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**FROM VE DAY TO THE FULDA GAP AND NEW
EUROPE: THE POLICY OF U.S. FORCES IN GERMANY-
IMPLICATIONS FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
CONFLICT**

by

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U.S. FORCES IN GERMANY-IMPLICATIONS FOR TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY CONFLICT**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the sources and character of U.S. policy that have maintained United States military forces in Germany from 1944 until the present, despite the multiform changes of the international political environment and the consistent global restructuring of U.S. troops in these decades. From the moment the decision was taken to transform the occupying forces in West Germany into stationed forces in the late 1940s until 2003 the presence of such forces has been the subject and debate about policy and strategy of remarkable consistency. Despite outward appearances of continuity in U.S. garrisons on the Rhine and Palatine Forest, however, U.S. force reductions in Germany have been discussed and attempted in varying degrees by numerous administrations since the end of the Second World War. This record is less evident to a new generation of men and women charged with thinking about the posture of U.S. forces deployed across the face of the globe, especially in the wake of the upheaval connected with the present decade. The specific aim of this thesis is to explore the balance between international and domestic pressures; bureaucratic infighting and politics; and the general conditions within what was long West Germany and, later, in a united Germany, that makers of foreign and military policy struggled with and that has led to the maintenance of the U.S. presence in the region. The ability of policy makers to successfully balance these factors in any given time period accounts for the presence of American troops in Germany for more than 60 years.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

This thesis examines the sources and character of U.S. policy that have maintained United States military forces in Germany from 1944 until the present, despite the multiform changes of the international political environment and the consistent global restructuring of U.S. troops in these decades. From the moment the decision was taken to transform the occupying forces in West Germany into stationed forces in the late 1940s until 2003 the presence of such forces has been the subject and debate about policy and strategy of remarkable consistency. Despite outward appearances of continuity in U.S. garrisons on the Rhine and Palatine Forest, however, U.S. force reductions in Germany have been discussed and attempted in varying degrees by numerous administrations since the end of the Second World War. This record is less evident to a new generation of men and women charged with thinking about the posture of U.S. forces deployed across the face of the globe, especially in the wake of the upheaval connected with the present decade. The specific aim of this thesis is to explore the balance between international and domestic pressures; bureaucratic infighting and politics; and the general conditions within what was long West Germany and, later, in a united Germany, that makers of foreign and military policy struggled with and that has led to the maintenance of the U.S. presence in the region.

United States foreign policy goals are tied to the notion of national interest and the military is often the most tangible expression of such policy. Currently, the United States is embattled in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) that has taken a toll both physically and mentally on the U.S. military, the American public, and the world at large. The nature of the conflict in Iraq, and the seemingly insurmountable hurdles of reconstruction and stabilization that lie ahead in the war torn country, have led some makers of policy as well as analysts of contemporary conflict to compare the U.S. mission in Germany following the end of the Second World War. Without doubt there are some striking similarities to the character and persona that the United States sought to

destroy in World War II and that of Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have both made comparisons, under heavy critique from historians, between Iraq and post war Germany.¹ There are nonetheless important differences as well that deserve due consideration in any assessment of such policy. Such comparisons beg the question that if one examines the reasons for and roles played by the U.S. military presence in post World War II Germany throughout various time periods, is it possible to gain a sense of the direction, endurance, or even a confirmation for our continued role in Iraq? The present and future of the U.S. position in Iraq and the Middle East provoke intense partisan debate, which nonetheless must be counterbalanced by a sober assessment of the record of the past. In this connection, one must be certain that the main focus of this work is to re-tell an important story of policy and practice of U.S. force structure in the wake of the Second World War, in the Cold War, and after the Cold War---in Central Europe.

This account speaks to general questions as concerns the rigors of post conflict reconstruction; the use of armed forces as a means of securing vital national and alliance interests; and as a means to understand how democracies deal with each other via the posture of said forces. The matter at hand allows a newcomer to the making of such security policy to take a more accurate measure of the present and its many perils. When applied properly, the analysis of the record of the past should aid policy and be something other than a weapon of rhetorical combat in the struggle for mass persuasion in wartime.

B. IMPORTANCE

The topic of force structuring, especially overseas, is of the utmost importance to America's leaders and decision makers and to that of its allies. The disposition, flexibility, and operability of U.S. forces must constantly be weighed against a shrinking defense budget, the United States' current war posture and likely future conflicts. Those charged with the determination of U.S. national interests overseas profoundly impact the

¹ Daniel Benjamin, "Condi's Phony History," <http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/> (accessed March 18, 2008).

disposition and the readiness of its troops to engage its foes on a worldwide scale. The civil military conflicts of such determination have been a force in U.S. strategic culture since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1898 and have remained so especially since the stationing of U.S. forces in Iceland in 1941, to say nothing of the force posture in the ex-Axis countries that emerged in 1944. So how do makers of policy in the United States define national interests?

Most often the President of the United States will expound his definition of “national interest” and use it to guide such overarching documents as the U.S. National Security Strategy; at least such has been the case since 1986 and the promulgation of the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act during the Reagan Administration. The nature of the U.S. political system, therefore, allows for varying degrees of classification and interpretation as world events and U.S. presidents change over time. For example, in the 1991 National Security Strategy President George H.W. Bush summarized the U.S. national interests as:

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure...A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad...Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations...[and] A stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.²

John Gimbel, a leading author on the subject of U.S. occupation forces in Germany, has stated in his study of military government operations that “it has been revealed that American actions and policy in Germany were governed by a broad range of interests and that some of those interests were given high priority only during certain

² George H.W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C: The White House, August 1991), 3-4.

time periods.”³ As Gimbel’s statement implies, the need to evaluate and define what U.S. interests were during certain time periods can be used to examine U.S. foreign policy and by default U.S. force posture decisions.

Continually Donald Nuechterlein, a prominent expert on American foreign policy, has lectured that national interests can be understood in four broad categories that take on varying levels of intensity. He defines his categories as: 1) defense of the homeland; 2) economic well being; 3) favorable world order; and 4) promotion of values.⁴ His four category approach allows for the inclusion of a wide range of topics and issues and leaves plenty of room for interpretation.

According to Ronald D. Asmus, a leading scholar on the U.S. and Germany, the United States has learned its lesson the hard way regarding the rigors of foreign and security policy. They learned through two world wars, the Cold War, Vietnam, Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq that they cannot withdrawal themselves from world affairs. Consequently, at the same time they cannot afford to go it alone. The United States continually asserts its interest and ideals to promote democracy and remain strong militarily.⁵ What Asmus points out is that the history of U.S. involvement in world affairs has had, and will continue to have, a profound impact on its current and future involvement in the global arena.

Based upon his reflection, Asmus is inclined to define a “vital national interest” for the U.S. as an interest “where the U.S. is unequivocally willing to spend money and put its military in harm’s way.”⁶ The adjudication of this claims’ merits, and others like it, are vital to U.S. decision makers. Through this lens the importance of the U.S. military presence in Germany since the end of World War II will be evaluated.

³ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), xiii.

⁴ Richmond M. Lloyd, *Strategy and Force Planning*, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval war College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995), 5.

⁵ Ronald D. Asmus, *Future Defense Policy toward Europe: The New Politics and Grand Strategy of European-American Relations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 1993), 2-3.

⁶ Ibid., 5.

Asmus furthers a number of other growing concerns that point to the importance of the U.S. dilemma. How does the U.S. “...find a balance between 1) its desire to retain its strategic flexibility and unilateral military capability and 2) its desire to promote collective security?”⁷ Essentially, Asmus is asking how the U.S. would continue to support NATO and its growth while maintaining the ability and international good will to act of its own in a unilateral fashion if policy demands it. He posed this question several years before September 11, 2001, but even in 1993 the issue had been a concern of U.S. makers of policy for decades, as it remains so today. The importance of this concern strikes at the heart of evaluating why there has been a continual U.S. military presence in Germany. Do American troops in Germany fulfill these two desires? If so, does it continue to fulfill these desires despite the unraveling of the USSR as a common threat on the European continent? These are the types of questions that have repeatedly been asked of U.S. political and military leadership with increased scrutiny following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also in the present decade of the twenty-first century as well. These same questions, or slight variations thereof, are worth re-evaluating through a historical context given the current conflicts that occupy the United States and its partners in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

Since the advent of the Goldwater Nichols law in the 1980s, the Secretary of Defense is required by title 10, section 118 of United States Code to submit to Congress every four years a report, known as the Quadrennial Defense Review, detailing the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and any other elements of the defense program as pertaining to the direction of the Department of Defense over the next 20 years.⁸ This document sets the tone for the strategic policy objectives and budget requests that shape U.S. military forces worldwide. This document also reflects the need to continually evaluate, and re-evaluate, the definition of what a vital national interest is, particularly overseas. Furthermore, this

⁷ Ronald D. Asmus, *Future Defense Policy toward Europe: The New Politics and Grand Strategy of European-American Relations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 1993), 8.

⁸ Department of Defense QDR website <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/> accessed 21 May 2007.

law compels the political leaders and military leaders to examine the amount U.S. interests and its European allies' interests overlap within the commitments of the U.S. to NATO and beyond. As the leadership of the U.S. struggles to determine its future military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan in the face of a strategic reality that has diverged from the optimistic expectations of 2003, whatever that presence might be, one hopes that by exploring the balance between international and domestic pressures; bureaucratic infighting and politics; and, historically, the general conditions in Germany that makers of foreign and military policy struggled with, decisions regarding the future deployment or redeployment of troops on the European continent, the Middle East, or any other area of interest will be made with as much knowledge and acumen as possible.

C. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The U.S. force structure in World War II Germany and its aftermath mirrored the geostrategic realities of the great powers on the global level. Such an analysis of policy naturally makes use of the tools of the historian to suggest a periodization of this story and this thesis is broken down into three distinct time periods. Such a periodization makes an evaluation of the internal and external influences that shaped decisions regarding the number of troops stationed in Germany more distinct and tangible. Throughout each time period military decisions, administration decisions, foreign policy goals, domestic politics, and major international events are examined for the role and influence they had on American troop levels in Germany. Although only briefly touched on here, the events will be explained and examined for insight in detail in the appropriate time period.

In the first time period, the end of the Second World War until the hardening of the post war order in the formal division of Europe (1944-1955) led to a new international order that saw the United States and the Soviet Union emerge as opposing blocs in a bipolar world in which the fate of Germany was a central issue. The need to successfully balance international and domestic pressures, bureaucratic infighting and politics, and the deteriorating conditions of post war Germany was greatest during this time period. The destruction from the war left the continent in shambles and the

economies of the European powers anxious that the stabilization of Germany would fail as it had in 1919. The United States, through high level meetings with allied leaders, attempted to address the issue of postwar Germany. Unable to reach a consensus, the allies agreed to divide the country into zones of occupation to be administered individually by each victor nation. Unprepared for the transition from offensive operations to occupation, the United States relied on the soldiers in place at the end of combat operations to perform the required duties as had happened on a smaller scale in the Rhineland in 1919-1922. Disagreements in the Roosevelt administration over German postwar policy led to internal strife and confusion for the military government role and expected reparations in Germany. The U.S. Army was especially recalcitrant in this connection, a fact little known in the twenty-first century. Finally, in 1945 the contested Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directive 1067 was signed into effect by Roosevelt providing direction to U.S. forces and military governors.

Furthermore, the establishment of a U.S. Constabulary force was a significant event relating to U.S. troops in Germany as well as the stabilization of West German society in the period 1944-1947. The dedicated police military force was mission specific, highly trained, and consisted of screened elite personnel. Their duties were seen by both the Americans and the West Germans as bridging the gap between the occupation and reconstruction role. The force also had a fairly large impact on the conduct of American G.I.s with respect to West German civilians during this time; relations that have proven to be necessary and enduring.

Moreover, the troop levels in the first time period were profoundly affected by the influence of the Korean War, the creation of the FRG and the decision taken then to arm the FRG despite the memory of militarism and Nazism. The late 1940's and early 1950's saw a rise in U.S. tensions with the Soviet Union and American foreign policy goals were explicitly anti-communist. The U.S. and allied efforts to rebuild West Germany and Berlin were being suppressed and hindered by a Soviet blockade of the German city that began in 1948. In response, and at the behest of U.S. military leaders in Germany, JCS directive 1779 was enacted. Otherwise known as the Marshall Plan, U.S. aid and troop levels were increased for over a year to counteract the Soviet blockade and rebuild

Western Europe and to reassure especially the French that the integration of the FRG into the West would not be harbinger of a remilitarized German threat as in the 1930s. North Korea's Soviet backed invasion of South Korea bolstered fears of Soviet expansionist ideas and the U.S. moved to significantly reinforce its strength in West Germany granted the generalized fear that as Korea went so would a divided Germany. These influences, some internal and others external, will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

The second time period evaluates the consolidation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its influences on U.S. troop levels in Germany (1955-1990). As the largest time period evaluated in this paper, balancing international and domestic pressures became the most significant factor that affected U.S. foreign policy decisions; factors which undoubtedly had direct effects on NATO and the FRG. Although originally created in 1949 to counter the rising Soviet threat, NATO quickly found an enduring adversary in May 1955 with the creation of the Warsaw Pact alliance which in part was a response to the creation of West German armed forces. The Soviet controlled alliance caused the U.S., and by default NATO's, force posture to increase. Moreover, the Soviet Union had increased its inflammatory rhetoric, mitigated U.S. nuclear hegemony, and constructed the Berlin Wall (1961) during this time period. All of these events influenced the role and level of troops stationed in Germany. At the same time, the mid-1950s had witnessed the first attempt to reduce the force levels in the FRG under Eisenhower's policy of the New Look.

The United States unilateral adventure in Vietnam soon shifted troop levels in the FRG during this time period to an emphasis on South East Asia. The conflict in South East Asia saw large numbers of American troops redeployed from their bases in Germany to fight in the conflict. Furthermore, the loss of troop strength was discerning for the NATO allies, who relied on U.S. conventional force commitments as the main deterrent force and a symbol of U.S. engagement on the continent.

Finally, as American interests were refocused during the late 1970's and early 1980's back on central Europe in the face of the Soviet build up there as well as the Afghan and Polish crises at the turn of the decade, troop levels seemed to stabilize. U.S. Marine forces were reoriented towards Europe from the Pacific, NATO undertook the

Intermediate Nuclear Forces deployment at the end of the 1970s, and the United States adopted a short war doctrine. President Ronald Reagan initiated his strategic defense initiative (SDI) in an attempt to render offensive nuclear weapons useless in the midst of the INF deployments. Reagan's program was cause for concern among the NATO allies and they began to question U.S. commitments to the continent. These influences, some a result of unilateral American decisions, and others a result of external factors, will be examined in the third chapter of this thesis.

The final time period (1990-2005) revisits NATO requirements and the American presence in the post Cold War era. It also examines the shifts that occurred in American interests as a result of same. Specifically, during this time period policy makers successfully balanced ever-present international and domestic pressures, bureaucratic infighting and politics, and changing conditions in a new, united Germany. Continually, it begins to examine events and interests in the Middle East and their role on the levels of U.S. forces in Germany. Polling data offering insight into German domestic public opinion regarding American troop levels as well as the past, current, and future rationale for an American presence is examined. Finally, the third time period concludes with an investigation into the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and defense transformation that came about with the George W. Bush administration. The RMA proposed by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld projected a major shift in the U.S. global force posture and took specific aim at the Cold War style structure found predominantly in Western Europe and the new united Germany. The events of the third time period, predominantly internal and unilateral in nature, are examined in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

The concluding chapter of this work attempts to tie together the underlying influences, both internal and external, that have shaped the American force posture in Germany following the end of World War II. Then, events surrounding the U.S. led mission to stabilize Iraq following the regime change will be examined for congruencies. Influences and factors such as administration decisions, Iraqi domestic concerns, U.S. force structure and role, and external international events will all be reviewed for similarities.

D. METHODOLOGY

1. Case Study

In order to evaluate what has defined a “vital national interest” for the U.S. to warrant a continued presence in Germany, three time periods will be examined as case studies. The first time period will look at the period 1945-1955, the second time period will look at 1955-1990, and the final time period will be from 1990 to the present. Within each case study, particular attention will be paid to the policy and structure that surrounded the U.S. forces in Germany at the time. During each of these time periods there were varying levels of troops stationed in Germany and the international order that the U.S. operated within changed. By breaking down the case studies into these time periods it is the hope that the periods of occupation can be defined in terms of U.S. national interest and an insight into future occupations can be gleaned.

2. Primary, Secondary, and Other Sources

The sources used in the formulation and evaluation of these arguments will be drawn from official government documents and speeches to include testimonies before the United States House and Senate committees, Department of Defense reports, as well as official State department documents. Furthermore, reprinted documents such as JCS orders, treaties, and other “official” documents relevant to the post war occupation will be used from scholarly sources instead of as originals. Secondary sources such as scholarly journals, newspaper articles, books, and non-governmental organization reports will also be used.

