

Sustainability of Universal ILE

A Monograph

by

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AY 06-07

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 30-03-2007		2. REPORT TYPE AMSP Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2006 - March 2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sustainability of Universal ILE				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR David M. Bresser (U.S. Army)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The premise of this monograph is that Universal ILE is not sustainable. The decision to provide resident ILE education for all majors was founded on numerous examinations of the officer education system; however the Army failed to set the conditions to ensure the system could support universal ILE. The Army cannot send all majors to ILE because there are too many operational requirements. The current Global War on Terror (GWOT) exacerbates the situation preventing even fewer from attending. Universal ILE was instituted to eliminate education as a discriminator, yet the force structure cannot sustain each officer getting an education. The results show the Army values education and the long term benefits of sending an officer to learn in a year long academic course. The concept of universal education was overdue and was a result of recommendations from numerous review boards, studies and officer surveys.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Intermediate Level Education (ILE), US Army Officer Education, Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Universal ILE, Officer Promotion.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 69	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, US Army
a. REPORT UNCLASS	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASS	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASS			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Abstract

Sustainability of Universal ILE by MAJ David M. Bresser, US Army, 39 pages.

The US Army instituted a long contemplated decision in 2005 when it began sending all majors to resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at either the year long course at Ft. Leavenworth, KS or one of three satellite courses consisting of a three and a half month long core curriculum. For many years, the Army utilized a central selection board to determine who would attend resident education; approximately 50% of majors were selected. The concept of universal education was overdue and was a result of recommendations from numerous review boards, studies and officer surveys.

The purpose of this research was to determine whether universal ILE is sustainable. This was a mixed methodology research project consisting of qualitative analysis and quantitative student surveys. The results show the Army values education and the long term benefits of sending an officer to learn in a year long academic course.

Universal ILE is not sustainable. The decision to provide resident ILE education for all majors was founded on numerous examinations of the officer education system; however the Army failed to set the conditions to ensure the system could support universal ILE. The Army cannot send all majors to ILE because there are too many operational requirements. The current Global War on Terror (GWOT) exacerbates the situation preventing even fewer from attending. Universal ILE was instituted to eliminate education as a discriminator, yet the force structure cannot sustain each officer getting an education.

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"It is as impossible to withhold education from the receptive mind as it is impossible to force it upon the unreasoning."

-- Agnes Repplier

INTRODUCTION

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas has long been recognized nationwide as a premier educational piece of the professional US Army.¹ Additionally, the participation of numerous international students each year shows its appeal worldwide. The members of CGSC's international officer hall of fame show that foreign countries send some of their best to the US Army school.² CGSC contributes to the positive image of a professional officer corps.

Command and staff education has historically been viewed as a necessary component to a professional and technically competent officer corps. The effort to send all majors to intermediate level education (ILE) and an emphasis on filling crucial operational billets for deploying and deployed units may be reducing the importance and quality of staff officer education. Filling critical operation positions at the field grade level limits both the student population and the number of active duty instructors. Academic Year (AY) 2005-06 was the first opportunity for officers in the first non-selection board year group to attend; 807 officers started. This class was the smallest since 1966-67. Another 277 officers started the following February bringing the total equal to the previous classes. This was the first time that two classes ran concurrently. Even with two classes and an entire year group eligible to attend, the number of students did not approach the capacity. Annual attendance since 1990 has been in the 1000-1200 with the average since 1990 being 1083.³

¹ General Gordon R. Sullivan, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, referred to CGSC as "The Jewel in the Crown of the Army Education System." From the *CGSC Program for Joint Education Self-Study Report*. 1997

² Command Brief. 46% of international graduates have gone on to become military chiefs of staff, ambassadors, government representatives or even presidents.

³ Numbers of students courtesy of CGSC registrar office. Interview 21 November 2006.

Universal ILE is not sustainable. The requirements for field grade officers to serve in operational billets prevent the necessary number of majors from attending ILE creating backlog. The system as a whole does not support sending all majors to school. Commanders are unwilling to send officers at soonest opportunity, unit life cycle commitments delay officer attendance and Human Resource Command (HRC) assignment officers are constrained on who can attend and when. An examination of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) serves as a warning why universal ILE is not sustainable. CAS3 was unsustainable because the Army could not send every captain to a six-week course.

Historically, officer attendance at the Command and General Staff Officer Course was based on selection by a Department of the Army centralized board. Approximately 50 percent of each year group was selected to attend the resident course while those not selected were required to complete a self-study correspondence course. The perception was that this methodology created a culture of “haves” and “have-nots”. General Dennis J. Reimer, Army Chief of Staff in 1998, summed it by saying “[t]oday education is the discriminator, because if you don’t make the cut for command and staff college as the 10th, 11th or 12th year, you in essence are a second-class citizen. That’s hard to say, but it’s the truth.”⁴ This upper half of a year group was given preferential treatment as they rose in the ranks. When it came time for promotion and selection for command at the battalion and brigade level, graduation from resident CGSC was perceived by many as the discriminator. In response to recommendations from officer education and career review boards and feedback from dissatisfied officers, the Army leadership decided to eliminate the selection criteria and instituted a program to ensure all officers promoted to major received

⁴ Jim Tice. “Staff college changes not yet final; Universal training proposed for line officers.” *Army Times*. Vol. 59, Issue 10. 5October 1998. p. 6.

the intermediate level education in residence. Every Army major would attend the Command and General Staff College in residence, thereby eliminating the discriminator of resident attendance.⁵

Background

During the decade of the 1870s, General William T. Sherman, the commanding General of the United States Army, identified poor professional training of officers as a significant problem. The Command and General Staff College started in 1881 as a tactical school, known then as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry.⁶ As the Army grew, many new officers had little military training and the larger Army demonstrated the need for general staff officers. The school continued to evolve from a tactical course to an educational school. The Infantry and Cavalry School changed names to the School of the Line in 1907. “Leavenworth became a postgraduate military institution that prepared well-qualified officers for general staff and positions of high command.”⁷ Though there were still not many officers matriculating through Ft. Leavenworth, their influence was prominent as the United States entered World War I. The intellectual capability of the Army Service School graduates was revealed. Ft. Leavenworth graduates dominated the general staff of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), commanded by General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing.⁸ The AEF’s success in France showed the necessity not only to continue such military education but also to increase instruction. The success of Leavenworth school graduates during WWI increased the respectability of an educated officer. The school went through many curriculum changes and course length modifications. In 1922, the course was one year due to the high demand for, but shortage of, school-trained

⁵ *Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1997. Reinforced with recommendations from the ATLDP study group in 2001.

⁶ Jonathan M. House, “The Fort and the New School, 1881-1916,” in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, ed. John W. Patin (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), p. 44

⁷ Timothy Nenner. *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978).

officers. In addition, the name was changed to the Command and General Staff College. Quality education was the focus as a limited number of officers were selected for two years of intense study. Additionally, the officers were extremely competitive during their time. The course was reduced back to one year in 1935 because of speculation that another war would require Leavenworth trained officers.

The winds of war led to the War Department mandating a compressed course in September 1939.⁹ The Army recognized the value of the Leavenworth trained officer. LTG McNair, the CGSC commandant, was instructed to decrease the time and increase the student body. The curriculum was re-designed to include the most essential elements and to streamline instruction for students based on their next assignment.¹⁰ The importance of the need for officers educated for general staff duties was respected.

Throughout the history of CGSC, the Army witnessed the value of an educated officer and consistently tried to maximize throughput. The experiences of the war may have re-emphasized the value of education but three review boards were required to determine that a more robust education system was necessary. "College officials raised educational standards and expanded course offerings so that officer graduates now were able to perform in a variety of staff positions."¹¹ Officer education review boards continued to recommend changes to update and improve officer education.

The officer performance during the two world wars proved the importance of education and the need to educate the maximum number of officers. Intense scrutiny of the Army officer education system began after World War II. In 1946, the Army commissioned the first

⁸ House. "The Fort and the New School, 1881-1916," p. 47. Twenty-three of the 26 chiefs of staff had studied at Ft. Leavenworth and Leavenworth schools graduates commanded five of the divisions.

⁹ Charles E. Heller, "World War I and the Interwar Years, 1916-1939," in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, ed. John W. Partin (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), p. 55.

¹⁰ John W. Patin. "Wars and New Challenges, 1939-1983," in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, ed. John W. Partin. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1983) p. 57-59.

comprehensive review of officer training and education with the Gerow Board. The boards periodically studied the officer education system and searched for areas of improvement. One constant recommendation and area of study was trying to find ways to allow the maximum number of officers to attend resident education.

The officer review boards conducted since World War II established the rationale to implement universal ILE. Shortly after the end of World War II to prepare in peacetime for the next conflict, the Army decided to conduct a review of the officer educational system. “The Board is directed to prepare a plan for the postwar education of the Army.”¹² The 1946 Gerow Board re-established the Army school system after WWII. The Army directed another review of the officer education system in 1949. Lieutenant General (LTG) Manton S. Eddy, Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, presided as the president of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers.¹³ The board also wanted the Army to continue “scrutiny and revision” of officer education to remain relevant with practical knowledge.¹⁴ This and future boards’ recommendations were highly regarded and the ideas would change how officers would be educated.

In keeping with the Eddy board recommendation, another periodic scrutiny was conducted in 1957. On 23 December 1957, the Department of the Army Board to Review the system of Officer Education and Training began under the supervision of Lieutenant General (LTG) Edward T. Williams. The Williams board highlighted the importance of CGSC and the need for the curriculum remain academically rigorous. The board also explored ways to increase attendance at CGSC but determined CGSC remain selective due to numerous identified limitations (infrastructure, classroom space). The Haines Board of 1965 searched for ways to

¹¹ Patin, “Wars and New Challenges, 1939-1983.” p. 60.

¹² *Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army*. Washington, D.C.: War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office. 5 February 1946. p. 5. The board was referred to as the Gerow Board for LTG L. T. Gerow, who served as the board president.

increase student enrollment. The Haines board attempted to resolve the problem of the need for education and the lack of available resources (infrastructure, faculty and student availability). The board determined the optimum annual capacity could be 1,680 officers annually by running a regular year long course of 1008 student and 2 associate courses with 336 per class (672 total).¹⁵ A new academic building for CGSC (Bell Hall) had been built since the Williams Board and the Haines Board used the maximum capacity of the auditorium, 1425, to arrive at their recommendation. The board explored many different alternatives to arrive at the maximum number of students per year, including the elimination of allied officers and students from other US services.¹⁶ During the time between boards, CGSC received accreditation from the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools for its Masters of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) degree.

