Documents, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/res.html>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007. All UNMISET relevant Security Council Resolutions can be accessed at this site.

¹⁹⁰United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1599, 28 April 2005; available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/326/31/PDF/N0532631.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007.

¹⁹¹Department of State, Eric G. John. On 28 April 2006 dissatisfied ex-military personnel rioted and were killed by military forces in Dili. The onset of violence created further instability and violence between and among groups of the police and military services. As East Timor's National Police disintegrated in Dili, gangs took part in looting and arson attacks pitting easterner and westerner groups against one another. During this time, the factions targeted no foreigners.

¹⁹²United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1690, 20 June 2006; available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/396/02/PDF/N0639602.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed on 13 January 2007. United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1690 (2006), was one of several resolutions that extended the mandate for UNOTIL.

Finally, on 25 August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1704 which established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). UN SCR 1704 mandated support for the Timor-Leste Government and state institutions “to consolidate stability, enhance a culture of democratic governance and facilitate political dialogue; and to support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary electoral process.”¹⁹³ Further, the mandate directed UN support for the national police and assistance by conducting a comprehensive review for the role and requirements of the Timor-Leste security sector. Lastly, the UNMIT goals included the cooperation and coordination with “UN agencies, funds and programmes and all relevant partners” to maximize security assistance in post conflict peace-building and capacity building.¹⁹⁴ The subsequent security resolution, UN SCR 1745, adopted by the UN on 22 February 2007 extended the UNMIT mandate until 26 February 2008.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1704, 25 August 2006; available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/479/02/PDF/N0647902.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed on 12 January 2007.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1745, 26 February 2006; available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/247/37/PDF/N0724737.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed on 12 January 2007.

APPENDIX D

US DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERPLAY

As outlined in the US Constitution, the President and Congress share in the responsibility for the development of foreign policy. Although the Constitution does not explicitly state the role of the executive branch in guiding foreign policy and national security, it does outline the Presidential body's role in making treaties with other countries and appointing ambassadors to other countries in coordination with the Senate. Further, the Constitution explicitly charges the executive with receiving ambassadors from other countries. Finally, the Constitution establishes the president as commander-in-chief of the military, which gives him or her a lot of control over how the US interacts with the world.¹⁹⁶

The executive and legislative branches each play important roles that are different, but often overlap. Both USG branches have opportunities to initiate and change foreign policy through explicit and implicit constitutional powers. Within the executive branch of the USG, the Department of State leads US foreign affairs and the Secretary of State acts as the President's principal foreign policy adviser. Although national security matters fall under the executive branch as per the Constitution, the Congress controls commitment of financial resources.

Through a published *NSS*, the President directs the foreign and national security policy agenda. The design of US democracy with its "checks and balances" of the legislative branch and American public opinion often influence the national security policies and programs of the executive branch.¹⁹⁷ The elected bodies of the Congress, elected by the American public, determine the level of commitment through appropriation of funds for this agenda. The objectives

¹⁹⁶The National Archives, Constitution of the United States, Article II, Section 2; available from http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution_transcript.html; Internet; accessed on 13 February 2007.

¹⁹⁷Blundell, et al., 1.

articulated in the NSS allow the Congress to develop programs that facilitate the accomplishment of foreign and national policy goals.

In a report provided by the Congressional Research Service, Richard F. Grimmett outlined the twelve different ways the President or executive branch and the Congress make US foreign policy. Within the report, Grimmett described examples of how the executive branch maximizes foreign policy opportunities through “responses to foreign events; proposals for legislation; negotiation of international agreements; policy statements; policy implementation; and independent action.”¹⁹⁸

Depending on which avenue the President takes to make US foreign policy, the Congress can either support the President’s goals or try to take a different approach. Grimmett also posited that in certain circumstances, the legislative branch retains little control over changing policy. In other cases, such as international agreements needing approval, the Congress retains more authority in deciding foreign policy. Normally, the legislative branch supports the President, but often makes modifications to initiatives before approving them. Likewise, the legislative branch influences foreign policy through “resolutions and policy statements; legislative directives; legislative pressure; legislative restrictions or funding denials; informal advice; and congressional oversight.”¹⁹⁹ Grimmett provided that in these circumstances, the President either supports or tries to change policies through interpretation of the directives and restrictions. Further, the executive branch decides “when and whether to adopt proposals and advice.”²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸Richard F. Grimmett, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, *Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress* (Washington, DC: United States Information Agency, Foreign Press Centers, 1 June 1999); available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/politics/pres/fpolicy.htm>; Internet; accessed on 13 February 2007.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰⁰Department of State, Executive Branch, Foreign Policy, Wellington, New Zealand Embassy Web Page, *Current Affairs: The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*; available from <http://wellington.usembassy.gov/introduction.html>; Internet; accessed on 13 February 2007.

