

CRS Report for Congress

Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries

November 27, 2007

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division



Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 27 NOV 2007		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 101 Independence Ave SE, Washington, DC, 20540-7500				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 23	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries

Summary

Russian oil and natural gas industries are increasingly important players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Another trend has been the increasing concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an increasingly authoritarian political system under the control of President Vladimir Putin, in which former intelligence officers play key roles.

Russian firms have tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of the countries of central and eastern Europe. They need these assets to transport energy supplies to lucrative western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where assets were sold to non-Russian firms, Russian firms cut off energy supplies to the facilities. Russia has also tried to build new pipelines to circumvent infrastructure that it does not control. Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices.

It is not completely clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is the primary explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions have been raised about the timing of such moves. Even the pursuit of multiple pipelines can be portrayed as a business decision. On the other hand, many countries of the region are concerned that Russia may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or to force them to make foreign policy concessions. Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries, Russian energy firms are able to manipulate the internal political situation by favoring certain local businessmen and politicians.

Administration officials have repeatedly criticized what they view as Russian efforts to use its energy supplies as a political weapon and have urged European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. The United States has strongly advocated the building of multiple pipelines from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. Members of Congress have also expressed concern about the impact on European countries of their dependence on Russian energy. In the 110th Congress, committees have held hearings that have touched on the issue. Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to worrisome aspects of Russian energy policy. Congress could address Russian energy policy in the future if it considers permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Russia. Related CRS products include *CRS Report RL33212, Russia Oil and Gas Challenges*, by Robert Pirog, and *CRS Report RL33636, The European Union's Energy Security Challenges*, by Paul Belkin. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents

Introduction	1
Russia's Oil and Gas Industries and Russian Foreign Policy	2
Gazprom	2
Russian Oil Companies	3
Russia's Objectives: Exploiting Dependency or Just Good Business?	4
Selected Recent Cases	7
Ukraine	7
Moldova	9
Georgia	10
Baltic States	11
Belarus	12
Armenia	13
U.S. Policy	13
U.S. "Pipeline Diplomacy"	14
Obstacles to U.S.-Supported Pipelines	16
Other Policy Issues	17
Congressional Response	19

List of Figures

Figure 1. Pipeline Map	20
------------------------------	----

Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries

Introduction

In recent years, Members of Congress, Administration officials, and many analysts have noted the dependence of many European countries on Russian energy. They have expressed concern that Russia is using this energy dependence as part of a larger effort to limit the sovereignty and pro-Western orientation of vulnerable neighboring countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. In addition to bolstering the sovereignty of these countries, the United States has also had a vital interest in keeping strong ties with NATO and EU member states. Some observers believe that these relations could be harmed in the long term if many of these states became too dependent on Russian energy.

At present, the European Union depends on Russia for 44% of its natural gas needs and 18% of its oil.¹ However, this figure conceals the fact that this dependence is unequally distributed. Some EU countries, many of them in central and eastern Europe, are dependent on Russia for most or all of the oil and natural gas they consume. For example, the Baltic states are entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas. Non-EU countries bordering Russia are also overwhelmingly or entirely dependent on Russian oil and natural gas.²

This report begins with a brief discussion of the Russian oil and gas industries, including their efforts to purchase energy infrastructure in central and eastern Europe and reduce energy subsidies to neighboring countries. A second section deals with the impact of recent Russian energy policy on neighboring countries, all of them formerly part of the Soviet Union, *de facto* or *de jure*, and all heavily dependent on Russian energy imports. Many of these countries are concerned about what they see as Russian efforts to manipulate that dependency to achieve political goals. A final section deals with U.S. efforts to promote the energy security of these countries and on Congress's response to the issue.³

¹ Presentation of Jeff Piper, "Toward an EU-Russia Energy Partnership," International Conference on Energy Security: The Role of Russian Gas Companies, 2007.

² U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA website [<http://www.eia.doe.gov>].

³ This report focuses on Russian oil and natural gas industries, due to their central importance to the countries concerned. Other energy issues, such as Russia's nuclear power industry, as well as electricity and coal exports, are not dealt with in this report.

Russia's Oil and Gas Industries and Russian Foreign Policy

Russian oil and natural gas industries are increasingly important players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Russia possesses over 30% of world natural gas reserves and at least 10% of global oil reserves. Another key trend has been the increasing concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an increasingly authoritarian political system under the tight control of President Vladimir Putin, a former officer of the Soviet KGB intelligence service. Both the leadership of Russian oil and gas firms and the Russian government are dominated by former members of the Russian intelligence service, now called the Federal Security Service (FSB), or are personally close to Putin, or both. For example, the head of the state oil company Rosneft is Igor Sechin, Putin's deputy chief of staff and formerly from the FSB. The head of the Russian oil pipeline monopoly Transneft is a former FSB officer who served with Putin in East Germany in the 1970s. The head of Gazprom, the Russian natural gas monopoly, is Alexei Miller, who worked for Putin in the St. Petersburg mayor's office in the 1990s. Other key posts at Gazprom are staffed by former KGB/FSB men.

The personal and political fortunes of Russia's leaders are tied to the energy firms, as Russia's economic revival and Putin's political popularity are in no small part due to the massive revenues generated by energy exports in a period of high global energy prices. However, many experts believe that the Russian leadership's state-oriented approach may be counterproductive for Russia in the long run, as output growth in Russian oil and gas fields is stagnating, despite rising international demand. They say Russia's oil and gas industries will likely need foreign investment and expertise, more efficient management, as well as less government regulation and taxation.

Gazprom

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the largest firm in Russia has been the state-controlled natural gas monopoly Gazprom. (The Russian government holds just over 50% of its shares.) It has a monopoly on gas pipelines in Russia. It controls nearly 90% of Russian gas production and over a quarter of the world's reserves of natural gas. Its impact within Russia is even more significant. It is the single largest contributor to the Russian government's budget, providing about 25% of tax receipts. It also controls banks, industrial holdings, farms, and media outlets.