In August 1977, the Chief of Staff of the Army, directed a study called A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO). The board was commissioned in response to the Office of Management and Budget 1975 assessment that too much was being spent on officer education and that the Army itself deemed its officers were not militarily competent. This study made recommendations regarding the requirements for the training and education of officers. The study examined alternatives in a resource-constrained environment.¹⁷ The RETO was the first comprehensive review of officer education after the Vietnam War. The board recognized that whatever system was implemented, it must meet both peacetime and wartime missions. The RETO board looked at all levels of officer education and training and also examined the other services education plans. The result was a five-volume report attempting to provide a framework

¹³ *Report of the Department of the Army Board on Education System for Officers*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 June 1949. This board is referred to as the Eddy Board.

¹⁴ Eddy Board. 1949. p. 9.

¹⁵ *Department of the Army Board Review of Army Officer Schools*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1965. p. D-23. This board is referred to as the Haines Board.

¹⁶ Haines Board. 1965. p. D-24.

for a system that would project into the 1990s. It “constitutes a system encompassing total career education and training needs.”¹⁸

In 1981, Congress set forth guidelines for policies and procedures for officer training and passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). To ensure compliance, the Army directed another review of officer development. The Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) commenced in May 1984 under the supervision of LTG Charles W. Bagnal. This study was directed to examine the entire spectrum of officer development from precommissioning to end of service for both active and reserve components. Additionally, the board was directed to “identify systemic strengths and weaknesses, develop findings and make recommendations” out to 2025.¹⁹ As a result of the PDOS, the Leader Development Action Plan (LDAP), implemented in 1989, revised the officer education system to ensure compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.²⁰ The PDOS also directly led to the development of Army doctrine to outline an officer’s career progression – Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management.²¹ The PDOS put strong emphasis on the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³). The CSA approved the recommendation that all “captains will attend CAS³ by the eighth year” of service.²²

In 1996, the Army Chief of Staff directed the OPMS XXI Study, the first significant review of the Officer Professional Management System since the PDOS in 1985. This comprehensive review was designed to make recommendations to take officer development into the twenty first century. Of the recommendations from this study, the most important was

¹⁷ *A Review of Education and Training of Officers*. vol 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 June 1978. p. I-1. This board is referred to as RETO.

¹⁸ RETO, vol 1, 1978. p. 2.

¹⁹ *Professional Development of Officers Study*. Vol. 1, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 1985. p. xxvii. This board is known as PDOS.

²⁰ Department of the Army Historic Summary: 1989. available online at <http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/DAHSUM/1989/CH12.htm>, accessed 15 February 2007.

²¹ DA Pam 600-3 originally dated 1989, updated numerous times since to comply with changes to Officer Education System.

²² PDOS p. 61.

requiring CAS³ attendance immediately following branch Officer Advanced Courses to prevent operational units from negatively affecting attendance and to reduce backlog. Perhaps, more significantly, the board recommended that all operational career field majors attend resident education at a command and staff college. The OPMS XXI Study also sought to update DA Pam 600-3 and make certain the officer education system would support the Goldwater-Nichols mandates.²³

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel convened in 1999 to examine all aspects of officer career progression, then follow with similar reviews for warrant officers and non commissioned officers. The panel was conducted at an interesting point in the history of the United States. Many officers were unsatisfied with their career and officer departures were increasing. The Army was searching for a clear definition of its role for the nation with soldiers serving in Bosnia and Kosovo. Many felt the Army did not have a clear direction.²⁴ The ATLDP was a well conducted review with some strong recommendations for officer education system changes including universal ILE. The panel was very influential in changing many aspects of officer training and development, most importantly the concept of universal ILE.

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is located at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and is comprised of five schools. The schools are: Command and General Staff School (CGSS), School of Advanced distributed Learning (SAdL), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), School for Command Preparation (SCP) and the Army Management Staff College (AMSC). All schools are located at Ft. Leavenworth except for AMSC, which is located at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. SAdL, formerly known as Non Resident Studies, “develops, distributes and administers” the intermediate level education distributed (or distance) learning courses. The School for Command Preparation is often referred to as the Pre-Command Course (PCC) and is

²³ *Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1997. Referred to as OPMS XXI Study.

designed for command sergeants major, lieutenant colonels, and colonels in preparation for leadership positions at the battalion and brigade level. The School for Advance Military Studies (SAMS) includes the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF). AMSC is taught at two locations, Ft. Leavenworth and Ft. Belvoir, and educates both military and civilian leaders of the sustaining base in management responsibilities.²⁵

The largest school in CGSC is the Command and General Staff School, CGSS. CGSS educates intermediate level officers and leaders to succeed as commanders and staff officers in full spectrum operations.²⁶ The CGSS teaches the course for majors now called Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and formerly known as the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). There are two methods of teaching ILE for active duty officers. The first is a 10 month course at Ft. Leavenworth consisting of the common core, the Advanced Operational Warfighting Course (AOWC) and two elective periods. The other method is a three and half month long course consisting of just the core curriculum taught at three satellite locations – Fort Belvoir, VA, Fort Gordon, GA, and Fort Lee, VA. After completion of the core curriculum the officer attends a credentialing course associated with his/her career field.

CGSC was founded on the ideals that “an important factor in the learning process is the development of an atmosphere for creative study and the ability of the instructors to inspire thinking on the part of the student.”²⁷ The course is one in which the officer was encouraged to think critically (how to think) verses adhering to a school solution for every problem (what to think):

CGSS produces intermediate level leaders who:

²⁴ The Army Training and Leader Development Panel. *Officer Study*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 10 October 2000. introduction.

²⁵ School descriptions available <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil> accessed 21 March 2007.

²⁶ The Command & General Staff School Mission Statement. <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/DSA/index.asp> accessed 21 March 2007.

²⁷ Eddy Board, p. 40.

Are comfortable with uncertainty, adept at identifying and assessing complex problems in order to enable problem solving, and able to compensate for ambiguity through precise communications.

Are broadly and critically informed, innovative (seek creative solutions to problems), and adaptive (applying old to new) leaders who demonstrate initiative and ingenuity in new and ambiguous situations.

Are inherently technically and tactically proficient in the broad range of mission tasks associated with Full Spectrum Operations and Joint Operational Art, and positioned to succeed in the many complex environments within which they will operate.

Can balance technical and tactical acumen (a broad understanding of doctrine without being wedded to it) with conceptual and interpersonal skills, while viewing challenges from multiple perspectives.

Are confident and aware of how much they know and can do, continuing to reinforce their values and reasoning with life-long learning.²⁸

Two radical changes occurred at roughly the same time within CGSC. The Army initiated the OPMS XXI study and ATLDP recommendation of resident education for all majors, known as universal MEL4. Military Education Level 4 (MEL4) is the designation an officer is given upon completion of intermediate level education. At the same time, CGSC was implementing an overhaul of the curriculum known as intermediate level education (ILE). So now a combination of the initiatives has come to be known as “universal ILE”. Universal ILE is used throughout to refer to the initiative to send all Army majors to resident education. Additionally, the term universal MEL4 insinuated that not all received this intermediate level education before. Universal MEL4 refers to the change that now all will receive this education via a resident course. As stated before, only about 50% of majors used to be selected for resident education. The others received their MEL4 qualification by taking a non-resident course via correspondence commonly referred to as the “box of books” course. Under the recommendations from the ATLDP, operations career field officers would attend only the resident course at Ft. Leavenworth.²⁹ All other career fields³⁰ would attend a satellite course followed by a

²⁸ Command and General Officer Course Resident Graduate Survey Report. June 2006. Graduate Definition Survey – AY 2005-06. 2 May 2006. Errata sheet.

²⁹ Operations career field branches are: Adjutant General (AG) Corps, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, Civil Affairs, Chemical Corps, Engineers, Field Artillery, Finance, Infantry, Military Intelligence,

credentialing course for the assigned functional area. A few officers from special branches (medical, judge advocate, and chaplain) and non-operations career field officers would attend the year long resident course at Ft. Leavenworth, but the majority would be required to receive the ILE education at one of the satellite courses.

Statement of the Problem

The primary research question to determine the whether universal ILE was sustainable. The goal of universal ILE was to eliminate discrimination for promotion based on education and to improve opportunities for all officers. The purpose was to examine why the Army implemented universal ILE and to determine if the decision to send all majors to a year long course was sustainable. It will also present some possible implications of trying to sustain universal ILE and make recommendations to sustain operational requirements and ensure education is emphasized. To remain relevant and practical CGSC must prepare the officer for the next 10-15 years of his/her career.

The importance of a trained and ready officer corps in the US Army is well documented. Additionally the education of officers was directed in numerous studies commissioned by Army leadership and prescribed throughout Army doctrine. The goal of intermediate level education is to instruct US Army majors “for duty as field grade commanders and staff officers, primarily at

Military Police, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Special Forces, Transportation, and Psychological Operations. *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 December 2005, p. 54-56.

³⁰ The other career fields are broken down as such: Institutional Support – Human Resource Management, Comptroller, Academy Professor, Operations Research/Systems Analysis, Force Management, Nuclear and Counterproliferation, Strategic Plans and Policy; Information Operations – Telecommunication System, Information Operations, Strategic Intelligence, Space Operations, Public Affairs, Information Systems Management, Simulation Operations; Operational Support – Foreign Area Officer, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. Then the special branches are Judge Advocate General (JAG), Chaplain, and the Army Medical Department (Doctors).

brigade, division, and corps echelons.”³¹ The long-term effects of universal ILE could have the unintended consequence of being detrimental to quality education.

Methodology

This is a mixed methodology research project using qualitative and quantitative measures. The research compiled and analyzed data using student surveys, participation in focus group interviews, personal interviews and independent research. The research method also used an analysis of data published on officer education and examination of personal observations and experience. The qualitative research sought to gain a better understanding of a complex situation.

The first phase of this project was secondary research, which examined the rationale and decisions to change the system to universal ILE. Research was designed to understand why the concept of universal ILE was implemented. The qualitative research relied on numerous previous officer studies. These studies have a wide scope; some are primarily focused on just officer education, some consider the entire realm of officer professional development while others are focused on leadership and the necessary knowledge, skills and attributes. The foundation of CGSC, from its historical foundation through the evolution of the college to the first two classes of 100% ILE was analyzed. This paper examined the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, commonly referred to by its acronym, CAS³ (pronounced cass cubed). CAS³ was a short duration course meant to train staff skills to captains. Parallels can be drawn from what happened with CAS³ in order to prevent similar events from occurring with ILE in the Command and General Staff College. Previous quantitative research and statistical analysis studies conducted by the Command and General Staff College Quality Assurance Office were examined. The secondary research showed the strong foundations of CGSC and the respect for the CGSC educated officer.

