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Preventing Insurgencies After Major Combat Operations

NORA BENSAHEL

In March 2003, the United States and its allies launched Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Major combat operations lasted three weeks, far less time than initially anticipated, and resulted in 139 personnel killed in action and 542 personnel wounded in action.¹ President Bush declared on 1 May 2003 that the mission had been accomplished, but a deadly insurgency arose soon thereafter that continues to this day. What military plans referred to as the 'post-conflict' stabilization phase of operations has required far more time, resources, and effort than major combat operations did. As of October 2006, more than 161,000 troops remain in Iraq, including 144,000 US troops.² Since 1 May 2003, total US casualty figures include 2,703 fatalities (of whom 2,170 were killed in hostile action) and 21,678 wounded, and somewhere between 43,000 and 62,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.³ Despite continuing US military operations, the insurgency continues unabated. An estimated 20,000 insurgents are active in Iraq, and are conducting an average of 105 attacks a day throughout the country.⁴

Iraq is not likely to be a unique case. Potential US adversaries who are monitoring developments in Iraq are likely to conclude that counterinsurgency is a major weakness of the US military. They may well adjust their tactics to take advantage of this perceived weakness. Furthermore, the emerging phenomenon of trans-regional militancy means that radicalized individuals are easily crossing state boundaries, teaching locals about state-of-the-art insurgency tactics that have proven effective elsewhere. The United States may not only be forced to respond to cases where trans-regional militancy is involved, but US interventions around the world may actually *create* insurgencies as well.

Regardless of the purpose of the intervention – whether its mission is humanitarian relief, providing stability, or overthrowing a regime – the presence of US forces in a foreign country will attract trans-regional militants.⁵

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The extent of that attraction will most likely vary according to the intervention's size and mission; militants will probably be more attracted to large and intrusive US interventions than they will to small training and advising missions, for example. Yet if even a small percentage of the local population is sympathetic to the militants' cause, they can provide the sanctuary and local intelligence necessary to conduct insurgent operations. Furthermore, such operations may draw increasing support from the local populations over time, particularly since foreign occupations usually provoke a nationalist counterresponse. This dynamic is likely to be exacerbated in unilateral US interventions (or those perceived as largely unilateral, as in Iraq in 2003), or in operations that lack a United Nations mandate, since the United States will serve as a focal point for both local and international dissatisfaction with the intervention.

As argued below, insurgencies are extremely difficult to defeat once they become entrenched. Counterinsurgency campaigns require extensive military, diplomatic, and economic resources over prolonged periods of time, and ultimately require resolution of some of the underlying political grievances that led the insurgents to take up arms. A better approach is to prevent insurgencies from arising in the first place, and to prevent nascent insurgencies from taking root in local populations. Since the wide range of US global interests makes it likely to continue to intervene abroad, the pressing policy question for the United States is therefore how to minimize the development of insurgencies during foreign interventions.

This article seeks to answer that question. A wide literature exists on ways to prevent the resurgence of conflict after interventions, but these mostly focus on cases that involve civil wars, internal conflict, or state collapse.⁶ By contrast, little work has been done on how to prevent conflict in the aftermath of major combat operations, since it is generally assumed that victory in major combat means an end to hostilities. Yet as recent US operations in Afghanistan and particularly in Iraq demonstrate, major combat operations that lead to regime change can create insurgencies that are fueled by opponents of the new political order. Tanks and infantry units may no longer be fighting for supremacy on the battlefield, but victory is not complete if an insurgency rages and continues to cause casualties among combatants and civilians alike.

This study starts by examining the experience in Iraq, in order to identify some of the missed opportunities and mistakes that led to the insurgency there. It then moves beyond the Iraq experience, and identifies three factors that can help prevent insurgencies: an official surrender or peace settlement; maintaining public order; and reconstructing local security forces. These factors may not be able to completely prevent insurgencies

from developing before, during, or after US military operations, but they may be able to minimize the threat that they pose by denying them the legitimacy, local support, and personnel that they need to thrive.

