Paralyzed or Pulverized? The Fall of the Republican Guard
Abstract
In his seminal work, "Strategy," Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart argued for a psychological paralysis created by land maneuver. As Army V Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force fought through regular and paramilitary resistance, bypassed Iraqi strongholds, and quickly pressed Baghdad, the regime could not respond. On the surface, then, the campaign plan appeared to be a textbook application of Liddell Hart's indirect approach theory. But appearances can be deceiving. In conjunction with the ground maneuver, the coalition air component conducted its own multifaceted operations, which, according to air component Commander Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, USAF, ran the gamut from "strategic attack, to interdiction, to close air support, to resupply." This includes joint and international airpower assets. Significantly, Moseley's air plan focused not on breaking the regime's will or merely supporting a ground advance; instead, it focused on destruction. Rather than paralyzing the enemy, Moseley sought to engage him in decisive battle as Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz suggested nearly 200 years ago. Moseley's words are important for theorists and campaign strategists, for they suggest a role reversal between airpower and land power and highlight joint success. Furthermore, they suggest a rethinking of contemporary airpower theory, much of which has focused on paralysis. Through this apparent contradiction -- an indirect (although aggressive) ground scheme of maneuver, coupled with a direct air attack -- Clausewitz appears to explain the joint Iraqi Freedom campaign more fully than Liddell Hart. This essay compares the theorists' concepts and analyzes Iraqi Freedom in their terms. Which theorist better describes the character of war and thereby points out lessons for future conduct?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA479866
Entities
People
- Howard D. Belote