

Committee on Homeland Security
Majority Staff Report Examining:

Public Health, Safety, and Security for Mass Gatherings



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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REP. BENNIE G. THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN

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Public Health, Safety, and Security for Mass Gatherings

Executive Summary

Charge to the Staff

Ensuring the public health, safety, and security of the public at mass gatherings can be especially challenging. These areas are interrelated and do not fall within the exclusive domain of the private sector. On the contrary, mass gatherings require that the public and private sectors interact with and support one another in complex ways.

With these challenges and characteristics in mind, as well as his ongoing emphasis on preventing, deterring, and preparing for terrorist attacks and other potential disasters before they occur, Chairman Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) of the House Committee on Homeland Security, charged the Democratic Majority staff to:

- **Examine** a number of different mass gathering events and venues,
- **Observe** how the public and private organizations providing support at mass gatherings identify, meet, and overcome the challenges inherent in dealing with threats to events, attendees, and the Nation, and
- **Identify** areas where additional homeland security resources and/or other assistance might help the public and private sectors as they work to ensure the public health, safety, and security of attendees, participants, support personnel, and surrounding communities at these events.

Overview

Mass gatherings pose special challenges in terms of management and control, especially considering their value as targets for terrorism and other crimes.¹ The terrorist goal of attacking cities in order to kill and injure the most people – and otherwise have the greatest impact for the least amount of effort – applies to mass gatherings as well. All large-scale mass gatherings need to be protected in the post-9/11 world.

Mass gatherings can be categorized in a number of different ways. Mass gatherings occur over different periods of time. Some are one-day events, such as the Super Bowl. Others extend for longer, such as the Lollapalooza music festival. Still others are composed of a series of one-day events, such as National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) “March Madness.” In this paper, one-day events are referred to as “short-term mass gatherings.” This paper primarily focuses on mass gatherings lasting for longer than one-day and the attendees, participants, and support personnel who physically remain in the same constrained location – “long-term mass gatherings.”

Mass gatherings can also be categorized according to whether they are designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs)² or non-NSSEs. The President, or the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, has the authority to designate a mass gathering as an NSSE.³ Mass gatherings that have been designated as NSSEs include the Democratic National Convention,⁴ the Republican National Convention,⁵ the Super Bowl,⁶ the state funeral for President Gerald Ford,⁷ and the Olympic Games.⁸ The declaration as an NSSE carries with it a large commitment of Federal funding and other resources,⁹ as well as the leadership and management of the U.S. Secret Service of all security matters, including security planning.¹⁰

Non-NSSE mass gatherings may include political events, business conventions, highly-attended religious services, county and State fairs, parades, Independence Day celebrations,¹¹ multi-day camping events held by National youth organizations,¹² music festivals,¹³ and sporting events such as those hosted by NASCAR, the NCAA,¹⁴ the National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), and the National Football League (NFL)¹⁵ (aside from those Super Bowl events that have been declared NSSEs).



Other mass gatherings occur on a standing basis without being related to specific events. For example, mass gatherings occur at large shopping malls, casinos, etc., to engage in certain activities but not because certain events are occurring at specific venues. These sorts of mass gatherings are not addressed in this report.

Whether mass gatherings are declared NSSEs or not, they can be so large and prolonged that they take on many of the characteristics of a city. These characteristics include population density, the need for law enforcement and first responder resources to manage crises, and the physical infrastructure of the venues themselves.

Mass gatherings may present an attractive set of targets to terrorists¹⁶ when they incorporate patriotic and or military activities; corporate advertisements;¹⁷ governmental sponsorship;¹⁸ and large-scale television broadcasts.¹⁹ The threat to such venues is real and believed to be rising.

Methods

On a bipartisan basis, Committee Staff visited and examined a number of mass gathering locations with different characteristics and challenges. These were the Democratic National Convention and Republican National Convention venues in Colorado (visited in August 2007) and Minnesota (visited in April 2008), two NASCAR venues in Alabama and North Carolina (both visited in October 2007), and the venue for the Papal Mass in Washington, DC (visited in April 2008).

Security officials were present during site visits to enable continuity and accessibility to public and private organizations at each venue. Staff met with a variety of personnel, including but not limited to those from the: local police; local bomb squads; local fire departments; local emergency medical services; State public health; State police; State transportation; State fusion centers; State homeland security; State emergency management; the Department of Homeland Security; Federal law enforcement; the National Guard; contract security; contract emergency medical services; corporate security; venue management; and venue medical services.

Democratic Majority Staff also researched other mass gathering events, including the Super Bowl; sporting events in collegiate stadiums; county fairs; parades; Independence Day festivities; large-scale athletic events such as the Olympics and other international games; multi-day camping events held by National youth organizations; and multi-day music festivals.

It is clear that support personnel at these venues are doing the best they can with what they have, and that their efforts are commendable. However, personnel supporting non-NSSEs need assistance in three particular areas: countering biological threats, collaborative planning, and partnering across sectors.

Findings

Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context

Biological agents – whether introduced intentionally or unintentionally – will likely cause greater numbers of people to become ill and/or die at long-term mass gathering venues for the simple reason that more people are concentrated in these geographic areas than is normally the case. Additionally, for those mass gathering venues consist of open-air facilities, there are few barriers to prevent the dissemination of biological agents.

The public health community throughout the U.S. tracks, identifies, and works to control the spread of contagious diseases, whether or not the organisms causing these diseases are intentionally released. However, the public health infrastructure where some venues are located is limited. The Federal government needs to help these localities by strengthening the public health infrastructure; establishing comprehensive surveillance systems; and ensuring that intelligence regarding intent to use biological agents is combined with public health data in ways that produce actionable information for decision-makers without compromising privacy.

Some organizations – such as State fusion centers – foster non-traditional partnerships among the intelligence, law enforcement, and public health communities. The Federal government must enable them to continue their work in building non-traditional relationships. The Federal government



must also encourage their efforts to seek the advice and input of non-traditional partners on an ongoing basis. Doing so will help them produce better medical and biologically-oriented intelligence.

Key Recommendations for Public Health Security:

- **Analyze** health data for unusual trends at mass gatherings,
- **Fully establish** a National biosurveillance system,
- **Develop** better biological detectors,
- **Communicate** information from biological detectors so it can be understood by decision-makers,
- **Improve** domestic medical intelligence efforts,
- **Continue** to demand that biological detectors produce valid and reliable results, and
- **Establish** a comprehensive National medical intelligence program.

Collaborative Planning in the Mass Gathering Context

Planning efforts occur throughout the public and private sectors. Both sectors use a variety of approaches and produce plans that vary as much or more in their utility. Organizations in charge of mass gatherings use planning processes that are based on capacity, capability, scenarios and/or collaboration to address requirements for managing and protecting the attending public. In the case of declared NSSEs, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) leads planning efforts, drawing upon a great deal of experience. On the other hand, non-NSSEs do not generally benefit from Federal guidance and planning support.

It is imperative that all mass gathering venues utilize collaborative planning processes to develop emergency action plans for use by all of the organizations involved. The Federal government can help with this and other planning efforts by providing planning guidance to these venues. However, to have utility, Federal guidance should not be difficult to put into practice or impose too great a burden to implement.

Key Recommendations for Collaborative Planning:

- **Involve** high-level decision-makers personally in planning efforts,
- **Connect** planning efforts to other activities,
- **Develop** and **implement** a comprehensive emergency action plan at each venue,
- **Create** more specific and useful planning guidance,
- **Issue** more guidance specific to changes in the National Threat Levels,
- **Provide** better guidance for special events and mass gatherings,
- **Release** more flexible funding guidance,
- **Use** a more comprehensive approach to funding,
- **Ensure** that planning, training, exercises, standards, and lessons learned are connected,
- **Hold** the Federal government accountable for delivering more useful planning and other products,
- **Require** the Department of Homeland Security to issue better guidance regarding the National Threat levels, and
- **Require** the Department of Homeland Security to work with the public and private sectors to develop emergency action plans for mass gatherings.

Partnering Across Sectors in the Mass Gathering Context

No one public or private organization that supports a mass gathering venue has enough resources to handle all of the public health, safety, and security requirements that need to be addressed. In the case of NSSEs, the Federal government dedicates significant resources to addressing these requirements. For NSSEs (and some non-NSSEs), it is remarkable how some of the organizations involved in providing support have established trusted relationships with each other and the extent to which information and resources are shared as a result.



When traditional and non-traditional partnerships occur and are successful in ensuring public health, safety, and security for mass gatherings, they should be institutionalized in order to better address future requirements and the always-changing threat context. For example, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has worked with local police, venue security, and NFL corporate security to address instances of commercial fraud and intellectual property rights infringements at the Super Bowl.²⁰ This has resulted in the successful prosecution of crime. Institutionalizing kind of partnership will ensure that crime is more efficiently and uniformly addressed.

Key Recommendations for Partnering Across Sectors:

- **Share** responsibility for providing resources,
- **Put** different types of organizations in the State fusion centers to help analyze information,
- **Institutionalize** the same valuable partnerships at all venues,
- **Share** more and better information and intelligence,
- **Make it a practice** to share information with trusted non-Federal partners,
- **Continue to assist** States, localities, and tribes in increasing their own resources,
- **Hold** the Department of Homeland Security accountable for creating useful planning guidance that does not create additional burdens for those that need to use it,
- **Encourage** the Department of Homeland Security to fund partnership-based activities,
- **Hold** the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies accountable for sharing information,
- **Encourage** the Department of Homeland Security to expand its funding criteria, and
- **Work** with the Department of Homeland Security to help its employees better assist in emergency situations.

Conclusion

Reinforcing the efforts of the public and private sectors as they manage and protect mass gatherings contributes to the stability and security of our Nation. Effective and efficient Federal support is critical. Congressional oversight is vital. Helping the organizations that safeguard mass gathering events – regardless of NSSE designation – will increase the public health, safety, and security of the Nation in numerous and practical ways.



Key Recommendations re: Public Health, Safety, and Security for Mass Gatherings

	What Non-Federal Entities Should Do	What the Federal Government Should Do	What Congress Should Do
Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context: Countering Biological and Other Threats to Human Health	Analyze health data for unusual trends at mass gatherings.	Fully establish a National biosurveillance system. Develop better biological detectors. Communicate information from detectors so it can be understood by decision-makers. Improve domestic medical intelligence efforts.	Continue to demand that biological detectors produce valid and reliable results. Establish a comprehensive National medical intelligence program.
Collaborative Planning in the Mass Gathering Context: Closing the Gap between Decisions and Emergency Action	Involve high-level decision-makers personally in planning efforts. Connect planning efforts to other activities. Develop and implement a comprehensive emergency action plan at each venue.	Create more specific and useful planning guidance. Issue more guidance specific to changes in the National Threat Level. Provide better guidance for special events and mass gatherings. Release more flexible funding guidance. Use a more comprehensive approach to funding.	Ensure that planning, training, exercises, standards, and lessons learned are connected. Hold the Federal government accountable for delivering more useful planning and other products. Require the Department of Homeland Security to issue better guidance regarding the National Threat Levels. Require the Department of Homeland Security to work with the public and private sectors to develop emergency action plans for mass gatherings.
Partnering Across Sectors in the Mass Gathering Context: Sharing Information and Resources to Achieve Mutual Goals and Objectives	Share responsibility for providing resources. Put different types of organizations in the fusion centers to help analyze information. Institutionalize the same valuable partnerships at all venues.	Share more and better information and intelligence. Make it a practice to share information with trusted non-Federal partners. Continue to assist States, localities, and tribes in increasing their own resources.	Hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable for creating useful guidance that does not create additional burdens for those that need to use it. Encourage the Department of Homeland Security to fund partnership-based activities. Hold the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies accountable for sharing information. Encourage the Department of Homeland Security to expand its funding criteria. Work with the Department of Homeland Security to help its employees better assist in emergency situations.



Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context

Countering Biological Terrorism and Other Threats to Human Health

CONGRESS SHOULD...

Continue to demand that biological detectors produce valid and reliable results.

Continue to support the fusion of public health and biological threat information.

Encourage the inclusion of non-traditional law enforcement partners, including public health professionals, at State fusion centers.

Establish a comprehensive National medical intelligence program.

Ensuring the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings is extremely challenging. Disease is a particular concern,²¹ especially when thousands of people are in close proximity to each other over extended periods of time.

Attempts to create a National biosurveillance system have been largely unsuccessful to date. It has been hard to incorporate the large number of different disease tracking systems that exist in every State, locality, and tribe. Additionally, different diseases affect different locations. The National value we place on protecting the privacy of our citizens (which includes information about their health) makes this task particularly challenging. The Federal government continues to integrate biosurveillance efforts and improve early warning systems for disease outbreaks. There has been some improvement, but there is much left to be done.

The technology to detect all types of agents used in weapons of mass destruction must be improved. In particular, first responders supporting mass gatherings need biological detectors that provide valid and reliable results.²² The Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies not only need to continue their efforts to improve this technology but also come up with acceptable devices that can provide some amount of reliable data in the meantime. The Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security specifically should continue to make such research a top priority.

An accurate picture of the biological threat also must be generated. Historically, information about human health, disease, and illness has been the responsibility of the public health and health care delivery communities. On the other hand, information on the intent to use biological agents for terrorist purposes has been the responsibility of the intelligence community. Further, information about the intent to use biological agents is often kept separate from information regarding outbreaks of disease. As a result, an important intelligence opportunity is being missed. The intelligence and public health communities need to combine information on disease with intelligence about enemy intent to use biological agents for terrorist and other criminal purposes.

Biological terrorism and naturally-occurring diseases could have an enormous impact on mass gatherings. Comprehensive biosurveillance, pervasive biological detectors, and domestic medical intelligence could help protect populations. Strengthening these areas will better ensure the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings throughout the Nation.



Q FEVER ATTACK – SCENARIO

The crowds had been gathering for days ahead of the races that they had come from across the country to watch. The race facility had the capacity to hold 150,000 in the grandstands and by race day it was full. In addition, the infield and miles of surrounding campgrounds hosted thousands more. Including the hundreds of support personnel who were also present, about 200,000 had descended on this otherwise quiet rural county. There were so many people assembled in and around the facility that the county suddenly became the third largest population center in the State.²³

The large number of people coming into the county gave the area many of the same urban characteristics that exist in cities. The Federal government did not take this into account when it was distributing homeland security funds, including those to help prevent terrorist attacks against urban areas.

