

A Military History of Modern Egypt from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War

**A Monograph
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Abstract

A MILITARY HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT FROM THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST TO THE RAMADAN WAR by LTC Shams El-Din, Osama, Egyptian Army, 90 pages.

Egypt has one of the oldest civilizations and proudest national histories in the world with a tradition of a well-maintained, advanced and relevant military force. These experiences provided guidance for developing victory in some of the most significant campaigns of Middle Eastern history, from Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt In 1517 AD to the Egyptian-Israeli conflict of 1973.

This monograph provides an overview of that history, decisive campaigns, and the features of that military experience in former times that could be useful, in the opinion of the author, for the education of Egyptian military officers today and in the futures--as one element in continuing improvement in Egyptian military and operational art.

Some of the key lessons learned from modern Egyptian military history are:

- The need for speed and mobility.
- The importance of support structures -- both an industrial base for producing weaponry, and strong logistical supply system for campaigns.
- Attention to strategic and tactical planning to assure that the enemy is engaged at times, in places, and under conditions of one's choosing
- The practice, following Clausewitz, of using war as "a continuation of politics by other means".

Conclusions and recommendations based on this analysis address how to apply learned lessons from Egyptian military history to current and future officer education. An advanced course, beyond the mid-career staff college, applying lessons from history to current doctrine, theories, and campaign planning, could provide a useful framework for using lessons learned from history for current and future military practice.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	1
Historical Setting	2
Purpose of This Study	4
Significance of Topic	4
Methodology.....	5
Conclusions and Recommendations	5
Chapter One: Egyptian Army in Medial Age from 1250-1800AD	7
The Mamluks Era from 1250AD-1517AD.....	7
The Bahri (Turkish) Period--1250-1390.....	8
The Burji (Circassian) Period--1382-1517	9
The Mongol Invasion 1258 AD.....	11
The Battle of Ayn Jalut, 3 September 1260 AD.....	11
The Aftermath of Ain Jalut Battle	12
The Ottoman Empire Conquered Egypt In 1517 AD	13
Modern Egypt.....	14
The French Invasion and Occupation, 1798-1801.....	14
Conclusion.....	17
Chapter Two: The Egyptian Army in Modern History	18
Muhammad Ali, from 1805-48.....	18
The Rise to Power	18
The Beginning of the State System	19
Anglo-Egyptian War (1807).....	20
Wahabi War 1811-1818	20
The Battle of Konia in December 1832 AD	22
Background	22
The Opposing Armies	22
The Grand Strategy and Preparing for the Battle	23
The Execution of the Konia Battle	24
The Aftermath of Konia Battle.....	25
Social Change in the Nineteenth Century.....	26
From Occupation to Nominal Independence: 1882-1923	29
The Occupiers	29
Egypt Under the Protectorate and the 1919 Revolution	30
Conclusion.....	31
Chapter Three: The History of Egyptian Army from 1948-1973.....	34
First Arab-Israeli War.....	34
The Establish of the Free Officer Movement	35
The Revolution and the Early Years of the New Government: 1952-56.....	36
The Nationalization of the Suez Canal	36
The Suez Crisis 1956.....	36
The Plan.....	37
The Execution.....	37
The June 1967 War.....	39
Background	39
Israel Launched Attack First.....	40
The Execution.....	41
War of Attrition and the October 1973 War.....	42
October War 1973	43

Strategic and Political Settings.....	43
The Preparation for War.....	45
The Execution	45
The Way to Peace with Israel.....	48
Conclusion.....	49
Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations	54
Conclusion.....	54
Recommendations	58
Designing the Future	58
The Importance of History for Field Grade Officer Education System	60
APPENDIX A	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY	82

INTRODUCTION

History is the depository of great actions, the witness of what are past, the example and instructor of the present, and monitor to the future.

Cervantes Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra
Spanish author (1547-1616)

Background

Geographically Egypt, occupies a focal position between Africa and Asia covering 1,001,449 square kilometers of land. It is about the same size as Texas and New Mexico combined. The country's greatest distance from north to south is 1,024 kilometers, and from east to west, 1,240 kilometers. The country is located in northeastern Africa and includes the Sinai Peninsula, which is often considered part of Asia. Egypt's natural boundaries consist of more than 2,900 kilometers of coastline along the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Red Sea. Egypt is divided into twenty-eight governorates (sometimes called provinces), which include four city governorates: Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, and Suez; the nine governorates of Lower Egypt in the Nile Delta region; the eight governorates of Upper Egypt along the Nile River south from Cairo to Aswan; and the five frontier governorates covering Sinai and the deserts that lie west and east of the Nile. All governorates, except the frontier ones, are in the Nile Delta or along the Nile Valley and Suez Canal.¹

Egypt's population, estimated at 3 million when Napoleon invaded the country in 1798, has increased at varying rates. The population grew gradually and steadily throughout the nineteenth century, doubling in size over the course of eighty years. Beginning in the 1880s, the growth rate accelerated, and the population increased more than 600 percent in 100 years. The growth rate was especially high after World War II. In 1947, a census indicated that Egypt's population was 19 million. A census in 1976 revealed that the population had

¹See Appendix A, Figure 1.

ballooned to 36.6 million. After 1976, the population grew at an annual rate of 2.9 percent and in 1986 reached 50.4 million, including about 2.3 million Egyptians working in other countries. Projections indicate the population will reach 80 million by 2008.

Historical Setting

Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman Philosopher (105 BC-43 BC), stated “History is the witness of the times, the torch of truth, the life of memory, the teacher of life, the messenger of antiquity.”

The Roots of Egyptian civilization extend back more than 7,000 years to the beginning of settled life along the banks of the Nile River.² The country has an unusual geographical and cultural unity that has given the Egyptian people a strong sense of identity and a pride in their heritage as descendants of humankind’s earliest civilized community. Within the long sweep of Egyptian history, certain events or epochs have been crucial to the development of Egyptian society and culture. One of these was the unification of Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt sometime in the third millennium B.C. The ancient Egyptians regarded this event as the most important in their history, comparable to the “First Time,” or the creation of the universe. With the unification of the “Two Lands” by the legendary, if not mythical, King Menes, the glorious Pharaonic Age began. Power was centralized in the hands of a god-king, and, thus, Egypt became the first organized society in the ancient world.

The ancient Egyptians were the first people of antiquity to believe in life after death. They were the first to build in stone and to fashion the arch in stone and brick. Even before the unification of the Two Lands, the Egyptians had developed a plow and a system of writing. They were accomplished sailors and shipbuilders. They learned to chart the heavens in order to predict the Nile flood. Their physicians prescribed healing remedies and performed surgical operations. They sculpted in stone and decorated the walls of their tombs with naturalistic murals in vibrant colors. The legacy of ancient Egypt is written in stone across the

²See Appendix A, Figure 2.

face of the country from the pyramids of Upper Egypt to the rock tombs in the Valley of the Kings, to the Old Kingdom temples of Luxor and Karnak, to the Ptolemaic temples of Edfu and Dendera, and to the Roman temple to Isis on Philae Island.

The Arab conquest of 641AD by the military commander, Amr ibn al as, was perhaps the next most important event in Egyptian history because it resulted in the Islamization and Urbanization of the country, which endure to this day. Even those who clung to the Coptic religion, a substantial minority of the population in 1990, were arabized; that is, they adopted the Arabic language and were assimilated into Arab culture.

Although Egypt was formally under Arab rule, beginning in the ninth century, during this period, Cairo was established as the capital of the country and became a center of religion, learning, art, and architecture. In 1260, the Egyptian ruler, Qutuz, and his forces stopped the Mongol advance across the Arab world at the battle of Ayn Jalut in Palestine. Because of this victory, Islamic civilization could continue to flourish when Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid caliphate, fell to the Mongols. Qutuz's successor, Baybars I, inaugurated the reign of the Mamluks, a dynasty of slave-soldiers of Turkish and Circassian origin that lasted for almost three centuries.

In 1517, Egypt was conquered by Sultan Selim I and absorbed into the Ottoman Empire. However, since the Turks were Muslims and the sultans regarded themselves as the preservers of Sunni Islam, this period saw institutional continuity, particularly in religion, education, and the religious law courts. In addition, after only a century of Ottoman rule, the Mamluk system reasserted itself, and Ottoman governors became at times virtual prisoners in the citadel, the ancient seat of Egypt's rulers.

The modern history of Egypt is marked by Egyptian attempts to achieve political independence, first from the Ottoman Empire and then from the British. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Muhammad Ali, an Albanian and the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, attempted to create an Egyptian empire that extended to Syria and to remove Egypt from Turkish control. Ultimately, he was unsuccessful, and true independence from foreign powers would not be achieved until midway through the next century. Foreign investment in Egypt

and Britain's need to maintain control over the Suez Canal resulted in the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Although Egypt was granted nominal independence in 1922, Britain remained the real power in the country.

Genuine political independence was finally achieved between the 1952 Revolution and the 1956 War. In 1952, the Free Officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, took control of the government and removed King Faruk from power. In 1956, Nasser, as Egyptian president, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, an action that resulted in the tripartite invasion by Britain, France, and Israel. Ultimately, however, Egypt prevailed, and the last British troops were withdrawn from the country by the end of the year.

No history of Egypt would be complete without mentioning the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has cost Egypt so much in lives, territory, and property. Armed conflict between Egypt and Israel ended in 1979 when the two countries signed the Camp David Accords. The accords, however, constituted a separate peace between Egypt and Israel and did not lead to a comprehensive settlement that would have satisfied Palestinian demands for a homeland or bring about peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Thus, Egypt remained embroiled in the conflict on the diplomatic level and continued to press for international conferences to achieve a comprehensive agreement.

Purpose of This Study

The purpose of this study is to conduct a brief reexamination of Egyptian military history, in order to provide useful concepts and methods for the education of military officers. This author will focus this study on the main stage in the modern military history of Egyptian Army to revealing a tradition of innovation and excellence that can suggest fresh ways of dealing with current and future challenges.

Significance of Topic

This analysis is based on advanced study in the School of Advanced Military Studies and the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, as well as graduate study at the

Egyptian Command and General Staff College. Those experiences gave the author an opportunity to reflect and explain how uniquely Egyptian understandings of the art of war, based on historical data, can provide an excellent basis for fresh understandings and applications of doctrine, theory and apply those programs to inherent military education in Egypt. Using these insights, military planners and future leaders can be better equipped to be agents of change for continual improvement of Egyptian military practice.

Methodology

This monograph recognizes the importance of the study of history as a decisive part of a military education system. It also draws lessons learned from historical experience, key battles, campaigns, tactics, and methods of warfare, weaponry, logistics and apply these lessons to present and future Egypt's military operations. In addition, it examines how to apply these lessons learned from history to the development of future Egyptian Army doctrine.

Search for this monograph was based on an examination of the open literature, in Egypt and the United States--books, professional journals, service schools' student monographs, and databases, other scholarly publications, course materials, and academic presentations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study demonstrates how the modern history of the Egyptian Army provides significant resources for military planners and future combat leaders. The summary of lessons learned from the modern Egyptian military history provides a basis for restoring and strengthening the role of historical studies in Egyptian military education.³ The study recommends the rebirth of a history focused military education system along with theory and doctrine that would enhance the ability of selected officers to think clearly, logically, and

³Andrew McGregor, *A Military History of Modern Egypt* (London: Praeger Security International Press, 2006), 1.

rapidly, to conceptualize and innovate, to teach and develop subordinates, to integrate the work of specialists, and to create high-performing staffs that would anticipate and adapt to change.

Lessons from historical experience, melded with theory, doctrine, campaign planning, and support tasking, provide four themes for on-going improvement. The study of military history was heavily emphasized to acquire the theoretical foundations of military science and to gain an appreciation for human performance under the stresses of combat.⁴ This analysis provides a basis for considering adaptations in Egyptian military education to use--not forge--history, in the continuing effort to train, educate, and organize for the future combat.

⁴General Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard, and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 199.

Chapter One: Egyptian Army in Medieval Age from 1250-1800AD

The Mamluks Era from 1250AD-1517AD

Mamluk is an Arabic term meaning something owned or possessed. In Islamic history, however, this term acquired the meaning of a slave, more specifically a white slave, used in the military establishment. The history of the Mamluk kingdom is unique. All rulers in this kingdom were ex-slaves or sons of ex-slaves.⁵

To understand the history of Egypt during the later Middle Ages, it is necessary to consider two major events occurred in the eastern Arab World: the migration of Turkish tribes during the Abbasid Caliphate and their eventual domination of it, and the Mongol invasion. Turkish tribes began moving west from the Eurasian steppes in the sixth century. As the Abbasid Empire weakened, Turkish tribes began to cross the frontier in search of pasturage. The Turks converted to Islam within a few decades after entering the Middle East. The Turks also entered the Middle East as mamluks (slaves) employed in the armies of Arab rulers.⁶

Mamluks, although slaves, were usually paid, sometimes handsomely, for their services. Indeed, a Mamluks service, as a soldier and member of an elite unit or as an imperial guard, was an enviable first step in a career that opened to him the possibility of occupying the highest offices in the state. Mamluk training was not restricted to military matters and often included languages as well as literary and administrative skills to enable the Mamluks to occupy administrative posts. In the late tenth century, a new wave of Turks entered the empire as free warriors and conquerors. One group occupied Baghdad, took control of the central government, and reduced the Abbasid caliphs to puppets. The other moved west into Anatolia, which it conquered from a weakened Byzantine Empire. There were actually two Mamluk periods--the Bahri (1250-1390) and the Burji (1382-1517).

⁵McGregor, 14.

⁶Ibid.

