

CHINESE POLICY IN AFRICA: STAKES, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CHINESE POLICY IN AFRICA: STAKES, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

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A decade ago, China's influence in Africa was limited. Recently, however, a more sophisticated generation of Chinese leaders more knowledgeable on Africa combined with a domestic population more confident in its country as a global actor have encouraged Beijing to take a more proactive approach to foreign affairs. In this context, a notable rapprochement was made with the African continent, and the mutual socio-cultural, economic and political exchanges are growing exponentially.

So, what strategy -ends, ways and means- did China adopt to strengthen its ties with this continent, and what are the stakes and the implications of this rapprochement? These are the questions to be examined and answered by this paper.

CHINESE POLICY IN AFRICA: STAKES, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS

When China will waken, the world will quiver.¹

—Napoleon 1st

After the Chinese Civil War, mainland China underwent a series of disruptive socioeconomic movements starting in the late 1950s with the Great Leap Forward² and continuing in the 1960s with the Cultural Revolution that left much of its education system and economy in shambles. In 1976, with the death of its first generation Communist Party leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the People's Republic of China (PRC) began implementing a series of political and economic reforms advocated by Deng Xiaoping that eventually formed the foundation for China's recent rapid economic development. In 1979, he established two main objectives for Chinese diplomacy: peace and development. Twenty-five years later, China has increased its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to reach \$10 trillion in 2006, with an average annual growth rate of 10%³. Maintaining this growth rate is imperative for China as they struggle to move from the largely agrarian economy of the 70's and 80's to the industrial giant they are today with the second largest GDP in the world after the U.S..⁴ As a matter of fact, the predictions of the Chinese awakening appear to be happening as the Middle Kingdom⁵ is on its way to recover its appropriate central place within the international community.

During the past decade, China has energetically expanded its outreach to the world. Having learned from it's past, marked by an excessive politicization of its diplomacy; China is increasingly opting for a pragmatic approach based on a

greater engagement and investment around the world. As mentioned in the Chinese government *White Paper* published in December 2005, "China can not achieve its peaceful development without the rest of the world. Likewise, the world needs China if it is to attain prosperity."⁶ Based on this principle, China has initiated a wide strategic rapprochement with the African Continent. A decade ago, China's influence in Africa was limited. Many Chinese were unsure about their country's role as an international actor. Its aid programs were not significant and its diplomats were relatively unskilled. In most international forums, China did little other than defend core interests, like the "One China" policy.⁷ Recently, however, continued strong economic growth, a better educated generation of Chinese leaders, and a domestic population more confident in China as a global actor, have encouraged Beijing to take a more proactive approach to foreign affairs, and especially towards Africa.

As China is emerging as an economic giant in Asia with global pretensions, Africa is seeking allies to improve its own disastrous economic conditions. Indeed, the African continent is the world's poorest continent with the largest number of developing countries.⁸ Since the end of colonialism, most of its 53 states, particularly the sub-Saharan countries, have frequently been hampered by instability, corruption, huge national debt, violence, and authoritarianism. Very few of them have been able to sustain democratic processes and economic reforms. The rates at which epidemics and diseases are spreading throughout the continent are the world's highest, decimating large parts of the population. As an example, with just over 12% of the world's

inhabitants, Africa is estimated to have more than 60% of the AIDS-infected population. The resulting disastrous socio-economic situation is aggravated by political crises and ethnic struggles that often provoke armed conflicts causing millions of deaths. This catastrophic situation and the need to overcome chronic underdevelopment have forced African leaders to seek new strategic partnerships to boost the continent's economic performance. In this endeavor, the rancor that prevails towards the occidental powers, especially the former European colonial Empires, leaves China as untainted baggage in Africa. This makes the latter the partner of choice for many of the African states.

While China's increased involvement in Africa may be seen, optimistically, as that continent's last chance to escape its mediocrity, others view this Chinese offensive as a new colonial adventure that will actually worsen and mortgage Africa's future. As this work demonstrates, even if this Sino-African rapprochement is currently not a perceived significant threat to U.S. interests, the potential that it may eventually have very real consequences is valid. The United States' (U.S.) policy towards both China and Africa should be adapted accordingly.

To support this thesis, this paper therefore focuses first on the stakes of the Chinese-African rapprochement; it then develops the cornerstones of the strategy adopted by China; and finally it gives insight on the future prospects of this relationship, including the implications for U.S. policy.

I- What does China want in Africa?

Beijing's motives in Africa are clear. China's growing industries demand new energy and raw material and its exporters want markets. Chinese diplomats are also seeking support in international organizations to preserve specific Chinese interests and, when necessary, to counter the U.S. influence in the world. As Dr. Ernest Wilson, Professor at the University of Maryland, told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission "China is on a new glide path, and a new strategic direction, in experimenting with a variety of ways to use the tools of statecraft to open the doors to get privileged access to energy and resources in Africa and elsewhere..."⁹

a- Natural Resources

With its GDP growth hitting 10.7% in 2006¹⁰ and projected to stay at 10% in 2008,¹¹ China's number one objective in its African strategy is to ensure unimpeded access to Africa's abundant natural resources, especially oil and other sources of energy.

Data about the Chinese appetite for natural resources is absolutely impressive. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial raw material has skyrocketed. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled in the 1990's, from 7% in 1990 to 15% in 2000. It has now reached about 20% and is likely to double again by the end of the decade.¹² The numbers relative to energy resources, especially oil, are even more astronomical. Rising oil demand and imports have made China a significant factor in world oil markets. In 2003, it

surpassed Japan as the world's second-largest oil consumer after the U.S. In fact, its consumption grew from 1765 barrels a day (BD) in 1980 to 7273 BD in 2006 (400% increase).¹³ According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China accounted for 40% of total growth in global demand for oil in the last four years.¹⁴ Last year, by itself, China accounted for 31% of global growth in oil demand.¹⁵ Further aggravating the situation is the fact that China's domestic oil production is likely to continue to diminish as it possesses no significant strategic petroleum reserve. 20 years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter; now it is the world's second-largest net importer after the U.S.¹⁶ China's voracious demand for energy to feed its booming economy, its need to become less dependant on market dictated-pricing, and its fear of a global crisis or a deliberate U.S. attempt to cut its supply energy lines has led it to seek oil supplies from multiple sources around the globe. With the Middle East mired in long-term instability, China has turned towards Africa.

