The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities and Strategic Challenges
Abstract
The British military has a well earned reputation for success in counter-insurgency operations since 1945, but the collective British experience of conducting such campaigns goes back well into the colonial era over a period of the last 200 years. This experience has tended to be ignored when setting the historical context for modern British doctrine. While the doctrine is still fit for its purpose now, has sufficient account been taken of the whole of British imperial and post-colonial historical experience when reviewing doctrine to counter the counter-insurgency challenges of the twenty-first century, particularly in the case of a global insurgency? This paper considers the future environment and strategic challenges, the myths of the approach behind the current British doctrine, themes from British colonial history and their relevance today, and the realties of the British approach to counter-insurgency. The conclusion reached is that study of the whole of Great Britain's colonial and post-colonial counter-insurgency experience is relevant and yields 16 premises that, taken together, constitute a theory that outlines how success can be pursued and when success may no longer be possible when countering an insurgency.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 25, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA479660
Entities
People
- I. A. Rigden
Organizations
- United States Army War College