The Bahri (Turkish) Period--1250-1390

The Mamluks stationed in Cairo under the last strong Ayyubid caliph were known as al-Bahriyya al-Salihiyya: “bahri” means “sea,” near which the Cairene Mamluks were stationed, and from across which they had come; “Salih” was the name of their owner, Sultan al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub (ruled 1240-1249). Nevertheless, in 1250, with the collapse of the Ayyubid dynasty, leaders arose among the Mamluk class who led the Mamluks to take control of the government. Chief among them were Baybars and Qalawun, both Kipchak Turks by birth, who called their state Dawlat al-Turk, The Turkish State.⁷

The first Mamluk sultan was Baybars, who was considered chivalrous, energetic, and enlightened. He established good relations with the Byzantine Empire and the Sicilian Kingdom. He formed an alliance with the Golden Horde, the Muslim Kipchak Mongols, and sworn enemies of the still pagan Ilkhanid Mongols in Iran. Baybars developed a friendly rapport with the Seljuk Turks of Anatolia, who were strategically placed between the Mongols and the Christian kingdom of Cilicia. Besides deposing the last of the Ayyubids in Syria, he also destroyed the feared Assassin sect. Finally, he allowed the last of the Abbasid dynasty to reestablish the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo after the Mongols destroyed Baghdad in 1258. Baybars was poisoned and died in 1277.

Two sons succeeded Baybars briefly, and then in 1280 by Qalawan, who became the next great Mamluk sultan. Qalawan had been a trusted friend of Baybars: his daughter married one of Baybars’ sons and he had been regent to Baybars’ 7-year-old son, who ruled for four months. Under Qalawan, trade with Yemen, India, and China grew. He rebuilt many fortifications along his borders, and built a lavish complex in Cairo, where he supported the arts. On his death at the age of 70 in 1290, there followed a period during which his sons and certain other Mamluks variously deposed and killed each other.

Eventually one of Qalawan’s sons, al-Malik al-Nasir Nasir al-Din Muhammad took control. He had been sultan for almost one year at the age of eight in 1294 and again for 10

⁷Ibid., 15.

years, beginning at the age of fourteen in 1299. This time he ruled from 1310 until 1341, a reign known for its peace and prosperity. The leaders of numerous Muslim empires, kings of Europe, and even the Pope frequented his court. Nasir al-Din Muhammad and the powerful amirs in the court supported art and architecture. Because of the expansion of trade, Mamluk arts began incorporating numerous motifs from the Orient.⁸

After the death of Nasir al-Din Muhammad, his sons and their heirs came to the throne; however, the true rulers of the Sultanate were really their amirs. The arts continued to flourish. However, in the second half of the 14th century there were several natural and fabricated disasters that undermined the Bahri Mamluk state including livestock and agricultural diseases, the Black Death, depredations by Christian kings, and the expansion of the armies of Timur from Central Asia.

The Burji (Circassian) Period--1382-1517

In 1382, Barquq, a Burji Mamluk, overthrew the last of the Bahris. The Mamluks in support of the Bahri sultan deposed Barquq. However, Barquq escaped from prison in 1390 and again deposed the Bahri ruler. Barquq was a Burji Mamluk, a Circassian, not a Turk. Unlike other Mamluks, he actually knew his father.⁹ Barquq formed an alliance with the sultan of the Ottoman Turks and the Khan of the Golden Horde against the advancing Timurids. He also gave refuge to the ruler of Iraq, whose capital city Baghdad had been sacked by the Timurids. He died in 1399, before facing the Timurids. His thirteen-year-old son, who became sultan after him, could not defeat the Ottomans and was forced to sign a humiliating treaty.

The Mamluk economy suffered in the first half of the 15th century, as tax revenues fell, military expenditures increased, the currency was devalued, and trade revenues were lost. There were famines and food shortages. In fact, the entire Burji period was one of violence

⁸Ibid.

⁹Earthlink.net, Mamluk Textiles, Available from <http://home.earthlink.net/~lilinah/Textiles/mamluk.html>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

and intrigue. At this time Mamluks were often taken as adults who were difficult to train and control--they often harassed the population and incited riots. Offices were sold to pay bribes and buy new slaves and sultans paid their supporters enormously to remain in control. Nonetheless, the empire managed to expand its borders and continue as a center of trade. The longest ruling Burji sultan was Qaitbay, who reigned from 1468 to 1496. He improved the state economy, expanded trade, and protected local merchants.

However, he earned the antagonism of the sultan of the Ottoman Turks, who invaded Cilicia. Although Qaitbay succeeded in halting the Ottoman advance, he could tell that they would be a major threat to the Mamluk Empire. Another plague hit the Empire during the end of his reign. Despite all this, his was the high point of the Burji period. Following his death came another period of constantly changing rulers.

The second to last Burji sultan was Qanush al-Ghri who was chosen by the Mamluk council in 1510. He replenished the treasury, rebuilt the army, and strengthened fortresses. He was an intellectual who supported the arts and architecture, and was a poet himself. However, the Ottomans were on the move again, defeating the Safavids of Iran in 1514, then the Zulkairs in southeastern Anatolia. Qanush led his army against the Ottomans in Syria in August 1516, but his forces were outnumbered, had inferior artillery, and lacked discipline. Qanush was killed in the battle. The last Burji sultan fought against the Ottomans but faced defeat after defeat. In January 1517, the Ottomans were recognized as rulers of the Mamluk Empire of Syria and Egypt.

The Mamluk Sultanate controlled more than Egypt: its territory spread east through the Levant to Syria, west to include parts of Libya, and south to include parts of the Sudan--its borders extended from southeastern Anatolia to the Hijaz in the Arabian Peninsula. Mamluk rule did not end until 1517, when the Ottoman Turks conquered Egypt.

The Mongol Invasion 1258 AD

Prophet Muhammad said, “O Muslims do not wish to meet the enemy; ask God for peace. But when you meet the enemy, be patient and remember that paradise lies in the shadow of swords.”¹⁰

In 1258, the Mongol invaders put to death the last Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. The following year, a Mongol army of as many as 120,000 men commanded by Hulagu Khan crossed the Euphrates and entered Syria. Meanwhile, in Egypt, the last Ayyubid sultan had died in 1250, and political control of the state had passed to the Mamluk guards whose generals seized the sultanate. In 1258, soon after the news of the Mongol entry into Syria had reached Egypt, the Turkish Mamluk Qutuz declared himself sultan and organized the successful military resistance to the Mongol advance. The decisive battle was fought in 1260 at Ayn Jalut in Palestine, where Qutuz’s forces defeated the Mongol army.¹¹

The Battle of Ayn Jalut, 3 September 1260 AD

Both Mamluk and Mongol armies encamped in the Holy Land (Palestine). In July of 1260, they finally met at Ain Jalut on 3 September, with both sides numbering about 20,000 men (the Mongol force was originally much larger, but Hulegu took most of his Army when he returned home to fight back the rebellion against him). The Mamluks drew out the Mongol cavalry with a feigned retreat, and were almost unable to withstand the assault. Qutuz rallied his troops for a successful counterattack, along with cavalry reserves hidden in the nearby valleys. The Mongols were forced to retreat, and Hulagu’s deputy Kitbuqa was captured and executed. Mamluk heavy cavalymen were able to clearly beat the Mongols in close combat, something that no one had previously done before. It is important to note that these particular Mamluks had essentially been created to meet the Mongol crisis.

¹⁰To know the Sunna and the Hadiths--that is, all the saying and deeds of the Prophet and his principal companions--the work of Al-Bukhari is essential. After the Koran, Al-Bukhari Sahih (authentic) is the chief source of Muslim law and ethics.

¹¹The name Mongols specifies several ethnic groups. The name “Monggol” has its origin in the Tungusic languages and originally means “the invincible ones.” At first it was applied to a small and still insignificant tribe in the area of the Onon River.

The bulk of them were Turkic or Circassian tribesmen sold in Constantinople to the Sultan of Egypt and trained on Mamluks Island in the Nile. They were not only great equestrians themselves, familiar with steppe warfare, but knew well Mongol tactics and weapons. After a time, Egypt became a country existing to support a military force. This was vital to defending the Holy Land, and doing what no one else had previously done, clearly defeating the Mongols, who never were able to avenge it. Many historians argue that this defeat, and the subsequent defeats by the Japanese of invading Mongols, marked the end of the Mongol Empire, though parts of it would last another 250 years. However, Ain Jalut and the defeats near Iki Island by the Japanese marked the end of the aura of Mongol invincibility.

The Aftermath of Ain Jalut Battle

After the victory at Ain Jalut, Baibars killed Qutuz on the way back to Cairo to avenge the murder of his friend Aktai, and became sultan himself. His successors would go on to capture the last of the Crusader states in Palestine by 1291. The Mongols were then beaten at the Battle of Homs less than a year later and completely expelled from Syria.

Ironically, it was interfamily fighting that prevented Hulagu Khan from massing his full power against the Mamluks at Ain Jalut. Berke Khan, the Il-Khan of the Kipchak Khanate in Russia, had converted to Islam, and watched with horror as his cousin destroyed the Abbasid Caliph, the spiritual head of Islam as far as Berke was concerned. The Mamluks, learning through spies that Berke was both a Muslim and not fond of his cousin, were careful to nourish their ties to him and his Khanate. Hulagu Khan died in 1265 and was buried in the Kaboudi Island in Lake Urmia. This signaled the end of the unified empire. His funeral was the only Ilkhanid funeral to feature human sacrifice. His son Abaqa, thus establishing his line, succeeded him.

At the end of the fourteenth century, power passed from the original Turkish elite, the Bahriyyah Mamluks, to Circassians, whom the Turkish Mamluk sultans had in their turn recruited as slave soldiers. Between 1260 and 1517, Mamluk sultans of Turco-Circassian origin ruled an empire that stretched from Egypt to Syria and included the holy cities of

Mecca and Medina. As “shadow caliphs,” the Mamluk sultans organized the yearly pilgrimages to Mecca. Because of Mamluk power, the western Islamic world was shielded from the threat of the Mongols. The great cities, especially Cairo, the Mamluk capital, grew in prestige. By the fourteenth century, Cairo had become the preeminent religious center of the Muslim world. The Mamluk Sultanate would rule the Middle East for 250 years until Selim the Grim and the Ottoman Empire put an end to their independence.

The Ottoman Empire Conquered Egypt In 1517 AD

In 1517 the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1512-20), known as Selim the Grim, conquered Egypt, defeating the Mamluk forces outside Cairo. The origins of the Ottoman Empire¹² go back to the Turkish-speaking tribes who crossed the frontier into Arab lands beginning in the tenth century. These Turkish tribes established themselves in Baghdad and Anatolia, but the Mongols destroyed them in the thirteenth century.

In the wake of the Mongol invasion, petty Turkish dynasties called amirates were formed in Anatolia. The leader of one of those dynasties was Osman (1280-1324) who went on to become the founder of the Ottoman Empire. In the thirteenth century, his amirate was one of many; by the sixteenth century, the amirate had become an empire, one of the largest and longest lived in world history. By the fourteenth century, the Ottomans already had a substantial empire in Eastern Europe. In 1453 they conquered Constantinople, the Byzantine capital, which became the Ottoman capital and was renamed Istanbul. Between 1512 and 1520, the Ottomans added the Arab provinces, including Egypt, to their empire.

In Egypt, the victorious Selim I left behind one of his most trusted collaborators, Khair Bey, as the ruler of Egypt. Khair Bey ruled as the sultan’s vassal, not as a provincial governor. He kept his court in the citadel, the ancient residence of the rulers of Egypt. Although Selim I did away with the Mamluk sultanate, neither he nor his successors succeeded in extinguishing Mamluk power and influence in Egypt.

¹²See Appendix A, Figure 3.

Only in the first century of Ottoman rule was the governor of Egypt able to perform his tasks without the interference of the Mamluk beys (bey was the highest rank among the Mamluks).

During the latter decades of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century, a series of revolts by various elements of the garrison troops occurred. During these years, there was also a revival within the Mamluk military structure. By the middle of the seventeenth century, political supremacy had passed to the beys. As the historian Daniel Crecelius has written, from that point on the history of Ottoman Egypt can be explained as the struggle between the Ottomans and the Mamluks for control of the administration and, hence, the revenues of Egypt, and the competition among rival Mamluk houses for control of the beylicate. This struggle affected Egyptian history until the late eighteenth century when one Mamluk bey gained an unprecedented control over the military and political structures and ousted the Ottoman governor.

Modern Egypt

Most scholars of Egyptian history now agree that the political, economic and military changes that occurred in Egypt itself in the latter half of the eighteenth century. At that time, political and military power was consolidated in the hands of the Mamluk; this effectively eliminated Ottoman control and repositioned Egypt at the center of a newly emerging network of international relationships that embraced the lands of the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea coasts, and Europe. Thus, Napoleon Bonaparte did not “open” an isolated Egypt to the West, nor was Muhammad Ali Pasha in the nineteenth century the originator of the policies responsible for Egypt’s transformation.

The French Invasion and Occupation, 1798-1801

After the death of Muhammad Bey, there was a decade-long struggle for dominance among the beys. Eventually Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey succeeded in asserting their authority and shared power in Egypt. Their dominance in the country survived an

unsuccessful attempt by the Ottomans to reestablish the empire's control (1786-91). The two continued in power until the French invasion in 1798.

In addition to the upheavals caused by the Ottoman-Mamluk clashes, waves of famine and plague hit Egypt between 1784 and 1792. Thus, Cairo was a devastated city and Egypt an impoverished country when the French arrived in 1798.

On 1 July 1798, a French invasion force under the command of Napoleon disembarked near Alexandria.¹³ The invasion force, which had sailed from Toulon on 19 May was accompanied by a commission of scholars and scientists whose function was to investigate every aspect of life in ancient and contemporary Egypt.

France wanted control of Egypt for two major reasons--its commercial and agricultural potential and its strategic importance to the Anglo-French rivalry. During the eighteenth century, French merchants handled the principal share of European trade with Egypt. The French also looked to Egypt as a source of grain and raw materials. In strategic terms, French control of Egypt could be used to threaten British commercial interests in the region and to block Britain's overland route to India.

