Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step
Abstract
On September 11, 2001, the United States possessed superb military forces, unparalleled information-collection assets, and dedicated intelligence analysts. But it failed to use them effectively, suffering from an almost systemic and often self-imposed lack of coordination and information-sharing among governmental agencies. This new threat required the breadth of vision, speed of action, and management of resources that could be accomplished only through synchronizing all the elements of national power to achieve what General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls "integrated operations," which must permeate all phases of conflict, from planning and war to stability and reconstruction. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) responded to this threat by creating a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). It was only the first step, but it was an order of magnitude greater than any prior attempt. This article traces the development of the CENTCOM JIACG through operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, using them as case studies to highlight the need for better and institutionalized interagency coordination at the operational level. The article concludes with practical recommendations for using "every tool in our arsenal" to reduce the likelihood of future terrorist attacks.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA480251
Entities
People
- Matthew F. Bogdanos
Organizations
- National Defense University