Gazprom has been useful domestically to Russian leaders. It provides 76% of its production at a loss (at prices 15-20% of those in Europe) to Russian companies and consumers, who often cannot or will not pay, thereby helping to ease social pressures. In exchange for subsidizing Russian domestic consumers, Gazprom receives a virtual monopoly on exports to richer customers abroad. Two-thirds of Gazprom's revenue comes from European customers. Many experts say Gazprom needs to substantially increase domestic prices for gas if it is ever to become a viable business. Russia has agreed to gradually increase some domestic gas prices to bring them closer to world market levels by 2011. The move was taken in response to EU

criticisms of the price subsidy in negotiations over Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁴

Gazprom's key current gas fields are in decline, its infrastructure is aging, and substantial investment will be needed just to maintain current, nearly stagnant production levels. Most foreign observers believe Gazprom could use foreign investment to provide expertise and capital. Indeed, in late 2005 Russia abolished the "ring fence" that barred foreigners from owning Gazprom shares. Current foreign ownership of Gazprom shares is modest; the largest foreign investor is the German firm E.ON, with a 6% stake.⁵

However, Gazprom's actions in other areas appear to point toward more state control and not toward more foreign investment. For example, in 2006, Gazprom bought out half of the interest of Shell and other foreign companies in the Sakhalin-2 gas field project at a very low price after the Russian government found alleged environmental problems in Shell's management of the project. In June 2007, the Russian-British TNK-BP oil firm was forced to sell its Kovytko gas field in Siberia cheaply to Gazprom, after Gazprom refused to approve an export route for the gas. Russia has also announced that it would develop its Shtokman field in the Arctic without international participation.

Russian Oil Companies

In the 1990s, the Russian government did not have a large stake in Russian oil production. The major oil companies were controlled by politically well-connected businessmen, dubbed oligarchs. This policy changed in 2003, when Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the giant Yukos oil firm, was arrested on tax evasion and other charges. However, most observers believe that the real reason for the arrest was that President Putin believed Khodorkovsky was showing unacceptable signs of political independence from the Kremlin. Yukos was hit with government claims for back taxes and declared bankrupt. In 2004, its key oil field assets were bought very cheaply by the Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft. The Yukos affair is not the only example of this trend. In 2005, Gazprom bought another major oil company, Sibneft, from oligarch Roman Abramovich, at a cut-rate price. The firm is now called Gazprom Neft. The Russian government now controls over 30% of Russia's oil production.⁶

In 2006, Putin said that the state would not take control of additional Russian oil companies. However, the strengthening of state control over the industry may be conducted by other means. The Russian government has placed pressure on foreign oil companies to sell their stakes in lucrative Russian oil fields to Russian state firms. The non-state oil firms that remain, such as Lukoil, are careful to retain close connections to Russian political leaders, in order to retain control of their businesses.

⁴ EIA Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA website [<http://www.eia.doe.gov>].

⁵ "France Wants Stake in Russia Gas Giant," Reuters news agency, October 10, 2007.

⁶ "Peter Finn, "Russian Giant Expands Control of Oil," *Washington Post*, September 29, 2005, D06.

For example, in July 2007, after more than a year of harassment by Russian prosecutors and tax authorities, Mikhail Gutseriyev, the head of the modestly-sized Russian oil firm Russneft announced that he would sell his stake to Oleg Deripaska, a powerful businessman with close ties with the Kremlin.⁷

Despite increasing direct and indirect state control, Russian oil firms continue to seek ties to foreign oil companies, provided that they are satisfied with a minority stake. ConocoPhillips has a 10% share in Lukoil. The Italian firm ENI has a 20% stake in Gazprom Neft. The second largest Russian oil firm, TNK-BP, was formed by the merger of the Tyumen Oil Company with British Petroleum (BP) in 2003. State-owned Rosneft floated shares on the London Stock Exchange in 2006. BP, the Malaysia state firm Petronas, and China's NCPC bought shares accounting for a modest 7.5% of Rosneft's total capital.

In addition to increasing control over oil production, the government controls Russia's oil and refined product pipelines, through the state firm Transneft. This monopoly gives the Russian government leverage against Russian private firms, foreign investors and foreign countries, if needed. For example, Transneft is the largest shareholder in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The CPC pipeline carries oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. This gives Russia a near monopoly on the transport of Kazakh oil destined for western markets. Other members include ExxonMobil and Chevron, which are involved in the exploitation of the Kazakh oil fields. In addition, Moscow has presented the Western oil companies with repeated financial demands, and threatening them with legal proceedings for allegedly unpaid taxes to Russia if they do not comply.⁸

Russia's Objectives: Exploiting Dependency or Just Good Business?

Through its energy firms, Moscow has pursued several objectives in recent years. Russia has tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of the countries of central and eastern Europe. Russia needs these assets to transport energy supplies to Western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where energy infrastructure was sold to non-Russian firms, Russia cut off energy supplies to the facilities.

Russian firms have recently attempted to buy energy infrastructure in western European countries, provoking unease in the EU. The EU has pressed Russia to open up its pipelines to western firms and to provide stronger protections for foreign investment in Russia's energy sector. Russia has flatly rejected EU demands that it ratify the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, which enshrines these principles. EU efforts to include the key components of the Energy Charter into a new Russia-EU

⁷ "Russneft Ordeal Places Premium on Loyalty," *Oxford Analytica*, August 2, 2007.

⁸ For more on Russia's oil and natural gas industries, see CRS Report RL33212, *Russia Oil and Gas Challenges*, by Robert Pirog.

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) have also been stymied. The EU Commission has proposed a new EU energy policy that would prohibit energy-producing companies from owning distribution networks. It would also bar foreign companies from investing in EU distribution networks, unless that country permitted such investment in its own networks. Russia has strongly criticized the Commission proposal.

