

THE NEW MARITIME STRATEGY – A CHANCE FOR GREATER RELEVANCE?

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The U.S. Navy, unarguably the most lethal navy in the world, has been struggling to find its place in the Global War on Terror. Overshadowed by the immense presence of the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force within Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Navy has been placed primarily in a supporting role. In an effort to maintain its relevance, the U.S. Navy has embarked on a new course via the recently published *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. The development of the new strategy relied heavily on the opinions of sources outside the usual sea service cultural boundaries. The outcome was a strategy that placed the soft power of “global cooperation” on par with the vaunted hard power naval pillars of Power Projection and Nuclear Deterrence. The new strategy still includes hard power requirements, but the inclusion of soft power applications and its rising from a “merely nice thing to do if possible” to a strategic tool make the new maritime strategy quite unique from the past. The factors that influenced the development of the new strategy, the challenges that face its implementation, along with several examples and recommendations for its future application are the subjects of this monograph.

THE NEW MARITIME STRATEGY – A CHANCE FOR GREATER RELEVANCE?

For far too long and in far too many ways, it has been about big-ship battles and high-tech weapons. Life is just not that simple anymore.

—Admiral Mike Mullen¹

The U.S. Navy, unarguably the most lethal navy in the world, has been struggling to find its place in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Overshadowed by the immense presence of the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and even the Air Force within Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Navy has been placed primarily in a supporting role. To keep their proverbial foot-in-the-door, the U.S. Navy has made a valiant effort to participate in both Iraq and Afghanistan by reconstituting a “riverine” force and supplying Sailors to augment under-strength Army units. Naval Aviation has also made significant contributions in support of ground forces, but as time goes by and the war drags on the need for such a big club and its unintended consequences has begun to wane. The Navy’s primary forces (i.e., Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, and Submarines) are geared to taking on conventional threats by projecting large amounts of firepower from its safe haven of the open ocean, but as Admiral Mullen stated in the epigraph above: “Life is just not that simple anymore.”² Naval leaders, in an effort to maintain relevance in a long term struggle that requires much more finesse than brute power, have now embarked on a new course via the recently published *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. This new strategy, for the first time signed by the three sea service chiefs (i.e., the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard) has added a new mindset for the application of naval power, that is, “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”³ Naval forces have routinely been made available during times of humanitarian crises (e.g., volcanic eruptions, hurricane relief, and sea rescue)

and also engaged other nations by providing limited ad hoc humanitarian aid. The new strategy places the soft power of “global cooperation” on par with the vaunted hard power naval pillars of Power Projection and Nuclear Deterrence. The factors that influenced the development of the new strategy, the challenges that face its implementation, along with several examples and recommendations for its future application are the subjects of this monograph.

The Development of the New Maritime Strategy

“At 7:58 AM local time (00:58:53 UTC) on 26 December 2004, a 9.15-magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra.”⁴ U.S. Naval forces delivered approximately 9.5 million pounds of aid in 45 days to the devastated region.⁵ This unselfish U.S. response to an area that contains the world’s largest concentration of Muslims had far greater implications than at first realized. Terror Free Tomorrow, an organization that conducts public opinion polls in various parts of the world, began to observe interesting trends that did not go unnoticed by naval leaders.⁶ Terror Free Tomorrow’s data indicated that following the tsunami relief efforts, Indonesian public opinion of those who opposed the U.S.’s efforts in combating terrorism decreased a dramatic 50% (from 72% in 2003 to 36% in 2005).⁷ Although it had always been assumed that the application of humanitarian aid would foster goodwill from a recipient, the Terror Free Tomorrow poll removed the “assumption” and gave U.S. naval leaders a tangible demonstration of the effects of soft power. This second-order effect would have huge implications in the development of the new maritime strategy.

As stated in the opening paragraph, the U.S. Navy has primarily been utilized in terms of its hard power application. Control of the sea, power projection from the sea,

and seaborne nuclear deterrence are the principle pillars of this hard power and the Navy has been quite adept at delivering this product. The last maritime strategy was released in 1986 during the Cold War and primarily focused on the application of hard naval power.⁸ *Sea Power 21*, the U.S. Navy's "vision for the 21st century" produced in 2002 under then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, supported the Navy's mission in the above hard power applications and introduced the concepts of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing as the basis for defining Navy capabilities.⁹ *Sea Power 21* expanded the Navy's role from primarily a blue-water force to now encompass a greater presence in the littoral (i.e., coastal or sometimes referred to as brown-water) environment to help confront non-conventional threats.¹⁰ This shift to place more emphasis on applying hard naval power to coastal waters was a harbinger of things to come.