Africa is the world's second most populous continent after Asia, and the second largest in size covering more than 20% of the total earth land area.¹⁷ Commodity-rich Africa, home to major oil producers, is also a key source of some of the world's most utilized minerals and precious metals such as gold, copper, diamonds, and coltan,¹⁸ as well as natural gas, timber and coal. Its natural potential is impressive and those riches remain largely untapped.¹⁹ Indeed, as examples of this remarkable natural wealth, Africa has 90% of the world's phosphate, 64% of its manganese, 50% of its gold, 40% of its platinum, 40% of its potential hydro electric power supply, 30% of the uranium, 13% of its copper,

12% of its natural gas, 7.5% of its coal, 8% of its known petroleum reserves, 3% of its iron ore, and the bulk of the world's diamond and chromium. Vast bauxite, nickel, and lead deposits are also found in Africa.²⁰ No other continent is blessed with such abundance and diversity.²¹

Tapping into Africa's enormous natural wealth is attractive for two main reasons. First, unlike the geopolitical problems that prevail in other energy resource rich regions like the Caucasus or the Middle East, Africa is generally free of problems such as terrorism or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, the authoritarian or predatory regimes that tend to flourish in Africa have also made this region attractive for the potential buyers of these resources since the natural resource domains benefit from the protection of such regimes. Thus, countries like Nigeria (largest oil producer in Africa and 11th in the world), Angola, Sudan, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are becoming the object of courtships not only by China but also by other major demanders of energy like the U.S., European Union (EU), Japan or India. Africa provides China with 30% of its current petroleum and gas needs,²² meeting 5% of China's energy needs and rivaling the Middle-East as a source of Chinese energy.²³ As a contrasting comparison, the U.S. imports only 15% of its oil from Africa.²⁴

b- New Markets for Chinese Goods

Chinese businessmen are looking to open new markets for their products to ensure that the Chinese export-driven economy -now the world's fourth largest- continues to grow and draw foreign direct investment. Africa, with a growing purchasing power of almost a billion consumers, with generally less

stringent quality control norms, and a geopolitical environment suitable for a flourishing weaponry trade is therefore a very appealing market for the Chinese goods.

The Chinese government recently published a report saying that Africa is an ideal market for products made in China.²⁵ Indeed, Africa is a potential and appropriate market for the Chinese economy, with its 900 million people²⁶ (which accounts for about 14% of the world's human population). It is increasingly a huge potential market with a moderate but sustainable growing purchasing power. It represents great opportunities for the cheaply manufactured Chinese products. Nearly all African countries have great demand for light industrial products, household appliances and electronic products. Bicycles, motorcycles, TV sets, textile products, and more and more "made-in-China" products of low prices are in great demand in remote African countries. Africa is actually reaping the fruits of a "new silk road" in its trade with China and the exchanges between the Middle Kingdom and the African countries are surprisingly successful. According to Chinese government reports, trade between China and Africa grew from \$12 million in the 1980s to \$10 billion in 2000 and has more than quadrupled between 2002 and 2006 to reach a record high of \$55.5 billion. In fact, Chinese merchants may be too successful. In 2004, Chinese exports to Ethiopia made up over 93% of the latter's bilateral trade while in the first half of 2005, Chinese purchases from Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia/Somaliland were negligible²⁷ creating an imbalance that could alienate these countries in the long run.

The African market is also attractive for China because it has less regard for quality control norms and service standards than other markets in the world. In fact, contrary to the developed countries like the U.S., EU and Japan, where the quality standards, especially regarding security, are draconian, most of the African nations particularly the sub-Saharan ones, do not apply, or at least not rigorously, these norms. In fact, the weak governmental control structures combined with the corruption that prevails amongst the national leaders and the top deciders, as well as the poverty and illiteracy of most of the African populations, allow Chinese firms to disregard the international standards of product quality, thus reducing the cost of goods production.

Finally, Africa is an attractive market for the weapons industry. Africa is the land of discrepancies. Although it has abundant natural resources, it remains the world's poorest and most underdeveloped continent, due largely to ignorance, illiteracy, corrupt governments, failed central planning, as well as widespread human rights violations and frequent bloody conflicts. This environment is consequently favorable to a flourishing weapons market. To maintain their power, authoritarian leaders equip themselves with disproportionately large military and police forces to counter potential popular uprisings. They consequently spend large percentages of their national budget on weapons to the detriment of other needs vital to their populations. One of the most prominent examples of military trade is with Sudan. While the U.S., EU, Japan, and others seek to impose UN sanctions on the Sudanese regime over Khartoum's support for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur—in which more than

400,000 have died and 2.5 million are homeless—²⁸ China strenuously opposes Security Council sanctions and continues to support Khartoum, especially militarily. In fact, China, downplaying the violence and ethnic cleansing in that country, provides the Sudanese government (according to Amnesty International) with billions of dollars worth of weapons used against the persecuted population of Darfur.²⁹ Furthermore, Khartoum has doubled its defense budget in recent years, spending 60 to 80% of its estimated \$500 million in annual oil revenue—half from China—on weapons.³⁰ Most of these weapons find their way to the Darfur region, to support the ongoing massacre. Moreover, with Chinese assistance, the Sudanese government recently built three weapons factories, dampening the effects of the international arms embargos against Khartoum. The former Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister defends Beijing's Sudan policy and by extension its policy in Africa by arguing that "Business is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them."³¹ That summarizes the Chinese vision of economic cooperation in Africa.

c- Enhance Global Political Influence

China's Africa strategy is about more than securing natural resources and seeking for new markets for Chinese goods. China is also pursuing two specific political objectives. The first one is to reinforce political influence within the developing world in order to increase its global legitimacy among the international community; and the second one is to seek additional allies to support its "One China" policy towards the Taiwanese issue.

First, as a rising power, China is keen on gathering political influence in Africa. It is actively and aggressively seeking new friends and allies. It needs votes at the United Nations (UN) and in other international forums to sustain its foreign policy, and to help blunt pressure from the Western democracies on recurrent issues like human rights, economic openness, and political freedoms. With over 50 nations, Africa represents more than one-quarter of the UN General Assembly—a significant voting bloc. To optimize the implementation of its strategy and adapt it to the African realms, China wants to steer a wedge between the conventional foreign policies of the West and the conventional policies of the global South. In fact, the Middle Kingdom uses a variety of ways and means that includes traditional diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, and increasingly, public diplomacy and ‘soft power’.³²

Ensuring support for its domestic and foreign policies within specialized organizations such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) is one of the objectives of the Chinese African policy. For this cause, China is providing unrestricted support to African countries, especially those reprimanded by the international community. For example, China helped fill the UNCHR with Africa's worst human rights abusers, including Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Eritrea.³³ Subsequently, at every opportunity these African nations have supported Beijing's efforts to sideline attempts to redress abuses throughout China and Africa. In the case of Sudan, China has used its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to block real measures intended to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. By leveraging its seat on the Security Council,

China has further driven a wedge between Sudan and the West, a move that only bolsters Beijing's importance to the oil-rich Khartoum regime. On the other hand, African states have been pivotal in avoiding a condemnation of Chinese human rights practices before the UNCHR.