EU countries have also been concerned about Russian actions to coordinate export policy with other natural gas-producing countries such as Algeria, evoking the specter of a cartel, or “gas OPEC.” Russia has also hinted that the bulk of Russian energy exports could be provided to China instead of Europe in the future, once new pipelines to Asia are completed. However, it is unclear whether the EU can adopt an effective common policy on the Russian energy question. Central and eastern European countries within the EU want the EU to take a stronger stance against dependence on Russia for energy, but energy companies and other influential voices in countries such as Germany and Italy are reluctant to upset Moscow on the issue.⁹

Facing difficulties in securing control of energy infrastructure in central and eastern Europe, Russia has tried to bypass countries in the region entirely where possible. It is expanding the use of the Baltic Pipeline system and its oil terminal at the port of Primorsk and reducing the use of oil terminals in the Baltic states, such as Butinge in Lithuania and Ventspils in Latvia. In addition, Russia is considering pipeline projects involving Murmansk and other ports in northern Russia. Gazprom has started preliminary work on the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), which would transport natural gas from Russia to Germany via a pipeline under the Baltic Sea starting as early as 2010, bypassing the states of central and eastern Europe. Another possible project is Yamal-Europe 2. This long-proposed pipeline, which would parallel a currently-operating one, would run through Belarus and Poland, bypassing Ukraine. The pipeline is unlikely ever to be built, as the Russian government and Gazprom have rejected Belarusian proposals to reactivate the Yamal-Europe 2 plans. However, if NEGP does not come to fruition, it is at least possible the Yamal-Europe 2 plan could be reactivated.

By seeking a range of transit routes through the region, Russia may be trying to reduce the leverage that transit countries, including those in central and eastern Europe, have in negotiations with Russian energy firms. Experts note that the capacity of these new routes, if built, would likely outstrip Russia’s capacity to produce oil and gas to fill them, allowing Russia to allocate scarce production to “favored” transit countries. Russia may also be trying to reduce the attractiveness of other routes for oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe and Asia that would bypass Russia.¹⁰

Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including

⁹ For more on EU energy policy, see CRS Report RL33636, *The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges*, by Paul Belkin.

¹⁰ Vladimir Socor, “South Stream; Gazprom’s New Mega-project,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 25, 2007.

by gradually raising the price these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices.¹¹ These actions may be seen as paralleling the reduction of subsidies to Russian domestic consumers. However, Russia has also used the withdrawal of price subsidies and the unpaid energy debts of countries in the region as leverage to try to secure key energy infrastructure in those countries.

It is not completely clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is the primary explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions have been raised about the timing of such moves. In support of their actions, Russian leaders point to the fact that Russian allies such as Armenia and Belarus have also been subject to energy price hikes. The pursuit of multiple pipelines can also be portrayed as a business decision, although some analysts disagree about its wisdom. They assert that Russia would do better to invest in boosting production rather than building pipelines that it may not be able to fill as its current oil and gas fields decline.

On the other hand, many countries of central and eastern Europe are concerned that Russia may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or force them to make foreign policy concessions. Gazprom's recent increases in energy prices to Georgia and Ukraine came after elections brought to power pro-Western leaders in what were termed respectively the "Rose" and "Orange" Revolutions, in reference to their campaign symbols. Analysts have asserted that Russian leaders feared so-called "color revolutions" elsewhere in the former Soviet countries that could reduce Russia's influence, and even perhaps threaten Russia's own increasingly authoritarian regime. Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries, Russia is able to manipulate the internal political situation by favoring certain local businessmen with participation in local business ventures of Gazprom or other Russian energy firms. These businessmen are in a position to assume a powerful political role themselves or bribe politicians to do Moscow's bidding.¹²

Critics of Russian policy say Moscow's motives become even clearer when viewed in the context of other actions to apply pressure to neighboring states. For example, Moldova's economy has been seriously harmed by a wine import ban Russia has imposed, ostensibly for health reasons. Georgia has been hurt by Russian immigration restrictions and a wine ban. Both countries have also faced problems with Russian support for breakaway regions on their territories. NATO and EU member Estonia suffered a reduction in transit traffic from Russia, as well as cyberattacks that may have been instigated by Russia, in the wake of a controversy over the removal of a Soviet-era military statue from Estonia's capital in April 2007.

¹¹ Keith C. Smith, "Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe," CSIS Euro-Focus, January 24, 2007.

¹² Testimony of Zeyno Baran before a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on "Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Transition," June 25, 2007.

Selected Recent Cases

The countries discussed in this report have all faced the impact of Russian energy policy recently. All are heavily or entirely dependent upon Russia for their natural gas and oil imports. They face common issues of cost (transition to world market prices), reliability of supplies, and Russian efforts to control downstream infrastructure such as pipelines, refineries, and domestic distribution networks. The countries differ in their geopolitical orientation. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are non-EU, non-NATO countries that have had or have recently adopted a pro-Western orientation that Moscow opposes. The Baltic states are EU and NATO members, but Russia maintains a strong hold on their energy sectors. On the other hand, Belarus has been Russia's most loyal supporter in Europe, while Armenia has been a strong ally of Moscow in the south Caucasus region.

Ukraine

Although it possesses modest oil and natural gas reserves of its own, Ukraine is dependent upon Russia for most of its oil and natural gas, both from Russia's own oil and natural gas fields and from Russian-controlled pipelines from Ukraine's suppliers in Central Asia, especially gas from Turkmenistan. In 2004, these imports account for 80% of Ukraine's oil consumption and 78% of its natural gas consumption. Natural gas accounts for half of Ukraine's energy usage. Most Ukrainian homes are heated by natural gas. Ukraine's steel and other heavy industries, which play a key role in Ukraine's exports, are highly inefficient users of energy. However, Ukraine's vulnerability to Russian pressure has been mitigated by the fact that the main oil and natural gas pipelines to central and western Europe transit its territory. Ukraine owns the sections of the pipelines that run through its territory as well as large gas storage facilities Ukraine has received transit fees from Gazprom, paid partly in gas and partly in cash. Seventy-eight percent of Russia's gas exports pass through Ukraine.¹³

Energy issues have played a key role in Russian-Ukrainian relations since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian firms supplied energy to Ukraine at prices far below market rates. In the early 1990s, these firms cut off supplies to Ukraine at times due to unpaid energy debts. Energy sales have been conducted by non-transparent intermediary institutions, offering the elites of both countries opportunities to profit.