Reexamining Iraq: Factors That Facilitated the Insurgency

What caused the insurgency in Iraq? In a broad sense, the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: disaffected Sunnis upset by the loss of their formerly privileged status joined forces with Islamic militants who saw Iraq as a place to promote their jihadist ideology and inflict pain upon the United States. The interests of both the Iraqis and the foreign fighters involved in the insurgency were situationally determined; there was little that the United States could have done to prevent either of these groups from perceiving their interests in this way. Yet the United States did make some strategic errors that facilitated the insurgency, thus enabling both of these groups to acquire the resources, safe haven, and support that they needed for the insurgency to take root.⁷

These errors started during the prewar planning process. US government planning for Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' was driven by a particular scenario, promoted by senior policymakers in the government, of how combat operations would proceed and what would be required thereafter. That scenario had several elements, but for the purposes of understanding the later insurgency, three stand out as particularly relevant.

- *The military campaign would have a decisive end.* U.S. civilian and military leaders believed that military operations would end once Saddam Hussein was removed from power, giving rise to a largely stable situation during the reconstruction phase. Local forces, particularly the police and the regular army, would be capable of providing law and order, so US forces could be withdrawn rapidly from Iraq. Administration officials had hoped to shrink the U.S. military presence to two divisions – between 30,000 and 40,000 troops – by the fall of 2003.⁸ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz succinctly expressed this assumption during Congressional testimony on 27 February 2003, when he stated, 'it's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army'.⁹
- *US and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators.* After Saddam was removed from power, the Iraqi population would support the US presence. Three days before the invasion began, Vice President Richard Cheney clearly articulated this view by stating, 'my belief is that we will,

in fact, be greeted as liberators'.¹⁰ Iraqi exiles emphasized that the Iraqis would greet US forces with 'sweets and flowers'.¹¹ General Tommy R. Franks, the commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM) assumed that the Iraqis would support US forces, and perhaps even join them in combat, once they believed that the US was serious about removing Saddam from power.¹²

- *Government ministries would continue to function.* Since the Ba'ath regime maintained a tightly centralized grip on power throughout the country, US officials assumed that government ministries were largely effective state structures. They assumed that the top leadership of each ministry could be replaced, leaving the technocrats and civil servants to continue running the state.¹³

Actual postwar events proved most of these assumptions to be faulty. Combat operations did not end neatly as expected; US forces were not greeted as liberators;¹⁴ and government ministries and police forces turned out to be hollow, without the capabilities and resources necessary to run the country once the Ba'athists were removed from power.¹⁵ Wolfowitz later acknowledged that defense officials had erred by making assumptions that 'turned out to underestimate the problem' in postwar Iraq.¹⁶

Although these assumptions proved to be wrong, they were not inherently unreasonable. The problem lay not with making these assumptions, but in failing to challenge them and to plan for alternative outcomes. The reasons why these assumptions were not challenged is a subject far beyond the scope of this study, but for present purposes it is simply important to note that no efforts were made to hedge against uncertainty, to address the consequences of what would occur if these assumptions did not hold. As a result, U.S. officials were completely unprepared for the scenario that did occur. Instead of a decisive end to military operations, Ba'athist remnants continued to fight and foreign fighters soon joined their cause. Instead of greeting the U.S. forces as liberators, the Iraqi population remained skeptical about the coalition presence and its willingness or ability to protect them. Instead of functioning smoothly, the central government essentially collapsed, which meant that Iraqi security forces were not available to provide law and order. Each of these factors boosted the nascent insurgency.

By the time the United States established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in June 2003, the insurgents had already had ample opportunity to embed themselves within the country. They could supply themselves by raiding the thousands of weapons caches and ammunition dumps that lay unprotected around the country. The breakdown of law and order

enabled them to travel freely, and to train with the foreign fighters who were flowing in across unprotected borders. Ordinary Iraqis who opposed the insurgents could not report on their activities, since there were no authorities to whom such activities could be reported. Nor did the establishment of CPA solve these problems. CPA was not fully up and running until the end of the summer, and even at its peak, it was largely confined to Baghdad and had little representation in the provinces. These conditions enabled the insurgency to take root throughout Iraq in ways that might have proven less challenging if the United States had planned for a wider range of postwar contingencies.