II. THE U.S. MILITARY IN GERMANY 1945-1955

A. FROM COMBAT TO MILITARY OCCUPATION

1. Background

By 1943, despite the lack of a military collapse and complete unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, plans were already being developed by the United States and its allies for the post war policy and administration of Germany. Based upon the bitterness of the campaign fought and wrought with images and reports of the inhumanity that engulfed the practices of Hitler's regime, it was determined that Germany must never again become an aggressor state.⁹ The American occupation of a portion of the Rhineland from 1919-1923 served a distinct memory for those charged with establishing policy in a newly defeated Germany. As a result of that early Rhineland occupation, the U.S. Army had concluded that success in the administration of civil affairs by a military government was to be measured by its ability to convert enemies into friends through just and mild treatment of the governed. The American forces at the time enacted a policy of supervision rather than direct administration.¹⁰ The realization that this approach had not endured resulted in the significantly more contemptuous attitude regarding Germany at the World War II. Developing an allied policy for operations to defeat Germany proved far easier than reaching a consensus on how to manage the post war state. The allied leadership met at the Tehran Conference in 1943 where Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were able successfully to discuss operational plans for the eventual defeat of the Axis. The U.S. had already begun to administer conquered territory with mixed results beginning in the North Africa campaign followed by the Italian campaign, and then in

⁹ For a more in depth study on the goals of the allied powers prior to the end of hostilities see Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 2; also Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), v.

¹⁰ John C. Rasmussen, *The American Forces in Germany and Civil Affairs, July 1919-January 1923* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia, 1972), i.

France as a prelude to the start of the occupation of Germany in Aachen in the fall of 1944. Despite devoting a large amount of time to postwar operations and all parties agreeing on some form of political dismemberment, however, no conclusions were reached.¹¹

Meeting again in 1945 at Yalta, with the end of hostilities appearing to be in sight, the three leaders were more determined to reach a conclusion on the postwar treatment of Germany. The U.S. sincerely expected to remove itself from Europe as soon as possible and in this connection, such a statement reflected the experience of the years 1919-1922 and what remained as an isolationist, anti-European vein of thought among the older generation of U.S. civilian and military makers of policy. Understandably, they desired to put into place a workable settlement that would not require American presence or supervision.¹² It was President Roosevelt's expectation that the U.S. would not remain in occupation of Germany or Europe for more than two years.¹³ Roosevelt summed up the principles that guided their discussion by stating, "We want Germany to live, but not at a higher standard than that of the USSR. I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining, but not starving."¹⁴ The outcome of the conference enabled a framework that was passed down to strategic and national level staffs to be used in planning for postwar operations and set forth the framework for the parties to acquire the legal right to exercise territorial sovereignty over Germany and to station their own forces there.¹⁵ The degree of this stationing, however, was only beginning to come to light. As early as April 1944 there

¹¹ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 2.

¹² Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 109. Emphasis added. See also, John L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 2.

¹⁵ David Haglund and Olaf Mager, *Homeward Bound: allied forces in the new Germany*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 22.

were around 72 post hostility studies being conducting at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) of which the most important became operation ECLIPSE.¹⁶

2. Operation Eclipse

Operation ECLIPSE was designed to be the apparatus that transitioned the allies from the wartime modes and objectives of operation OVERLORD to the eventual post hostility requirements of the military occupation. The plan called for two phases with the primary phase acting as the culminating point of operation OVERLORD and the allies moving rapidly to secure strategic areas deep within the respective zones of Germany. Obviously, the nature of this phase was a combination of both the peace and wartime operations. This blended operation was cause for concern and confusion did emerge among the allied occupiers as well as the German civilians as to who was in charge.¹⁷ During the second phase of the plan, the allies proposed to further their control of occupied areas and work towards the objectives established for the operation such as: de-Nazification, disarming German forces, enforcing the surrender terms, establishing law and order, and redeploying allied forces into designated national zones of occupation. Finally, and especially relevant to this study, the plan anticipated a requirement for the redeployment of “surplus U.S. and British forces not required for occupational duties.”¹⁸ The significance of this statement lies in the ability to point to it and say that the U.S., in 1944, was already planning for the reduction of its footprint in Germany.

The transition from war to peace was proven, through operation ECLIPSE, to be a concurrent action rather than a sequential one. Political objectives tend to drive states that make war and national interests are repeatedly re-defined and altered. This task is

¹⁶ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 3.

¹⁷ Kenneth McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany” in *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 65, No. 3 (July 2001) 724.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 725.

made inherently more difficult when operating in a coalition, as the allies found. Each of the allies undoubtedly pursued their own interests and each may have had differing views of what peace was. With conflicting views on how to alleviate the vague and highly undefined roles and responsibilities within a Germany that was in conditions of both war and occupied peace, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, requested clarification and direction from Washington. On September 2, 1944, the Secretaries of War, State, and Treasury met to develop German postwar policy. Eventually, the direction they created for Eisenhower became the draft for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) directive 1067.¹⁹

The draft version of JCS 1067 called for the implementation of the Morgenthau plan as postwar policy. The Morgenthau plan was named after Henry Morgenthau Jr., then Secretary of the Treasury, and advocated extremely harsh postwar policies towards Germany and its citizens. Morgenthau was particularly determined to revert the German landscape and economy back to an agrarian system.²⁰ He wanted to make sure that an industrialized Germany could not rise again and produce the war machine that the allies had fought so hard to destroy. The plan, however, was met with stark criticism from within Roosevelt's cabinet that led to fierce bureaucratic infighting.

3. JCS 1067

The President's expressed desire to punish Germany provided the backdrop for disagreement between the Secretaries of War and Treasury. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, as mentioned earlier, sought to punish Germany in the economical sense and render the economy nothing more than an agrarian society with FDR's general desire to strip the traditional European continental powers of their capacity for mischief. He sought to split Germany permanently into smaller states and included deportations

¹⁹ Kenneth McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany" in *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 65, No. 3 (July 2001), 734.

²⁰ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 105.

and summary imprisonment for anyone with a responsibility for Nazi war crimes.²¹ Secretary of War Henry Stimson, however, saw the needs of policy differently. Together with his Deputy Secretary of War John J. McCloy, he opposed the Morgenthau portion of the plan to President Roosevelt.²² What he most feared, however, was that too low a subsistence-level economy would turn the anger of the German people against the allies and cause a situation that would "obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the viciousness of their doctrines and their acts." This sentiment was reinforced by General Lucius D. Clay, Deputy General under Eisenhower and later the Military Governor of the U.S. zone in West Germany, as he was viewing the destruction of Germany from the war. He commented to McCloy:

Washington must revise its thinking relative to the destruction of Germany's war potential...The progress of the war has accomplished that end...the industry which remains, with few exceptions, even when restored will suffice barely for a very low minimum living standard in Germany.²³

Stimson pressed similar arguments on President Harry S. Truman in the spring of 1945 as final drafts were being considered.²⁴ JCS 1067 was eventually sent by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. to Ambassador Winant in London for presentation to the European Advisory Committee (EAC) as the U.S. proposal for a directive to govern all of defeated Germany.²⁵ The most glaring change from the original draft proposal was the

²¹ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 101.

²² Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 101-102.

²³ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 6.

²⁴ Arnold A. Offner, "Research on American-German Relations: A Critical View" in Joseph McVeigh and Frank Trommler, eds. *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 176.

²⁵ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 208.

time period for its authority had been extended to well after the expected establishment of the tripartite authorities and would remain in effect until the governments established long range plans and policies.²⁶

Throughout the entire process of drafting the directive, JCS 1067 was attacked from many sides. Those in the War Department wanted less centralization in administering zonal authority; those in the Treasury department wanted less industrialization; and those in the State department wanted centralization as well as German responsibility for economic recovery. The disagreement was further complicated by the accessibility each department had to President Roosevelt. Roosevelt eventually gave clear guidance to the members of his cabinet and together they produced a revised directive for Germany.

The group responsible for composing the directive, the Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG), quickly put together part I (Political and General) and part III (financial) of IPCOG 1, however it took the Treasury department another four weeks to put together part II (economic).²⁷ Harry Truman became President on 12 April and within two weeks the IPCOG had approved and sent him a draft of IPCOG 1. After review, the JCS gave final concurrence to IPCOG 1 with a few amendments. Specifically, Eisenhower was to be allowed to continue the production of much needed synthetic rubber and oil, aluminum, and magnesium for the occupying troops. The Nazi built war machines from the Four Year Plan were exactly what Morgenthau wanted destroyed and on this point President Truman completely disagreed with him. Such was the shape of reality in conflict with ideas and policy in the abstract. Finally on 14 May,

²⁶ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 208.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 214.

the directive was signed and sent to General Eisenhower as JCS directive 1067/8.²⁸ There are a few major highlights that should be pointed out from this document. They are as follows:²⁹

- *Part I, Section 4, Number 4, Letter C:* Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives.
- *Part I, Section 4, Number 4, Letter B:* The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.
- *Part II, Section 21:* You will estimate requirements of supplies necessary to prevent starvation or widespread disease or such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. You will take all practicable economic and police measures to assure that German resources are fully utilized and consumption held to the minimum in order that imports may be strictly limited and that surpluses may be made available for the occupying forces and displaced persons.

The above main points highlight how close to the original Morgenthau plan the document actually ended up being. In fact, Morgenthau told his staff that Truman's endorsement of the IPCOG directive was a "big day for the Treasury," despite the loopholes that McCloy had inserted, as mentioned earlier. He commented to his son's that the directive was plenty tough and that so long as it was carried out in Germany as it was conceived in Washington Germany could not rise to make war again for at least another fifty years.³⁰ Although the complete elimination of the German industry was not spelled out, the directives provided to the commanders in the field show an obvious

²⁸ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 214.

²⁹ United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian of the Department of State, 1985), 17-24.

³⁰ Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the destruction of Hitler's Germany 1941-1945* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 233.

indifference towards the German public. The occupied country was to be used to support the occupiers and little provision seems made to promote its recovery and stability. These deficiencies will be explored in more detail later in the study below.

4. The Occupation Force

At the end of the war, Eisenhower had roughly 1.6 million forces in western Germany, Berlin, and Austria. With the shooting over, those men became the occupation troops whose job it was to control the population and suppress any resistance which had bulked large in assumptions about war termination.³¹ The initial phases of the military government were characterized by the uncoordinated, pragmatic efforts of local detachments to restore a semblance of order and security. At the same time, they were to arrest former Nazis and round up military personnel; denazify public service; confiscate Nazi, Wehrmacht, and Waffen SS equipment; provide for displaced persons; enforce non-fraternization regulations; and finally provide accommodations for other U.S. troops.³² Although given a low priority in the planning phase of postwar policy, de-Nazification grew increasingly important as special branches within the military government were developed with the task of “vetting” the population.³³ Typically, these tasks were accomplished by having the occupation troops man border control stations, maintain checkpoints at road junctions and bridges, send out roving patrols to apprehend curfew and circulation violators, and keep stationary guards at railroad bridges, Army installations, Displaced Persons camps, jails, telephone exchanges, factories, and banks. In the first months troops were plentiful and almost everything of importance-and some not so important-was guarded. In effect, the combat forces became military government security troops.³⁴ This type of occupation force employed a much larger number of

³¹ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 320.

³² John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 46.

³³ For a discussion on the American de-Nazification policy see Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany 1944-1955* (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), pp. 157-168.

³⁴ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 320.

troops than would be available for the permanent occupation and did so at considerable cost in combat potential and discipline. The larger units lost their cohesiveness, and in the platoons and companies discipline diminished. Ironically, the supposed chief beneficiary, the military government, concluded after two months' experience that the better plan would have been to form occupational police battalions, because the tactical troops thought in terms of military security and therefore often followed different priorities than were required of police type security forces.³⁵ Notwithstanding these problems John Gimbel, a leading authority on the U.S. zone of Germany, has written that "on the whole, the military government followed the guidelines of JCS 1067 remarkably well for an organization being formed at the same time that the area it administered had virtually disintegrated politically, socially, and economically."³⁶

Despite, however, the problems mentioned above, the biggest hurdle that had to be overcome was the lack of permanence that the occupying troops brought with them. Most of them were scheduled to be redeployed to the Pacific or home to be discharged.³⁷ A large portion of them would only be remaining in Germany for a few more weeks or months. Regardless, they were all slated to be rotated out with the possibility of war in the Pacific.³⁸

In November 1944 the General of the Army Services, Lt. General Brehon Somerville, told Eisenhower that the European theater was to become the staging ground and jumping off point for the continued war in the Pacific. In order to help facilitate the concurrent requirements to field a occupation force, redeploy troops to the Pacific, and redeploy troops back home for discharge, it was suggested by Chief of Staff General George Marshall that only those with the least eligibility for discharge be redeployed to the Pacific, those with the most eligibility be redeployed home, and the rest stay in

³⁵ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 320.

³⁶ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 2.

³⁷ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 321.

³⁸ Ibid.

Europe as the occupying force.³⁹ On May 12, 1945, known as R-day for the redeployment of troops, the movement of troops began. However, the retraining of troops for the Pacific theater became increasingly difficult because troops were constantly reshuffled within Germany to fill in for those troops that were redeployed stateside for discharge.⁴⁰

The second atomic bomb was dropped in Japan on 9 August, and the next day Marshall told Eisenhower to be ready, as soon as Japan surrendered, to reverse the redeployment and readjustment priorities. First priority was to go to the men eligible for demobilization. This included the troops with 85 points and also included plans for moving out the men with at least 75 points. Eisenhower asked for a month to clear the pipeline of more than 380,000 low-score men already processed and awaiting shipment to the Pacific theater. On 15 August, the War Department directed Eisenhower to reverse the priorities immediately and prepare to ship out 1,716,000 men by the end of January 1946. Marshall informed Eisenhower that he could not expect to have any men with scores over 45 left in the theater after 1 April 1946 and therefore should screen out from among the low-score men in the pipeline as many men with less than 45 points as he could.⁴¹

Since R-day, the long-range planning tool to aid in determining the number of occupation forces had been the Occupational Troop Basis; the total number of troops to be left in Germany after the redeployment and readjustment were completed. The original Occupational Troop Basis was 404,500 troops and was to be reached a year and a half after the surrender. In May, the War Department reduced the time to only one year. In August, it reduced the number of troops to 370,000. The shipping schedule set in August

³⁹ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 328. Also, in order to determine the eligibility for a G.I. to be discharged, the Adjusted Service Rating was created. It was individually calculated for only the enlisted service members on the basis of one point for each month of service since September 1940, one point for each month of overseas service since September 1940, five points for each decoration or battle star, and 12 points for each child under 18 up to a maximum of three. The critical score for men was 85 point and for women was 44. Any service member with those point values or more were eligible for discharge.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 330.

⁴¹ Ibid., 334.

would bring USFET's (U.S. Forces European Theater) strength down to this number by the end of January 1946. The low point would be reached in the middle of the first postwar winter, when civil unrest, if it occurred at all, was to be expected in Germany and when the Army would probably still have to care for roughly a half million displaced persons and guard many thousands of war prisoners and internees.⁴²

The inability of the War department and USFET to return all of the troops with 80 points or more by October resulted in a large decrease in the level of efficiency and morale for the troops. It was reported that both Officer and Enlisted men were poorly trained in their duties and that a ready to fight balanced force of infantry, armor, air, and combat support troops no longer existed. Furthermore, the report rated the ability of the troops to conduct offensive combat operations as poor, defensive operations as slightly better, and the ability to conduct occupation duties was only satisfactory.⁴³ Contributing to the demise of troop morale and readiness was the realization that the local population they were there to “administer” was not far off from their own families. The socio-cultural environment had a disarming impact on the morale of American soldiers who found it increasingly difficult to hate people who reminded them so much of their own friends and family back home.⁴⁴ These problems caused the leadership to consider other options for the occupation. For the whole European theater, the War Department forecasted a probable strength of five divisions, with further reductions likely after July 1, 1946. In October, Marshall asked Eisenhower to consider switching to a police-type occupation similar to one being devised for Japan, in which a native Japanese police force under American supervision and backed by U.S. tactical units would take over practically the entire responsibility for security and order in the country.⁴⁵ Eisenhower

⁴² Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 334.

⁴³ Ibid., 336.

⁴⁴ Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 57-58.

⁴⁵ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 340.

accepted the idea of a police-type occupation, with some modifications, and the task was undertaken to field the U.S. Army Constabulary as the new units in charge of the occupation.

B. THE U.S. ARMY CONSTABULARY FORCE 1946-1953

1. Background

The need to establish a specific force for the occupation of the American zone in Germany trained in policing the civil population as well as controlling the tactical and combat troops still needed in country had become obvious to Eisenhower. The American zone of occupation covered more than 40,000 square miles and included nearly 1,400 miles of international and regional boundaries (to include other occupation zones). This line extended from Austria in the south to the British zone in the north, and from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone in the east to the Rhine River and French zone in the west. Further, there was a contingent of occupation troops in Trieste on the Adriatic. More than 16 million German people lived in this area as well as more than half a million displaced persons (DP).⁴⁶ The sheer volume of people coupled with the size of the zone meant that Eisenhower had to have a force that was trained to deal with the population, enforce military government directives regarding troop interactions, and allow the combat forces to remain available.

⁴⁶ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 6.