³¹ *Army Regulation 350-1: Army Training and Leader Development*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 13 January 2006. p. 56, para 3-32 a.

It also showed dissatisfaction among officers regarding the selection of only a limited group to attend resident education.

The second phase of research used the secondary research information to help determine if universal ILE was sustainable. The information was used to develop questions for faculty interviews and student surveys. The opinions of CGSC staff and faculty about the decision to send all majors to resident schooling were sought via interview. A small number of focused and in-depth interviews of members of the staff and faculty of the Command and General Staff College were conducted. This population included a representative from every department that instructs during ILE. Input was sought from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel's office (Army G-1), from assignment officers at Human Resource Command (HRC) and from Army leadership. Eleven in depth interviews were conducted with staff, faculty and graduates of CGSC. The actual face-to-face interview was preceded with an email with some questions to provoke thought. The questions can be found in Appendix C. Those questions were used as a starting point for the interview. The intent was to let the instructor dictate the course of the discussion to allow him/her to discuss freely opinions without being influenced by the thesis. During the interview, neither the thesis nor any research conclusions were disclosed. A survey consisting of 12 questions was sent to 59 ILE students in the AY 06-07 class that started in August 2006 (See Appendix B). The goal of having a representative sample of 30 respondents was not achieved, only 17 responded. The purpose of the surveys was to determine the perception of the student. The surveys utilized the five point Likert scale and free response questions. Survey results are in Appendix D. Numerous assignments officers at Human Resource Command were contacted but only two responded with in-depth answers. Interviews with assignments officers were designed to get their honest assessment of the assignment process. The intent was to garner the ground truth from those who must implement the universal ILE plan. The two that did respond did convey that their thoughts are generally shared among the other assignment officers.

REQUIREMENTS

Universal ILE is not sustainable because the Army cannot send all majors to ILE. Too many operational requirements exist to fill ILE to capacity in order to maintain the proper throughput. Operational positions are given priority. Student surveys and interviews revealed officers would rather be acting than learning. Officers rate operational experience in key developmental positions more important than attending ILE.

Operational needs are preventing officers from attending training and education. In 2005, the Army could not fill the class due to constraints of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Officers were needed to fill operational assignments in units deployed to OIF and OEF. Even without the war, the Army could still not support sending all majors to a year long course and still meet its requirements to ensure units are adequately manned with field grade officers. The fact that the Army G3 and CGSC have allowed a small group of majors to depart the course early the past three academic years would appear to undermine the value of CGSC, although this may only reflect the stress the Army is experiencing because of OIF and OEF. It may also indicate that operational deploying units have priority. Sixty-three students graduated early from the academic year 2004-2005 class; “[t]he officers were needed to help their units prepare for deployment. The students had satisfied their obligatory coursework”.³² The number increase each year with almost double leaving early in March and April of 2007.

Analysis of previous officer education review boards revealed the Army strongly emphasizes and values professional officer education. The boards invariably tried to find ways to maximize quality education for the maximum number of officers. They recognized the importance of educated officers for the operational Army. The first priority was always manning the force but the dividends of a quality education were continuously reemphasized. “The Army

³² Dawn Bormann. “Wars affect the training of officers: Fort Leavenworth forced to alter its curriculum.” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News. Washington, DC. 13 February 2006. accessed 5 October 2006 from <http://proquest.umi.com>.

service school system is second in importance only to the troop units which are the fighting strength of the US Army.”³³ The continuous review and evolution contributed to United States military education becoming renowned world wide. The numerous boards beginning with the Gerow board in 1945 through the ATLDP consistently recognized the need for officer education and strongly recommended improving the quality of the course and making the benefits available to the maximum number of officers.

The Army G1 office for manpower allocation has given the concept of universal ILE much consideration. In 1999, that office briefed the ATLDP showing that sending all majors to CGSOC was not supportable. The G1 could not and would not be able to fill operational requirements and send the projected number to school. Filling operational slots is the most critical aspect for the Army personnel system. The Army must ensure that deploying units are adequately manned in order to perform combat operations.³⁴

The Army G1 analyzed the feasibility of taking 100% of the operations career field, sending them to a one-year resident course while maintaining the O4 positions in the Army.³⁵ In a thesis for the Naval Post Graduate School, LTC Arthur Hoffmann did an operational research study on the effects that changes in the Officer Education System would have on the Transient, Holdee, and Student (THS) account. The THS account is the system the US Army uses to report on the number of soldiers attending training or schooling. Soldiers in the THS account are unavailable to fill operational slots in the Army. “There is a delicate balance needed between the number of officers attending Officer Education System (OES) schools and the number needed to man positions in warfighting units. Fewer officers in the THS account leave more officers

³³ *Report of the Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board.* Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1958, p. 45. This board was known as the Williams board.

³⁴ *ILE Slate Guidance for AY 07-08*, Power Point slide presentation. U.S. Army Human Resource Command, n.d.

³⁵ Arthur J. Hoffmann, Jr. “An Analysis of the Impact of Changes in the Officer Education System on the Army’s Transient, Holdee, and Student Account.” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. June 2004.

available for operational assignments benefiting the Army's current commitments."³⁶ LTC Hoffmann conducted his study because the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, wanted to find a balance when filling school slots and filling unit positions. The Army G-1 faces a delicate task in ensuring units are adequately filled and sending officers to necessary education to maintain the professionalism of the Officer Corps.³⁷

The initial research indicated that CGSC could not accommodate an entire year group. Based on officer review boards, the Army could not conceivably send all majors to ILE because there were too many majors in the population to fit through the school. Due to a reduced size force, this is incorrect given the population of majors (See Figure 1 for year group strengths). Year Group 94 will be used as example, since this is the first year group to attend ILE for universal ILE. The current year group strength is 1522 and according to Army G-1 an average of 20 percent of each year group is designated into a career field other than operations at the 7 year mark.³⁸ Therefore, of those 1522 majors 1218 would be required to attend the 1 year ILE course at Ft. Leavenworth. Given that the capacity of the new the Lewis & Clark center academic building at Ft. Leavenworth, is 1536, all YG 94 could attend during the same year and still allow the Joint service and international service officers to attend. Although all could theoretically attend the problem comes in taking that many officers out of the force for 1 year. The problem arises in simple supply and demand terms. The Army must find an appropriate balance between operational needs and educational requirements. It truly is delicate balance; the Army recognizes the benefit of education and the necessity to succeed in the global war on terror. Even without the war, the Army would be extremely hard pressed to fully implement universal ILE. The problem is not insufficient seats at the schoolhouse; the problem is insufficient officers to fill all the positions in the operational army.

³⁶ Hoffmann, p. 1.

³⁷ Hoffmann, p. 1.

ACC Year Group Sizes




Figure 1, Year Group Sizes

Student surveys found that the majority of officers had to wait to attend resident ILE (61%). This is an indication of the impending and growing backlog. Officers were restricted from leaving their previous duty station due to time on station and needs of the unit. Others had to wait because their branch had limited number of slots and priority was given to officers redeploying from combat. The school facilities at Ft. Leavenworth can accommodate larger classes yet operational requirements are preventing officers from attending.

Operational needs are preventing the college from operating at capacity. The Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) is limiting those who can attend. HRC assignments officers are prohibited from slating an officer that is in a life cycle unit.³⁹ CAS³ tendencies showed

³⁸ Email from LTC Mark Lukens, Ph.D. Chief of Officer Program Strength Analysis and Forecasting. Washington DC Army G1, dated 14 February 2007

³⁹ Email from HRC assignment officer.

commanders in the field were reluctant to send officers to a course. Operational assignments took precedence. The requirements for field grade officers to fill an increasing number of billets continue to rise. The Army has announced consideration to stand up another Combatant Command in the very near future. Africa Command would take over duties on a continent that was split between European Command (EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM).⁴⁰ More majors will be required to fill this staff thereby, reducing the number of available officers to attend. If a major is assigned to a unit locked into the ARFORGEN model, that officer will be unavailable for movement for 36 months. The ARFORGEN model is depicted in Appendix A. Student surveys showed that students would either do a key developmental position or combat duty before coming to ILE. In interviewing members of the current CGSC faculty I asked if the ARFORGEN concept would interfere with education. Many felt just the opposite – that education was getting in the way properly and fully implementing the ARFORGEN.

SYSTEM

The Army failed to set the conditions for universal ILE to succeed. The Army system as a whole makes universal ILE not sustainable. When deciding to implement universal ILE the Army failed to do a thorough analysis of all aspects and implications of sending all majors to a year long educational opportunity. The personnel assignment system was not adjusted. Not only do the requirements far outnumber the actual number of majors, the entire Army force structure does not support the concept of universal ILE.

From the beginning, officer education and career review boards emphasized the importance of education and recommended the maximum number attend. The problem is that those boards failed to examine how a universal education plan would be implemented. The review boards examined the importance of education and outlined the requirements but failed to

⁴⁰ Gordon Lubold. "Working Group forms to consider 'Africa Command'". *Army Times*. 13 November 2006. <http://www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=1-292925-2354732.php>. Accessed 4 December 2006.

set the conditions to ensure the force structure could support sending all mid level officers to a one year educational opportunity.

In 1945, the Gerow Board recognized the importance of officer education and made strong recommendations to quickly re-institute the command and general staff instruction. The Eddy board in 1949 reiterated the need for a course longer and more intense than the 10 week design during World War II. Additionally, the board surmised that one year is the minimum time needed to instruct an officer for general staff responsibilities. However, the board also felt that the education received at CGSC was “so important to an officer’s career that every effort should be made to permit the maximum number to attend.”⁴¹ The Eddy board set the precedent that the education for mid level officers should be one year. The one year course, the large number of majors and the short time spent as a major makes sending all majors to resident education not sustainable.

The Williams board of 1958 pointed out why not all officers should attend CGSC. Limiting factors included capacity of the college, course length, curriculum content, personnel support and by “the necessity to reduce the number of students to a minimum in order to support operational elements of the Army, and by the desire to insure that available resources of money and personnel are not expended in the education of officers with minimum potential.”⁴² The Williams board concluded that a maximum of 1550 graduates could be produced each year. The method would be to conduct one regular course with 750 and 2 associate courses (5 month duration) of 400 each. This was based on a CGSC capacity of 1150. This would equate to 65 percent of eligible Regular Army officers.⁴³

Again in 1965, a board explored many alternatives in trying to maximize the CGSC educational opportunity for majors. The Haines board found the major limitation to be the

⁴¹ Eddy Board, p. 6.

⁴² Williams Board, p. 18.