Another significant Chinese objective in Africa is to isolate Taiwan diplomatically in an effort to pressure Taipei toward unification. Curtailing Taiwan's diplomatic influence was not a high priority on China's Africa policy agenda until the early 1990s, when the competition between Beijing and Taipei to win diplomatic recognition from individual countries escalated drastically. The official "China's African Policy" *White Paper* issued in January 2006 is clear about this issue: "The one-China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations."³⁴ This document further enunciates that "...The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one-China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification."³⁵ Africa is one of two parts of the world, along with Latin America, with sizable numbers of states that still recognize Taiwan. Seven countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Swaziland—currently maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.³⁶ Taiwan's remaining allies are vital to preventing the island from becoming isolated diplomatically, and Beijing clearly wants to marginalize Taiwan's influence on the continent. In late 2005, China lured Senegal, one of the most important West African states, back into its

camp.³⁷ African rulers affirm their support for the "One China" principle at every official meeting with their Chinese counterparts. In 2007, Ethiopia's parliament even approved a resolution in support of Beijing's anti-secession law.³⁸ Furthermore, in recent years, African states have been pivotal in preventing Taiwan from joining the World Health Organization.³⁹

II- What are the Cornerstones of the Chinese Policy in Africa?

As seen earlier, the Chinese are making a more concerted effort to reach out to the African countries in recent years in support of their national interests to include access to resources, markets, and securing diplomatic allies. To achieve these objectives, the PRC laid-out an ingenious strategy adapted to the realities of this continent and based on the concept of "China's peaceful rise."⁴⁰ This strategy is multidimensional, combining political, socio-cultural, financial and economic ways and means, as well as relying upon a combination of trade, military aid, development assistance, diplomacy, and corruption to foster long-term partnerships with African countries. In January 2006, Beijing released an official China-Africa policy white paper.⁴¹ A document remarkable for the broad range of issues it covers, it offers some clues into Beijing's strategy in Africa. It clearly outlines that based on shared fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples; China establishes and develops a new type of strategic partnership with Africa which features political equality, mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of this policy are summarized as follows:

- Sincerity, friendship, equality and respect of African countries' independent road of development choice.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity.
- Mutual support and close coordination within the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's positions.
- Learning from each other and seeking common development, and strengthening exchanges and cooperation in education, science, culture and health.

In brief, the Chinese policy in Africa is defined as leaning on three cornerstones: Historical legitimacy, a soft power political strategy, and a “win-win” economic cooperation.

a- Historical Legitimacy.

The first cornerstone the Chinese African Strategy leans on is its claimed historical legitimacy. In fact, the China-Africa friendship is embedded in a long history of interchange. It is an evolving construct with historical roots going back to antiquity. Contacts were first initiated in the 10th century B.C. when China established connections with the pharaohs of Egypt. This said the first notable commercial exchanges were established during the Ming Dynasty period (1368-1644) when the explorer mariner Zheng He⁴² landed on the eastern African coast. Unfortunately, this rapprochement was broken in the 19th century, with European colonization of both China and Africa, a period the Chinese call the "hundred years of humiliation" because they believe their country was exploited and weakened by foreign powers. The 1950s, with the founding of the modern

PRC and the decline of the European empires, reopened Africa to a new rapprochement with the “Eastern Giant”. This relationship made its roots through the Asian-African conference of Bandung in 1955 with the Chinese desire to be the leader of the third world. It was then extended during the Cold War and further developed after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Thus, China has firmly and continuously supported Africa’s break away from colonial powers and pursuit of development. Sharing similar historical experiences, China and Africa have all along sympathized with, and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship in their self identification with Third World struggles.⁴³ In a throwback to the Maoist revolutionary days of the 1960s and the 1970s, and the Cold War when those relationships were driven mainly by anti-capitalist ideologies of Marx and Mao, Beijing has once again identified the African continent as an area of strategic interest. But this time, the PRC is not interested in exporting international communism. Instead, it is expanding its spheres of influence and ensuring access to energy and raw materials through soft power, diplomacy, investment, and trade.

b- “Soft Power” Approach

China’s rapprochement is relying on a “soft power” political strategy based on bilateral relationships between China and each of the 53 African Nations, including some African leaders exiled by the international community. China justifies this behavior by one of the most important pillars in its strategy: “noninterference in internal affairs”. African leaders and especially Africa’s

dictators find this policy comforting. In addition, the African leaders say that diplomatically, unlike Western countries, the Chinese treat them more as equals.⁴⁴ President Hu Jintao said during the 4th African-Chinese Summit held in Beijing in 2006 that "...Treating each other as equals is crucial for ensuring mutual trust. ... We both are serious in addressing each other's concerns and are eager to benefit from each other's practice in development."⁴⁵ Implementation of this strategy is done at all levels: heads of states visits, exchanges between governmental and legislative bodies, political parties, private forums among business leaders, and even local partnerships between regions and cities.

Indeed, China's African Policy paper states:

China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration."⁴⁶

The "soft" Chinese approach to Africa also includes people-to-people exchanges through social organizations and institutions. To implement and optimize this strategy, a vast program of continuous education on local cultures and languages of each of the African countries is conducted by China to produce scholars for these respective regions.⁴⁷ Essential domains for development like Africa's education and healthcare are also targeted within the Chinese soft policy, especially the youth and women with a view of increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. Moreover, Chinese technical aid to Africa is becoming increasingly important in building China's influence in the region. Medical, agricultural and engineering teams have provided technical aid to African countries for decades to support everything from

building projects to treating AIDS patients. Since 1963, some 15,000 “volunteer” Chinese doctors have worked in 47 African states treating nearly 180 million cases of HIV/AIDS. At the end of 2003, 940 Chinese doctors were still working throughout the continent.⁴⁸ These medical teams provide medicines and medical materials to African countries as well as help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel.⁴⁹ Contrary to U.S. programs which prefer loan programs and direct aid, Beijing prefers technical support over financial aid to African countries. From China’s perspective, financial aid stretches resources and diverts capital from significant needs at home while investments in trade and projects that have a chance at providing bigger and more long-term returns. In fact, they apply the Chinese proverb: “Give a fish to a man, you will feed him for a day; Teach him how to fish, you will feed him for a lifetime.”