One additional factor enabled the insurgency to take root that is worth mentioning, though unlike the ones above, this one resulted from a change in US policy rather than a failure to challenge planning assumptions. The decision to disband the Iraqi Army was not part of the initial plan for postwar Iraq. Instead, surrendering Iraqi military units would assist with reconstruction projects, even as the military's organizational structure was being reformed. As it turned out, coalition forces discovered that Iraqi army units largely dissolved during the three weeks of major combat. Many simply changed into civilian clothes and went back home; others took weapons and other valuable equipment with them as they departed the battlefield. Iraq's military facilities were among the many government structures that were thoroughly looted and rendered unusable. On 23 May 2003, shortly after his arrival in Baghdad, CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer signed Order Number 2, which officially dissolved the Iraqi Army and other security institutions. Bremer brought instructions to do so with him from Washington, where Pentagon and other senior U.S. officials agreed that the Army had essentially 'self-demobilized' by leaving their units, and that there were no facilities available where army personnel could reassemble for a more structured demobilization process. They were also concerned about a possible backlash from the Shia and Kurdish communities if they left a Sunni-dominated military in place.¹⁷

While such concerns were valid, the decision to disband the Army directly contributed to the rising insurgency. More than 400,000 military personnel became unemployed overnight, depriving them and as many as a million of their dependents of income at a time when few jobs were available. These personnel now had a grievance against the occupying authority that they might not have had otherwise, and they possessed exactly the kinds of skills, training, and weaponry that could help a nascent insurgency get off the ground. Those who argued that the Army 'self-demobilized' may have correctly diagnosed the problem, but officially disbanding the Army gave many military personnel the motives, means, and desire to support the

insurgency and challenge the occupying authority. Even if the disintegration of individual units and the looting of military barracks and other facilities made it impossible to implement preexisting plans for restructuring the military forces, it would have been better to leave the Army nominally intact and to continue paying military personnel while temporary facilities were being built and small units were being reconstituted. Such a process would have had many limitations, of course, since identifying all relevant personnel and restructuring the military structures would undoubtedly involve many unforeseen challenges. But even if the process proceeded imperfectly, and even if it took a long time, it still would have prevented the wholesale alienation of a considerable percentage of the population – particularly that portion which had the training, means, and wherewithal to help strengthen the insurgency.

Preventing Insurgencies in Future Operations

What lessons can be drawn from the experience in Iraq? If we could go back in time and adjust the planning process so that it anticipated the problems identified above, could the insurgency have been prevented? The answer is most likely no. US interventions abroad always risk creating the conditions for an insurgency. The very presence of American forces will inevitably spur some form of a nationalist backlash, and as discussed earlier, U.S.-led interventions will attract foreign fighters with broader anti-U.S. agendas. That said, the planning process can include steps that would help minimize the chances that insurgents develop beyond the nascent stage and take root throughout a society. Three of the most important steps in this direction include securing some form of official surrender or settlement; maintaining public order immediately after combat; and reconstructing indigenous security forces as quickly and effectively as possible.

Official Surrender or Settlement

It is usually very easy to tell when wars start, but much more difficult to tell when they end. Wars only rarely end when one side is completely vanquished in military, political, and economic terms. Instead, belligerents more often reach some sort of negotiated end to their conflict.¹⁸ The question of how, when, and why wars end is not as well understood as the question of how, when, and why wars start,¹⁹ yet they are just as consequential – and for the purposes of preventing an insurgency, they are even more consequential. If the defeated party acknowledges its defeat, either through a statement of surrender or some sort of peace settlement, any

nascent insurgent movement will lose its claim to be representing a legitimate opposition movement. That party might be a regime that US forces have overthrown, or a belligerent in a civil war where the US has chosen to intervene, but the effect is the same: an official surrender or settlement will delegitimize any potential insurgent movement, and party loyalists will be less likely to continue fighting. It also means that the new governing authority – whether it is local or foreign – will be less likely to be challenged, since it has been acknowledged as the successor to the defeated party.

What should such a surrender look like? Unconditional surrender is ideal, since it leaves no question about who is in charge, but it is historically rare. It should, at a minimum, include a statement that acknowledges the defeat, and set out any terms that are included in the settlement. Explicit statements of support for the new government are desirable, but may not always be realistic. It should occur as quickly as is practical after combat ends, to prevent a power vacuum from emerging. It should be signed by the former ruler, or if the ruler has fled and cannot be located (as was the case with Saddam Hussein during ‘Iraqi Freedom’), it should be signed by the most senior leader available. Such a substitute would have to be readily associated with the faction that has been defeated and would have to have sufficient stature for the local population to believe that he spoke for the regime.²⁰ The surrender or settlement statement should be communicated to the local population as quickly and as clearly as possible, through whichever media forms the population relies upon most.