The French forces took Alexandria without difficulty, defeated the Mamluk army at Shubra Khit and Imbabah, and entered Cairo on 25 July. Murad Bey fled to Upper Egypt while Ibrahim Bey and the Ottoman viceroy went to Syria. Mamluk rule in Egypt collapsed.

Nevertheless, Napoleon's position in Egypt was precarious. The French controlled only the Delta and Cairo; Upper Egypt was the preserve of the Mamluks and the bedouins. In addition, Britain and the Ottoman government joined forces in an attempt to defeat Napoleon and drive him out of Egypt. On 1 August 1798, the British fleet under Lord Nelson annihilated the French ships as they lay at anchor at Abu Qir, thus isolating Napoleon's forces in Egypt. On 11 September, Sultan Selim III declared war on France.

On 21 October, the people of Cairo rioted against the French, whom they regarded as occupying strangers, not as liberators. The rebellion had a religious as well as a national

¹³See Appendix A, Figure 4.

character and centered on Al Azhar mosque. Its leaders were the ulama, religiously trained scholars, whom Napoleon had tried to woo to the French side. During this period, the populace began to regard the ulama not only as moral but also as political leaders.

To forestall an Ottoman invasion, Napoleon invaded Syria, but, unable to take Acre in Palestine, his forces retreated on 20 May 1799. On 22 August, Napoleon, with a very small company, secretly left Egypt for France, leaving his troops behind and General Jean-Baptiste Kléber as his successor. Kléber found himself the unwilling commander in chief of a dispirited army with a bankrupt treasury. His main preoccupation was to secure the evacuation of his troops to France. When Britain rejected the evacuation plan, Kléber was forced to fight. After Kléber's assassination by a Syrian, his command was taken over by General Abdullah Jacques Menou, a French convert to Islam. An Anglo-Ottoman invasion force finally terminated the occupation. The French forces in Cairo surrendered on 18 June 1801, and Menou himself surrendered at Alexandria on 3 September. By the end of September, the last French forces had left the country.

As historian Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot has written, the three-year French occupation was too short to effects on Egypt. Its most important effect on Egypt internally was the rapid decline in the power of the Mamluks.¹⁴ The major impact of the French invasion was the effect it had on Europe. Napoleon's invasion revealed the Middle East as an area of immense strategic importance to the European powers, thus inaugurating the Anglo-French rivalry for influence in the region and bringing the British into the Mediterranean. The French invasion of Egypt also had an important effect on France because of the publication of *Description de l'Egypte*, which detailed the findings of the scholars and scientists who had accompanied Napoleon to Egypt. This publication became the foundation of modern research into the history, society, and economics of Egypt.

¹⁴Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 51.

Conclusion

The Mamluk state reached its height under the Turkish sultans and then fell into a prolonged phase of decline under the Circassians. The Circassian Mamluks experienced a critical economic period before their downfall in 1517 AD, which also reflected on their military power.

Ain Jalut or the “Spring of Jalut” took place on 3 September 1260, between the Mamluks and the Mongols in Palestine. This battle is considered by many historians to be of great macro historical importance in the modern military history of tactical deception when the Mamluks drew out the Mongol cavalry and separated them from the army’s main body by feigned retreat. This allowed the Mamluks to counterattack along with cavalry reserves hidden in the nearby valleys and forced the Mongols to retreat.

In addition, it marked the high water of Mongol conquests, and the first time they had been decisively defeated; previously where they had been defeated, they had always returned and avenged the loss--this marked the first occasion they were unable to do so. Hulagu Khan never was able to advance into Egypt, and the Khanate he established in Persia was only able to defeat the Mamluks once in follow-up battle.

France invaded Egypt for two major reasons--its commercial and agricultural potential and its strategic importance to the Anglo-French rivalry. The French also looked to Egypt as a source of grain and raw materials. In strategic terms, French control of Egypt could be used to threaten British commercial interests in the region and to block Britain’s overland route to India. In Napoleon’s last days in exile on St. Helena, he still mused about what might have happened had he held Egypt and marched from there, like Alexander the Great, through the Middle East into India.¹⁵

¹⁵McGregor, 51.

Chapter Two: The Egyptian Army in Modern History

Muhammad Ali, from 1805-48

The Rise to Power

After Napoleon and the French army eventually evacuated Egypt, an Ottoman army remained in the country, but the French expedition already left a strong cultural impact and reintroduced Egypt to Europe. The Ottoman government was determined to prevent a revival of Mamluk power and autonomy and to bring Egypt under the control of the central government. The Ottomans appointed Khusraw Pasha as viceroy. By 1803, it was apparent that a third party had emerged in the struggle for power in Egypt. Muhammad Ali, who had arrived in Egypt as a junior commander in the Albanian forces, by 1803 risen to commander. In just two short years, he would become the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt.

Muhammad Ali, who has been called the “father of modern Egypt,” was able to attain control of Egypt because of his own leadership abilities and political shrewdness but also because the country seemed to be slipping into anarchy.¹⁶ Muhammad Ali’s reign in Egypt can be divided roughly into two periods. For the first few years, he spent his time consolidating his rule and eliminating opposition. The second phase was spent in economic and military expansion. Between 1805 and 1811, Muhammad Ali consolidated his position in Egypt by defeating the Mamluks and bringing Upper Egypt under his control. Finally, in March 1811, Muhammad Ali had sixty-four Mamluks, including twenty-four beys, assassinated in the citadel. From then on, Muhammad Ali was the sole ruler of Egypt. Muhammad Ali wanted to detach Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, and he realized that to do so Egypt had to be strong economically and militarily.¹⁷

¹⁶McGregor, 52.

¹⁷Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, 54.

The Beginning of the State System

Muhammad Ali's development strategy was based on agriculture. He expanded the area under cultivation and planted crops specifically for export, such as long-staple cotton, rice, indigo, and sugarcane. The surplus income from agricultural production was used for public works, such as irrigation, canals, dams, and barrages, and to finance industrial development and the military. The development plans hinged on the state gaining a monopoly over the country's agricultural resources. In practical terms, this meant the peasants were told what crops to plant, in what quantity, and over what area. The government bought directly from the peasants and sold directly to the buyer, cutting out the intermediaries or merchants.

Muhammad Ali was also committed to the industrial development of Egypt. The government set up modern factories for weaving cotton, jute, silk, and wool. Workers were drafted into factories to weave on government looms. Factories for sugar, indigo, glass, and tanning were set up with the assistance of foreign advisers and imported machinery. Industries employed about 4 percent of the population or between 180,000 and 200,000 persons fifteen years of age and over. The textile industry was protected by embargoes imposed by the government to prohibit the import of the cheap British textiles that had flooded the Egyptian market. Commercial activities were geared toward the establishment of foreign trade monopolies and an attempt to acquire a favorable balance of trade.¹⁸

British became determined to check Muhammad Ali because a strong Egypt represented a threat to Britain's economic and strategic interests. Economically, British interests would be served as long as Egypt continued to produce raw cotton for the textile mills of Lancashire and to import finished goods from Britain. Thus, the British and the French were particularly angered by the Egyptian monopolies even though Britain and France engaged in such trade practices as high tariffs and embargoes to protect their own economies. Strategically, Britain wanted to maintain access to the overland route through Egypt to India, a vital link in the imperial line of communications.

¹⁸Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, 55.

Anglo-Egyptian War (1807)

Seeking to replace Muhammad Ali with a puppet ruler favorable to British interests, Britain invaded with nearly 5,300 troops on 17 March 1807. British forces led by General A. Mackenzie Fraser seized the city of Alexandria. British forces suffered several military defeats before retreating and evacuating Egypt on 14 September. Britain was worried not only about the establishment of a united, militarily strong state straddling the eastern Mediterranean but also about Muhammad Ali's close ties to France. Thus Lord Palmerston, the British minister of foreign affairs, established the British policy, which lasted until the outbreak of World War I, of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Britain preferred a weakened but intact Ottoman Empire that would grant it the strategic and commercial advantages it needed to maintain its influence in the region.¹⁹

Wahabi War 1811-1818

The history of Wahhabism²⁰ started with the call of Shaykh Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab in 1740. Since its beginning, Wahhabism relied on the ideas of a Muslim scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah, who called for a return to "real Islam," ideals taken from the Koran, the Sunna and the Hadith.

He believed that returning to this spartan interpretation of Islam would enable Muslims to save themselves from deteriorating situation. These are the precepts followed by Osama bin Laden and extremist Sunni Islamic movements that have appeared and proliferated in the majority of Islamic and Arab countries.

Wahhabism was founded and spread in the Arabian Peninsula where isolation, primitive conditions, and tribalism fostered the development of many Islamic sects. The followers of the four main Islamic sects were scattered throughout the Hijaz. The Qaramitas

¹⁹McGregor, 54-56.

²⁰The main source of religious extremism in the Arab and Islamic world is the first Wahhabi movement that was founded on the Najd Hill in the village of Uyayna by Shaykh Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab. Born in 1703, established an alliance with the al-Saud family'.

were located in the Qatif area, the Shi'a Imamiya in al-Ihsaa, the Zeydiyun in Yemen, and the Shawafi'a in several areas in the region.

The Wahhabism called for adopting the jihad (Holy War), fighting any infidelity to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. This was the political basis for attacks on al-Ihsaa and Qatar in 1795. They also launched military campaigns, which were closer to raids than to "jihad," against Iraq between 1801 and 1810. Further attacks targeted the cities of Samawa, Souq al-Shouyoukh, Basra, Karbala and Najaf. Karbala fell to the Wahhabis in 1802, but resistance in Najaf prevented the Wahhabis from entering the town.

The year 1811 marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of Wahhabism. The movement was gaining ground, and had become a threat to existing governments in and around Arabia. When the Ottoman Sultanate failed to suppress the Wahhabi movement, it urged Mohammed Ali to organize military campaigns in order to crush it. Toson, Mohammed Ali's son, who entered Taif and Mecca in 1813, led the first Egyptian campaign. Other Egyptian campaigns took place later with equal success. The Wahhabis were defeated in Asir, and a campaign led by Ibrahim Basha in 1816 resulted in the surrender and total destruction of Darhiya (the capital of Wahhabism and the al-Saud family).²¹

The Wahhabi movement was still very much alive, however, due to the continuous support of the British (through the emirs of al-Saud family). The British had a vested interest in the continued destabilization of the Ottoman Empire, and saw the Wahhabis as a vehicle to that end. The Empire's support for the cause lasted for about half a century. During this period (1850-1900), the Ottomans countered by supporting the al-Rashids, traditional rivals of Wahhabism and the al-Saud family.

²¹See Appendix A, Figure 5.

The Battle of Konia in December 1832 AD

Background

Muhammad Ali's invasion of Syria in 1831 and his attempt to break away from the Ottoman Empire jeopardized British policy and its military and commercial interests in the Middle East and India. The Egyptian invasion of Syria was provoked ostensibly by the sultan's refusal to give Syria and Morea (Peloponnesus) to Muhammad Ali in return for his assistance in opposing the Greek war for independence in the late 1820s.²² An army sent by Egypt's Muhammad Ali and led by his son Ibrahim²³ Paşa occupied Konya on 21 November 1832, after sweeping through Palestine and Syria during the previous year. On 21 December, outside of Konya, Ibrahim Pasha defeated the army sent by Sultan Mahmud II and led by Mehmet V Reşat, opening the way for conquest of all of Anatolia.

The battle of Konia²⁴ in December 1831 was undoubtedly one of Ibrahim Pasha's greatest military victories. Right in the middle of Anatolia, that is hundreds of miles away from his home and in the midst of severe cold weather, Pasha succeeded in inflicting a heavy defeat on an army that was three times as large as his own was.

The Opposing Armies

Egyptian Forces: Ibrahim Pasha commanded about 50,000 men in all of Greater Syria, including recent Syrian recruits and about 7,000 Arab auxiliaries and irregulars. The regular forces were organised into ten infantry brigades, twelve cavalry brigades and the artillery and engineers.

Much of this force was spread out on his supply lines, and only 15,000 regular troops were available at the battle of Konya. However, these were the most experienced and

²²Library of Congress, Country Studies, Egypt, Muhammad Ali, 1805-48, Available from [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+eg0029\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0029)); Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

²³See Appendix A, Figure 7.

²⁴Konia located in south central Turkey. See also Appendix A, Figure 6, The Egyptian Army Advanced in Konia in Turkey.

disciplined of his army. At the battle, Ibrahim had five infantry regiments,²⁵ four cavalry regiments,²⁶ the Guardia regiment²⁷ and assisted by six cannon batteries containing altogether thirty-six guns.

Ottoman Forces: Reshid Pasha commanded an army of 80,000 from various Ottoman provinces, including many Albanians and Bosnians. At the battle Reshid had a total of about 54,000 men, of which about 20,000 were irregulars: 54 infantry battalions, 28 cavalry squadrons, and 100 guns.

The Grand Strategy and Preparing for the Battle

Throughout the month of December 1832 Ibrahim was busy preparing his army to confront the Ottoman army. He trained his troops on a site to the north of Konia where he chose to meet the Ottomans. Every soldier had become acquainted with the exact movements he was expected to perform when the actual fighting started,²⁸ and the battle was said to have been exercised twenty times before it actually took place.²⁹ Detailed reports were regularly received about enemy movements³⁰ and precise information was gathered about the terrain.³¹

Ibrahim arranged his forces in a way that clearly showed his talents as a commander. He put his forces in three rows dissected by the road leading from Konia to Istanbul. On the first row, he placed two infantry regiments led jointly by Selim Bey. Five hundred feet behind

²⁵These were: the 12th under the command of Ibrahim Bey, the 14th under the command of Osama Beym the 13th under the command of Rasid Bey and the 18th under the command of Hamza Bey. I could not find the name of the fifth regiment but it certain that it participated in the battle; See Mahafix, Syrian Campaign designated by "Sham," 15/187, on 30 B 1248/23 December 1832.