⁴³ Williams Board, p. 18.

infrastructure. There were insufficient classrooms and limited seats in Eisenhower auditorium in Bell Hall. The board ultimately determined that not all majors could attend a resident course and directed that a more robust non-resident program be developed.⁴⁴

The OPMS XXI study pointedly noted that “resident command and staff college attendance tends to act as a *de facto* screening mechanism, limiting the number of officers competing for critical branch-qualifying jobs because resident MEL 4 graduates get preferential assignment to divisions, and hence key branch-qualifying jobs, before nonresident graduates.”⁴⁵ Ultimately, the board was all about trying to institute fairness. The board made eight key recommendations. Most dealt with adjustments to career fields and arranging officers into career fields to ensure competition for promotion was equal. The last one was the most important and the most specific: “Send all officers selected for promotion to major to resident intermediate level military education and all officers selected for promotion to colonel to resident senior service college-level education.”⁴⁶ The board strongly recommended implementation of a resident MEL 4 program for all majors and elimination of selection boards.⁴⁷ While making such a potentially radical recommendation the board failed to factor how such a plan would be implemented given that officer inventory was inadequate. “A significant misalignment between the number of authorized positions for field-grade officers and the affordable officer inventory has created

⁴⁴ Haines Board, p. D-25.

⁴⁵ OPMS XXI Study, p. 4-12. “This is a *de facto* PERSCOM policy, and most divisions openly give priority treatment to resident MEL 4 graduates. Some divisions go so far as to proscribe non-resident MEL 4 graduates from serving in critical branch-qualifying jobs. Two important notes need mentioning here. First, given the degree of inflation in the current OER and the nature of where the MEL 4 selection cut line is drawn (at the midpoint of a year group), it is doubtful that MEL 4 selection boards truly can identify properly which officers ought to be the contenders for battalion and higher commands. At the very best, the distinctions are very fine among officers in the middle of a cohort, and it is often not clear whether there is any appreciable qualitative difference between many of those who make the cut and many who do not. Since this is the single most important selection officers will face in their first 15 years of service, the Army would do well to have a more reliable metric. Second, since resident command and staff college selection is largely a reflection of an officer’s performance in company command, usually complete by his or her eighth year of service, one has to question whether too large a decision rides on too little of an officer’s career at a too-early point in his or her development. Finally, given the importance of education in Army XXI, one must question the practice of providing a demonstrably superior resident education to only half of a year group.” Footnote on p. 4-12 of OPMS XXI Study.

serious management problems. This misalignment extends across virtually all branches and functional areas. The officer inventory is only enough to fill fewer than 75% of the authorized major positions”.⁴⁸ However, implementing such change would “require substantial planning, coordination, and commitment of resources.”⁴⁹

Using strong data⁵⁰ the panel concluded “[c]urrent CGSOC selection policy makes education a discriminator, particularly for the 50% of officers who do not receive resident education to prepare them for their duties and responsibilities. OPMS XXI and full spectrum operations demand that all officers receive the benefit of an Intermediate Level Education (ILE) opportunity to develop their talent for the next ten years of service.”⁵¹

The ATLDP reiterated the findings and recommendations from the OPMS XXI study. The panel was very influential in changing many aspects of officer training and development. The re-emphasis on ending selection criteria and instituting universal MEL4 facilitated the actual implementation plan. It recommended providing “all majors with a quality resident ILE based on OPMS XXI, giving them a common core of Army operational instruction and career field, branch, or functional area training tailored to prepare them for their future service in the Army.”⁵² This recommendation would eliminate the perceived culture of “haves” and “have-nots”. “It also ends education opportunities as a discriminator for branch qualification, promotion, and command selection. With ILE, all majors receive the same common core instruction that ‘re-greens’ them on Army warfighting doctrine.”⁵³

⁴⁶ OPMS XXI Study, p. iv.

⁴⁷ OPMS XXI Study, p. 7-12.

⁴⁸ OPMS XXI Study, p. vii.

⁴⁹ OPMS XXI Study, p. xvi.

⁵⁰ The ATLDP compiled and analyzed data from more than 13,500 leaders, using comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews and independent research. More than 9000 active duty officers were interviewed or surveyed (13.5% of active component officers) as well as 1058 reserve component. This provided an extensive and credible sampling data.

⁵¹ ATLDP, p. OS-12.

⁵² ATLDP, p. OS-13.

⁵³ ATLDP, p. OS-13.

The ATLDP reiterated statements from many previous boards to get former battalion commanders as instructors throughout OES. After continually making this recommendation, it appears that it is not happening and there are significant factors from preventing it from occurring. It would be nice but compromises must be made. Former battalion commanders are in high demand not only for educational purposes but also for operational jobs. Instructing is no longer perceived as a career enhancer as it was in Eisenhower's time. There are just not enough former battalion commanders to go around.

The boards were so focused on eliminating the culture and perceptions of the upper 50% they failed to examine the "how to" of implementation. They made recommendations after in depth analysis of the why. None of these boards or studies went far enough to challenge the structure of the entire system. Education of the officer was heavily emphasized as well as having a faculty with strong credentials. The boards failed to examine whether the system could sustain such an ambitious program.

As the Army began to drawdown after the Gulf War in 1991, the problem was no longer too many officers to put through the school. The problem was now trying to juggle filling operational needs and fill school slots. The assignments officers are finding it difficult to slot officers to attend school. In some cases, they have too many officers for the limited number of slots they are given. Others are having a difficult time filling the slots they are allotted. Some officers are unavailable to move, usually because they are serving in a unit preparing for deployment and therefore are locked into the unit until return. Student surveys also found this a reason some were unable to attend when eligible. Assignment officers are also restricted from sending any officer who is in a life cycle unit during the three year life cycle (ARFORGEN).⁵⁴ A backlog is already developing. AY 05-06 was the first year that those officers who fell under the

⁵⁴ Interviews with assignment officers and *ILE Slate Guidance for AY 07-08*, Power Point slide presentation. U.S. Army Human Resource Command, n.d., presented to HRC assignment officers for AY07-08.

universal ILE implementation plan could attend. In two years with only two year groups (94 and 95), there is a backlog of 1755 officers. In the first two years of eligibility, only 43% of year group 94 officers have attended. The Army G3 set a quota of 1191 officers to attend intermediate education. This number included the requirements to fill sister service and international schools with US Army officers. Due to restrictions, HRC could only muster 880 officers to attend ILE. Of course, the joint demands were met first leaving attendance at Ft. Leavenworth at 749 Army officers.⁵⁵ The Army is already implementing measures to manage this small but growing backlog. Seat allocation for each branch were redistributed in an attempt to even the backlog across all branches. Under universal ILE, it is the HRC assignment officer who determines which officers attend ILE. The old system of a central DA selection board has been replaced by having an officer of the same rank as the potential student determine attendance. Interviews with HRC assignments officers revealed an unfair system. The assignment officers are given guidance on which officers may attend CGSC. The first slating criteria is based on a prioritized list of officers from a division. This again provided puts the selection criteria into someone else's hands. The next guidance criteria was recent deployment experience.⁵⁶

General William Wallace, the Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Commander, relayed his concerns to HRC that only the most eligible officers are attending as opposed to the best officers.⁵⁷ He recognized that not all can attend ILE, yet they still want the best officers to attend resident training. Additionally, he expressed concern that officers doing well in the field will end up receiving constructive credit or completing some sort of core-course alternative because they cannot fit attendance into their timeline.

Another aspect that the system could not sustain was the need for quality faculty. The boards consistently recommended using former battalion commanders as instructors. Former

⁵⁵ *ILE Slate Guidance for AY 07-08*, Power Point slide presentation. U.S. Army Human Resource Command, n.d.

⁵⁶ *ILE Slate Guidance for AY 07-08*.

battalion commanders are in high demand not only for education purposes but also for operational jobs. Additionally, the mix of the faculty has changed. Historically, the mix was 90% uniformed active duty military and 10% civilian; it is now 30% military and 70% civilian. In an attempt to make universal ILE sustainable, CGSC turned to utilizing civilian faculty since uniformed personnel are needed in operational assignments. The civilians are hired under Title 10, section 4021 of the U.S. Code and are government employees not contractors. Hiring under this section of Title 10 allows for flexibility. The instructors are not long term employees. Numbers can be quickly reduced through elimination of positions if necessary without significant bureaucratic obstacles.

Interviews with the department directors identified another aspect that complicates the supportability of universal ILE. Part of Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 dictated joint training. As part of that legislation, each service had to provide a certain percentage of officers to each class to other services command and service colleges and war colleges. The other services are having a difficult time maintaining the agreed to percentage as the Army increases the class size. Air Force is trying and has been able to maintain the proper percentage. The Navy said it would be pressed if it could at all support the universal ILE when it was introduced five years ago.⁵⁷ HRC assignment officers cannot send Army officers to Navy courses off cycle,⁵⁸ meaning the Navy will not send officers to the February start date. Marine officers will fill those spots. Further, the February start is hampering other services' efforts to maintain the proper balance.

In an email exchange the chief of the Army's officer program for strength analysis and forecasting summed up why sending all majors to ILE is not sustainable:

We can support universal ILE if we have the inventory and the class seats.

The problem is we do not have inventory necessary to fill units let alone classroom seats. There are several reasons for this lack of inventory (supply and

⁵⁷ Interview with HRC assignment officer.

⁵⁸ Interview with faculty member.

⁵⁹ *ILE Slate Guidance for AY 07-08*.

demand): DEMAND huge structure growth, operational demands, SUPPLY small accession year groups, officer retention.

BOTTOM LINE: If we fix officer shortages by increasing the supply, then we can fill ILE. The current forecast is a minimum of 6 years to fix projected shortages. It takes 10 years to grow a Major and 4 more years just to create an officer. Long lead time.

I presented to TRADOC the problems with universal ILE back in October 2001.

The THS bill is supportable if we retain more officers in the inventory.⁶⁰

COMBINED ARMS AND SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL (CAS³)

The evolution and eventual demise of CAS³ is an example of why universal ILE is not sustainable. CAS³ was not sustainable because the Army could not send all captains. A review of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School is important because parallels can be drawn from its life cycle and applied to ILE. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School is commonly referred to by its acronym CAS³ and pronounced “cass cubed”. CAS³ was a 5-week long course to train captains in the necessary staff skills in preparation for positions on battalion and brigade level staffs. CAS³ was started in 1980 with a pilot course of 117 captains. In 2004, it was eliminated as a singular course and the learning objectives assimilated into the branch Captain’s Career Courses (CCC).

