

CRS Report for Congress

The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice

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**Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress**



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	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
	10 U.S.C. § 906. Cruel and unusual punishment, including flogging, or branding or otherwise branding the body is prohibited against persons subject to the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 855. The convicted person may appeal a sentence, and the sentence may be mitigated or commuted, but not increased, by the judge advocate reviewing the case. 10 U.S.C. §§ 864, 866, 867.	lawful punishment or condition of punishment as the commission shall determine to be proper.” § 6(G). If the Secretary of Defense has the authority to conduct the final review of a conviction and sentence, he may mitigate, commute, defer, or suspend, but not increase, the sentence. However, he may disapprove the findings and return them for further action by the military commission. § 6(H).		

1. The law of war and the international laws of armed conflict terms are generally regarded as synonymous. There is some question as to whether Al Qaeda is subject to the law of war, in light of the Administration's determination that Al Qaeda is not subject to the Geneva Convention. However, even if the attacks of Sept. 11 may not be regarded as war crimes, it is likely they would qualify as crimes against humanity. Complicity in those acts or other attacks may therefore fall under the jurisdiction over offenses as described in the proposed legislation, whereas ordinary belligerent acts committed on the battlefield may not.

Source: Congressional Research Service

The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice

Summary

The Department of Defense recently announced it has filed formal charges against two of the detainees held at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in connection with the war against terrorism. The two will likely be tried soon by military commission convened pursuant to President Bush's Military Order (M.O.) of November 13, 2001 pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the current war against terrorism. The M.O. has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad. Critics argued that the tribunals could violate the rights of the accused under the Constitution as well as international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals.

The Administration has responded by publishing a series of military orders and instructions clarifying some of the details. The procedural aspects of the trials are to be controlled by Military Commission Order No. 1 ("M.C.O. No. 1"). The Department of Defense has also released two more orders and nine "Military Commission Instructions," which set forth the elements of some crimes that may be tried, establish guidelines for civilian attorneys, and provide other administrative guidance. These rules have been praised as a significant improvement over what might have been permitted under the M.O., but some argue that the enhancements do not go far enough.

Three bills have been introduced in the 108th Congress to authorize and regulate military tribunals for the trial of terrorists: S. 22, Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003 contains the Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2003 at Subtitle C of Title I. A companion bill, H.R. 1290, was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. 2428, would provide for congressional review and possible disapproval of regulations relating to military tribunals.

This report provides a background and analysis comparing military commissions as envisioned under M.C.O. No. 1 and general military courts-martial conducted under the UCMJ. The report notes some of the criticism directed at the President's M.O., and explains how those concerns are addressed by the military commission orders and instructions. The report concludes by summarizing legislation introduced to authorize and regulate military tribunals to try suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban members, and provides two charts to compare the proposed military tribunals under proposed legislation, the regulations issued by the Department of Defense, and standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial. The second chart, which compares procedural safeguards incorporated in the regulations and the two versions of Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2003, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, *Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts*, in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed legislation to safeguards provided in federal court and the International Criminal Court.

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Introduction

On April 30, 2003, the Department of Defense (DoD) released eight "Military Commission Instructions" ("MCI No. 1-8")¹ to elaborate on the set of procedural rules to govern military tribunals, Military Commission Order No. 1 ("M.C.O. No. 1"), issued in March, 2002.² The new documents set forth the elements of some crimes that may be tried by military commission, establish guidelines for civilian attorneys, and provide other administrative guidance and procedures for military commissions convened pursuant to President Bush's Military Order (M.O.) of November 13, 2001.³ On December 30, 2003, DoD released Military Commission Instruction No. 9 ("MCI No. 9") to establish procedures for the military commission review panels. The Defense Department has announced that preparations for military commissions are complete, but has not set a date for the trials to begin. Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. (retired) has replaced Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz as the Appointing Authority for the commissions.⁴ General Altenburg, a former assistant judge advocate general for the Department of the Army, is serving as a civilian.⁵ Air Force Brigadier General Thomas L. Hemingway

¹ Department of Defense ("DoD") documents related to military commissions are available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html> (Last visited Mar. 2, 2004).

² *Reprinted at* 41 I.L.M. 725 (2002).

³ Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism §1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (hereinafter "M.O.").

⁴ Among his powers will be the authority to appoint and remove commission members (M.C.O. No. 1 at § 4(A)), to approve charges (§ 3(A)), to decide interlocutory questions (§ 4(A)(5)(d)), to approve plea agreements (§ 6(A)(4)), to prepare supplementary regulations (§ 7(A)), and to revoke the eligibility of civilian attorneys and others to appear before the commission (§ 4(A)(5)(b)).

⁵ See Press Release, Department of Defense, Appointing Authority Decision Made (Dec. 30, 2003), *available at* [<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0820.html>].

(retired) has been recalled to active duty to act as the legal advisor to the appointing authority.⁶

President Bush has made an initial determination that six of the detainees at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay are subject to the M.O. and may consequently be charged and tried before military commissions,⁷ including two citizens of the U.K. and one Australian citizen.⁸ Two detainees, one citizen from Yemen and one from the Sudan, have been formally charged with conspiracy to commit certain violations of the law of war (and other crimes triable by military commission).⁹ The Administration held discussions with the British and Australian governments regarding the trial of their citizens, and has agreed that none of those three detainees will be subject to the death penalty.¹⁰ The Administration has agreed to modify some of the rules with respect to trials of Australian detainees,¹¹ but has not yet reached an agreement with the United Kingdom. Four of the detainees have been assigned counsel, and Australian detainee David Hicks has been permitted to meet with a civilian defense attorney from his home country.¹²

The M.O. has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad. Critics argue that the tribunals could violate the rights of the accused under the Constitution as well as international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals. The Administration initially responded that the M.O. provided only the minimum requirements for a full and fair trial, and that the

⁶ See Press Release, Department of Defense, Military Commission Legal Advisor Announced (Dec. 30, 2003), *available at* [<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0821.html>].

⁷ See Press Release, Department of Defense, President Determines Enemy Combatants Subject to His Military Order (July 3, 2003), *available at* [<http://www.dod.gov/releases/2003/nr20030703-173.html>]. According to the Defense Department, that determination is effectively “a grant of [military] jurisdiction over the person.” See John Mintz, *6 Could Be Facing Military Tribunals*, WASH. POST July 4, 2003, at A1.

⁸ See John Mintz and Glenn Frankel, *2 Britons, Australian Among Six Facing Trial*, WASH. POST, July 5, 2003, at A13.

⁹ Press Release, Department of Defense, Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged (Feb. 24, 2004), *available at* <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040224-0363.html>. The two defendants are charged with “willfully and knowingly joining an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired with Osama bin Laden and others to commit the following offenses: attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.”

¹⁰ See Press Releases, Department of Defense, Statements on Detainee Meetings (July 23, 2003), *available at* [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html>].

¹¹ See Press Release, Department of Defense, U.S. and Australia Announce Agreements on Guantanamo Detainees (Nov. 25, 2003), *available at* [<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031125-0702.html>].

¹² See *US Names Defense Lawyers for Guantanamo Detainee Ahead of Possible Trial* AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 18, 2003.

Secretary of Defense intended to establish rules prescribing detailed procedural safeguards for tribunals established pursuant to the M.O. The procedural rules released in March 2002 were praised as a significant improvement over what might have been permitted under the language of the M.O., but some have continued to argue that the enhancements do not go far enough, and that the checks and balances of a separate rule-making authority and an independent appellate process are necessary.¹³ The release of the Military Commission Instructions sparked renewed debate, especially concerning the restrictions on civilian attorneys,¹⁴ resulting in further modifications to the rules. Critics have noted that the rules do not address the issue of indefinite detention without charge, as appears to be possible under the original M.O.,¹⁵ or that the Department of Defense may continue to detain persons who have been cleared by a military commission.¹⁶

Military Commissions are courts usually set up by military commanders in the field to try persons accused of certain offenses during war.¹⁷ They are distinct from military courts-martial, which are panels set up to try U.S. service members (and during declared wars, civilians accompanying the armed forces) under procedures prescribed by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).¹⁸ U.S. service members charged with a war crime are normally tried before courts-martial, but may also be tried by military commission or in federal court, depending on the nature of the crime charged.¹⁹ All three options are also available to try certain other persons for war crimes. Federal and state criminal statutes and courts are available to prosecute specific criminal acts related to terrorism that may or may not be triable by military commission.

Military commissions trying enemy belligerents for war crimes directly apply the international law of war, without recourse to domestic criminal statutes, unless

¹³ See Letter from Timothy H. Edgar, ACLU Legislative Counsel, *Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002* (April 16, 2002), available at www.aclu.org/congress/1041602c.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2003); American College of Trial Lawyers, Report on Military Commissions for the Trial of Terrorists, March 2003 [hereinafter "ACTL"].

¹⁴ The president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) announced that NACDL "cannot advise its members to act as civilian counsel" because it deems the rules too restrictive to allow for zealous and professional representation on their part. See Lawrence Goldman, *Guantanamo: Little Hope for Zealous Advocacy*, NACDL CHAMPION, July 2003, at 4, available at <http://www.nacdl.org> (last visited Aug. 14, 2003).

¹⁵ The Administration has not explicitly used this authority; instead, it says the prisoners are being held as "enemy combatants" pursuant to the law of war.

¹⁶ See Bruce Zagaris, *U.S. Defense Department Issues Order on Military Commissions*, 18 No. 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP 215 (2002) (citing comments by DoD chief counsel William J. Haynes II to a New York Times reporter).

¹⁷ See CRS Report RL31191, *Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before Military Commissions* (providing a general background of U.S. history of military commissions).

¹⁸ 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.

¹⁹ See 10 U.S.C. § 818; 18 U.S.C. §2441.

such statutes are declaratory of international law.²⁰ Historically, military commissions have applied the same set of procedural rules that applied in courts-martial.²¹ Some critics of the current plan to use military commissions believe the rules are modeled more closely after the military commissions held during World War II than today's courts-martial.²²

M.C.O. No. 1 sets forth procedural rules for the establishment and operation of military commissions convened pursuant to the November 13, 2001, M.O. It addresses the jurisdiction and structure of the commissions, prescribes trial procedures, including standards for admissibility of evidence and procedural safeguards for the accused, and establishes a review process. It contains various mechanisms for safeguarding sensitive government information. M.C.O. No. 3, "Special Administrative Measures for Certain Communications Subject to Monitoring," establishes procedures for authorizing and controlling the monitoring of communications between detainees and their defense counsel for security or intelligence-gathering purposes. M.C.O. No. 2 and 4 designate appointing officials.

MCI No. 1 provides guidance for interpretation of the instructions as well as for issuing new instructions. It states that the eight MCI apply to all DoD personnel as well as prosecuting attorneys assigned by the Justice Department and all civilian attorneys who have been qualified as members of the pool. Failure on the part of any of these participants to comply with any instructions or other regulations "may be subject to the appropriate action by the Appointing Authority, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, or the Presiding Officer of a military commission."²³ "Appropriate action" is not further defined, nor is any statutory authority cited for the power.²⁴ MCI No. 1 also reiterates that none of the instructions is to be construed as creating any enforceable right or privilege.

²⁰ See U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, section 505(e) [hereinafter "FM 27-10"].

²¹ See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 841-42 (2d ed. 1920) (noting that "in the absence of any statute or regulation," the same principles and procedures commonly govern, though possibly more "liberally construed and applied"); David Glazier, Note, *Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century Military Commission*, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005 (2003).

²² See Kevin J. Barry, *Military Commissions: American Justice on Trial*, FED LAW., July 2003, at 24.

²³ MCI No. 1 at § 4.C.