Surrenders and settlement statements may help prevent insurgencies from arising, by delegitimizing any form of resistance. It is important to note, however, the limits of such statements. Those who lose power in the aftermath of an armed conflict may see no prospects for themselves in the new society and government, and may therefore face very strong incentives for resistance. Still, surrenders and settlements remove an important propaganda point for potential insurgents. They may not prevent hardcore opponents of the new order from organizing resistance, but they may help reduce the resonance of their message with local populations.

Maintaining Public Order After Combat

Maintaining public order in the immediate aftermath of combat is perhaps the most important factor in helping prevent insurgencies from arising. Insurgents thrive when law and order breaks down, for as noted above, they can plan, train, and equip in the ensuing chaos. Fearful citizens grow quickly frustrated with soaring crime rates, random explosions, and having

to remain inside their houses in order to feel safe. As chaotic and unsafe conditions continue, it becomes increasingly likely that the governing authority's inability to control the situation will attract some citizens to the insurgents' cause. And as long as the governing authority cannot provide safety and protection for its citizens, even those who oppose the insurgents will not come forward with valuable intelligence about insurgent activities due to fear of reprisals. Maintaining public order is also a necessary precondition for broader efforts at post-conflict reconstruction.²¹ Over the long term, the best way to undermine insurgents is to build effective governance structures and to pursue economic and social development – but none of this can progress in an environment that lacks basic security.

Ideally, maintaining order after combat is a civilian and not a military task. Security should be provided either by local police forces or by international civilian forces on temporary deployment. In practice, however, civilian authorities are almost never capable of providing security in a timely and effective manner in post-combat situations. This creates a 'security gap', in which neither indigenous nor foreign security forces are capable of securing law and order.²²

What causes the security gap? Local police forces may be discredited by their association with the old regime, or may have to be reconstructed in order to function effectively (a subject addressed in the next section). International civilian police forces (CIVPOL) may be able to take on some security responsibilities, but they suffer from limitations that often prevent them from being an effective interim solution. Standing CIVPOL capabilities are rare, so most personnel have to be assembled on an ad hoc basis. It is difficult to find police officers who are able and willing to put aside their peacetime responsibilities for a several-month international deployment. As a result, it can take a year or more to assemble and deploy a CIVPOL mission.²³ Even then, members of CIVPOL missions often have uneven qualifications and capabilities, and a single mission may combine personnel from countries with different policing philosophies and legal traditions.²⁴ International police can play an important role in medium- and long-term stabilization efforts, but they cannot provide the immediate law, order, and security that will prevent insurgents from gathering in the aftermath of combat.

In most cases, only military forces possess the capabilities necessary to fill the security gap. Military forces are usually not ideally suited for civilian policing tasks, since they are optimized for the overwhelming application of firepower rather than the discriminate use of force. Nevertheless, they are capable of conducting this mission, as long as they receive the relevant training and additional equipment before their deployment. Military forces

are often reluctant to take on this mission, because ensuring law and order is not seen as one of the military's core purposes. While this is certainly true, the consequences of failing to provide security in the aftermath of combat can undermine the overall strategic objectives of the operation, as the Iraq experience demonstrates all too well. Whether they like it or not, military forces will often be called upon to fill the security gap by providing basic law and order in the immediate aftermath of major combat – and perhaps for a good deal longer as well.

Reconstructing Indigenous Security Forces

Whenever the United States intervenes abroad, it must make sure that indigenous military and police forces do not disintegrate. This may seem counterintuitive, especially when the objectives of the US intervention include defeating adversary military forces. Yet after those forces have been defeated, they must be reconstructed in a preplanned and systematic fashion, instead of allowing their personnel to blend back into the civilian population without a trace. In the short term, members of indigenous security forces are particularly attractive allies for those organizing an insurgency, and can dramatically strengthen the insurgents' capabilities. Such personnel will possess weapons training, knowledge of irregular tactics, and other military skills that are vital for an insurgency but relatively rare among the civilian population. They also know where weapons caches are located, and can help fuel the insurgency by providing access to explosives and other useful materiel.

Over the longer term, indigenous security forces are absolutely essential to the successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency campaign, a point noted elsewhere in this article. Reconstructing such forces will be both faster and more effective if the process starts immediately after combat ends and occurs as part of a systematic process, rather than letting the forces disintegrate after combat and then attempting to reassemble them, as occurred in Iraq.