²⁶These were: the 1st under the command of Huseyin Bey, the 2nd under the command of Sadek Beym the 3rd under the command of Saleh Bey, and the 4th under the command of Veli Bey.

²⁷This was a special elite force that was handpicked by Ibrahim Pasha himself, it seems it was named after the French National Guard.

²⁸Sham 15/157, on 23 B 1248/17 December 1832; and Marshal Marmont, trans. by Colonel Sir Frederic Smith, *The Present State of the Turkish Empire* (London: Thomas Harrison, 1984), 254; and Abu-Izzeddin, Ibrahim Basha fi Surriyya, 113.

²⁹Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men "Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt"* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), 160.

³⁰Sham 15/148, on 23 B 1248/17 December 1832.

³¹Mostafa Morhtar, *The Pass Leading to Konia in Sham, December 1832* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1995), 87.

this row, he placed two other infantry regiments under the command of Suleyman Bey. The Guardia Regiment under the command of Selim Bey was placed three hundred feet behind that second line together with two cavalry brigades. Behind this third row, he placed the irregular Bedouin forces.

As for the artillery, he placed three batteries along the first row, two with the second row, and one behind the Guardia regiment. In addition to this arrangement, and to safeguard against any attempt by the enemy to envelopment his forces. Only six of the eight battalions in the second infantry line were deployed in column, while the remaining two battalions were put one at each flank to form the square formation.³²

The Execution of the Konia Battle

Finally, on the morning of Friday, 21 December 1832, both armies met on the plain just north of Konia in the center Anatolian plateau. The actually battle started at noon with the Ottomans firing cannon at the Egyptian side. Due to the heavy fog, the Ottomans could not correct their artillery fire so that the bombardment was not very effective. Ibrahim Pasha ordered the second row to come close to the first row to avoid the cannon balls that falling behind it and which were causing some casualties.

Then the Egyptian artillery started firing continuous volleys from both left and right. When the fog lifted Ibrahim Pasha, saw that during the Ottoman's advance, they had created a gap of 1,000 feet between their cavalry and infantry forces and effectively isolated the left wing from the army. Immediately, Ibrahim seized the opportunity and decided to lead a combined force from his cavalry and Guardia regiments. The Guardia regiment followed by the cavalry regiments stormed northward and then fiercely attacked the left wing of the Ottomans. This action was assisted by the artillery batteries which showered their volleys on them Ottomans so strongly and accurately that the Ottomans positions were badly shaken causing them to retreat northward in disarray.

³²Fahmy, 160.

Thus, the left wing of the Ottoman army had been hit by confusion and defeated. When Rasid Pasha realized that his left wing had been defeated, he attempted to gather its forces and encourage its men to fight back, but he lost his way in the fog before reaching his men and was captured by Egyptian soldiers who disarmed him and led him prisoner to Ibrahim Pasha.

Nevertheless, there was still some hope for the ottoman commander who took charge after the collapse of the center and left wing of the army. He saw that to succeed he had to envelopment the left flank of the Egyptian army by using his right wing but his attack faced with strength and fortitude. The artillery battery from the second row moved forward to assist the left wing battery in front row, the combined artillery aimed at the enemy and mowed them down.

At the same time, the infantry forces realized that the result of the battle rested squarely on them, courageously withstood the attack. This confrontation lasted three quarters of an hour and its resulted not only in breaking down the Ottoman counter attack but also in defeating them and causing them to retreat in disarray.³³

The Aftermath of Konia Battle

Konia was Ibrahim's greatest victory. He lost 262 dead and 530 wounded, whereas the Ottomans lost 3,000 dead and had over 5,000 taken prisoner, including many senior officers. The Egyptians remained in possession of the field and took forty-six guns, and the Ottoman army was scattered. Nothing remained between Ibrahim's army and Istanbul after the battle. However, when Egyptian forces invaded and occupied Syria and came within sight of Istanbul, the great powers (Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia) allied themselves with the Ottoman government to drive the Egyptian forces out of Syria.³⁴

³³Ibid., 162.

³⁴Wikipedia, Battle of Konya, Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Konya; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

A British fleet bombarded Beirut in September 1840, and an Anglo-Turkish force landed, causing uprisings against the Egyptian forces. Acre fell in November, and a British naval force anchored off Alexandria. The Egyptian army was forced to retreat to Egypt, and Muhammad Ali was obliged to accede to British demands. According to the Treaty of 1841, Muhammad Ali was stripped of all the conquered territory except Sudan but was granted the hereditary governorship of Egypt for life, with succession going to the eldest male in the family.³⁵

Muhammad Ali was also compelled to agree to the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838, which established “free trade” in Egypt. This meant that Muhammad Ali was forced to abandon his monopolies and establish new tariffs that were favorable to imports. Thus, Egypt was unable to control the flood of cheap manufactured imports that decimated local industries.

Muhammad Ali continued to rule Egypt after his defeat in Syria. He became increasingly senile toward the end of his rule and his eldest son, Ibrahim, petitioned the Ottoman government to be appointed governor because of his father’s inability to rule. Ibrahim was gravely ill of tuberculosis, however, and ruled for only six months, from July to November 1848. Muhammad Ali died in August 1849.

Social Change in the Nineteenth Century

Friedrich Engels, German Philosopher (1820-1895) said “All history has been a history of class struggles between dominated classes at various stages of social development.”

During the nineteenth century, the socioeconomic and political foundations of the modern Egyptian state were laid. The transformation of Egypt began with the integration of the economy into the world capitalist system with the result that by the end of the century Egypt had become an exporter of raw materials to Europe and an importer of European

³⁵The News Blog, Colonial Warfare, Available from <http://stevegilliard.blogspot.com/2004/12/colonial-warfare-pt-19.html>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

manufactured goods.³⁶ The transformation of Egypt led to the emergence of a ruling elite composed of large landowners of Turco-Circassian origin and the creation of a class of medium-sized landowners of Egyptian origin who played an increasingly important role in the political and economic life of the country.

In the countryside, peasants were dispossessed because of debt, and many landless peasants migrated to the cities where they joined unemployed and the swelling ranks of the under. In the cities, a professional middle class emerged composed of civil servants, lawyers, teachers, and technicians. Finally, Western ideas and cultural forms were introduced into the country.

Muhammad Ali had attempted to take Egypt directly from a subsistence agricultural economy to a complex industrial one. In the industrial sector, Muhammad Ali's factories did not last past his death. In the agricultural sector, Egypt's long staple cotton became increasingly attractive to British textile manufacturers. Between 1840 and 1860, the export of cotton increased 300 percent. During the American Civil War, the area devoted to cotton cultivation in Egypt increased almost fourfold and cotton prices rose along with cotton production. The transformation of the rural economy from subsistence to cash-crop agriculture caused dramatic changes, including the privatization of land in fewer hands and the dispossession of peasants. By the 1870s, the royal family owned one-fifth of all the cultivated land in the country. The largest royal estates could be as large as 10,000 feddans.³⁷

The American Civil War put a premium on Egyptian cotton, and the price increased. When the war ended, the inflated prices suddenly dropped. For the first time in Egypt, a serious problem of peasant indebtedness appeared with its inevitable consequences: mortgages, foreclosures, and usurious loans. The village headmen and the owners of great

³⁶Country Studies, Social Change in the Nineteenth Century, Available from <http://www.country-studies.com/egypt/social-change-in-the-nineteenth-century.html>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

³⁷An Egyptian unit of land area, formerly used throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The feddan equals about 0.42 hectare or the feddan equal to 1.038 acre.

estates profited from the crisis by purchasing abandoned land. The headmen also profited as moneylenders.

At the turn of the century, the population of Egypt was about 10 million. Approximately 2 million lived in towns and cities, and of those, 500,000 lived in cities with a population of more than 20,000. The population of Alexandria grew, as it became the financial and commercial center of the cotton industry. New towns like Az Zaqaziq and Port Said (Bur Said) on the Suez Canal were established. Most of the increase in Egypt's urban population was the result of the migration of peasants from the countryside.

Although some became workers or petty traders, most joined the ranks of the under- or unemployed. By the turn of the century, a working class had emerged. It was composed mainly of transport and building workers and of workers in the few industries that had been established--sugar refineries, ginning mills, and cigarette factories. However, a large proportion of the new urban lower class consisted of a fluctuating mass of people without any fixed employment.

The change was reflected in the increase of foreigners in Egypt--from between 8,000 and 10,000 in 1838 to 90,000 in 1881. The majority was engaged in cotton production, import-export trade, banking, and finance. The European community occupied a privileged position as a result of the capitulations, the treaties governing the status of foreigners within the Ottoman Empire.

These treaties put Europeans virtually beyond the reach of Egyptian law until the establishment of the mixed courts (with jurisdiction over Egyptians and foreigners) in 1876. Like the artisans, Egyptian merchants suffered from a large variety of oppressive taxes and duties from which foreign merchants were exempt. With the support of their consuls, foreigners in Egypt became an increasingly powerful pressure group committed to defending its own interests.

From Occupation to Nominal Independence: 1882-1923

The Occupiers

With the occupation of 1882, Egypt became a part of the British Empire but never officially a colony. The khedival government provided the facade of autonomy, but behind it laid the real power in the country, specifically, the British agent and consul general, backed by British troops. At the outset of the occupation, the British government declared its intention to withdraw its troops as soon as possible.³⁸ This could not be done, however, until the authority of the khedive was restored. Eventually, the British realized that these two aims were incompatible because the military intervention, which Khedive Tawfiq supported and which prevented his overthrow, had undermined the authority of the ruler. Without the British presence, the khedival government would probably have collapsed.³⁹

In addition, the British government realized that the most effective way to protect its interests was from its position in Egypt. This represented a change in the policy that had existed since the time of Muhammad Ali, when the British were committed to preserving the Ottoman Empire. The change in British policy occurred for several reasons. Sultan Abdul Hamid had refused Britain's request to intervene in Egypt against Urabi and to preserve the khedival government. In addition, Britain's influence in Istanbul was declining while that of Germany was rising. Finally, Britain's unilateral invasion of Egypt gave Britain the opportunity to supplant French influence in the country. Moreover, Britain was determined to preserve its control over the Suez Canal and to safeguard the vital route to India.⁴⁰

Between 1883 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914, there were three British agents and consuls general in Egypt: Lord Cromer (1883-1907), Sir John Eldon Gorst (1907-11), and Lord Herbert Kitchener (1911-14). Cromer was an autocrat whose control over Egypt was more absolute than that of any Mamluk or khedive. Cromer believed his first task

³⁸The News Blog.

³⁹Geographic.org, Egypt the Occupiers, Available from http://www.workmall.com/wfb2001/egypt/egypt_history_the_occupiers.html; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

⁴⁰McGregor, 161.

was to achieve financial solvency for Egypt. He serviced the debt, balanced the budget, and spent what money remained after debt payments on agriculture, irrigation, and railroads. He neglected industry and education, a policy that became a political issue in the country. He brought in British officials to staff the bureaucracy.

This policy, too, was controversial because it prevented Egyptian civil servants from rising to the top of their fields.⁴¹

On 29 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers. Martial law was declared in Egypt on 2 November. On 3 November, the British government unilaterally declared Egypt a protectorate,⁴² severing the country from the Ottoman Empire. Britain deposed Khedive Abbas,⁴³ who had succeeded Khedive Tawfiq upon the latter's death in 1892, because Abbas, who was in Istanbul when the war broke out, was suspected of pro-German sympathies. Kitchener was recalled to London to serve as minister of war.

Egypt Under the Protectorate and the 1919 Revolution

Opposition to European interference in Egypt's affairs resulted in the emergence of a nationalist movement that coalesced and spread after the British military intervention and occupation of 1882. The immediate causes of what is known to Egyptians as the 1919 Revolution, however, were British actions during the war that caused widespread hardship and resentment. Specifically, these included Britain's purchase of cotton and requisitioning of fodder at below market prices, Britain's forcible recruitment of about 500,000 peasants into the Labor and Camel Transport Corps in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and its use of the country as a base and a garrison populated by British, Australian, and other troops. After the war, Egypt felt the adverse effects of soaring prices and unemployment.

⁴¹McGregor, 163.

⁴²Country Studies, From Occupation to Nominal Independence 1882-1923, Available from <http://www.country-studies.com/egypt/from-occupation-to-nominal-independence:-1882-1923.html>; Internet; Accessed on 1 May 2007.

⁴³See Appendix A, Figure 7.

When the war ended, the nationalists began to press the British again for independence. In addition to their other reasons, American President Woodrow Wilson, who was preaching self-determination for all nations, influenced the Egyptians. In September 1918, Egypt made the first moves toward the formation of a wafd, or delegation, to voice its demands for independence at the Paris Peace Conference.⁴⁴

In May 1919, Lord Milner was appointed to head a mission to investigate how Egypt could be granted “self-governing institutions” while maintaining the protectorate and safeguarding British interests. The mission arrived in Egypt in December 1919, but was boycotted by the nationalists, who opposed the continuation of the protectorate. The arrival of the Milner Mission was followed by strikes in which students, lawyers, professionals, and workers participated. Merchants closed their shops, and organizers distributed leaflets urging the Egyptians not to cooperate with the mission.

On 28 February 1922, Britain unilaterally declared Egyptian independence without any negotiations with Egypt. Four matters were “absolutely reserved to the discretion” of the British government until agreements concerning them could be negotiated: the security of communications of the British Empire in Egypt; the defense of Egypt against all foreign aggressors or interference, direct or indirect; the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; and Sudan. Sultan Ahmad Fuad became King Fuad I, and his son, Faruk, was named as his heir.

On 19 April, a new constitution was approved. In addition, that month, an electoral law was issued that ushered in a new phase in Egypt’s political development--parliamentary elections.