The Review and Training of Officers (RETO) board first introduced the concept of universal staff training in 1978. The RETO and other boards identified a deficiency in officer staff skills; hence a need to provide officers with the requisite skills. Initially, CAS³ was not meant for captains. The RETO board recommended CAS³ be for all officers selected for major. The board, noting the deficiency, recommended the creation of CAS³ “to ensure that 100 percent of the officers selected for major receive required staff training.”⁶¹ After the RETO concluded, CGSC conducted some independent analysis of the concepts. MAJ Robert Van Steenburg was the CAS³ project officer for CGSC; he summarized his analysis in a memorandum after providing

⁶⁰ Email from LTC Mark Lukens, Ph.D. Chief of Officer Program Strength Analysis and Forecasting. Washington DC Army G1, dated 14 February 2007

decision briefings for General Meyer, the Chief of Staff of the Army. General Meyer decided that all officers would attend CAS³ between their seventh and ninth year of service. The analysis by CGSC provided the information for General Meyer to decide to eliminate the implementation of the RETO recommendation to reduce the size of the CGSOC. Furthermore, the analysis led to the decision to make CAS³ mandatory for captains. Attendance occurred before promotion to major and selection for CGSC.⁶²

The primary consideration was the lack of resources and the desire to reduce the money spent on officer education. CAS³ was intentionally designed to be a short course due to limited resources. President Jimmy Carter had reduced military spending due to inflation; therefore, the Army was looking for ways to save money.⁶³ At the time, the RETO considered the option of integrating staff training into the branch officer advanced courses but concluded this was too early in an officer's career. Interestingly, because of this new course, the board also recommended reducing attendance at CGSOC to only one fifth of majors. A smaller CGSC class would also reduce the faculty requirements and allow for more officers in the operational force as well as reducing resource requirements. Although the idea of limiting the CGSOC class to only 20% of majors never materialized, the concept of having staff training for all officers was widely embraced. The cheapest alternative was to develop a short course.⁶⁴

From the start, CAS³ was well-designed. It consisted of a nine-week course to teach the essentials of staff work. It had the additional benefit of interaction among officers of other branches for the first time in their careers. Up to this point, officers spent most of their time in units surrounded by officers of the same branch. CAS³ would consist of 3 segments: a non-resident phase, an exam (pass before admission) and a resident phase. The board ultimately

⁶¹ RETO. Executive Summary p. 2.

⁶² Memorandum, dated 7 April 1980. Available in archive section of Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

⁶³ Dale R. Herspring. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005) p. 237-238.

decided on a nine-week resident course where the student would attend in a temporary duty (TDY) status and return to his/her unit. There would be 4 courses per year, with 572 students (500 active duty and 72 reserve) per course.⁶⁵

The pilot course for CAS³ began in 1980. CAS³ attendance would gradually increase with 1985 as the target year for maximum student population. The Howard K. Johnson wing was added to Bell Hall in 1985 specifically designed for CAS³ small group type classrooms. The PDOS recognized the additional classroom space and recommended a yearly output of 2400 in FY86 and 4500 in FY87.⁶⁶

Life Cycle of CAS3




Figure 2, CAS³ Life Cycle

⁶⁴ RETO, p. VI-2.

⁶⁵ RETO, p. A-3-13.

⁶⁶ PDOS p. 64 (?)

CAS³ was originally intended to be taught by former Battalion commanders. That was soon determined to be not supportable, since there were too few and in high demand for other billets. The requirement was then for instructors to be lieutenant colonels. The decline continued – when there were not enough lieutenant colonels, majors could fill instructor positions and when the positions could not be filled by active duty officers, the classes were then taught by hired civilians. Most of these were retired officers and brought that experience with them. When the course was finally eliminated many of the instructors were civilian contractors. Many of the contractors were retirees but there was no guarantee that all of the instructors would have a military background.

CAS³ was mandatory for all officers in year group 79 and later.⁶⁷ Concerns arose over the disruption that was caused due to absences from units to attend CAS³. In response to such concerns, the CAS³ model was modified. The course was shortened from 9 weeks to 6 weeks, the number of classes offered each year was increased by two to accommodate more officers and attendance would be in conjunction with the officer advanced courses.⁶⁸ By October 1997, the waiting list to attend CAS³ had grown to 7500.⁶⁹ Due to this large backlog 3,300 officers in year groups 1987 to 1990 were given a “waiver of requirement” to attend CAS³. The rationale was that these officers were already branch qualified, meaning that each had met the qualifications of their particular branch, and had job experience similar to the concepts taught at CAS³.⁷⁰

In 2003, the Army decided to eliminate this course altogether with the last active duty class being spring 2004. The course was eliminated in 2004 although the last reserve and National Guard CAS³ classes would run through 2005. These courses were not taught at Ft.

⁶⁷ Officer News. Army Communicator. Summer 1994, vol. 19 Issue 2. accessed via ebscohost.com on 28 October 2006.

⁶⁸ “Captains’ Professional Military Education.” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Jul-Sep 97, vol. 23, Issue 3. p. 56. accessed online 28 October 2006.

⁶⁹ Jim Tice, “School waiting list now at 7,500,” *Army Times* 20 October 1997, p.. vol. 58, Issue 12. accessed via ebscohost.com on 28 October 2006.

⁷⁰ Jim Tice. “3300 officers waive CAS3 course” *Army Times*. 5 October 1998. vol. 59, Issue 10. p. 8.

Leavenworth but at satellite sites closer to state units. The concepts covered in CAS³ were to be assimilated into the normal captain's career course curriculum at the respective branch school. Even though a six week long course was being totally eliminated and learning objectives were transferred to the branch schools, only minor adjustments were made to the length of the captain's career course. The branch schools were already burdened with trying to fit a large amount of material into their 5 ½ month long course. At this time, the Army was introducing Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) with no associated training prior to showing up at an operational unit.⁷¹ In response, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tried to add more classes to the curriculum to teach emerging concepts associated with digital systems. More instruction would be added with the stipulation that the CCC could not extend beyond 19 ½ weeks. CAS³ became a bill payer for many initiatives in officer education.

In 2003, the Army introduced a new plan for officer education. All newly commissioned lieutenants would attend the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) at one of many designated installations to receive the fundamental training required for all officers. Each officer would then go to his/her branch specific installation to receive specialized training.⁷² The trained lieutenant would then go to an operational assignment where he/she could expect to spend the next 6-7 years. Each new officer would do the lieutenant jobs – platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion staff and would attend the captain's career course at approximately the mid-tour point (three years) and return to the same unit to serve as a primary staff officer at the battalion level and then command a company.

CAS³ can be viewed as a situation highlighting some of the potential pitfalls of implementing universal ILE. CAS³ was viewed as not necessary for success by both captains and senior leaders responsible for ensuring officers were allowed the time to attend. The RETO's

⁷¹ Army Digital Training Strategy. Dated September 2003

original idea behind the implementation of CAS³ was to bridge the gap between the half of field grade officers who received training in staff procedures and those not selected for resident CGSOC. CAS³ closed this gap for a short time. Universal ILE is today's plan to eliminate this gap. It is interesting to see how CAS³ evolved and moved from a course for field grade officers to a course for junior pre-company command captains. A move of approximately 6 years earlier in an officer's career.

ILE's evolvement is paralleling the CAS³ concept. The Army became backlogged trying to send all captains to CAS³. The concept was for captains to go closer to the mid-point of their time in grade as captain – about the 3-4 years time in grade mark, but it became difficult to try to fit this six-week course in during a captain's career. Officers were unable to go for many reasons, including needs of the unit. Units were reluctant to allow a 6-7 week absence for a captain and were many times constrained to pay the associated temporary duty (TDY) expenses. So the plan evolved to send a captain in conjunction with a permanent change of station (PCS). The traditional time to move to a new installation is during the summer months coinciding with children's school calendars. The course could not handle such a large number during the summer months. A normal class was about 1000 students. The infrastructure (classrooms and lodging) and instructors could not support this upper number. Officers were not being afforded the opportunity to be absent for almost 60 days for staff training. In 1994, Signal branch in its professional journal, *Army Communicator*, began to notice problems with signal officer attendance at CAS³, "[i]t is incumbent upon every Signal commander to help us turn the current attendance trend around."⁷³ By 1998, 3300 waivers were granted. The decline of CAS³ continued.

⁷² Aviation lieutenants would proceed to Ft. Rucker for flight school (IERW – initial entry rotary wing training), military intelligence lieutenants would proceed to Ft. Huachuca for intelligence training, armor officers to Ft. Knox to learn mounted maneuver tactics, etc.

⁷³ *Army Communicator*. Summer 1994, vol. 19 Issue 2. accessed via ebscohost.com on 28 October 2006

As a solution to sending captains at the mid point, the decision was made to send them in conjunction with the advanced course, later called the captain's career course (CCC). Incidentally, the RETO warned that the advanced course/CCC was too early for the skills taught in CAS³.⁷⁴ Each captain knew that at the end of a five to six month long advanced course would be a 6 week TDY trip to Ft. Leavenworth for CAS³. Even with this plan there was a large number of more senior captains who still needed to attend. No longer would attendance at CAS³ be required for promotion to major. The precedent had been set – CAS³ was not critical in the career of an officer. An official US Army news release dated April 12, 2004 announced the plan to merge CAS³ into the officer advanced course. "The decision to merge CAS³ with the OAC eliminates repetitive instruction, and minimizes captains' time away from operational assignments and their families."⁷⁵ Again, the Army wanted to ensure maximum time in operational assignments. Colonel David S. Thomson, CAS³ director, noted at the graduation of the last CAS³ class in May 2004, "With the Army at war, captains need to get back to their units."⁷⁶ The Army was unwilling to extend the captain's career course, again exemplifying that the content was not as important as getting captains to operational assignments.

While Army education review boards praised the CAS³ skills, the leaders in the operational units prevented some officers from attending creating a backlog. The operational Army essentially decided the fate of CAS³, its unwillingness to release a captain for 60 days. The course was eliminated to minimize captain's time away from operational assignments. Student surveys in 1999 revealed that much of the course was duplicated from what was taught at the CCCs and within 4 years the decision was made to eliminate CAS³.

⁷⁴ RETO, p. V-9.

⁷⁵ U.S. Army News Release. April 12, 2004. Army Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20310. Accessed from <http://www4.army.mil/ocpa> on 28 October 2006.

⁷⁶ Jim Tice, "CAS cubed ends." *Army Times*. Vol. 64, issue 46. p 22. 7 June 2004.