The process of reconstructing military forces usually involves three phases: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). These phases are not entirely distinct: they overlap conceptually, and are often implemented simultaneously rather than sequentially. Yet each phase is discussed separately below, in order to highlight the essential features of each one. It is also worth noting that most DDR processes have occurred in the aftermath of civil wars, and so most of the research and writing on this subject focuses on this subject. Despite the obvious differences between the situations after a civil war and after an external intervention, two important

similarities exist: indigenous security forces are likely to have been very repressive, having focused on protecting a small group of elites rather than the broader citizenry;²⁵ and they are likely to be a key constituency in the new political order. For these reasons, effective DDR processes in the aftermath of US interventions will be both challenging to implement and vital to the long-term success of the new government.

Disarmament

Disarmament is the first, and often most pressing, phase of the reconstruction process. It is important to ensure that former combatants turn over any weapons in their possession or under their control,²⁶ including tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, large-caliber guns, grenade launchers, light rocket launchers, anti-aircraft missiles, and land mines.²⁷ Disarming former combatants is critically important for a very straightforward reason: the more weapons they have available to them, the more capable they will be of conducting or facilitating an insurgency. Over the longer term, disarmament also minimizes the threat that the reconstructed security forces will face. Disarmament needs to occur as soon as possible once conflict has ended, because otherwise weapons and their owners will quickly disperse and will become much harder to control.

Voluntary disarmament measures such as weapons buy-back programs have a mixed record of success at best,²⁸ and forcible disarmament risks provoking violent counterreactions. As Virginia Gamba notes, 'the greater the number of weapons actually collected and destroyed, the less need for massive operations of recovery and destruction of weapons in the future'.²⁹

Demobilization

Demobilization refers to the process of disbanding official security forces, and returning their personnel from military to civilian status.³⁰ This process can include the complete disbanding of military and police units, or keeping some units intact but reducing them significantly in size.³¹ Some personnel may be allowed to remain in the reformed security forces, either because they possess special skills or because they lacked ideological attachment to the old political order.³² In most post-conflict situations, however, the security forces will need to be significantly downsized to be appropriately sized and structured for a peacetime role.

Demobilization processes must be carefully managed, since trained combatants often face great difficulties returning to civilian life. Some of them may have never known any other way of life, and may suffer from a perceived loss of status as well as a lack of skills that are transferable to civilian jobs.³³ Demobilization must carefully match ex-combatants to potential

civilian employment possibilities, and continue paying their salaries during the transition process. Otherwise, the frustration and economic realities of sudden unemployment may lead them to banditry, criminal activity, and possibly even insurgency.³⁴ For this reason, one study concludes that 'across-the-board demobilisation or the automatic dissolution of units is not necessarily the best option, especially when employment opportunities are limited and political tensions persist'.³⁵

Reintegration

Whereas demobilization focuses on the immediate transition from military to civilian status, reintegration includes medium-term and long-term programs to help ex-combatants become a productive part of civilian society. Reintegration often includes vocational training programs that are matched to the particular interests of the ex-combatants, providing credit for small enterprises, and, in some cases, creating incentives to resume agricultural activity.³⁶ Whatever the specific measure, the overall goal is to enable ex-combatants to pursue sustainable civilian livelihoods. Cash payments may help address the immediate needs of ex-combatants during the demobilization phase, but in the long run, productive employment is the best way for ex-combatants to develop a stake in the new political order.³⁷ That, in turn, will reduce the chances that they become involved in criminal or insurgent activity.

Implementing DDR Programs

The processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, are analytically separate, but in practice they overlap to a great extent. Over many years of experience in many different countries, practitioners have learned a great deal about the best ways to implement DDR programs. They generally agree that the process needs to involve several different phases, including the immediate assembly and cantonment of combatants; a structured program to discharge combatants over time; a short-term benefits package that includes housing, medical, and financial assistance; and establishing vocational assistance and other long-term reintegration efforts during the demobilization phase.³⁸

Assessing each of these steps and how they fit together is well beyond the scope of this paper, but the underlying theme offers an extremely valuable lesson: DDR processes must be planned and implemented carefully and systematically. They cannot be improvised on the ground, since the process must start as soon as conflict ends in order to keep combatants and their weapons from disappearing into civilian society. To the extent that these combatants develop some sort of stake in the new political order, they

will be less likely to conduct regular criminal activity and to choose to challenge that new order through an insurgency.