Conclusion

Between 1805 and 1811, Muhammad Ali consolidated his position in Egypt by defeating the Mamluks and bringing Upper Egypt under his control. Finally, in March 1811,

⁴⁴Military Research Organization, *The Evolution of Egyptian Armed Forces across the History* (Egyptian Army Press 1985), 76-81.

Muhammad Ali had sixty-four Mamluks, including twenty-four beys, assassinated in the citadel. From then on, Muhammad Ali was the sole ruler of Egypt.

Muhammad Ali had attempted to take Egypt directly from a subsistence agricultural economy to a complex industrial one. He wanted to detach Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, and he realized that to do so Egypt had to be strong economically and militarily but he did not pay any attention to internal economic weaknesses and external European pressures.

The question of whether the wars that Mohammed Ali waged during the first third of the nineteenth century were dynastic wars of imperialistic expansion or national wars of independence is central to understanding the whole of Mohammed Ali's career and indeed of the history of Egypt during his reign. For even if it is granted that Mohammed Ali was seeking to get rid of the Ottoman right from beginning of his careers, the question remains as to the nature of this independence, could it be viewed as similar to the independence sought by the Greeks against their Ottoman? On the other hand, is it more plausible to link as a series of internal wars within the Ottoman Empire that were waged by local governors against central government control.

Alternatively, it was always posited in terms of what conquest could add to Egypt's financial situation, so that the expansion was economic planning carried out by other means. For example, that the Hijaz campaign was influenced by the desire to redirect some of the profits of the Red Sea, trade towards Egypt, that the Sudan was lured by gold mines. That the Greek war was entered into partly to re-establish the Egyptian trade with the Aegean and finally, the Syria provided with sources of timber necessary for his navy and coal for the production of gunpowder.

Britain preferred a weakened but intact Ottoman Empire that would grant it the strategic and commercial advantages it needed to maintain its influence in the region. Thus, Muhammad Ali's invasion of Syria in 1831 and his attempt to break away from the Ottoman Empire jeopardized British policy and its military and commercial interests in the Middle East and India. The Egyptian invasion of Syria was provoked ostensibly by the sultan's refusal to give Syria and Morea to Muhammad Ali in return for his assistance in opposing the Greek

war for independence in the late 1820s. This resulted in Turkey and Egypt being forced out of the eastern Mediterranean by the destruction of their combined naval strength at Navarino on the southern coast of Greece.

When Egyptian forces came within sight of Istanbul, the great powers (Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia) allied themselves with the Ottoman government to drive the Egyptian forces out of Syria. Uprisings against the Egyptian forces cause The Egyptian army to retreat to Egypt, and Muhammad Ali was obliged to accede to British demands. According to the Treaty of 1841, Muhammad Ali was stripped of all the conquered territory except Sudan but was granted the hereditary governorship of Egypt for life. This meant that Muhammad Ali was forced to abandon his monopolies and establish new tariffs that were favorable to imports. Thus, Egypt was unable to control the flood of cheap manufactured imports that decimated local industries.

With the occupation of 1882, Egypt became a part of the British Empire but never officially a colony. British government realized that the most effective way to protect its interests was from its position in Egypt. This represented a change in the policy that had existed since the time of Mohammad Ali, when the British were committed to preserving the Ottoman Empire. The change in British policy occurred because the Britain's influence in Istanbul was declining while that of Germany was rising. Finally, Britain's unilateral invasion of Egypt gave Britain the opportunity to supplant French influence in the country. Moreover, Britain was determined to preserve its control over the Suez Canal and to safeguard the vital route to India.

After Egypt went through centuries of occupation, The Modern Egyptian Army was reborn in the Revolution of the free officer movement on 23 July 1952. How and why this happened will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: The History of Egyptian Army from 1948-1973

First Arab-Israeli War

By Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel by David Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv, the League of Arab States (Arab League)⁴⁵ had decided to resist by force the UN plan for partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state.

Thus, when Israel announced its independence in 1948, the armies of the various Arab states,⁴⁶ including an Egyptian force of 7,000 men crossed the Palestinian border at Rafah on the Mediterranean coast and at Al Awja (Nizzana) farther inland. They soon reached Ashdod, less than thirty-five kilometers from Tel Aviv. However, by the time the first truce ended in mid-July, the Israelis had reinforced their positions, beating off Egyptian attacks and recovering territory to protect Jewish settlements in the Negev.

By the fall of 1948, the Israelis put Egypt's 18,000 troops deployed in Palestine on the defensive and penetrated the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt and Israel concluded an armistice under United Nations (UN) auspices at the end of 1948 and later agreed on a cease-fire line that generally followed the prewar boundary between Palestine and Sinai. However, Egyptian forces still occupied and administered the narrow coastal strip of southwestern Palestine. The Arabs were defeated by Israel, although the Arab Legion of Transjordan held onto the old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt saved a strip of territory around Gaza that became known as the Gaza Strip.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Arab League is an organization of predominately Arab states. Headquartered in Cairo, the League's charter states that the League shall co-ordinate economic affairs, including commercial relations; communications; cultural affairs; nationality, passports, and visas; social affairs; and health affairs. Seven states formed the Arab League on 22 March 1945: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

⁴⁶See Appendix A, Figure 8.

⁴⁷See Appendix A, Figure 9.

The Establish of the Free Officer Movement

One of the men who served in the war was Gamal Abdul Nasser, who commanded an army unit in Palestine and was wounded in the chest. Nasser was dismayed by the inefficiency and lack of preparation of the army. In the battle for the Negev Desert in October 1948, Nasser and his unit were trapped at Falluja, near Beersheba. The unit held out and was eventually able to counterattack. This event assumed great importance for Nasser, who saw it as a symbol of his country's determination to free Egypt from all forms of oppression, internal and external.

Nasser organized a clandestine group inside the army called the Free Officers.⁴⁸ After the war against Israel, the Free Officers began to plan for a revolutionary overthrow of the government. In 1949, nine of the Free Officers formed the Committee of the Free Officers' Movement; in 1950, Nasser was elected chairman.

The venality and ineffectiveness of the Faruk regime were the main causes of Egypt's failures in the war. Although inexperienced, Egypt's troops had performed well in defensive operations before being driven back by the Israelis. The January incident led directly to "Black Saturday," 26 January 1952, which began with a mutiny by police in Cairo in protest against the death of their colleagues. Concurrently, groups of people in Cairo went on a rampage. British property and other symbols of the Western presence were attacked. By the end of the day, 750 establishments valued at £50 million had been burned or destroyed. Thirty persons were killed, including eleven British and other foreigners; hundreds were injured.

On 22 July, the Free Officers realized that the king might be preparing to move against them. They decided to strike and seize power the next morning. On 26 July, King

⁴⁸The nine men who had constituted the Free Officers Movement and led the 1952 Revolution were Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, Major Abdel Hakim Amer, Lieutenant Colonel Anwar El-Sadat, Major Salah Salem, Major Kamal ad Din Husayn, Wing Commander Gamal Salem, Squadron Leader Hassan Ibrahim, Major Khalid mohieddin, and Wing Commander Abd al Latif al Baghdadi. Major Hussein Al Shafei and Lieutenant Colonel Zakaria Mohieddin joined the committee later.

Faruk, forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son, sailed into exile on the same yacht on which his grandfather, Ismail, had left for exile about seventy years earlier.⁴⁹

The Revolution and the Early Years of the New Government: 1952-56

Between 1952 and 1954, there was a struggle between Naguib and Nasser and his colleagues control of the government and over the future form of the government. Naguib was to have one vote on the council and was responsible for carrying out council decisions. The conflicts came to a head on 23 February 1954 when Naguib resigned.⁵⁰

The Nationalization of the Suez Canal

Nasser took advantage and nationalized the Suez Canal after the international loan bank refused to support building the high dam. Egypt promised to compensate the stockholders of the Suez Canal Company and to guarantee right of access to all ships, so it was difficult for the French and British to rally international support to regain the canal by force. The Soviet Union, its East European allies, and Third World countries generally supported Egypt. The United States moved farther away from Britain and stated that while it opposed the nationalization of the canal, it was against the use of force.⁵¹

The Suez Crisis 1956

What followed was the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel, an action known as the Tripartite Invasion or the 1956 war. Whereas the truth about the invasion eventually became known, at the time the Conservative government in London denied that it used Israel as an excuse for attacking Egypt. Eden, who had an intense personal dislike for Nasser, concealed the cooperation with Israel from his colleagues, British diplomats, and the United States.⁵²

⁴⁹Military Research Organization, 82-87.

⁵⁰Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, 114.

⁵¹McGregor, 248.

⁵²Anwar Sadat, *Anwar El Sadat: In Search of Identity* (Arabic edition, Amaktab Amasry 2001), 185-190.

The Plan

The plan, which was supposed to enable Britain and France to gain physical control of the canal, called for Israel to attack across the Sinai Desert. When Israel neared the canal, Britain and France would issue an ultimatum for an Egyptian and Israeli withdrawal from both sides of the canal. An Anglo-French force would then occupy the canal to prevent further fighting and to keep it open to shipping. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion agreed to the plan but informed Britain that Israel would not attack unless Britain and France first destroyed the Egyptian air force.⁵³

The Execution

On 28 October, Israeli troops crossed the frontier into the Sinai Peninsula (also seen as Sinai), allegedly to destroy the bases of Egyptian commandos. The first sign of collusion between Israel and Britain and France came on the same day when the Anglo-French ultimatum was handed to Egypt and Israel before Israel had even reached the canal. British bombing destroyed the Egyptian air force, and British and French paratroopers were dropped over Port Said and Port Fuad. The Egyptians put up fierce resistance. Ships were sunk in the canal to prevent transit. In the battle for Port Said, about 2,700 Egyptian civilians and soldiers were killed.⁵⁴

Although it was invaded and occupied for a time, Egypt can claim to have emerged the victor. There was almost universal condemnation of the Tripartite Invasion. The Soviet Union threatened Britain and France with a rocket attack if they did not withdraw. The United States, angered because its allies of the invasion had not informed it, realized it could not allow the Soviet Union to appear as the champion of the Third World against Western imperialism.⁵⁵

⁵³See Appendix A, Figure 10.

⁵⁴See Appendix A, Figure 10 (table).

⁵⁵Anwar El Sadat, 189-190.

Thus, the United States put pressure on the British and French to withdraw. Faced with almost total opposition to the invasion, the anger of the United States, and the threat of the collapse of the pound sterling, the British agreed to withdraw. Severely condemned, Britain and France accepted a cease-fire on 6 November as their troops were poised to advance the length of the canal. The final evacuation took place on 22 December.⁵⁶

Israel, which occupied all of Sinai, was reluctant to withdraw. President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States placed great pressure on Israel to give up all its territorial acquisitions and even threatened sanctions. The Israelis did withdraw from Sinai, but they carried out a scorched earth policy, destroying roads, railroads, and military installations as they went.

A United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established and began arriving in Egypt on 21 November. The troops were stationed on the Egyptian side of the Egyptian-Israeli border as well as along the eastern coast of Sinai. Israel refused to allow UN troops on its territory. The UN troops were stationed on the Gulf of Aqaba to ensure the free passage of Israeli shipping to Elat. The troops remained in Egypt until 1967, when their removal contributed to the outbreak of the June 1967 War.⁵⁷

Egypt reopened the canal to shipping in April and ran it smoothly. It was open to all ships except those of Israel, and it remained open until the June 1967 War (Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six-Day War). Diplomatic relations between Egypt and Britain were not restored until 1969.

Nasser had won a significant victory. The immediate effect was that Britain and France were finally out of Egypt. Nasser went on to nationalize all other British and French assets in Egypt. The Egyptians now had full control of the canal and its revenues. The Suez

⁵⁶C212: RA-B-C-D-E-F-G Strategy blocks Study Case, "Suez Canal Crises" (Ft Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, May 2006).

⁵⁷McGregor, 254-255.

crisis also made Nasser the hero of the Arab world, a man who had stood up to Western imperialism and had prevailed.⁵⁸

The June 1967 War

Background

During the mid-1960s, tensions between the Arab states and Israel increased. In November 1966, Egypt and Syria signed a five-year defense pact. In the same month, Israeli forces crossed into the West Bank of Jordan to destroy the village of As Samu in retaliation for increasing Palestinian guerrilla raids. In 1967, Israeli leaders repeatedly threatened to invade Syria and overthrow the Syrian government if guerrilla raids across the Syrian border did not stop. In April 1967, there were serious Israeli-Syrian air clashes over Syrian air space. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol warned that Damascus could be occupied if necessary.⁵⁹

The Soviet Union warned Egypt that they had information that the Israelis had mobilized two brigades on the frontier. Nasser reacted by sending troops to the Israeli border, and Syria followed suit. The claim has been made that Nasser believed that the presence of Egyptian troops would deter the Israelis from attacking Syria.⁶⁰ Israel responded by deploying its own forces. It was clear that it would be difficult for Egypt to come to Syria's aid according to the terms of their agreement because of an obstacle--the presence of UNEF troops, stationed on the Egyptian side of the Egyptian-Israeli border since the 1956 war.

A great deal of pressure to remove the troops had been put on Nasser by Arab critics such as King Hussein of Jordan and Crown Prince Faisal (Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud) of Saudi Arabia, who accused him of not living up to his responsibilities as an Arab leader. He

⁵⁸Anwar El Sadat, 190-194.

⁵⁹Jewish Virtual Library, A Country Study of Egypt: The June 1967 War, Available from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/LC1967Egypt.html>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

⁶⁰Anwar El Sadat, 224.

was accused of failing to match words with deeds and of hiding behind the UN shield rather than thinking about liberating the Palestinian homeland.

On 16 May, Nasser made the move that led inexorably to war. He asked the UN to remove the UNEF from the Egyptian-Israeli frontier in Sinai. Once the UNEF was withdrawn, Nasser declared he was closing the Strait of Tiran, which connects the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, to Israeli shipping--a threat he never carried out. Israel, for its part, regarded the withdrawal of the UNEF troops as a hostile act and the closing of the strait as a *casus belli*. Meanwhile, Jordan and Iraq signed defense agreements with Egypt.