Until recently, Ukrainian foreign policy tried to strike a balance between improving ties with the West, including nominal support for Euro-Atlantic integration, while not offending Moscow. However, in early 2005, Viktor Yushchenko was elected President of Ukraine, overcoming the previous regime's attempts at electoral fraud, in what was termed the "Orange Revolution." Russian leaders, who had strongly backed his opponent, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, reacted angrily to Yushchenko's victory. Yushchenko, Ukraine's first clearly pro-

¹³ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Ukraine, March 2006, from the EIA website [<http://www.eia.doe.gov>].

Western leader, said Ukraine would conduct serious reforms so that it could join NATO and the European Union as soon as it was ready.

Soon after Yushchenko took office, Gazprom started to demand a sharp increase in the price of natural gas that it supplied to Ukraine. By the end of 2005, Gazprom demanded a price increase for its natural gas from \$50 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to \$230 per tcm, the current market price. When Ukraine rejected this proposal, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine on December 31, 2006. Ukraine then diverted to its own use some of the gas that Gazprom intended for European customers. After western European governments protested sharply, Gazprom resumed gas deliveries on January 2. Two days later, the Russian government and Gazprom reached an agreement with Ukraine for ensuring gas supplies to Ukraine. The agreement called for gas to be purchased by Ukraine through an intermediary firm, RosUkrEnergo. This firm pays for gas from Central Asia at a price lower than market levels, and adds gas from Russia at market prices, and provides it to Ukraine at an average price of \$95 per tcm. The agreement also provides for higher transit fee payments to Ukraine (now entirely in cash rather than partly in gas).

Perhaps more troubling for Ukraine, the accord called for the creation of UkrGazEnergo, a joint venture between RosUkrEnergo and the Ukrainian gas firm Naftogaz that grants the former access to one-half of Ukraine's domestic market. Ukraine's intelligence service reportedly believes the owners of RosUkrEnergo are using their control over energy supplies to secure ownership of energy intensive industries such as fertilizer plants and a titanium plant.¹⁴

Some analysts are concerned about possible involvement of organized crime groups in RosUkrEnergo, as well as corrupt links with Russian and Ukrainian officials. The U.S. Justice Department is reportedly investigating the firm.¹⁵ Nominally, Gazprom owns 50% of RosUkrEnergo, Ukrainian businessman Dimitry Firtash owns 45%, and another Ukrainian businessman owns 5%. Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who was an important player in the natural gas industry in the 1990s, called for the elimination of RosUkrEnergo as a middleman. She was dismissed by Yushchenko in September 2005, in a move that some observers believed was aimed in part at appeasing Gazprom and its supporters within the Ukrainian government.

Yanukovych's party won Ukraine's March 2006 parliamentary elections, and Yanukovych once again become Prime Minister. Gazprom's discussions with the Yanukovych government in late 2006 went more smoothly than those of the previous year. In 2007, Russia and Ukraine agreed on a moderate increase in the natural gas price. The two sides agreed to gradually increase the price of Russian natural gas to

¹⁴ Roman Kupchinsky, "Russia/Ukraine: Pipeline Conflict Resurfaces," Radio-Free Europe Radio Liberty Newslines, June 28, 2007.

¹⁵ Glenn R. Simpson and David Crawford, "Supplier of Russian Gas Draws Investigation," Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2006, 1. For background on the gas crisis, see CRS Report RS22378, *Russia's Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine: Context and Implications*, by Bernard Gelb, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel.

Ukraine over the next five years, until it reaches the world market price. Some observers have seen Gazprom's tough attitude toward Ukraine in the 2005 negotiations and its relatively benign stance in 2006 as evidence that Russia has manipulated the gas issue to undermine Yushchenko. In September 2007, Putin appeared to verify this view when he said that Russia had no desire to provide cheap energy to "Orange" forces.¹⁶

On September 30, 2007, Ukraine held closely contested parliamentary elections. On October 2, as the vote count showed a narrow victory by "Orange" parties, Gazprom announced that it would reduce gas supplies to Ukraine, if Ukraine did not pay outstanding debts to Gazprom by the end of the month. Gazprom officials hinted that Ukraine's energy debts could be solved if it turned over shares in the gas pipeline system to Gazprom as payment. However, the crisis was resolved when the Ukrainian government agreed to provide gas in Ukrainian storage facilities as payment. If the model of past years holds, Ukraine may experience a sharp jump in the cost of its natural gas this winter if Gazprom nemesis Tymoshenko is elected as Prime Minister.

Russia has continued to pursue its long-standing goal of ownership of Ukraine's natural gas pipelines and storage facilities, as well as its local gas distribution network. In February 2007, Putin announced that he and Prime Minister Yanukovich had agreed on joint Russian-Ukrainian control of Ukraine's natural gas assets, in exchange for a Ukrainian stake in Russian natural gas fields. However, this statement provoked a strongly negative reaction in Ukraine, and in February 2007 the parliament approved a law banning any transfer of control of the pipelines by a vote of 430-0. Russia has tied possible support for building new pipelines in Ukraine to greater Gazprom ownership of Ukraine's pipeline system. Russia is also working on developing new energy export routes through the Baltic Sea and the Balkans to western Europe that could bypass Ukraine, at least in part. If successful, these efforts could reduce Ukraine's leverage over Russia on energy issues.

Moldova

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, according to the World Bank. It is entirely dependent upon Russia for its energy resources, and also as a market for the wine and agricultural products that are its main exports. In 2005, Russia restricted wine and other agricultural imports from Moldova, allegedly over health concerns, dealing a very heavy blow to the country's economy. Russia has stalled on implementing pledges to end its embargo on Moldovan wine, still citing health concerns. In addition, Russia has supported a breakaway regime in the Transnistria region of the country, including by deploying 1,500 troops there.