²⁴ MCI No. 1 lists 10 U.S.C. § 898 as a reference. That law, Article 98, UCMJ, Noncompliance with procedural rules, provides:

Any person subject to this chapter who -

(1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case of a person accused of an offense under this chapter; or

(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct

Jurisdiction

The President's M.O. has been criticized as overly broad in its assertion of jurisdiction, because it could be interpreted to cover non-citizens who have no connection with Al Qaeda or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It has been argued that the constitutional and statutory authority of the President to establish military tribunals does not extend any further than Congress' authorization to use armed force in response to the attacks.²⁵ Under a literal interpretation of the M.O., however, the President may designate as subject to the order any non-citizen he believes has ever engaged in any activity related to international terrorism, no matter when or where these acts took place. A person subject to the M.O. may be detained and possibly tried by military tribunal for violations of the law of war and "other applicable law."²⁶

M.C.O. No. 1 does not explicitly limit its coverage to the scope of the authorization of force, but it clarifies somewhat the ambiguity with respect to the offenses covered. M.C.O. No. 1 establishes that commissions may be convened to try aliens who are designated by the President as subject to the M.O., whether captured overseas or on U.S. territory, for violations of the law of war and "all other offenses triable by military commissions." While this language is somewhat narrower than "other applicable law," it remains vague. However, the statutory language recognizing the jurisdiction of military commissions is similarly vague, such that the M.C.O. does not appear on its face to exceed the statute with respect to jurisdiction over offenses. It does not resolve the issue of whether the President may, consistent with the Constitution, direct that criminal statutes defined by Congress to be dealt with in federal court be redefined as "war crimes" to be tried by the military.

By statute, military tribunals may be used to try "offenders or offenses designated by statute or the law of war."²⁷ There are only two statutory offenses for which convening a military commission is explicitly recognized: aiding the enemy and spying (in time of war).²⁸ It appears that "offenses designated by the law of war" are not necessarily synonymous with "offenses *against* the law of war." Military

²⁵ P.L. 107-40.

²⁶ M.O. § 1(e) (finding such tribunals necessary to protect the United States and for effective conduct of military operations).

²⁷ 10 U.S.C. § 821.

²⁸ 10 U.S.C. §§ 904 and 906, respectively. The circumstances under which civilians accused of aiding the enemy may be tried by military tribunal have not been decided, but a court interpreting the article may limit its application to conduct committed in territory under martial law or military government, within a zone of military operations or area of invasion, or within areas subject to military jurisdiction. See FM 27-10, *supra* note 20, at para. 79(b) (noting that treason and espionage laws are available for incidents occurring outside of these areas, but are triable in civil courts). Spying is not technically a violation of the law of war, however, but violates domestic law and traditionally may be tried by military commission. See *id.* at para. 77 (explaining that spies are not punished as "violators of the law of war, but to render that method of obtaining information as dangerous, difficult, and ineffective as possible").

tribunals may also be used to try civilians in occupied territory for ordinary crimes.²⁹ During a war, they may also be used to try civilians for committing belligerent acts, even those for which lawful belligerents would be entitled to immunity under the law of war, but only where martial law or military government may legally be exercised or on the battlefield,³⁰ where civilian courts are closed.³¹ Such acts are not necessarily offenses against the law of war (that is, they do not amount to an international war crime), but are merely *unprivileged* under it, although courts and commentators have tended to use the terms interchangeably.

Some argue that civilians, including unprivileged combatants unaffiliated with a state (or other entity with “international personality” necessary for hostilities to amount to an “armed conflict”), are not directly subject to the international law of war and thus may not be prosecuted for violating it.³² They may, however, be prosecuted for most belligerent acts under ordinary domestic law, irrespective of whether such an act would violate the international law of war if committed by a soldier. Under international law, those offenders who are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status under the Geneva Convention are entitled to be tried by court-martial and may not be tried by a military commission offering fewer safeguards than a general court-martial, even if those prisoners are charged with war crimes.³³

Presumably, “offenses triable by military commission” would not include acts triable by military commissions only in the context of a military occupation or martial law.³⁴ On the other hand, the language could be interpreted to reserve to the

²⁹ See, e.g., *United States v. Schultz*, 4 C.M.R. 104, 114 (1952)(listing as crimes punishable under the law of war, in occupied territory as murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, larceny, arson, maiming, assaults, burglary, and forgery).’

³⁰ See WINTHROP, *supra* note 21, 48, at 836.

³¹ See *id.* (citing *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)). Winthrop notes that the limitation as to place, time and subjects were not always strictly followed, mentioning a Civil War case in which seven persons who had conspired to seize a U.S. merchant vessel at Panama were captured and transported to San Francisco for trial by military commission. *Id.* at 837 (citing the pre-*Milligan* case of T.E. Hogg).

³² See Leila Nadya Sadat, *Terrorism and the Rule of Law*, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135 (2004)(arguing that no armed conflict exists with respect to terrorists, making the law of war inapplicable to them).

³³ The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 102 states: A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.

6 U.S.T. 3317. The Supreme Court finding to the contrary in *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), is likely superceded by the 1949 Geneva Convention. For more information about the treatment of prisoners of war, see CRS Report RL31367, *Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism*.

³⁴ See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNOTATED GUIDE: PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 10-11 (hereinafter “NIMJ”)(noting that civilians in occupied Germany (continued...)

military the discretion of determining what crimes may be tried. The Supreme Court has stated that charges of violations of the law of war tried before military commissions need not be as exact as those brought before regular courts.³⁵ The Administration appears to take the view that the executive branch may determine which acts violate the law of war and may be tried by military commission.³⁶ According to this view, a military tribunal may need only to determine the existence of some nexus between the offense and the military to establish its jurisdiction.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. MCI No. 2, Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission, details some of the crimes that might be subject to the jurisdiction of the commissions. Unlike the rest of the MCI issued so far, this instruction was published in draft form by DoD for outside comment. The final version appears to have incorporated some of the revisions, though not all, suggested by those who offered comments.³⁷ The revision clarifies that the burden of proof is on the prosecution, precludes liability for *ex post facto* crimes,³⁸ adds two new war crimes, and clearly delineates between war crimes and “other offenses triable by military commission.”

MCINo. 2 clarifies that the crimes and elements derive from the law of war, but does not provide any references to international treaties or other sources that comprise the law of war. The instruction does not purport to be an exhaustive list; it is intended as an illustration of acts punishable under the law of war³⁹ or triable by

³⁴ (...continued)

after World War II were sometimes tried by military commission for ordinary crimes unrelated to the laws of war). Military trials of civilians for crimes unrelated to the law of war on U.S. territory under martial law are permissible only when the courts are not functioning. See *Duncan v. Kahanamoku*, 327 U.S. 304 (1945).

³⁵ 327 U.S. at 17 (“Obviously charges of violations of the law of war triable before a military tribunal need not be stated with the precision of a common law indictment.”).

³⁶ See Philip A. Gagner, *The Bush Administration's Claim That Even Citizens Can Be Brought Before Military Tribunals, and Why it Should Never Be Put into Practice*, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011226_gagner.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) (describing Administration position set forth in court documents in the case of Dr. Samuel Mudd).

³⁷ See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK 95 (2003) [hereinafter “SOURCEBOOK”]. DoD has not made public an exact account of who provided comments to the instruction, but some of them are published in the Sourcebook.

³⁸ See MCI No. 2 § 3(A) (“No offense is cognizable in a trial by military commission if that offense did not exist prior to the conduct in question.”).

³⁹ Crimes against the law of war listed in MCI No. 2 are: 1) Willful Killing of Protected Persons; 2) Attacking Civilians; 3) Attacking Civilian Objects; 4) Attacking Protected Property; 5) Pillaging; 6) Denying Quarter; 7) Taking Hostages; 8) Employing Poison or Analogous Weapons; 9) Using Protected Persons as Shields; 10) Using Protected Property as Shields; 11) Torture; 12) Causing Serious Injury; 13) Mutilation or Maiming; 14) Use of Treachery or Perfidy; 15) Improper Use of Flag of Truce; 16) Improper Use of Protective Emblems; 17) Degrading Treatment of a Dead Body; and 18) Rape.

military commissions.⁴⁰ “Aiding the enemy” and “spying” are included under the latter group, but are not defined with reference to the statutory authority in UCMJ articles 104 and 106 (though the language is very similar).⁴¹ Terrorism is also defined without reference to the statutory definition in title 18, U.S. Code.⁴²

It appears that “offenses triable by military commissions” in both the M.O. and M.C.O. No. 1 could cover ordinary belligerent acts carried out by unlawful combatants, regardless of whether they are technically war crimes. The draft version of MCI No. 2 made explicit that

Even an attack against a military objective that normally would be permitted under the law of armed conflict could serve as the basis for th[e] offense [of terrorism] if the attack itself constituted an unlawful belligerency (that is, if the attack was committed by an accused who did not enjoy combatant immunity).

Thus, under the draft language, it appeared that a Taliban fighter who attacked a U.S. or coalition soldier, or perhaps even a soldier of the Northern Alliance prior to the arrival of U.S. forces, for example, could be charged with “terrorism” and tried by a military tribunal.⁴³

However, the final version of MCI No.2 substituted the following language:

The requirement that the conduct be wrongful for this crime necessitates that the conduct establishing the offense not constitute an attack against a lawful military

⁴⁰ Crimes “triable by military commissions” include: 1) Hijacking or Hazarding a Vessel or Aircraft; 2) Terrorism; 3) Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent; 4) Destruction of Property by an Unprivileged Belligerent; 5) Aiding the Enemy; 6) Spying; 7) Perjury or False Testimony; and 8) Obstruction of Justice Related to Military Commissions. Listed as “other forms of liability and related offenses” are: 1) Aiding or Abetting. 2) Solicitation; 3) Command/Superior Responsibility - Perpetrating; 4) Command/Superior Responsibility - Misprision; 5) Accessory After the Fact; 6) Conspiracy; and 7) Attempt.

⁴¹ Ordinarily, the charge of “aiding the enemy” would require the accused have allegiance to the party whose enemy he has aided. DoD added a comment to this charge explaining that the wrongfulness requirement may necessitate that “in the case of a lawful belligerent, the accused owe allegiance or some duty to the United States or an ally or coalition partner...” such as “citizenship, resident alien status, or a contractual relationship with [any of these countries].” MCI No.2 §6(A)(5)(b)(3). It is unclear what is meant by limiting the requirement to “a lawful belligerent.” It could be read to make those persons considered the “enemy” also subject to trial for “aiding the enemy.”

⁴² 18 U.S.C. § 2331 *et seq.* defines and punishes terrorism, providing exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts. *See id.* at 35 (letter from National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) noting that Congress has defined war crimes in 18 U.S.C. § 2441 with reference to specific treaties).

⁴³ MCI No. 2 § 6(18). One of the elements of the crime of terrorism is that the “accused did not enjoy combatant immunity or an object of the attack was not a military objective.” Another element required that “the killing or destruction was an attack or part of an attack designed to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government.” The final version of the MCI omits the reference to “affect[ing] the conduct of a government.

objective undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties.

The change appears to eliminate the possibility that Taliban fighters could be charged with “terrorism” in connection with combat activities; however, such a fighter could still be charged with murder or destruction of property “by an unprivileged belligerent”⁴⁴ for participating in combat, as long as the commission finds that the accused “did not enjoy combatant immunity,” which, according to the instruction, is enjoyed only by “lawful combatants.”⁴⁵ “Lawful combatant” is not further defined. Inasmuch as the President has already declared that all of the detainees incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay, whether members of the Taliban or members of Al Qaeda, are unlawful combatants, it appears unlikely that the defense of combat immunity would be available.⁴⁶ It is unclear whether other defenses, such as self-defense or duress, would be available to the accused. MCI No. 2 states that such defenses *may* be available, but that “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, defenses in individual cases are presumed not to apply.”⁴⁷

Temporal and Spatial Jurisdiction. The law of war has traditionally applied within the territorial and temporal boundaries of an armed conflict between at least two belligerents.⁴⁸ It has not traditionally been applied to conduct occurring on the territory of neutral states or on the territory of a belligerent that lies outside the zone of battle, to conduct that preceded the outbreak of hostilities, or to conduct during hostilities that do not amount to an armed conflict. With respect to the international conflict in Afghanistan, in which coalition forces ousted the Taliban government, it appears relatively clear when and where the law of war would apply.