Prop-airplanes and the occasional helicopter flew overhead, pulling advertising banners behind them. They flew at a 3000-foot or higher ceiling up until one hour before and one hour after a race, during which time greater Federally-imposed flight restrictions came into play.²⁴

Having long wanted to target one of America's favorite pastimes, the terrorist – a trained pilot – decided to use one of these banner planes (originally a crop duster)²⁵ to commit an act of biological terrorism. Weeks before, he filed a flight plan to pull a banner, release it, and then do some sky-writing. By race day, he had mounted both crop-spraying²⁶ and smoke-generating equipment on the plane. Consistent with his flight plan, the pilot drew a banner behind the plane up until 30 minutes before FAA rules required that planes stop flying above the venue.

Over the next 25 minutes the plane flew lower and lower. Five minutes before all aircraft needed to leave the area completely; the terrorist dropped the plane close to the stands, flying 4000 feet along the front and back stretches of the track. The air traffic controllers furiously demanded that the plane fly to an appropriate distance away from the venue. The pilot insisted that he was just trying to give the crowds a thrill. No one saw the biological agent he released. The weather²⁷ and the configuration of the grandstands kept the biological agent in the air at one to five meters²⁸ above and around the crowds along two lines²⁹ near the front and back stretches of the track.

The audience was excited to have the plane fly so close, and did not notice anything coming out of the plane. First responders at the track did not realize what had occurred because the agents used was not visible and they did not have biological detectors.³⁰

The terrorist had not been interested in killing large numbers of people at this venue. Killing just a few would accomplish his purposes – mass panic, and economic and social disruption. With these aims in mind, the enemy chose a biological agent that was not known to cause large numbers of deaths.³¹

Ordinarily, the symptoms of the disease caused by the agent would not show up until 10-14 days after people had been exposed to a small amount of the agent. However, knowing that some would have had a higher exposure than others, the terrorist expected that at least some people in the audience would get sick in only a few days.

Most fans stayed to watch the race that day and overnight. About 80,000 fans had left for their homes throughout the region, and another 80,000 continued to camp near the venue when the first signs of illness began to occur, including a number of nonspecific symptoms such as fever, headache, chills, weakness, and mild coughing.³² Unfortunately, people suffering these symptoms did not feel they needed to see a doctor. When some began to develop pneumonia, however, they did get medical treatment. As more became ill, and it became clear something had happened at the race, many people began to panic and similar venues began to worry about the impact on ticket sales.

Eventually, the organism was identified as the rickettsia *Coxiella burnetii*, which causes Q Fever, a potentially (but not usually) deadly disease.³³ Almost everyone who had been at the venue was treated with antibiotics and recovered. However, some died either from the disease itself or because they had compromised immune systems that were unable to fight the disease. An investigation by Federal law enforcement identified the banner plane as the delivery vehicle. In the end this act of biological terrorism was attributed to a homegrown terrorist – a member of an extremist white supremacist organization.



Background

Since the anthrax events of 2001, the threat of biological terrorism has been taken seriously³⁴ and is no longer considered a remote possibility.³⁵ Although there are no biological weapons in the U.S., and it is more difficult to obtain biological organisms now than it used to be,³⁶ the biological threat is still real. Some organisms, such as anthrax³⁷ and plague,³⁸ are found naturally throughout the U.S. and the world. It is easy to get training in laboratory procedures at most universities. Security is also not as tight as it should be in many places where scientists are conducting research on these diseases.³⁹ As a result, it is possible for terrorists to get hold of and grow these and other naturally occurring organisms for biological terrorism.⁴⁰ It is also relatively easy to figure out how to deliver these biological agents.⁴¹

Large groups of people congregate at mass gatherings of all types for days before, during, and after the events. In some cases, the number of people concentrated in these areas can grow so large that ordinarily small towns become some of the largest cities in the States where these events happen. Infectious diseases such as Q Fever⁴² and anthrax⁴³ infect a person but do not spread directly from one person to another. Bioterrorism using infectious disease agents benefits from mass gatherings because there are more people present that could be exposed initially. Using military-grade biological weapons or material in this context could be devastating.⁴⁴ Just one of these biological agents could kill hundreds to hundreds of thousands, depending on whether the organism has been modified, how much of it is used, and how it is delivered.⁴⁵

As for contagious diseases (diseases that one person can pass on to another), the more people concentrated in one area, the quicker a contagious disease spreads, and the more likely people will get sick.⁴⁶ Moreover, many may not show signs of disease until some time after they return home.⁴⁷

Mass gatherings can be affected by naturally-occurring diseases, as well as bioterrorism.⁴⁸ Existing guidelines state that if a potentially devastating disease was spreading throughout a population, then community leaders should seriously consider canceling and prohibiting public gatherings.⁴⁹ Pandemic influenza is an example of this type of disease.⁵⁰ However, this decision would be made only after the disease has already obviously begun to spread. In the case of a long-term mass gathering, it could be that a disease starts to spread just as events are happening at a particular venue, but before anyone has had a chance to notice. As a result, a naturally-occurring disease could cause the hundreds of thousands of people attending these events to become sick even without an act of biological terrorism.

“Mass gatherings such as NASCAR races present major public health risks.”⁴⁶

- Dr. Lou Turner
Department of Health
North Carolina

Furthermore, diseases that could be prevented by vaccines could be the source of outbreaks at mass gatherings if enough of the people exposed there had not been immunized beforehand.⁵¹ People decide not to get vaccinated for a variety of reasons (such as fear of bad reactions, expense, and the misguided belief that they are unnecessary). As a result, the overall immunity of a group that can protect unvaccinated individuals (herd immunity)⁵² decreases.⁵³ Complicating the problem is that some public officials have incorrectly stated that all necessary immunizations are obtained as children.⁵⁴ Seasonal influenza is only one of a number of immunizations that adolescents and adults must get.⁵⁵

Adults who were never vaccinated as children against certain diseases, or have not received boosters for them, may not be able to fight off the organisms that can cause an outbreak – including those that could be introduced by terrorists deliberately at mass gatherings.⁵⁶ An example of such a naturally-occurring disease is Hepatitis A, which afflicted attendees of mass gatherings at an outdoor concert series in 2003.⁵⁷ The attendees that became ill were young adults that had never been vaccinated against the disease.⁵⁸



What Has Been Happening

Sharing Information

Public and private sector personnel in different States share information about the biological threat and resources to counter this threat with those they consider partners. However, personnel in the States have decided to do so for different reasons. For example, in Alabama, many talked about a culture of cooperation that exists in that State.⁵⁹ They said that this cooperative culture was a characteristic of Alabamians. In another example, public and private sector personnel in North Carolina described sharing information as a best practice, feeling that doing so makes organizations more efficient in their State.⁶⁰

Collecting and reporting information regarding health and illness is the responsibility of Departments of Health throughout the Nation. Different States employ different strategies for collecting, reporting, and sharing public health information about mass gatherings. For example, some States have teams of public health personnel physically onsite during mass gatherings.⁶¹ Others have teams spread throughout the State on a permanent basis, sometimes near venues where mass gatherings occur frequently.⁶² Having public health personnel at or near mass gathering venues could allow them to pass information from the Departments of Health to support personnel at the venues and back.

Regardless of the type of mass gathering event, health care professionals (emergency medical technicians, nurses, doctors, etc.) that treat attendees, participants, and others report information about their patients in accordance with State requirements.⁶³ Additionally, there is communication between the private sector entities that provide this health care and those that pay for this service.⁶⁴ These private sector health care entities also may have the ability to communicate directly with personnel within the venue's Joint Operations Center, if there is one.⁶⁵

The FBI has already established relationships with all State Departments of Health throughout the country,⁶⁶ and the State and other public health

laboratories that form the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN).⁶⁷ Therefore, information can be shared and exchanged between the FBI and the public health community generally and with the LRN member public health laboratories specifically.⁶⁸ When the FBI is present at mass gatherings,⁶⁹ it is possible for those in the public health community to relate information about a biological threat to the FBI, which could in turn communicate that information to the Federal and non-Federal organizations they partner with at these venues.

National Guard Civil Support Teams⁷⁰ are sometimes deployed to mass gathering venues, with equipment to detect biological and other agents that could be used for terrorism.⁷¹ The Civil Support Teams throughout the U.S. have worked hard over the past 10 years to establish relationships with the members of the LRN.⁷² They have also learned how to communicate information about what they detect to both their military and civilian partners (including those within the public health community).⁷³

Some information regarding biological threats may exist at the State fusion centers.⁷⁴ A fusion center is defined as "a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity."⁷⁵ Many fusion centers have established relationships with non-traditional law enforcement partners, such as the public health community.⁷⁶ They reach out to members of those communities if they need help in analyzing information about biological threats.⁷⁷

Conducting Biosurveillance

Departments of Health throughout the country possess public health surveillance systems that track, monitor, and report public health and disease-related information. Additionally, public health teams are often deployed throughout States. Personnel who specialize in identifying and controlling disease outbreaks are members of these teams. The teams reach out to the community and monitor diseases.⁷⁸ If these teams



are in the right place at the right time, they can be in an ideal position to identify and help manage outbreaks.⁷⁹

North Carolina, for instance, assigns public health personnel to hospitals throughout the State to monitor patient information and identify unusual trends that could indicate that an act of bioterrorism or a naturally-occurring outbreak has occurred.⁸⁰ The North Carolina Department of Health has put public health personnel in 11 major hospitals for these purposes. Known as the North Carolina Detect System, this hospital information is combined with information from North Carolina State Poison Control to create an overall picture of disease within the State.⁸¹ Leaders at the North Carolina Department of Health recognize that information technology may eventually gather, analyze, and communicate this sort of information more efficiently. However, at this point, they feel there is no better solution than to have public health personnel in the same place that generates the patient information. This allows them to use their best judgment to identify trends and communicate concerns back to the Department of Health and throughout the State.

County health departments in Florida have biosurveillance systems that they use regularly. When Super Bowl XLI came to Miami in 2007, three County health departments and the State Department of Health increased their public health activities in general and biosurveillance efforts in particular.⁸² These four departments managed to incorporate a number of very different biosurveillance systems to obtain additional data, enabling them to more quickly detect an outbreak or bioterrorist attack should they occur during this two-week period.⁸³ A bioterrorist attack did not occur, but the combined and focused use of these multiple systems did pick up increased cases of illness, accidents, and absenteeism.⁸⁴ This effort demonstrated that it was possible to integrate different biosurveillance systems – even in the absence of a coherent National biosurveillance program.

The collocation of public health epidemiology personnel with health care delivery personnel has occurred at some mass gatherings. For example,

this occurred during the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games.⁸⁵ This collocation was part of a public health surveillance system that was established specially for this mass gathering venue.⁸⁶

The collocation of public health and medical personnel who were implementing a biosurveillance system tailored to a particular event also occurred during an outdoor mass gathering of a National youth organization.⁸⁷ At this mass gathering, collaborative planning⁸⁸ resulted in daily syndromic surveillance that was conducted throughout the event.⁸⁹ This allowed for rapid disease identification and control.⁹⁰

Overseas, China is increasing its biosurveillance and biosecurity efforts in advance of the Olympics to be held this summer in Beijing.⁹¹ The country has recognized that a biological event could occur if organisms that cause illness and/or death are left unsecured. They also realize that the impact of such an event would be much greater due to the large numbers of attendees, participants, and support personnel that will make up the Olympic mass gathering. The effort to better ensure laboratory safety and security is being carried out by a non-traditional partnership between the Beijing Municipal Health Bureau and the Beijing Anti-Terrorism Office.⁹²

Assessing the Biological Threat

The FBI is responsible for both obtaining and generating intelligence regarding a variety of threats and potential targets, including mass gatherings throughout the U.S. As a member of the intelligence community, the FBI can also obtain intelligence (regarding the targeting of mass gatherings) from other intelligence organizations. Whether and how much information the FBI gets depends on:

- How well it understands the threats against mass gatherings,
- Its relationships with others in the intelligence community, and



- Its ability to generate requests for information to which FBI and other agents can realistically respond.

The FBI also creates threat assessments.⁹³ It shares those assessments with State, local, and tribal personnel in the public and private sectors, if they think it is necessary.⁹⁴ If the FBI gets information that indicates that a biological agent might be used for terrorism at a particular mass gathering, that information is included in the threat assessment for that venue. Other more non-specific or unsubstantiated threats may be addressed in FBI bulletins. For example, a threat against sporting venues (including NCAA venues) was indicated online, and was the subject of an FBI bulletin in 2006.⁹⁵ These bulletins provide information about possible targeted groups and events throughout the U.S. These bulletins are more widely distributed and accessible to the public than the threat assessments.

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do

Analyze Health Data for Unusual Trends at Mass Gatherings

As stated previously, some information is collected on the patients seen by health care providers at mass gatherings and passed to appropriate State public health entities. Although an outbreak would quickly be identified after patients had been transported to hospitals and doctors offices, it is possible that patients decline to be seen by other health care professionals, choosing instead to return to the mass gathering. For this reason, information generated by these mass gathering venues should be analyzed for unusual trends, regardless of whether patients leave the venue for additional medical treatment.

“Tonight, we will have a weather inversion. If aerosolized or powdered biological agents were dropped via aircraft doing a fly-over of the stands and track, this biological material would stay over the crowd. We know this would occur, but we would not be able to detect it unless the agent was visible.”³⁰

- Fire Chief Randy Holloway
Department of Fire & Life Safety
City of Concord
North Carolina

What the Federal Government Should Do

Fully Establish a National Biosurveillance System

Systems of varying sizes, capabilities, and utility that track diseases operate throughout the Nation. However, these systems differ in each State, locality, and tribe by:

- How much tracking is done,
- Which diseases and health conditions are monitored, and
- Whether personnel just look at reported information or actively go out to see if people are getting sick.

Attempts to create a National biosurveillance system have been largely unsuccessful to date. It has been hard to incorporate the large number of different disease tracking systems that exist in every State, locality, and tribe. Additionally, different diseases affect different locations. The National value we place on protecting the privacy of our citizens (which includes information about their health) also makes this task particularly challenging. The Federal government continues to integrate biosurveillance efforts and improve early warning systems for disease outbreaks. There has been some improvement, but there is much left to be done.