Figure 1. U.S. Zone of Occupation.⁴⁷

Despite the staff work at SHAEF and higher, when American troops first entered Germany in the fall of 1944 there were no firm guidelines concerning the troops' conduct toward the enemy population (the occupation directive, JCS 1067, was still being revised, and ECLIPSE was not published). The early interaction between American soldiers and German civilians displayed a wide spectrum of attitudes ranging from open hostility to reluctant good will and kindness. Such recalled the experience of the U.S. occupation of the Rhineland in 1919 and the fate of Aachen was crucial in this regard for the future of U.S. policy as well as Nazi dreams of resistance in the months to come.

⁴⁷ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 7.

When the rigid non-fraternization policy in JCS Directive 1067 was issued from the chain of command, in some cases it superseded local policies that allowed contact between the Americans and local population. In a short period of time the American soldiers gradually ignored the order. The directive failed in part because the soldiers did not encounter many German civilians characterized by the propaganda medium of the day, that being a fanatical society devoted to Hitler and fighting to the death. Instead the Americans generally found a defeated population devastated by the destruction of the war and rather desperate in its desire to make peace and start anew. In typical fashion American soldiers often gave food to the children and elderly they encountered. The allure of German women to soldiers far from home further challenged the non-fraternization policy. Add to this that punishment was unevenly, and then later rarely, enforced; it is little wonder that JCS 1067 was generally ignored after Germany's unconditional surrender in May and then quietly repealed in October 1945 after the practical experience of such policy led to its widespread flaunting by all concerned.⁴⁸

The fraternization issue between German civilians and American soldiers was reduced substantially as units were redeployed out of the European theater, but contact was still needed between the two to bring about law and order as well as the overall policies of the occupation. This contact was officially orchestrated and controlled by the SHAEF special staff section, the European Civil Affairs Division. This staff element trained and administered military detachments that became the military government in the zone of occupation. Detachments consisting of up to nine officers were attached to line divisions to conduct military government affairs, and each was trained to operate in a specific geographic locality. Under the provisions of JCS 1067 and ECLIPSE, the military government detachments sought out leading citizens who had resisted Nazism and appointed them to positions of leadership in the town and villages. Local elections

⁴⁸ Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 50-53.

were held as soon as possible to ratify these people or to elect other suitable candidates. The only stipulation to these free elections was to ban candidates with Nazi ties.⁴⁹

2. Establishing the Constabulary Force

Eisenhower, in October of 1945, announced the establishment of a special constabulary of 38,000 men to control the U.S. zone of occupation. The aim of the force was for an elite unit composed of the highest caliber personnel who would volunteer. They were equipped with an efficient communications network, their own light vehicles, and liaison airplanes to make it highly mobile.⁵⁰ This new organization was initially known by a series of names such as “State Police,” “State Constabulary,” and “Zone Constabulary.” The name that finally emerged was the United States Constabulary. The mission of the U.S. Constabulary was to maintain general military and civil security, assist in accomplishing the American government’s objectives, and to control the borders of the U.S. Zone of Occupation.

Furthermore, cooperating with the growing German police forces (one should note that the police had Nazified and militarized in the Third Reich, with a significant number of police having SS rank; the unraveling of same in turn had a somewhat checkered experience in terms of de-Nazification and the eradication of former SS structures and personalities), the Constabulary would constantly hunt for black marketers and former Nazi leaders and conduct general law enforcement and traffic control. All of its members would require training in urban, rural, and border security operations. The main force from which these forces were drawn came from the 4th Armored Division. In addition, the remaining seven cavalry groups in Europe were set to be incorporated into the U.S. Constabulary by Eisenhower’s announcement as referenced above. These groups were equipped with large numbers of light tanks, trucks, and jeeps and had been

⁴⁹ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 9.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

used in the war for reconnaissance. Their high mobility and firepower seemed ideal for the postwar occupation and mission envisioned of the Constabulary force.⁵¹

Formally activated on July 1, 1946, the constabulary's launch was based on the time it needed properly to train, organize, equip, and relocate the troops into the proper locations throughout the zone of occupation. The total force of available Constabulary troops at this time was 32,000. One of the biggest advantages afforded by the gap between establishment and activation of the U.S. Constabulary force was the ability to evaluate and learn from the experiences of the previous military occupiers.⁵² While the civil affairs schools upon which part of the occupation effort had been based attempted such an effort, the success in the wake of total war and rapid demobilization was a pretty modest undertaking at best.

As was stated earlier, the intent was to obtain the highest caliber personnel in the theater, but the redeployment of units out of theater made this extremely difficult. Oftentimes, delays occurred when some of the units selected for the U.S. Constabulary could not reorganize and train until released from their parent commands. Also, few units were located exactly where they were intended under the plan, and some outfits were moved four or five times within a period of a few months before they finally settled into their final patrol areas. Furthermore, barracks were in short supply as Displaced Persons occupied many of the former Wehrmacht casernes. New equipment was drawn from depots as far away as France and was mostly comprised of combat vehicles left behind by units returning to the United States for demobilization. The condition of the vehicles placed a severe test on the U.S. Constabulary, which had no maintenance elements when it was first formed. This omission in the organization was corrected within the year, but the troops had to use their skills, innovation, and local German mechanics under contract to make sure their vehicles remained operational.⁵³

⁵¹ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 10.

⁵² Ibid., 11.

⁵³ Ibid., 11-12.

The toughest obstacle that the U.S. Constabulary faced in its early years was the acquisition and training of personnel. The people and units selected for Constabulary duty were veterans, but the units were seriously limited in strength because of troop redeployments. Essentially, the turnover and turnaround of troops became the most glaring limiting factors for fielding the new force. Oftentimes, the Constabulary units would exist only on paper because in reality they were not manned anywhere near their required strength. The most damaging statistic for the early years of the force was from 1946-1947 when the U.S. Constabulary saw a 100% turnover rate within its ranks.⁵⁴ Few of these personnel were trained in their principal role of police duties, and there were no field manuals or precedents from which to teach them and it became increasingly difficult to maintain effectiveness and readiness with statistics of that nature. In postwar Germany, the American forces could ill-afford such difficulties.

To counter the poor trend depicted above, it was determined that a U.S. Constabulary school would need to be enacted that would teach both policing techniques and the doctrine that would guide their actions.⁵⁵ The curriculum was aimed especially at officers and non-commissioned officers and would instruct them in such subjects as German geography, history, and politics. Furthermore, police specific training would include the theory and practice of criminal investigation, police records, self-defense, and how to apprehend wanted persons.⁵⁶

Although the U.S. Constabulary School began to graduate classes of mission-ready troopers, changes in the redeployment rules in spring 1946, as mentioned above after the dropping of the second atomic bomb in the Pacific theater, caused the loss of 25 percent of the soldiers within a matter of a few weeks and an additional 42 percent in the following three months. Not surprising, the job of replacing and training new personnel was overwhelming, and was made worse by a critical shortage of junior officers during late summer 1946. This delayed the U.S. Constabulary in attaining the desired standards

⁵⁴ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 15.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

in discipline and operations. Particularly, units were short changed because as the final stage of training each unit participated in at least one practice search and seizure operation before becoming fully operational.⁵⁷

The dominating operation performed by the constabulary force was the patrol. In this capacity the soldiers served as an ever-present deterrent force in the eyes of the local populace. As the soldiers patrolled the streets with their light tanks and vehicles, they were able to show the locals that they meant business, knew what they were doing, and ready and willing to respond to emergencies. As the Constabulary force gained experience in analyzing crime statistics and their knowledge of the operating area and local population grew, they were able to reduce the patrols and focus on the trouble spots.⁵⁸

As the presence of the constabulary force became generally accepted by the local population and their reputation began to precede them, they were oftentimes accompanied on patrols and raids by local municipal, rural, and border police units. The Constabulary force became closely acquainted with the local policemen who often tipped off the forces and worked with them to receive updates, work to trap criminals, and prevent possible disturbances.⁵⁹ German police officers who accompanied the constabulary troops on patrols would often be the arresting officer when the suspect was a German or displaced person. If the suspect was an American, the American forces made the arrest. This policy served to add legitimacy to the constabulary force, but also added to the prestige and legitimacy of the local police forces as local law and order were trying to be re-established.⁶⁰

Another major function of the Constabulary force was the search and seizure. These raids were often conducted after authorization and/or request from the UN Relief

⁵⁷ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 16.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 18.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), local military commanders, the military government, or other agencies that had reason to suspect black market activities or activities that worked against the reconstruction process.⁶¹ The searches were usually conducted in a two step process beginning with a cordoning off of the area and then followed by a meticulous search for specific persons, groups, or black market paraphernalia. As the local German police forces gained legitimacy and experience, they began to lead and conduct the searches, still utilizing the proper authorizations as mentioned above. Over time, the number of searches and seizures performed by the Constabulary forces declined.⁶² The table below shows the number of operations, troops used, and arrests made by U.S Constabulary forces over the course a year from July 1946 to June 1947.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Operations</u>	<u>Troops Used</u>	<u>Arrests</u>
Jul 46	11	639	104
Aug 46	11	1,403	287
Sep 46	19	1,674	348
Oct 46	13	2,127	342
Nov 46	10	4,748	232
Dec 46	8	2,518	60
Jan 47	3	232	5
Feb 47	1	29	1
Mar 47	1	215	73
Apr 47	1	572	48
May 47	0	0	0
Jun 47	0	0	0
Total	78	14,157	1,500

Figure 2. Search and seizure operations statistics.⁶³

⁶¹ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 20.

⁶² Ibid., 23.

⁶³ Ibid., 24.

The third major task of the U.S. constabulary forces was border maintenance for the U.S. zone of occupation. Most of the people attempting to cross the international or inter-zonal borders were ordinary Germans who were looking for food or lost relatives. Most of them also originated from the Soviet zone. When the U.S. Constabulary apprehended illegal border crossers they were taken to the nearest Office of Military Government for questioning. They could then be prosecuted, fined and/or jailed, or simply returned to the border and sent back. But whether they simply sought family members, wanted to conduct legal or illegal business, or were fleeing communism, in the first year after the war there was little to physically dissuade them from trying to cross into the U.S. zone.⁶⁴

Despite the large number of people being turned back at the border, it was clear many were getting through. In response, the U.S. Constabulary did away with regularly scheduled foot patrols and discontinued the fixed border posts. The manpower saved by these measures was then re-allocated to establish roving checkpoints operating up to about 1,000 meters behind the border. They would randomly appear, set up and operate for 4 to 8 hours, then move on. This change proved beneficial, as Germans could not overcome the system by simply mapping out the fixed posts and scheduled foot patrols and then plan the best way to avoid them.⁶⁵

The most progress for the U.S. Constabulary forces in securing the borders of the American zone, however, was made with the development and transition of the German border police; particularly in the Hessen and Bavarian States. Initially, the Germans were given responsibility for the eastern border and then shortly thereafter were given the task for the inter-zonal borders as well. The U.S. forces continued to man eight crossing in order to maintain awareness and control Allied movements into and out of zones. German border police had no authority over the allied personnel crossing. They only had

⁶⁴ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 26.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

authority over Germans and displaced persons.⁶⁶ The increase in available manpower for the U.S. constabulary force that this generated actually marked the beginning of the end of its role as the occupation police force.

3. The End of the Constabulary Mission

The end of the U.S. Constabulary forces in Germany began with its final reorganization in 1948. One need also note that preparations soon began for the creation of the Federal Republic months later in May, 1949 whereupon the rationale for the force was vanishing. Around this time, the force was gradually shifting from police missions to tactical training and combat maneuver missions. Moreover, the assets and equipment that were assigned to the constabulary force were such that they became more aligned as a division size force comparable to the 1st infantry division. They were routinely sent out on training maneuvers and large scale combined exercises.⁶⁷ As the need for the U.S. Constabulary diminished with the recovery of West German society and the economy, the Constabulary's mission and organization changed to meet the new demands. An example of this shift in mission occurred during the Berlin Airlift in the spring of 1948 when the war scare associated with this event worked a major shift. In this case, three of the nine regiments were quickly refitted as armored cavalry regiments and given more M-8 armored cars and additional infantry heavy weapons. These now had a combat mission but were still considered part of the U.S. Constabulary. The rest of the U.S. Constabulary, however, continued its "traditional" mission, but over time even these forces shifted from police functions to training for war and were redeployed to the border areas.⁶⁸ These transitions were considered safe moves because by this time, the German police and local governments were regaining legitimacy and respect from within the population. Finally, in 1949, the majority of personnel were transferred to the Seventh Army marking the transition for the U.S. Constabulary from an occupation force to a stationed, defensive

⁶⁶ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 26.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 27.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

force. A small constabulary presence was maintained along the international borders until the U.S. Army Constabulary force structure was removed in 1952 as the West Germans established the Bundesgrenzschutz in the same year.⁶⁹

Aside from the policing services they provided, the most glaring positive influence that the Constabulary force had on German postwar stability was the respect it gleaned from the German population. They were often referred to as Blitzpolizei, or Lightning Police, because of their unit insignia as well as the ability for them to appear everywhere at once and operate in an extremely professional manner.⁷⁰ They were able to bridge the gap between the defeated population and the American occupiers and ensure that the interests of the American military government and by extension the interests of the United States could be furthered. The need for a Constabulary force at all in the postwar period speaks volumes to the conditions in the American zone of Germany at the time and the need for Americans to balance those conditions against the growing tide of international and domestic pressure that would soon dominate American foreign policy.

C. THE KOREAN WAR INFLUENCE 1950-1953

1. Background

In order to effectively set the tone for the influence that the Korean War had on U.S. interests in Germany and the U.S. force posture there, it is important to reflect on events and exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States leading up to the beginning of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State James Francis Byrnes gave his famous “Speech of Hope” in Stuttgart, Germany. In his speech, Byrnes repudiated the proposal for the reconstruction of Germany using the Morgenthau plan and instead gave the Germans hope for prosperity and a return to the international scene. Most importantly, however, in the speech Byrnes undoubtedly committed American forces to Europe for as long as any of the other occupying powers

⁶⁹ Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, vigilance, and justice: the U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1952* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 27.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

remained in Germany.⁷¹ Later, Byrnes would refine the core of what his message implied when he stated to a delegation of U.S. Senators in Paris, “The nub of our program was to win the German people . . . it was a battle between us and Russia over minds. . . .”⁷² His comments reflect the United States’ growing interest in stopping the influence of communism on the defeated German population. These comments are instrumental in defining the beginning of a Cold War that would last until the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.⁷³

John Gimbel has implied that American interests post World War II were to frustrate socialism, forestall communism, spare American taxpayers’ money, counteract French plans to dismember Germany, and to contain the Soviet Union in Central Europe.⁷⁴ When one combines the comments of Byrnes in his “Speech of Hope” and the analysis of Gimbel, the tone for American foreign policy and interests begins to take shape. It also allows a beginning context to be able to understand why the Korean War helped shape U.S. military forces in Germany during this time period.

2. The Rising Communist Threat and the Marshall Plan

In 1947 the relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union were beginning to reach an obvious impasse. The differences that began to play out provided further reason for the American presence to remain in Germany; at least in the near term. The role of the American troops began to take on a hearts and minds campaign to win over allies and ensure that defeated Germany was buttressed against the growing threat of

⁷¹ See Biography of James F. Byrnes <http://www.daz.org/enJamesFByrnes.html> (accessed February 2008).

⁷² Comments taken from: <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/docs/ga1-020305.htm> (accessed February 2008).

⁷³ The actual beginning of the Cold War is a topic that is much debated. Some scholars believe it can be traced back to World War I while others offer that the ends of World War II or the Korean War are the true beginnings of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the period being evaluated here has played a significant role.

⁷⁴ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), xiii.

communism.⁷⁵ Furthermore, by this time it became apparent that the U.S. was not going to return to the traditional role it had played after World War I of isolating itself from the political and military affairs of the devastated European continent.⁷⁶

On May 2, 1947, General Clay summarized his personal warnings of German financial difficulties to Secretary of State George C. Marshall and told him that Germany had lost her foreign balances, assets, and gold reserves. Moreover, foreign loans and grants were not forthcoming because Germany was a poor credit risk. Germany needed money and foreign exchange to buy raw materials to produce exports and foreign trade to produce foreign credits. Without credits Germany could not become self-sustaining.⁷⁷ These types of concerns painted a picture of Germany that many feared would be ripe for communist influence. The U.S. and its allies had to act in order to stave off and contain the Soviets. John Foster Dulles, who at the time was a U.S. delegate to the United Nations, referenced Marshall's sentiments in a memorandum whereby he espoused the dangers of both an independent Germany in political and social disarray on the one hand and a Soviet controlled Germany on the other.⁷⁸

Earlier in the year, as the struggle to rebuild the economy of the European allies began to stall, it became more and more obvious to officials such as Clay and Marshall that the rebuilding of Europe could not be successful without the industrial base that Germany had provided in the past. Marshall stated that "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate" and instructed the Office of the Military Government from Germany to increase the pressure to make Germany self-sufficient, develop a new level of industry plan, and revise the reparations list.⁷⁹ There were those on the continent, such as France,

⁷⁵ David Haglund, "American Troops in Germany: the evolving context," in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 140.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 149.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 122.

⁷⁹ Greg Behrman, *The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2007), 5.

that remained adamant about denying Germany any industrial production, and the Soviets were beginning to claim that territories under their occupation—or that of Poland—were not available for resource. This prompted the U.S. to take action to supply the western zones of Berlin with 200,000 tons of food per month.⁸⁰ The impacts of Marshall's instructions were compounded and impeded by the Soviet blockade of Berlin.