The practices illustrated in Grimmatt's report to the legislative branch show that developing US foreign policy is a complex process. Further, the report demonstrated that when both branches work together to accomplish common goals, US foreign policy appears strong and more effective. During certain elected periods of time, the executive branch seemed to dominate the foreign policy agenda. While in other intervals, the Congress strongly influenced the foreign policy agenda. In balancing national security issues with foreign affairs, the pendulum swings back and forth between legislative bodies depending on the USG's priorities.

This swing back and forth is nothing new concerning foreign policy. Throughout history, the USG has pursued a variety of foreign policy objectives depending on its position in the world. Although the oceans insulated the US to an extent from the power limitations of European and Asian states, the maritime capabilities of the US became the connection to American interests as an economic and military power.²⁰¹ A strong military and protection of US interests abroad fit well with early views of separateness and "American exceptionalism."²⁰² The isolationists of the 1920s and 30s objected to both noninvolvement and world dominance; however, these views were short lived with the onset of World War II.²⁰³

By 1945, the US, with its military might and industrial economy, acquired its position as a central actor on the world stage. As the Roosevelt and Truman administration prosecuted World

²⁰¹The maritime view of the world fit well with the rise of the United States to the position of the preeminent world economy and with accelerating advances in communications.

²⁰²James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, "Back to Basics: US Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade," 51-56; and Howard Zinn, "The Power and the Glory: Myths of American Exceptionalism," *Boston Review*; available from <http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/zinn.html>; Internet; accessed on 14 February 2007. In the first half of US history, the country's foreign policy focused on mercantile interests abroad. Although the United States considered itself as a continental power, it wanted to avoid foreign altercations. American foreign policy wanted to appear friendly for commerce, yet reserved space for itself. According to James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, the purpose of US foreign policy in its first century "was to consolidate America's geographic space for itself and to organize and integrate that space in pursuit of the national destiny." Struggling with its identity in the world, American foreign policy shifted after the Second World War. America was no longer just a continental power, but rather, an island looking outward east and west across the two seas. In the early 1900s the disintegration of the European political balance led to a new international role for the United States. Facilitated by the political administrations of the USG, American presence conveyed worldwide capability while preserving a sense of separateness.

²⁰³Department of State, Richard F. Grimmatt.

War II, foreign policy goals took shape based on the threat of the spread of communism. With a strategy of containment, the importance of security assistance took a different approach.²⁰⁴ The transition of security assistance allowed the USG to sell surplus property left in Europe. By selling surplus equipment to European countries, the USG focused on the redemption of economic value rather than the serviceability of the equipment. Instead of losing resources already invested in the defense of Europe, the USG chose to resell the equipment, rather than transport it back to the US.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴US Department of Commerce, 2, 35-38; Shepardson, 270; quoted in Huston *Outposts and Allies*; Department of the Army, *Annual Report of the Army Service Forces for Fiscal Year 1945* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 63-74; and Huston, *Outposts and Allies*, 131. After declaring Victory in Japan, President Truman terminated the Lend-Lease Program and security assistance transitioned to support peacetime defense preparations. The Lend-Lease Program was the mechanism for furnishing military equipment to allied nations throughout the war. For the fiscal years 1940-1945, the USG directed a total of 95 percent of all foreign aid to the Lend-Lease Program. Of the aid offered to other governments, the total value of supplies and equipment amounted to approximately \$49.1 billion—28.6 for Britain and the dependencies, 10.8 billion for the Soviet Union, 2.6 billion for France, and 5.1 billion for all other recipients. Goods and services furnished to the United States by foreign governments as “reverse lend-lease” amounted to \$7.8 billion. Prior to the termination of the Lend-Lease Program, security assistance completed the process of evolution from private loans to government loans to government grants. Except for continued assistance to China, the program required that foreign assistance return to a cash or loan basis.

²⁰⁵Department of Commerce, v, vi.

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