⁴⁴ MCI No. 2 § 6(19).

⁴⁵ Under MCI No. 2, the lack of combatant immunity is considered an element of some of the crimes rather than a defense, so the prosecutor has the burden of proving its absence.

⁴⁶ Whether the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay should be considered lawful combatants with combatant immunity is an issue of some international concern. See generally CRS Report RL31367, *Treatment of ‘Battlefield Detainees’ in the War on Terrorism*. DoD’s original draft included the requirement that a lawful combatant be part of the “armed forces of a legitimate party to an armed conflict.” The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged DoD to revise the definition in line with the Geneva Convention. See SOURCEBOOK, *supra* note 37, at 50-51 and 59. The revised version leaves ambiguous who might be a “lawful combatant.”

⁴⁷ MCI. No. 2 § 4(B). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) objected to this provision in its comments on the DoD draft, remarking that it “not only places the ordinary burden on the accused to going forward with evidence that establishes affirmative defense, but it also appears to place an unprecedented burden on the accused to overcome the presumption that the defenses do not apply.” See SOURCEBOOK, *supra* note 37, at 69.

⁴⁸ See WINTHROP, *supra* note 21, 48, at 773 (the law of war “prescribes the rights and obligations of belligerents, or ... define the status and relations not only of enemies – whether or not in arms – but also of persons under military government or martial law and persons simply resident or being upon the theatre of war, and which authorizes their trial and punishment when offenders”); *id* at 836 (military commissions have valid jurisdiction only in theater of war or territory under martial law or military government).

The war on terrorism, however, does not have clear boundaries in time or space,⁴⁹ nor is it entirely clear who the belligerents are. The broad reach of the M.O. to encompass conduct and persons customarily subject to ordinary criminal law has evoked criticism that the claimed jurisdiction of the military commissions exceeds the customary law of armed conflict, which MCI No. 2 purports to restate.⁵⁰

A common element among the crimes enumerated in MCI No.2 is that the conduct “took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.” The instruction explains that the phrase requires a “nexus between the conduct and armed hostilities,”⁵¹ which has traditionally been a necessary element of any war crime. However, the definition of “armed hostilities” is broader than the customary definition of war or “armed conflict.” “Armed hostilities” need not be a declared war or “ongoing mutual hostilities.”⁵² Instead, any hostile act or attempted hostile act might have sufficient nexus if its severity rises to the level of an “armed attack,” or if it is intended to contribute to such acts. Some commentators have argued that the expansion of “armed conflict” beyond its customary bounds improperly expands the jurisdiction of military commissions beyond those that by statute or under the law of war are triable by military commissions.⁵³

The definition for “Enemy” provided in MCI No. 2 raises similar issues. According to § 5(B), “Enemy” includes

any entity with which the United States or allied forces may be engaged in armed conflicts or which is preparing to attack the United States. It is not limited to foreign nations, or foreign military organizations or members thereof. “Enemy” specifically includes any organization of terrorists with international reach.

Some observers argue that this impermissibly subjects suspected international criminals to the jurisdiction of military commissions in circumstances in which the

⁴⁹ It may be argued that no war has a specific deadline and that all conflicts are in a sense indefinite. In traditional armed conflicts, however, it has been relatively easy to identify when hostilities have ended; for example, upon the surrender or annihilation of one party, an annexation of territory under dispute, an armistice or peace treaty, or when one party to the conflict unilaterally withdraws its forces. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, *LAW AMONG NATIONS* 722-730 (6th ed. 1992).

⁵⁰ See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Trial Under Military Order, A Guide to the Final Rules for Military Commissions* (2003)[hereinafter “LCHR”], *available at* http://www.lchr.org/us_law/a_guide_to_the_final_rules.pdf; Sadat, *supra* note 32, at 146 (noting possibly advantageous domestic aspects of treating terrorist attacks as war crimes, but identifying possible pitfalls of creating a new international legal regime).

⁵¹ MCI No. 2 § 5(C).

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ See SOURCEBOOK, *supra* note 37, at 38-39 (NACDL comments); *id.* at 51 (Human Rights Watch (HRW) comments); *id.* at 59-60 (LCHR). However, MCI No. 9 lists among possible “material errors of law” for which the Reviewing Panel might return a finding for further procedures, “a conviction of a charge that fails to state an offense that by statute or the law of war may be tried by military commission. ...” MCI No. 9 § 4(C)(2)(b).

law of armed conflict has never applied.⁵⁴ The distinction between a “war crime,” traditionally subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions, and a common crime, traditionally the province of criminal courts, may prove to be a matter of some contention during some of the proceedings.⁵⁵

Composition and Powers

Under M.C.O. No. 1, the military commissions will consist of a panel of three to seven military officers as well as one or more alternate members who have been “determined to be competent to perform the duties involved” by the Secretary of Defense or his designee.⁵⁶ These may include reserve personnel on active duty, National Guard personnel in active federal service, and retired personnel recalled to active duty. They may also include persons temporarily commissioned by the President to serve as officers in the armed services during a national emergency.⁵⁷ The presiding officer must be a judge advocate in any of the U.S. armed forces, but need not be a military judge.⁵⁸

The presiding officer has the authority to decide evidentiary matters and interlocutory motions, or to refer them to the commission or certify them to Appointing Authority for decision. The presiding officer has the power to close any portion of the proceedings in accordance with M.C.O. No. 1, and “to act upon any contempt or breach of Commission rules and procedures,” including disciplining any individual who violates any “laws, rules, regulations, or other orders” applicable to the commission, as the presiding officer sees fit. Presumably this power includes not only military and civilian attorneys but also any witnesses who have been summoned under order of the Secretary of Defense pursuant to M.C.O. No. 1 § 5(A)(5).⁵⁹ The UCMJ authorizes military commissions to punish contempt with a fine of \$100, confinement for up to 30 days, or both.⁶⁰ Under the UCMJ, a duly subpoenaed witness who is not subject to the UCMJ and who refuses to appear before a military commission may be prosecuted in federal court.⁶¹ To the extent that M.C.O. No. 1

⁵⁴ See *id.* at 38 (NACDL comments).

⁵⁵ See *id.* at 98 (commentary of Eugene R. Fidell and Michael F. Noone).

⁵⁶ M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(A)(3).

⁵⁷ See 10 U.S.C. § 603, listed as reference (e) of M.C.O. No. 1.

⁵⁸ M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(A)(4). See NIMJ, *supra* note 34, at 17 (commenting that the lack of a military judge to preside over the proceedings is a significant departure from the UCMJ). A judge advocate is a military officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the Army or Navy (a military lawyer). A military judge is a judge advocate who is certified as qualified by the JAG Corps of his or her service to serve in a role similar to civilian judges.

⁵⁹ See M.C.O. No. 1 § 3(C) (asserting jurisdiction over participants in commission proceedings “as necessary to preserve the integrity and order of the proceedings”).

⁶⁰ See 10 U.S.C. § 848.

⁶¹ See 10 U.S.C. § 847. It is unclear how witnesses are “duly subpoenaed;” 10 U.S.C. § 846 empowers the president of the court-martial to compel witnesses to appear and testify and to compel production of evidence, but this statutory authority does not explicitly apply to

would allow disciplinary measures against civilian witnesses who refuse to testify or produce other evidence as ordered by the commission, M.C.O. No. 1 would appear to be inconsistent with the UCMJ.

One of the perceived shortcomings of the M.O. has to do with the problem of command influence over commission personnel.⁶² M.C.O. No. 1 provides for a “full and fair trial,” but contains few specific safeguards that appear to address the issue of impartiality. The President appears to have complete control over the proceedings. He or his designee decide which charges to press, select the members of the panel, the prosecution and the defense counsel, select the members of the review panel, and approve and implement the final outcome. The procedural rules are entirely under the control of the President or his designees, who write them, interpret them, enforce them, and may amend them at any time. All commission personnel other than the commission members themselves are under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, directly or through the DoD General Counsel.⁶³ The Secretary of Defense is the direct supervisor of Review Panel members.⁶⁴ The Chief Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel both report ultimately to the DoD General Counsel, although the Defense Counsel reports through the Deputy General Counsel (Personnel and Health Policy), rather than the Deputy General Counsel (Legal Counsel), which directly supervises the prosecution.⁶⁵ The structure of the military commission system thus remains vulnerable to the charge it is not be conducive to the provision of a fair and impartial trial.⁶⁶

The following sections summarize provisions of the procedural rules meant to provide appropriate procedural safeguards.

Procedures Accorded the Accused

The military commissions established pursuant to M.C.O. No. 1 will have procedural safeguards similar to many of those that apply in general courts-martial, but the M.C.O. does not specifically adopt any procedures from the UCMJ, even

⁶¹ (...continued)

military commissions. The subpoena power extends to “any part of the United States, or the Territories, Commonwealth and possessions.”

⁶² See Edgar, *supra* note 13. The court-martial system in the military contains some structural safeguards that are absent from M.C.O. No. 1. For example, military judges and defense attorneys belong to separate organizations, outside the chain of command of the convening authority. See NIMJ, *supra* note 34, at 17-18 (describing differences between court-martial proceedings and M.C.O. No. 1 rules relating to the perception of command influence).

⁶³ MCI No. 6.

⁶⁴ *Id.* § 3(A)(7).

⁶⁵ *Cf* United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172 (2001), *aff'd on reconsideration*, 57 M.J. 48 (2002) (noting that command relationships among participants in court-martial proceeding may give rise to “implied bias”).

⁶⁶ See Edgar, *supra* note 13; ACTL, *supra* note 13, at 11-14.

those that explicitly apply to military commissions.⁶⁷ The M.C.O. provides that only the procedures it prescribes or any supplemental regulations that may be established pursuant to the M.O., *and no others* shall govern the trials,⁶⁸ perhaps precluding commissions from looking to the UCMJ or other law to fill in any gaps. The M.C.O. does not explicitly recognize that accused persons have rights under the law. The procedures that are accorded to the accused do not give rise to any enforceable right, benefit or privilege, and are not to be construed as requirements of the U.S. Constitution.⁶⁹ The accused has no opportunity to challenge the interpretation of the rules or seek redress in case of a breach.⁷⁰

The procedural safeguards are for the most part listed in section 5. The accused is entitled to be informed of the charges sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a defense,⁷¹ shall be presumed innocent until determined to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by two thirds of the commission members,⁷² shall have the right not to testify at trial unless he so chooses, shall have the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution, and may be present at every stage of proceeding unless it is closed for security concerns or other reasons.⁷³ The presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination will result in an entered plea of “Not Guilty” if the accused refuses to enter a plea or enters a “Guilty” plea that is determined to be involuntary or ill informed.⁷⁴

Open Hearing. The trials themselves will be conducted openly except to the extent the Appointing Authority or presiding officer closes proceedings to protect classified or classifiable information or information protected by law from unauthorized disclosure, the physical safety of participants, intelligence or law enforcement sources and methods, other national security interests, or “for any other reason necessary for the conduct of a full and fair trial.”⁷⁵ DoD has invited members

⁶⁷ See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (providing military commission rules “may not be contrary to or inconsistent with [the UCMJ]”). *But see In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1946) (finding Congress did not intend the language “military commission” in Article 38 of the Articles of War, the precursor to UCMJ Art. 36, to mean military commissions trying enemy combatants). On the other hand, President Bush explicitly invoked UCMJ art. 36 as statutory authority for the M.O., and included a finding, “consistent with section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.” M.O. § 1(g).