Funding to improve and integrate disease tracking technology throughout the U.S. must be systematically applied in order to achieve the goal of creating a comprehensive National biosurveillance system. Funding from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and some private sector entities has been used to upgrade the technology for existing systems and to create new systems. However, technology will have to leap over current levels to achieve the sort of National system needed.



Develop Better Biological Detectors

In addition to the information technology requirements described above, the technology to detect all types of agents used in weapons of mass destruction must be improved. In particular, first responders supporting mass gatherings need biological detectors that provide valid and reliable results.⁹⁶ However, because biological detectors vary in their ability to provide valid and reliable results, the widespread use of the biological detectors currently available to first responders is not recommended at this time.

Other detectors provided by the Federal government (such as the Department of Homeland Security BioWatch detectors) are not yet prevalent, and efforts to improve the technology are still ongoing. However, even if the technology was perfect, these detectors might not necessarily be the best kind to put in non-urban venues as they were originally designed to be used in metropolitan environments. Regardless, first responders providing support to mass gathering venues need reliable detectors for biological and other agents,⁹⁷ whether they are hand-held devices or the type that could be mounted to facilities found at mass gatherings.⁹⁸ The Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies not only need to continue their efforts to improve this technology but also come up with acceptable devices that can provide some amount of reliable data in the meantime. The Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security specifically should continue to make such research a top priority.

Communicate Information from Detectors So It Can Be Understood by Decision-Makers

The information generated by detectors will be used by decision-makers at mass gatherings themselves and by policymakers at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels. It must be understandable. Ideally, this information should also be easily uploaded by standard information management systems such as the FBI Virtual Command Center (VCC). The VCC system is utilized by some mass gathering venues in their Joint Operations Centers for the purpose of

managing events and identifying public health, safety, and security requirements.

Improve Domestic Medical Intelligence Efforts

An accurate picture of the biological threat must be generated. In order to do so, it is important to gather, validate, and analyze information about:

- Human health, disease, and illness, and
- Terrorist or other criminal intent to use biological agents against a particular group or population.

Historically, information about human health, disease, and illness has been the responsibility of the public health and health care delivery communities. On the other hand, information on the intent to use biological agents for terrorist purposes has been the responsibility of the intelligence community.

The intelligence community is addressing the biological threat in a variety of ways. Its efforts have grown out of historical requirements such as the need to understand the threats from biological warfare and naturally-occurring diseases in the areas in which military troops operate. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), for example, has produced medical intelligence for soldiers deployed abroad for 68 years.⁹⁹ However, AFMIC activities are strictly confined to DOD personnel and activities overseas. Here in the U.S., there is no equivalent military or civilian activity. Other programs run by the intelligence community to address the biological threat are also so specialized that they do not provide a comprehensive or particularly useful picture of this biological threat to or within the U.S.

Approaches for keeping patient data anonymous must be developed in order to promote better intelligence analysis of biological threats. Patient health information is not shared easily with the intelligence or Federal law enforcement communities. This is necessary to protect the privacy of these patients. However, because information about the intent to use biological agents is separate from information regarding outbreaks of



disease, an important intelligence opportunity is being missed.

An attempt has been made at the Federal level to solve this problem by providing some intelligence to a few Federal health agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). However, because these agencies are not part of the intelligence community they do not usually possess intelligence analysts who can make best use of this information. Additionally, often only high-level personnel (who are not responsible for intelligence analysis) in these organizations possess the clearances necessary to view classified information in the first place. Another way to combine patient health information with intelligence regarding intent to use biological agents for terrorist or other criminal purposes must be found.

Working through these issues marks the beginning of a domestic medical intelligence program. However, these efforts are not yet organized or robust enough to produce medical intelligence for the entire Nation. Additionally, what little medical intelligence is produced by the Federal government is not yet efficiently or effectively communicated to State, local, and tribal personnel.

What Should Congress Do

Continue to Demand that Biological Detectors Produce Valid and Reliable Results

The Department of Homeland Security has made next-generation technology for BioWatch a top priority. However, it is just as important to improve biological detectors for first responders that can be used in a variety of areas, and that will produce valid and reliable results.

Congress should continue to conduct oversight of the Department of Homeland Security regarding BioWatch. Congress should also continue to hold the Department of Homeland Security and other

Federal Departments and agencies that develop biological detection technology accountable for detectors that produce valid and reliable results, and that the first responder community can afford and will use.

Establish a Comprehensive National Medical Intelligence Program

The U.S. needs a comprehensive National Medical Intelligence program that will provide early warning of disease outbreaks. The program should allow public health information to be combined with information about the biological threat and the intent to use biological agents for terrorism and/or other criminal acts. To support these aims, Congress should continue to conduct oversight over current efforts to produce domestic medical intelligence, within a framework that protects patient privacy. Congress should also continue to support the expansion of State fusion center activities to address the biological threat by including non-traditional law enforcement partners¹⁰⁰ such as public health professionals.¹⁰¹



Collaborative Planning in the Mass Gathering Context

Closing the Gap between Decisions and Emergency Action

CONGRESS SHOULD...

Ensure that training, exercises, standards, and lessons learned are connected to planning efforts.

Hold the Federal government accountable for delivering more useful planning and other products.

Require the Department of Homeland Security to issue better guidance regarding the National Threat Levels.

Require the Department of Homeland Security to work with the public and private sectors to develop emergency action plans for mass gatherings.

Planning for long-term mass gatherings is extremely challenging especially when hundreds of thousands of people attend for days at a time. They can be spread out over many acres, and they may move in and out of the venues frequently. They may also participate in events that occur before, during, and after the main events. Additionally, because so many people attend, it may be that it is not possible for every person, container, and vehicle to be checked conclusively for safety and security.

The public and private sector entities that work with mass gatherings utilize a variety of planning processes to determine how best to deal with threats to these events. The most effective of these is collaborative planning.¹⁰² This type of planning has been used to produce plans and guidance and to inspire ongoing interaction among partners striving to ensure public health, safety, and security at mass gatherings. Event managers and the public and private sector organizations providing support to mass gathering venues also need to ensure that training opportunities, exercise requirements, setting of standards, and identification and communication of lessons learned are connected to the collaborative planning processes they engage in together.

Public and private sector personnel providing support to mass gathering venues must create tailored emergency action plans and become familiar with their contents. They must address public health, safety, and security,¹⁰³ as well as a variety of risks, including those from hazardous materials and agents that could be used by terrorists.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, every emergency action plan should be revisited at least annually to take into account different threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that may have arisen over the past year.

The Federal government must issue additional specific guidance so that those in the public and private sector know what to do when the National Threat Level changes¹⁰⁵ – including at mass gatherings. It will be impossible for the Department of Homeland Security to effectively and efficiently communicate requirements to all public and private sector entities throughout the Nation in the midst of an emergency. This guidance needs to be developed and issued now, so that response is not delayed.

The Federal government needs to improve its mechanisms for developing and communicating planning guidance regarding mass gatherings to the public and private sectors. It must also create more flexible grant guidance that takes into account unique State, local, and tribal needs without being either too general or specific. Strengthening these areas will better ensure the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings throughout the Nation.



CHANGE TO CODE ORANGE – SCENARIO

On July 2nd, the Department of Homeland Security raised the National Threat Level¹⁰⁶ from yellow to orange¹⁰⁷ for the entire country and every sector within it. Throughout the country, decision-makers in communities, large and small, had to weigh whether to go forward with parades, festivals, concerts, and fireworks to celebrate July 4th. Most decided to host Independence Day festivities as planned so as not to allow the terrorists to win.

Although people were aware that the National Threat Level had changed and that the Department of Homeland Security had issued recommended actions for citizens,¹⁰⁸ they did not change their plans to attend community-sponsored July 4th celebrations.

Across the country, local law enforcement personnel tried to get additional information about the threat from the Federal government to find out whether their particular events were at risk. All that the Department of Homeland Security would say was that the National Threat Level has been raised to orange as a precaution and to stand by for further information. Law enforcement personnel also approached their local FBI field office in hopes of getting clarification but were disappointed to find that their contacts at the FBI were unable or unwilling to provide more information.

At the State level, the State Directors of Homeland Security asked their respective Governors as well as their own contacts in the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice whether additional resources would be deployed to any of the States since the National Threat Level had been raised. The response from the Federal government was that Federal resources were not being sent at that time.

In the absence of actionable information or intelligence, most local, tribal, and State law enforcement officers felt compelled to ramp up security. All emergency personnel were required to be on standby. Hospitals were told to bring in additional personnel, as opposed to simply having them on call. Members of the public health community were told to activate their disease surveillance systems. Organizations responsible for environmental monitoring were also told to increase their efforts. Doing all of this came at an enormous economic cost, as so many in each community took an “all-hands-on-deck” approach to address an unknown threat to their July 4th festivities.

The parades, concerts, festivals, and fireworks went off as planned. All across the country, there was a collective sigh of relief that terrorists did not attack one of our most cherished National holidays.

However, the added public health, safety, and security precautions came at a huge price. Over the weeks that followed, costs were tallied. American citizens were appalled to find out that their State and local governments—many of whom had budget deficits—were forced to spend between \$20,000 and \$1,000,000 to ramp up their efforts to protect these mass gatherings from a terrorist threat that was never properly identified. There was never any indication from the Federal government after July 4th as to whether a threat had been deterred, or whether the increased security efforts throughout the Nation contributed to preventing an act of terrorism from occurring.

Without “specific, actionable information...we run the risk of communities taking it upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat.”¹⁰⁵

- Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS)
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives



Background

The public and private sectors create plans to address preparedness, detection, response, and recovery requirements for when mass gatherings are threatened. Planning efforts for large-scale long-term mass gatherings rank among the most challenging, since they can be so large and complex.¹⁰⁹ This planning is difficult because:

- Attendees can stay in the vicinity for longer than a week,¹¹⁰
- Hundreds of thousands of people may flock to the area,¹¹¹
- The venue could be targeted for acts of terrorism¹¹² and
- The association of many of these events with American culture¹¹³ could increase terrorist motivation to target these over other activities and events.

What Has Been Happening

Planning Based on Scenarios

Military and paramilitary organizations commonly use scenarios to drive their planning efforts. For example, the U.S. Secret Service uses scenarios to help them identify training and other requirements necessary to protect Presidential candidates at mass gatherings.¹¹⁴ Local law enforcement also understands the value of this type of planning.¹¹⁵

NASCAR corporate security uses scenarios to drive planning efforts with its own employees as well as with the public and private sector personnel that support its venues.¹¹⁶ For example, NASCAR hosts an annual security summit,¹¹⁷ during which time a variety of concerns are addressed. A scenario is used to frame discussion regarding:

- How well the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks particular to the scenario are being addressed, and
- How current resources and actions can be applied to situations that have not yet arisen at the different venues.¹¹⁸

The trouble with scenario-based planning is that it can be difficult for participants to believe that the hypothetical scenario could really happen. When a well-respected organization such as the U.S. Secret Service uses a realistic scenario for planning efforts, participants are inclined to believe the same and plan accordingly. However, when other organizations put forward scenarios for the same planning purpose, they do not necessarily carry the same level of credibility. If participants do not believe a planning scenario is possible, they may not be inclined to seriously consider what actions they would need to take to address the challenges presented in the scenario.

PLANNING PROCESSES USED FOR MASS GATHERINGS

Scenario-based planning is used to consider different possible environments (including potential threats that may be intentionally introduced, naturally-occurring, or accidental in nature), and to determine what steps would have to be taken today in order to accomplish organizational goals and objectives in those environments.¹¹⁹ Many organizations in the public and private sector use scenarios to help plan for different possible future states and contingencies.¹²⁰

Capacity-based planning occurs outside of or in addition to scenario-based planning. In this process, the amount of work that can be completed within a specified timeframe to accomplish a specific task or set of tasks is determined. Capacity-based planning also seeks to identify areas in which efficiency can be increased and subsequently addressed.¹²¹

Capability-based planning also occurs outside of or in addition to future-oriented scenario-based planning activities. In this process, performance standards and desired capabilities in a variety of situations are identified and subsequently pursued.¹²²

Collaborative planning is one of the most effective planning processes. In this process, organizations with unique goals and objectives share information and other resources, working together to plan for and achieve goals agreed upon by the group.¹²³



Planning Based on Capacity

State and local organizations providing support to mass gatherings emphasize the importance of planning based on current capacities.¹²⁴ They are often very focused on:

- The resources they have,
- The limitations of their equipment and training, and
- The difference between what they can do now and what they could do if they had more resources.¹²⁵

These organizations are also concerned about what they might be called upon to do, based on the needs of a particular emergency, regardless of the resources they possess.¹²⁶ State and local personnel are clear that given their current resource constraints, they are very limited in their ability to take on additional requirements. For example, the local bomb squad in Cabarrus County, North Carolina, provides much of the bomb detection support for mass gatherings that occur in the county and has one team composed of four people, one of whom provides administrative support only.¹²⁷ The equipment it has is antiquated¹²⁸ and the team possesses very few detection dogs.¹²⁹ The bomb squad works in concert with other law enforcement organizations that bring their own personnel, dogs, and equipment to address various situations.¹³⁰ It does have the capacity to sweep a mass gathering venue on multiple occasions, respond to suspicious packages, and conduct some other limited activities. However, in an emergency, it would not be able to take on many more duties. It simply does not have the human, animal, or physical resources to do so.¹³¹

Local personnel are fully aware of their predicament. They are quite clear in their communications with others about what they have and what they can do. Reality guides their planning and operations, not wishful thinking. They are also

aware of what they could do if they had more resources – funding, equipment, and personnel. This knowledge allows them to participate in capability-based planning as well.¹³² As part of capacity-based planning for different mass gatherings, there has been discussion of how to evacuate venues such as the Olympics¹³³ and whether to shelter in place when evacuation is not possible or advisable.¹³⁴ During an exercise at the Talladega Super Speedway, the public and private sector personnel supporting the races addressed what to do in the event of a biological attack. They:

- Learned that evacuation may not always be the best choice for response – because there may be more medical assets and personnel at the venue, among other reasons,¹³⁵
- Weighed the benefits and consequences of evacuating spectators – realizing that panicked evacuation could cause injuries,¹³⁶ and
- Decided that having fans and support personnel remaining in place might be a better option – because evacuation could possibly infect or harm others beyond the venue.¹³⁷

“We must continually anticipate possible dangers and be ready with a plan of action to keep the public safe.”¹¹⁵

- Mark H. Luttrell
Sheriff, Shelby County, Memphis
Tennessee

The Department of Homeland Security has produced evacuation planning guidance to be used at all NASCAR venues.¹³⁸ Members of the public and private sector that provide support at three race facilities met in 2007 with personnel from the Department and provided input regarding

their challenges and circumstances.¹³⁹ Originally, the public and private sector participants expected that the Department would help personnel supporting these three venues develop evacuation plans specific to their tracks and surrounding areas that could then be modified and tailored for use by the other venues.¹⁴⁰ Instead, the Department preliminarily issued more general guidance¹⁴¹ that the track personnel responsible for evacuation planning found to be of limited use.¹⁴² The Department has accepted this feedback and continues to work with NASCAR and its public and private sector partners to refine this guidance.¹⁴³



Planning Based on Capabilities

Capability-based planning is undertaken by those at the State, local, and tribal levels who know or believe they can obtain more resources than what they usually have on hand.¹⁴⁴ They do not necessarily expect that additional resources will come from the Federal government. States that have more resources because they have larger economic bases¹⁴⁵ often engage in capability-based planning. Florida's economy, for example, allows for such planning because it possesses large organizations such as Universal Studios and attractions like Walt Disney World, dense population centers,¹⁴⁶ and other characteristics such as urban areas that qualify for funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).¹⁴⁷ Additional resources generated or paid for in the State can be and have been leveraged throughout the State to respond to emergencies (such as large-scale fires) and disasters (such as hurricanes). Therefore, local and tribal personnel in States like these expect that additional resources can be made available to them in the future as well.

