Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
Abstract
Since 2006, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has contributed to the Project on National Security Reform's study of the interagency process. The Project's mission is "to assist national leadership in improving the U.S. Government's ability "to effectively provide for the nation's security in the 21st century". This study is aimed at developing an interagency reform agenda that would parallel the historic Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Project on National Security Reform is a nonpartisan initiative hosted by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. As part of this cooperative effort and in furtherance of the INSS mission to inform the national defense policy debate, INSS is publishing selected analyses on national security reform. This paper is a contribution to this endeavor. The war in Iraq reminds us of the role that uncertainty and friction play in both the planning and the execution of military operations. Uncertainty and friction also apply to writing history and analyses of decision making. At this juncture, there are no final truths about the war in Iraq, only early attempts to create a record. Those who demand complete and indisputable analysis of the war should remember that in the fall of 2007, some of our best scholars are still arguing over how World War I started.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA479692
Entities
People
- Joseph Collins
Organizations
- National Defense University