Field Marshal Amir, deputy supreme commander of the armed forces, and Shams ad Din Badran, the minister of defense, urged Nasser to strike first, saying the Egyptian army was strong enough to win. The Soviet Union and the United States urged Nasser not to go to war.

Nasser publicly denied that Egypt would strike first and spoke of a negotiated peace if the Palestinians were allowed to return to their homeland and of a possible compromise over the Strait of Tiran.⁶¹

Israel Launched Attack First

“The Egyptian army concentrations in Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”⁶²

On the morning of 5 June, Israel launched a full-scale attack on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In three hours, at least 300 of Egypt’s 430 combat aircraft were destroyed, many on the ground as the pilots did not have time to take off. Israeli ground forces started a lightning strike into Sinai and by 8 June had reached the Suez Canal. On that day, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire. By 11 June, the Arab defeat was total; Israel now

⁶¹Mitchell G. Bard, *Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Inc., 2006).

⁶²Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Speech to Israeli National College, Jerusalem Post, 20 August 1982.

held all of historic Palestine, including the Old City of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, as well as Sinai and part of the Golan Heights of Syria.⁶³

The Execution

The Israelis took Egypt by surprise on 5 June, when their aircraft approached from the Mediterranean at low altitudes to avoid detection by radar and attacked the Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground.⁶⁴ Within three hours, the Israelis had destroyed 300 Egyptian combat aircraft, including all of Egypt's 30 long-range bombers. Israel focused its ground attack on the heavily fortified Sinai road junction of Abu Uwayqilah as it had done in 1956.

After a fierce battle, the Israelis overwhelmed Egyptian forces in fewer than twelve hours. The devastating air attacks and initial Israeli ground successes panicked Egyptian commander in chief Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amir into withdrawing army units from Sinai to the west bank of the Suez Canal.⁶⁵ Staff officers later persuaded Amir to rescind his order, but by that time, all the main elements of the four frontline divisions had already begun retreating westward.

At several points, rearguard actions delayed Israeli advances, but Israeli forces managed to block bottlenecks in the Giddi Pass and the Mitla Pass and at Bir al Jifjafah and prevented the escape of Egyptian troops and equipment. The Israeli air force bombed and strafed thousands of Egyptian tanks, guns, and vehicles caught in the bottleneck.

After four days of intensive fighting, Israel controlled the entire Sinai Peninsula up to the east bank of the canal. Egypt acknowledged that of approximately 100,000 troops in Sinai, 10,000 soldiers and officers were casualties.⁶⁶ Observers estimated that about half of the dead had succumbed to thirst or exhaustion in the desert. A further 5,000 soldiers and 500 officers were captured, many of whom were wounded. Israel also destroyed or captured about 700 of

⁶³Jewish Virtual Library.

⁶⁴Mitchell G. Bard.

⁶⁵See Appendix A, Figure 11.

⁶⁶Ibid.

Egypt's 930 tanks. Popular support for the military subsided rapidly after the June 1967 War and morale within the forces plunged to its lowest level since before the military takeover of 1952.

Perhaps most importantly, the humiliating defeat of 1967 and its aftermath the continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands which deeply wounded the Arab psyche. The stigma placed on the Arabs was unbearable. Arab nations collectively vowed to have revenge. Buffered by the occupied territories and buoyed by a sense of overall military superiority, Israel was certain it could crush any Arab military attempt to achieve these political aims. Convinced they could eventually force the Arabs to peace on Israeli terms, the Israelis were satisfied with the status quo.⁶⁷

War of Attrition and the October 1973 War

After conquering Sinai, the Israelis constructed the Bar-Lev Line, a series of thirty-three small, heavily fortified observation posts atop sand ramparts twenty meters high along the east bank of the Suez Canal.⁶⁸ They built a second sand embankment several kilometers behind the first one. Both embankments had firing ramps for roving armored patrols. In January 1969, Egypt began the War of Attrition with an intensive eighty-day bombardment along the whole canal. Israeli positions along the Bar-Lev Line survived the attack but suffered heavy damage. Egypt followed the attack with commando raids on the line itself and against Israeli patrols and rear installations. The relative ineffectiveness of Egypt's Soviet SA-2 high-altitude surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) against the Israeli raids necessitated the introduction of low-level SA-3 SAMs, manned mostly by Soviet technicians. Egypt's revitalized air defense system succeeded in destroying a considerable number of Israeli aircraft. In August 1970, a cease-fire negotiated by the United States with Soviet support ended the fighting between Israel and Egypt.

⁶⁷Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 136.

⁶⁸See Appendix A, Figure 12.

War is only a branch of political activity. . . . A continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. . . . Policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument. It changes the terrible battle-sword that a man needs both hands and his entire strength to wield, and with which he strikes home once and no more, into a light, handy rapier--sometimes just a foil for exchange of thrusts, feints, and parries. . . . The conduct of war . . . is therefore policy itself, which takes up a sword in place of the pen.⁶⁹

October War 1973

Strategic and Political Settings

The strategic objective of October was to move the case towards the peaceful solution in the frame of security Council resolution and international legitimacy, since there was political stagnation in the Middle East; the so called state of no-war-no-peace. So that the Egyptian President Sadat believed that diplomatic resolution of the situation was impossible, as Israel felt secure; it had no incentive to negotiate. In order to extract Israeli concessions, Sadat determined that direct threat on Israel was necessary. The Arabs must shatter the Israeli sense of security to make them more inclined to negotiate. Further, the Arabs must convince the United States of the need to pressure the Israelis for concessions.

On 4 February 1971, Sadat announced a new peace initiative that contained a significant concession: he was willing to accept an interim agreement with Israel in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. A timetable would then be set for Israel's withdrawal from the rest of the occupied territories in accordance with UN Resolution 242. Egypt would reopen the canal, restore diplomatic relations with the United States, which had been broken after the June 1967 War, and sign a peace agreement with Israel through Jarring. Sadat's initiative was ignored in Tel Aviv and in Washington, which was not disposed to assisting the Soviet Union's major client in the region. Disillusioned by Israel's failure to respond to his initiative, Sadat rejected the Rogers Plan and the cease-fire.

My advice to president Sadat is to be realistic, since we live in the world of reality, and we cannot Construct Something based on hopes and imagination. The fact is you are defeated; therefore, do not ask for what the winner does. There have got to be some Concessions from your side so that the United States will support you in return

⁶⁹von Clausewitz, , 605-610.

we will change our way of handling the Solution If you are not able to do so, we will have to find other appropriate solutions rather than the ones you are offering.⁷⁰

In May 1972, President Nixon met Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev, and Sadat was convinced that the two superpowers would try to prevent a new war in the Middle east and that a position of stalemate--no peace, no war--had been reached. For Sadat this position was intolerable. The June 1967 War had been a humiliating defeat for the Arabs. Without a military victory, any Arab leader who agreed to negotiate directly with Israel would do so from a position of extreme weakness. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union were urging restraint and caution.

However, the United States refused to put pressure on Israel to make concessions, and the Soviet Union, which had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of the June 1967 War, had no influence over Israel. Internally, the Egyptian economy was being steadily drained by the confrontation with Israel. Economic problems were becoming more serious because of the tremendous amount of resources directed toward building up the military since the June 1967 War, and it was clear that Sadat would have to demonstrate some results from this policy. In the last half of 1972, there were large-scale student riots, and some journalists came out publicly in support of the students. Thus, Sadat felt under increasing pressure to go to war against Israel as the only way to regain the lost territories.

Sadat's desired military end state was to hold lodgments within the occupied territories at the time a cease-fire was proclaimed, and then achieve further territorial gains to reach a strategic end-state through negotiations conducted from a position of Arab strength. The limited military objectives selected directly supported Arab policy aims by enhancing the possibility of successful military action and creating the condition for international intervention and political pressure, as well as internal Israeli pressure, for negotiations and concessions. If the military strategy failed to achieve the political objectives quickly, the

⁷⁰Henry Kissinger said in respond to Anwer El Sadat proposel 1971.

Arabs were prepared for a prolonged war of attrition with the Israelis, until Israel, through exhaustion of money and lives, would be compelled to negotiate concessions.⁷¹

The Preparation for War

The political and Diplomatic Efforts Egypt started to exert the political through bilateral coordination with the Arab states aiming to present the Arab support effort in beginning of the war. Egypt accepted Rogers Initiative which led to cease fire on 8 August 1970. In retrospect, there were indications that Egypt was preparing for war. On 17 July 1972, when Sadat expelled the 15,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt. Sadat later explained that the expulsion freed him to pursue his preparations for war. On 28 December 1972, Sadat created “permanent war committees.” On 26 March 1973, Sadat assumed the additional title of prime minister and formed a new government designed to continue preparations for a confrontation with Israel.⁷²

The Execution

“Know the enemy; know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”⁷³

The 1973 war started by Egyptian 200 planes attack against the Israeli positions, and opened thousands of guns at the same time fire along the battlefronts of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian forces (5 Infantry Division)⁷⁴ rushed to break the Israeli Defense east channel “Bar Lev line” in a few hours, although it is one of the strongest and most complex military defense lines. The Egyptian forces succeeded during three days in advance to a distance of 12 to 15 kilometers to extend east of the Suez Canal.⁷⁵ However, it has, from 6-October 13, “a stalwart tactical” led to the relative calm on the front joint Egyptian. Due to the Syrian pressure, the Egyptian forces resume their offensive on 14 October but suffered serious losses, lost about

⁷¹Insight Team of the *Sunday London Times*, 42-43, quoting Sadat’s interview with the Arnaud de Borchgrave in *Newsweek*, March 1973.

⁷²Saad el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 2003), Arabic edition, 25-28.

⁷³Sun Tzu, *Art of War*

⁷⁴See Appendix A, Figure 14.

⁷⁵See Appendix A, Figure 15.

250 tanks,⁷⁶ having moved away from the missile umbrella, decided at the end of the day return to their positions. Israeli forces have benefited from the tactical Egyptian stand and the American airlift provided huge quantities of sophisticated weapons, Israeli rearrangement of its forces, and taken the strategic initiative.

On 16 October, an attack led by Sharon managed to infiltrate the Egyptian lines and crossing the Suez Canal,⁷⁷ and the opening of a “loophole passageway” west of the Suez Canal, to the south of the city of Ismailia. When the Security Council resolution was passed, ceasefire maximum depth of the “Israeli” channel west between 25 to 30 kilometers.⁷⁸

However, the “Israeli” offensive followed, and arrived at a point 101 kilometers, or 101 kilometers east of Cairo.⁷⁹ Ceasefire was arrested definitive in the 28 October 1973. Egypt held the disengagement with the Israeli entity in the 18 January 1974, provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the west channel to a distance of 20 to 30 kilometers east of the Suez Canal, Egypt and retaining troops limited in the territories retaken east of the Suez Canal (a depth of 12-8 kilometers). On 21 February 1974, the Israeli forces had withdrawn from the west channel gap “passageway.” Arab countries have shown strong solidarity with Egypt and Syria in the war and nine Arab countries sent military forces to participate in a war.

On 17 October, the Arab oil producers announced a program of reprisals against the Western backers of Israel: a 5 percent cutback in output, followed by further such reductions every month until Israel had withdrawn from all the occupied territories and the rights of the Palestinians had been restored. The next day, President Nixon formally asked Congress for US \$2.2 billion in emergency funds to finance the massive airlift of arms to Israel that was already under way. The following day, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia decreed an immediate 10 percent cutback in Saudi oil and, five days after that, the complete suspension of all shipments to the United States.⁸⁰

⁷⁶See Appendix A, Figure 16.

⁷⁷See Appendix A, Figure 17.

⁷⁸Moshe Dayan, *Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976), 520-523.

⁷⁹See Appendix A, Figure 18.

⁸⁰Dayan, 520-523.

On 22 October, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling for a cease-fire by all parties within twelve hours in the positions they occupied. Egypt accepted the cease-fire, but Israel violated the cease-fire, completed the encirclement of the Third Army to the east of the canal. By nightfall on 23 October,⁸¹ the road to Suez, the Third Army's only supply line, was in Israeli hands, cutting off 2 divisions and 45,000 men.⁸²

On 24 October, the Soviet ambassador handed Kissinger a note from Brezhnev threatening that if the United States were not prepared to join in sending forces to impose the cease-fire, the Soviet Union would act alone. The United States took the threat very seriously and responded by ordering a grade-three nuclear alert, the first of its kind since President John F. Kennedy's order during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The threat came to naught, however, because a UN emergency force arrived in the battle zone to police the ceasefire.⁸³

Neither side had won a clear-cut victory, but for the Egyptians, it was a victory nonetheless. The Arabs had taken the initiative in attacking the Israelis and had shown that Israel was not invincible. The stinging defeats of 1948, 1956, and 1967 seemed to be avenged.

The Israelis, however, paid a heavy price for merely holding their attackers to an inconclusive draw. In three weeks, they lost 2,523 personnel, two and a half times as many, proportionally speaking, as the United States lost in the ten years of the Vietnam War. The war had a devastating effect on Israel's economy, was followed by savage austerity measures, and drastically reduced living standards. For the first time, Israelis witnessed the humiliating spectacle of Israeli prisoners, heads bowed, paraded on Arab television. In addition, for the first time captured Israeli hardware was exhibited in Cairo.⁸⁴

On 5 June 1975, the Suez Canal was reopened. This was a great moment for Sadat, not only politically but also economically, because the canal provided Egypt with considerable revenues.

⁸¹See Appendix A, Figure 19.

⁸²Saad el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 285.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 281-283.

⁸⁴Elizabeth Monroe and A. H. Farrah-Hockley, *The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973: Background and Events* (London; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), 15.