Collaborative Planning

Of the four types of planning, collaborative planning has the most utility, results in products that are helpful to all participants, and is recognized as such. For example, even with NSSEs such as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, it is clear that collaborative planning involving the U.S. Secret Service and non-Federal entities is effective.¹⁴⁸ For the Democratic National Convention, the U.S. Secret Service has established an executive steering committee for planning purposes that includes traditional partners (such as local police departments and State public safety) and non-traditional law enforcement partners (such as the Denver Health Medical Center).¹⁴⁹

During its annual security summit, NASCAR also encourages and supports participation in

collaborative planning. Topics addressed at the summit vary¹⁵⁰ and attendance has increased over the years.¹⁵¹ The summit provides a forum for the presentation of ideas, information, and training.¹⁵² It also provides a unique opportunity for those attending to express their opinions about NASCAR guidance, Federal requirements, and other concerns.¹⁵³ Members of the NASCAR Corporate Security team often serve as facilitators.¹⁵⁴ This year, the summit engaged in collaborative planning regarding various requirements resulting from changes in the National Threat Level.¹⁵⁵ Collaborative planning also fills a conspicuous gap created by the Federal government's failure to issue specific guidance about what to do when the National Threat Level changes from one level to another.¹⁵⁶ Instead of waiting for the Federal government to finally issue such guidance, some States¹⁵⁷ and private sector organizations¹⁵⁸ have taken the initiative to address this and other issues using collaborative planning.

Other Activities Related to Planning

Training and education play key roles in fulfilling accreditation and/or professional development requirements for those in the public and private sectors.¹⁵⁹ State and local governmental personnel stated that they do not have enough funding to provide all the training they would like¹⁶⁰ or to provide coverage so that critical personnel can attend training.¹⁶¹ In the case of an NSSE occurring in a particular State, the U.S. Secret Service pays for and provides training to State and local personnel as part of their NSSE security operations.¹⁶² For mass gatherings that are not designated as NSSEs, training is not always provided.¹⁶³ However, some mass gathering venues do provide training regarding the services available at and for those venues.¹⁶⁴

The University of Southern Mississippi Center for Spectator Sports Security Management¹⁶⁵ has established a program to provide training and education in areas of concern to mass gatherings at sporting venues. The Center takes a number of

“Public health planning for multi-day, outdoor mass gatherings should involve the event planning staff, local and State health departments, and other agencies responsible for public health and safety.”⁸⁸

- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention



threats into account, including terrorism, violence, and disasters.¹⁶⁶ It delivers its training through academic and professional forums, as well as workshops.¹⁶⁷ Students include event managers and organizers, venue staff, first responders, and private security,¹⁶⁸ as well as other support personnel, such as ushers.¹⁶⁹

Specialized training has been developed for some mass gatherings. For example, in advance of the Republican National Convention of 2004, thousands of law enforcement officers received training regarding weapons and agents of mass destruction.¹⁷⁰ This training was developed and delivered by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) – not the U.S. Secret Service.¹⁷¹ Personnel throughout the Nation have also participated in **exercises** related to different types of mass gatherings, especially to test emergency preparedness and response.¹⁷² For example, the Large Stadium Initiative conducted by the Office of Homeland Security in the State of California has addressed various requirements regarding mass gatherings that occur at stadiums throughout the State using an exercise series.¹⁷³ This Initiative has conducted a number of exercises at mass gathering venues including Dodger Stadium and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.¹⁷⁴

As with training requirements, **standards** are often set by professional bodies.¹⁷⁵ Meeting these standards is required to maintain professional accreditation or certification.¹⁷⁶ Local, tribal, State, and Federal governmental entities also require that accreditation and certification standards be met.¹⁷⁷

Some mass gathering venues establish certain safety and security standards that personnel and venues must meet in order to be able to host events. For example, NASCAR has established and requires that certain safety and security standards be met in order for race facilities to be able to host NASCAR races.¹⁷⁸ When standards are already established, they are incorporated into plans.¹⁷⁹

On the other hand, standards have not yet been set for other mass gathering venues. For example, although the NCAA has issued planning guidelines,¹⁸⁰ it has not yet identified and

established public health, safety, and security standards for the venues that host NCAA games.

Lessons learned during training events, exercises, and real-world experiences are valuable pieces of information that deserve to be recorded and shared with others.¹⁸¹ Lessons learned by the U.S. Secret Service and its partners when planning for and executing security requirements for previous NSSEs should be identified and also communicated to the organizations that must manage mass gatherings that are not declared NSSEs.¹⁸² The FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system¹⁸³ could host this information because people at and in support of some mass gathering venues already have access to LEO.¹⁸⁴ However, the Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) system was specifically established for this purpose and could be used to centralize lessons learned regarding all mass gatherings.¹⁸⁵ However, greater efforts need to be made to make the Federal, State, local, and tribal public health, safety, and security personnel that manage and support mass gatherings aware of LLIS and its utility.

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do

Involve High-Level Decision-Makers Personally in Planning Efforts

There is a need for high-level public and private sector decision-makers to be more involved in planning efforts for mass gatherings, especially those that have not been declared NSSEs.¹⁸⁶ Although these decision-makers, such as State homeland security directors and venue owners are often not present for these discussions, they are the ones who request and control many of the resources necessary to accomplish the new goals and objectives that result from these planning efforts. Unfortunately, other demands often prevent their involvement. However, without the participation of these decision-makers, their personnel must still return and convince them that the new goals and objectives should be funded and supported.¹⁸⁷ This severely limits opportunities to communicate and promote change.



Connect Planning Efforts to Other Activities

Planning is part of a cycle that should generate requirements for:

- Training,¹⁸⁸
- Exercises,¹⁸⁹
- Setting of standards,¹⁹⁰
- Identifying lessons learned,¹⁹¹ and
- Receiving feedback that informs further planning.¹⁹²

Regardless of the type of planning process used, it must maintain connection with these activities.

Event managers and the public and private sector organizations providing support to mass gathering venues need to ensure that training opportunities, exercise requirements, and setting of standards are connected to the collaborative planning processes they engage in together. In addition, special emphasis should be placed on observing, identifying, describing, recording, and communicating lessons learned to all partners involved in providing support to these venues. Purposeful attention to these areas and commitment to ensuring that training, exercises, standards, and lessons learned remain connected to planning is necessary to ensure the public health, safety, and security of those attending mass gatherings and the personnel that provide support to these venues.

Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Emergency Action Plan at Each Venue

Each venue that hosts mass gatherings needs to have a comprehensive emergency action plan. This should be the case regardless of the National prominence of the venues. For example, the emergency action plan for Ontario County, New York, contains plans that address emergency requirements (including evacuation) for a number of their large mass gatherings, such as the county fair and the Hill Cumorah Pageant in Manchester.¹⁹³

Frankly, if local entities can develop emergency action plans for their venues, higher-level better-resourced organizations should be able to do so as well.

Example plans¹⁹⁴ and templates¹⁹⁵ are widely available. A preexisting emergency action plan can serve as a model or a template can be used, but either way emergency action plans must take into account the unique characteristics and requirements of each venue. Public and private sector personnel providing support to mass gathering venues must create tailored emergency action plans and become familiar with their contents. They must address public health, safety, and security,¹⁹⁶ as well as a variety of risks, including those from hazardous materials and

agents that could be used by terrorists.¹⁹⁷ Lastly, every emergency action plan should be revisited at least annually to take into account different threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that may have arisen over the past year.

Emergency action planning is part of a sound preparedness approach that addresses emergency situations. For the private sector, the return on investment has been proven to be high¹⁹⁸ when such planning efforts are undertaken.¹⁹⁹ Further, putting such a plan in place could decrease potential liability if an emergency occurs.

What the Federal Government Should Do

Create Specific and Useful Planning Guidance

In some cases, the Federal government has issued general guidance addressing mass gatherings. For example, the Department of Homeland Security worked with NASCAR Corporate Security and personnel at three of the tracks to create evacuation planning guidance.²⁰⁰ Much of the first product was deficient in a number of ways – too vague in parts²⁰¹ and too overwhelming in the way of questions asked of track planners.²⁰² As a result, many felt that they could not use the guidance at all, choosing instead to rely on other resources and

“There is an interaction between doing what is right to add to the economy and the government obligation to protect – States need to plan for both.”¹²⁵

- James M. Walker, Jr.
Director of Homeland Security
Alabama



their own judgment.²⁰³ The Department continues to work with NASCAR and its public and private sector partners to refine this guidance.²⁰⁴ It needs to be finalized soon. It should not take years to produce useful planning guidance specific to these venues.

Provide Better Guidance for Special Events and Mass Gatherings

There are cases in which the Federal government has issued guidance that applies only when it says it applies, leaving State, local, and tribal personnel guessing. For example, the Department of Homeland Security uses a five-level rating scheme (called the Special Events Assessment Rating) to determine how different special events should be classified.²⁰⁵ The Department has created guidance specific to each rating level, and has also pre-identified what sort of Federal support will be provided accordingly.²⁰⁶ However, it has not provided lists of events that fall into each rating.

It is extremely difficult for organizations to self-classify using this rating system, and at the same time apply the limited amount of publicly available guidance to their venues or events.²⁰⁷ Further, the system is skewed towards Federal support as opposed to the identification of requirements for those supporting these venues at the State, local, and tribal levels.²⁰⁸

Issue More Guidance Specific to Changes in the National Threat Level

The Federal government must issue more guidance so that those in the public and private sector know what to do when the National Threat Level changes.²⁰⁹ Further, it will be impossible for the Department of Homeland Security to effectively and efficiently communicate new requirements to all public and private sector entities throughout the Nation while emergencies, disasters, or attacks are occurring and the Department is in the midst of responding to them. This guidance needs to be developed and issued now, so that response is not delayed in the future.

Release More Flexible Funding Guidance

The Federal government must create more flexible homeland security, emergency preparedness, planning, and planning-related funding guidance that takes into account individual State, local, and tribal needs without being too general or overly specific. Of course, Federal entities must strictly manage the grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements they issue. However, Federal entities must also understand the inter-relatedness of different activities, and take into account State, local, and tribal realities. For example, it is not uncommon to find that Federal exercise funding cannot be used to cover training expenses.²¹⁰ Unfortunately, it is also commonly the case that personnel must participate in an exercise without having been trained.²¹¹ In this situation, there is no point in forcing personnel to participate in exercises that test them on things that they have not yet been trained to do.

The rules governing how funding can be applied should take into account these sorts of situations. It is also imperative that representatives from the Department of Homeland Security meet with the State Directors of Homeland Security to understand these situations and better inform Federal funding decisions.²¹²

Use a More Comprehensive Approach to Funding

Connecting planning, training, exercises, setting of standards, and identification of lessons learned to each other is necessary to ensure public health, safety and security for mass gatherings. The Federal government must help non-Federal entities establish and execute programs composed of these interrelated activities. Funding and other support should be flexible enough to allow recipients to allocate the money to address and connect each of these elements. However, flexibility should not trump accountability.



What Congress Should Do

Ensure that Planning, Training, Exercises, Standards, and Lessons Learned are Connected

Congress should continue to conduct oversight over programs established by the Federal government for planning, training, exercises, setting of standards, and identification of lessons learned. In particular, Congress should require the Department of Homeland Security to support programs in these areas that are connected and complement each other. Congress should also demand integration among these same areas within the Department.

Hold the Federal Government Accountable for Delivering More Useful Planning and Other Products

Congress should continue to solicit feedback about how valuable guidance, intelligence products, and other resources produced by the Federal government are to public and private sector entities. Congress should use that information to advocate on behalf of individuals and organizations throughout the Nation, and hold the Federal government accountable for delivering useful materials.

Require the Department of Homeland Security to Issue Better Guidance Regarding the National Threat Levels

Congress should establish a deadline for the Department of Homeland Security to provide clear and comprehensive guidance to the public and private sectors regarding what to do when the National Threat Level changes. Currently, there is too little information at the Department of Homeland Security's website²¹³ and other publicly available sources about what to do when these levels change.

Require the Department of Homeland Security to Work with the Public and Private Sectors to Develop Emergency Action Plans for Mass Gatherings

Congress should require the Department of Homeland Security to work with private sector entities that host mass gatherings to create emergency action plans for venues where mass gatherings occur. Congress should also ensure that the evacuation planning guidance developed by the Department of Homeland Security is not finalized until planners at the venues find the guidance useful enough to produce evacuation plans and incorporate them into the emergency action plan for each venue.



Partnering Across Sectors in the Mass Gathering Context

Sharing Information and Resources to Achieve Mutual Goals and Objectives

CONGRESS SHOULD...

Hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable for creating useful guidance that does not generate additional burdens for those who need to use it.

Require that the Department of Homeland Security keep improving its evacuation planning guidance until stakeholder needs are met.