As China’s power and influence grows, Beijing is becoming more willing to challenge the U.S., European nations, and others in international arenas to protect its interests in Africa. This goal is facilitated by the fact that China, in many cases, is proving a less demanding alternative to the more rigorous relationships that African nations must have with the Western powers. Also, while over the past decade the U.S. has too often ignored sub-Saharan Africa countries except for counterterrorism cooperation and aid initiatives, Beijing has quietly established relationships with the continent’s political and business elites. In UN forums, China has supported a range of proposals favored by African countries on UN Security Council reform, peacekeeping, and debt relief. In so doing, Chinese officials often portray Beijing as a champion of the developing

world that listens to other countries while drawing an implicit contrast with the U.S., which China portrays as “uninterested in developing nations' needs.”⁵⁰ As Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao puts it, “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will always stand side by side with developing countries in Africa and other parts of the world.”⁵¹

One of the biggest benefactors of China’s efforts towards Africa is Zimbabwe. In July 2005, while Britain, backed by the United States and seven other countries, led a Security Council briefing on Zimbabwe’s slum demolition campaign in an effort to organize a formal debate in the General Assembly and possibly generate a punitive Security Council resolution,⁵² Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe visited Beijing, sought financial assistance for his failing economy and political support for its international immunity. Successful in his efforts, Beijing opposed any Security Council action against Zimbabwe and the UN was unable to reach a consensus on further formal discussions of the issue.

Another primary Chinese way to support and sustain its political influence towards the African countries is the multiplication of the official exchange visits like those of heads of state level and of high governmental authority. In 2006, Beijing declared 2006 the “Year of Africa”. During that year, Chinese leaders visited half of Africa’s countries, promised to make their first major high-level diplomatic trip of every year to Africa, and in November Beijing hosted a major summit where nearly 50 African Heads of State attended. China used this high-level meeting to lavish African leaders with diplomatic pomp and circumstance

and promised them generous financial, commercial, and military assistance. Its theme was “The three 50s”: 50 years of China–Africa relations, the existence of over 50 African nations, and \$50 billion in bilateral Sino–African trade.⁵³

In this context, the Chinese government also created the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (COFAC), an umbrella organization designed to encourage better diplomatic relations, trade and investment. This COFAC is one of the most successful international meetings in terms of regularity and quality of the attendance. Launched in October 2000 in Beijing in the presence of the Chinese president, 80 Chinese ministers, and heads of state and chiefs of government from 44 African countries, this forum is an effective mechanism for the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring “long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.”⁵⁴ The second meeting of this forum was held in Addis-Ababa—Ethiopia in December 2003, and resulted in the *Addis-Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006*, including several bilateral and multilateral actions of cooperation to promote the mutual interests, and especially the development of the African countries. A Chinese-Africa Business Council was also formed in October 2004, and China has hosted more than 100 meetings with visiting trade and foreign affairs officials.

African and Chinese scholars applaud Chinese engagement in Africa saying it represents an alternative to the Western imperialism lead by the former colonial empires. In fact, they find common ground in the view that the West’s historical experiences in achieving development are distant from the African

realities. Beijing supports this notion by promoting the idea that engagement with the West is overly moralizing, conditional, and excessively bureaucratic.⁵⁵ Citing the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2005 report on Africa,⁵⁶ China argues that it is also “investing and providing assistance in areas that Western aid agencies have long neglected—physical infrastructure, industry, and agriculture.” The CFR report also says that China offers African nations a financing alternative to Western donors like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank by providing choices these countries might not otherwise have. As a Nigerian government commerce official said, “the U.S. will talk to you about governance, efficiency, security, and environment. The Chinese just ask: How do we procure this license?”⁵⁷ In fact, as related earlier, most of the African governments particularly appreciate the Chinese policy of “non-interference” in internal affairs of other countries.

c- Economic Win-Win cooperation

The footprint of the Chinese involvement in economic development of Africa is undeniable. In its 6 February 2007 editorial entitled “No Panacea for Africa: China’s Influence is not an Alternative to Neoliberalism,” the *Financial Times* wrote:

President Hu Jintao’s eight-nation tour of Africa this week has been no exception. In its wake we can expect more roads, more bridges, and airports, more oil deals, more cheap imports, more credit and also more Chinese labor on the continent. We can also expect more support to the Chinese international policy.⁵⁸

China has developed plans to boost its ties with Africa, outlining a new relationship with the continent based on a “win-win” concept of economic and

military cooperation. The need to find resources is now the driving component in Chinese foreign policy. China is able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy to an unprecedented level by encouraging state-controlled companies to seek out exploration and supply contracts with countries that produce oil, gas, and other resources. At the same time, Beijing aggressively courts the governments of those countries with diplomacy, trade deals, debt forgiveness, and adapted aid packages. The strategy is working: China has gained access to key resources, especially oil, from Africa.

On the trade front, Beijing has enacted policies to encourage greater Chinese investment in Africa. It has launched "Centers for Investment and Trade Promotion," providing business and consultation to Chinese enterprises in Africa, and created special funds with simplified procedures to promote Chinese investment. China has also used debt relief to assist African nations and effectively wrote-off loans or turning them into grants. Beijing has written off at least \$10 billion of African bilateral debt since 2000⁵⁹ and has taken significant steps to cancel the debt of 31 African countries.⁶⁰ The World Bank believes that the Chinese import–export bank has loans valued at nearly \$13 billion in infrastructure projects in Africa alone.⁶¹ As a matter of fact, the African Development Bank has chosen to hold its annual summit in Shanghai this spring in recognition of China's increasingly pivotal role in the region.⁶² Furthermore, as an example of African leaders' reaction to these Chinese initiatives, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has proclaimed that "China's exemplary endeavor

to ease African countries' debt problem is indeed a true expression of solidarity and commitment."⁶³

China-Africa exchanges and cooperation have grown in all fields and yielded fruitful results. China–Africa trade is rising at a very fast rate, an average of 50% annually since 2002 and soared to \$56 billion last year (2007),⁶⁴ bringing critical revenue to some of the world's poorest nations. The manifestations are as multiple as diverse, and witness to a clear engagement of the Middle Kingdom as an efficient partner. Infrastructures, education, health, Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) are some of the examples concretized by this partnership. The eight steps resolutions⁶⁵ announced by the Chinese government in 2006, during the 3rd Summit of the FOCAC, are an example of this engagement. Basic infrastructures are one of the most important sectors where the African countries are the most developed thanks to the Chinese programs of cooperation. According to the 2006 official White Paper, the Chinese Government stepped up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, telecommunications, water conservancy, electricity and other types of infrastructure. It vigorously encouraged Chinese enterprises to participate in these efforts, scaled up their contracts, and gradually established multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects.