The situation in Germany, and the rest of Europe for that matter, became dire. After the war, most Europeans had felt that capitalism had produced high levels of unemployment through the 1930's and had fueled the rise of Fascism. At the same time, the rhetoric coming from the east in the Soviet Union glorified the successes of Communism. The appeal took on a greater aura of progress and momentum for the war ravaged economies when combined with the Soviet Union's seemingly positive role in the war and the resistance.⁸¹ Again, the threat of the expanding influence of communism was highlighted by these sentiments. If the U.S., and its increasing tensions with the Soviets, was going to contain communism and ensure that Western Europe was rebuilt under democratic principles it had to make sure that Europeans would not starve. As General Clay has famously quipped from Germany, "There is no choice between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000."⁸²

George C. Marshall's aid program to jump start the recovery in Europe, officially designated JCS directive 1779, was instrumental in defining the early days of the Cold War. It can easily be seen as a tool that was used to ensure the east-west divide tipped in favor of the United States as much as possible. Although European states were still pursuing their own interests, the division of aid promoted a spirit of European cooperation and tied Europe's recovery plans together and it was the United States that had come to the rescue.⁸³ Across the divide, Stalin and the communists saw the Marshall

⁸⁰ Greg Behrman, *The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2007), 12-13.

⁸¹ Ibid., 28.

⁸² Ibid., 29.

⁸³ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and Military 1945-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 216.

Plan as an American plan to dictate and control European affairs. The rhetoric and tensions between the two blocs were coming to a head.

As the Army continued to help rebuild West Germany, Truman faced the harsh reality of Soviet designs in Europe and elsewhere in the world. George Kennan's "long telegram" of February 1946 forced the U.S. leaders to confront their failure to provide a national strategy and a defined national interest. Just over a year later, on 12 March 1947, the Truman Doctrine was born with the proclamation by the President that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."⁸⁴ This statement essentially became the guiding principle for U.S. grand strategy and this ideal, combined with the determination of the Truman administration not to bankrupt the country with unnecessary defense spending, drove U.S. decision makers with respect to force posturing decision during this time. It also was very pointedly directed at the Soviet Union and promoted containment. Truman, a fiscal conservative, was steadily reducing the financial resources available to defense in line with his fear that another depression would soon eventuate and because such was the tradition in the U.S. since the 18th century. Defense expenditures declined from \$81.6 billion in 1945 to \$44.7 in 1946, to \$13.1 billion for 1947.⁸⁵ Faith in the Air Force and America's nuclear monopoly allowed the makers of U.S. policy to believe that the nuclear monopoly would deter war.

3. Opening the Door to the West?

The invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 changed American and European strategic thinking which had been evolving towards a more forward policy in the wake of the creation of NATO, but was based on the assumption that no war loomed in the immediate future. Containment as a national policy faced domestic and international hurdles, and Truman sensed this months prior to the invasion of the South by the North Koreans. In response to the Soviet Union's explosion of a nuclear device in 1949, the

⁸⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 22.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

victory in China by the communists led by Mao Tse-tung, and rising tide of anti-communist sentiment in the opposition in Congress, Truman directed the Secretaries of Defense and State to reexamine United States objectives and plans on 30 January 1950. The resulting document, NSC-68, was a turning point in how the United States would wage the Cold War.⁸⁶ When NSC-68 arrived on Truman's desk in June 1950, it recommended large increases in defense spending to build up the American military and allies in order (with the creation of NATO) to balance the Soviet Union's growing world power and ambitions. The adoption of the containment strategy of NSC-68 ultimately established the framework for U.S. security policy throughout most of the Cold War era. The strategy came about not through a single event, but by a collaborative process involving interagency coordination much like that which serves the country today. Moreover, it is worth noting that while the basic strategic guidelines of NSC-68, the use of containment for the purpose of achieving a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend the U.S. if the free world is attacked, remained in place throughout the Cold War. The implementation of that strategy also went through several versions over time, adapting to both changing domestic priorities and the evolution of the international strategic environment.⁸⁷

The North Korean invasion of South Korea shocked the West that the Soviet side seemed willing to engage not only the South Koreans and Americans, but the global community as a whole.⁸⁸ The momentum and swiftness with which the attack was undertaken served notice to the Americans and western Europeans. Fearing that the Korea situation was the beginning of a larger invasion and struggle in a divided Germany and the rest of Western Europe, the United States and its newly formed North Atlantic Treaty allies quickly moved to reinforce their position. Most important in this context, the Western allies began to apply the ideas of the NSC 68 towards a conventional build

⁸⁶ Doris M. Condit, *The Test of War, 1950-1953. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume II* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), 5-6.

⁸⁷ S. Nelson Drew, "The Legacy of NSC-68" in *NCS-68: Forging the Strategies of Containment*, S. Nelson Drew ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 5-6.

⁸⁸ South Korea had its national army as well as a residual American presence from the Pacific campaign. However shortly after hostilities started the UNSC passed a resolution and sent troops to assist.

up and raise the combat power of western armies. The possibility of arming the FRG was present in the tumult of the moment, a circumstance that went against U.S. policy and which collided with French interests.⁸⁹

The U.S. subsequently tripled its troop strength in Germany, sending between May and December 1951 an additional four divisions to bolster the two that were already doing occupation duty.⁹⁰ This policy was put in hand in the wake of the announcement of the European defense community and the decision to raise German troops for this entity.⁹¹ This sharp increase in U.S. forces in Germany was a direct result of the Korean War and the need to hold Western Europe as well as hold the FRG and mollify the French. The role that the U.S. military was playing in Germany definitely shifted from an occupation type force to a defensive posture able to defend the territory as far east as possible, though this capacity was not a given at first. It was because of this highly visible and external event that scholars such as Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler hold the opinion that the fundamental aim of the German-American alliance after World War II was the containment of Soviet power without resorting to force, and to maintain that purpose unfailingly for as long as necessary.⁹² Thus, the need to balance the new international pressure brought about by the Korean War and the need to allay European fears of a rearmed FRG put an end for once and all the idea of FDR that U.S. troops in the 1940s would soon follow the ghosts of the Koblenz garrison of 1922 in a homeward progress.

D. CONCLUSION

The time period of 1945-1955 saw American military presence in Germany rise, fall, and rise again. The events that led up to and dictated such drastic swings can be

⁸⁹ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 47.

⁹⁰ David Haglund, "American Troops in Germany: the evolving context," in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 141.

⁹¹ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 47.

⁹² Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler, *From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992), 16.

attributed to the international and domestic pressures following the end of the war as well and the infighting that took place within the administration, to say nothing of the conditions within West Germany, particularly the American zone, all of which took their toll as policy makers worked to balance out these forces. The end of the Second World War, while celebrated by the allies, also ushered in a new role and set of responsibilities. For the U.S., the defined interests and goals on the continent were abruptly shifted from a combat to occupation force. The transition, both at the federal government level and the military level, were not without their difficulties. The army had to retrain its forces while in the middle of a huge demobilization and redeployment. The new constabulary force that was created had the daunting task of policing both the defeated Germans and the occupying Americans. Moreover, the established American military government of Germany was pressed to rebuild the German economy while trying to follow a directive (JCS 1067) that most definitely did not favor such a task.

As was spelled out earlier, the U.S., before the end of combat operations, was anticipating a stay on the European continent that would last no more than two years. The conferences of allied statesmen at Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945) had set democratization of Germany as one goal of the occupation and it was the assumption that together the allies would work to accomplish that goal. Democracy, however, embodied different values for each of the powers as the realist notions of international order began to play out. Political infighting within the U.S. cabinet added to the internal dilemma as the U.S. refused to fall back to its isolationist past. The exact role that the U.S. military was to play in the reconstruction of Germany was hard pressed to be defined despite attempts to do so and further added to the internal causes for the swing in the number of troops. The case made in the previous sections outlined the difficulties the Americans had with reconciling the desired from the realistic. The internal policy goals sought by the administration and the events that were witnessed by the leadership in the military government of Germany, most notably General Lucius Clay, were rarely squared.

The lack of adequate personnel, equipment, training, and guidance all plagued the American forces, including the constabulary force, during the occupation. However, the

role that emerged for the Americans helped rebuild and stabilize not only Germany, but Western Europe as well. As the German economy slowly began to recover and local and state governments were re-established, the role and presence of the American military forces were scaled back and drawn down. It took the external events of the Korean War to usher in a new era of uncertainty and tension and cause the U.S. to roughly triple the amount of forces in Germany under defensive instead of occupation auspices.

1945	2,613,000
1946	278,042
1947	103,749
1948	91,535
1949	82,492
1950	79,495
1951	121,566
1952	256,557
1953	243,842
1954	352,644
1955	356,787

Figure 3. Total Number of Assigned Military Personnel in Europe by Year.⁹³

During the time period covered in this chapter, the role and force posture of the U.S. military were definitely driven by the changing American vital interests on the continent. The initial number of forces and their role were governed by the interests defined under operations OVERLORD and ECLIPSE. Following the transition, humanitarian and economic stability and rehabilitation dictated the force structure and role that the American G.I.s played in Germany. Finally, the rising tensions with the Soviet Union and the Korean War caused U.S. foreign policy goals to shift to containment of communism. Germany became the gate that needed to be buttressed

⁹³ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 44.

against the Soviet threat in order to protect American interests in Europe. The balancing act required to answer international and domestic pressures as tensions rose as well as the political infighting and deplorable conditions in postwar West Germany ensured that American military forces would remain. The Cold War with the Soviet Union, however, was just beginning to “heat” up.

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III. THE U.S. MILITARY IN GERMANY 1955-1990

A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

1. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged from the first crises of the Cold War and has endured into the present. However, its history in the years until 1990 has great merit and importance for the theme at hand. Created out of the need for collective defense to counter the rising Soviet threat and the spread of communism, NATO saw the end of its Soviet opponent, but the security building and roles and missions of a U.S.-European alliance have endured and led to the enlargement of NATO. Nowhere has this process been more visible than in the FRG from 1955 until 1990.

As post-World War II negotiations were conducted, statesmen and policymakers in Great Britain and the United States sensed a growing rift between their objectives and those of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, numerous governments of eastern European countries were falling to Communism. The political leaders of western European nations, ravaged by the war, were concerned that they might also succumb to this expanding influence, and were relatively helpless to prevent it. United States policymakers were also concerned, and steps were taken on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to ensure that democracy was maintained in Western Europe. Ultimately, NATO was created to ensure their collective defense against the threat they perceived.

Following the end of the Second World War U.S. troop demobilization and redeployment became an issue of importance almost immediately. Although plans were in place to ensure that the occupation zone was manned, those soldiers that were not a part of the U.S. Army Constabulary force were earmarked for redeployment.⁹⁴ This point was discussed in the previous chapter. The emergence of NATO in April 1949 solidified

⁹⁴ Kenneth McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany" in *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 65, No. 3 (July 2001) 724.

the U.S. commitment to maintaining a combat presence on the continent and further tied the United States to the security and defense of its European allies.

As the Cold War was ushered in and the U.S. involvement on the Korean peninsula began to take shape, the number of U.S. troops on the European continent, and especially in Germany, was tripled from roughly 82,000 to 256,000 at the peak of the Korean War.⁹⁵ The basis for this increase, as mentioned previously, was the belief that the communist invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops was the opening door to a new campaign in Europe by the champions of Communism: the Soviets.⁹⁶ The events of the Cold War ensured the maintenance of U.S. forward presence until the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991. Soon thereafter, policies and force postures were re-evaluated as congressmen and other governmental officials reveled in the U.S. Cold War “victory.” Furthermore, many international relations scholars began articulating theories that would either support the termination of NATO and the redeployment of U.S. military forces or provide justifications for the relevance and continuation of the organization and the American commitments that accompany it.

This chapter will examine the role that NATO commitments have had in posturing U.S. forces in Germany with particular attention to the time period from 1955 to 1990. The aim of the chapter is to identify the link between the military requirements that NATO commitments entail for the U.S. and the defining of national interest by the United States. This goal will be accomplished by examining the internal and external influences that affected the U.S. forces throughout the time period.

Understanding the way alliance requirements shape the overseas force posture of the United States is an important consideration for U.S. political and military leaders. The disposition, flexibility, and operability of U.S. forces in the past and present must constantly be weighed against a shrinking defense budget, the current (i.e. 2008) war posture, and likely future conflicts. As Steven Muller has pointed out, “The U.S. has

⁹⁵ See chart in previous chapter for the number of troops in Europe during this period.

⁹⁶ David Haglund, “American Troops in Germany: the evolving context,” in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 141.

been a de facto participant in European affairs by virtue of its dominant role with respect to western European security.”⁹⁷ There are a variety of reasons that the U.S. is so inextricably linked to the security and stability of the European continent. The fact of the matter remains that common values between the Atlantic democracies as well as the shared experience of the 20th century have created a political and cultural bond between the United States and its western European allies. Moreover, as long as the U.S. remains the world’s democratic military superpower, it will be called upon to continue as the most significant contributor to the standing NATO forces that serve in the organization’s growing sphere of influence. Understanding this particular history and trends that have shaped the U.S. force posture will become a vital task as the U.S. looks towards the future and contemplates its force structure in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan. Herein lays the significance of evaluating NATO through this lens.

The most common scholarly evaluations on the subject at hand, again, tend to have lines of cleavage around international relations theory. Most notably, as mentioned earlier, there are those that sit in the realism camp and those that sit in the institutionalism camp. Helga Haftendorn, a leading German international relations scholar, has opined that “the purpose and function of American troops in Germany has historically been 1) guardian of the German question, 2) guarantors of security of a divided Germany and 3) counterweights to opposing military blocs.”⁹⁸ Realists would argue that the creation of NATO served these purposes and guaranteed the security of U.S. interests and that, since the need to accomplish these three tasks no longer remains, NATO is no longer significant in the year 2008. Conversely, those in the institutionalism camp would argue for the continued relevance of NATO and offer as evidence the transparency that accompanies such institutions as a dominating trait of security and stability. Again, it is hoped that this study will establish the links between these NATO commitments and the

⁹⁷ Steven Muller, *From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and a United Germany in a Changing World Order*, eds. Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992), 19.

⁹⁸ Helga Haftendorn in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 19.

decisions that have influenced the U.S. military force posture in the Federal Republic of Germany in the decisive period from the Korean War until the first Gulf War.

2. Background

When Germany and the U.S. have had strong ties, Europe has remained stable. When they have not, there has been war. –General (ret.) William Odom⁹⁹

One of the most prominent features of the Cold War was the institutionalized alliance military arrangements that became an institution of enduring importance. That is, the concentration of sizable opposing military forces where the two blocs met in a divided Germany which would become the most important prize in a geopolitical struggle.¹⁰⁰ In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed and can be seen as the major milestone in the establishment of a western security system. Although the genesis of NATO predates the time period of this chapter, it is necessary to offer sufficient background in order to place the role that NATO has had in shaping U.S. forces and defining U.S. interests in Germany as well as the European continent into context.

On March 4, 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to discuss a treaty of mutual assistance. On that same day, the French Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bidault sent a message to Secretary of State Marshall: “The moment has come to strengthen on the political level and, as soon as possible, on the military level, the collaboration of the old and of the new world, both so closely united in their attachment to the only civilization which counts.”¹⁰¹ Bidault declared that France, with Great Britain, was determined to do everything in its power to organize the common defense of the democratic countries of Europe. He expressed gratitude for the economic assistance given by the United States

⁹⁹ David Haglund, “American Troops in Germany: the evolving context,” in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 159.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰¹ Background information obtained from official NATO website <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> (accessed February 2008).

but stressed, as Mr. Bevin had done in previous messages, that the resolve of the European countries to resist aggression could be effective only with American help. He proposed political consultations and the examination of technical problems “concerned with common defense against a peril which can be immediate.”¹⁰² These sentiments and statements reflect the growing desire of the western European countries to take greater responsibility for their collective defense and security. Although thankful for the assistance and aid that the U.S. had provided, it was their express desire to pursue European led security and defense.

On April 11, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall and Under-Secretary Robert M. Lovett began preliminary talks with Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the security problems of the North Atlantic area. On April 28, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty system, was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. It was welcomed a week later in Westminster by Mr. Bevin. At about the same time, Senator Vandenberg prepared, in consultation with the State Department, a resolution which recommended in part:

The association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security, and the United States... contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.¹⁰³

These actions set the foundation for the U.S. entry into an Atlantic alliance and the formation of NATO. The wording also served as the lynch pin that furthered ties between the U.S. and the European continent through mutual aid and items that affect its own national security.

¹⁰² Background information obtained from official NATO website
<http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> (accessed February 2008).

¹⁰³Ibid.