Encourage the Department of Homeland Security to fund partnership-based activities.

Hold the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies accountable for sharing information regarding mass gatherings.

Encourage the Department of Homeland Security to expand its funding criteria for programs that impact mass gatherings.

Work with the Department of Homeland Security to help its employees better assist State, local, and tribal personnel in emergency situations.

Sharing information and resources helps ensure the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings. The public and private sector organizations that support mass gatherings interact in complex ways. These organizations need to collaborate and cooperate to achieve their goals and objectives. No one organization by itself has enough information, funding, and resources to control everything that happens at mass gatherings.

Organizations are most successful when they set aside professional differences, adopt the same mission, and purposely choose to work together in order to achieve that mission. When that occurs, information and resources are shared. When it does not, information is held back, resources are hoarded, and unnecessary competition occurs.

The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI need to partner effectively with the State fusion centers. Additionally, all Federal Departments and agencies need to help States obtain and maintain back-up systems and resources to handle a crisis when Federal organizations have to pull back and support other missions. Partnerships also need to be strengthened and institutionalized between the public and private sectors.

Employees of the Department of Homeland Security are assigned to field offices and are conducting operations throughout the Nation. They must be trained and empowered to better assist State, local, and tribal personnel should they have to assist in a response to a disaster or catastrophe. Department of Homeland Security personnel need to know: how to serve as intermediaries between the Department and State, local, and tribal personnel; and what duties to carry out until a Principal Federal Official and a Federal Coordinating Officer can be identified and deployed to the area, if the situation warrants. Strengthening these areas will better ensure the public health, safety, and security for mass gatherings throughout the Nation.



TORNADO AT THE CONVENTION CENTER – SCENARIO

The Washington County Council had decided to issue permits to the organizers of a major traveling alternative music festival, allowing them to put on shows at three different venues, over a three-day period in August. This festival was expected to draw more than 180,000 and was viewed as a potential boon to the local economy. It was the responsibility of the sheriff's office to coordinate with security personnel at the three venues (the Regal Amphitheater, the Corner Community Playhouse, and Washington County Community College Stadium) and other public safety and security personnel who volunteered to come in from other areas of the State to help protect this mass gathering.

The sheriff did not expect much in the way of Federal support. However, the sheriff had worked with an ICE agent a few years ago on a human trafficking case, and was informed by that agent that ICE would be bringing a five-person team to the festival, working in an undercover capacity. The team was following the music festival as it moved across the Nation, building a case against a ring that was selling counterfeit merchandise.²¹⁴

On the morning of the second day of the festival, organizers announced that one of the bands, a legendary group out of Chicago, was breaking up and would not be performing that night. In response to the news, vendors outside the three venues quickly sold out of all merchandise associated with this group. The ICE agents realized this would result in the sale of more counterfeit merchandise and a bigger bust, if only they had more agents on site. However, ICE did not send more agents to the venue because investigations elsewhere needed support and there were no more agents to spare.

By that afternoon, the weather turned unseasonably hot and humid. Weather forecasts mentioned possible tornado conditions, but most people at the festival believed the odds were low. The military, however, canceled a field exercise that had been going on at a nearby base because it was concerned that excessive winds could damage the communications equipment being used in the exercise.

The troops were given time off and many decided to come to the festival.

At approximately 4:30 pm, a tornado hit the Washington County Community College Stadium. There was no advance warning, so it was not possible to evacuate anyone before landfall. Fans, musicians, and emergency personnel were surprised by the sudden appearance of the tornado. Some were killed instantly by flying debris. The extensive damage to the stadium hindered evacuation, search, and rescue efforts.

Tornados also touched down in two other areas of the State. They overwhelmed the capacity and capability of the State and local governments to respond. The Governor asked the President to declare a state of emergency²¹⁵ which would allow Federal response assets to be sent to the State to assist. The President made the declaration.

Although there was a county emergency action plan, that plan only contained general evacuation planning guidance. The college also had an emergency action plan, but it was specific to evacuating intact buildings.

According to the National Response Framework, the Department of Justice should be in charge of public safety and security²¹⁶ when responding to a Presidentially declared disaster. Because there were no representatives from the Department of Justice present at the festival, leadership of the emergency support function was assumed by the ICE agents, when the team members identified themselves. The ICE agents also offered to assist with response activities, feeling it was their duty as representatives of the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal agency responsible for emergency management, response, and recovery. The agents had little prior training in and knowledge of these areas and the Department's emergency management and response assets. They were essentially flying blind, developing expertise and relationships as they helped State and local personnel respond to the disaster.



Background

Managing mass gatherings is challenging. Many organizers and venue owners feel that they have seen and prepared for almost everything. They also believe that the Department of Homeland Security or some other Federal agency will tell them if there are additional risks or threats to their venues. Without new information, they assume there is nothing else to worry about.

Partnerships have been established over the years to address acts of terrorism,²¹⁷ crime,²¹⁸ and nature²¹⁹ for mass gatherings. These partnerships are between the public and private sectors, different levels of government, and different businesses. They vary according to:

- Location,
- Organizational policies,
- Priorities of powerful stakeholders (such as venue owners), and most importantly,
- Whether individuals decide to partner.

Different partners in this effort nevertheless still find it difficult to work together.²²⁰ Events like those of September 11, 2001, however, provide a reminder of what can happen when different organizations operate separately but then are suddenly expected to work and communicate with each other. The NYPD²²¹ and the New York City Fire Department (FDNY),²²² for example, were historically competitive organizations that took great pride in maintaining their differences. However, on September 11, 2001, they found that they could not communicate quickly with one another because they lacked interoperable communications equipment²²³ and because communicating with one another on a daily basis was not a priority for either the NYPD or FDNY until that day.²²⁴ Today, despite this horrific example of what happens when partnerships are not in place ahead of time, many organizations throughout the country are still unable to communicate with each other due to old communications equipment²²⁵ and reluctance to abandon longstanding competition.²²⁶ This serves no one.

THE LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK: NON-TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIPS ADDRESSING THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT

The Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL),²²⁷ the CDC, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the FBI decided to work together to establish the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN) in 1999.²²⁸ Although these Federal entities had some experience working with each other before 1999, the State Public Health Laboratories (SPHLs)²²⁹ did not have significant ongoing experience with the FBI. Members and staff of APHL decided to make developing a relationship with the FBI across the Nation a priority – and senior management and staff at the FBI decided to reciprocate.²³⁰ Personnel in both organizations were required to:

- Communicate with one another,
- Identify points-of-contact, and
- Ensure that they knew where the SPHLs, and FBI offices were located, etc.²³¹

All of this was required well in advance of the anthrax events of 2001.²³² As a result, these attacks were handled far more efficiently and effectively than would have happened otherwise.

Non-traditional relationships of this sort take continuous work to maintain. Nearly ten years later, FBI agents new to the LRN still walk into meetings announcing that they are “in charge,” and are surprised to find that others do not agree (even within the FBI). Technicians in the laboratories who find that they have to support LRN activities for the first time still shy away from contacting local FBI field offices, nervous about communicating with someone in Federal law enforcement on matters of National and homeland security. The bottom line is that these relationships require maintenance, clearly defined and understood roles, open lines of communication, and the ongoing support of senior leadership in all of the partner organizations. Only then will entities such as the LRN continue to be successful when responding to potential and suspected acts of terrorism.



The public and private sectors historically also have operated independently.²³³ However, there is growing recognition that in certain situations the public sector may need to get involved in what the private sector is doing. One of these situations is when mass gathering events need greater security than had been necessary before, because they have become:

- So successful that losing them would hurt the economy,
- So popular that they would make attractive targets for terrorism or other crimes, or
- So large that acts of terrorism and other crimes committed there would affect more people.

Consequently, all levels of government and the private sector need to be involved in ensuring the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings where a terrorist could have tremendous social and economic impact.

What Has Been Happening

Sharing Information at the Fusion Centers

One of the reasons State fusion centers were established was to help share information and intelligence between the Federal government and State and local authorities, within a framework that protects privacy and civil liberties.²³⁴ Fusion centers try to meet the State and local demand for homeland security information. They are a testament to the fact that personnel at the State and local level are the best people to obtain information about acts of terrorism and other crimes occurring in their own localities.²³⁵ They also provide logical nexus points for the Federal government to share its data on threats.

Throughout the Nation, fusion centers have received varying levels of funding, other resources, and support.²³⁶ Also, each fusion center:

- Is developing at a different rate,²³⁷
- Emphasizes different things,
- Builds on old State and Federal systems,

- Is affected by the leadership styles of their State Homeland Security Director,²³⁸ and
- Varies in terms of the ongoing presence of non-traditional law enforcement partners.²³⁹

Federal entities vary in the speed at which they have placed their own personnel at these fusion centers.²⁴⁰ For example, in North Carolina, the FBI already has two personnel in the fusion center, but the Department of Homeland Security has yet to send anyone.²⁴¹ Other fusion centers, such as the center in Alabama, are still waiting for personnel from both of these Federal Departments.²⁴² As of March 2008, DHS has deployed personnel to 19 fusion centers, with plans to have personnel in an additional 21 centers by the end of the year.²⁴³

Fusion centers share a number of different types of information. However, it is often easiest for them to share criminal statistics because the law enforcement databases that generate this information have already been integrated there.²⁴⁴ Fusion centers also keep track of major events that are occurring in their States on common calendars, so that their partners are aware that these events are happening.²⁴⁵ Additionally, fusion centers may assess threats to mass gathering events or rely upon other entities (such as the FBI or the State Highway Patrol) to conduct threat assessments and send them to the centers. Organizations that need information obtain it by contacting the fusion centers directly.

Sharing Information by Participating in Task Forces

Information is also shared when participating in task forces and working groups that focus on issues of mutual concern. Including representatives from a variety of different organizations in these groups is the key to success. For example, membership in bioterrorism task forces in North Carolina goes well beyond the public health community.²⁴⁶ The bioterrorism task force in North Carolina has been so effective in using non-traditional partnerships, sharing information, and working together that it is now looking to address other issues as well.²⁴⁷



Sharing Resources

No one entity by itself has all of the necessary resources to control and manage mass gatherings. This is especially the case when they:

- Are very large,
- Last for long periods of time, and
- Include many events.

This holds true for corporate entities, each individual venue, and every public and private sector organization providing support during mass gathering events. Therefore, resources must be shared.

Some resources utilized by law enforcement are commonly shared in order to better secure mass gatherings. For example, for football games occurring at Ohio State University (which attract more than 100,000 people), a local police force combines their canine resources with those of the State Highway Patrol, and together they sweep the venue for bombs.²⁴⁸

In the case of NASCAR, ATF brings a number of its resources to these venues.²⁴⁹ Although they share these resources or access to them, all remain under the control of ATF.²⁵⁰ For example, ATF places cameras throughout each venue but grants track private security personnel access to the video feeds.²⁵¹ Sharing resources in this case is easy because:

- The entities involved share the same mission requirements,
- ATF leaders have made support to such events and local governments a priority,²⁵² and
- Bringing in their own equipment allows ATF to respond more quickly and help prosecute criminals more efficiently.

Other Federal entities may also be present at mass gathering venues and share their resources at varying levels and for different reasons. For example, the FBI sometimes has a presence at mass gatherings to counter terrorism and can share its equipment with some of the venues in order to help its partners manage the mass gathering.²⁵³

Additionally, when requested by the Governor or the Governor's authorized representative, the National Guard also deploys civil support teams to some mass gathering venues. These teams bring their own detection equipment for weapons of mass destruction and their agents.²⁵⁴ Although they do not share their equipment, they do share the information about what they detect with their partners at these venues.²⁵⁵

State entities can play a similarly important role. For example, the Alabama State Department of Transportation shares access to its camera network and video feeds with the State Highway Patrol.²⁵⁶ In North Carolina, the Department of Transportation²⁵⁷ and the Highway Patrol²⁵⁸ command posts are collocated at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, where they share space as well as equipment with each other.²⁵⁹ In Alabama, this is not the case, but the Department of Transportation²⁶⁰ and Highway Patrol²⁶¹ often physically place their personnel, vehicles, and other resources together on the roads at major intersections.²⁶² Because the Department of Transportation and the Highway Patrol in both States share traffic control and safety missions, it is easier for them to share their resources and better control traffic at mass gatherings.

Organizations coming together to ensure the public health, safety, and security of the attendees, participants, and support personnel at these venues recognize that together they can accomplish more than they can alone. In order for different organizations to share resources, they must:

- Agree to support the overarching public health, safety, and security mission,
- Share a goal that supports this mission,
- Trust each other, and
- Be willing and able to communicate frequently.

Cooperation among Different Entities

The sharing of information and resources is always a challenge in any context, but happens more often when organizations are part of the same sector (such as defense) or when they share goals and



objectives (such as law enforcement and public health agencies both working together to address the threat of terrorism). Agreeing to support the overall mission – to ensure the public health, safety, and security of attendees, participants, and support personnel at mass gatherings – is a good place to start partnering at these venues. Not only is this mission inspirational, it is also the sort of mission that no one argues against. From there, similarities can be identified, differences can be resolved, and disagreements about who is in charge of what can be negotiated.²⁶³

Responsibilities for public health, safety, and/or security are sometimes shared by organizations in different professions or sectors. For example, at a mass gathering for an NFL Redskins football game at FedEx Field in Maryland, the stadium owner, county police, and the county fire department share responsibilities for public safety and security.²⁶⁴ In order for ordinary and emergency-oriented public safety and security decisions to be made efficiently, these different entities must cooperate to make decisions together or have decided ahead of time who is specifically responsible for what type of decision and in what instances.

During the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games, public health and health care delivery personnel were colocated.²⁶⁵ Although it may seem to some readers that this would not be an unusual occurrence, the public health and medical professions do not usually colocate in this manner. In another remarkable occurrence, public health information was also shared with a very non-traditional public health set of partners – officials at the games.²⁶⁶

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do

Share Responsibility for Providing Resources

Scarce resources cause even the most tight-knit communities to fight. This certainly holds true for the community of people that should work together to ensure the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings. Even in the case of NSSEs (where the Federal government provides many resources), there is debate. Some believe that corporate entities should pay for everything

because they turn profits. Others believe it is the responsibility of the Federal government to pay because it appears to have the most resources at its disposal. Still others believe that local governments should pay because they possess primary jurisdiction over where mass gathering venues are located. All of these stakeholders need to discuss what each organization can and will provide. No one organization by itself has all of the resources necessary to manage and control every mass gathering.