One of the most important political benefits China is making through its economic win-win strategy in Africa is on the Taiwanese issue. Through offers of massive economic assistance and financial advantages cited above, Beijing secured recognition from six additional African countries at Taiwan's expense. Lesotho and Niger switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC respectively

in 1994 and 1996. The Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and South Africa adopted the same position in 1998, and Liberia followed in 2003 shortly before China dispatched People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops to assist with Liberian water-supply projects.

III- What are the global implications of the Chinese-African rapprochement?

Disagreement does exist regarding the impact on the development of Africa from this Chinese-African rapprochement. If it brings some economic opportunities, it is also considered from a global perspective to bring some potential political risks. While some scholars have praised Chinese involvement in Africa, applauding Beijing's willingness to take risks in markets where some Western energy firms can't—or won't—go for a variety of reasons; others are critical of China's African strategy comparing it to “neo-colonialism,” seeking exclusive access to oil and gas supplies. If this claim proves to be true, it should be a concern for the U.S. Department of State.⁶⁶ Consequently, U.S. foreign policy should be more involved from now on to make it more efficient for sustainable development of this continent, the reinforcement of universal values, and the preservation of U.S. interests for middle and long term strategies.

a- Short-term Positive Impact on Africa

Some western model detractors support Chinese intervention in Africa. They affirm that the Chinese dare to take risk in markets where the other developed countries, like the U.S. and the EU, avoid engagement. As seen earlier, there is no doubt that Chinese speculation is bringing in much needed investment in many fields within impoverished Africa. These supporters of

Chinese diplomatic and economic intervention assert that the Chinese generous, and unconditional, loans are replacing the rigorous lending of the international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In fact, Chinese government firms have invested billions of dollars in foreign exchange in Africa and have used Chinese engineering and construction resources on infrastructure for developing oil, gas, mineral, and other natural resources in dozens of African countries, including Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.⁶⁷ Other examples of positive results include hospitals, sports stadiums, bridges, social lodging facilities, energy, and schools. Chinese-sponsored roads and railways are under construction in Kenya, Rwanda, and Nigeria, and a mobile telephone network is being built in Tunisia.⁶⁸ But the most important Chinese efforts are in the realm of communication, especially roads. As an example, the TAZARA⁶⁹ Railway, built in the late 70s to serve landlocked Zambia as an alternative to rail lines via Rhodesia⁷⁰ and South Africa, is one example of the successful development project undertaken by the PRC in Africa. Its total cost was about 500 million dollars, totally financed by the Chinese government, making it the largest foreign-aid project ever undertaken by the PRC.

In addition, as discussed earlier, China was involved for decades in basic domains of African development like education and health, especially in the sub-Saharan countries. As an example of this active cooperation, during the 3rd FOCAC Summit in 2006, Beijing made the commitment, during the period 2007-2010, to educate 15,000 African professionals in various disciplines, including

engineering; to send 100 senior Chinese farming engineers to Africa; to set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centers; to build 30 hospitals, and to provide 300 million Yuan for the prevention and treatment of malaria; to build 100 rural schools; and to increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009.⁷¹

Finally, one of the most important areas that China is involved with in African development, and security, is its participation in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) under the auspices of the UN, especially in the sub-Saharan countries. In fact, Africa is a new field for its diplomatic actions. It has participated in PKOs since 1990, and rank 13th as a military and police contributor to UN missions worldwide (Pakistan ranking first with more than 10,000 troops).⁷² In Africa, they now have more than 1,300 peacekeepers⁷³ deployed in the sub-Saharan countries, like Sudan (UNMIS),⁷⁴ Liberia (UNMIL),⁷⁵ and Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).⁷⁶

b- Long-term pernicious impact on Africa

But Beijing's involvement in Africa also has its critics including the Africans themselves. Indeed, some African scholars are warning of Chinese hegemony in Africa⁷⁷ and are asserting that Beijing is pursuing its own narrow self-interests on the continent—interests that benefit only Africa's elites. These critics have issues with the political and the economic “pernicious” strategies adopted by the Middle Kingdom to accomplish its objectives, and their impact on the long-term development of the continent. These critics see China as assisting African

governments to oppress their own people and complain about the Chinese failure to engage in efforts to build African civil society and civil society institutions, and of ignoring public opinion and needs.

Their first concern is about China's promotion of its politics influenced economic model, built on a significant economic growth overseen by a limited market economy and a disciplined one-party totalitarian state with full authority over all aspects of economic activity. In fact, Beijing actively holds out this model as an example for others to emulate. Chinese firms with state links often have poor standards of corporate governance, including a lack of transparency. In Africa, where the rule of law is often questionable, China's state-led business model could prove a disaster and an invitation for rapacious governments and companies. Chinese firms, many of them owned by the Chinese state, have been known to submit bids below cost in an effort to break into a market, on one hand, and corrupt the leaders and business deciders on the other hand. The results can be disastrous, especially in terms of quality and environmental norms.

There is also mounting concern that Chinese lending practices are increasing the dependence of the African countries towards China, comparing this strategy to a "new imperialism" from the Middle Kingdom. Concessionary PRC soft loans have put the IMF's and other bank projects on hold due to concerns about economic mismanagement and corruption.⁷⁸ In fact, this model is undermining international debt-relief strategies, which have considerably reduced the debt burden in Africa. The fear is that these lending practices may result in the rapid reestablishment of an unsustainable level of debt in Africa. Last

October, the President of the World Bank expressed the worry that many of Africa's poorest countries may be incurring excessive new debt as a result of unconditional loans made by Chinese banks.⁷⁹ The U.S. Treasury Department put a finer point on it, calling China a "rogue creditor" practicing "opportunistic lending."⁸⁰ Indeed, many African regimes, desperate to invigorate their struggling economies while maintaining a strong grip on political power, find China's modernization model preferable to difficult free-market and democratic reforms advocated by the U.S. and the EU.⁸¹

More specifically, South African President Thabo Mbeki recently cautioned that China risks replicating in Africa a "colonial relationship" of the kind that existed under white rule. Those are pretty strong words, especially coming in advance of a visit of the Chinese president.⁸² Even in South Africa, China's largest trading partner, local labor officials have blamed unemployment problems on cheap Chinese imports. South African observer Moeletsi Mbeki⁸³ says China represents both a "Tantalizing opportunity and a terrifying threat. We sell them raw materials, they sell us back manufactured goods."⁸⁴ In Zambia, where China has significant copper mining interests, there has been a political backlash against the Chinese over labor practices. In fact, a Zambian presidential contender last year ran on a political platform criticizing Chinese presence in the country.⁸⁵ According to *The Wall Street Journal*, anti-Chinese sentiment bordering on racism is also bubbling over in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Lesotho.⁸⁶