When NATO was formed, West Germany was of course not invited in as a member. West Germany had not yet achieved full sovereignty and the question regarding its re-armament was far from settled.¹⁰⁴ Regardless of the exclusion of West Germany as a partner country, it was clear that the eastern line of defense for the new organization was the Elbe River not the Rhine River and therefore West Germany would fall within the protection zone. Early disagreement by the members regarding the armament of FRG in the NATO context, particularly between France and the United States, was answered by explicit commitments on the part of the Americans and British in the form of troop commitments and upper level leadership (i.e. SACEUR). The Europeans readily accepted the expanded role of the Americans into European affairs. They viewed U.S. troops and leadership vital prerequisites for the success of NATO.¹⁰⁵

On September 19, 1950, the foreign ministers came to an agreement of seven major points regarding the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany): 1) the three occupying powers – the U.S., Britain, and France – agreed that they would increase and reinforce their forces in Germany to include West Berlin; 2) the three occupying powers would treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin as an attack upon themselves; 3) the three governments authorized West Germany to form mobile police formations (which was a big step for France as they feared any German national army) based upon the state system but they would be subject to mobilization by the Federal government in emergencies; 4) the occupying powers agreed to terminate the state of war between themselves and Germany; 5) they agreed to amend the occupation statute; 6) they agreed to enable the Federal Republic to conduct its own diplomatic relations, but would be limited to posts approved by the Allied High Commissioners; and 7) there would be a reduction in the number of internal controls within Germany.¹⁰⁶

Immediately, the prospect of U.S. reinforcements also went with secret discussion on a future West German contribution to Atlantic Defense. The biggest obstacle for the

¹⁰⁴ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 39.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

troop increase in Europe was the U.S. Congress who controlled the funding for such an endeavor and was concerned about U.S. fortunes in the UN operation in Korea. In the end, despite much debate that largely centered on conservative Republican holdouts, Congress passed the troop authorization. The reasons that congress passed the authorization offers a unique insight into what the interests of the United States were at the time. Daniel J. Nelson, in his book *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany*, summarizes eight reasons for the authorization. Six of them are what he calls explicit and two are implicit. The eight reasons are: 1) the reassurance to Europe that, despite U.S. involvement in Korea, U.S. ties with Europe remained paramount; 2) the increased deterrent to Soviet adventures in Europe which U.S. troops would represent in the period following the loss of the American nuclear monopoly; 3) the assurance that if Soviet aggression had to be countered, the battle would not take place on American soil but in Europe with U.S. troops; 4) only the U.S. could provide the requisite military strength and leadership to insure the success of NATO; 5) U.S. troops would serve to bolster European morale and determination in the face of a Soviet challenge; 6) U.S. occupation forces in Germany were too few and ill-equipped to counter a Russian attack and needed reinforcements; 7) U.S troops would allay French fears of an armed West Germany; and 8) U.S troops would provide security for West Germany and Europe while the military integration process in NATO took place.¹⁰⁷

The reasons for authorization mentioned above seemingly point to the U.S. interest in containment. During this period of time, the idea of containment is most often associated with the containment of Soviet Communism. Further analysis, however, offers a second type of containment that was achieved by the large presence of American troops in Germany during this time period. David Haglund points out that a major purpose for the U.S. military presence in Germany is the containment of Germany. German containment, however, differed from Soviet communist containment. Germany sought to contain itself. The U.S. ability to provide security and stability led to a German

¹⁰⁷ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 44.

focus on internal rebuilding. The New Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, willingly and explicitly aligned West Germany under the western system and the United States. By doing so, he was able to ensure the protection of the state while at the same time containing the requirements that would have been leveled against a member country of NATO. Moreover, this allowed West Germany to direct its efforts on strengthening the internal structures of the new state such as the economy, rule of law, and other government mechanisms. Furthermore, Haglund points out that it is unlikely that absent a U.S. military presence at the end of World War II, Germany would have chosen the path of self containment.¹⁰⁸

In a series of meetings in London and Paris in 1954, the representatives of the NATO countries formally drafted the treaties that ended the occupation regime and integrated West Germany into the western alliance structure along the lines of the September 1950 talks mentioned above. West Germany was accorded the rights and duties of a fully sovereign state, subject only to allied reservations concerning Berlin and the reunification of Germany. Less than a year later, on May 5, 1955, the London and Paris Agreements became legally activated and West German sovereignty became a fact. Furthermore, as a full member of the WEU it was also an associate member of NATO.¹⁰⁹ The decision to increase the U.S. military presence in Germany was seen by Americans as stabilizing for both allied and American security, by the Germans as a sign of German-American solidarity and cooperation, and by the French as a necessary restraint on German re-armament.¹¹⁰ Regardless, the decision was viewed by all as proof of a long term American commitment to Europe.¹¹¹ NATO influence will play a major part in the continued evaluation of U.S. interests and force posture throughout the rest of the chapter.

¹⁰⁸ David Haglund, "American Troops in Germany: the evolving context," in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 138.

¹⁰⁹ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 53.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

B. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE BERLIN WALL

A common theme regarding military strategy and decisions with reference to U.S. forces in Germany during this time period is that they were heavily influenced by the use of nuclear weapons.¹¹² The President of the United States, Dwight Eisenhower, sought to contain and control the Soviet question by favoring nuclear weapons as a means to cut defense spending and rationalize commitments. The London and Paris agreements of 1955 stipulated that the Federal Republic of Germany would not build or acquire nuclear weapons for its new armed forces. This did not mean, however, that nuclear defense was not an option. In 1955, the first tactical nuclear weapons were deployed to Germany under the command of U.S. leadership at Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR).

The Eisenhower administration favored what became known as the New Look or massive retaliation. This strategy, by default of America's position of leadership and control of nuclear release, also became the primary strategy of NATO. Massive retaliation was a deterrent strategy that assumed West Germany along with the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces made western defense impossible without strong nuclear forces as a backdrop for conventional forces.¹¹³ Massive retaliation involved the use of tactical weapons by conventional forces as well as the use of a strategic nuclear deterrent.

In the case of Europe, and specifically West Germany, it meant placing conventional forces (trip wire) as near to the East German border as possible to repel an attack. In the event that the forward conventional forces began to fall, tactical nuclear weapons would then be employed, and if a major loss was anticipated, the larger strategic deterrent was then brought to bear.¹¹⁴ Massive retaliation contained inherent flaws in its execution which became evident in the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 and in the Cuban Missile Crisis as well. The Kennedy administration in turn adopted the strategy of flexible response which meant a re-look at stationed forces to raise the nuclear threshold.

¹¹² Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 65.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 67-68.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 68.

This strategy required large numbers of conventional troops because escalation to either nuclear level (tactical or strategic) required Soviet escalation first or an attack on Europe that overwhelmed NATO's forces.¹¹⁵ One can see, from the strategy that the U.S. employed during this period of the Cold War, that large numbers of U.S. troops, under both an American flag and a NATO flag, were an integral part to United States security strategy especially in the crisis associated with Berlin. Moreover, conventional troop concentrations for European forward defense were required irrespective of whether it was massive retaliation or flexible response doctrine.

The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 sparked an increase in the number of troops in Germany during this time period, if only for a short while. In 1958, the Soviets announced a new settlement proposal for the Berlin question. In it, they accused the western powers of violating the Potsdam agreements. They held the position that Berlin should be administered as a free city complete with demilitarization on both sides. In effect, they pushed for the "free city" of Berlin to become aligned with the territory in which it was situated: the Soviet zone. The Soviet proposal, however, was regarded as an ultimatum particularly when they threatened to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and give the Soviet backed puppet government of the East authority over the access and control points into West Berlin.¹¹⁶ Soviet logic saw this situation as leverage that would require the western allies to negotiate access rights to West Berlin.¹¹⁷

The U.S. responded with a quick and harshly toned reply. They refuted the Soviet legal claim and asserted that their rights in Berlin were derived not from Potsdam Agreements, but from the defeat of Germany and the division that was approved at Yalta. The Americans further reiterated their commitment to West Berlin with warnings that they would not surrender their rights to a threat of force.¹¹⁸ The Soviets replied in turn with a message that was considerably less inflammatory, however, they still asserted their

¹¹⁵ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 69. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 63.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

legal argument.¹¹⁹ The impasses that ensued came to a head on August 13, 1961, when the Soviets halted all traffic between East and West Berlin, all checkpoints were sealed, and the construction of the Berlin Wall began.

The Soviets gave the East Germans the go ahead to stop the mass exodus of some of its most talented individuals to the West. From 1949 to early 1961 (the construction of the Berlin Wall) there was an annual average of 230,000 refugees that crossed over to West Berlin.¹²⁰ The Berlin Wall put an end to this. Of note to this study, however, is the U.S. response to the situation. The allied forces in West Berlin were heavily reinforced for a short time and limited changes were made to the U.S. ground posture in Europe.

William P. Mako offers a description of the changes that the U.S. put in place in response to the Berlin crisis. The changes are as follows:

About 42,000 troops were sent to Europe, mostly to provide the U.S. Army in Europe with the combat and support units necessary for sustained conventional operations that had been lacking since the Army's 1956 reorganization for nuclear combat. Three infantry divisions in West Germany were mechanized and additional heavy divisions in the United States were activated, so that the ratio of heavy to light divisions in the ground forces was substantially increased....To facilitate the deployment of U.S. based heavy formations, the equipment for two divisions was also prepositioned in Europe.¹²¹

The U.S. response, though militarily practical, was an enormous disappointment to the West Germans. Even though tanks were brought to the "frontline" and the White House issued strong statements in opposition to the Soviet actions in Berlin, no actions

¹¹⁹ The two leaders, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, met in Geneva in May and at Camp David in September. Although the issue of Berlin was discussed, no agreement was reached and only the ultimatums were repealed. They set a new summit meeting for May 1960 in Paris to discuss the issue further. The Paris summit was interrupted, however, when the U-2 aircraft flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet Territory. At that point Khrushchev decided he would wait until the next American president to continue negotiations on Berlin. President Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The two leaders, amid rising tensions, conducted an emotionally charged and confrontational campaign in the international press.

¹²⁰ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 64.

¹²¹ William P. Mako, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 1983.), pp. 17-18. See also, Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 64.

were taken to actually stop the Russians.¹²² The reinforcement of American forces in Berlin, which resulted from the Berlin crisis, did not last very long. In fact, the troop increase was followed by a decrease in 1963-1964.¹²³

Between 1966 and 1968 there was a major decrease in troop strength because of the Vietnam War. This occurred at the same time that U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield, who had always opposed a large garrison of U.S. troops in Europe, introduced a resolution to reduce drastically U.S. troop strength in Europe in the wake of the French withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO. The reasons he cited most often, besides the issue of unbalanced burden sharing, were reduction in hostility between East and West and increases in reinforcement capability in case of crisis. Mansfield used the rhetoric primarily as a scare tactic to force greater offset payments by the West Germans.¹²⁴ He actively campaigned for a limited withdrawal as a minimum and his efforts paid off when the Germans offered more offset payments and the Department of Defense enacted a troop reduction of 35,000 in 1967-1968 which also surely was connected with the Vietnam War.¹²⁵

U.S. military strength in Europe as a whole, and West Germany more specifically, was much like the time period from the previous chapter. It tended to rise and fall in a cyclical fashion. The interests of the United States in terms of national security were directly tied to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments that engulfed the early parts of the Cold War. The nuclear umbrella that Western Europe sat under consisted of two parts. The first is the nuclear protection of the United States. The second is the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union. The time frame 1955-1970 was a period guided by a series of premises basically surrounding the struggle between two hard line

¹²² Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 64.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 83.

systems on a global scale and Europe was caught in the middle.¹²⁶ Although technology advancements had diminished the need for a large network of European base, the B47 was augmented by the B52 and ICBMs, geopolitical implications still persisted.¹²⁷ U.S. interest in stopping the spread of communism while at the same time ensuring that if a confrontation took place it did not take place on the American continent was obviously self serving and it served as the basis for national security decision making and U.S. force posturing in Europe. The Number of U.S. troops in Germany from the time period 1955-1968 can be seen in the figure below.

1955	261,000
1956	262,000
1957	250,000
1958	235,000
1959	240,000
1960	237,000
1961	242,000
1962	280,000
1963	265,000
1964	263,000
1965	262,000
1966	237,000
1967	N/A
1968	210,000

Figure 4. Approximate U.S. Military Strength in Germany, 1955-1968.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas H. Moorer, "U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems on Projecting American Military Power Abroad" in *The Washington Papers Volume V. #47* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Press, 1977), 5.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 6.

¹²⁸ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 82.

C. THE VIETMAN WAR INFLUENCE

The Seventh Army in Europe was destroyed by the demand for personnel in Vietnam. Whole battalions of the Seventh Army were left with one first lieutenant, a captain or a major and eighteen to twenty lieutenants in command...The result was total chaos in morale, discipline, and readiness.¹²⁹ –General Davidson

In 1967, the U.S. began to redeploy forces to the United States in order to placate the need to bolster and backfill gaps caused by the Vietnam War.¹³⁰ During this time period, Congress fully supported a compromised solution to burden sharing issues, reached within the Johnson administration as a result of offset difficulties in Germany created by the Vietnam War, that reduced permanently the level of forces based in that country. The Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara argued at the time for a 75,000 man troop reduction. This was met with opposition by both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The compromised figure of 35,000 was finally reached which in effect returned two-thirds of a division from Germany to bases in the United States.¹³¹

The loss of such a large amount of forces in Germany had obvious impacts on the West German and NATO perceptions of American security guarantees. The U.S. government, in an attempt to offer justification for its actions and to dispel fears of a massive withdrawal, proposed a new military strategy referred to as dual basing.¹³²

1. Dual Basing and Total Force Policy

Dual basing was not an entirely new concept for the U.S. military in the sense that its deterrent capability relied on large scale reinforcements from the United States in the event the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries attacked Western Europe. The new aspect, in this case, was that specific units would be based in the U.S but remains under the

¹²⁹ General Davidson as quoted in Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 107.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 89.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

command of U.S. Army, Europe and deploy to Germany under a rotational basis for large scale exercises. They would also be available for rapid deployment in case of hostilities.¹³³ According to Daniel J. Nelson, the decision to move towards a dual basing strategy marked the beginning of a “period of attrition in the combat strength level of the U.S. forces in Germany which lasted until well into the 1970’s.”¹³⁴

Beginning in 1969, President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger initiated what became known as the “Total Force” policy as a result of the progressive development of U.S.-Soviet détente. Coupled with détente was the administrations official policy for the contraction of the Vietnam War. Together these two circumstances helped to redefine American policy (interest) toward NATO in general and Germany in particular.¹³⁵ Essentially the Total Force policy acknowledged that the lower force levels in Europe over the course of the previous three years had become the permanent force level. For this reason, an attack by the Warsaw Pact on NATO would only require the active onsite forces of NATO to hold the line for a short period of time. This increased the dependence on rapid reinforcement from the United States in order to sustain combat past the first few days.¹³⁶ The Vietnam War’s influence on this policy is evident as distaste for the draft and the war made the military’s shift to an all volunteer force all but inevitable.

2. Beginning of the All Volunteer Force

The transition from the conscription forces of World War II to the all volunteer force offers a momentous change in the character and structure of U.S. forces in Germany.¹³⁷ Although the transition was not fully completed until 1973 as the Vietnam War was coming to an end, it became the backbone for new strategic doctrine and force

¹³³ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 89-90.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 90.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 91.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 92.

posturing requirements. The Nixon administration shifted from a two and a half war strategy to a one and a half war strategy. This meant that the U.S. had to be capably manned to fight one conventional war and still be manned and equipped to fight a lesser contingency elsewhere such as a third world country.¹³⁸ The Vietnam War reduced the desire to engage in a conventional land war in Asia, and Nixon's rapprochement with China reduced the perception that it was a threat to American interests in the region.¹³⁹ The lone, large scale threat of a Soviet attack into Western Europe again became the cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy and the implied "one" in the one and half war doctrine. These concerns and reactions forced Europe and Germany in particular, directly to the center of U.S. interest as the Vietnam War drew to a close.¹⁴⁰

1966	366,000
1967	337,000
1968	316,000
1969	300,000
1970	296,000
1971	314,000
1972	300,000
1973	313,000

Figure 5. U.S. Military Personnel in Europe, 1966-1973.¹⁴¹

The figure above depicts a very revealing nature to the changing military posture in Germany during the Vietnam War. The numbers reflect total forces in Europe, but the largest area of military concentration is in Germany so these numbers are indicative of a German trend as well. First off, the initial decrease of 1967 can be attributed to the

¹³⁸ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 96.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 96-97.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 103.

redeployment associated with the dual basing program described earlier. For the next three years, however, the rather significant decrease can be attributed to the attrition of European based soldiers, particularly from Germany, as a result of the Vietnam War.¹⁴² Then, as mentioned earlier, the reduction of forces in Vietnam coupled with the Nixon administration switch to a one and a half war policy refocused American attentions and interests on western European security and its NATO commitments.

D. REASSESSING AMERICA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS: LATE 1970'S THROUGH THE 1980'S

Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, again led a movement to withdrawal troops out of Europe. This time, however, his momentum was stronger than when previously attempted. His movement called for a reassessment of America's role in global affairs.¹⁴³ There were several factors that forced the reassessment: disillusionment with the results of the Vietnam War, growing balance of payments deficits, declining value of the dollar, disputes over offset payments, a resurgence of isolationist sentiment in U.S. public opinion, and an increase in congressional rhetoric over apparent European unwillingness to contribute adequately to the burdens associated with the NATO common defense mission.¹⁴⁴

Mansfield's case was based on the idea that it was unjustified militarily, economically, and politically to have close to half a million troops in Europe. He believed that the western European governments encouraged small instabilities to keep Americans in Europe.¹⁴⁵ Mansfield also implied that in order for the Europeans to close the gap of military capabilities and burdens, a large scale U.S. troop withdrawal might be needed. The continued U.S. defense of Europe psychologically weakened and discouraged the Europeans from improving their defense capabilities. Furthermore, since

¹⁴² Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 103-104.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 140.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 141.