There are many processes for understanding the point-of-view of others and getting people to agree on plans and procedures. One of these processes should be chosen and used in the mass gathering context. How much responsibility for providing funding and other resources public and private sector organizations should take is something that should be debated,²⁶⁷ with the expectation that everyone needs to share at least some of their resources.

Put Different Types of Organizations in the Fusion Centers to Help Analyze Information

The best products from information analysis are those that:

- Draw upon a variety of sources,²⁶⁸
- Have very different entities viewing the same problem, and
- Incorporate radically different perspectives.²⁶⁹

Fusion centers go out of their way to develop partnerships with those outside of the law enforcement community. However, unless a variety of organizations are present in the fusion center full-time, the analysis of information can never really be complete. For example, without public health personnel in the fusion centers, the centers can never fully understand the biological threat or other threats to public health.

Fusion centers should build upon the good work they have done so far in establishing, developing, and maintaining partnerships with personnel that are not in the law enforcement community. Fusion centers that do not have these non-traditional



partners physically within their centers should work to make that happen. This will better enable:

- Information sharing between and among these different communities,
- Intelligence development at the fusion centers, and
- Earlier detection of threats.

Institutionalize the Same Valuable Partnerships at All Venues

As discussed previously, ICE has partnered with the private sector to investigate commercial fraud and violations of intellectual property rights at a number of mass gathering events, including the Super Bowl.²⁷⁰ This partnership between the public and private sectors works well.²⁷¹ It benefits the sport (preventing the illegal use of logos, etc.), and it benefits ICE (helping them to execute their law enforcement missions). Having ICE and other Department of Homeland Security personnel at the stadium also allows for more rapid communication with the Department of Homeland Security.²⁷² This is a clear example of a partnership that should be institutionalized at other mass gathering venues.

What the Federal Government Should Do

Share More and Better Information and Intelligence

Information sharing remains a challenge at all levels. After September 11, 2001, National policy was changed to require that Federal agencies share information and intelligence with State, local, tribal, and private sector organizations.²⁷³ However, Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies were not accustomed to sharing information with non-Federal entities and found it difficult to do so despite the new emphasis on needing to share. This is not surprising considering the historical challenges that have prevented Federal agencies from sharing information and intelligence with each other.

The FBI sometimes generates and distributes intelligence bulletins to State and local law enforcement officers nationwide. These bulletins

contain information about potential threats and other issues for which FBI partners should be on the lookout. Although these bulletins are often sent to State and local law enforcement, because they are unclassified, they also find their way to other types of organizations.

Lack of information sharing has had a tangible impact. For example, the FBI field office in Birmingham, Alabama, had developed a threat assessment regarding the Talladega Super Speedway.²⁷⁴ The FBI decided that it did not need to share this assessment, since there was no special threat to the Speedway.²⁷⁵ This made State, local, and private sector personnel needlessly wonder if there were threats to the Speedway that they were not being told about.²⁷⁶

Complicating matters has been the tendency of Federal agencies not to share threat assessments and other information and intelligence with State fusion centers on an ongoing basis.²⁷⁷ As a result, fusion centers must either create their own threat assessments for mass gatherings and other situations, or go without them altogether.²⁷⁸

The Federal government certainly has the right to decide whether it is appropriate to share its threat assessments, information, and intelligence. However, deciding whether an outside entity needs this information is not only dependent on the judgment of the Federal organization that created the product in the first place. Without building relationships and understanding the information requirements of its partners, a Federal agency may have no idea what sort of information another Federal, State, local, tribal, or private sector entity might need. Organizations must develop these relationships and overcome barriers to information sharing.

Make it a Practice to Share Information with Trusted Non-Federal Partners

The Federal government should establish a nationwide policy for Federal agencies to share certain types of information with trusted non-Federal partners, understanding that exceptions must be made in certain circumstances. For example, FBI field offices should share the results



of threat assessments for mass gatherings in the States where they are located with at least one non-Federal organization that helps to provide security at these venues, such as the local Sheriff's Department or the State Bureau of Investigation. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security should share the information it has about threats to mass gatherings regularly with trusted partners throughout the country, such as the State Departments of Homeland Security or the State fusion centers. If the lack of security clearance is a problem, then Federal agencies should make it a priority to get their trusted partners cleared. Until that happens, they should make as much of the necessary information available in an unclassified format.

Continue to Assist States, Localities, and Tribes in Increasing Their Own Resources

Sharing resources to fill gaps that no one organization or sector can fill is certainly a good idea, and one that is implemented to varying extents at mass gathering venues throughout the country. However, filling gaps is not enough. As described above, some Federal Departments and agencies share resources with non-Federal public and private sector personnel in support of mass gatherings. Unfortunately, these resources can be called away from these venues if some higher priority situation happens (such as an act of terrorism). For example, ATF brings in resources to address the threat of bombing at a number of mass gathering venues and events, and shares these resources with State and local police as well as private venue security.²⁷⁹ However, should ATF be called away to address a bombing or other threat, then ATF may well have to pull some or all of its resources away from its commitment. This would leave the venue short the resources that its track and public security forces count on to keep the attending public safe. It is, therefore, important for these non-Federal agencies to have strong infrastructures and their own resources (such as closed-circuit television) so that

they will not be so dependent on those of the Federal government.

Additional funding for State, local, and tribal agencies to purchase the equipment and other resources they need must be provided by the Federal government. On the other hand, State, local, tribal, and private sector entities also need to make a concerted effort to apply for additional grant funding to make these purchases. The need to support mass gathering events, and the reality that Federal assets that are usually shared but could be pulled at any time to support higher priority missions, should serve as two parts of the funding justification. Additionally, State leaders and bureaucracies should not stand in the way of applicants getting all or most of the funding for which they apply.

It is also well worth exploring how much redundancy should exist. Federal, State, local, and tribal budgets are tight, so wise choices about how to allocate homeland security resources must be made. Purchasing equipment and other resources that are not used often and simply collect dust on a shelf is wasteful. On the other hand, without some redundancy, communities are:

- Less prepared,
- Less able to withstand emergencies,
- Less able to carry out response and recovery activities, and
- More prone to their infrastructure being compromised.

One solution is to purchase additional equipment and resources that not only shore up existing stocks and support current missions but also have alternate uses in addition to homeland security. This kind of flexibility allows communities to deal with a whole host of issues.

“State and Federal collaboration needs to increase. States need to be included in the process and strategy sessions that determine Federal funding allocations.”²⁴¹

- Bryan E. Beatty
Secretary of the Department of
Crime Control & Public Safety
North Carolina



What Congress Should Do

Hold the Department of Homeland Security Accountable for Creating Useful Guidance that Does Not Create Additional Burdens for Those That Need to Use It

Congress should continue to hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable for creating useful guidance that does not create additional burdens for those that need to use it. Using the specific example of the evacuation planning guide produced recently by the Department of Homeland Security for use by NASCAR venues,²⁸⁰ Congress should take into consideration the feedback from NASCAR about this guidance. Congress should require the Department of Homeland Security to improve that guidance until these stakeholders feel they have a tool that meets their needs.

Encourage the Department of Homeland Security to Fund Partnership-Based Activities

Congress should encourage the Department of Homeland Security to fund activities that are based on partnerships, including those that are non-traditional. Organizations seeking grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements from the Federal government often feel that they have no choice but to limit their activities (including reaching out to non-traditional partners) in order to compete successfully for funding. Congress should ensure that individual members of the Federal government do not unnecessarily restrict partnering activities with funding requirements that prevent organizations from establishing relationships with non-traditional partners, such as law enforcement partnering with public health.

Hold the Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies Accountable for Sharing Information

Congress should not only hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable for sharing information within its own organization. Congress should also hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable for sharing information with the non-Federal organizations and citizens it serves. If these non-Federal entities are not getting

what they need, then the Department of Homeland Security has failed. Systems such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)²⁸¹ need to be reworked, taking into better account the needs of the people who will use HSIN in the public and private sectors.

Congress should also continue to hold the Federal government accountable for sharing information and intelligence. In addition to fulfilling various mandates, the basic act of sharing overcomes long-standing distrust. Trust can be fostered by holding Federal Departments and agencies to benchmarks for progress in this arena. This ensures that requirements are being met going forward.

Encourage the Department of Homeland Security to Expand its Funding Criteria

Congress should encourage the Department of Homeland Security to expand its criteria for funding so that it can be better used to purchase appropriate equipment and other resources. A State, locality, or tribe should be more competitive for funding if it has provided compelling justification for receiving it. Compelling justification exists if:

- A State, local, or tribal organization can show that what it purchases will be used frequently for one homeland security purpose and occasionally for others,
- The resources purchased will provide additional back-up, which would in turn improve preparedness, response, and recovery, and
- Input from a wide array of potential users has been obtained and shows there is consensus that the equipment and resources add significant value to homeland security efforts.

Work with the Department of Homeland Security to Help Its Employees Better Assist in Emergency Situations

Congress should work with the Department of Homeland Security to help its employees throughout the Nation better assist State, local, and tribal personnel in emergency situations. Congress should also encourage the Department of Homeland Security to continue to refine the



National Response Framework, better clarifying roles and responsibilities.²⁸² In addition, training should be provided by the Department to teach its personnel how best to represent the Department during disasters and catastrophes. At a minimum, they should be trained to:

- Know exactly who at the Department of Homeland Security they need to call in different situations,
- Coordinate Federal and emergency assets and services until the Principal Federal Official²⁸³ and Federal Coordinating Officer²⁸⁴ are named and arrive on-scene (should a situation warrant naming such officials), and
- Delegate or drop their other Federal mission requirements until relieved.

Such a program would require additional resources to design and maintain. Congress should provide such funding.



Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context

Conclusion

CONGRESS WILL DO ITS PART THROUGH...

Continuing conversations with personnel in the public and private sectors.

Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal Departments and agencies.

Legislation, where necessary.

Discussion

It is clear that public and private sector partners have done and are doing a great deal on their own to ensure the public health, safety, and security of attendees, participants, and support personnel at mass gathering venues. There are major differences between the Federal resources and other Federal support provided to NSSEs and to mass gatherings that are not declared NSSEs. These disparities are not always appropriate, given the relative similarities between many mass gatherings that have been declared NSSEs to date, and those that have been considered non-NSSEs. Gaps also still exist, particularly in the areas of countering biological threats, collaborative planning, and partnering across sectors – all areas where the Department of Homeland Security should step up and do what it can to fill these gaps effectively.

In the meantime, mass gathering lessons learned should be identified and adopted by organizers of all events, leveraging valuable experiences. All levels of government need to remain aware of potential threats to mass gatherings and continue to provide the additional funding and resources necessary to make up critical shortfalls.

Next Steps

This report recommends a number of actions that should be taken to ensure public health, safety, and security at mass gatherings. They should be executed immediately by those in the public and private sectors.

It is imperative that mass gatherings of all types and varying lengths be protected in the post-9/11 world. The House Committee on Homeland Security has examined a number of venues for mass gatherings and will continue to do so in its efforts to help keep the American people safe.

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Endnotes

¹ "Arenas and stadiums are attractive potential targets during events." Esposito, R. (2008, March 4). March Madness: Homeland Security Issues Warning on Sports Arenas – FBI and DHS Issue Warning Just in Time for March Madness. *ABC News*. Retrieved on March 6, 2008 at <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=4387469&page=1>

² "When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the U.S. Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead federal agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan and Federal resources are deployed to maintain the level of security needed for the event and the area. The goal of such an operation is to prevent terrorist attacks and criminal acts. Once an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service relies on existing partnerships with federal, state and local law enforcement and public safety officials with the goal of coordinating participating agencies to provide a safe and secure environment for the event and those in attendance." Department of Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm.

"...The Secret Service is authorized to participate in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special events of national significance," termed National Special Security Events. "When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan." United States Secret Service. National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at <http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml>.

³ Reese, Shawn. (2008). CRS Report for Congress: National Special Security Events. *Congressional Research Service*. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 from <http://www.congress.gov/erp/rs/pdf/RS22754.pdf>

⁴ "A political convention has "all of the elements of a terrorist's target — it's got a lot of people there, it's very symbolic ... and it's also very political," former CIA operative and senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, told FOX News. "The threat continues and there's no doubt this is a prime time to insert themselves — not only to kill Americans, but to insert themselves into our democratic process." Porteus L. (2004, July 8). Officials Warn of Summer Threats. *FOXNews*. Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,125065,00.html>.

⁵ "A political convention has "all of the elements of a terrorist's target — it's got a lot of people there, it's very symbolic ... and it's also very political," former CIA operative and senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, told FOX News. "The threat continues and there's no doubt this is a prime time to insert themselves — not only to kill Americans, but to insert themselves into our democratic process." Porteus L. (2004, July 8). Officials Warn of Summer Threats. *FOXNews*. Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,125065,00.html>.

⁶ Department of Homeland Security. (2003, July 9). National Special Security Events Fact Sheet. Retrieved on May 11, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0207.shtm.

⁷ Department of Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 11, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm.

⁸ Department of Homeland Security. (2003, July 9). National Special Security Events Fact Sheet. Retrieved on May 11, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0207.shtm.

⁹ The NSSE designation is viewed "...as important to garner more Federal resources to protect the public and the event." Archibold RC. (2003, July 10). GOP Convention Has Top Security Status. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E3DF103DF933A25754C0A9659C8B63>.

¹⁰ "The objective behind the National Special Security Event as well as its designation is to coordinate a seamless security plan with our State and local partners, one that will create a safe and secure environment for all involved," Secretary Ridge said.' Archibold RC. (2003, July 10). GOP Convention Has Top Security Status. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E3DF103DF933A25754C0A9659C8B63>.

¹¹ "As with past July 4 festivities since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the [National] Mall was fenced off and visitors will be required to pass through security checkpoints." The Associated Press. (2007, July 4). July 4 Marked Amid Heightened Security. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19602173/>.

¹² "43,000 youths and adults attending a 10-day camping event held every 4 years by a national youth organization." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. *MMWR Weekly* 55(03):71.



