Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Abstract
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but during 2004-2007 much of Iraq was highly violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. At the same time, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities stimulated debate within the United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention a stable, democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism could ever be achieved, and, if so, at what cost. The Administration is claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security that had become acute by the end of 2006, attributing the gains to a troop surge strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 ( New Way Forward ). The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for U.S. policy in Anbar Province. U.S. overall commander in Iraq General David Petraeus, said in testimony during April 8-9, 2008, that overall violence is down at least 60% since June 2007, to levels of spring 2005, but that the security situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory, and that progress is fragile and reversible. This fragility was demonstrated in March-April 2008 by an outbreak of intense and widespread fighting between Shiite-dominated government forces and Shiite militias, and in which government forces did not accomplished their objectives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 18, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA480752
Entities
People
- Kenneth Katzman
Organizations
- Library of Congress