⁶⁸ M.C.O. No. 1 § 1.

⁶⁹ *Id.* § 10.

⁷⁰ *Id.*; MCI No. 1 § 6 (Non-Creation of Right).

⁷¹ M.C.O. No. 1 § 5(A).

⁷² *Id.* §§ 5(B-C); 6(F).

⁷³ *Id.* §§ 4(A)(5)(a); 5(K); 6B(3).

⁷⁴ *Id.* §§ 5(B) and 6(B).

⁷⁵ M.C.O. No. 1 § 6(D)(5).

of the press to apply for permission to attend the trials,⁷⁶ although it informed Human Rights Watch and other groups that logistical issues would likely preclude their attendance.⁷⁷ However, at the discretion of the Appointing Authority, “open proceedings” need not necessarily be open to the public and the press.⁷⁸ Proceedings may be closed to the accused or the accused’s civilian attorney, but not to detailed defense counsel. Furthermore, counsel for either side must obtain permission from the Appointing Authority or the DoD General Counsel in order to make a statement to the press.⁷⁹

Because the public, and not just the accused, has a constitutionally protected interest in public trials, the extent to which trials by military commission are open to the press and public may be subject to challenge by media representatives.⁸⁰ The First Amendment right of public access extends to trials by court-martial,⁸¹ but is not absolute. Trials may be closed only where the following test is met: the party seeking closure demonstrates an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; the trial court has considered reasonable alternatives to closure; and the trial court makes adequate findings to support the closure.⁸² Because procedures established under M.C.O. No. 1 appear to allow the exclusion of the press and public based on the discretion of the Appointing Authority without any consideration of the above requirements with respect to the specific exigencies of the case at trial, the procedures may implicate the First Amendment rights of the press and public.

Although the First Amendment bars government interference with the free press, it does not impose on the government a duty “to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally.”⁸³ The reporters’ right to gather information does not include an absolute right to gain access to areas not open to the public. Thus, if the military commissions were to sit in areas off-limits

⁷⁶ See DoD Press Release, DoD Announces Media Coverage Opportunities for Military Commissions (Feb. 11, 2004), *available at* [<http://www.defenselink.mil/advisories/2004/pa20040211-0205.html>].

⁷⁷ See Toni Locy, *Human Rights Groups Denied Seats at Tribunals*, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2004, at A3.

⁷⁸ *Id.* at § 6(B)(3) (“Open proceedings may include, at the discretion of the Appointing Authority, attendance by the public and accredited press, and public release of transcripts at the appropriate time.”) In courts-martial, “public” is defined to include members of the military as well as civilian communities. R.C.M. 806.

⁷⁹ MCI No. 3 § 5(C) (Prosecutor’s Office); MCI No. 4 § 5(C) (Defense counsel, including members of civilian defense counsel pool).

⁸⁰ See *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct.*, 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982) (newspaper had standing to challenge court order closing portions of criminal trial).

⁸¹ *United States v. Hershey*, 20 M.J. 433 (C.M.A.1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986); *United States v. Grunden*, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A.1977). The press has standing to challenge closure of military justice proceedings. *ABC, Inc. v. Powell*, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (1997).

⁸² See *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California*, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).

⁸³ *Pell v. Procunier*, 417 U.S. 817, 822-24 (1974).

to the public for other valid reasons, media access may be restricted for reasons of operational necessity.⁸⁴ Access of the press to the proceedings of military commissions may be an issue of contention for the courts ultimately to decide, even if those tried by military commission are determined to lack the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to an open trial or means to challenge the trial.⁸⁵

Right to Counsel. Once charges are referred,⁸⁶ the defendant will have military defense counsel assigned free of cost, but may request another JAG officer, who will be provided as a replacement if available in accordance with any applicable instructions or supplementary regulations that might later be issued.⁸⁷ The accused does not have the right to refuse counsel in favor of self-representation.⁸⁸ MCI No. 4 requires detailed defense counsel to “defend the accused zealously within the bounds of the law ... notwithstanding any intention expressed by the accused to represent himself.”⁸⁹

The accused may also hire a civilian attorney at his own expense, but must be represented by assigned defense counsel at all relevant times, even if he retains the services of a civilian attorney. Civilian attorneys may apply to qualify as members of the pool of eligible attorneys, or may seek to qualify *ad hoc* at the request of an accused. Some critics argue the rules provide disincentives for the participation of civilian lawyers.⁹⁰ Civilian attorneys must agree that the military commission representation will be his or her primary duty, and are not permitted to bring any assistants, such as co-counsel or paralegal support personnel, with them to the defense team. Originally, all defense and case preparation was to be done on site, and civilian attorneys were not to share documents or discuss the case with anyone but the detailed counsel or the defendant. These restrictions, read literally, might have prevented civilian defense counsel from conducting witness interviews or

⁸⁴ See Juan R. Torruella, *On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential Power*, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 718 (2002) (noting that proceedings, if held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station, may be *de facto* closed due to the physical isolation of the facility).

⁸⁵ Cf. *Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft*, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.2002), (finding closure of immigration hearings based on relation to events of Sept. 11 unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment right to free press). *But see* *North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft*, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) *cert denied* ___ U.S. ___ (2003)(no presumption of openness for immigration hearings).

⁸⁶ In practice, some of the detainees have been assigned counsel upon their designation as subject to the President’s M.O.

⁸⁷ M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(C). MCI No. 4 § 3(D) lists criteria for the “availability” of selected detailed counsel.

⁸⁸ *But see* *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Const. Amend. VI guarantees the right to self-representation).

⁸⁹ MCI No. 4 § 3(C).

⁹⁰ See LCHR, *supra* note 50, at 2-3; Vanessa Blum, *Tribunals Put Defense Bar in Bind*, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 1 (reporting that only 10 civilian attorneys had applied to join the pool of civilian defense lawyers).

seeking advice from experts in humanitarian law, for example.⁹¹ However, the Pentagon later released a new version of MCI No. 5 that loosened the restrictions to allow communications with “individuals with particularized knowledge that may assist in discovering relevant evidence.”⁹²

Civilian attorneys must meet strict qualifications to be admitted before a military commission. The civilian attorney must be a U.S. citizen (except for those representing Australian detainees⁹³) with at least a SECRET clearance,⁹⁴ who is admitted to the bar of any state or territory. Furthermore, the civilian attorney may not have any disciplinary record, and must agree in writing to comply with all rules of court.⁹⁵ The civilian attorney is not guaranteed access to closed hearings or information deemed protected under the rules, which may or may not include classified information.⁹⁶

The requirement that civilian counsel must agree that communications with the client may be monitored has been modified to require prior notification and to permit the attorney to notify the client when monitoring is to occur.⁹⁷ Although the government will not be permitted to use information against the accused at trial, some argue the absence of the normal attorney-client privilege could impede communications between them, possibly decreasing the effectiveness of counsel. Civilian attorneys are bound to inform the military counsel if they learn of information about a pending crime that could lead to “death, substantial bodily harm,

⁹¹ See SOURCEBOOK, *supra* note 37, at 136-37.

⁹² MCI No. 5, Annex B, “Affidavit and Agreement by Civilian Defense Counsel,” at § II(E)(1). The communications are subject to restrictions on classified or “protected” information. *Id.*

⁹³ See DoD Press Release, *supra* note 11.

⁹⁴ Originally, civilian attorneys were required to pay the costs associated with obtaining a clearance. MCI No. 5 §3(A)(2)(d)(ii). DoD has waived the administrative costs for processing applications for TOP SECRET clearances in cases that would require the higher level of security clearance. See DoD Press Release No. 084-04, New Military Commission Orders, Annex Issued (Feb. 6, 2004), available at [<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040206-0331.html>] (Last visited Mar. 3, 2004).

⁹⁵ M.C.O. No. 1 § 4(C)(3)(b).

⁹⁶ *Id.*; see Edgar, *supra* note 13 (emphasizing that national security may be invoked to close portions of a trial irrespective of whether classified information is involved).

⁹⁷ See M.C.O. No. 3, “Special Administrative Measures for Certain Communications Subject to Monitoring.” The required affidavit and agreement annexed to MCI No. 3 was modified to eliminate the following language:

I understand that my communications with my client, even if traditionally covered by the attorney-client privilege, may be subject to monitoring or review by government officials, using any available means, for security and intelligence purposes. I understand that any such monitoring will only take place in limited circumstances when approved by proper authority, and that any evidence or information derived from such communications will not be used in proceedings against the Accused who made or received the relevant communication.

or a significant impairment of national security.”⁹⁸ MCI No. 5 provides no criteria to assist defense counsel in identifying what might constitute a “significant impairment of national security.”

All defense counsel are under the overall supervision of the Office of the Chief Defense Counsel, which is entrusted with the proper management of personnel and resources the duty to preclude conflicts of interest.⁹⁹ The M.C.O. further provides that “in no circumstance shall accommodation of counsel be allowed to delay proceedings unreasonably.”¹⁰⁰ The Appointing Authority may revoke any attorney’s eligibility to appear before any commission.¹⁰¹

Some attorneys’ groups have voiced opposition to the restrictions and requirements placed on civilian defense counsel, arguing the rules would not allow a defense attorney ethically to represent any client. The board of directors for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued an ethics statement saying that it is unethical for a lawyer to represent a client before a military tribunal under the current rules and that lawyers who choose to do so are bound to contest the unethical conditions.¹⁰² The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA) took no position on whether civilian lawyers should participate in the tribunals, but urged the Pentagon to relax some of the rules, especially with respect to the monitoring of communications between clients and civilian attorneys.¹⁰³ The National Institute of Military Justice, while echoing concerns about the commission rules, has stated that lawyers who participate will be performing an important public service.¹⁰⁴

Discovery. The accused has the right to view evidence the Prosecution intends to present as well as any exculpatory evidence known, as long as it is not deemed to be protected under Sec. 6(D)(5).¹⁰⁵ In courts-martial, by contrast, the accused has the right to view any documents in the possession of the Prosecution related to the

⁹⁸ MCI No. 5, Annex B § II(J).

⁹⁹ M.C.O. No 1 § 4(C)(1); see Torruella, *supra* note 84, at 719 (noting that the civilian criminal defense system has no equivalent to this system, in which the accused has no apparent choice over the supervision of the defense efforts).

¹⁰⁰ M.C.O. No 1 § 4(A)(5)(c).

¹⁰¹ *Id* § 4(A)(5)(b).

¹⁰² See NACDL Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 03-04 (August 2003), available at [<http://www.nacdl.org>]; *Participation in Secret Military Terror Trials Unethical*, U.S. Lawyers Say, AP Aug. 2, 2003 (quoting incoming NACDL president Barry Scheck).

¹⁰³ See *U.S. May Ease Tribunal Rules*, NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 2003, at A18.

¹⁰⁴ See NIMJ Statement on Civilian Attorney Participation as Defense Counsel in Military Commissions, July 13, 2003, available at http://www.nimj.com/documents/NIMJ_Civ_Atty_Participation_Statement.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2003).