NATO strategy relied upon the use of nuclear power at the outset of war; the removal of a large number of American forces from Germany would not alter that strategy. Finally, Mansfield believed that a U.S. force reduction would expose France, in particular, for its military contradictions and force them into cooperating with their European allies.¹⁴⁶

For their part, the West German government strongly opposed the Mansfield initiative. They repeatedly pointed to the military weakness of the separate European states. They espoused that the only hope for Western Europe to protect itself from Soviet military aggression and political blackmail was through the NATO alliance and that NATO, as well as West German, credibility rested on the military might of the United States. Moreover, the German leaders saw fit to remind Senator Mansfield that the stationing of U.S. troops in Germany was not only, or even primarily, for the defense of West Germany. Their presence ultimately served American interest. If American troops were redeployed out of West Germany and Europe then the forward line on defense for the U.S. would not be the East German and Czechoslovakian borders, but rather the eastern seaboard of the continental U.S..¹⁴⁷ After much debate, and a few more attempts by Senator Mansfield to pass legislation that required troop withdrawals, his initiatives were decisively defeated.

1. Leathernecks in Europe

In July, 1975, General Louis Wilson was named Commandant of the Marine Corps. One of the reasons for his appointment was his willingness and interest in refocusing the Marine Corps towards the Atlantic and Europe. This was in stark contrast to the status quo that saw the Marines oriented towards the Pacific since World War II.¹⁴⁸ In October of that year, Marines landed in Germany and were immediately revered for the reputation that preceded them. During this time, the German population became especially intrigued by the Marines. A milestone event that included for the first time a

¹⁴⁶ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 141.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 144.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 152

large combined NATO exercise involved American forces under the supreme command of a West German officer was underscored by the attraction of the 1,800 Marines that participated in the exercise despite a total participation of 3,500 American troops.¹⁴⁹

The alignment of the Marine Corps to the east, however, was not viewed by all as an increase in the American commitment to the continent or NATO for that matter. There was speculation at the time the move was mainly a political signal aimed at the U.S. Congress to convince them that the Marine Corps could play as significant a role in the Atlantic theater as they did in the Pacific.¹⁵⁰ The Marine Corps already had a west coast division and an east coast division which left the Third Marines in Okinawa a prime target for abolition after they returned the island of Okinawa back to Japanese sovereignty. The alignment of the Third Marines to the east was seen by some as a way for General Wilson to demonstrate to Congress that they would be perfectly suited as a strategic reserve for the NATO alliance.¹⁵¹ Regardless, the Marines were welcomed by the Germans and NATO and have remained on the continent to this day.

2. Nuclear Weapons and Air Superiority

In 1974 a debate in the Department of Defense and in Congress surrounded the need and number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. During this time the U.S. had roughly 7,000 nuclear warheads which, according to official definition, were “tactical” nuclear weapons.¹⁵² Over time, the presence of the nuclear warheads became symbolic of the American commitment; much the same way the U.S. troop presence had. European as well as American officials had long regarded any troop decreases as a signal to a reduced American commitment to NATO, and now the same view was being shared with regard to U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. So long as the number stayed at or above

¹⁴⁹ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 153.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 154.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 155.

¹⁵² Ibid., 163.

7,000 the Europeans considered the assurance strong and enduring.¹⁵³ The U.S. maintained control and release authority for the weapons, however, two-thirds of the bases on which there were warheads were jointly used by NATO forces. This further tied nuclear doctrine and strategy to NATO.

In the fall of 1974 the Defense Department undertook a study to review the stockpiles of weapons as well as the strategy and requirements for their use and safeguarding.¹⁵⁴ The main thrust of the review, as presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee, acknowledged the need for some minor adjustments, but concluded it would be unwise to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe so long as the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries remained unwilling to reach a compromise on balanced force reductions in Europe.¹⁵⁵

In the fall of 1976, in keeping with their decision to increase combat troops at the expense of support troops, the Pentagon announced a significant increase in its fighter presence in Germany.¹⁵⁶ The move was part of a continued need to reverse the decline in troop strength during the Vietnam War. During 1977 the additional planes were phased into the NATO force structure and the F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter was introduced to the NATO front.¹⁵⁷ The aging F-4 aircraft that the F-15 replaced, however, was not returned stateside. Instead it was reassigned to other bases in Germany thus increasing the total number of fighters. Furthermore, the increase in the air power pushed the Air Force to the west and the army to the east. The large contingent of increased Air Force personnel settled in the Kaiserslautern-Ramstein-Sembach area and the Army moved “forward” to the Wiesbaden area.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 164.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 165.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 162

3. “Tooth to Tail” and the Wartime Host Nation Support Treaty

The issue is not simply whether airborne reinforcements from the United States would arrive to participate in the second phase of battle. Rather, it is whether the army would have the resources in manpower and ammunition to keep the front supplied.¹⁵⁹ – Drew Middleton, New York Times

During the late 1970's there was concern in both the Pentagon and in Congress over the Soviet Union's ability to launch a ground attack on Western Europe with only five to seven days of preparation instead of the assumed three weeks by NATO planners.¹⁶⁰ In turn, NATO and American planners, at the behest of Senator Sam Nunn began planning for a force structure that further shifted the emphasis towards combat troops and also towards reinforcement of the northern portion of the FRG. The increase was seen as a necessity in order to effectively counter an initial Soviet attack. The changes can be seen in the ratio of combat to support troops between 1972 and 1977. In 1972 the ratio was 59% to 41%, a very reasonable division that would presumably allow for a protracted war. By 1977, after the changes had taken place, the ratio was 71% to 29%, a ratio that favored combat force and direct action but severely limited the ability to resupply and maintain the war fighters past an initial phase of battle.¹⁶¹

The movement of supplies and reinforcements to the battle area is the primary role of the support troops. The shift in organization and the structural changes provided by the Nunn Amendment focused the U.S. strategic doctrine from protracted war to short war. The shift might also be seen as a result from military planners' desire to avoid any misstep towards a Vietnam type war. The obvious problem arises when one considers the big “what if” scenario. What if the defense plans that NATO and the Americans

¹⁵⁹ Quote attributed to Drew Middleton of the New York Times and cited here from Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 178.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 173.

¹⁶¹ Troops ratios taken from Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 177.

worked out were unsuccessful? What if the initial stage of combat resulted in a protracted war and support troops were needed? The end result could be disastrous.¹⁶²

After years of American administrations using the threat of troop withdrawals to gain greater respect for their initiatives or American-inspired NATO missions, the Wartime Host Nation Treaty was signed in April 1982 as a consequence of Nunn's efforts and as a West German attempt to defuse the offset issue once and for all. The treaty formally reasserted the U.S. rapid reinforcement (ten divisions in ten days), in crisis or war, of its ground and air forces in Germany to more than twice their strength.¹⁶³ The move would buttress the forward defense of the alliance area by six combat divisions within ten days. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Germany would train and equip up to 93,000 reservists to augment the active duty soldiers and provide the necessary support troops that would be needed to maintain the "tooth to tail" ratio that had fallen with the earlier American restructuring.¹⁶⁴ Essentially the treaty significantly reduced the requirement for the United States to provide support troops in a crisis and could instead concentrate its efforts on combat related troops. The treaty was seen by both sides as having a positive influence on German-American relations in general since amicable conclusions were reached and both sides made concessions.¹⁶⁵

4. Strategic Defense Initiative and the end of the Cold War

In 1977, NATO's attention shifted from short range nuclear systems to long and medium range nuclear systems. For much of the 1950s and 1960s the Soviet Union shared, at a minimum, parity with the U.S. and as their strategic forces grew, at times, appeared to surpass the capability of U.S. strategic forces.¹⁶⁶ During that same year, the Soviet Union deployed the SS-20 missile, a multiple independently targeted reentry

¹⁶² Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 178.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 186.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 187.

vehicle (MIRV) that was presumably an upgrading of their IRBM forces.¹⁶⁷ This improvement was viewed as a shift in the nuclear balance in favor of the Soviet Union.

In December, 1979, NATO foreign ministers announced that the Long Range Theater Nuclear Force (LRTNF) would be modernized with the deployment of Pershing launchers and cruise missiles to Western Europe in order to close the IRBM capability gap.¹⁶⁸ NATO's decision to modernize its program served to strengthen deterrence and crisis stability and further reinforce the deterrent tie between Western Europe and the United States. As the tension and uncertainty surrounding ICBM's continued, the United States regained the initiative in 1981 when President Ronald Reagan stated that the United States was prepared to cancel its deployment of the Pershing missiles if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.¹⁶⁹

A parallel issue confronting the United States', and by default NATO's, strategy of flexible response in this period of nuclear ambiguity was the large presence of U.S. forces. As mentioned earlier, there was strong U.S. domestic pressure to reduce the number of troops stationed in Europe, particularly in Germany. The Western European allies, however, viewed the troops as more than a conventional force guarantee, they viewed them as a symbol of U.S. nuclear guarantee. The allies were of the opinion that rather than risk the loss of their forces to a Warsaw Pact attack, the U.S. would use nuclear weapons for their defense and the defense of Western Europe. The European NATO allies, therefore, vehemently protested against any U.S. force reductions.¹⁷⁰ It has been argued, however, that despite the logic of the NATO European allies, it simply was not the case. It has been suggested that although the American conventional forces in Europe were seen as instrumental in containing the Soviet Union, they were viewed as

¹⁶⁶ Jean D. Reed, *NATO's Theater Nuclear Forces: A Coherent Strategy for the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 14.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 17.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 21.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 23.

expendable pawns in an arms control negotiation.¹⁷¹ This account offers a unique perspective into what the primary national interest of the United States was or could have been at the time. If the statement is indeed true, then arms control and the spiraling nuclear and ICBM race took precedent over Western European security and the safety of American forces.

If, under the threat of nuclear blackmail, the United States failed to meet its commitments to NATO and the nations of Western Europe came under the control of the Soviet Union, the result for the U.S. would be devastating. Jean D. Reed has stated that in such a situation the U.S. would become a “second rate, insular power emasculated by the loss of traditional cultural ties, economic markets, and sources of political, economic, and military strength.”¹⁷² Reed’s statement shows the complexity of the ICBM and nuclear issue that President Ronald Reagan was dealing with when he took office.

In 1983, Reagan outlined his vision of a world free from nuclear weapons. He called for the development of a program for the United States that was designed to render offensive nuclear forces useless. He called his program the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and it completely took the European allies by surprise.¹⁷³ It was not until 1985 that FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl offered the first favorable remarks on SDI by a major European leader. Most German officials and defense thinkers accepted the validity of SDI research; however, they remained skeptical that it could be constructed at an acceptable cost or that it could enhance Western security instead of endanger its cohesion.¹⁷⁴ In 1985 and 1986, the West German government was excluded from SDI research initiatives by the U.S. who was tightening its control on technology transfer. SDI research had proven to be extremely expensive. The growing concern for the

¹⁷¹ David Haglund, “American Troops in Germany: the evolving context,” in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 20.

¹⁷² Jean D. Reed, *NATO’s Theater Nuclear Forces: A Coherent Strategy for the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 26.

¹⁷³ John A. Reed, *Germany and NATO* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 132.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 133.

European allies was where the U.S. would find the funds for their endeavors. Ultimately, they feared, the U.S. would want the allies to shoulder some of the cost burden because they would be a benefactor of the system, but Germany and the allies were reluctant. They feared that the increase in SDI spending would mean a reduction in other defense areas to include deterrent forces and defense forces in Europe.¹⁷⁵

After Mikhail S. Gorbachev acceded to the post of general secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in 1985, the Soviets had shown a new flexibility in collective security and arms control discussions that had been deadlocked for many years. In the September 1986 Stockholm Agreement, the thirty-five nation Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe expanded the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, in which the same participants had promised to give prior notification of large military exercises. In the 1986 document European nations, including the Soviet Union, mutually agreed for the first time to involuntary inspections on their territory. In 1986 the Warsaw Pact offered to discuss broad, new European arms reduction proposals that led both alliances to agree the following year to new negotiations among the twenty-three NATO and Warsaw Pact nations on conventional arms limitations.¹⁷⁶

Bilateral agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany also was reached in 1986 for the removal of U.S. chemical weapons from Germany by the end of 1992, a deadline that was later moved forward to 1990. In a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev came to an agreement in principle on the limitation of certain intermediate-range missiles worldwide, and in 1987 they agreed for the first time to eliminate totally a whole class of weapons—all intermediate-range missiles. These included USAREUR's Pershing II missiles and U.S. Air Force Europe ground-launched

¹⁷⁵ John A. Reed, *Germany and NATO* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 134.

¹⁷⁶ The information was taken from the Headquarters of the USAREUR homepage. <http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/aa%20consolidated.htm> (accessed February 20, 2008)

cruise missiles, both of which carried nuclear warheads. These initiatives indicated that the Cold War was changing, but the shape of the new era remained unknown.¹⁷⁷

The trials and tribulations of the Soviets in the mid 1980's, combined with the Reagan administration's growing defense expenditures through his SDI program, marked the end of competition and the desire to return to détente by the Soviets.¹⁷⁸ Soviet foreign policy was mired by failure to defeat NATO and the Americans in the Euro-missile confrontations of 1980-1984 and they had to deal with the growing consequences of an unwinnable war in Afghanistan and a domestic economic crisis. Furthermore, the rhetoric coming out of Washington was beginning to take a classical anticommunist tune.¹⁷⁹

By the end of 1988, when Gorbachev visited New York, where he met one last time with Reagan, who was accompanied by President-elect George H.W. Bush, the Cold War was over. Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed on an armistice and it would be up to Bush and the Soviet leader to work out the final peace settlement.¹⁸⁰ On November 9, 1989, after an all day meeting of the party council, East Berlin's party boss reported to the public and the press that anyone who wished to go to the west, for whatever reasons, could get an exit visa at the border. The rush of people, however, overwhelmed the border guards and people eventually just walked through the checkpoints.¹⁸¹ The Berlin Wall had officially and spontaneously become insignificant. A new future was opened for all Germans. The fall of the most recognizable symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, became the global indication that the Cold War was over.

¹⁷⁷ The information was taken from the Headquarters of the USAREUR homepage.
<http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/aa%20consolidated.htm> (accessed February 20, 2008)

¹⁷⁸ William G. Hyland, *The Cold War is Over* (New York, N.Y.: Random House, Inc., 1990), 177.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 176.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 175.

¹⁸¹ Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, *American Forces in Berlin 1945-1994* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 169.

D. CONCLUSION

The need to balance a combination of foreign policy and strategic military concerns (read international and domestic concerns) dominated this time period. As a result, troop levels in Europe, though not without fluctuation, not only endured, but remained fairly consistent. The figure below, taken from the Heritage Foundation website, shows the number of U.S. forces stationed overseas by region for the time period covered by this chapter. Particular attention should be paid to the lines representing Europe as well as East Asia.




Figure 6. U.S. Troops Overseas 1950-2005, By Region.¹⁸²

¹⁸² The data set was taken from the Heritage foundation website.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-11.cfm#_ftn1 (accessed February 21, 2008).

The figure above can be seen as a graphical representation of the major U.S. foreign policy interests and adventures during the time period discussed. Right from the start one notices the strong relationship between U.S. forces in East Asia and U.S. forces in Europe. The chart begins by showing the troop buildup that was associated with the perceived threat during the Korean War. Then, as the U.S. turned its attention to Vietnam in 1965-1973, large numbers of forces were redeployed to East Asia (the large spike on the graph) causing the troops levels in Europe to decrease by close to 150,000. U.S. interests at this time were reflected in their containment strategy. The administration saw Vietnam as the first in a series of dominoes that would fall if they allowed communism to spread.

As a result of the ICBM and nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union, the 1980's show a mild buildup of forces in Europe. It was during this time period that large debates were taking place regarding conventional troop postures in Europe. Recalling the discussion earlier, the Europeans saw the U.S. troop commitment as a symbol of their nuclear commitment and lobbied hard to prevent any troop withdrawals. Also during this time, President Ronald Reagan initiated his Security Defense Initiative (SDI) unilaterally without consultation from his NATO allies. This sparked strong debate regarding commitments and costs. Eventually, the gamble paid off and the Soviet Union, desiring a return to détente, became decidedly more flexible in its arms negotiations. Finally, on November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall, the long standing symbol of east versus west, was opened and the Cold War came to a close. According to the graph, there was a sharp decline in American troop strength in Europe right after this time. This will be addressed in the following chapter.