Following the Indonesian tsunami relief efforts, a new CNO, Admiral Mike Mullen, took over his post in July of 2005. As in most cases when a change in leadership takes place, the new leader will analyze the current state of affairs that he/she has been dealt and then determine if the current organizational directives still apply or need updating. In Admiral Mullen's case, he had been one of the key architects in developing *Sea Power 21*.¹¹ In January 2006, Admiral Mullen wrote an article for the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* journal in which he stated that he was "struck" by the Terror Free Tomorrow poll results following the Indonesian tsunami relief effort and declared it was "one of the defining moments of this new century, and shame on us if, even through benign neglect, we allow those same opinions to turn against our best intentions again."¹² Admiral Mullen's goal was now to build upon the vision of *Sea*

Power 21 and develop a new comprehensive maritime strategy “to guide the Navy in an entirely new, globally-connected environment that has not existed in the past.”¹³ The first indication of what Admiral Mullen’s new strategy might entail was his introduction of the “Thousand Ship Navy (TSN)” concept.¹⁴ The goal of TSN, now called a Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), is to link all navies together in a voluntary global-coalition to share information and police the world’s oceans against pirates, organized crime, human smugglers, and terrorists.¹⁵ The concept of GMP also served as an admission to the rest of the world that the U.S. Navy could not police the world’s oceans alone and opened the door for other navies to participate.

Utilizing such notables as Peter Schwartz, author of *The Art of the Long View*, and Peter M. Swartz, scientific analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses, Admiral Mullen set out to lay the Navy’s course for the future. Swartz provided a detailed briefing on the history of U.S. Navy strategies and concepts from 1970-2006 to the CNO and other senior naval leaders.¹⁶ Within this briefing Swartz showed that prior to Admiral Mullen becoming CNO, the Navy had produced twenty capstone documents (e.g., strategies, visions, or concepts) since 1970.¹⁷ In general, these documents were produced as a result of a new CNO taking office, new Presidential administration, or new capability being made available to naval forces.¹⁸ Swartz also insinuated that with so many changes in strategy it was difficult for the U.S. Navy to change, or even expand, its mission focus because the lead time to design and build ships takes much longer than changing a strategy; hence, there is a competition between CNO strategies and Department of Defense (DoD) budget cycles.¹⁹ His guidance to senior naval leaders was that for a strategy to become an enduring document it must be followed by an

equally viable operational concept (i.e., tactics to implement strategy) and acquisition plan (i.e., money to buy the resources that support tactics).²⁰ The point here is that a strategy should be just that, a strategy. Producing a strategy which lays out resources required to implement the strategy could cause a premature failure if such resources are never obtained.

Armed with the vision of *Sea Power 21*, the concept of a Global Maritime Partnership, the positive effects of soft power following the tsunami, and Swartz's lessons of the past and ways to re-look at the future, Admiral Mullen and his staff set out to develop a comprehensive maritime strategy. The process was unique in that it utilized a new method called "Conversations with the Country" which involved public forum symposiums in eight different cities through November 2006 to May 2007. Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy, stated: "We need the help of an active American public to formulate our maritime strategy, to help us get it right for our future."²¹ This public debate on the future roadmap for naval forces served two purposes. First, naval leaders were forced to see the problem from a different perspective. Naval planners trapped in traditional frameworks of thinking will most likely formulate traditional strategies. Most likely this technique was brought about by senior naval leaders' relationship with Peter Schwartz. In Schwartz's book *The Art of the Long View* he introduced the concept of using "scenarios," or "stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment" which allow you to make "choices today with an understanding of how they might turn out."²² Utilizing these "outside-of-the-circle" opinions gave naval leaders a fresh perspective on how naval power could be applied outside of traditional

means. The second purpose was to give the public, or taxpayers, buy-in to the strategy. As mentioned earlier, a strategy becomes a hollow document if resources are not applied towards its application. Having the public's buy-in could in the long run be beneficial to obtaining the resources, both in material and personnel, to implement the strategy. In the end, three consistent themes from the public were gathered: "our people want us to remain strong, they want us to protect them and our homeland, and they want us to work with partners around the world to prevent war."²³ Nothing entirely earth-shattering from the first two, but the last theme was taken to heart by the strategy writers and incorporated throughout the entire new maritime strategy document.