In addition, the most direct and deleterious negative economic impact of China's policies on many African countries is their massive export machine which has swamped many fledgling African producers. Aided by its undervalued currency, China's unparalleled competitiveness in developed international markets like those of the U.S. and Europe has hurt African exports. The PRC's firms underbid local African companies and Chinese contractors often use cheap imported Chinese labor. Some contracts require 70% Chinese labor, adding little to local employment or skill development.⁸⁷ Moreover, cheap Chinese goods flood African places, especially textiles, stifling markets that Africans are trying to develop. The press and textile manufacturers call the current situation an African "textile tsunami."⁸⁸ Previously, African textile manufacturers operated under special arrangements permitted under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) that permitted duty free textile imports from Africa, including products sewn in Africa using non-African textiles. On January 1, 2005 the MFA ended and the free-trade WTO provisions superseded them.⁸⁹ There was no longer an advantage for investors and manufacturers to set up in Africa. The consequence was a veritable flood of extremely cheap Chinese clothing imports. The effects were immediate. Several factories facing bankruptcies closed and thousands lost their jobs. In an attempt to ease the lopsided trade relationship, this year Beijing scrapped tariffs on 190 commodities from 25 African nations.⁹⁰ Yet, despite claims by Beijing that this initiative marks an "important commitment to help African countries develop their economies," the decision is unlikely to dramatically change China's trade relationships in the region.⁹¹

Chinese policies in Africa are also troubling because they often support, legitimize and encourage Africa's most repressive regimes thereby increasing the emergence of weak and failed states. Beijing rewards its African friends with diplomatic attention and financial and military assistance, exacerbating existing forced displacements of populations and abetting massive human rights abuses in troubled countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. As a consequence, Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa counters the liberalizing influences of Africa's traditional European and American partners. Indeed, although much of Africa has rid itself of dictators, the continent is still left with fragile, poor pseudo-democracies that lack strong civil societies, independent media, and other important pillars of democracy. In this fragile environment, Chinese influence could complicate democratic consolidation and good governance. In fact, as we saw earlier, the Chinese economic strategy is based on non-interference in political internal affairs. This unwillingness to put any conditions on economic assistance to Africa generally has dramatic effects on the development of the targeted countries, especially the populations. As an example, international corruption watchdogs like *Global Witness*⁹² have warned that China's \$2 billion aid to Angola, given in advance and without pressure for poverty reduction, will allow the Angolan government to revert to its old habits of skimming the petroleum cream for itself. Today, the majority of Angola's roughly 13 million people still live in poverty, while elites have siphoned off much of the nation's oil wealth. Yet in November 2005, José Pedro de Morais, Angola's finance minister, said he expected future Chinese loans would exceed \$2 billion.

"When we ask our Chinese counterparts if they are willing to provide more loans, they say yes".⁹³

Over time, differences between China and democracies over human rights and basic political and civil rights will sharpen. While the international community promotes better practices in the global business environment, China's policy of "non-interference" makes it an ideal partner to many nations participating in questionable practices. China's growing influence in Africa is therefore counterproductive to western objectives of promoting human rights and abolishing corruption. In fact, China's broad energy, trade, political, diplomatic, and military interests and activities in Africa threaten to undermine long-standing international efforts to promote regional peace, prosperity, and democracy in the continent. When President Hu Jintao visited Africa in April 2006, he "reiterated China's policy of making business deals without any expectation that governments will improve democracy, respect human rights, or fight corruption."⁹⁴ The examples of the Chinese support to African authoritarian regimes are numerous, but the most evident is the support to its primary African allies: Zimbabwe and Sudan.

The Mugabe regime's repeated abuses led the U.S. and EU to impose sanctions against Zimbabwean officials who had "formulated, implemented, or supported policies that have undermined Zimbabwe's democratic institutions."⁹⁵ Increasing isolation and pressure from the West have caused Zimbabwe to develop close relations with China, adopting a "Look East" policy that provides Mugabe with a lifeline to resist Western sanctions and criticism.⁹⁶ China provides

for Mugabe's military needs without interfering in his "internal affairs" and praises Mugabe as "a man of great achievements, devoted to world peace and a good friend of the Chinese people."⁹⁷ Mugabe was ecstatic at his good fortune. "The Chinese are our good friends, you see," he told a British interviewer.⁹⁸

Beyond Zimbabwe, Beijing was also criticized for blocking Western efforts to isolate and punish the Sudanese government. In the fall of 2004, when the U.S. submitted draft resolutions to the UN that would have called for tough action against ethnic cleansing in Darfur, China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, quietly defanged the drafts, rendering them useless. Chinese support also has helped African leaders maintain controls on information. Beijing aids African regimes with training on press and Internet monitoring. Tracing China's efforts in this area is difficult, but China's official press even alluded to these media initiatives. On November 11, 2005, the Chinese *People's Daily* proclaimed, "In the information sector, China has trained dozens of media from 35 African countries for the past two years." The day before, the group *Reporters without Borders* released an analysis of Mugabe's media activities, finding that "the use of Chinese technology in a totally hypocritical and non-transparent fashion reveals the government's iron resolve to abolish freedom of opinion in Zimbabwe."⁹⁹

c- Implications for the U.S.

In its 2006 annually report before the U.S. Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security review commission stated:

China's regional activities in Africa are beginning to assume the character of a counterbalancing strategy vis-à-vis the United States. That is, China's

support for rogue regimes and anti-American governments and groups in vital regions serves an international purpose: to balance American power, create an alternative model of governance, and frustrate the ability of the international community to uphold its norms.¹⁰⁰

Since the collapse of the Communist bloc lead by the Soviet Union, the U.S. is, indisputably, the primary Super Power in the world. In order to maintain this status and meet it's economic, political and security objectives, the U.S. must pursue a foreign policy around the world that ensures continued economic growth through free access to natural resources and open markets to U.S. products. As mentioned above, Africa is home to almost 900 million people with a sustainable growing purchasing power, but also, and especially, has huge potential in terms of natural resources. In this context, the growing interest of China towards this continent and especially the Chinese African counterbalancing strategy vis-à-vis the United States should be a concern focused on by the U.S. Government and U.S. scholars.