During this time period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took center stage as the counterweight to the Warsaw Pact countries. This chapter explored the links between NATO commitments and the decisions that have influenced the U.S. military force posture in Germany. However, the dominant role that the United States played, not only in NATO but in the bipolar international order, leads one to believe that the links may have been reversed. The decisions that the U.S. made regarding its foreign policy interest, particularly dealing with the Soviet Union, seemed to have influenced the type of

commitments and the posture of NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance relied so heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for protection that many American administrations were able to use the threat of U.S. Troop withdrawals to persuade agreement for U.S. led “NATO” initiatives. The times when the U.S. acted outside of NATO, namely Vietnam, troop levels decreased. The reduction affected NATO readiness and troop strength and caused concern within the European allies regarding the American commitment to defend the continent. As the focus became re-centered on Europe, West Germany in particular, the security and deterrent effects provided by the U.S. nuclear doctrines helped shape conventional force postures on the ground. Debates surrounded the lead time required to counter a Soviet ground attack in Germany which prompted an increase in the number of combat troops and air superiority fighters in West Germany.

The race for an ICBM advantage ended in the 1980’s when President Reagan announced his SDI initiative. The program drew hesitant approval from the European allies who feared a withdrawal by the Americans with the ability to strike first as well as prevent the assumed mutually assured destruction of a nuclear exchange. The end of the Cold War, however, and the relaxing of the Soviet threat, began to open the door for a new look at the U.S. interest on the European continent and the role they would play in NATO.

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IV. THE U.S. MILITARY IN GERMANY 1990-PRESENT

A. BACKGROUND

The end of the Cold War signaled to many an impending shift in the United States national security strategy as had been the case in the wake of the first and second world wars. International relations scholars around the globe attempted to offer insight into what would become of the new international order. The new worldwide scene that arrived with the end of the Cold War simultaneously justified American purpose and past strategies with regard to foreign policy and interests while at the same time forced U.S. decision makers to rethink the assumptions that guided their national security interests for nearly half a century.¹⁸³ At the very core of the debate was the attempt to strike a new balance between definitions of American interests and the appropriate direction for American strategy.

As the apparent large, external threat to the United States and Western Europe began to disappear (Soviet Union), domestic politics and concerns began to drive U.S. security interests. In 1990, 60 percent of the American public and 63 percent of opinion leaders described the economic power of Japan as a “critical threat” with 30 percent of the public and 41 percent of opinion leaders considering the same for European economic competition.¹⁸⁴ Continually, a large number of Americans also suggested that economic adversaries were a greater threat than military adversaries.¹⁸⁵ These numbers suggested a shift within the American public that could not be ignored by congress and the administration. Concerns of this type undoubtedly affect national security policy because they address issues such as how much Americans spend, for what purpose, and what Americans are willing to spend their treasure and risk their lives for. The growing trend

¹⁸³ Ronald D. Asmus, *Future U.S. Defense Policy Toward Europe: The New American Politics and Grand Strategy of European-American Relations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993), 1.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹⁸⁵ Ronald D. Asmus, *Future U.S. Defense Policy Toward Europe: The New American Politics and Grand Strategy of European-American Relations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993), 4.

mentioned above showed how Americans during this time period were willing to support an international role, but wanted to know why old commitments were still required and whether resources could be better spent at home.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, the end of the Cold War caused a re-evaluation of what the United States determined to be a “vital national interest.” Ronald Asmus, as mentioned earlier, defined a vital national interest as one in which the United States is prepared to spend the nation’s treasure and put its forces in harm’s way.¹⁸⁷ All of these sentiments show that the United States during this time period sought to carve out a new post Cold War role that would balance its desire to retain a unilateral capability and face the new demands of a multilateral world that looked toward collective decision-making.¹⁸⁸ The attempt to reconcile and balance these factors of American foreign policy during this time period undoubtedly affected the U.S. force posture in Germany.

B. NATO

As mentioned in the last chapter, NATO has continued to survive to this day, even increasing its role and sphere of influence. The United States has continued to play a significant role in NATO and maintains a strong commitment to the organization. During the Cold War, the United States had a large leadership role in NATO. The reasons for this were obvious: the large number of U.S. troops stationed on the continent and the dependence on the U.S. nuclear arsenal for deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the role that the United States should play in NATO has been in question. Undoubtedly, a factor for the question at hand will be determined by the level of troops that the U.S. maintains in Europe. This point certainly links NATO to the U.S. force posture in Germany.

Richard Kugler, in a study for the RAND Corporation has suggested that the lack of an influential U.S. role in NATO could erode alliance cohesion and produce a deficient

¹⁸⁶ Ronald D. Asmus, *Future U.S. Defense Policy Toward Europe: The New American Politics and Grand Strategy of European-American Relations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993), 3.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

NATO defense posture and military strategy. He further suggested that the result could lead a state, such as Germany, to pursue a unilateral course of action leading to tensions with Russia over control in Eastern Europe.¹⁸⁹ Continually, Kugler asserted that a U.S. force posture commitment of less than 100,000 troops would offer a negative appraisal from NATO. The lack of commitment could erode U.S. influence, NATO cohesion, upset the balance of power in Europe, and, for anything other than a slowly evolving crisis, disrupt the U.S./NATO defense posture.¹⁹⁰

In 1990, NATO leaders met in London to discuss a new NATO military strategy that updated the foundation used by members to coordinate defense contributions, achieve acceptable burden sharing arrangements, and allocate military responsibilities.¹⁹¹ Finally, a new strategic concept was agreed upon at the Rome summit with a few of the guiding highlights being pointed out below:¹⁹²

- NATO must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe. Its nuclear weapons will be kept at the lowest and most stable level to prevent war.
- Nuclear weapons will continue to fulfill an essential role in NATO's strategy, and there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation to military action might be discounted.
- The significant presence of North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies.

The points highlighted above implied that, overall, NATO's force posture would be reduced, and thereby allow U.S. forces to be withdrawn. At the same time, it

¹⁸⁹ Richard Kugler, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 55.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 56.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 75.

¹⁹² Highlights are taken from Richard Kugler, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 76-77.

suggested that NATO largely endorsed a continued and sizable U.S. military presence in Europe. The international pressure to maintain U.S. leadership and commitment to NATO and keep forces, albeit reduced, on the continent had to be balanced by American policymakers against growing domestic politics and concerns; a battle that surely met resistance on both sides of the Atlantic. The end result was continued American SACEUR dominance as well as roughly 100,000 troops stationed in Europe, predominantly in a newly united Germany.¹⁹³

NATO's creation and sustainment up until this point in time was centered on the idea of deterrence, primarily against the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced NATO to redefine deterrence in more subtle concepts such as persuasion and dissuasion. Furthermore, NATO's strategy had to address a new spectrum of challenges beyond Russian aggression. The sphere of influence had to grow if NATO wanted to maintain the same type of role it had during the bipolarity of the Cold War. Nuclear forces remained an option that could not be used except in extreme circumstances, therefore conventional forces were required to take on an even wider role than previously under deterrent doctrine.¹⁹⁴ Any future strategy that NATO had must undoubtedly carry with it a strong requirement for conventional forces. The crux of NATO during the Cold War will likely remain, with slight allocations for future dynamics: conventional forces followed, when appropriate, by a measured and controlled nuclear escalation.¹⁹⁵ This requirement reinforced the need to maintain U.S. troops on the continent, particularly in Germany.

The NATO military committee document 14/4 (MC 14/4) evolved in the post-Cold War context to provide direction for NATO forces.¹⁹⁶ Asmus, in his assessment of the subject, mentioned that NATO had planned to maintain three categories of forces:

¹⁹³ The data set was taken from the Heritage foundation website.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-11.cfm#_ftn1 (accessed February 21, 2008).

¹⁹⁴ Richard Kugler, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 78.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 80.

rapid reaction, main defense, and augmentation forces. He described how U.S. forces deployed in Europe (the Capable Corps, the associated 3 to 4 fighter wings, and the Sixth Fleet) were classified as rapid reaction forces. These forces would be highly ready and capable for deployment anywhere in Europe or the surrounding regions. The U.S. Atlantic forces would serve as backups to these forces and would be earmarked for commitment to Europe during a contingency that required reinforcement. Finally, six Army reserve divisions, as well as fighter wings and naval forces would be available as augmentation forces.¹⁹⁷

Despite the reassuring picture that the numbers above paint for NATO, the U.S. military commitment still needed to be unpacked a bit. The U.S. military forces deployed to Europe would contribute only about 15 percent of the active duty forces maintained in Central Europe, according to Asmus.¹⁹⁸ This contribution was of strong political importance because it signaled American reliability and alliance leadership. Furthermore, the U.S. was set to provide 30 to 40 percent of NATO's rapid reaction forces for crises outside of Central Europe. In total then, 75 percent of the forces that could readily be deployed were provided by American forces.¹⁹⁹

In part, NATO's survival in the immediate post Cold War period was at the mercy of the American commitment. The risk of a major U.S. pullback of forces and commitments to NATO could diminish alliance unity, weaken conventional defense capabilities, and render the alliance military strategy incoherent.²⁰⁰ As the U.S. continues to evaluate its commitment to NATO forces and its role on the European continent, they will need to pay attention to crisis management and the military mission requirements needed to perform those functions. NATO's growing sphere of influence, to include the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan today, encompasses a wide spectrum of crises that are from small to large, fast to slow, and urgent to non-

¹⁹⁷ Richard Kugler, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 82.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 84.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 85.

urgent in nature. Maintaining a forward presence, the U.S. is better able to continue its commitments to NATO as well as allow maximum flexibility to deploy elsewhere under unilateral auspices.

C. MID 1990'S TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The events of the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991 have shown that Middle East oil interests and security have increased with respect to U.S. national interests. Based upon past U.S. actions, protecting its overseas interests usually meant detaching, deploying, or basing a military contingent in the region to deter aggression and maintain the freedom of such interests. The countries of the Arabian Gulf region, however, would provide strong political obstacles to the prepositioning of required assets and large numbers of forces on their soil without express UN resolutions.²⁰¹ The large buildup that was associated with the first Gulf War, although noted to have been burdened by the massive Cold War posture and logistical apparatus that came with it would have been inherently more difficult if the forces and equipment had to come entirely from the United States. The continued emphasis on the Middle East as the flash point for the Global War on Terrorism ensures that the need for the United States to have forces in close proximity to areas of crisis will endure. U.S. forces in Germany provide that capability.

In 1993, the United States had 105,254 troops stationed in Germany.²⁰² Helga Haftendorn, as discussed earlier, stated that historically the reason for U.S. troops in Germany has been 1) guardians of the German question, 2) guarantors of security for a divided Germany, and 3) counterweights to an opposing military bloc.²⁰³ Were the large numbers of American troops in Germany in 1993 still accomplishing those three tasks? Indeed, it can be argued that they were, of course with a few clarifications such as a

²⁰¹ David S. Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (no. 8, Summer 1995), 74. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1508.pdf (accessed February 26, 2008).

²⁰² Timothy Kane PhD., "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003," *Center for Data Analysis Report 04-11*. (Heritage Foundation, October 2004). <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-11.cfm?renderforprint=1> (accessed February 26, 2008).

²⁰³ Helga Haftendorn in *Homeward Bound: Allied forces in the new Germany*, eds. David Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 19.

unified Germany versus a divided Germany. In this case, the German question still remains, though in an altered form. No longer is it in the immediate post World War II context, but rather as a check against too much continental influence and to limit its rise as a peer competitor to the United States. The reunification of Germany left the country open and vulnerable. The world watched with reluctance as the impoverished GDR was welcomed and merged with the bustling economic stability of the FRG. It could be argued the large American presence in the country acted as a stabilizing force that retained its deterrent role from Cold War past. Furthermore, continuous U.S. investment, by both the Federal government and servicemen and women in country, certainly assisted the economy during the transition. Finally, although there is no longer a large opposing military bloc to hedge against, the U.S. has stated that its primary foreign policy goal was to prevent the emergence of a new rival along the scale of the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.²⁰⁴

The point made above is updated and reinforced by David Yost in a 1995 article regarding the future of U.S. overseas presence. He opined that three approaches could be used to justify a continued overseas presence: 1) the imperial rationale of glory and economic gain, 2) power politics that preserve the balance of power and secure national interests, and 3) ideology or the duty of promoting American beliefs.²⁰⁵ The United States has a long history of rejecting that it is imperialistic and the second and third points appear to be complimentary. That being said, the U.S. presence in Germany seems to logically be a result of the second and third points. Although considered allies, the strength of the European states, particularly Germany, must not rise to the level of peer competitor to the United States. Maintaining a military presence there helps ensure continued U.S. influence.

²⁰⁴ John Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2001). <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faessay5569/john-j-mearsheimer/the-future-of-the-american-pacifier.html> (accessed February 26, 2008).

²⁰⁵ David S. Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (no. 8, Summer 1995), 79. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1508.pdf (accessed February 26, 2008).

D. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

The United States' ability to defend its interests abroad is largely defined by tools of intervention and by participation with key allies or powers in specific regions. Essentially, the U.S. role is shaped by its ability to network. What makes it a global power is its ability to leverage relations with one region to engage states in other regions.²⁰⁶ The end of the Cold War, as mentioned earlier, greatly shifted the American strategic focus. The challenge, however, was to shift from extended deterrence of the Soviet Union to extended defense of the United States and its interests.

The revolution in military affairs (RMA) that the United States began pursuing in the late 20th and early 21st centuries centered on not only the post Cold War international order, but also advances in war fighting technology. The idea behind the RMA was that maintaining alliances would require developing an interdependent relationship different from that which existed during the Cold War.²⁰⁷ While the U.S. nuclear umbrella makes increasingly less sense absent a major power war, technologies that help mitigate international ambiguities and assist the application of force by U.S. allies are increasingly valuable.²⁰⁸

When President George W. Bush took office he brought with him, as Secretary Of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld was an "old timer" who politically and militarily came of age during the Cold War years. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review took a hard look at the emerging threat environment and emphasized the need for a new strategy.²⁰⁹ Rumsfeld pointed out that the Department of Defense was moving away

²⁰⁶ Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: allied perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 7.

²⁰⁷ National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century," (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Panel, 1997).

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=5&sid=8deb46ad-09d2-418f-8bc0-9b4d258475b8%40sessionmgr3> (accessed February 27, 2008).

from a threat based strategy to a capabilities based strategy that focused less on who might threaten the U.S. or where, and more on how they would be threatened and what would be needed to deter those threats.²¹⁰

More than anyone else, Rumsfeld was a hard and fast supporter for the transformation of United States military forces abroad. Rumsfeld was supported by President Bush, who in August, 2004 announced a wide range of changes to be made to the structure and disposition of forces overseas known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS).²¹¹ Together the two leaders fought to realign and redeploy troops from overseas bases. Based upon troop levels and the disposition of forces at the time, the hardest hit region would be the U.S. military in Germany, where the most senior level officials in the administration believed that our forces were obsolete and remained in a “Cold War” posture to face a non-existent Soviet conventional force threat.

The plan called for the redeployment of troops from Germany and the consolidation of bases into a three tiered model. The first tier consisted of only a few larger “hub” bases. These bases would retain the housing, schools, and other support services and serve as logistical staging bases. The second tier would be the establishment of smaller forward operating sites that maintain a less robust support system and serve as bases to which service members deploy for temporary duty. These sites are not necessarily in Germany, and would potentially be expanded into Eastern Europe. Finally, the third tier of base is the cooperative security location. These sites would likely be run by host nation personnel and would not be used by U.S. personnel on a day to day basis. The role of these sites would be for crisis situations or regional access otherwise not maintained with the larger hub bases. These sites would be in strategic locations to

²¹⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=5&sid=8deb46ad-09d2-418f-8bc0-9b4d258475b8%40sessionmgr3> (accessed February 27, 2008).

²¹¹ Speech by President George W. Bush on 16 August, 2004. Official press release is available on the White House website. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-5.html> (accessed 18 May 2007).

monitor “hot spots.”²¹² The idea is to utilize advances in technology to minimize loss of life, number of forces required for action, and deliver a quick victory anywhere in the world.²¹³

In a report for the Heritage Foundation, Jack Spencer and John Hulsman have articulated Rumsfeld’s concept of the RMA. They suggested that a new European basing structure, citing the inadequacy of the Germany bases to accomplish American strategic goals, should advance the national interests of the United States strategically, operationally, politically, and economically.²¹⁴ Moreover, they suggested that flashpoints for future conflict were likely to revolve around the Caucasus, Iraq, the Middle East, and North Africa. Establishing forward positions in closer geographical proximity to those regions would demonstrate America’s commitment to the long-term security of the region. It would also allow the U.S. to respond rapidly to crises in those regions. These points generally reflect the desired outcome sought by the Bush administration’s defense transformation led by Rumsfeld. The results would be a significant reduction in the U.S. presence in Germany.

In reality, however, the defense transformation that Rumsfeld initiated when he took office has since slowed as resources and manpower continue to be drained by the ongoing battles in Iraq and Afghanistan that have diverged from the optimistic outlook following military victory in Iraq. Even as early as late 2003, the language from the Pentagon regarding European base closures and transformation has shifted towards a slowdown.²¹⁵ Had the RMA been allowed to continue without GWOT influence, the number of troops would have most likely been reduced further as units were relocated

²¹² Robert D. Critchlow, “U.S. Military Overseas Basing” (CRS Report for Congress RL33148. 31 October 2005), 2-3.

²¹³ Earl H. Tilford Jr., “Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 1995), iii.