The Way to Peace with Israel

As stated by Abba Eban, Israeli Diplomat (2002-1915), “Men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives.” In 1977, the outlook for peace between Israel and Egypt was not good. Israel still held most of Sinai, and negotiations had been at a stalemate since the second disengagement agreement in 1975. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was a hard-liner and a supporter of Israeli expansion. He approved the development of settlements on the occupied West Bank and reprisal raids into southern Lebanon. He also refused to approve any negotiation with the PLO.

After the food riots of January 1977, Sadat decided that something dramatic had to be done, and so on 19 November 1977, in response to an invitation from Begin, Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem.⁸⁵

The world was amazed by this courageous move. The reaction in Egypt was generally favorable. Many Egyptians accepted peace with Israel if it meant regaining Egyptian territories. They were tired of bearing the major burden of the confrontation and, considering the sacrifices Egypt had already made, felt that the Palestinians were ungrateful. Of the Arab countries, only Sudan, Oman, and Morocco were favorable to Sadat’s trip. In the other Arab states, there was shock and dismay. The Arabs felt that Sadat had betrayed the cause of Arab solidarity and the Palestinians. In spite of Sadat’s denials, the Arabs believed that he intended to go it alone and make a separate peace with Israel.

In fact, that is what happened. In December 1977, Egypt and Israel began peace negotiations in Cairo. These negotiations continued and off over the next several months, but by September 1978, it was clear that they were deadlocked. President Jimmy Carter had become closely involved in the negotiations. In an effort to break the deadlock, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David. The negotiations were tense and almost broke down several times.⁸⁶ On 17 September, however, Carter announced that the Camp David Accords had

⁸⁵Anwar El Sadat, 395-400.

⁸⁶Country Studies, Peace with Israel, Available from <http://www.country-studies.com/egypt/peace-with-israel.html>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

been reached. They consisted of two parts, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed on 26 March 1979. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai within three years of the treaty; normal diplomatic and trade relations were to be established, and Israeli ships would pass unhindered through the canal. Egypt, however, would not have full sovereignty over Sinai. A multinational observer force would be stationed in Sinai, and the United States would monitor events there.

The Camp David Accords made Sadat a hero in Europe and the United States. The reaction in Egypt was generally favorable, but there was opposition from the left and from the Muslim Brotherhood. In the Arab world, Sadat was almost universally condemned. Only Sudan issued an ambivalent statement of support. The Arab states suspended all official aid and severed diplomatic relations. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League.

Conclusion

The 1948 war between the Arabs and Israel, unequal war parties in terms of several factors affecting the conduct of this war. From political point, most of the Arab countries were occupied by the Western European powers such as England, which were in control of the Egyptian army during the war. Nevertheless, the Egyptian army was under the control of the British Commander which he not control by Egyptian king, but he was receiving orders from England. In addition to the heterogeneity of the Arab armies allied There was no general plan determine the ultimate objective of this war and there was no political or moral support due to the opposition of the Arab world to the Security Council resolution on the partition of Palestine into two neighboring states. From military side completely Arab armies were weak iron majority of the disarmament of the remnants of the Second World War as well as some states, such as Saudi Arabia armed their army by rifles from the 19th century. The only Egyptian army had a strong point by using CAS to supports ground units, which gave to the Egyptian army in the first instance the upper hand, until Israel reinforcement with the newest

aircraft and pilots had participated in the World War II to stand side by side with Israel in the 1948 war.

The 1948 war led to a big shock in the Arab countries led to sequences of military revolution in Syria and completed the revolution of the Free Officers on 23 July 1952, during the monarchy in Egypt. Assassinated King Abdullah of Jordan on 20 July 1950, and King Hussein expelled the Chief of Staff of the Jordanian army Glubb Pasha and arabization of the Jordanian army in March 1956. Arab countries held joint defense agreement on 13 April 1950, pursued a number of defense agreements between bilateral and trilateral some during the years 1955-1956. Egypt, Syria sought to break the Western monopoly on the export of arms, by holding weapons deals with Czechoslovakia.

The United States had offered a loan to Egypt financially to build the High Dam of the most vital to the Egyptian economy. But Egypt refused to set up the Baghdad Pact (which was acceded to by Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan), which aimed to link the interests of the region of Western forces, and face the “communist threat,” while distracting attention from the Israeli danger that lurks in the heart of the region, led to the withdrawal of America presented in the 19 July 1956. Even Egypt for providing the necessary funds to build the High Dam, Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 26 July 1956 nationalization of the company of the Suez Canal. This form of a major blow to the economic interests of the British. The France-disturbed part of the Egyptian support for the Algerian revolution against it.

Israeli agreed with Britain and France to attack Egypt, leading to the Israeli occupation of Sinai, the British and French occupation of the Suez Canal. Israel began the offensive on 29 October 1956, the air landing forces paratrooper in the Mutla corridor about 65 kilometers east of the Suez Canal. Britain and France started attack on 31 October in their aggression against Egypt, especially airports and seaports. Egypt decided to focus on the protection of the Canal and the Port triangle-Cairo-Suez, the Egyptian army ordered to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai and concentration on the west of Suez Canal. Israel managed without difficulty of occupying Gaza during the 31 October-3 November 1956, and the occupation of Sinai during the eight days (29 October-5 November 1956).

The issuance of the decision of the United Nations on 2 November ending the war and the withdrawal of the forces of the French-British invasion of the Egyptian territories and the withdrawal of Israel to behind the armistice lines. Within British-French forces on 22 December 1956, Israeli forces completed their withdrawal on 6 March 1957. This war marked the end of the colonial era British-French in the region, the inheritance of America and the Soviet Union for the racetrack competition.

Although, the war revealed the extent of the evolution of the Israeli military, and the inability of the Egyptian side of protecting himself. This war marshaled Arab and Islamic sympathy and wide with Egypt, and showed the Egyptian leadership, especially Abdel Nasser's "heroes" in the resistance and defends the Arab rights, and a star Abdel Nasser full of the masses in the Arab victory and liberation.

Israel had started the war on 5 June 1967 by broke the Egyptian border, overcame the limited resistance encountered in Gaza, Rafah and Kharouba and Abu Muhammad and Bir Jvjavh and others, and has progressed to the Suez Canal. Israel completed its occupation of Sinai on 8 June 1967. In the Jordanian front the battles began 5 June in the areas of Jerusalem, Jenin and Kabatiya, Hebron, the evening of 6 June and the Jordanian defenses had collapsed, and were ordered to withdraw to the east of Jordan, on 7 June Israeli occupied the West Bank including East Jerusalem. The battles on the Syrian front began on 9 June and ended on 10 June the occupation of the Syrian Golan. The most prominent results of the 1967 war were:

1. Occupation "Israel" for the remainder of Palestine, a West Bank (5878 square kilometers) and the Gaza Strip (363 square kilometers), the occupation of the Egyptian Sinai (61198 square kilometers) and the Syrian Golan (1150 square meters), bringing the total land controlled by the Zionist entity 89359 square km.

2. The displacement of about 330 thousand Palestinians.

3. Control of the Israeli entity on the upper waters of Jordan, and the opening of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba traffic.

4. The formation of the Israeli entity to new lines of defense, provide strategic depth.

5. The imposition of a new occupation of the Arab territories, making the goal of the Arabs subsequently restoring these occupied territories.

6. The destruction of the military forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

7. Disillusionment with the weakness of Arab leaders, and the lack of coordination among them, and the lack of seriousness in the liberation of Palestine.

8. The emergence of the armed Palestinian resistance and scale and the emergence of Palestinian national identity, which decided to take the initiative after it transpired over Arab weakness.

The Egyptian national strategy during the interwar period with Israel from June 1967 until October 1973 can be divided into four main stages of development of the armed conflict between Egypt and Israel. Those stages are; the stage of steadfastness, the stage of active defense, the stage of attrition and deterrence, and the stage of cease-fire that ends with launching the October war of 1973. Each of these stages is assigned with certain tasks and objectives. The final stage resulted in cease-fire when both Egypt and Israel accepted the Rogers' initiative on 8 August 1970, then ends with launching the October war of 1973. Throughout these four stages, the Egyptian armed forces acted toward the objective of liberating Sinai through an over-whole strategy outlined for both the political and military reforms.

Then on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces launched a successful surprise attack across the Suez Canal. The Egyptian devoted a great deal of time, effort, and resources to developing a plan for overcoming the Bar Lev line, and the Egyptian Corps of engineers played a key role.⁸⁷ The Syrians carried out an attack on Israel at the same time. For the Arabs, it was the fasting month of Ramadan, and for Israel, it was Yom Kippur. The crossing of the canal, an astounding feat of technology and military acumen, took only four hours to complete.

The crossing was code-named Operation Badr after the first victory of the Prophet Muhammad, which culminated in his entry into Mecca in 630 AD.

⁸⁷See Appendix A, Figure 13.

Israel was shocked and unprepared for the war. After the initial confusion and near panic in Israel followed by the infusion of United States weaponry, Israel was able to counterattack and succeeded in crossing to the west bank of the canal and surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. With the Third Army surrounded, Sadat appealed to the Soviet Union for help. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin believed he had obtained the American acceptance of a cease-fire through Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State. The Arabs use for the first time, the oil weapon, by reduce their production by 5 percent per month and a total ban on oil exports to the United States and the Netherlands. On 22 October, oil ministers decided to increase the proportion of the production cut to 25 percent. One of the most prominent results of the 1973 war: breaking the myth of the Israeli army, which is not invincible, and shattering the theory of Israeli security, and demonstrate the possibility of restoring parts of the occupied territories, at least by military force. The Arab initiative and the transition from the strategic defensive to the offensive, and to demonstrate the efficiency and courage of the Arab warrior. A high degree of Arab solidarity, through military participation, and using the oil weapon. Achieve a sense of self-confidence and high morale after years of defeat and frustration. Use of the Arab regimes - especially in Egypt - the previous results to move the political situation, and try to reach a peaceful settlement with the Israeli entity, which included the return of the occupied territories in 1967.

Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

The summary discussion of this chapters focuses on how the modern Egyptian army ways of war and some of the more contemporary ways were applied to the benefit of Egyptian military operations. Over an astonishing history dating back more than seven thousand years, Egypt maintained an advanced and relevant military force through the history. In different historical stages, Egypt always came to prove itself as a dominant military force in the region and threatened the Ottoman Empire leading to instability in power over the Europe. That acquired all the characteristics of a great military power. This history has given lessons for military leaders to learn from and to apply in modern warfare. The one cardinal fact of modern Egyptian history is that the births of Egyptian civilization on the Nile was fashioned in war and prove to Mohamed Ali that the best solders for his army was Egyptians.

With the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1516, Mamluks rule in Egypt collapsed; Egypt no longer have national army for 281 years because Egypt become a mandate under the Turkish rule. Egypt started its modern history when exposed to a French campaign led by Napoleon in 1798. When Muhammad Ali Pasha rose to power and ruled Egypt in 1805, he attempted to establishe an army with a complex and sophisticated economic system, to achieve the aspirations and dreams of strong stats. He attempted to take Egypt as the base for its ambitions, his ambitions have exceeded at times this hope up to inherit the Ottoman Empire but these attempted to form an army has been seeking to many changes between rely on the elements from Turkish or Mamluks or Sudanese.

In the month of January 1823, he had been completed convinced that the most viable elements of the new army must be formed from Egyptians. Training of the new army started by training six Egyptians Brigade, the training and organizing of the new army was similar to French army style at this time. French officers headed by Colonel Saif executed the training and organized the army; Colonel Saif had the right of the credit for the preparation of Egypt's

modern army. We believe that 1823 is the started to form of the modern Egyptian army but in 1824 is the entry of this fledgling army service as the distribution of those brigades. The first brigade sent immediately to the Sudan and the second to Saudi Arabia, while the other four were sent to Greece.

To raise the level of efficiency of this army, it was require to establishment a large number of military schools. So that military Academy school established in 1822 and in 1825 established a school staff, in the 1825 established a school in the Navy, in 1831 established a school of artillery, in 1832 the Infantry School, In 1844 a school military engineers.

Mohamed Ali sent a large number of foreign missions in all fields to Europe, the largest number focused in France. the army was at this time is the main tool of Mohammad Ali in achieving its objectives for that reason he established schools of medicine, engineering, martial arts and the advancement of the industries army weapons, ammunition and clothing.

The Egyptian navy in 1839 consists of 32 large warship frigates in addition to a large number of ships assistance the total number of Navy fighters 16,000 and the largest warships Egyptian Aka and with a 106 guns and total crew 1,148 fighters. It was built in the Shipbuilding factory in Alexandria, which were constructed in 1824. In terms of combat efficiency, the Egyptian navy gunboat fleet was the third in the world after the British and French fleets.

The Egyptian victory in the battle of Konia 1839 opened the way for the Egyptian army to the Istanbul capital of Ottoman Empire. Turkey and European rushed to intervene and prevent Egypt to reap the fruits of victory by holding the London conference in 1840 to settle the conflict between each of Egypt and Turkey. Due to this conference Egypt, forcing the evacuation of the occupied territories in return the Sultan of Turkey provides for a family of Muhammad Ali inheritance rules in Egypt and Sudan. The size of the Egyptian army restricted to 18,000 fighters. This action ended the Empire conquered made by Egyptian army in 20th year.

The Egyptian army continued teachings and regulations on the pattern French style until Prussia's victory in the war over France in 1870, from so on the Egyptian army was

planning to amend to German-style and Egyptian military law issued in 1871, which is taken from the English and American law.

When Britain began its bombardment of Alexandria in Egypt in the 11 July 1882, the Egyptian army went to defend the independence of Egypt. The British army entered in Cairo on 15 September 1882, and dissolve the army in the 19 September 1882, this closing a chapter of glory and pride of the Egyptian army, which was established in 1823 and fought through 60 years. In 1922 Britain Announcement Egypt independent state with some reservations and followed by 1936 the Treaty between Egypt and Britain, all of this has led to a full-steps to reorganize the Egyptian army. During World War II, the Egyptian army has been assigned to some of the tasks defensive and insurance internal security.