¹³ “The bands performing at these concerts and festivals attract fans who travel from one concert to another, sometimes continuously over several months. Concerts are often multiday events involving camping on established or impromptu campgrounds...Attendance at the events has ranged from 1,200 to 82,000 persons.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003, September 5). Public Health Dispatch: multistate outbreak of Hepatitis A among young adult concert attendees – United States, 2003. *MMWR Weekly* 52(35): 844. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5235a5.htm>.

¹⁴ “...College sports events were among the most vulnerable, with hundreds of venues, varying security emphasis and a high emotional impact. More than 48 million people attend at least one National Collegiate Athletic Association football game a season, offering an easy target.” The Associated Press. (2007, December 25). Experts Worry About College Stadium Security. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22394686/>.

“The intercollegiate game-day environment meets the criteria for a perfect strike with high consequences.” Hall S. Effective Security Management of University Sport Venues. *The Sports Journal*. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/effective-security-management-university-sport-venues>.

¹⁵ According to Al-Queda’s Manual of Afghan Jihad, football stadiums are recommended possible sites for acts of terrorism. Hall S. Effective Security Management of University Sport Venues. *The Sports Journal*. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/effective-security-management-university-sport-venues>

¹⁶ According to the FBI, some mass gathering venues could be considered ripe targets due to the openness of the venues and amount of people in one area at one time, as well as clear association as American sports or activities, the amount of money generated, and the huge number of sponsorships. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

¹⁷ For example, “according to the IEG Sponsorship Report, NASCAR had total corporate sponsorship revenue last year of \$1.5 billion, compared with \$445 million for the NFL and \$340 million for Major League Baseball...There are 106 Fortune 500 companies involved as sponsors – more than in any other sport.” O’Keefe B. (2005, September 5). America’s Fastest Growing Sport. *CNN*. Retrieved November 20, 2007 from http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/09/05/8271412/index.htm

¹⁸ For example, U.S. government agencies that are NASCAR sponsors include the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Naval Criminal Investigative Services, as well as entities within the Department of Homeland Security – the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.

¹⁹ For example, NASCAR is widely televised. Bernhardt K. (2006, May 26). NASCAR’s Marketing Prowess a Biz Model. *The Atlanta Business Chronicle*. Retrieved on December 6, 2007 from <http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2006/05/29/smallb2.html>

²⁰ For example, “A week-long enforcement blitz led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting the sale of counterfeit sports merchandise during Super Bowl XLII led to the seizure of more than 9,500 pieces of clothing and sports memorabilia valued at nearly a half-million dollars. As part of the crackdown, ICE agents and officers from the Glendale and Phoenix police departments arrested 24 individuals who now face charges of trafficking in counterfeit goods. The ICE-led enforcement effort, which also included investigators under contract to the NFL, focused on counterfeit items being sold by stores and street vendors across the Phoenix metropolitan area.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2008, February 7). ICE-led Task Force Seizes Nearly \$500,000 Worth of Phony NFL Merchandise and Sports Memorabilia. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080207phoenix.htm>

In another example, “A joint operation by ICE, the NFL and the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office at Super Bowl XXXIX seized about 20,000 counterfeit items valued at more than \$5 million.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2007, August 2). ICE Seizes \$5M in Fake NFL Goods. *Inside ICE* 2(4). Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/insideice/articles/insideice_021405_Web1.htm.

²¹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Gathering – Virginia 2005. *MMWR Weekly* 55(03): 71-74, p. 71. Retrieved on January 20, 2007 from <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5503a3.htm>

²² House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

²³ This is similar to what occurs when NASCAR races occur at the Talladega Super Speedway in Talladega, Alabama. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, Physicians Medical Center Carraway, lead physician at Hardwick Care Center at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6)



- ²⁴ “Pursuant to 14 CFR Section 99.7, Special Security Instructions, commencing one hour before the scheduled time of the event until one hour after the end of the event, all aircraft and parachute operations are prohibited at and below 3,000 feet agl within a three nautical mile radius of any stadium having a seating capacity of 30,000 or more people in which a Major League Baseball, National Football League, NCAA Division One football, or major motor speedway event is occurring.” Federal Aviation Administration. (2003, June 3). Special Notice, USA. Security NOTAM: FDC 3/1862. Retrieved on February 14, 2008 at http://tfr.faa.gov/save_pages/detail_3_1862.html
- ²⁵ Various entities that provide support at the Talladega Super Speedway, such as the 46th Civil Support Team that deployed to the track from Montgomery, Alabama, believe they are prepared to detect and respond to biological agents distributed via crop duster at a mass gathering event like NASCAR. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).
- ²⁶ Jane's Information Group. (1992). *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition)*, p.138. Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group.
- ²⁷ Jane's Information Group. (1992). *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition)*, p.140. Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group.
- ²⁸ Jane's Information Group. (1992). *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition)*, p. 140. Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group.
- ²⁹ Jane's Information Group. (1992). *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition)*, p. 140. Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group.
- ³⁰ The possible impact of the lack of biodetectors is a particular concern to first responders. For example, on the day he was interviewed by Committee Staff, Fire Chief Randy Holloway stated that, “Tonight, we will have a weather inversion. If aerosolized or powdered biological agents were dropped via aircraft doing a fly-over of the stands and track, this biological material would stay over the crowd. We know this would occur, but we would not be able to detect it unless the agent was visible.” House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).
- ³¹ Jane's Information Group. (1992). *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition)*, pp. 160-1. Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group.
- ³² Jane's Information Group. (1992). *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition)*, p.160. Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group.
- ³³ For more information on Q Fever, see <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/qfever/>.
- ³⁴ “At the extreme, some biological agents are as much as 14 billion times more effective than chemical agents, making it easy to see why biological agents are often described as the poor man's atomic bomb.” Fatah AA, Barrett JA, Arcilesi RD, Ewing KJ, Lattin CH, and Moshier TF. (2001, December). *An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders (NIJ Guide 101-00)*, p.1. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
- ³⁵ Chang M, Glynn MK, and Groseclose SL. (2003, May). Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-related Diseases, U.S., 1992-1999. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 9(5): 556
- Mintz J and Warrick J. (2004, November 8). U.S. Unprepared Despite Progress, Experts Say. *The Washington Post*, p. A01. Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32738-2004Nov7.html>.
- ³⁶ American Type Culture Collection. (2003, September 8). Material Transfer Agreement. Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at <http://www.atcc.org/common/documents/mta/mta.cfm>
- ³⁷ Chang M, Glynn MK, and Groseclose SL. (2003, May). Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-related Diseases, U.S., 1992-1999. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 9(5): 556-564.
- ³⁸ Chang M, Glynn MK, and Groseclose SL. (2003, May). Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-related Diseases, U.S., 1992-1999. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 9(5): 556-564.
- ³⁹ Franko C. (2007, September 7). CDC Reports Further Texas A&M Lab Safety Failures, Select Agent Research Remains Suspended. *UPMC Biosecurity Briefing*. Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/biosecurity_briefing/archive/science_biosecurity/content/2007-09-07-cdcreportsfurthertxamlabsafetyfailures.html
- ⁴⁰ Olsen KB. (1999, July-August). Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat? *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 5(4): 513-514.



⁴¹ Interpol. (2007). *Bioterrorism Incident Pre-planning and Response Guide*, p.4. Lyon, France, ICPO-Interpol. Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at <http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/BioterrorismGuide.pdf>.

⁴² American Public Health Association. (1990). *Control of Communicable Diseases in Man*, pp. 350-1. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association.

⁴³ American Public Health Association. (1990). *Control of Communicable Diseases in Man*, p. 18. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association.

⁴⁴ Alibek K and Handelman S. (1999). *Biohazard: the chilling true story of the largest covert biological weapons program in the world – told from the inside by the man who ran it*. New York: Random House.

⁴⁵ Danzig R. (2003, August). *Catastrophic Bioterrorism – What is to be Done?* Washington, DC: National Defense University.

⁴⁶ For example, “Mass gatherings such as NASCAR races present major public health risks.” House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

Stergarchis A and Tsouros AD. (2007). International experience and framework of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games: Overview and Framework. In Tsouros AD and Efstathiou PA (Eds.) (2007). *Mass Gatherings and Public Health: the experience of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games*, pp.6-8, 13. Copenhagen, Denmark: World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe.

Franaszek J. (1986). Medical care at mass gatherings. *Annals of Emergency Medicine* 15:600–601.

⁴⁷ Examples of diseases with incubation periods that could span the time that fans and support personnel are at mass gathering venues include anthrax (two to seven days), plague (one to six days), and smallpox (7-17 days). American Public Health Association. (1990). *Control of Communicable Diseases in Man*, pp. 18, 326, and 396. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association.

⁴⁸ Stergarchis A and Tsouros AD. (2007). International experience and framework of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games: Overview and Framework. In Tsouros AD and Efstathiou PA (Eds.) (2007). *Mass Gatherings and Public Health: the experience of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games*, p.6. Copenhagen, Denmark: World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe.

⁴⁹ “...A combination of early, targeted use of antiviral medicines and social distancing (measures such as cancelling mass gatherings and closing schools) can stop a pandemic, or at least slow its spread. There would be significant practical challenges to implementing such measures, but the enormous social trauma and human suffering that an influenza pandemic could inflict creates an obligation to thoroughly explore all proposals to limit this damage.” World Health Organization. (2005, August 3). WHO Statement. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2005/s08/en/index.html>

⁵⁰ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Jeffrey Engel, Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁵¹ For example, it is feared that there will be a measles outbreak at the Euro 2008 soccer games. “Significant outbreaks are occurring in Switzerland and Austria, the two countries hosting the competition this summer, Europe-wide figures show...Hundreds of thousands of people, some of whom may be unvaccinated against measles, are expected to travel to Austria and Switzerland for the championship, European officials warned. ECDC director Zsuzsanna Jakab said: ‘Measles is one of the most contagious viruses in existence, causing serious illness and even death. If unvaccinated people are exposed to it they have a high chance of being infected.’” *BBC News*. (2008, April 18). Euro 2008 Fans at Risk of Measles. Retrieved on April 22, 2008 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7352490.stm>

Another example is mumps. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, May 18). Update: Multistate Outbreak of Mumps – U.S., January 1 – May 2, 2006. *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 55(Dispatch): 1-5. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm55d518a1.htm>



⁵² Herd immunity is “the resistance to an infectious agent of an entire group or community (and, in particular, protection of susceptible persons) as a result of a substantial proportion of the population being immune to the agent. Herd immunity is based on having a substantial number of immune persons, thereby reducing the likelihood that an infected person will come in contact with a susceptible one among human populations.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2007, April 25). Glossary of Epidemiology Terms. Retrieved on April 17, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/excite/library/glossary.htm#immunityherd>

⁵³ For example, “...As long as vaccine-preventable diseases circulate in the world, a decline in immunization could leave American children vulnerable to infection...Without sustaining and maintaining the high coverage levels, these diseases can come back.” Manning A. (2005, July 26). Immunization Rates Exceed Federal Goals. *USATODAY*. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-07-26-baby-immunization_x.htm

⁵⁴ For example, the statement that everyone at the NASCAR races in Concord got all of their immunizations when they were born is both inaccurate and impossible, since not all immunizations are given to children but must be obtained as adolescents or adults, including those that are delivered on an annual basis, such as seasonal influenza. Hayes R. “Come to Concord. We’d love to have you [inaudible]. We got our shots when we were born.” *CNN*. (2007, October 11). *Lou Dobbs Tonight*. Transcript retrieved on January 25, 2008 at <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/071011/ldt.01.html>

⁵⁵ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, October 13). Recommended Adult Immunization Schedule – U.S., October 2006 – September 2007. *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 55(40): Q1-Q4

⁵⁶ “Even though most infants and toddlers have received all recommended vaccines by age 2, many under-immunized children remain, leaving the potential for outbreaks of disease. Many adolescents and adults are under-immunized as well, missing opportunities to protect themselves against diseases such as Hepatitis B, influenza, and pneumococcal disease.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2007, July 19). Vaccines and Preventable Diseases. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/default.htm>

“...If we were not protected by vaccinations these diseases could quickly spread throughout the population, causing epidemics here. At the same time, the relatively few cases we currently have in the U.S. could very quickly become tens or hundreds of thousands of cases without the protection we get from vaccines.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2007, May 29). Basic and Common Questions: some common misconceptions about vaccination and how to respond to them. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/6mishome.htm#Vaccinepreventable>

⁵⁷ “...A cluster of hepatitis A cases were identified among young adults who had attended outdoor concert and camping events featuring various jam bands.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003, September 5). Public Health Dispatch: Multistate Outbreak of Hepatitis A Among Young Adult Concert Attendees – United States, 2003. *MMWR Weekly* 52(35):844. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5235a5.htm>.

⁵⁸ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003, September 5). Public Health Dispatch: Multistate Outbreak of Hepatitis A Among Young Adult Concert Attendees – United States, 2003. *MMWR Weekly* 52(35):844-845. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5235a5.htm>.

⁵⁹ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

⁶⁰ “Sharing information is critical. The less information shared, the less efficiently things run.” House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

⁶¹ For example, the Alabama Department of Health puts an emergency preparedness team onsite at the Talladega Super Speedway over the entire time that the campgrounds are open for fans attending NASCAR events. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

⁶² This is the case with the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services which operates a regional public health response team out of Charlotte, North Carolina, near the Lowe’s Motor Speedway. They remain nearby while NASCAR events are occurring. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).



⁶³ For example, public health reporting during NASCAR races at Talladega occurs in accordance with normal State reporting requirements. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5).

⁶⁴ For example, the Carraway Physicians Medical Center was contracted by and communicates with NASCAR to provide medical support at the Talladega Super Speedway. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

Additionally, Carolinas Hospital has a contract and communicates with Lowe's Motor Speedway (not NASCAR itself) to provide medical services. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe's Motor Speedway Medical Director, and Mr. Joe Penner, MEDIC Executive Director at MEDIC (Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services Agency), Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 12).

⁶⁵ For example, the Talladega Super Speedway care centers can communicate directly with the Joint Operations Center for the Speedway. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

This is also the case with the care centers at the Lowe's Motor Speedway. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe's Motor Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 12).