The new *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* was released in October 2007. As much as the theme of democracy building dominated President Bush's 2006 National Security Strategy, the theme of "global naval cooperation" dominates the new maritime strategy. In explaining this shift in tone, Donald Winter, Secretary of the Navy, stated in a recent interview regarding the new strategy: "We can't do things unilaterally...Not all things, not all places."²⁴ Granted, the new strategy still includes hard power requirements, but the inclusion of soft power applications and its rising from a "merely nice thing to do if possible" to a strategic tool on par with Power Projection and Nuclear Deterrence make the new maritime strategy quite unique from the past.

To further enhance the global tone of the new strategy and the unity of U.S. sea services to its implementation, Admiral Gary Roughead, the current CNO, General James Conway, the Marine Corps Commandant, and Admiral Thad Allen, the Coast Guard Commandant, gathered together at the International Seapower Symposium at

the Naval War College for its unveiling. The high profile release of the new strategy was a deliberate attempt to garner buy-in from international navies in the area of global cooperation. Additionally, senior leaders wanted to impress upon their own subordinates that the new strategy was not just another “good idea,” but rather an important shift that needs to be incorporated in their thought process of how they look at the world. Time will tell how the rest of the world reacts to this U.S. version of “smiling diplomacy.”²⁵

No Strings Attached – Changing the World’s Perception

It is hard not to be suspicious of a king. Overcoming the perception that the U.S. only acts on behalf of its own interests will be an incredible challenge. The U.S. sea services will have to tread very softly so as not to give the wrong impression to other countries that only U.S. specific interests are important. How well the U.S. maintains the fine line between common interests among nations and U.S. only interests will ultimately determine whether or not other navies will accept and cooperate with a renewed U.S. naval presence much closer to their shores. The new maritime strategy specifically addresses this issue and states that “trust and cooperation [with other international partners] cannot be surged. They must be built over time so that strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered.”²⁶ The key word is “time.” Although based on a noble premise, the sea services have signed onto a strategy that has strayed away from a purely U.S. centric strategy and incorporated a set of ideals centered upon global engagement. This could prove to be a risky assumption in that the next Presidential administration may change course to a more isolationist mindset. If this indeed happens, any commitments or partnerships made in the interim may be directed to be scaled back and could set back the trust equation.

As the sea services begin to initiate increased engagement with other countries several factors must be addressed. Following the tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defense Secretary at the time stated: "...we came, we gave help and we left. We didn't come for a military purpose."²⁷ Wolfowitz, perhaps unknowingly, described an underlying world perception problem faced by the U.S. with regards to its relation to other countries. In general, the U.S. is often looked at as a country that would readily provide monetary assistance or military training, but with strings attached. From the U.S. perspective these strings are necessary to develop stable economies and governments. From the recipient's perspective, no matter if the string would actually serve a good purpose, they are viewed as an unwanted measure of control. To be effective, the sea services should carefully consider the needs of the governments and people to whom they choose to engage. Pushing too hard too early could ultimately push those they intend to help away. Initially, expecting anything in return for a goodwill gesture (e.g., training, humanitarian aid, or equipment) will defeat the purpose and undermine the foundation of trust.

Another driver behind the world's opinion of the U.S. is commitment. Ambassador Peter Chaveas, the Director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, puts it this way in regards to Africa: "One aspect of Africans experience is Americans start great initiatives and then five years later do not follow through on it...we have to keep communicating with them and consulting with them so they know we are with them for the long term."²⁸ Like it or not, many underdeveloped countries are steeped in historical narratives rampant with stories of colonial transgressions. Convincing these countries that the U.S. is committed in both time and money for the long haul will not be easy. If the sea

services over-reach and promise too much they may find themselves in a position where they have created more distrust of America when promises are not kept. Any attempt to engage these countries must be closely monitored and selectively manned to ensure the concept of the doctor's creed "to do no harm" is actively maintained. The sea services, by the mere fact that they are able to interact with people and places far away from the U.S. shoreline will undoubtedly make an impact, hopefully positive, but if not careful, a negative.