In part due to its vulnerable position, Moldova has tried to balance ties between Moscow and Western countries. However, since 2003, Moldovan leaders, despairing of striking a deal with Moscow over the Transnistria problem, have sought greater engagement with the West, irritating Russia. Perhaps even more irksome to Moscow, in 2005, Moldova, with EU help, began to tighten its customs policies to

¹⁶ *The Times* of London, September 15, 2007, 4.

stop profitable smuggling operations from Transnistrian territory. Powerful groups in Ukraine and Russia have profited from the Transnistria regime's activities. Russia provides subsidies to Transnistria, which include grants and loans as well as subsidized energy. In return, Russian firms have received stakes in Transnistrian businesses.¹⁷

Russia has increased pressure on Moldova on the issue of energy supplies. On January 1, 2006, the Russian government-controlled firm Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Moldova, after Moldova rejected Gazprom's demand for a doubling of the price Moldova pays for natural gas. Gazprom restored supplies on January 17, in exchange for a price increase from \$60 per 1,000 cubic meters to \$110. Moldova also agreed to give Gazprom, already the majority shareholder, Transnistria's 13% stake in MoldovaGaz, which controls Moldova's natural gas pipelines and other infrastructure (Moldova had earlier ceded majority control to Gazprom in exchange for settling Moldova's gas debts). As a result of the agreement, Gazprom now holds 63.4% of MoldovaGaz's shares and has control of Moldova's domestic gas infrastructure. Gazprom increased the price of its gas to Moldova to \$170 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2007. It is planned that the price will be increased until it reaches the price paid by EU member states in 2011. However, as the price is set yearly, Moscow could increase prices more quickly if desired, for political or other reasons.¹⁸

Georgia

Georgia began to follow a clearly pro-Western orientation after the "Rose Revolution" of November 2003, which swept out of power political forces with close ties to Russia after they had tried to use electoral fraud to win legislative elections. Mihael Saakashvili won presidential elections in early 2004. Georgia is seeking NATO membership. Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated in the wake of the Rose Revolution. Russia has many ways to pressure Georgia, including supporting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and disrupting economic ties between Georgia and Russia, including in the energy sphere.

In late 2005, Gazprom announced substantial increases in the price of gas shipped to Georgia. In the winter of 2005-2006, unknown saboteurs bombed gas pipelines in Russia, temporarily cutting off supplies to Georgia. Gazprom announced in November 2006 that it would cut off gas supplies to Georgia by the end of the year unless Georgia agreed to a 100% price hike or sold its main gas pipeline to Gazprom.

However, Georgia's geographical position neighboring energy-rich Azerbaijan has allowed it to counter Russian pressure more effectively than other countries. Georgia is a transit state for a pipeline completed in mid-2006 carrying one million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC pipeline). Another pipeline completed in early 2007 initially carries 2.2 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani natural gas to Georgia and Turkey, lessening

¹⁷ International Crisis Group, "Moldova's Uncertain Future," August 17, 2006, from the ICG website [<http://www.crisisgroup.org>].

¹⁸ Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 4, 2007.

their dependence on Russia as a supplier. Another pipeline carries oil from Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa.¹⁹

Baltic States

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are members of NATO and the EU. They have often had difficult relations with Moscow. About 90% of their oil comes from Russia, and 100% of their natural gas. They faced Soviet energy supply cutoffs in the early 1990s, as they were trying to achieve independence and shortly thereafter. They have paid world market prices for their energy supplies since shortly after achieving independence.

In the past few years, the main concern in the Baltic states has been Russian efforts to increase control over the energy infrastructure in their countries. Gazprom has a large equity stake in domestic natural gas companies of each of the three Baltic countries.²⁰ When Russian takeover efforts have failed, Russia has cut off energy supplies to Baltic energy facilities. One striking case involves the Mazeikiai oil complex in Lithuania. Mazeikiai includes a large refinery, the Butinge maritime terminal, and a pipeline. It is the largest enterprise in Lithuania (accounting for about 10% of Lithuania's GDP) and provides vitally-needed tax revenue. In 1999, the U.S. firm Williams International bought a large stake in Mazeikiai and also received the operating rights. In response, the state-run Russian oil firm Lukoil, which supplied the oil to the refinery, slowed deliveries to a trickle, making Mazeikiai unprofitable. This led Williams, which had financial problems of its own, to sell its stake to Yukos in 2002.

Under Yukos, the refinery became profitable again. However, when Yukos later fell afoul of Russian authorities, and was driven into bankruptcy, Yukos attempted to sell its stake in Mazeikiai. The Polish oil firm PKN Orlen agreed to buy out Yukos, despite an effort by the Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft to purchase the refinery. At the end of July 2006, the Russian government-owned oil transport company Transneft announced that the part of the Druzhba oil pipeline that supplies Mazeikiai was temporarily shutting down for repairs following an oil leak. Transneft later said that it would not be reopening the pipeline, due to its unprofitability. Transneft has blocked Lithuania's efforts to secure supplies from Kazakhstan through Transneft's pipelines. Critics charged that once again Russia was manipulating energy supplies to punish Lithuania for seeking to diversify ownership in its energy sector.²¹

¹⁹ For more on Georgia, see *CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, *CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests*, and *CRS Report 97-727, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy*, all by Jim Nichol.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Baltic Sea Regional Fact Sheet, July 2006, from the EIA website [<http://www.eia.doe.gov>].

²¹ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 161, August 18, 2006.

Another example of a Russian company using its control over energy supplies in an effort to strong-arm a Baltic country into handing over key infrastructure occurred in January 2003. The Russian-government controlled Transneft oil pipeline company cut off all oil shipments to the Latvian oil terminal at the port of Ventspils, after having decreased shipments in late 2002. The move was a large blow to Latvia, as Ventspils has been important to Latvia's economy. Transneft diverted the oil shipments to its own Baltic Pipeline System and the Russian port of Primorsk, which it controls. Transneft claims that there is no demand for using Ventspils, a claim viewed with skepticism by outside observers. Most saw the move as a power play by Transneft to secure a controlling share of the firm Ventspils Nafta, which operates the oil terminal.²²

Estonia has also felt the effects of Russian pressure on its energy supply. On May 2, 2007, Russia's state railway monopoly halted delivery of oil products and coal to Estonia in the midst of a political furor over the relocation of a Soviet war memorial statue from a square in central Tallinn, Estonia's capital.²³

Belarus

Belarus, under the authoritarian leadership of President Aleksandr Lukashenko, has been Moscow's most loyal ally in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus's unreformed, largely Soviet-style economy is heavily dependent on cheap Russian natural gas and oil. Gazprom long supplied Belarus with energy at Russian domestic prices, providing a large indirect subsidy to the Lukashenko regime.