The emergence of the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict, following the departure of British forces from Palestine. Egypt enters quickly in unequal war against Israel on 15 May 1948, to solve the case of Palestine. War has revealed serious deficiencies in armaments and equipments of the Egyptian army, that was one of the main objectives of the revolution of 23 July 1952 is to establishment of a national army forces. After that Western countries refused to respond to requests for Egypt to purchase weapons, Egypt signed an armaments agreement with the in the Soviet Union 12 August 1955.

Nasser took advantage and nationalized the Suez Canal after the international load bank refused to support building the high dam, followed by invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel, an action known as the Tripartite Invasion or the 1956 war. The second round of the Arab-Israeli conflict finished that Britain and France accepted a cease-fire on 6 November as their troops were poised to advance the length of the canal. The final evacuation took place on 22 December. The Israelis did withdraw from Sinai, but they carried out a scorched earth policy, destroying roads, railroads, and military installations as they went. The evolution of political events in the Arab world and the revolution in Yemen, Egypt has the support of the revolution in 1962 to send most of the army units to Yemen, which led Israel to seize that opportunity then attack in the 5 June 1967 achieving a quick victory.

Egypt has had to respond aggression, particularly after Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the refusal of Israel to all attempts at a peaceful settlement, the army had launched jointly with the Syrian army in the fourth round of Arab 6 October 1973. The Egyptian army was able to achieve military victory, historically crossing the strongest water in Military history. For Egypt to gain any military or political success against Israel in the 1973 War depended on the Egyptian Armed Forces first crossing the Suez Canal, then assaulting the Bar Lev Line, and finally establishing secure bridgeheads on the eastern bank. These challenges were essentially engineering problems, and therefore, the achievement of the operation is, in many respects, a saga of the perseverance and ingenuity of the Egyptian Corps of Engineers. They were asked to build 10 heavy bridges for tanks and other heavy equipment; to construct 5 light bridges, each with a capacity of 4 tons; to erect 10 pontoon bridges for the infantry; to operate 50 or so ferries; and to pilot close to 1,000 rubber boats for the initial assaults. Awakened this victory and cut off by Israel through its expansionist, which aims to create a strategic depth, at the expense of neighboring countries. This war was a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict and opened the road to peace in region after wars and conflicts almost more than 50 years. The peace treaty was signed with Egypt in the 26 March 1979; Israel withdrew from all of Sinai.

The Egyptian army in modern history is not only a tool defends Egypt, expansion, or extension of external influence, but it reflects the pulse of the Egyptian people and the reality of the same hopes and dreams. The Egyptian army Defend national movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century represented in the revolution Abrabih In late 1881. In the first half of the 20th century, when widespread political corruption in Egypt and violated the Constitution and the constitutional provision heart is strong three the King, the British occupation and parties. The army represented in the Free Officers movement conducts the revolution, on 23 July 1952, declaration of the Republic on 18 June 1953. Not only the efforts of the Egyptian army in the country but has supported popular revolutions of the Arab countries against the occupation so that 14 Arab countries have condemned the yellow

independence directly or indirectly to the 23 July 1952 revolution and the sacrifices of the Egyptian army.

Not only the efforts of the Egyptian army focused inside the country but also helped and supported popular revolutions of the Arab countries against the occupation, so that 14 Arab countries have become aware of independence condemnns directly or indirectly to the 23 July 1952, revolution and the sacrifices of the Egyptian army.

Recommendations

As quoted by General Erick K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, US Army, “It’s our duty to develop soldiers and leaders who have the skills necessary to succeed today and in the future.”

Previous chapters have outlined significant experiences in the long history of success in Egyptian military performance. This study has identified the most significant aspects of that experience for today from the Modern eras. This final chapter will use this historical analysis as a foundation for determining how to include the study of military history as a resource for meeting the challenges confronting the Egyptian military in this complex era. This analysis also provides a basis for some recommendations for change in the role of historical studies within the curriculum of Egyptian military education.

Designing the Future

At the beginning of the 21st century, tactical and operational military planners encounter a number of unprecedented conditions: they facing of uncertainty condition due to irregular enemy (uninformed), the rapidly changing operational environment, the advantage of the repaid flow of the information between operational and tactical levels, the impact of Media coverage (international, regional and local) on the planning procedure and execution.

The Egyptian military today faces the same challenges that most of military army facing around the world due to the new enemy form (Insurgency--terrors--civil war) most of the new enemy are uninformed or civilian with or without obvious Chan of command

structures all of these are more complex and daunting than those of previous regular wars and requires different army officer education system. In order to understand the politics in obscure corners of the world, to integrate new technologies, and to create new systems of organization and discipline, the military will require first-rate thinkers to create a successful military education system and operating performance. The new security environment requires that the Army's officer education system also be transformed to meet the demands of its expanded professional jurisdiction. Primarily, the professional Army officer must of course be firmly grounded in the fundamentals of tactics, technology, and leadership, these are the basic but we need for them more education focus on better understanding of basic strategic concepts earlier in their careers. This will help them when they arrive at the senior service college level.

Egypt not only plays a prominent role in the region, as a cornerstone for its security and stability in Middle East, but it also wields a significant influence within the United Nations, African Union and many other official or non official organization in assuring international security. The next few decades may well bring unforeseen threats requiring Egyptian military intervention in unstable environments. The Egyptian Army is already implementing changes to the Officer Education System to improve leadership, Commandership, planning and success in planning and executing full spectrum operations at the tactical and operational levels for field grade officers (Captain, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels). To address a similar dilemma, The American Army has recognized for a decade the need to change in order to respond to the changed strategic environment.

The new security environment has changed the relationship between the levels of war in ways that must be considered when determining an effective way to educate officers for the future. Today's young officer is much more likely to be confronted by decisions that may have operational or even strategic consequences than were his Cold War predecessors.

Today's missions in places such as Bosnia or Kosovo are more politically and culturally complex than were most Cold War missions.⁸⁸

Consequently, these new conditions and requirements must be considered in developing military leadership capable of dealing with the growing levels of complexity on the battlefield. To accommodate uncertainty, education and training must be designed to foster institutional initiative and self-reliance. In short, current and foreseeable conditions require that joint staff officers be more knowledgeable and innovative, as well as joint force commanders who are better prepared for correspondingly expanded duties and responsibilities.

The Importance of History for Field Grade Officer Education System

Today officers must acquire a much more sophisticated understanding of the integration of all of the elements involve in the new mission (Bosnia/Kosovo or Iraq or Afghanistan) one of most important element is the history of the straggle another basic elements required military, diplomatic, economic and match all of these to national power in the pursuit of national objectives.

In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman argues that "globalization" has replaced the Cold War as the new defining international system.⁸⁹ This is another unique reason to study and understand the history, because the history like the foundation of the building we cannot built the building without building the foundation first, so we will not be able to understand the global system without understanding the background history about it.

In the process of educating officers we should not focused to study the recent past, but also of military history in general. The study of military history was heavily emphasized to acquire the theoretical foundations of military science and to gain an appreciation for human performance under the stresses of combat.

⁸⁸Lieutenant General Leonard D. Holder Jr. and Williamson Murray, "Prospects for Military Education," *Joint Forces Quarterly* no.18 (Spring 1998): 9.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

The France's failure in World War II to prepare their army to the following war by not form an effective doctrine to meet the complexity and difficulty in operational level. The French army trained, organized and equipped essentially for another World War I. This was derived from their experiences with emphasis on the destructiveness of firepower, the strength of the defense, the ascendancy of the methodical battle, and the unifying power of the commander.⁹⁰

During World War I, George C. Marshall was chief of operations with the US First Army in France. He taught in Army schools from 1927 to 1936. In 1939, he became the Army's Chief of Staff. Of his elevation to that position, he commented: "It became clear to me at age 58; I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position, I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the new arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills".⁹¹ General Marshall clearly discussed throughout this article the increased complexity of military missions today, will increased reliance on information and advanced technology, which it's, require from the leaders' greater intellectual skills.

However, our strategy of containment has been replaced by a strategy of engagement internationally, which has been increased demands for the military to become involved in domestic emergencies. This requires more military professional's forces to shape, respond, and prepare, to Success in such operations may be better defined in terms of conflict prevention or resolution as opposed to clear victory. Officers must be able to articulate clearly what military forces can and cannot do in the pursuit of national objectives in a particular situation.

⁹⁰Robert Allan Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster* (Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1985), 186.

⁹¹Roderick R. Magee II, ed., *Strategic Leader Primer* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1998), 1.

APPENDIX A

Figure No.	Title
1	Map of Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)
2	Sketch Show the historical classification of Egypt
3	Map of The Ottoman Empire In 1683
4	The French Invasion and Occupation Egypt In 1798
5	The Wahabi war from 1811-1818 AD
6	the Egyptian Army Advanced to Konia In Turkey 1832 AD
7	The Family Trees of Mohammed Ali pasha (continue)
8	The 1948 war between Arab stats and Israel
9	The 1948 war Final result
10	The Canal crises 1956 (Anglo-French-Israel attack Egypt
11	The 1967 war between Egypt and Israel
12	show the rampart dusty on the Eastern edge of Suez Canal
13 a\b	Show Achievements of the Egyptian Corps of Engineers In 1973 war
14	The position of the Egyptian and Israeli Forces before 6 of October 1973 war
15	Phase one, the first eight days from 6 – 13 October 1973
16	Phase two, October 14th
17	Phase three, from 15 – 17 October
18	Phase four, from 18 – 23 October
19	Size and status of Egyptian and Israeli troops Upon The Cease-fire 22-28 October

Figure 1: Map of Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)



Source: Egypt.com, Available from <http://www.egypt.com>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

Figure 2: Sketch Show the historical classification of Egypt





Figure3: Map of The Ottoman Empire In 1683



Source: Wikipedia, Ottoman Empire, Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Empire; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

Figure 4: The French Invasion and Occupation Egypt In 1798




Figure 5: The Wahabi war from 1811-1818 AD



Figure 6: the Egyptian Army Advanced to Konia In Turkey 1832 AD



Figure 7: Show Family Trees of Mohammed Ali pasha



*In the House of Mohammed Ali' A Family Album 1805-1937". By Hassan Hassan, The American University in Cairo Egypt
Second printing 2001 Dar El Kutub.*

Source: Hassan Hassan, In the House of Muhammad Ali: A Family Album, 1805-1952, 2nd ed., Dar El Kutab (Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 2001), 223-224.

Figure 7 Continue: Show Family Trees of Mohammed Ali pasha





Figure 8: The 1948 war between Arab states and Israel




Source: Wikipedia, 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab-Israeli_War; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

Figure 9: The 1948 war Final result



Source: Jewish Virtual Library, Available from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourcemyths/mf4.html>; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

Figure 10: The Canal crises 1956 (Anglo-French-Israel attack Egypt)




State	Entry	Exit	Combat Forces	Population	Losses
Britain	1956	1956	2000	56000000	20
Egypt	1956	1956	300000	37000000	3000
France	1956	1956	1000	45000000	10
Israel	1956	1956	175000	3000000	200

<http://www.suezcrisis.com/suezcrisis.html>

Source: Wikipedia, Suez Crisis; Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis; Internet; accessed on 1 May 2007.

Figure 11: The 1967 war between Egypt and Israel




State	Entry	Exit	Combat Forces	Population	Losses
Egypt	1967	1967	400000	40000000	10000
Iraq	1967	1967	250000	10000000	2000
Israel	1967	1967	200000	3800000	2000
Jordan	1967	1967	60000	1500000	5000
Syria	1967	1967	300000	8000000	1000

<http://www.southcentral.edu/History/1917.htm>

Source: Jewish Virtual Library, The 1967 Six-Day War, Available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/History/67_War.html; Interent; accessed on 1 May 2007.

Figure 12 : show the rampart dusty on the Eastern edge of Suez Canal




A : road near to the top of rampart allow tanks to move without observance.

B : firing mastaba for the tanks, distance between one mastaba and another 100 m .

Source: Saad el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 2003) Arabic edition, 399-401.

Figure 13 a-b: Show Achievements of the Egyptian Corps of Engineers
In 1973 war

Figure 13a: show the concrete shoulders of Suez Canal that
should be explode to allow to the amphibious vehicle to cross



A : The Concrete shoulder in Egyptian side.

B : The Concrete shoulder in Israeli side.

figure13b: show the enemy ideas to inflaming the surface of
Suez Cannel water






Figure 14: The position of the Egyptian and Israeli Forces before 6 of October 1973 war



Source: Military Research Organization, *The Evolution of Egyptian Armed Forces across the History*, Egyptian Army power point presentation slide # 81, 2002.


Figure 15: Phase one, the first eight days from 6 – 13 October 1973



	
↓	↓
Total Losses	Total Losses
↓	↓
240 Tanks	300 Tanks 6/7 October
	260 Tanks 8/9 October
	50 Tanks 10/13 October
	610 Tanks 6/13 October

Source: Military Research Organization, *The Evolution of Egyptian Armed Forces across the History*, Egyptian Army power point presentation slide # 91, 2002.

Figure 16: Phase two, October 14th



Source: **Military Research Organization**, *The Evolution of Egyptian Armed Forces across the History*, Egyptian Army power point presentation slide # 81, 2002.

Figure17:Phase three, from 15 – 17 October






Figure18:Phase four, from 18 – 23 October



Source: Military Research Organization, *The Evolution of Egyptian Armed Forces across the History*, Egyptian Army power point presentation slide # 99, 2002.

Figure19: Size and status of Egyptian and Israeli troops Upon The Cease-fire 22-28 October 1973



Source: Military Research Organization, *The Evolution of Egyptian Armed Forces across the History*, Egyptian Army power point presentation slide # 110, 2002

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