¹⁰⁵ *Id* § 5(E).

charges, and evidence that reasonably tends to negate the guilt of the accused, reduce the degree of guilt or reduce the punishment.¹⁰⁶

The accused may also obtain witnesses and documents “to the extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer” and subject to secrecy determinations. The Appointing Authority shall make available to the accused “such investigative or other resources” deemed necessary for a full and fair trial.¹⁰⁷ Access to other detainees who might be able to provide mitigating or exculpatory testimony may be impeded by the prohibition on defense counsel from entering into agreements with “other Accused or Defense Counsel that might cause them or the Accused they represent to incur an obligation of confidentiality with such other Accused or Defense Counsel or to effect some other impediment to representation.”¹⁰⁸ In other words, communications with potential witnesses would not be privileged and could be used against the witness at his own trial.

The overriding consideration with regard to whether the accused or defense counsel (including detailed defense counsel) may gain access to information appears to be the need for secrecy. The presiding officer may delete specific items from any information to be made available to the accused or defense counsel, or may direct that unclassified summaries of protected information be prepared.¹⁰⁹ However, no evidence may be admitted for consideration by the rest of the commission members unless it has been made available to at least the detailed defense counsel.¹¹⁰ Information that was reviewed by the presiding officer *ex parte* and *in camera* but withheld from the defense over defense objection will be sealed and annexed to the record of the proceedings for review by the various reviewing authorities.¹¹¹ Nothing in the M.C.O. limits the purposes for which the reviewing authorities may use such material.

Right to Face One’s Accuser. The presiding officer may authorize any methods appropriate to protect witnesses, including telephone or other electronic means, closure of all or part of the proceedings and the use of pseudonyms.¹¹² The commission may consider sworn or unsworn statements, and these apparently may be read into evidence without meeting the requirements for authentication of depositions and without regard to the availability of the witness under the UCMJ, as

¹⁰⁶ See R.C.M. 701(a)(6); NIMJ, *supra* note 34, at 31-32.

¹⁰⁷ M.C.O. No 1 § 5(H). Civilian defense counsel must agree not to submit any claims for reimbursement from the government for any costs related to the defense. MCI No. 5 Annex B.

¹⁰⁸ MCI No. 4 § 5.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* § 6(D)(5)(b). Some observers note that protected information could include exculpatory evidence as well as incriminating evidence, which could implicate 6th Amendment rights and rights under the Geneva Convention, if applicable. See LCHR, *supra* note 50, at 3.

¹¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹¹ *Id.* § 6(D)(5)(d).

¹¹² *Id.* § 6(D)(2)(d).

these provisions expressly apply to military commissions.¹¹³ UCMJ articles 49 and 50 could be read to apply to military commissions the same rules against hearsay used at courts-martial, however, the Supreme Court has declined to apply similar provisions to military commissions trying enemy combatants.¹¹⁴

Admissibility of Evidence. The standard for the admissibility of evidence remains as it was stated in the M.O.; evidence is admissible if it is deemed to have “probative value to a reasonable person.”¹¹⁵ This is a significant departure from the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.), which provide that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States [and other applicable statutes, regulations and rules]”¹¹⁶ In a court-martial, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by other factors.¹¹⁷

“Probative value to a reasonable man” is a seemingly lax standard for application to criminal trials.¹¹⁸ A reasonable person could find plausible sounding rumors or hearsay to be at least somewhat probative, despite inherent questions of reliability and fairness that both federal and military rules of evidence are designed to address. Furthermore, defendants before military commissions do not appear to

¹¹³ See 10 U.S.C. §§ 849 -50. UCMJ art. 49 states:

(d) A duly authenticated deposition taken upon reasonable notice to the other parties, so far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be read in evidence or, in the case of audiotape, videotape, or similar material, may be played in evidence before any military court or commission in any case not capital, or in any proceeding before a court of inquiry or military board, if it appears--

(1) that the witness resides or is beyond the State, Territory, Commonwealth, or District of Columbia in which the court, commission, or board is ordered to sit, or beyond 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing;

(2) that the witness by reason of death, age, sickness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, military necessity, nonamenability to process, or other reasonable cause, is unable or refuses to appear and testify in person at the place of trial or hearing; or

(3) that the present whereabouts of the witness is unknown.

(e) Subject to subsection (d), testimony by deposition may be presented by the defense in capital cases.

(f) Subject to subsection (d), a deposition may be read in evidence or, in the case of audiotape, videotape, or similar material, may be played in evidence in any case in which the death penalty is authorized but is not mandatory, whenever the convening authority directs that the case be treated as not capital, and in such a case a sentence of death may not be adjudged by the court-martial.

¹¹⁴ See *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1, 19 (1946) (declining to apply art. 25 of the Articles of War, which is substantially the same as current UCMJ art. 49, to trial by military commission of an enemy combatant). The *Yamashita* Court concluded that Congress intended the procedural safeguards in the Articles of War to apply only to persons “subject to military law” under article 2. *But see id.* at 61-72 (Rutledge, J. dissenting)(arguing the plain language of the statute does not support that interpretation).

¹¹⁵ M.C.O. No. 1 § 6(D)(1).

¹¹⁶ Mil. R. Evid. 402.

¹¹⁷ Mil. R. Evid. 403.

¹¹⁸ See Torruella, *supra* note 84, at 715; ACTL, *supra* note 13, at 11.

have the right to move that evidence be excluded because of its propensity to create confusion or unfair prejudice, or because it was unlawfully obtained or coerced.

Sentencing. The prosecution must provide in advance to the accused any evidence to be used for sentencing, unless good cause is shown. The accused may present evidence and make a statement during sentencing proceedings, however, this right does not appear to mirror the right to make an unsworn statement that military defendants may exercise in regular courts-martial.¹¹⁹ Statements made by the accused during the sentencing phase appear to be subject to cross-examination.

Possible penalties include execution,¹²⁰ imprisonment for life or any lesser term, payment of a fine or restitution (which may be enforced by confiscation of property subject to the rights of third parties), or “such other lawful punishment or condition of punishment” determined to be proper. Detention associated with the accused’s status as an “enemy combatant” will not count toward serving any sentence imposed.¹²¹ If the sentence includes confinement, it is unclear whether or how the conditions of imprisonment will differ from that of detention as an “enemy combatant.” Sentences agreed in plea agreements are binding on the commission, unlike regular courts-martial, in which the agreement is treated as the maximum sentence. Similar to the practice in military courts-martial, the death penalty may only be imposed upon a unanimous vote of the Commission.¹²² In courts-martial, however, both conviction for any crime punishable by death and any death sentence must be by unanimous vote.¹²³ None of the rules specify which offenses might be eligible for the death penalty, but the Pentagon announced the death penalty will not be sought in the cases of the two detainees charged with conspiracy or for the detainees from the United Kingdom and Australia who have been designated subject to the President’s M.O. but not yet charged.

Post-Trial Procedure

One criticism leveled at the language of the M.O. was that it does not include an opportunity for the accused to appeal a conviction, and appears to bar habeas corpus relief. Another was that it appears to allow the Secretary of Defense (or the

¹¹⁹ See NIMJ, *supra* note 34, at 37 (citing *United States v. Rosato*, 32 M.J. 93, 96 (C.M.A. 1991)).

¹²⁰ The method of execution used by the Army to carry out a death sentence by military commission is lethal injection. See U.S. Army Correctional System: Procedures for Military Executions, AR 190-55 (1999). It is unclear whether DoD will follow these regulations with respect to sentences issued by these military commissions, but it appears unlikely that any such sentences would be carried out at Ft. Leavenworth, in accordance with AR 190-55.

¹²¹ MCI No. 7 § 3(A).

¹²² M.C.O. No. 1 § 6(F).

¹²³ 10 U.S.C. § 851.

President) the discretion to change the verdict, and does not protect persons from double jeopardy.¹²⁴ M.C.O. No.1 addresses these issues in part.

Review and Appeal. The rules provide for the administrative review of the trial record by the Appointing Authority, who forwards the record, if found satisfactory, to a review panel consisting of three military officers, one of whom must have experience as a judge. The Bush Administration has announced its intent to commission four individuals to active duty to serve on the Military Commission Review Panels.¹²⁵ They are Griffin Bell, a former U.S. attorney general and judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit; Edward Biester, a former Member of the U.S. House of Representatives and current judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania; the Honorable William T. Coleman Jr., a former Secretary of Transportation; and Chief Justice Frank Williams of the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

There is no opportunity for the accused to appeal a conviction in the ordinary sense. The review panel may, however, at its discretion, review any written submissions from the prosecution and the defense, who do not appear to have an opportunity to view or rebut the submission from the opposing party.¹²⁶ If the review panel forms a “firm and definite conviction that a material error of law occurred,” it returns the case to the Appointing Authority for further proceedings. If the review panel determines that one or more charges should be dismissed, the Appointing Authority is bound to do so.¹²⁷ For other cases involving errors, the Appointing Authority is required to return the case to the military commission. Otherwise, the case is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense with a written recommendation. (Under the UCMJ, the trial record of a military commission would be forwarded to the appropriate JAG first).¹²⁸

After reviewing the record, the Secretary of Defense may forward the case to the President or return it for further proceedings for any reason, not explicitly limited to material errors of law. The M.C.O. does not indicate what “further proceedings” may entail. If the Secretary of Defense is delegated final approving authority, he can approve or disapprove the finding, or mitigate or commute the sentence. The rules do not clarify what happens to a case that has been “disapproved.” It is unclear

¹²⁴ See Laurence H. Tribe, *Trial by Fury*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001.

¹²⁵ See Press Release, Military Commission Review Panel Members to be Designated and Instruction Issued (Dec. 30, 2003), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0822.html]. 10 U.S.C. § 603 permits the President, during war or national emergency, to appoint any qualified person as a military officer in the grade of major general or below.

¹²⁶ The convening authority of a general court-martial is required to consider all matters presented by the accused. 10 U.S.C. § 860.

¹²⁷ MCI No. 9 § 4(C).

¹²⁸ 10 U.S.C. § 8037 (listing among duties of Air Force Judge Advocate General to “receive, revise, and have recorded the proceedings of ... military commissions”); 10 U.S.C. § 3037 (similar duty ascribed to Army Judge Advocate General).

whether a disapproved finding is effectively vacated and remanded to the military commission for a rehearing.

The UCMJ forbids rehearings or appeal by the government of verdicts amounting to a finding of Not Guilty, and prohibits the invalidation of a verdict or sentence due to an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.¹²⁹ The M.C.O. does not contain any such explicit prohibitions, but MCI No. 9 defines “Material Error of Law” to exclude variances from the M.O. or any of the military orders or instructions promulgated under it that would not have had a material effect on the outcome of the military commission.¹³⁰ MCI No. 9 allows the review panel to recommend the disapproval of a finding of Guilty on a basis other than a material error of law.¹³¹ It does not indicate what options the review panel would have with respect to findings of Not Guilty.

M.C.O. No. 1 does not provide a route for a convicted person to appeal to any independent authority. Persons subject to the M.O. are described as not privileged to “seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly” in federal or state court, the court of any foreign nation, or any international tribunal.¹³² However, a defendant may be able to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the jurisdiction of the military commission.¹³³

Protection against Double Jeopardy. The M.C.O. provides that the accused may not be tried for the same charge twice by any military commission once the commission’s finding on that charge becomes final (meaning once the verdict and sentence have been approved).¹³⁴ Therefore, apparently, jeopardy does not attach – there has not been a “trial” – until the final verdict has been approved by the President or the Secretary of Defense. In contrast, at general courts-martial, jeopardy attaches after the first introduction of evidence by the prosecution. If a charge is dismissed or is terminated by the convening authority after the introduction of

¹²⁹ 10 U.S.C. § 859.

¹³⁰ MCI No. 9 § 4(C)(2)(a)

¹³¹ MCI No. 9 § 4(C)(1)(b).

¹³² M.O. at § 7(b).