The Maritime Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)?

The Brookings Institution "conducted a study to determine just how many distinct foreign assistance objectives, laws, initiatives, and organizations exist within the U.S. government" and came up with a list of one hundred fifty.²⁹ Although the list was subjective the study clearly pointed out that unity of effort amongst so many disorganized entities could be a problem. So exactly how do U.S. naval forces integrate into this melee of dysfunctional do-gooders? Before one could answer this question there is another issue that often rears its ugly head; that is, the underlying concern of who best can operate in the "humanitarian space?"³⁰ Many NGOs would argue that military forces should stay out of the humanitarian business because "the military is a corrupting influence in terms of its emphasis on violence and force to deal with disputes."³¹ NGOs try to operate on the moral high ground and serve society on the basis of not choosing a side while military aid and assistance is often seen as trying to influence an outcome favorable to their cause. This dilemma has often caused tension between NGOs and the military. Depending on the circumstance, "the blurring of roles and responsibilities erases any distinction between military and non-military actors, who

are lumped into a single category of outsiders”³² which inherently places NGO members at risk. This issue, of course, is more prevalent in areas where hostilities are still in progress. However, “absence of warring factions makes imperatives like impartiality and neutrality moot, and NGOs become eager to capitalize on the logistical capacity of the American military to assist in the delivery of aid.”³³ It is in this aspect of humanitarian assistance that U.S. naval forces are uniquely suited. The capability of the U.S. Navy to travel great distances and conduct self-sustained operations provide NGOs the logistical framework to reach far greater numbers of people in need. Concentrating on regions unhindered by large-scale conflict virtually eliminate the tensions mentioned above and allow the best attributes of NGOs and naval capability to cooperate together and maximize effectiveness. The sea services should apply the tenets of the new maritime strategy in areas where limited conflict exist and capitalize on the relationships many NGOs have already cultivated, but have had limited impact due to distance.

Although aggressive regional engagement and cooperation with NGOs sounds promising it should not be conducted in a vacuum. As pointed out earlier, the numerous other U.S. government foreign assistance programs are working their own agendas, not to mention any United Nations initiatives, and U.S. naval forces could inadvertently undermine any of them if not careful. The answer lies in the U.S. Navy’s historic relationship with the U.S. Department of State (DOS). As the Honorable Michael W. Coulter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, stated: “Since the days of John Paul Jones and Thomas Jefferson, Navy and State have worked in partnership beyond our borders...these two national security agencies are defining new and mutually supportive roles and establishing reinvigorated relevance.”³⁴ Maintaining

this close relationship with the DOS will be critical for the U.S. Navy as they apply their floating diplomacy with renewed vigor as put forth in the new maritime strategy.

Balancing the sea services traditional applications of conventional force with non-conventional methods will take detailed pre-planning with foreign governments and U.S. Embassy Country Teams. The current commitment of the DOS to work closely with the U.S. Navy to align objectives bodes well for the new strategy as maritime forces begin a more robust application of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) programs.

The New Maritime Strategy Applications of TSC and HA

Much like raising a child, building trust and showing genuine care at the earliest stages of development may ultimately affect behavioral patterns in later years. Even a child brought up in a loving home can go astray, but odds are they will not. To do nothing with burgeoning countries when the capacity exists to do so would in itself be one more version of reaping what you sow. Helping countries build themselves up to a point where they can defend their people and provide an atmosphere that promotes the possibility of a better life may result in a more stable and economically viable world. The *2006 Navy Strategic Plan* puts it this way: "To be sure, the GWOT writ large is less like those 'hot' wars of the 20th Century; and more like the Cold War – a long-term struggle against a committed ideological opponent."³⁵ The ideological opponent referred to in the above quote is most likely a lost cause. Trying to convert a committed foe would be the subject of another paper altogether, and one that would not have a happy ending. The new maritime strategy appears to stay away from that type of conversion and focuses more on increasing capacities of established, but often inept, international partners.

Winning the hearts and minds of the populace that have not joined the ranks of the committed ideologue is what the sea services should focus on in the applications of TSC and HA.