CONCLUSIONS

The implications in attempting to maintain a plan that is not sustainable go beyond just trying to find ways to ensure all officers receive intermediate level education. CGSC was founded on a system of selecting the best for education and instructing those individuals to a high standard. The United States reaped the benefits of a quality military education. CGSC was founded upon a system that sought to find and subsequently educate the best officers for service on general staffs. CGSC was recognized as providing top-notch education for mid-level officers preparing them for both peacetime and wartime responsibilities. The Leavenworth educated officers proved their value in success during both World Wars. Victory in future conflicts depends on the education of officers. The history and tradition of the college show that it was actually an effective system. The Army obviously was selecting the better officers since resident graduates did have a higher promotion rate and selection for command.⁷⁷ These officers were not getting promoted because of the education – they were promoted because they were a higher quality officer. The CGSC education merely enhanced their skills.

CGSC success is attributable to its selectivity. It is a privilege to attend. Officers exemplifying strong performance and high potential were selected to attend making it competitive and providing a competitive environment. Universal ILE will cause a decline in academic standards. The Williams board came to a similar assessment when assessing the idea to make all officers attend ranger school, “‘mass production’ would reduce standards and increase costs.”⁷⁸ Part of the success is the selection of quality officers, but the benefit comes in educating those officers in an academically rigorous environment thereby encouraging the pursuit for knowledge. The competitive environment is conducive to learning and culture that emphasized success.

Erosion in CGSC efficacy is prompted by two reasons. The Command and General Staff College’s success is its own undoing. Since CGSC graduates were promoted at a higher rate than

⁷⁷ Findings from ATLDP.

non selectees it was perceived as being necessary for success. Those not selected viewed non attendance as a career ender. This perceived unfairness led to the instituting of universal ILE. Now the Army is letting everyone in which is leading to a “check the block” mentality. It is not viewed a true career enriching experience and simply viewed as just another career gate to be met. Student surveys and faculty interviews showed that some students view the course as just another Army course to get through.

The second reason the efficacy of CGSC has eroded is due to the operational and combat needs of the Army. The priority of fill is to units in or going into combat. Since not all majors may be able to attend, resident attendance will be viewed negatively. Operational time may be deemed more significant for career success than quality education and therefore reduces the importance of intermediate level education. The faculty relayed this concern in that they feel commanders are preventing their high performers from attending ILE. The top officers are perceived to be necessary for mission success. The Army cannot feasibly send all majors to ILE; there are too many operational requirements. The operational needs are more critical and education will take a back seat. The increased requirements of the GWOT just exacerbates the situation.

Overall, this effectiveness erosion is harmful generally to a professional officer corps. “Commitment and the accompanying attitude and values are what cause officers to derive personal rewards or fulfillment from the professional conduct of education and training activities as well as mission accomplishment.”⁷⁹ Ultimately, universal ILE is a bad idea and will be detrimental to the professional officer corps. It is not supportable and the secondary and tertiary effects could result in marginalization of Army education and in a decline of education standards. The idea of permitting all majors to receive an education sounds great but it is not supportable given the number of Joint and Army major billets. One of the members from the ATLDP

⁷⁸ Williams Board, p. 22.

admitted that the panel did not do a thorough analysis of the supportability of the Universal ILE concept. It was a recommendation based on surveys from officers who pointed out the unfairness of sending only 50% to resident CGSOC. The recommendation was made to allow fairness to permit all the opportunity for education. It is difficult to emphasize the importance of education and then restrict who can go.

RECOMMENDATION

After thorough examination by and strong recommendations from two comprehensive review boards on the advantages of universal ILE, the idea is not likely to wane. Although universal ILE is not sustainable, the Army is unlikely to restrict officers from seeking education when seats are available at the school. The Army is short field grade officers and there just are not enough majors to go around.⁸⁰ Army G1 statistics back this up. Human Resource Command states Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) prohibits some officers from attending. The method of having HRC assignment officers determine who should attend is becoming less than fair for eligible officers. In light of these facts, the Army must consider alternatives and/or start examining modifications to the implementation. The recommendation is made to ensure CGSC continues to be viewed as valuable not only to the officer attending but also to the entire officer corps. Additionally, some further recommendations are made to offer ways to improve the overall officer education and to ensure the curriculum at CGSC remains relevant and beneficial. The recommendations are presented to avoid the pitfalls experienced with the decline of CAS³.

Recommendation #1: The concept of universal ILE is not sustainable and the implementation will hinder the officer education system. The old of method of sending only 50% of majors to resident training was unfair and created an adversarial environment. If the Army G1 determined that sending all majors to ILE could not be supported in 2001, the demands of war

⁷⁹ PDOS, p. 40.

⁸⁰ Tom Vanden Brook. "Officer Shortage Looming in Army." USA Today. March 12, 2007. accessed online March 12, 2007 <http://www.usatoday.com>. Gannett Co. Inc. 2007.

further hamper that goal. To prevent assignment officers from determining who should attend, a central DA selection board must be reinstituted to identify the upper portions of officers who have shown the potential to serve on high staffs and ultimately command and have the propensity for educational challenges. The selection must not be limited to just 50%. Further analysis is necessary as to what the exact attendance percentage or number of officers should be for each class. It would be premature to recommend what fraction of officers should attend the resident ILE at Ft. Leavenworth. The Army G1 must determine what a supportable number is to send to school and still keep Joint and Army filled grade positions filled. A concentrated effort among Army G1 manpower assessment specialists and Human Resource Command should determine the percentage of officers that could come to Ft. Leavenworth while still maintaining an adequately manned operational force. The numbers could change each year to facilitate flow and based on requirements. This would alleviate backlog before it gets out of hand. In addition, yearly selection boards could adjust numbers to prevent backlog. It would also prevent the need to provide constructive credit or grant waivers. The Lewis & Clark center can accommodate a student load of 1,536 and CGSC states it can surge to a student load of 1,792. Those not selected for attendance would receive the ATLDP described “re-greening instruction”⁸¹ at one of the satellite 3.5 month courses.

A central DA selection board also has additional benefits. Selection by a board will compel leaders to facilitate resident attendance and send the selected officers to school. With no selection criteria, leaders will attempt to retain some top officers putting the needs of the unit ahead of the needs of the individual. Another concern is that majors would not find the time to attend based on competing career demands and pressure from superiors that their absence is unacceptable. Therefore, advanced distributed learning (non-resident) needs to be continued but

⁸¹ The ATLDP saw one of the benefits of CGSOC as being the chance for officers to become reoriented to Army procedures after completing branch qualified captains positions such as recruiting duty, AC/RC positions, USMA or ROTC instructors.

only available to officers who are in the primary zone for promotion to lieutenant colonel. The distributed learning method only becomes available to the officer who is not selected below the zone for lieutenant colonel. If a senior leader has identified an officer who has potential to be promoted to below the zone, that leader must ensure that officer receives the appropriate education prior to consideration for lieutenant colonel. Additionally, this will impress upon the officer the importance of this education and reduce reluctance to attend. In keeping with the recommendation of the PDOS in 1985, in order to get promoted to lieutenant colonel an officer must be MEL4 qualified. This requires maintaining the non-resident option for active duty, but only for the officer who has exhausted all other means and is in the primary zone for education. This gives the officer limited time to complete the non-resident portion before the next promotion board. This will be the motivation to complete the course in a timely manner. This means only officers who completed resident ILE (either at Ft. Leavenworth or at a satellite course) are eligible for below the zone consideration.

The officers considered for selection should not be limited to operational career field officers. The diversity of the CGSC class is what makes it beneficial for the student. Operational career field officers benefit by interacting with institutional and operational support. Information operations and strategic communications is just one area where interaction is necessary. Given the complex contemporary operational environment of counterinsurgency and nation building, interaction with lawyers, civil affairs, and foreign affairs officers is crucial.

While a need to change was identified by numerous boards over many years, the Army education system must remain true to its roots. To remain relevant and beneficial ILE must be a course that officers strive to attend and not one that just becomes a ticket to be punched. The concepts that made CGSC respected must be upheld. It should be perceived as an honor and privilege to attend

Recommendation #2: Also given the current emphasis on operational experience and the limited time allowed for education, the staff college should become a masters producing course.

The masters should not just be limited to the current MMAS program. The college could work with some local institutions to offer a wider range of degrees that could be leveraged in today's asymmetric military. University of Kansas is only 45 minutes away, University of Missouri Kansas City is less than 30 minutes away, University of Missouri and Kansas State University are within a 2-3 hour drive. Webster University and Central Michigan University offer masters of arts for officers enrolled in ILE. The officer takes the requisite courses for the degree and uses ILE courses for electives credit. The 2005 CGSC self study recommended that "CGSC should enter into collaborative relationships with area institutions to learn from their experiences with assessment."⁸² Already, CGSC has established cooperative agreements with local universities offering opportunities for both students and faculty to pursue advanced degrees.

As a solution to the problem of sending every major to Ft. Leavenworth for ILE would be to ensure every major receives a masters degree in some field. Army regulations would need to be changed to reflect a masters degree from an accredited university is equivalent to MEL4 qualification. That field does not have to be directly tied to the military profession. To ensure that Ft. Leavenworth remains relevant the college must require each student to graduate with a masters degree. It must be dictated that the student strive for the MMAS or a degree from one of the universities that offers a masters in conjunction with CGSC course work. The argument may be that a Masters of Business Administration (MBA) from Webster University or one in adult education from Kansas State University bears no relevance to the military profession, but such degrees may be more valuable for the Army in the long term.⁸³ The corporate world is constantly applying military concepts to business practices and vice versa. Additionally, technical degrees from civilian institutions should be encouraged. As the military faces a continually evolving

⁸² *Self Study Report submitted to Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of College and Schools*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC. December, 2005. p. 182.

⁸³ LTC Tom O'Sullivan. "A 'More Appropriate' Student Body for the CGSC Officer Course?" *Army Magazine*. September 1999. p 10-12. LTC O'Sullivan makes the argument that these degrees are not

enemy, we need experts in computer science, engineering, psychology and social science, anthropology, language, etc. If universal ILE is here to stay, then the Army must take a further step making a graduate degree from an accredited institution a requirement for promotion to lieutenant colonel. If a civilian degree is attained the officer will still be required to attend one of the satellite ILE courses in order to meet the intent of the recommendations of the ATLDP and the OPMS XXI boards to ensure the re-greening process. Due to the inability to send all officers to professional education, some officers may need to find time on their own to pursue the masters degree. But the requisite for promotion to colonel (O6) should be a post graduate degree from an accredited institution.

Recommendation #3: Re-institute academic rigor. These recommendations are provided with the intent to take steps to improve the quality of officer education. Having a world class education requires four elements: a world class faculty, world class students, a world class curriculum and world class facilities and resources.⁸⁴ Interviews with staff and faculty show CGSC is dedicated to recruiting and retaining top-notch instructors. Continual internal review shows the desire to keep the curriculum relevant, practical and beneficial to the student. The Lewis & Clark center proves the Army will invest resources to ensure facilities are excellent. The challenge arises in ensuring the students remain world class. The Army must ensure the officer is prepared to attend and that the college is responsible to develop that student into the professional officer.