²¹⁴ Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, PhD, “Restructuring America’s European Base Structure for the New Era,” *The Heritage Foundation*, 28 April 2003
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bgl648.cfm>; (accessed February 27, 2008)

²¹⁵ Steve Liewer, “Plans slow for base closures in Europe,” in *Stars and Stripes European Edition* December 8, 2003. http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_120803_Base,00.html (accessed March 2008).

stateside. Delays in the process, provided by bureaucratic infighting and domestic politics, however, would have maintained the status quo as an international and domestic equilibrium was sought.

E. CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War, to many, brought with it the appearance of an apparent end to the U.S. presence in Europe. The role that the U.S. had played on the continent for more than fifty years was seemingly over. Administrations on both sides of the Atlantic found themselves fighting domestic discourse for a reduction in the American troop structure in Germany. As this chapter pointed out, international and domestic pressures, as well as bureaucratic infighting and politics worked to continue, albeit reduced, the American force levels.

The initial sharp decline in troop strength in Germany can easily be seen as a direct result of the end of the Cold War. The lack of a large obvious threat to U.S. and European security, like the one posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, drove domestic public opinion, as mentioned earlier, to view economic adversaries versus military adversaries as the largest threat to U.S. interests. When NATO re-evaluated its role and objectives in light of the new international situation, however, it became apparent that there was an overall desire to maintain a U.S. presence. The structures, institutions, and leadership roles that had become commonplace and were proven during the Cold War, needed to be maintained in order to continue the success of cooperation enjoyed by NATO. All parties involved knew that the U.S. must continue to be a part of such endeavors. Through the external policies and desires of NATO, the American commitment was continued.

Finally, as President George W. Bush took office, his administration led an internally influenced push to change the global presence of the U.S. military. The terrible events of September 11, 2001 cultivated domestic opinion that there needed to be a definite shift in the strategic focus of the United States and its military. Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began drastic reductions to the number of troops in Germany so that they may be refitted for more expeditionary roles. Moreover, he

encouraged the reduction of the large European base structures like the ones in Germany in favor of a plan to develop cooperative security locations and forward operating bases in countries that were formally associated with the Soviet Union. The poorly defined Global War on Terrorism has been the catalyst such changes.

The attempt to reach a new balance between all of these factors is not new. Nuclear strategies of the past evolved through a multitude of U.S. administrations and military strategies as new balances were sought. As the larger factors of international and domestic pressure compete against bureaucratic infighting and politics across time, the force levels in Germany seemed to act as a fulcrum around which balance was maintained. U.S. troops in Germany have served as a constant around which the dynamic factors that push and pull policy makers play themselves out.

V. CONCLUSION

A. TYING TOGETHER THE TIME PERIODS

The historical examination of the role and presence that the United States military has played, first in postwar West Germany then later a united Germany, is actually an examination of U.S. interests since 1945. Insight into what has caused the continued presence can be gleaned by evaluating the balance that was required between international and domestic pressures; bureaucratic infighting and politics; and the conditions in Germany throughout the various time periods. The rise and fall of U.S. troop levels have offered an obvious indicator of what and where U.S. interests and attentions were at any given time.

In the first time period evaluated (1945-1955), it was clear that the United States had not intended to station forces in Germany permanently. As mentioned earlier, Roosevelt sincerely expected the U.S. to remove itself from Europe as soon as possible. Understandably, he desired to put into place a workable settlement that would not require American presence or supervision.²¹⁶ It was President Roosevelt's expectation that the U.S. would not remain in occupation of West Germany or Europe for more than two years that is, as had been the case in 1918 when U.S. troops withdrew by the start of 1922.²¹⁷ The implementation of JCS 1067, though contentious within the administrations of both Roosevelt and Truman, provided the internal influence and direction needed for the U.S. military government to begin occupation duties. The establishment of the U.S. Constabulary force in 1946 was an indication that offensive combat troops were not effective occupation troops. The reconstruction and stabilization duties that were required in the aftermath of the war could only be accomplished by training a new force of soldiers skilled in culture, language, police type duties, and most importantly human

²¹⁶ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 109. Emphasis added.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

interaction. Engaging the German public and the inclusion of the growing German police forces added legitimacy to the reconstruction efforts.

The division of Germany and, later, the blockade of Berlin in 1948 convinced President Harry Truman that a continued military commitment to Europe by the U.S. would be needed.²¹⁸ However, the external events of the Berlin blockade and the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 notwithstanding, it was the influence of the Korean War in 1950 that provided the stimulus for both the large scale return of U.S. troops to Germany as well as the re-armament of West Germany.²¹⁹ By most accounts, the number of U.S. troops tripled from 1950-1955 (~100,000 to ~356,000) as the United States moved to buttress Central Europe against a Soviet invasion.²²⁰ The Cold War had officially begun and American strategic policy, global interests, and force postures were reflected. American forces were first stationed in Germany by right of conquest and occupation, transitioned to a reconstruction role when it became evident that American interests would depend on a prosperous, stabile Europe, and remained in increasing numbers as the key element of the NATO forces deployed to counter a Soviet threat.

The second time period (1955-1990), undoubtedly the longest, was marked by the growth of NATO, the construction of the Berlin Wall, détente, the Vietnam War, nuclear standoff, and the United States' strategic defense initiative (SDI). All of these influences affected the number of U.S. troops stationed in Germany. The external influences of NATO and the Berlin Wall, which provided troop increases, were grossly countered from the mid 1960's on by the U.S. unilateral actions in Vietnam, American economic difficulties, détente, and President Reagan's SDI campaign.²²¹ American interest in containing Soviet sponsored communism focused its attention to Southeast Asia.

²¹⁸ Christopher T. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: the leasehold empire* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 199.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1987), 44.

²²¹ Christopher T. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: the leasehold empire* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 209.

The number of troops redeployed out of Germany as a result of the Vietnam War was roughly 60,000.²²² This resulted in a significant loss of readiness and manpower to the American defensive front in West Germany and, by default, NATO.

U.S. doctrine, strategic initiatives, and forces postures during the late 1970's and into the 1980's were shifted as the two opposing blocs prepared for battle using nuclear ICBMs. The American willingness to show nuclear restraint was directly related, according to Europeans who undoubtedly would host the battlefield, to the continued presence of U.S. troops on the continent. President Reagan's SDI campaign, conducted without the consultation of NATO, worked to mitigate the Soviet offensive nuclear capability. The Soviet Union, unable to keep up with American defense spending and research, opted for a return to détente and the end to the Cold War soon followed. Reagan's unilateral, internal actions and decisions set the stage for the next chapter of U.S. force postures in Germany; one that undoubtedly came about as a result of the new uncertain international order. American interests during this time period were dominated by containment and deterrence. U.S. troop levels in Germany reflected these prevailing characteristics.

The third time period (1990-2003) brought with it ambiguity regarding the American presence in Germany. The European powers, however, recognized that the continued presence of American troops was essential to the future stability of Europe and argued against a total withdrawal.²²³ The United States reluctance to get involved in the Yugoslavian conflict gave rise to fears in the international community that the U.S., under domestic pressure, was returning to the isolationism it embraced from 1919 to 1929. The inability of the Europeans to handle the situation on their own enabled the U.S. to resume its role as guarantor of European security. Not only did the Americans broker the Dayton peace settlement, they contributed 22,000 troops, largely from

²²² Christopher T. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: the leasehold empire* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 209.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 222.

Germany, to the implementation force under the direction of NATO.²²⁴ Furthermore, the U.N. sponsored, but U.S. led coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait, included a grandiose military buildup in late 1990. This effort highlighted the role of the German bases. More than 100 transport planes landed every night at Ramstein and Rhein-Main air bases as supplies were repositioned in anticipation for the war.²²⁵

As U.S. interests became increasingly focused on the Middle East region, significant draw downs occurred in Germany. By 1999, the U.S. Army in Germany only numbered 43,000 troops and the U.S. Air Force 15,000. The events of 9/11, and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism, allowed the George W. Bush administration to pursue a new Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) under the auspices of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The restructuring plan would reorganize what many believed was the U.S. Cold War posture into a lighter, more efficient, expeditionary force. The hardest hit region restructured would be Germany. Until recently, the redeployment of troops from the European Command (EUCOM) was a significant issue. However, the current Commander of EUCOM, General Bantz Craddock, has requested a stop to the redeployment citing current rhetoric from Russia, and the inability for him to maintain the readiness and force levels required to support NATO obligations and in case of crisis. The dilemma stems from U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The refocus of American interests towards the Middle East has been the latest influence to affect the U.S. force posture in Germany. The undetermined future of the GWOT will continue to drive American interests and its global force posture will have to follow suit. Overall, the third time period saw American interests shift south and east to the Arabian Gulf region. U.S. support for the expansion of NATO can be seen as a maneuver to bolster continental burden sharing as a means to free up American forces to

²²⁴ Christopher T. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: the leasehold empire* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 222.

²²⁵ Yarrow Cleaves, "U.S. Military Presence in Germany," in *The Sun Never Sets: confronting the network of foreign U.S. military bases*, edited by Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991), 239.

engage these new interests. The reluctance of the U.S. to disengage from NATO may very well be an acknowledgement of the importance of European community to American global interests.

In the beginning of this study it was proposed, as proffered by Ronald Asmus, that a vital interest for the United States is one in which it was willing spend money and put its troops in harm's way. The three periods examined in this study have offered some validity to this claim with respect to U.S. troop levels in Germany. During the first time period, Asmus' definition undoubtedly holds true. Large amounts of troops and treasure were spent rebuilding and stabilizing Germany after the war. During the second time period, highlighted by the American attention shift to South East Asia, American forces and money were diverted away from Germany. The shift in doctrine and reliance on nuclear strike capability reinvested conventional forces and on a limited scale money to Germany. Finally, as American interests favored Middle East policies, American forces in Germany were drastically reduced and restructured to accommodate a revolution in military affairs.

B. LOOKING FOR CONGRUENCIES: THE FUTURE OF IRAQ?

On November 26, 2007, the Office of the White House Press Secretary released a "Declaration of Principles for a Long Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America."²²⁶ This proclamation ensured a continued U.S. commitment to Iraq much the same way NATO tied American security to European security in the aftermath of World War II. The national strategy for Iraq has labeled victory in Iraq as a vital U.S. interest.²²⁷ Indeed, it emphasizes that Iraq is the central front in the global war on terror and that the fate of the greater Middle East,

²²⁶ Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Declaration of Principles for a Long Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America," issued November 26, 2007. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/stories/CGs_Corner/white%20house%20declaration.pdf (accessed March 8, 2008).

²²⁷ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf (accessed March 8, 2008).

and by default American security, is at stake. Does this proclamation conform to past U.S. actions regarding the mission, force posture, and direction that have historically been undertaken; particularly in comparison to the long and enduring presence of U.S. forces in Germany?

The comparison of the current U.S. war in Iraq to post war efforts in West Germany is a very contentious topic. On the one hand officials in the Bush administration such as Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice have offered the case for comparison citing the post-WWII “werewolf” insurgents as a model for today’s struggles. While on the other hand historians such as former National Security Council official Daniel Benjamin have scoffed at the attempt.²²⁸ The historical context that needs to be examined for congruencies and direction by this study, however, is rooted in the attempt to find a balance between international and domestic pressures, bureaucratic infighting and politics, and the conditions in the occupied country that have affected administration decisions, policies, and force postures as a reason for the continued presence of U.S. troops.

Following Victory in Europe day (VE day), the American forces found themselves in charge of a West Germany whose infrastructure, economy, and security were ravaged by the war. Much the same argument can be said for the situation following the invasion of Iraq and the successful removal of Saddam Hussein.²²⁹ Yet the fact remains paramount, that, though Dwight Eisenhower and Joseph Goebbels both suggested a hostile reception to U.S. forces, such resistance collapsed entirely on VE Day in May 1945, something which has not been the case in the wake of April 2003. The transition from an occupation to a reconstruction and stabilization force by the U.S. in West Germany was heavily influenced by the realization that American interests would be directly tied to a secure and prosperous West German state and Western Europe.

²²⁸ Both Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld have made such comparisons. Their remarks have been highly attacked by a multitude of historians. See Fred Kaplan, “What a 60 Year Old Allen Dulles Speech can Teach us About Postwar Reconstruction,” <http://www.slate.com/id/2089987/> and Daniel Benjamin, “Condi’s Phony History,” <http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/> (accessed March, 2008).

²²⁹ For purposes of discussion here, the end of the both wars is delineated by the defeat of the heads of the state; in this case Hitler and Hussein.

According to the strategy for victory in Iraq articulated earlier, the same can be said for the U.S. mission there as well, but the policy prior to the end of hostilities diverged in the aspect of how the U.S. government and forces anticipated the length and rigors of a sustained presence. The report explicitly states that American security is directly tied to the security of the greater Middle East and Iraq is the central front in that battle for security. The response by the U.S. in West Germany provided economic aid, established a constabulary force that was trained apart from the combat forces and engaging towards the West Germans, integrated West German police forces, and re-established the industrial base of West Germany to ensure economic self dependence. The response in Iraq, though similar, lacks complete congruence in the aspects of grand strategy, institutional response, as well as local society. Indeed, the U.S. has provided economic resources to rebuild Iraq and re-established and trained an Iraqi police force and Army. The largest difference, despite the rhetoric of the “hearts and minds” campaign, is the lack of a constabulary force to provide coherent security apart from combat and the lag time associated with same in the wake of spring 2003. Granted, the continued insurgency in Iraq tinders a glaring difference between the two wars, however, a professional cadre of trained U.S. personnel to swiftly fill the vacuum of the collapsed regime as well as build security through a comprehensive reconstruction and reform of state and society has been lacking or very half hearted at best. Until the local population can easily distinguish between a security force and an offensive force, stabilization and reconciliation will remain a daunting, distant task. To be sure, the U.S. and allied effort in Germany was frustrated by numerous hurdles and setbacks, to say nothing of the ill effects of the Cold War in its initial stages. However, the institutions of U.S. policy took the task of occupation and security building far more seriously in the era 1942-1946 than was the case in the years 2002-2005.

A significant trait that emerged across the three time periods evaluated earlier in this study was the influence that external wars (or internal if the war was unilateral) played on the role and presence of American troops in West Germany. Does the U.S. risk a similar influence while in Iraq? Although the U.S. is engaged in Iraq and its focus and interests have remained centered there, the U.S. has already expressed concern over

the rise and modernization of the Chinese military and the growing threat posed by Iran.²³⁰ Instability in Africa, the continued rise of China, and the uncertainty surrounding Iran all fight for American attention. Historically speaking, the Korean War saw an increase of American troops in West Germany while the Vietnam War saw the number reduced. If the United States shifts its focus to Iran, the likelihood of a troop increase in Iraq is probably high because of the proximity and influence to the current war. If a confrontation with China escalates, however, U.S. forces would likely need to be redeployed. Again, similar types of influences that affected the United States' long presence in West Germany might emerge for the U.S. while engaged in Iraq.

Much has been said regarding the two bloc standoff of the Cold War. The rise of the Soviet Union as a global threat forced the United States into action and the creation of the North Atlantic alliance. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush labeled Iran as a member of the "axis of evil." Then, again in his 2008 State of the Union address he revisited the Iranian issue and declared that the government in Tehran was aiding terrorists in Iraq and around the world as well as developing ballistic missiles of increasing range to go with its nuclear ambitions.²³¹ The tone of the message and desire to contain Iran conjures images of the Cold War past. Does Iran's emergent threat and resistance to international will mean that the United States will need to position itself for a long term mission in Iraq after it is stabilized and rebuilt much the same way they did in West Germany to counter the rising Soviet threat? If that is the case, will a strong strategic alliance, with the U.S. as the cornerstone, emerge in the region much the same way as NATO did in Western Europe?

Questions like the ones posed above will undoubtedly remain as the United States moves forward with its undertaking in Iraq and its desire to prosecute the ever changing and strategically diffuse Global War on Terror. Although lacking in direct comparison,

²³⁰ "Military Power of the People's Republic of China," report to Congress from the Department of Defense website http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf (accessed March 8, 2008).

²³¹ President Bush's remarks and State of the Union addresses can be accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov> (accessed March 9, 2008).

there are some strikingly similar influences between the past military campaigns of the United States and its current endeavors. The case of U.S. forces in Germany has been unique in place and time. However, the institutions of the U.S. military as a reflection of U.S. foreign policy spans time and geography in a manner that those who come freshly to the study of policy and strategy require a point a departure. This point of departure cannot be found in newspaper headlines, in internet blogs, and in uninformed chatter and sloppy historical analogies. Such analysis must proceed from as sober an analysis of the past, present and future as policymakers and scholars alike can muster in the difficulties of the present. The historical analysis of policy that this study undertook, regarding the evolving nature of influences on the U.S. force posture in what was once West Germany and later a united Germany, has provided a solid foundation and historical reference for those charged with determining the future of American foreign policy and its global posture. The same balancing act that was needed in the immediate postwar period of WWII that saw a transition from occupation forces to stationed forces that have endured foreign policy shifts, administrations, and military strategies are still needed today as the United States fights international and domestic pressure on its foreign policy, specifically in Iraq; battles bureaucratic infighting and politics, and struggles with the postwar conditions of Iraq. Unless one of those factors tips heavily in one direction causing a disengagement from the region, the American presence in Iraq may be set to endure in much the same fashion as the American presence in Germany.

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