¹³³ See Alberto R. Gonzales, *Martial Justice, Full and Fair*, NY TIMES (op-ed), Nov. 30, 2001 (stating that the original M.O. was not intended to preclude habeas corpus review). However, there is a split between the D.C. and 9th Circuits as to whether federal courts may assert jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus challenges on behalf of aliens detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station. See *Coalition of Clergy v. Bush*, 189 F.Supp.2d 1036 (C.D. Cal.), *vacated in part by* 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied* 123 S.Ct. 2073 (2003) (court did not have authority to rule as to jurisdiction because petitioners lacked standing); *Rasul v. Bush*, 215 F.Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), *aff’d sub nom Al Odah v. United States*, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir.), *cert. granted*, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003); *Gherebi v. Bush*, 262 F.Supp.2d 1064 (C.D.Cal.), *rev’d*, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003).

¹³⁴ M.C.O. No. 1 § 5(P). The finding is final when “the President or, if designated by the President, the Secretary of Defense makes a final decision thereon pursuant to Section 4(c)(8) of the President’s Military Order and in accordance with Section 6(H)(6) of [M.C.O. No. 1].” *Id.* § 6(H)(2).

evidence but prior to a finding, through no fault of the accused, or if there is a finding of Not Guilty, the trial is considered complete for purposes of jeopardy, and the accused may not be tried again for the same charge by any U.S. military or federal court without the consent of the accused.¹³⁵ Although M.C.O. No. 1 provides that an authenticated verdict¹³⁶ of Not Guilty by the commission may not be changed to Guilty,¹³⁷ either the Secretary of Defense or the President may disapprove the finding and return the case for “further proceedings” prior to the findings’ becoming final, regardless of the verdict. If a finding of Not Guilty is referred back to the commission for rehearing, double jeopardy may be implicated.¹³⁸

Another double jeopardy issue that might arise is related to the requirements for the specification of charges.¹³⁹ M.C.O. No. 1 does not provide a specific form for the charges, and does not require an oath or signature.¹⁴⁰ If the charge does not adequately describe the offense, another trial for the same offense under a new description is not as easily prevented. MCI No. 2, setting forth elements of crimes triable by the commissions, may provide an effective safeguard; however, new crimes may be added to its list at any time.

The M.O. also left open the possibility that a person subject to the order might be transferred at any time to some other governmental authority for trial.¹⁴¹ A federal criminal trial, as a trial conducted under the same sovereign as a military commission, could have double jeopardy implications if the accused had already been tried by military commission for the same crime or crimes, even if the commission proceedings did not result in a final verdict. The federal court would face the issue of whether jeopardy had already attached prior to the transfer of the individual from military control to other federal authorities.

Conversely, the M.O. provides the President may determine at any time that an individual is subject to the M.O., at which point any state or federal authorities holding the individual would be required to turn the accused over to military authorities. If the accused were already the subject of a federal criminal trial under charges for the same conduct that resulted in the President’s determination that the accused is subject to the M.O., and if jeopardy had already attached in the federal trial, double jeopardy could be implicated by a new trial before a military

¹³⁵ 10 U.S.C. § 844. Federal courts and U.S. military courts are considered to serve under the same sovereign for purposes of double (or former) jeopardy.

¹³⁶ In regular courts-martial, the record of a proceeding is “authenticated,” or certified as to its accuracy, by the military judge who presided over the proceeding. R.C.M. 1104. None of the military orders or instructions establishing procedures for military commissions explains what is meant by “authenticated finding.”

¹³⁷ M.C.O. No. 1 § 6(H)(2).

¹³⁸ The UCMJ does not permit rehearing on a charge for which the accused is found on the facts to be not guilty.

¹³⁹ See NIMJ, *supra* note 34, at 39.

¹⁴⁰ See M.C.O. No. 1 § 6(A)(1).

¹⁴¹ M.O. § 7(e).

commission. M.C.O. No. 1 does not explicitly provide for a double jeopardy defense under such circumstances.

Role of Congress

The President's order appears to be broader than the authority exercised by previous Presidents and may cover aliens in the United States legally who are citizens of countries with which the nation is at peace. M.C.O. No. 1 clarifies that the commissions will have jurisdiction only over violations of the law of war but does not expressly limit jurisdiction to coincide with Congress' authorization for the use of force. It does not limit the provisions appearing to allow for the indefinite detention of non-citizens, whether or not they are accused of having committed a violation of the law of war, based solely on the President's determination that there is reason to believe the individual is a member of the class of persons subject to the order, in possible contradiction to the USA PATRIOT Act.¹⁴² It does not clarify whether the President intends to use the statutory definitions of "acts of international terrorism" to determine who is subject to the order.

Congress has the authority to regulate the operation of military commissions, but has not in the past prescribed procedural regulations.¹⁴³ Congress may also draft legislation defining offenses against the law of war triable by military commissions. Because the draft regulations appear to provide some of the safeguards critics argued were missing from the original M.O., supporters of the Administration's policy will likely urge Congress not to interfere. Notably, M.C.O. No. 1 is subject to amendment without notification to Congress, and the Secretary of Defense has the authority to direct that some other procedures be used.¹⁴⁴ M.C.O. No. 1 also states that no "other rules" will govern, which could mean that the rules are not to be construed with reference to the UCMJ or any other statute. Indeed, M.C.O. No. 1 § 10 states that "[n]o provision in [the] Order shall be construed to be a requirement of the United States Constitution." Finally, an act of Congress would appear necessary to enable the federal courts to take appellate jurisdiction over the military commissions.¹⁴⁵

The Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2003, introduced in the Senate as Title I, subtitle C of S. 22 (Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003), and in the House of Representatives as H.R. 1290, would authorize the establishment of extraordinary tribunals for offenses arising from the September 11, 2001 attacks. The bill narrows the field of potential defendants from that stated in the M.O. and expands the minimum procedural requirements to be established by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. It provides for the same avenue of review used for courts-martial, that is, a board of

¹⁴² P.L. 107-56 § 412 (requiring aliens detained as suspected terrorists must be charged with a crime, subjected to removal proceedings under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, or released within 7 days).

¹⁴³ See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (delegating authority to the President).

¹⁴⁴ See M.C.O. No. 1 § 1.

¹⁴⁵ See *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946); *Ex parte Vallandigham*, 68 (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).

review to ascertain whether the evidence was sufficient and that procedural requirements were met, appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. The bill authorizes the detention of suspected terrorists under certain limitations and clarifies the application of international law to the process. H.R. 2428 would provide for congressional review and possible disapproval of regulations relating to military tribunals.

The following charts provide a comparison of the proposed military tribunals under the above proposed legislation, the regulations issued by the Department of Defense, and standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial. Table 1 compares the legal authorities for establishing military tribunals, the jurisdiction over persons and offenses, and the different structures of the envisioned tribunals. Table 2, which compares procedural safeguards incorporated in the regulations and the Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2003, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, *Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts*, in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed legislation to safeguards provided in federal court and the International Criminal Court.

Table 1. Comparison of Military Commission Rules and Proposed Legislation

	General Courts Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290	H.R. 2428
Authority	U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8.	U.S. Constitution, Article II; Presidential Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001 (M.O).	U.S. Constitution, Article I § 8.	U.S. Constitution, Article I § 8.	Not specified, presumably U.S. Constitution, Article I § 8.
Procedure	Rules are provided by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), chapter 47, title 10, and the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) and the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.), issued by the President pursuant to art. 36, UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 836.	Rules are issued by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the M.O. No other rules apply (presumably excluding the UCMJ). § 1.	Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General establish rules. §1303(c).	Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General establish rules. § 3(c).	Procedural rules are issued by the President, subject to disapproval by Congress by means of a joint resolution.
Jurisdiction over Persons	Members of the armed forces, cadets, midshipmen, reservists while on inactive-duty training, members of the National Guard or Air National Guard when in federal service, prisoners of war in custody of the armed	Individual subject to M.O., determined by President to be: 1. a non-citizen, and 2. a member of Al Qaeda or person who has engaged in acts related to terrorism against the United States, or who has	Individuals who: 1. are not U.S. persons under 50 U.S.C. 1801(i), or permanent resident aliens 2. are members of Al Qaeda, or members of other terrorist organizations who knowingly cooperated	Individuals who: 1. are not U.S. persons under 50 U.S.C. 1801(i) (which includes permanent resident aliens) 2. are members of Al Qaeda, or members of other terrorist organizations who	Not specified.

	General Courts Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290	H.R. 2428
	forces, civilian employees accompanying the armed forces in time of declared war, and certain others. 10 U.S.C. § 802; United States v. Averette, 17 USCMA 363 (1968) (holding “in time of war” to mean only wars declared by Congress Individuals who are subject to military tribunal jurisdiction under the law of war may also be tried by general court martial. 10 U.S.C. § 818.	harbored one or more such individuals and is referred to the commission by the Appointing Authority. § 3(A).	with Al Qaeda in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the September attacks, or non-members who knowingly aided and abetted the attacks 3. are apprehended in the context of the armed conflict in Afghanistan or elsewhere, against the United States 4. are not entitled to POW status under the Geneva Convention, or any related protocol. §§ 1303(a); 1307(2)	knowingly cooperated with Al Qaeda in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the September attacks, or non-members who knowingly aided and abetted the attacks 3. are apprehended in the context of the armed conflict in Afghanistan or elsewhere, against the United States 4. are not entitled to POW status under the Geneva Convention, §§ 3(a); 8(2).	
Jurisdiction over Offenses	Any offenses made punishable by the UCMJ; offenses subject to trial by military tribunal under the law of war. 10 U.S.C. § 818.	Offenses in violation of the laws of war and all other offenses triable by military commission. § 3(B). M.C.I. No. 2 clarifies that terrorism and aircraft hijacking, among other crimes, are to be considered crimes triable by military commission. <i>See supra</i>	Violations of the law of war or international laws of armed conflict, ¹ or crimes against humanity targeted against U.S. persons or residents. § 1303(b).	Violations of the law of war or international laws of armed conflict, or crimes against humanity targeted against U.S. persons or residents. § 3(b).	Not specified.

	General Courts Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290	H.R. 2428
		note 40.			
Composition	A military judge and not less than five members. R.C.M. 501.	From three to seven members, as determined by the Appointing Authority. § 4(A)(2).	S. 22 does not provide for composition of the tribunals	A military judge and no fewer than five members. § 4(a)(21).	Not specified.

Source: Congressional Research Service

Table 2. Comparison of Procedural Safeguards

	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
Presumption of Innocence	If the defendant fails to enter a proper plea, a plea of not guilty will be entered. R.C.M. 910(b). Members of court martial must be instructed that the “accused must be presumed to be innocent until the accused’s guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” R.C.M. 920(e). The accused shall be properly attired in uniform with grade insignia and any decorations to which entitled. Physical restraint shall not be imposed unless prescribed by the military judge. R.C.M. 804.	The Accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. § 5(B). Commission members must base their vote for a finding of guilty on evidence admitted at trial. §§ 5(C); 6(F). The Commission must determine the voluntary and informed nature of any plea agreement submitted by the Accused and approved by the Appointing Authority before admitting it as stipulation into evidence. § 6(B).	Procedural rules are required to provide that the accused “must be presumed innocent until proven guilty.” § 1304(a)(15)	Procedural rules are required to provide that the accused “must be presumed innocent until proven guilty.” § 4(a)(15)
Right to Remain Silent	Coerced confessions or confessions made without statutory equivalent of Miranda warning are not admissible as evidence.	Not provided. Neither the M.O. nor MCO requires a warning or bars the use of statements made during military interrogation, or any	Rules must provide that the accused “not be compelled to confess guilt or testify against himself.” § 1304(a)(16).	Rules must provide that the accused “not be compelled to confess guilt or testify against himself.” § 4(a)(16).