Conclusion

Whenever the United States intervenes abroad, it must be prepared for the possibility of an insurgency. Sometimes locals will decide that insurgent tactics are the best way to counter the overwhelming US military advantage; at other times, foreign fighters will flock to the area of intervention in order to fight the United States. Regardless of the cause, intervening US military forces must plan ahead for the possibility of an insurgency, and take proactive measures to prevent nascent insurgencies from taking root. The three mechanisms described here – securing a formal surrender or settlement, providing law and order in the immediate aftermath of combat, and reconstructing indigenous security forces – are important parts of that process. These measures will probably not be sufficient to prevent insurgencies altogether, since determined insurgents may still find ways to conduct their activities. Yet these measures may help delegitimize their cause, reduce their appeal to local populations, and limit their access to trained personnel and material, which will make it more difficult for them to operate. US and local forces will therefore have a better chance of preventing the insurgency from moving beyond the nascent stage, and therefore can minimize the unpleasant prospect of having to conduct intensive counterinsurgency warfare.

NOTES

Based on a paper prepared for the 2006 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 22–25 March, San Diego, California.

- 1 Dept. of Defense, 'Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) US Casualty Status', data current as of 13 Nov. 2006 p. 20, available at <www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf>. The number of personnel wounded in action includes both those who returned to duty within 72 hours and those who did not.
- 2 Brookings Iraq Index, updated 13 Nov. 2006, p.20, available at <www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>.
- 3 'Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status', data current as of 14 Nov. 2006; Brookings Iraq Index, p.10.
- 4 Brookings Iraq Index, pp.17 and 22.
- 5 I am indebted to my colleagues Kim Cragin and Sara Daly for developing the concept of trans-regional militancy.
- 6 See, for example, Paul Collier, 'Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace', *Journal of International Development* 6/3 (1994) pp.343–51; Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford: OUP for IISS 1996); Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia UP 1999); United Nations Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in*

- a *Peacekeeping Environment* (New York: UN Dec. 1999); Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton UP 2004); Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail* (Princeton UP 2004); *International Peacekeeping*, special issue on Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform in Peace Support Operations, 13/1 (March 2006).
- 7 This section draws heavily on unpublished work conducted by the author.
 - 8 These plans called for an additional third division, from a yet-to-be-determined coalition partner, to join the two US divisions in Iraq. Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, 'US Plans to Reduce Forces in Iraq, With Help of Allies', *New York Times*, 3 May 2003; Esther Schrader and Paul Richter, 'US Delays Pullout in Iraq', *Los Angeles Times*, 15 July 2003.
 - 9 Paul Wolfowitz, testimony to the House Budget Committee, 27 Feb. 2003. It is worth noting that this contradicted the assessment of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, who had testified to Congress two days earlier that postwar operations would require 'something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers'. Shinseki testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 Feb. 2003.
 - 10 Vice President Richard Cheney, remarks made on *Meet the Press*, televised 16 March 2003.
 - 11 Kanan Makiya, an influential Iraqi expatriate, acknowledged after the war that this had been his message to President Bush, and he stated, 'I admit I was wrong.' Joel Brinkley and Eric Schmitt, 'Iraqi Leaders Say US Was Warned of Disorder After Hussein, But Little Was Done', *New York Times*, 30 Nov. 2003. See also Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2004) p.259.
 - 12 Woodward (note 11) p.81.
 - 13 One source reports that the number 50 came up frequently during discussions of how many senior Iraqi officials would need to be removed. Gordon Corera, 'Iraq provides lessons in nation building', *Jane's Intelligence Review* 16/1 (Jan. 2004) p.31.
 - 14 Ten days after the war started, an unnamed senior administration official was already quoted in the press as questioning this assumption: 'We underestimated their capacity to put up resistance. We underestimated the role of nationalism. And we overestimated the appeal of liberation.' Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, 'Plan's Defect: No Defectors', *Los Angeles Times*, 28 March 2003.
 - 15 In retrospect, it became clear that US analysts had underestimated the level of damage done to Iraq's infrastructure, including the ministries, during the previous decade of international sanctions. For more on the effects of the sanctions, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'Crossed Wires Kept Power Off in Iraq', *Washington Post*, 25 Sept. 2003.
 - 16 Wolfowitz identified three conditions that were worse than defense officials had anticipated: the failure of Iraqi army units to fight alongside the United States and assist in the reconstruction; the requirement to rebuild the police forces; and the difficulty of imagining that Ba'ath Party remnants would continue to fight. See Dept. of Defense News Transcript, 'Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Briefing on His Recent Trip to Iraq', 23 July 2003, available at <www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-depsecdef0441.html>, accessed Sept. 2005.
 - 17 For more on the reasons behind this decision, see L. Paul Bremer, *My Year in Iraq* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006), esp. Ch. 3.
 - 18 See Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, 'No Peace Without Surrender', *New York Times*, 8 April 2003.
 - 19 For three important contributions to the literature on war termination, see Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End*, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia UP 1991); H.E. Goemans, *War and Punishment* (Princeton UP 2000); and Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, 'Working Out the Inevitable: Domestic Coalitions in War Termination', PhD Dissertation, Dept. of Government, Harvard Univ. 2002.
 - 20 Senior leaders of the defeated party may demand some sort of concessions in exchange for making such a statement, including potentially unpalatable ones such as amnesty or a continued position of privilege in the new government. Such concessions should be considered on a case-by-case basis, since the tradeoffs involved with such offers will vary widely