However, in 2006, it appeared that Russia had decided to reduce its subsidies to Lukashenko. In late 2006, Gazprom strongly pressured Belarus to sell to it control of the Beltransgaz natural gas firm (which controls the pipelines and other infrastructure on Belarusian territory) and other key Belarusian energy firms, or face the quadrupling of the price Belarus would pay for Russian natural gas. Gazprom threatened a cut-off in supplies on January 1, 2007, if Belarus did not agree to pay the higher price. Just hours before the deadline, however, the two sides reached an agreement that averted a gas shutoff. Belarus agreed to pay \$105 per 1000 cubic meters in 2007, more than double the \$46.48 it paid in 2006. Moreover, prices are scheduled to rise steadily over the next few years, reaching world market levels in 2011. Belarus also agreed to sell Gazprom a majority stake in Beltransgaz. Gazprom will pay for its share in installments between 2007 and 2010.

After settling the gas dispute, the two countries were soon embroiled in conflict over oil supplies. In addition to receiving cheap natural gas, Belarus has also benefitted from inexpensive and duty-free crude oil supplies that are processed at Belarusian refineries. Belarus then sold the bulk of these refined products to EU countries at a hefty profit. In January 2007, Russia moved to sharply reduce this subsidy to the Belarusian economy. Russia imposed a tariff on oil exports to Belarus.

²² Keith C. Smith, "Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe," CSIS Euro-Focus, January 24, 2007 from the CSIS website [<http://www.cis.org/europe>].

²³ Russian authorities cited track repairs and a shortage of wagons. RFE/RL, *Newsline*, May 3, 2007.

Belarus retaliated by increasing transit fees for Russian oil supplies to Western Europe. When Russia refused to pay, Belarus cut off oil supplies to Western European countries, angering their governments.

Belarus and Russia ended the crisis by agreeing that Belarus would raise its export duty on crude and refined oil products to Western Europe to match that imposed by Russia. Russia would then exempt Belarus from most of the new Russian oil export duty. Perhaps most significantly, Belarus agreed to hand over to Russia 70% of the proceeds that it receives from its exports of refined oil products to the Western market. This figure will be gradually increased to 85% in 2009. The drop in support from Moscow has caused Lukashenko to cut some government spending and to look to Western banks for loans.²⁴ Increased capacity at its oil terminal at Primorsk may also lead to Russia reducing its use of the Druzhba pipeline, which runs through Belarus.

Armenia

Armenia and Russia have close political and military ties, in large part due to Armenia's desire for support in its struggle with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. However, in early 2006, Russia informed Armenia that it would sharply increase the price it would have to pay for gas. In May 2006, Armenia agreed to relinquish various energy assets to Russian firms as partial payment for this price increase. Some critics have alleged that Russia now has virtual control over Armenia's energy supplies.

In October 2006, Armenian officials announced that Gazprom would assume effective management control of an Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline. According to some experts, this acquisition may indicate Russia's intent to block use of Armenia as a pipeline route independent of Russian control. The first segment of the gas pipeline was completed in March 2007, with the rest to be completed in 2008. Some of the gas will be used to generate electricity for Iran and Georgia, but the remainder may satisfy all Armenia's other consumption needs, removing its dependence on Russian gas transported via Georgia.²⁵

U.S. Policy

The United States has repeatedly criticized what it has viewed as Russian efforts to use its energy supplies as a political weapon. During the January 2006 natural gas standoff between Russia and Ukraine, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack criticized Russia for using "energy for political purposes." He stressed that while the Administration supported a gradual increase in prices to market levels,

²⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Belarus, March 2007.

²⁵ For more on Armenia, see *CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, and *CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests*, both by Jim Nichol.

it disagreed with a “precipitous” increase and cutoff. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice likewise on January 5 stated that Russia had made “politically motivated efforts to constrain energy supply to Ukraine.”²⁶ In May 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney criticized Russia’s tactics of “supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation” against vulnerable countries in the region as “blackmail” and intimidation.”²⁷ In testimony before Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Administration in June 2007, Administration officials cast doubt on the reliability of Russian oil and natural gas supplies to Europe and criticized Moscow’s “nationalistic interventions in its energy sector.”²⁸ On October 23, 2007, Secretary Rice noted that “we respect Russia’s interests, but no interest is served if Russia uses its great wealth, its oil and gas wealth, as a political weapon, or that if it treats its independent neighbors as part of some old sphere of influence.”²⁹

While the Administration has been active on this issue, skeptics might argue that key U.S. interests are not at stake, given the fact that the problem is one of European dependence, not that of the United States. Moreover, the EU and other European countries will have to be the main players in finding a solution (if they have the will to do so), with the United States playing a secondary role.

U.S. “Pipeline Diplomacy”

The United States has urged European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy supplies. The United States has strongly advocated the building of multiple pipelines to supply energy from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. These projects include the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline), which carries one million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Another important project supported by the United States has been the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCGP), which taps Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field.

In the longer term, through about 2020, the United States supports expanding the SCGP. The United States also supports the Nabucco pipeline, an EU-sponsored project that would supply natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The EU hopes construction of the pipeline will begin in 2008, and be completed by 2011. Another

²⁶ The State Department. Statement, January 1, 2006; Daily Press Briefing, January 3, 2006; Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at the State Department Correspondents Association’s Breakfast, January 5, 2006.

²⁷ “Vice President’s Remarks at the Vilnius Conference,” May 4, 2006, from the White House website [<http://www.whitehouse.gov>].

²⁸ Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of Gregory Manuel, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State and International Energy Coordinator, Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, and Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, June 25, 2007.

²⁹ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Opening Remarks at the Office of the Historian’s Conference on U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969-1976,” from the State Department website, [<http://www.state.gov>].

U.S.-backed proposal is a Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) gas pipeline. The connection of the Turkish and Greek gas pipelines was completed in November 2007. The Greek and Italian gas transport systems are scheduled to be connected by 2012.

