Preventing Insurgencies after Major Combat Operations
Abstract
Whenever the United States intervenes abroad, it must be prepared for the possibility of an insurgency. Sometimes locals will decide that insurgent tactics are the best way to counter the overwhelming U.S. military advantage; at other times, foreign fighters will flock to the area of intervention just to fight the United States. Regardless of the cause, intervening U.S. military forces must plan ahead for the possibility of an insurgency, and take proactive measures to prevent nascent insurgencies from taking root. The three mechanisms described here -- securing a formal surrender or settlement, providing law and order in the immediate aftermath of combat, and reconstructing indigenous security forces -- are important parts of that process. These measures will probably not be sufficient to prevent insurgencies altogether, since determined insurgents may still find ways to conduct their activities. Yet these measures may help delegitimize their cause, reduce their appeal to local populations, and limit their access to trained personnel and material, which will make it more difficult for them to operate. U.S. and local forces will therefore have a better chance of preventing the insurgency from moving beyond the nascent stage, and therefore can minimize the unpleasant prospect of having to conduct intensive counterinsurgency warfare.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA480985
Entities
People
- Nora Bensahel
Organizations
- RAND Corporation