- depending on the particular situation. This does suggest, however, that US planners should seek to identify those parties *before* the war starts, so that the specific tradeoffs can be analyzed and appropriate policies can be developed.
- 21 Scott Feil, 'Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities', in Robert C. Orr (ed.), *Winning the Peace* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004) pp.39–57; Seth G. Jones et al., *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MG-374-RC 2005) pp.8–10.
 - 22 For more on the concept of the 'security gap', see Erwin A. Schmidl, 'Police Functions in Peace Operations: An Historical Overview', in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, *Policing the New World Disorder* (Washington DC: National Defense UP 1998) pp.19–40.
 - 23 James Dobbins et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1753-RC 2003) p.151.
 - 24 Charles T. Call and William Stanley, 'Civilian Security', in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.), *Ending Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002) (note 6) esp. pp.314–16; Jones et al. pp.207–11.
 - 25 For more on the repressive nature of indigenous security forces, see Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford: OUP for IISS 1996) (note 6) esp. pp.13–14; and Call and Stanley (note 24) esp. p.306.
 - 26 The United Nations defines disarmament more broadly, as extending to the civilian population as well as ex-combatants. Assessing the costs and benefits of civilian disarmament is quite complicated, and is beyond the scope of this paper. United Nations Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment* (New York: UN Dec. 1999).
 - 27 Joanna Spear, 'Disarmament and Demobilization', in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (note 6) p.143.
 - 28 Weapons buy-back programs often suffer from the fact that armaments provide a source of livelihood as well as security, and the payments offered for the weapons are often not enough to compensate. As a result, the weapons turned in during such programs tend to be poor quality small arms, rather than more advanced armaments. Berdal (note 25) pp.17 and 33–37; UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations (note 26) p.35.
 - 29 Virginia Gamba, 'Managing Violence: Disarmament and Demobilization', in John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) p.134.
 - 30 Berdal (note 6) p.39; Nat J. Coletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, 'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail* (Princeton UP 2004) p.173.
 - 31 Spear (note 27) p.145.
 - 32 For a discussion of these issues in Iraq, see Walter B. Slocombe, 'Iraq's Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform "Under Fire"', in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänngi (eds.), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 2004) esp. pp.22–3.
 - 33 Berdal (note 6) p.17; Spear (note 27) p.145; Call and Stanley (note 24) pp.305–6.
 - 34 As Coletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer (note 30) note, 'Demobilizing combatants into a livelihood vacuum can lead to disgruntled warriors and increased criminal activity.' See p.171.
 - 35 Berdal (note 6) p.57. It is worth noting that this study was published in 1996, well before regime change operations and demobilization efforts in Iraq.
 - 36 Berdal (note 6) pp.46–7.
 - 37 Ibid. pp.47–9; Coletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer (note 30) p.175; Nicole Ball, 'Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa', in Krishna Kumar (ed.), *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1997) p.99.
 - 38 For more details on these phases, see Ball (note 37) esp. pp.86–90, and UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations (note 26).