Turkey plays a central role in all of these pipeline projects. Turkey limits shipping in the Bosphorus Strait due to environmental concerns. This reduces the potential for tankers to use the Black Sea to ship oil and gas to European markets. Therefore, supplies from the Caucasus and Central Asia must cross Turkey's territory or transit across the Black Sea from the Caucasus in the east to the Balkans in the west. The United States has supported the American Macedonian Bulgarian Oil pipeline (AMBO), another Bosphorus bypass project. It could supply Caspian oil from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas through Macedonia to Albania's Adriatic port of Vlore. It is expected to begin construction in 2008 and be completed in 2011.

The United States has advocated extending an existing oil pipeline that currently runs from the oil terminal at Odesa in Ukraine to Brody, on the Polish border. This pipeline could then be extended to Gdansk in northern Poland. However, the project remains stalled due to a lack of financing. At present, the Odesa-Brody pipeline runs in the reverse direction, pumping Russian oil to Odesa. In October 2007, representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Georgia, and Azerbaijan met with EU and U.S. officials at an Energy Security Conference in Vilnius, Lithuania to discuss how to reduce the dependence of vulnerable countries on Russian energy resources and pipelines. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Poland signed an agreement to fund a feasibility study on the Odesa-Brody extension project. Another proposal at the conference was a gas pipeline dubbed White Stream, which would provide gas from the Caspian through a pipeline under the Black Sea from Georgia to Crimea, in Ukraine. The pipeline would have to pass over Russia's Blue Stream pipeline on the seabed.³⁰

U.S. officials have criticized the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) project, which would traverse the Baltic Sea floor, supplying Germany and other western European countries with natural gas, and bypassing the central and eastern European countries through which the main current pipelines run. The U.S. has supported discussions by Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states on alternatives, including delivering Norway's expanding gas production to northern Europe via Danish pipelines and by developing liquified natural gas terminals in Poland and the Baltic states.³¹

Germany supports the NEGP, as it is looking for a dependable source of natural gas, particularly after the natural gas and oil crises between Russia and Ukraine and Belarus, which briefly interrupted supplies in 2006 and 2007. Gazprom owns 51% of the NEGP project, while two German firms and a Dutch firm own the rest. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is chairman of the NEGP consortium. On the other hand, the Baltic countries, Poland and Ukraine have expressed opposition to the NEGP, fearing that it will give Moscow more leverage on energy

³⁰ Eurasia Daily Report, October 12, 2007.

³¹ Testimony of Gregory Manuel, Matthew Bryza, and Steven Mann in a hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.

issues with them. Estonia has blocked NEGP requests to conduct surveys in the waters of its exclusive economic zone for the pipeline. Sweden has objected on environmental grounds to the current path the pipeline would take through its own waters, forcing the consortium to submit to it another proposed route for approval. The pipeline would also run through the economic zones of Finland, and Denmark.

Obstacles to U.S.-Supported Pipelines. These U.S. efforts at “pipeline diplomacy” face challenges. The success or failure of these projects will likely depend more on whether private energy firms find them profitable than on U.S. diplomatic skill and energy. A particular concern is whether there is enough oil and natural gas to supply the various pipelines. Russian-supported pipelines appear to have the upper hand because they have copious supplies available. Their potential profitability makes them tempting even to central and eastern European countries that are trying to reduce dependence on Russia. In addition, Moscow can offer them and western European firms participation in exploiting oil and natural gas fields in Russia.

For example, the prospects for Nabucco are clouded as Moscow has proposed alternative pipelines on similar routes in order to steer European countries away from full support for the U.S. and EU-backed projects. These include plans to extend the Blue Stream gas pipeline (which currently runs from Russia to Turkey) through the Balkans. In November 2007, Gazprom and the Italian firm ENI signed an agreement to build a “South Stream” gas pipeline that would run from Russia to Turkey, through the Balkans, with branches to Austria and Italy. The Austrian state-controlled energy firm OMV has agreed to sell a 50% stake in its Baumgarten gas storage and distribution center. The move could allow Moscow to block Nabucco, as Baumgarten is the planned terminus of the project.³²

Russian firms will hold a majority stake in an oil pipeline under the Black Sea connecting Russia to Bulgaria’s port of Burgas, then on to Alexandroupolis on Greece’s Aegean coast. It is scheduled to begin construction in 2008 and be completed by 2010. This project could compete with the U.S.-backed AMBO pipeline project, scheduled for construction in 2008 and completion in 2011.

It is less clear whether sufficient oil and gas supplies exist for U.S.-supported alternative routes. The United States is strongly opposed to tapping Iran’s energy resources, due to Iran’s support of terrorism, its nuclear ambitions, its policy in Iraq, and other factors. Turmoil in Iraq makes it unlikely supplies can be drawn from there in the near future. The main U.S. hopes lie with Central Asia and Azerbaijan. However, Moscow retains strong levers of influence over oil-rich Kazakhstan and key natural gas supplier Turkmenistan, including control over the pipelines transporting most of their current output. In May 2007, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia agreed to build a new natural gas pipeline from Central Asia along the Caspian Sea to Russia, in yet another apparent effort to eclipse U.S.-led alternatives.

Russia and Iran have imposed another obstacle to U.S.-supported efforts. They have asserted that no country bordering the Caspian Sea can legally undertake

³² Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 19, 2007.

projects such as building a pipeline on the seabed or drilling for oil and gas there without the consent of all Caspian littoral states. Although the other littoral states reject the Russo-Iranian view, this position could make potential investors leery of investing in such a project. Shipments via oil tanker across the Caspian to Baku can be increased, but would be more expensive.

On the other hand, given the fact that Moscow has often struck a hard bargain with Central Asian countries on the use of Russian pipelines, alternative routes may be tempting to them in the future. For example, Turkmenistan is forced to sell its gas to Gazprom for little more than one-third of the price that Gazprom gets when it sells it to European countries. Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction of Central Asian energy producers with Russia may not necessarily mean that they will opt for U.S.-supported pipelines to Europe. They have decided to develop pipelines eastward, toward China and the rest of Asia. Increased transport of energy to Asia through non-Russian pipelines could have a significant impact on the energy plans of the United States, the European Union, and Russia.