Several TSC and HA examples, both before and after the new strategy was written, currently exist which demonstrate the application of soft power now codified in the new maritime strategy. The first two examples were the humanitarian deployments of the hospital ships USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH-20). Although both deployments took place prior to the release of the new maritime strategy, both exemplify precisely the way the sea services should go about winning the hearts and minds of those less fortunate. In 2006, the USNS Mercy deployed to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, with a return trip to Indonesia, and in 2007, the USNS Comfort deployed to Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Both deployments combined the efforts of U.S. military personnel and NGOs (e.g., Project Hope³⁶ and Operation Smile³⁷) to provide medical care and humanitarian assistance. Detachments of Seabees were also utilized to perform repairs and minor construction projects ashore. The combined efforts of both ships resulted in the treatment of over 290,000 patients (nearly 200,000³⁸ for USNS Mercy and more than 98,000³⁹ for USNS Comfort). Admiral Mullen, the CNO at the time of both deployments stated: "They're [the men and women onboard the USNS Mercy and Comfort] building relationships...it's the strength of the fabric of those relationships which, I think, will be remembered for many, many years by the young children that they are engaged with who grow up."⁴⁰ If the GWOT turns out to be a generational war, then the efforts put forth by the humanitarian missions of the USNS Mercy and Comfort could have a significant impact on whether the creation of a

potential foe comes to fruition. Unfortunately, the USNS Mercy and Comfort are the only two dedicated hospital ships in the U.S. inventory and currently no additional ships of the same, or similar, capacity are planned for in the U.S. Navy's 313-ship plan.⁴¹ In the meantime, smaller ships have been sent to a variety of areas to conduct similar missions on a lesser scale. For example, as part of Pacific Partnership 2007, the USS Peleliu (LHA 5) and United States Public Health Services (USPHS) combined to conduct a medical/dental civil-assistance program (MEDCAP/DENCAP) visit throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania.⁴² U.S. personnel were assisted by other nations (i.e., Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore) to conduct a four-month long humanitarian mission in this often neglected region.⁴³ Another, albeit on a much smaller scale, MEDCAP/DENCAP/Community relations type visit was conducted by the USS Essex (LHA 2) and USS Gary (FFG 51) to Cambodia. This was the first visit by the U.S. Navy to Cambodia in thirty years.⁴⁴ Both of the above visits exemplify what the U.S. Navy can accomplish with the forces currently in the inventory. Certainly, it would be less ambiguous of U.S. intentions for visited nations to see a ship painted white with a red cross vice a gray-hulled U.S. war ship off their shores, but for the time being the risk of offense to a nation's sovereignty is overshadowed by the goodwill nature of the mission.

Another use of the global capability of U.S. maritime forces that primarily focuses more on training and collaboration than strictly humanitarian purposes is the Africa Partnership Station (APS). Under the pillar of *Sea Power 21's* Sea Basing is the concept of the Global Fleet Station (GFS). From the *2006 Naval Operations Concept*, "GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative

efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations.”⁴⁵ Currently, the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) and the high-speed vessel Swift (HSV-2) are deployed in the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) in support of APS. On board the two ships are members from the three sea services, international partners (i.e., France, Britain, Spain, Germany, and Portugal), U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Project Hope.⁴⁶ Vice Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet Commander with the responsibility over APS stated: “We are not about building bases out there...we are trying to do our part in trying to help a very challenging part of the world help themselves.”⁴⁷ The idea was to demonstrate a persistent presence that would build trust and show genuine interest in a region plagued by illegal activity outside the capabilities of regional navies to control. GOG nations were consulted to determine what type of training they desired and the training curriculum and personnel were tailored to meet their needs. Sixth Fleet’s focus on “pleasing the customer” and commitment for the long term should go a long way in building trust within a region where far too often “episodic engagements” by major powers have failed.⁴⁸

Granted, except for APS, the above visits occurred prior to the actual release of the new maritime strategy; however, these types of visits that employ a variety of organizations and international partners are exactly what the sea services should continue to pursue. Admiral Roughead stated in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that “Our actions send a message to the world that United States seapower promotes security and stability in cooperative ways that do not necessarily

resemble conventional applications of seapower.”⁴⁹ This use of maritime soft power produces a “by-product that engenders trust and invites further cooperation in addressing our collective security interests.”⁵⁰ The U.S. will need to be careful to avoid the perception that some sort of pay-back is expected in return. A sign that the new maritime strategy is successful will be when nations approach the U.S. with promises of renewed cooperation. This is analogous to the once hateful teenager coming to the realization that their parents actually “did” have their best interests in mind.