The disadvantage of enforcing academic rigor and actually failing a student it that this may significantly hinder or ruin an officer's career. An outstanding leader with outstanding tactical abilities, who may have succeeded as a battalion and brigade commander, may never get

beneficial to the US Army and the Army is wasting money paying for tuition assistance. He advocates that all students must get a MMAS.

⁸⁴ *Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings*. Marine Corps University. Quantico, VA. 29 September 2006, p.2.

the chance with such a blemish in his/her record. This is a negative unintended effect of sending all majors to education and enforcing academic standards.

Enforcement of academic rigor should include some accountability for your performance. Currently, the academic evaluation report (AER) outlining performance during the course that all students receive upon completion of ILE is not seen by promotion or selection boards. If this information was made available to promotion boards, an officer would take an increased interest in his/her academic performance. An alternative to permitting AER for promotion boards, an officer's overall grade for ILE could be represented on his/her officer record brief (ORB). Now the officer's academic performance could be seen by the chain of command. This is an incredible incentive to put forth maximum effort during the school year.

EPILOGUE

CGSC is valuable to the officer corps, but the establishment of universal ILE has compromised this value. Wartime demands further exacerbate the situation. Universal ILE could lead to deterioration in the quality of education at CGSC, as officers will view it as just another Army course and a block to be checked. The decision for universal ILE was made years ago and without serious consideration of sustainability. What was intended to be fair has become unfair. The decision was made to improve every officer's education but the result now is a lesser education for all. The decision was made for sustainability of a professional officer corps. The system as a whole makes it unsustainable. Universal ILE is not sustainable because the Army cannot fulfill operational needs and send officers to school and the entire Army system fails to set the conditions for full implementation. The demise of CAS3 serves as a warning as to what can happen when the system fails to maintain an emphasis on education.


APPENDIX A

ARFORGEN

The concept for ARFORGEN is that a unit will enter a life cycle consisting of a period of 3 years where ideally the organization does not change in terms of personnel. A Soldier is sent to unit where he/she will remain for 36 months. Jobs within that brigade combat team (BCT) may change (promotion, key positions rotation, etc.), but the Soldier will remain within. The unit goes through three distinct phases under the ARFORGEN model. Phase I is the reset/train phase where the unit begins to replace its personnel and repair its equipment. The unit is unavailable for deployment during this phase as it acceptable the unit to be coded as C4 (the lowest readiness status). The unit slowly builds its force to enter the ready phase. A ready force can be rapidly trained, equipped, resourced and ready for deployment. The final phase (III) is the available phase where the unit is available for deployment and most likely will consist of time to either OIF or OEF. An available force is trained, equipped, resourced and ready for deployment.⁸⁵ The universal MEL 4 does not fit well into the ARFORGEN model. Once an officer is in a BCT he/she must remain until the unit begins its next retrain/refit phase. Then the officer may move (PCS (permanent change of station)) to another unit and attend any required schooling. Upon completion of ILE the officer will then be sent to a division and wait until the next brigade begins the process over where again the officer is locked in for another 3 years.

⁸⁵ HQDA ARFORGEN 101 Brief. Dated 6 January 2006. Found through search on AKO. Accessed on 4 December 2006.

ARFORGEN FORCE POOLS





- **Reset / Train Pool** - The initial ARFORGEN Force Pool includes modular units that redeploy from long term operations, are directed to reset/train, or are experiencing significant personnel and/or equipment changes or reorganization and are unable to sustain Ready or Available Force capability levels.

- **Ready Force Pool** - The second Force Pool includes those modular units which have been assessed as "Ready" at designated capability levels (from training and readiness "gates") to conduct mission preparation and higher level collective training with other operational headquarters. They are eligible for sourcing, may be mobilized if required, and can be trained, equipped, resourced and committed, if necessary, to meet operational (surge) requirements.

- **Available Force Pool** - The third Force Pool includes those modular units which have been assessed as "Available" at designated capability levels (from training and readiness "gates") to conduct mission execution under any RCC. **ALL AC AND RC UNITS (CBT/CS/CSS) PASS THROUGH THE AVAILABLE FORCE POOL WINDOW OF TIME (1YEAR).** They are sourced against an operational requirement or focused on a contingency requirement. AC units are available for immediate deployment and RC units are available for alert/mob/required post-mob training & validation/deployment. At the end of their respective Available Force Pool time, all units return to the Reset/Train Force Pool.

STRUCTURING THE FORCE → GENERATING READY FORCES

ARFORGEN – the "bridge" that synchronizes operational requirements and available modular unit readiness in a logical, systemic process



Intent:

- Rapidly deployable, agile and expeditionary forces
- Availability of adequate AC and RC follow-on forces
- Right mix of capabilities – trained, ready, relevant

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) – A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements.

– ACP Change 1 (09172004)

Event-Based versus Time-Based...Time (Predictability) is a Goal

APPENDIX B

Student Survey

I am a student attending the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) located at Fort Leavenworth. I am conducting research as part of the Master of Military Arts and Science degree program. Your support and participation in this research is both important and highly appreciated.

All information collected is confidential and will be used solely for completion of this research project. The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Thank you for your participation. If you have questions, please contact

Researcher: MAJ David Bresser via email david.bresser@us.army.mil
Survey Administrator, Maria Clark via email maria.clark1@leavenworth.army.mil

This survey is not being conducted by CGSC or SAMS. Data will be provided to CGSC or SAMS leadership only as a final monograph product with no identifying information of participants.
This Survey has been approved by QAO.
Survey Control number is 07- 10

If given the choice, which of the following options would you have preferred to do first?

- ☐ ILE
- ☐ Key developmental position associated with your branch
- ☐ Field experience in combat
- ☐ No preference
- ☐ Other

Please provide your other preference.

How important are the following for your personal development?

	Extremely Important	Moderately Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important	Undecided
ILE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Master Degree from a Civilian University	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
MMAS Degree	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combat Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

How important are the following for your military career?

	Extremely Important	Moderately Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important	Undecided
ILE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Master Degree from a Civilian University	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
MMAS Degree	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combat Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

How important are the following for success in key developmental branch assignments?	Extremely Important	Moderately Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important	Undecided
ILE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Master Degree from a Civilian University	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
MMAS Degree	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combat Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

How important are the following for military officer promotion?	Extremely Important	Moderately Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important	Undecided
ILE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Master Degree from a Civilian University	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
MMAS Degree	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combat Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

How important are the following for selection for battalion command?	Extremely Important	Moderately Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important	Undecided
ILE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Master Degree from a Civilian University	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
MMAS Degree	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combat Experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please describe the benefits of ILE attendance.

Please select your agreement with the following statements.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
ILE is preparing me for the next 10 years of my military career.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ILE should be a requirement for promotion success.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ILE is of high quality.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ILE should be a requirement for selection for battalion command.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please use the space below to provide comments and/or experiences you would like to share regarding your ILE attendance at CGSC.

The following demographic information is needed for data analysis to determine if opinions differ among various branches and/or year groups. Only aggregate data will be used.

Please provide your year group.

Please provide your branch.

Did you have to wait to attend ILE?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Why?

Please select any of the following that describe you.

☐ I am not a combat veteran.

☐ I am an OIF combat veteran.

☐ I am an OEF combat veteran.

☐ I am a Gulf War veteran.

☒ I have other experience that provided a combat patch.

What other experience do you have that led to a combat patch?

How did combat experience contribute to your learning in ILE?

APPENDIX C

Faculty Pre-Interview Questionnaire

With the elimination of selection boards for attendance and institution of Universal MEL4, have you witnessed a decline in academic skills?

Has there been a decline in student motivation for academic pursuits?

Do you foresee any problems or limitations with overall class size in the new Lewis and Clark center?

Are there enough instructors to meet the demand of 100% attendance at ILE?

Do you feel the Army is putting the appropriate emphasis on education (not training)?

Do you think that OIF and OEF are interfering with Army education?

Do you think that the ARFORGEN model will interfere with sending officers to ILE?

Do you have any recommendations to improve the quality of education received at ILE?

Is there any difference in curriculum between the ILE common core taught at Ft. Leavenworth and that taught at one of the satellite courses?

Do you think the 3.5-month satellite course is sufficient to qualify an operational career field officer as MEL4? Is the AOWC a necessary component of that qualification?

APPENDIX D

Student Survey Results

	Count	Percent
<u>If given the choice, which of the following options would you have preferred to do first?</u>		
ILE	7	41.18 %
Key developmental position associated with your branch	3	17.65 %
Field experience in combat	7	41.18 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

How important are the following for your personal development?

ILE

Extremely Important	6	37.50 %
Moderately Important	2	12.50 %
Somewhat Important	7	43.75 %
Not Important	1	6.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

Operational Experience

Extremely Important	11	68.75 %
Moderately Important	5	31.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

Master Degree from a Civilian University

Extremely Important	9	56.25 %
Moderately Important	1	6.25 %
Somewhat Important	5	31.25 %
Not Important	1	6.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

MMAS Degree

Moderately Important	1	6.25 %
Somewhat Important	8	50.00 %
Not Important	7	43.75 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

Combat Experience

Extremely Important	9	52.94 %
Moderately Important	6	35.29 %
Somewhat Important	1	5.88 %
Not Important	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

How important are the following for your military career?

ILE

Extremely Important	9	56.25 %
Moderately Important	2	12.50 %
Somewhat Important	4	25.00 %
Not Important	1	6.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

Operational Experience

Extremely Important	13	81.25 %
Moderately Important	2	12.50 %
Somewhat Important	1	6.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

Master Degree from a Civilian University

Extremely Important	8	50.00 %
Moderately Important	5	31.25 %
Somewhat Important	3	18.75 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

MMAS Degree

Moderately Important	2	12.50 %
Somewhat Important	5	31.25 %
Not Important	9	56.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

Combat Experience

Extremely Important	12	70.59 %
Moderately Important	4	23.53 %
Somewhat Important	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

How important are the following for success in key developmental branch assignments?

ILE

Extremely Important	4	23.53 %
Moderately Important	5	29.41 %
Somewhat Important	3	17.65 %
Not Important	5	29.41 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Operational Experience

Extremely Important	11	64.71 %
Moderately Important	5	29.41 %
Somewhat Important	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Master Degree from a Civilian University

Extremely Important	1	6.25 %
Moderately Important	5	31.25 %
Somewhat Important	5	31.25 %
Not Important	5	31.25 %
Total Responses	16	100.00 %

MMAS Degree

Moderately Important	1	5.88 %
Somewhat Important	6	35.29 %
Not Important	10	58.82 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Combat Experience

Extremely Important	8	47.06 %
Moderately Important	6	35.29 %
Somewhat Important	2	11.76 %
Not Important	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

How important are the following for military officer promotion?