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	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
	Persons subject to the UCMJ are prohibited from compelling any individual to make a confession 10 U.S.C. § 831. The prosecutor must notify the defense of any incriminating statements made by the accused that are relevant to the case prior to the arraignment. Motions to suppress such statements must be made prior to pleading. Mil. R. Evid. 304.	coerced statement, from military commission proceedings. Art. 31(a), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 831) bars persons subject to it from compelling any individual to make a confession, but there does not appear to be a remedy in case of violation. No person subject to the UCMJ may compel any person to give evidence before any military tribunal if the evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. 10 U.S.C. § 831.		
Freedom from Unreasonable Searches & Seizures	“Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure ... is inadmissible against the accused ...” unless certain exceptions apply. Mil. R. Evid. 311. “Authorization to search” may be oral or written, and may be issued by a military judge or an officer in command of the area to be searched, or if the	Not provided; no exclusionary rule appears to be available. However, monitored conversations between the detainee and defense counsel may not be communicated to persons involved in prosecuting the accused or used at trial MCO No. 3. No provisions for	Not provided.	Not provided.

	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
	area is not under military control, with authority over persons subject to military law or the law of war. It must be based on probable cause. Mil. R. Evid. 315. Interception of wire and oral communications within the United States requires judicial application in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 <i>et seq.</i> Mil. R. Evid. 317. A search conducted by foreign officials is unlawful only if the accused is subject to "gross and brutal treatment." Mil. R. Evid. 311(c).	determining probable cause or issuance of search warrants are included. Insofar as searches and seizures take place outside of the United States against non-U.S. persons, the Fourth Amendment may not apply. See <i>United States v. Verdugo Urquidez</i>, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).		
Assistance of Effective Counsel	The right to an attorney attaches during the investigation phase under art. 32, UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 832. The defendant has a right to military counsel at government expense. The defendant may choose counsel, if that attorney is reasonably available, and may hire a civilian attorney in	MCO 1 provides that the Accused must be represented "at all relevant times" (presumably, once charges are approved until findings are final – but not for individuals who are detained but not charged) by detailed defense counsel. § 4(C)(4). The Accused is assigned a	Rules must provide the accused a right to be represented by counsel. § 1304 (a)(6). Rules must provide that the accused be "afforded all necessary means of defense before and after the trial." § 1304(a)(11). Detainees have an implied right to counsel to challenge	Rules must provide the accused a right to be represented by counsel. § 4 (a)(6). Rules must provide that the accused be "afforded all necessary means of defense before and after the trial." § 4(a)(11). Detainees have an implied right to counsel to challenge

	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
	addition to military counsel. 10 U.S.C. § 838. Appointed counsel must be certified as qualified and may not be someone who has taken any part in the investigation or prosecution, unless explicitly requested by the defendant. 10 U.S.C. § 827. The attorney-client privilege is honored. Mil. R. Evid. 502.	military judge advocate to serve as counsel, but may request to replace or augment the detailed counsel with a specific officer, if that person is available. § 4(C)(3)(a). The Accused may also hire a civilian attorney who is a U.S. citizen, is admitted to the bar in any state, district, or possession, has a SECRET clearance (or higher, if necessary for a particular case), and agrees to comply with all applicable rules. The civilian attorney does not replace the detailed counsel, and is not guaranteed access to classified evidence or closed hearings. § 4(C)(3)(b). Defense Counsel may present evidence at trial and cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. § 5(f). The Appointing Authority	the detention itself, including the right to an unclassified summary of information the government may have that might demonstrate the detainee is not a person subject to trial by military commission. § 1305(c).	the detention itself, including the right to an unclassified summary of information the government may have that might demonstrate the detainee is not a person subject to trial by military commission. § 5(c).

	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
		must order such resources be provided to the defense as he deems necessary for a "full and fair trial." § 5(H). Communications between defense counsel and the accused are subject to monitoring by the government. Although information obtained through such monitoring may not be used as evidence against the accused, MCI No. 3, the monitoring could have a chilling effect on attorney-client conversations, possibly hampering the ability of defense counsel to provide effective representation.		
Right to Indictment and Presentment	The right to indictment by grand jury is explicitly excluded in "cases arising in the land or naval forces." U.S. Constitution, Amendment V. Whenever an offense is alleged, the commander is	Probably not applicable to military commissions, provided the accused is an enemy belligerent. <i>See Ex parte Quirin</i>, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Office of the Chief Prosecutor prepares charges	Not provided. Probably not applicable to military commissions, provided the accused is an enemy belligerent. <i>See Ex parte Quirin</i>, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).	Not provided. Probably not applicable to military commissions, provided the accused is an enemy belligerent. <i>See Ex parte Quirin</i>, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
	responsible for initiating a preliminary inquiry under art. 32, UCMJ, and deciding how to dispose of the offense. 10 U.S.C. § 832; R.C.M. 303-06. The Accused must be advised of the charges brought against him and has the right to an attorney during the investigation and hearing proceedings. 10 U.S.C. § 832.	for referral by the Appointing Authority. § 4(B). There is no requirement for an impartial investigation prior to a referral of charges. The Commission may adjust a charged offense in a manner that does not change the nature or increase the seriousness of the charge. § 6(F).		
Right to Written Statement of Charges	Charges and specifications must be signed under oath and made known to the accused as soon as practicable. 10 U.S.C. § 830.	Copies of approved charges are provided to the Accused and Defense Counsel in English and another language the Accused understands, if appropriate. § 5(A).	Rules must require that the accused be notified of "the particulars of the offense charged or alleged without delay," but there is no explicit requirement for a written statement. § 1304(a)(2).	Rules must require that the accused be notified of "the particulars of the offense charged or alleged without delay," but there is no explicit requirement for a written statement. § 4(a)(2).
Right to be Present at Trial	The presence of the accused is required during arraignment, at the plea, and at every stage of the court-martial unless the accused waives the right by voluntarily absenting him or	The Accused may be present at every stage of trial before the Commission unless the Presiding Officer excludes the Accused because of disruptive conduct or for security	Rules must provide the accused the opportunity to be present at trial. § 1304(a)(5). Proceedings must be made simultaneously intelligible	Rules must provide the accused the opportunity to be present at trial. § 4(a)(5). Proceedings must be made simultaneously intelligible

	General Courts-Martial	Military Commission Order No. 1 (MCO)	S. 22	H.R. 1290
	herself from the proceedings after the arraignment or by persisting in conduct that justifies the trial judge in ordering the removal of the accused from the proceedings. R.C.M. 801.	reasons, or “any other reason necessary for the conduct of a full and fair trial.” §§ 4(A)(5)(a); 5(K); 6B(3).	through an interpreter, if necessary. § 1304(a)(3)	through an interpreter, if necessary. § 4(a)(3)
Prohibition against Ex Post Facto Crimes	Courts-martial will not enforce an ex post facto law, including increasing amount of pay to be forfeited for specific crimes. U.S. v. Gorki, 47 M.J. 370 (1997).	Not provided, but may be implicit in restrictions on jurisdiction over offenses. See § 3(B). MCI No. 2 § 3(A) provides that “no offense is cognizable in a trial by military commission if that offense did not exist prior to the conduct in question.”	Rules must provide that conviction must be based on conduct that was an offense under law at the time it was perpetrated, and the penalty for such an offense cannot be greater than it was when the offense was committed. § 1304(a)(13-14).	Rules must provide that conviction must be based on conduct that was an offense under law at the time it was perpetrated, and the penalty for such an offense cannot be greater than it was when the offense was committed. § 4(a)(13-14).
Protection against Double Jeopardy	Double jeopardy clause applies. See <i>Wade v. Hunter</i> , 336 US 684, 688-89 (1949). Art. 44, UCMJ prohibits double jeopardy, provides for jeopardy to attach after introduction of evidence. 10 U.S.C. § 844. General court-martial proceeding is considered to be	The Accused may not be tried again by any Commission for a charge once a Commission’s finding becomes final. (Jeopardy appears to attach when the finding becomes final, at least with respect to subsequent U.S. military commissions.) § 5(P). However, although a finding	Not explicitly provided, however, review procedures apply only to convictions, which would ensure that a verdict of “Not Guilty” would not be overturned or vacated and retried. Protection is also arguably incorporated through the inclusion of the right to appeal through the military appeals system.	Not explicitly provided, however, review procedures apply only to convictions, which would ensure that a verdict of “Not Guilty” would not be overturned or vacated and retried. Protection is also arguably incorporated through the inclusion of the right to appeal through the military appeals system.

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	a federal trial for double jeopardy purposes. Double jeopardy does not result from charges brought in state or foreign courts, although court-martial in such cases is disfavored. U. S. v. Stokes, 12 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 1982). Once military authorities have turned service member over to civil authorities for trial, military may have waived jurisdiction for that crime, although it may be possible to charge the individual for another crime arising from the same conduct. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D, Military and Civil Defense §§ 227-28. The government may only appeal orders or rulings that do not amount to a finding of not guilty. 10 U.S.C. § 862. The judge advocate only reviews cases in which there has been a finding of guilty.	of Not Guilty by the Commission may not be changed to Guilty, either the reviewing panel, the Appointing Authority, the Secretary of Defense, or the President may return the case for "further proceedings" prior to the findings' becoming final. If a finding of Not Guilty is vacated and retried, double jeopardy may be implicated. The order does not specify whether a person already tried by any other court or tribunal may be tried by a military commission under the M.O. The M.O. reserves for the President the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense to transfer an individual subject to the M.O. to another governmental authority, which is not precluded by the order from prosecuting the individual. This subsection could be read	§ 1304(e).	§ 4(e).

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	10 U.S.C. § 864.	to authorize prosecution by federal authorities after the individual was subject to trial by military commission. M.O. § 7(e).		
Speedy & Public Trial	In general, accused must be brought to trial within 120 days of the preferral of charges or the imposition of restraint, whichever date is earliest. R.C.M. 707(a). Charges must be referred within eight days of arrest or confinement, unless it is not practicable to do so. 10 U.S.C. § 835. The right to a public trial applies in courts-martial but is not absolute. R.C.M. 806. The military trial judge may exclude the public from portions of a proceeding for the purpose of protecting classified information if the prosecution demonstrates an overriding need to do so and	The Commission is required to proceed expeditiously, “preventing any unnecessary interference or delay.” § 6(B)(2). Failure to meet a specified deadline does not create a right to relief. § 10. The rules do not prohibit detention without charge, or require charges to be brought within a specific time period. Proceedings “should be open to the maximum extent possible,” but the Appointing Authority has broad discretion to close hearings, and may exclude the public or accredited press from open proceedings. § 6(B)(3).	Rules must provide for expeditious proceedings and disposition of cases. § 1304(a)(9). Persons may only be detained for the duration of a state of armed conflict or where the person is under investigation with a view toward prosecution, or trial proceedings are ongoing. There is no specific time limit by which charges must be referred, but the President must recertify the conditions every 180 days. § 1305. Trials are open and public, including the public availability of transcripts and pronouncements of judgment, “consistent with any	Rules must provide for expeditious proceedings and disposition of cases. § 4(a)(9). Persons may only be detained for the duration of a state of armed conflict or where the person is under investigation with a view toward prosecution, or trial proceedings are ongoing. There is no specific time limit by which charges must be referred, but the President must recertify the conditions every 180 days. § 5. Trials are open and public, including the public availability of transcripts and pronouncements of judgment, “consistent with any

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	the closure is no broader than necessary. United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (CMA 1977).		demonstrable necessity to secure the safety” of all participants, and subject to security procedures. Government information may be kept secret from the public only when the relevant agency head certifies in writing the disclosure will interfere with military objectives or the capture of Al Qaeda members anywhere, cause significant, identifiable harm to intelligence sources or methods; or raise a substantial risk that such evidence could be used for planning future terrorist attacks. §§ 1304(a)(17); 1304(c-d).	demonstrable necessity to secure the safety” of all participants, and subject to security procedures. Government information may be kept secret from the public only when the relevant agency head certifies in writing the disclosure will interfere with military objectives or the capture of Al Qaeda members anywhere, cause significant, identifiable harm to intelligence sources or methods; or raise a substantial risk that such evidence could be used for planning future terrorist attacks. §§ 4(a)(17); 4(c-d).
Burden & Standard of Proof	Members of court martial must be instructed that the burden of proof to establish guilt is upon the government and that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant. R.C.M. 920(e).	Commission members may vote for a finding of guilty only if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, based on evidence admitted at trial, that the Accused is guilty. §§ 5(C); 6(F).	The accused is to be presumed innocent until guilt of individual responsibility is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. § 1304(a)(12); § 1304(a)(15).	The accused is to be presumed innocent until guilt of individual responsibility is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. § 4(a)(15); 4(a)(12).