Azerbaijan is the most eager participant in the U.S.-supported pipeline plans, but has the disadvantage that it has only modest amounts of oil and natural gas to export at present. The United States hopes that this will change by 2015 or 2016 as Azerbaijan develops its gas fields.³³

Other Policy Issues

The Europeans, supported by the United States, may be able to take other steps to diversify their energy supplies. Oil and natural gas pipelines in Europe run in a mainly east-west direction. More north-south interconnections within Europe could help to buffer any shortfalls in a particular region. Larger storage facilities could also be helpful in this regard. European leaders have endorsed European Commission proposals to enhance interconnections within Europe and increase storage, but the initiatives remain in the planning stage.

In the longer run, given continued high energy prices, liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to terminals throughout Europe may be an economical substitute for natural gas from Gazprom pipelines. Natural gas may become more easily transported and traded, making it easier for a country to diversify its supplies, rather than rely on long-term contracts signed with Gazprom. Already, LNG (largely from North Africa) makes up 15% of Europe's gas imports, and is particularly important for some western European countries. For example, 65% of Spain's gas imports are LNG.³⁴ Poland intends to build an LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea in order to diversify its supplies. U.S. and European officials have also stressed the need for countries of the region to improve energy conservation and develop alternative fuels, although they acknowledge that these efforts will take time.

³³ Testimony of Gregory Manuel, Matthew Bryza, and Steven Mann in a hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.

³⁴ See CRS Report RL33636, *The European Union's Energy Security Challenges*, by Paul Belkin.

Some experts have proposed that the United States and the EU block Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization unless it stops political manipulation of energy dependency in Europe.³⁵ However, negotiations between Russia and the U.S. and EU on Russia WTO membership have focused on other concerns, such as Russia's subsidized domestic energy prices and Russia's protection of intellectual property rights. On the other hand, countries from the region that are already WTO members, such as Georgia and Moldova, can block Russia's WTO membership if they choose. Moldova has declined to do so, while Georgia used another issue, Moscow's refusal to set up customs checkpoints between Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia, to block Russia's WTO entry. Ukraine may also join the WTO before Russia, possibly giving it leverage over Moscow.

In the long run, Russia's statist manipulative approach to energy policy may eventually be moderated by its own needs. Some observers believe that Russia will need Western investment and expertise to fully exploit new oil and natural gas fields as current ones decline over the next decade. This may provide an opening for the United States and other countries to persuade Russia to liberalize its energy sector. Russia's current control of Central Asian supplies has allowed it to postpone the massive investments needed to exploit remote areas of its own territory, such as Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, and the Far East. However, this may change due to increasing worldwide demand for energy and the diversification of export routes by Central Asian countries. On the other hand, the current statist system has provided Russia's leaders with immense personal wealth and power, and afforded them the satisfaction of overseeing Russia's renewed international strength. They may not want to change this system, even if it might be in Russia's long-term interest to do so.

Some experts have said that the United States needs to restore the post of full-time envoy to deal with Eurasian energy issues. From 2001 to 2004, Steven Mann was Special Advisor for Caspian Energy Diplomacy. Since that time, the responsibilities of this post have been divided among several persons. Currently, Gregory Manuel is Special Advisor to the Secretary of State and International Energy Coordinator. Matthew Bryza is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs. Both have worked on European pipeline diplomacy, but each has other responsibilities as well. Robert Deutsch, Senior Advisor on Regional Integration, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, has focused on electricity and transport links between Central and South Asia. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum also focuses on these issues, but has other responsibilities.

In addition to diplomacy, the United States has other tools to deal with the energy dependency question. The United States has funded feasibility studies for some pipeline routes through the Trade and Development Administration (TDA). For example, in August 2007, the TDA provided \$1.7 million for feasibility studies on building both an oil and a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea to link to the BTC

³⁵ Testimony of Keith C. Smith before the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.

pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline.³⁶ The Export-Import Bank has also provided funds for pipeline projects. The United States and EU are working with Ukraine to develop an energy efficiency action plan for that country. The United States provides small amounts of aid to the countries of the region to help build their energy security.

Congressional Response

Members of Congress have expressed concern about the impact of Russian energy dependency on the countries of central and eastern Europe. Members have sharply criticized Russian policy and called on the European Union to work with the United States in helping these countries diversify their energy supplies. Senator Richard Lugar has called for a greater NATO role in energy security issues, including providing emergency energy assistance to member states facing a sudden energy cutoff.³⁷ Senator Lugar and other Members have cited recent Russian behavior in debate over legislation on U.S. energy dependency and purchase of U.S. energy assets by foreign countries, including Russia and Venezuela.

In the 110th Congress, committees have held hearings that have touched on the issue. In January 2007, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held a hearing on “The Geopolitics of Oil,” during which Russian manipulation of its oil resources for political purposes was discussed. In June 2007, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held a hearing on “Energy Security in the OSCE Region.” In July 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing entitled “Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Democratic Transition,” during which witnesses and Members viewed the dependency of the countries of the region on Russian energy as a threat to their democracies.

Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to concerns about Russian energy policy. S.Res. 530, in a list of criticisms of Russian policies on the eve of the St. Petersburg G-8 summit in July 2006, expressed disapproval of Russian energy policy toward Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other countries. H.Res. 500, passed in July 2007, charged that Russia and other countries in creating a gas OPEC, and criticized Russia’s use of its gas supplies as a political tool against Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries.

Congress may have the ability to address Russian energy policy in the future if it considers the issue of permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Russia. If Russia is granted membership in the World Trade Organization, the United States will have to grant Russia PNTR for Russia to enjoy the benefit of WTO membership in its relations with the United States.

³⁶ “Promoting Technology in the Oil and Gas Sector,” TDA website, [<http://www.ustda.gov>].

³⁷ “Remarks to the German Marshall Fund Conference,” Congressional Record, December 7, 2006, S11483-S11485. For a discussion of NATO’s role in Western energy security, see CRS Report RS22409, *NATO and Energy Security*, by Paul Gallis, updated regularly.

Figure 1. Pipeline Map



Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA website <http://www.eia.doe.gov>