While in theory China's involvement in Africa could complement the activities of the international community in general and the U.S. in particular, in practice it often contradicts multilateral efforts to improve democracy, human rights, and governmental accountability and transparency, due essentially to the Chinese policy of turning a blind eye to these issues, as discussed earlier. The Chinese government combined its efforts to secure exclusive access to African natural resources with an aggressive political campaign to ingratiate itself with Africa's tyrants and despots. This growing influence comes to some extent at U.S. expense. Yet, Africa is not a priority for U.S. foreign policy, other than counterterrorism cooperation with states in North and East Africa.¹⁰¹ Since at

least the 1980s, U.S. scholars on Africa have focused primarily on developments within the continent, or on Africa's relations with Western nations and international aid and financial institutions.¹⁰² American scholars on China, by contrast, tend to focus on Chinese domestic developments, U.S.-China relations, and China's relations with the Asian region. As a result, there is limited research on how China pursued influence in Africa over the past two decades. Understanding these tools of influence offers a window into China's strategies on the continent, and even whether they could be replicated in other parts of the developing world.

The U.S. must share part of the blame for its loss of influence on the African continent vis-à-vis China. In some democratic African nations, the war in Iraq, the use of the term "empire" in relation to elements of U.S. foreign policy, and the American focus on transparency, is sometimes seen as meddling in others' affairs and generate genuine anger and apprehension with the average African citizen. The White House held a few bilateral meetings with the continent's most important players, and, according to a report on West Africa by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), it cut back on American energy attachés to the continent, even as African oil became more important to the U.S.. At the same time, restrictive U.S. policies on student visas have led many Africans studying abroad, historically a vanguard of pro-American sentiment, to look outside the United States for their education and increasingly in China.

China's strategy in Africa also has a potential impact on the U.S. position vis-à-vis Taiwan. This situation should be of a great concern for the U.S. foreign policy, and should be faced adequately to avoid a further isolation of the Taiwanese government within the international community.

The U.S. must also be alert to the potential long-term disruption of American access to important raw materials and energy sources as these resources are "locked up" by Chinese firms for the PRC's domestic market. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission appointed by the U.S. Congress to provide annual reports on this issue, pointed out in November 2006 that:¹⁰³

- China's stated diplomacy promotes friendly relations with other countries, and development of complementary economic cooperation.¹⁰⁴ However, some of China's international relationships, namely those with totalitarian, repressive governments, conflict with U.S. values.
- China's regional activities in Africa are beginning to assume the character of a counterbalancing strategy vis-à-vis the U.S. That is, China's support for anti-American governments serves to balance American power, create an alternative model of governance, and frustrate the ability of the international community to uphold its norms.
- China's economic development policies can exacerbate instability in volatile regions. Beijing's export-led growth has magnified trade imbalances, and complicated and inhibited local economic development

strategies, in some instances undermining the ability of governments in those regions to prevent or respond to the rise of terrorist groups.

- China's strategy to isolate Taiwan is manifest in its foreign policy actions around the world, including encouraging other nations to switch their recognition to PRC, and preventing Taiwan from participating in international organizations.

Thus, these conclusions bring to the forefront some of the challenges that U.S. must face while trying to engage both China and the African countries. U.S. national interests lie in effectively countering the growing Chinese model of governance in Africa by deftly encouraging democratic processes and transparency, economic freedom, and respect for human rights across the continent. These interests differ greatly with the Chinese strategy laid out in its approach to the African countries, and the U.S. needs to be prepared for a sustained dialogue with the Chinese, since they clearly view foreign policy with long term implications. In sum, for the U.S., China's growing role in Africa should be a wakeup call.¹⁰⁵ Beijing's hunger may worry some in Washington, but it also creates new grounds for cooperation.

Indeed, because U.S. and China have some shared interests on the continent (i.e. like their roles as oil consumers), and not as many competing security objectives as they do in other regions, there is potential for U.S.-China cooperation in the region. The Commission above emphasized the importance of active U.S.-China cooperation on this issue and the necessity of public encouragement for China to act as a “responsible stakeholder” in this respect. It

added that “. . . China should participate with the U.S. in trying to create more transparent, accountable and ultimately stable governments in the areas where it gets its resources, both oil and otherwise.” In addition to the dialogue with China, the U.S. foreign policy should reinforce its strategy towards the African countries. In fact, to protect and advance American interests and influence in this part of the world, the U.S. should develop a coordinated and comprehensive strategy based on a review of the challenges and obstacles in each country and the available American resources. Washington needs to convince both average Africans and their leaders that their future is better served, over the long term, by working more closely with the U.S., EU, international community, and UN institutions, especially the financial ones. One of the most important ways to recover the popular support to U.S. actions is to change some pervasive perceptions like the sentiment that the U.S. cares little for the region, or the poor perception of the future arrival of U.S. AFRICOM. The development of an efficient communication strategy towards the different components of the African Nations Society is, in this regard, the best way to improve this perception.

In summary, talking about the Chinese presence in Africa is related to its increasing status of rising global power. On the evidence, it seems clear that China is rapidly expanding its influence in Africa to secure access to natural resources, to expand Beijing's political influence at the expense of the western powers, to further isolate Taiwan diplomatically, and even to increase its international commercial markets through generous but self-serving diplomatic, financial, and military assistance. To achieve these objectives, China has

adopted an adapted strategy supported by three pillars: a historical legitimacy anchored in bilateral and multilateral contacts; a soft political approach based on multi directional cooperation levels, opposed to the western models; and strategic economic “win-win” cooperation based essentially on a mutual unconditional support, and unseen close cooperation platforms. Unfortunately, China’s activities in Africa are not without controversy. If the implications of this relationship are assessed positively by some scholars, regarding the development of Africa especially in terms of infrastructures, education and health, it is seen by others as a pernicious long-term strategy that not only will not contribute to the development of the African countries, but is actually undermining all the progress made in terms of democracy, human rights, and good governance, under the auspices of the International community. If the actual involvement of China in Africa does not represent a real short-term threat to the U.S. interests in this region, the U.S. Administration should be concerned about its implications in the future, and adjust its foreign policy towards both China and the African countries.

There is plenty of work to do in Africa, and the Africans themselves will ultimately decide what course to follow. China has real interests in Africa and consequently is engaged there, and it has also a constructive role to play. The important issue from the U.S. perspective is to encourage China to become involved in Africa in a way that supports international norms. The U.S. and others will do well to continue to press China on the issues of concern cited above, but

also to look for opportunities to work bilaterally and multilaterally with China in the region.

Endnotes

¹ Alain Peyrefitte, *Quand la Chine s'éveillera, le monde tremblera*, Trans. (Livre de poche, 1973).

² The Great Leap Forward of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1960 which aimed to use China's vast population to rapidly transform mainland China from a primarily agrarian economy dominated by peasant farmers into a modern, industrialized communist society. The Great Leap Forward is now widely seen – both within China and outside – as a major economic and humanitarian disaster (sometimes called the "giant step back"), with estimates of the number of people killed by famine during this period ranging from 14 to 43 million.