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Privilege Against Self-Incrimination	No person subject to the UCMJ may compel any person to answer incriminating questions. 10 U.S.C. § 831(a). Defendant may not be compelled to give testimony that is immaterial or potentially degrading. 10 U.S.C. § 831(c). No adverse inference is to be drawn from a defendant's refusal to answer any questions or testify at court-martial. Mil. R. Evid. 301(f). Witnesses may not be compelled to give testimony that may be incriminating unless granted immunity for that testimony by a general court-martial convening authority, as authorized by the Attorney General, if required. 18 U.S.C. § 6002; R.C.M. 704.	The Accused is not required to testify, and the commission may draw no adverse inference from a refusal to testify. § 5(F). However, there is no rule against the use of coerced statements as evidence. There is no specific provision for immunity of witnesses to prevent their testimony from being used against them in any subsequent legal proceeding, however, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 <i>et seq.</i>, a witness required by a military tribunal to give incriminating testimony is immune from prosecution in any criminal case, other than for perjury, giving false statements, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 18 U.S.C. §§6002; 6004.	Rules must provide the accused not be compelled to confess guilt. §1304(a)(16). Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 <i>et seq.</i>, a witness required by a military tribunal to give incriminating testimony is immune from prosecution in any criminal case, other than for perjury, giving false statements, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 18 U.S.C. §§6002; 6004.	Rules must provide the accused not be compelled to confess guilt. §4(a)(16). Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 <i>et seq.</i>, a witness required by a military tribunal to give incriminating testimony is immune from prosecution in any criminal case, other than for perjury, giving false statements, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 18 U.S.C. §§6002; 6004.

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Right to Examine or Have Examined Adverse Witnesses	Hearsay rules apply as in federal court. Mil. R. Evid. 801 <i>et seq.</i> A duly authenticated deposition, or video or audio-taped testimony, may be used in lieu of a live witness only if the witness is beyond 100 miles from the place or trial, the witness is unavailable due to death, health reasons, military necessity, nonamenability to process, or the whereabouts of the witness is unknown. In capital cases, sworn depositions may not be used in lieu of witness, unless court-martial is treated as non-capital or it is introduced by the defense. 10 U.S.C. § 849. The military judge may allow the government to use a summary of classified information, unless the use of the classified information itself	Defense Counsel may cross-examine the Prosecution's witnesses who appear before the Commission. § 5(1). However, the Commission may also permit witnesses to testify by telephone or other means not requiring the presence of the witness at trial, in which case cross-examination may be impossible. § 6(D)(2). In the case of closed proceedings or classified evidence, only the detailed defense counsel may be permitted to participate. Hearsay evidence is admissible as long as the Commission determines it would have probative value to a reasonable person. § 6(D)(1). The Commission may consider testimony from prior trials as well as sworn and	Rules must provide the accused an opportunity to respond to evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. § 1304(a)(7-8). The tribunals are to apply "reasonable rules of evidence designed to ensure admission only of reliable information or material with probative value." § 1304(a)(10). Except in capital cases, a duly authenticated deposition, or video or audio-taped testimony, may be used in lieu of a live witness only if the witness is beyond 100 miles from the place or trial, the witness is unavailable due to death, health reasons, military necessity, nonamenability to process, or other reasonable cause, or the whereabouts of the witness is unknown. 10 U.S.C. § 849 (expressly applies to military commissions as well as courts-	Rules must provide the accused an opportunity to respond to evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. § 4(a)(7-8). The tribunals are to apply "reasonable rules of evidence designed to ensure admission only of reliable information or material with probative value." § 4(a)(10). Except in capital cases, a duly authenticated deposition, or video or audio-taped testimony, may be used in lieu of a live witness only if the witness is beyond 100 miles from the place or trial, the witness is unavailable due to death, health reasons, military necessity, nonamenability to process, or other reasonable cause, or the whereabouts of the witness is unknown. 10 U.S.C. § 849 (expressly applies to military commissions as well as courts-

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	is necessary to afford the accused a fair trial. Mil. R. Evid. 505.	unsworn written statements, apparently without regard to the availability of the declarant, in apparent contradiction with 10 U.S.C. § 849. § 6(D)(3).	martial, although <i>Yamashita</i> decision may preclude its application to military tribunals of enemy combatants. See <i>supra</i> notes 67, 114, 145.	martial, although <i>Yamashita</i> decision may preclude its application to military tribunals of enemy combatants. See <i>supra</i> notes 67, 114, 145.
Right to Compulsory Process to Obtain Witnesses	Defendants before court-martial have the right to compel appearance of witnesses necessary to their defense. R.C.M. 703. Process to compel witnesses in court-martial cases is to be similar to the process used in federal courts. 10 U.S.C. § 846.	The Accused may obtain witnesses and documents "to the extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer." § 5(H). The Commission has the power to summon witnesses as requested by the Defense. § 6(A)(5). The power to issue subpoenas is exercised by the Chief Prosecutor; the Chief Defense Counsel has no such authority. MCI Nos. 3-4.	There is no provision authorizing the commission to subpoena witnesses, but § 1304(a)(11), providing for all necessary means of defense, and § 1304(a)(8), right to offer witnesses, might be interpreted to include the right to compel witnesses. Art. 47, UCMJ, implies that military commissions have the power to issue subpoenas. 10 U.S.C. § 847 (conferring jurisdiction to district courts for trial of persons not subject to the UCMJ for failure to appear or testify).	There is no provision authorizing the commission to subpoena witnesses, but § 4(a)(11), providing for all necessary means of defense, and § 4(a)(8), right to offer witnesses, might be interpreted to include the right to compel witnesses. Art. 847, UCMJ, implies that military commissions have the power to issue subpoenas. 10 U.S.C. § 847 (conferring jurisdiction to district courts for trial of persons not subject to the UCMJ for failure to appear or testify).

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Right to Trial by Impartial Judge	A qualified military judge is detailed to preside over the court-martial. The convening authority may not prepare or review any report concerning the performance or effectiveness of the military judge. 10 U.S.C. § 826. Article 37, UCMJ, prohibits unlawful influence of courts-martial through admonishment, censure, or reprimand of its members by the convening authority or commanding officer, or any unlawful attempt by a person subject to the UCMJ to coerce or influence the action of a court-martial or convening authority. 10 U.S.C. § 837. Military defendants have the opportunity to challenge the military judge for cause. 10 U.S.C. § 41.	The Presiding Officer is appointed directly by the Appointing Authority, which decides all interlocutory issues. There do not appear to be any special procedural safeguards to ensure impartiality. §4(A)(4). The presiding judge, who decides issues of admissibility of evidence, also votes as part of the commission on the finding of guilt or innocence. Article 37, UCMJ, provides that no person subject to the UCMJ “may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or <i>any other military tribunal</i> or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts.” 10 U.S.C. § 837.	Rules must provide that the tribunal be independent and impartial. § 1304(a)(1).	Rules must provide that the tribunal be independent and impartial. § 4(a)(1).

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Right to Trial By Impartial Jury	A military accused has no Sixth Amendment right to a trial by petit jury. <i>Ex Parte Quirin</i>, 317 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1942) (<i>dicta</i>). However, "Congress has provided for trial by members at a court-martial." <i>United States v. Witham</i>, 47 MJ 297, 301 (1997); 10 U.S.C. § 825. The Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury be impartial applies to court-martial members and covers not only the selection of individual jurors, but also their conduct during the trial proceedings and the subsequent deliberations. <i>United States v. Lambert</i>, 55 M.J. 293 (2001). Military defendants have the opportunity to exercise peremptory challenge and challenge panel members for cause. 10 U.S.C. § 41.	Military tribunals probably do not require a jury trial. <i>See Ex Parte Quirin</i>, 317 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1942) (<i>dicta</i>). The commission members are appointed directly by the Appointing Authority. While the Commission is bound to proceed impartially, there do not appear to be any special procedural safeguards designed to ensure their impartiality. § 6(B). MCI No. 6, defining reporting relationships for military commission personnel, may raise issues with regard to command influence. <i>See supra</i> note 62, and accompanying text.	Rules must provide that the tribunal be independent and impartial. § 1304(a)(1).	Rules must provide that the tribunal be independent and impartial. § 4(a)(1).

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	The military judge does not take part in the deliberations of the panel, and cannot preside over cases in which he has taken part in any investigation or acted as accuser or counsel. 10 U.S.C. § 26. The absence of a right to trial by jury precludes criminal trial of civilians by court-martial. <i>Reid v. Covert</i>, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); <i>Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton</i>, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).			
Right to Appeal to Independent Reviewing Authority	The defendant has the right to appeal to the appropriate Court of Criminal Appeals, and then to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The writ of <i>habeas corpus</i> provides the primary means by which those sentenced by military court, having exhausted military appeals, can challenge a conviction or sentence in a civilian court. The scope of matters that a court will address is more	There is no stated right to appeal outside the Defense Department. A review panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense reviews the record of the trial in a closed conference, disregarding any procedural variances that would not materially affect the outcome of the trial, and recommends its disposition to the Secretary of Defense. Although the Defense Counsel has the duty of representing	The procedures established must allow review of the proceedings, convictions and sentences by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and subject to appeal to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. § 1304(e).	The procedures established must allow review of the proceedings, convictions and sentences by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and subject to appeal to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. § 4(e). The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under title 28, U.S. Code, is preserved. § 4(a)(20).

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	narrow than in challenges of federal or state convictions. <i>Burns v. Wilson</i>, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).	the interests of the Accused during any review process, the review panel need not consider written submissions from the Defense, nor does there appear to be an opportunity to rebut the submissions of the prosecution. If the majority of the review panel forms a “definite and firm conviction that a material error of law occurred,” it may return the case to the Appointing Authority for further proceedings. § 6(H)(4). The review panel recommendation does not appear to be binding. The Secretary of Defense may serve as Appointing Authority and as the final reviewing authority, as designated by the President. The individual is not privileged to seek any remedy in any U.S. court or state		

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Protection against Excessive Penalties	Death may only be adjudged for certain crimes where the defendant is found guilty by unanimous vote of court-martial members present at the time of the vote. Prior to arraignment, the trial counsel must give the defense written notice of aggravating factors the prosecution intends to prove. R.C.M. 1004. A conviction of spying during time of war under article 106, UCMJ, carries a mandatory death penalty.	court, the court of any foreign nation, or any international tribunal. M.O. § 7(b). However, the Administration has indicated that the M.O. does not preclude petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which it also argues is unavailable to enemy belligerents outside the sovereign territory of the United States.	The requirements of the UCMJ for the imposition of the death penalty apply, meaning both the conviction and sentence must be approved by unanimous vote of the commission and by the President. § 1304(b).	The requirements of the UCMJ for the imposition of the death penalty apply, meaning both the conviction and sentence must be approved by unanimous vote of the commission and by the President. § 4(b).