Recommendations

To avoid the appearance of going-it-alone, the U.S. Navy should closely coordinate with the DOS, especially U.S. Embassy Country Teams, and Combatant Commanders to combine efforts and achieve regional goals. Coulter put it best when he wrote that “Working in tandem [DOS and U.S. Navy] has an exponential effect that far exceeds the benefits achieved working separately.”⁵¹ Unity of effort as exemplified by the Africa Partnership Station is an excellent framework from which to base future endeavors. Similar partnership stations should be considered for the southern waters of the Philippines (i.e., the Celebes Sea) and the Straits of Malacca. Both areas would encourage further engagement with Indonesia and Malaysia while strengthening ties with the governments of the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

The purely humanitarian deployments of the hospital ships USNS Mercy and Comfort were outstanding examples of cooperation between NGOs, international partners, and combined efforts of all U.S. military services. In a budget with no limits, it would be worthwhile to have ten of these type ships, not necessarily in size, but in capability. The U.S. Navy should consider investing in a smaller class of ship that could

easily maneuver in coastal waters and shallow ports to provide medical services to less accessible places. As Admiral Roughead testified, these purely humanitarian missions “have a positive impact on the image of the United States and help build trust and confidence around the globe.”⁵²

To provide a basis of continuity and foster relationships between specific countries and a U.S. platform (e.g., much like State Partnership for Peace Program) Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) should adopt an Area of Responsibility and coordinate visits, community relations projects, and MEDCAP/DENCAP efforts as an integral part of their normal deployments. The manpower available is quite large and detailed planning would need to be conducted. Multiple ships are assigned to each Strike Group that could fan out in a region of interest to conduct multiple visits simultaneously in the area. CSG and ESG personnel would know going in that the port visit is not about taking liberty or visiting local drinking establishments, but rather about fostering strategic relationships and community service.

Finally, commanding officers should be told by their seniors that it is expected of them to conduct these types of missions. Many commanding officers completely focus on the tactical application of their commands and disregard the possible strategic power they have within their grasp. Measuring the success of a deployment by counting the number of flight sorties executed only serves as a source of pride for the carrier and Air Wing, but has little impact on anyone else. Sorties are important, but as the members of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) experienced after assisting in the 2005 tsunami

relief efforts, their impact changed a population's perception of what an American is all about. That was definitely worth a few traps.

Conclusion

Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, in a recent article for *Global Forecast*, summed up their version of America's future role in the globalized world by stating: "Providing for the global good helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world's interests, values, and aspirations. It is not charity. It is effective foreign policy."⁵³ Determining what an actual "global good" is can be in the eye of a beholder; however, few would argue though that in the areas of health care and combating piracy any effort to provide help would not be construed as acting in one's own interests. The effects have the possibility of producing profound changes in behavior that may ultimately provide more security for all, not just for America. Armitage and Nye came up with the term "smart power" to coalesce the advantages of America's hard power and soft power to take on global challenges.⁵⁴ The new maritime strategy and its definite shift in tone reflect this concept smart power. President Roosevelt's Great White Fleet announced to the world that the U.S. had "arrived as a significant, outward-looking, world power with peaceful intent."⁵⁵ The new maritime strategy has announced to the world that even though the U.S. may have the most powerful sea services in the world its power is insignificant compared to the vastness of the world's waterways. The only way to provide security, both economic and personal, is through cooperation, trust, and the application of smart power. The sea services have extended a helping-hand and it is up to the rest of the world to decide if they want to climb onboard.

The title of this paper posed the question of whether the new maritime strategy would make the sea services more relevant, especially in a time when the current conflicts are primarily land based. The answer is that the sea services will always be relevant regardless of what strategy is promulgated. More importantly, the new maritime strategy is a “revelation” to the rest of the world that the U.S., as powerful as it is, cannot go-it-alone and is looking to give, and receive, some help.

Endnotes

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