³ White paper on Peaceful development road, 22 December 2005, available at www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm

⁴ When measured on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, theory using the long-term equilibrium exchange rate of two currencies to equalize their purchasing power. Developed by Gustav Cassel in 1920, it is based on the law of one price: the idea that, in an efficient market, identical goods must have only one price.

⁵ China is called Zhongguo in Chinese. The character zhōng means "middle" or "central," while guó means "state". The term is commonly translated into English as "Middle Kingdom", but is also sometimes translated as "Central Kingdom".

⁶ Chinese White Paper on Peaceful development, 22 December 2005, available at www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm

⁷ Principle that there is one China and that mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are all part of that China. The acceptance or rejection of this principle is a major factor in relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC), which governs mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and the Republic of China (ROC), which governs Taiwan.

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¹⁷ Africa, Wikipedia the free encyclopedia available from <http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa>.

¹⁸ Coltan is the colloquial African name for columbite-tantalite. It is a dull black mineral used in consumer electronics products such as cell phones, DVD players, computers, and games consoles

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²³ Peter Brooks, "Into Africa: China's Grab for influence and oil," Heritage Lectures Magazine, March 26, 2007, p2.

²⁴ Wilson III, 7.

²⁵ *Africa an ideal market for Chinese products*, 31 May 2005, available at http://en.ce.cn/Business/Macro-economic/200605/31/t20060531_7164691.shtml

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³⁶ Peter Brookes (Director of the Asian studies center at the heritage Foundation) and Ji Hye Shin (Research assistant in the same Center), *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States*, February 22, 2006, available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific>.

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⁴⁰ Official Chinese government white paper *China's African Policy*, 12 January 2006, available at http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-01/12/content_156490.htm.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Zheng He, was a Chinese mariner, explorer, diplomat and fleet admiral, who made the voyages collectively referred to as the travels of "*Eunuch Sanbao to the Western Ocean*" from 1405 to 1433 .

⁴³ *China's African Policy*.

⁴⁴ Peter Brooks, "Into Africa: China's Grab for influence and oil," *Heritage Lectures Magazine*, March 26, 2007, p2.

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⁴⁸ Dr. Ernest j. Wilson III, "China's Influence In Africa", testimony before the sub-committee on Africa, human rights and international operations U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. JULY 28, 2005 available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/wilson/wilson_congressional_testimony_2005_07_28.pdf

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⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Jason Blazevec, *Looking Toward Africa: China and the Promise of African Oil*, ASPAC Papers Online Journal, available at <http://www.lclark.edu/~pnwpsa/2007/blazevec.pdf>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ See annex I.

⁶⁶ Report before the US Congress, of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2006, p6, Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.uscc.gov>

⁶⁷ Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States", February 22, 2006, available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific>.

⁶⁸ South African Migration Project (SAMP) - Queen's University - <http://www.queensu.ca/samp>

⁶⁹ Abreviation of Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority.

⁷⁰ Actual Zimbabwe.

⁷¹ President Hu Jintao's Speech at the 4th China-Africa Summit in Beijing, 4 November 2006, available at www.dawodu.com/china1.htm

⁷² Susan Puska, "Military backs China's Africa adventure," *Asia Times online*, 8 June 2007, available at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IF08Ad02.html>

⁷³ In April 2003, approximately 175 People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and a 42-man medical team were deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December 2003, 550 peacekeeping troops, equipped with nearly 200 military vehicles and water-supply trucks, were sent to Liberia, marking China's largest overseas operation under UN auspices since it deployed 800 military engineers to Cambodia from 1992 to 1994. China has also deployed about 4,000 PLA troops to southern Sudan to guard an oil pipeline and recently reaffirmed its intention to strengthen military collaboration and exchange programs, technical and training assistance with many African countries.

⁷⁴ United Nations Mission in Sudan,

⁷⁵ United Nations Mission In Liberia.

⁷⁶ United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

⁷⁷ Peter Brooks, "Into Africa: China's Grab for influence and oil," *Heritage Lectures Magazine*, March 26, 2007.

⁷⁸ Peter Brooks, "Into Africa: China's Grab for influence and oil," *Heritage Lectures Magazine*, March 26, 2007.

⁷⁹ Rowan Callick, "Wolfowitz Holds Beijing to Account over Africa," *The Australian*, October 25, 2006, at www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20640755-2703,00.html;

⁸⁰ Michael Phillips, "G-7 to Warn China over Costly Loans to Poor Countries," The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2006, p. A2.

⁸¹ Peter Brooks, "Into Africa: China's Grab for influence and oil," Heritage Lectures Magazine, March 26, 2007.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Mbeki is a South African private business entrepreneur. He is a director of several companies. He is Deputy Chairman of the South African Institute for International Affairs; an independent think tank based at the University of the Witwatersrand and is a political analyst for Nedcor Bank.

⁸⁴ Wilson III, 13.

⁸⁵ Peter Brooks, "Into Africa: China's Grab for influence and oil," Heritage Lectures Magazine, March 26, 2007, p2.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Wilson III, 9.

⁸⁹ Wilson III, 10.

⁹⁰ Joshua Eisenman And Joshua Kurlantzick, China's Africa Strategy, May 2006, p220, available at <http://www.afpc.org/china-africa.shtml>

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² NGO that exposes the corrupt exploitation of natural resources and international trade systems; and drives campaigns that end impunity, resource-linked conflict, and human rights and environmental abuses (http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/about_us.html).

⁹³ Joshua Eisenman And Joshua Kurlantzick, *China's Africa Strategy*, American Foreign policy Magazine, May 2006

⁹⁴ Craig Timberg, "*In Africa, China Trade Brings Growth, Unease*," Washington Post, 13 June 2006.

⁹⁵ Press release, "U.S. Targeted Sanctions on Zimbabwean Government Officials," White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 7, 2003, available at www.state.gov/p/af/rls/prsrl/18546.htm

⁹⁶ Jonathan Watts and Andrew Meldrum, "Mugabe Finds Succour in Beijing Deals," The Guardian, July 27, 2005, at www.guardian.co.uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,1536808,00.html.

⁹⁷ Mure Dickie and John Reed, "China Hails Mugabe's 'Brilliant' Diplomacy," Financial Times, July 27, 2005, at news.ft.com/cms/s/c9fd6d06-fe4a-11d9-a289-00000e2511c8.html

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Report before the US Congress, of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2006, p6, Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.uscc.gov>

¹⁰¹ Joshua Eisenman And Joshua Kurlantzick.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ “Main characteristics of China’s Foreign Policy,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zgwjzc/t35077.htm .

¹⁰⁵ Joshua Eisenman And Joshua Kurlantzick.