ILE

Extremely Important	11	64.71 %
Moderately Important	2	11.76 %
Somewhat Important	3	17.65 %
Not Important	1	5.88 %

Total Responses 17 100.00 %

Operational Experience

Extremely Important	11	64.71 %
Moderately Important	5	29.41 %
Somewhat Important	1	5.88 %

Total Responses 17 100.00 %

Master Degree from a Civilian University

Extremely Important	4	23.53 %
Moderately Important	6	35.29 %
Somewhat Important	5	29.41 %
Not Important	2	11.76 %

Total Responses 17 100.00 %

MMAS Degree

Extremely Important	1	5.88 %
Moderately Important	3	17.65 %
Somewhat Important	5	29.41 %
Not Important	8	47.06 %

Total Responses 17 100.00 %

Combat Experience

Extremely Important	12	70.59 %
Moderately Important	5	29.41 %

Total Responses 17 100.00 %

How important are the following for selection for battalion command?

ILE

Extremely Important	10	58.82 %
Moderately Important	2	11.76 %
Somewhat Important	3	17.65 %
Not Important	1	5.88 %
Undecided	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Operational Experience

Extremely Important	14	82.35 %
Moderately Important	2	11.76 %
Undecided	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Master Degree from a Civilian University

Extremely Important	4	23.53 %
Moderately Important	4	23.53 %
Somewhat Important	6	35.29 %
Not Important	2	11.76 %
Undecided	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

MMAS Degree

Extremely Important	1	5.88 %
Moderately Important	1	5.88 %
Somewhat Important	7	41.18 %
Not Important	6	35.29 %
Undecided	2	11.76 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Combat Experience

Extremely Important	13	76.47 %
Moderately Important	2	11.76 %
Somewhat Important	1	5.88 %
Undecided	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

ILE is preparing me for the next 10 years of my military career.

Strongly Agree	6	35.29 %
Agree	3	17.65 %
Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	29.41 %
Disagree	3	17.65 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

ILE should be a requirement for promotion success.

Strongly Agree	3	17.65 %
Agree	6	35.29 %
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	23.53 %
Disagree	4	23.53 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

ILE is of high quality.

Strongly Agree	3	17.65 %
Agree	6	35.29 %
Neither Agree nor Disagree	3	17.65 %
Disagree	4	23.53 %
Strongly Disagree	1	5.88 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

ILE should be a requirement for selection for battalion command.

Strongly Agree	6	35.29 %
Agree	4	23.53 %
Neither Agree nor Disagree	3	17.65 %
Disagree	2	11.76 %
Strongly Disagree	2	11.76 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Please select any of the following that describe you.

I am not a combat veteran.	6	37.50 %
I am an OIF combat veteran.	10	62.50 %
I am an OEF combat veteran.	2	12.50 %
I am a Gulf War veteran.	1	6.25 %
I have other experience that provided a combat patch.	1	6.25 %
Total Responses	20	

Did you have to wait to attend ILE?

Yes	9	52.94 %
No	8	47.06 %
Total Responses	17	100.00 %

Question: Please describe the benefits of ILE attendance.

Learning a broad overview of higher level operations. Making contacts with other Majors I will joining in the force after graduation.

Opportunity to take a breather, spend time with family, do some reading, meet good people.

Opportunity to interact with peers from both the Army and other services. A year to hop off the deployment train.

Education on a broad variety of subjects that prepare us for the next 10 years of our careers. It also gives us the opportunity to compare notes (especially on operational/combat experience) with our peers in a non-attribution atmosphere.

Question: Please use the space below to provide comments and/or experiences you would like to share regarding your ILE attendance at CGSC.

I think there should be a "no-harm/no foul" easy out for people who don't want to put in a full effort at ILE, or don't want to be here. I think this school needs to maintain high standards and not bend them, but not necessarily attach a hard stigma to people for moving on to get them to move along voluntarily without fighting it and wasting faculty time. Some people complain about some of the curriculum and its relevance, especially the History and Leadership program, but all of this is very important and worthwhile. In fact, the History program in particular should be expanded.

I was also somewhat concerned that civilian instructors would wear down and become apathetic after a while, but have been pleased with the quality of instruction from all of them. They have to deal with a lot of grief from each class and we need to do something to keep these people motivated and make sure we retain the best.

I believe that when all officers were allowed/required to attend ILE, it reduced the quality of the officers who attend the course. Clearly there are (many) students who care more about obtaining a civilian masters degree or spending every moment with their family, than obtaining the potential benefits of ILE.

To improve the quality of ILE, the quality of the instructors must be improved. Just because someone retired from the military with 20 years of service, does not make them qualified to teach. Make teaching at ILE a career enhancing job, (just like the MTT). Get instructors who were successful BN Commanders, not just guys who were on a Division or Joint Staff.

Incorporate the MMAS into the ILE course, if Naval CGSC can do, why can't the Army. This would allow students to put more and diverse emphasis on military studies and I would argue, ultimately give them some more free time.

Glad to have the opportunity to come to the Army program.

ILE is what you put into it. Your last question is somewhat suspicious, because ILE is universal, not selective.

1. The STRAT, Leadership and History I found somewhat useful.

2. Tactics was a waste of time. Since all branches now come to ILE with 100% attendance, the course has been dumbed down to accomodate them. As a CBT Arms officer the lions share of work fell on me and my fellow CBT Arms officers. Other branches just were not expected nor required to perform at nearly the same level.

I think there should be more interaction with active duty officers. Some of the retired officers are knowledgeable, but they haven't operated in the COE that we will be facing after graduation. Also, there seems to be a lack of preparation by both faculty and students, so the school seems undermined. I have sharpened my critical thinking, but haven't gained a lot of knowledge about my future jobs.

ILE represents the obvious tension between preparing an officer for an operational and strategic thinker and leader vs. preparing an officer to be better prepared for a duty assignment. 2 different missions.

lacking in academic rigor. difficult nut to crack. requires excellent instructors of which we have some; some not. difficult to balance the need for a break for stressed officers and their families with added value of more difficult poi. although this is a 'no major left behind' type course, it is probably close to right given pace of ops. now that students are not top 30% of officers, teaching style will need to change if the learning from peers is to be sustained. lots of nonsense gets discussed if instructors fail to take a more active role. a role not required with a different demographic of students.

Question: Please provide your branch.

- in
- qm
- IN
- MI/USAR
- Infantry
- ADA
- Engineer
- MI
- USAF
- IN
- FA
- field artillery
- Ordnance/Logistics
- Infantry
- SC
- USN
- FA

Question: Please provide your year group.

95

95

94

1994

1994

1994

94

94

1994

1996

1995

1994

2004

1990

1994

94

94

Question: What other experience do you have that led to a combat patch?

panama, somalia

Question: Why?

could not leave jrtc

Space available to folks in YG 93 and the back log caused by those redeploying back to CONUS from OIF/OEF. They had priority.

I had to meet minimum time on station requirements.

Slated for FEB 2006 Start. Unit was short O4s, so it requested from HRC and received approval to keep until June 2006.

Had to compete for an ARNG residence slot

selected in 2nd look of 3

USAR duplicative enrollment in the SaDL program conflicted with AGR Board Selection process for ILE

Not selected first look

Universal ILE caused "perturbations" in the system.

Question: How did combat experience contribute to your learning in ILE?

My previous experience taught me how much I needed to learn.

It provided a frame of reference for activities at echelons above the corps level. This assisted in strategic and operational studies, concepts that would have been foreign otherwise.

I had experience doing logistics planning at the division level in OIF that gave me experience directly relevant to the planning we did in our exercises. We were planning to go through Turkey, so we had to do a lot of the planning from scratch and for going through an under-developed area, very similar to the GAAT scenario used in ILE, rather than going into a familiar and well developed area with lots of Army infrastructure like Kuwait. It also helped to know some of the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the war in Iraq.

I learned that there are a lot of people whose last deployment was Bosnia or Kosovo and that the ability to provide and receive first-hand accounts of events is very valuable. My combat tours allowed me to provide a perspective to my small group that only a minority had experienced. I was also able to learn from individuals who had been deployed to different countries with different organizations about what they did, how they did it and why.

I can't read the last line of the question. But I assume it asks how combat experience contributed to my learning in ILE.

Three things;

- 1) My motivation for study (extra work effort) was not high coming off of a 1 year separation from my wife and family. I was emotionally drained.
 - 2) 1/2 my class does not have a combat patch. Having one, does give some INITIAL credibility to what you say.
 - 3) So little of the study has not focused on combat, that I do not believe my combat tour experience contributed to my success at ILE any more than any other of my military experiences.
-

Somewhat

It allowed me to participate in discussions about operations in Iraq.

1. Provided a context in which to reference what we were attempting to do in class.
 2. Doctrine and CTAC instructions years behind current fight. Civilian instructors woefully inadequate to the task of COIN. They were about 1 question deep on emerging doctrine, but couldn't explain the why or how. Routinely we were forced to teach ourselves.
-

Provided experience

Question: How did the lack of combat experience affect your learning in ILE?

I could not say I've been there and here's what I experienced as a staff/XO/S4/ASST G4 etc.

It did not.

Lack of combat experience has no bearing on either of my abilities to learn or perform, but my war stories weren't as cool since I could only recount numerous events of being shot at while conducting multiple iterations of Convoy LFX with the mobilized USAR/NG CS and CSS soldiers.

Interestingly enough most of my small group peers with "combat patches" got their "combat experience" from the FOB. I suspect a separate survey would reveal similar results.

It did not. I have operational experience in Kosovo. Combat is about application of tactical skills at Bde and below. ILE focus is on operational skills, Bde and above.

My lack of Army knowledge and combat experience made my learning curve very steep. During group discussions, I tended to stay quiet. I felt as though I did not have the right to add my input unless the discussion focused on opinion which I could not justify due to my lack of combat experience. Though, my fellow students gave me good insight on the ground war from a field grade officer's perspective.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank those who proofread and gave me insight when I was frustrated with myself. First, I want to express my gratitude to my family who put up with me during this process, especially my wife, Devon, who proofread multiple iterations as well as listened as I read portions aloud.

I want to thank my in-laws who also painstakingly read early rough drafts and provided guidance – COL (R) Anthony Wagner, Patricia Wagner, and Tony Wagner. Other proofreaders included Robin McLean, Ph.D. and Mr. Scott Hecht, Esquire. Additionally, I would like to thank the research librarians at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) for their help in tracking down books, articles, and always finding that crucial archived document.