⁶⁶ For example, both the FBI and the Alabama Department of Health participate in the Alabama State Bioterrorism Advisory Council. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). The FBI also has a Memorandum of Understanding with the State Department of Health in Alabama. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

⁶⁷ Caruso JT. (2001, November 6). Bioterrorism. Testimony of J. T. Caruso, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/caruso110601.htm>

Jarboe JF. (2001, November 7). Law Enforcement Response to Bioterrorism. Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, Domestic Terrorism Section, FBI before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/jarboe110701.htm>

⁶⁸ For example, the public health laboratories in North Carolina page or otherwise alert the FBI field personnel in the State with information regarding suspicious and strange findings. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

A similar situation is described in Alabama between the public health laboratories and the FBI field personnel in the State. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

⁶⁹ For example, the FBI is physically present at the races at Talladega to protect life and to call in assets if something were to happen. The FBI also works closely with track security and has agents present during the pre-race meetings and during the races. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

The FBI also maintains a physical presence at the races in Concord. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).



⁷⁰ “The WMD Civil Support Teams were established to deploy rapidly to assist a local incident commander in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on State and Federal military response assets. They are joint units and, as such, can consist of both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel, with some of these units commanded by Air National Guard lieutenant colonels.” Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Retrieved on December 17, 2007 at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm>

⁷¹ “The mission of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams is to support local and State authorities at domestic WMD/NBC incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional military support.” Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Retrieved on December 17, 2007 at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm>

⁷² For example, the Alabama State Department of Health partners with the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD) – the Civil Support Team has an infrared scanner for powders enabling them to identify primary components before the LRN laboratory utilizes its standard testing protocols. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6)

⁷³ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6)

⁷⁴ National Governors Association. Issue Brief: Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers, p. 11. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at <http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/FusionCenterIB.pdf>

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice. (2006, August). Fusion Center Guidelines: developing and sharing information and intelligence in a new era, p. 2. Washington, DC: Department of Justice. Retrieved on December 14, 2007 at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf.

⁷⁶ Numerous fusion centers - including centers in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin – have established relationships with public health, private sector, and other non-traditional law enforcement partners. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. GAO-08-35, pp. 56-107.

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁷⁷ For example, the Alabama Department of Health is a non-traditional partner that works with (but does not maintain a physical ongoing presence at) the State Fusion Center. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services is also such a non-traditional partner that works with the State Fusion Center. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁷⁸ For example, there is one emergency preparedness team in each of 11 public health areas in the State of Alabama. Nurses on these teams link to infection control personnel in counties throughout Alabama. These nurses also obtain information from the county



laboratories and forward it to the epidemiology division of the Alabama State Department of Health. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services fields regional response teams throughout the State. Team members integrate and communicate with local public health departments. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁷⁹ For example, the Alabama Department of Health puts an emergency preparedness team onsite at some long-term mass gatherings for the entire time that events are occurring. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services operates a regional public health response team out of Charlotte, North Carolina, which is located near a number of venues featuring mass gatherings. They, too, remain nearby while mass gathering events are occurring. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁸⁰ In North Carolina, the Department of Health and Human Services has put a public health epidemiologist in each of 11 major hospitals to examine emergency room data and report suspicious trends to the Department. This is known as the North Carolina Detect System. Bioterrorism preparedness funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is utilized to purchase and maintain the system. It is housed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and provides syndromic surveillance for the State. Additionally, some data are also provided by State Poison Control. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁸¹ In North Carolina, the Department of Health and Human Services has also put a public health epidemiologist in each of 11 major hospitals to examine emergency room data and report suspicious trends to the Department. This is known as the North Carolina Detect System. Bioterrorism preparedness funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is utilized to purchase and maintain the system. It is housed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and provides syndromic surveillance for the State. Additionally, some data are also provided by State Poison Control. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁸² "Four departments participated: Miami-Dade County Health Department, Cook County Department of Public Health, Marion County Health Department, and Indiana State Health Department." Sniegowski C, Loschen W, Dearth S, Gibson J, Lombardo J, Wade M, Westercamp M, Wojcik R, and Zhang G. (2007). Super Bowl Surveillance: a practical exercise in inter-jurisdictional public health information sharing. *Advances in Disease Surveillance* 4: 195.

For example, "though the Miami-Dade County Health Department has in place a syndromic surveillance system, additional public health measures were implemented to ensure the health and safety of all residents and visitors in the weeks surrounding..." Super Bowl XLI. O'Connell E, Zhang G, Leguen F, Bustamante M, Borroto-Ponce, R. (2007). Enhanced Public Health Surveillance Activities in Miami-Dade County for Super Bowl XLI. *Advances in Disease Surveillance* 4: 181. Retrieved on May 7, 2009 at <http://www.isdsjournal.org/article/viewFile/2084/1652>.

⁸³ "The Miami-Dade County Health Department utilized four surveillance systems, which included the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization system to support the BioWatch program, the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics, the Miami-Dade Fire Rescue 911 Call Center data, and school absenteeism data received from the Miami-Dade County Public School System." O'Connell E, Zhang G, Leguen F, Bustamante M, Borroto-Ponce, R. (2007). Enhanced Public Health Surveillance Activities in Miami-Dade County for Super Bowl XLI. *Advances in Disease Surveillance* 4: 181. Retrieved on May 7, 2009 at <http://www.isdsjournal.org/article/viewFile/2084/1652>.

⁸⁴ "Although no communicable disease outbreak or bioterrorism event was detected during the days surrounding these festivities, the Super Bowl had a public health impact on the community as evidenced by an increase in respiratory syndrome cases, motor vehicle accidents and school absenteeism during that period." O'Connell E, Zhang G, Leguen F, Bustamante M, Borroto-Ponce, R. (2007).



Enhanced Public Health Surveillance Activities in Miami-Dade County for Super Bowl XLI. *Advances in Disease Surveillance* 4: 181. Retrieved on May 7, 2009 at <http://www.isdsjournal.org/article/viewFile/2084/1652>.

⁸⁵ "Physicians provided medical care at the athletic village hospital, where an epidemiology unit conducted surveillance while the village was open." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. *MMRW Weekly* 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm>.

⁸⁶ "To monitor injury- and illness-related morbidity among participants, the schools of public health and medicine at the University of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Olympic Committee established a public health surveillance system designed specifically for this event." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. *MMRW Weekly* 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm>.

⁸⁷ "...As buses arrived during the first two days of the event, medical and public health personnel screened persons on each incoming bus..." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. *MMWR Weekly* 55(30): 71-74.

⁸⁸ "Public health planning for multi-day, outdoor mass gatherings should involve the event planning staff, local and State health departments, and other agencies responsible for public health and safety." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. *MMWR Weekly* 55(30): 74.

⁸⁹ "...A daily syndromic sentinel surveillance system was used for rapid detection of communicable disease outbreaks to enable prompt public health intervention." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. *MMWR Weekly* 55(30): 71-74.

⁹⁰ "...A daily syndromic sentinel surveillance system was used for rapid detection of communicable disease outbreaks to enable prompt public health intervention." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. *MMWR Weekly* 55(30): 71-74.

⁹¹ (2008, March 16). China Steps Up Biosurveillance for Safe Olympics. *China View*. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/16/content_7802796.htm.

⁹² (2008, March 16). China Steps Up Biosurveillance for Safe Olympics. *China View*. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/16/content_7802796.htm.

⁹³ The FBI generates threat assessments for mass gatherings, when the FBI believes it is necessary. The threat assessment is law enforcement sensitive and is sometimes shared with other law enforcement providing support at these mass gatherings. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

For example, the Charlotte field office of the FBI also generates threat assessments for mass gatherings. Larger police departments throughout the State have their own threat assessment units as well. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

⁹⁴ The threat assessment is law enforcement sensitive and is shared with other law enforcement providing support at mass gatherings, when the FBI believes it is necessary. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

On the other hand, some threat assessments generated by the FBI field office in Charlotte for some mass gatherings can be viewed via the LEO database. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

⁹⁵ "The FBI said Friday there is no specific, credible threat of a terror attack aimed at college basketball arenas or other sports stadiums, but acknowledged alerting law enforcement to a recent Internet posting discussing such attacks... The FBI and Homeland Security Department distributed an intelligence bulletin...to State and local law enforcement nationwide describing the online threat against sporting venues..." The Associated Press. (2006, March 10). FBI: no credible terror threat on NCAA tournament. *USATODAY*.



Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2006-03-10-terror-threat_x.htm?POE=SP0ISVA%3Cbr%3E%3C/a%3E.

"With college basketball championships under way around the country, the FBI has warned stadium operators of a possible suicide bomb attack at sporting events...In a directive...the FBI said a posting on an extremist message board 'advocated suicide attacks against sporting events as a cost-effective means of killing thousands of Americans.'" Ross B. (2006, March 10). FBI Warns of Possible Terror Threat at Sporting Events: extremist web posting comes as NCAA basketball's finals heat up. *ABC News*. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1711158>.

⁹⁶ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

⁹⁷ For example, regarding chemical detectors, "...the large number of community festivals and sporting events in Shelby County that routinely attract thousands of people. Homeland Security Deputies will set up the sensing devices at community festivals such as the Memphis in May festivities and races at the Memphis International Motorsports Park in North Shelby County, which is located next door to a chemical company. Should chemicals be released into the air, the monitoring equipment would detect the type of chemical, give the speed and direction of the wind, and even provide guidance for an evacuation. Included with the sensing devices are detailed computer files about residential neighborhoods and business districts and their proximity to chemical companies." Shelby County Sheriff's Office, Memphis, Tennessee. (2007, February 23). Sheriff's Office to Receive Equipment for Terrorist and Chemical Disasters. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.shelby-sheriff.org/press_releases/homelandsecuritysystem.asp.

⁹⁸ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

⁹⁹ Kaufman DC. (February 21, 2001). Medical Intelligence: a theater engagement tool, p.11. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at https://carlisle-www.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/Kaufman_D_C_01.pdf

¹⁰⁰ "Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel..." Larence E. (2007, September 27). Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. Statement of Eileen Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, submitted for the record when testifying before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at <http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070927132600-95675.pdf>

¹⁰¹ This is supported by personnel at the Alabama Fusion Center, who indicated that they would like to get someone from the Alabama Department of Health assigned to work at the Center to help with the Center's efforts to address the biological threat. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

¹⁰² "Collaborative planning is a process whereby individuals, agencies, and organizations, often with widely varied interests, work together to share knowledge and resources, and achieve mutually beneficial goals and enduring solutions through structured, civil dialogue." Sonoran Institute. (2004). Collaborative Planning. Retrieved on February 16, 2008 at http://www.trustland.org/challenges/collab_planning.cfm

¹⁰³ "Isolation of these agencies from...planning will lead to potentially significant hindrances in caring for the public in the event of an emergency incident during the special event." Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.51. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

¹⁰⁴ "In planning security for major special events, law enforcement must always consider the risk from hazardous materials and weapons of mass destruction." Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.53. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

¹⁰⁵ "The Committee on Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the importance of getting specific, actionable information to our first preventers in law enforcement and other emergency response providers. I urge you to follow up on your "gut feeling" and share whatever information our nation's first preventers need to be on alert and prepared. Otherwise, we run the risk of communities taking it upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat. This not only would result in communities depleting their scarce homeland security resources but runs contrary to your efforts to move toward a risk-based approach to homeland security." Thompson, BG. (2007, July 11). Letter to Secretary Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at <http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=241>.



¹⁰⁶ “The Homeland Security Advisory System is designed to guide our protective measures when specific information to a particular sector or geographic region is received. It combines threat information with vulnerability assessments and provides communications to public safety officials and the public.” Department of Homeland Security. (2008, February 1). Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on February 2, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xinfo/share/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm

¹⁰⁷ A “color-coded threat level system is used to communicate with public safety officials and the public at-large through a threat-based, color-coded system so that protective measures can be implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack.” Department of Homeland Security. (2008, February 1). Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on February 2, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xinfo/share/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm

¹⁰⁸ Department of Homeland Security. Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CitizenGuidanceHSAS2.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

¹¹⁰ “Sports events of extended duration particularly need thorough monitoring and planning.” Horrocks M and Stewart D. (1999). Enhancing Healthy Mega-Events: Planning for Health Rights. *First International Conference on Sports and Human Rights 1-3 September 1999, Sydney, Australia*, p.100. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://catalogue.ausport.gov.au/fulltext/1999/nsw/p96-101.pdf>

For example, fans can remain in and around NASCAR venues for as long as 10 days. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

¹¹¹ For example, approximately 250,000 people come into Talladega to watch the races and/or participate in other related activities, making Talladega among the largest cities in Alabama during races weeks. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

¹¹² According to the FBI, some mass gatherings might be ripe targets due to the openness of their venues, the amount of people in one area at one time, and other characteristics, such as the perception that the activity is clearly American, and that it generates a large amount of money generated. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

¹¹³ According to the FBI, Lowe's Motor Speedway could be considered a ripe target due to the openness of the venue and amount of people in one area at one time, as well as the clear association as an American sport, the amount of money generated, and the huge number of sponsorships. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

¹¹⁴ King J. (2007, June 20). Elections Already Putting Strain on Secret Service. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/06/19/secret.service/index.html>.

¹¹⁵ We must continually anticipate possible dangers and be ready with a plan of action to keep the public safe.” Shelby County Sheriff's Office, Memphis, Tennessee. (2007, February 23). Sheriff's Office to Receive Equipment for Terrorist and Chemical Disasters. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.shelby-sheriff.org/press_releases/homelandsecuritysystem.asp.

¹¹⁶ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

¹¹⁷ “NASCAR Security and Track Services host an annual education and training summit for all sanctioned facilities to enhance their platforms.” NASCAR Security. Mission Statement. Retrieved on February 12, 2008 at <http://www.nascarsecurity.com/wfMissionStatement.aspx>

¹¹⁸ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

¹¹⁹ Schwarz P. (1991). *The Art of the Long View*, p.4. New York, NY.

¹²⁰ For example, the National Planning Scenarios are used to generate requirements that are subsequently addressed by many levels of government. “The National Planning Scenarios...depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Collectively, the 15 scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning for homeland security



preparedness work at all levels of government and with the private sector. The scenarios form the basis for coordinated Federal planning, training, exercises, and grant investments needed to prepare for emergencies of all types.” Department of Homeland Security. (2007, October 3). National Preparedness Guidelines: Critical Elements. Retrieved on January 29, 2009 at http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm

¹²¹ Capacity-based planning is “the process of determining the amount of capacity required to produce in the future.” NCSU. Supply Chain Management at NCSU. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at <http://scrc.ncsu.edu/public/DEFINITIONS/C.html>

¹²² “This method involves a functional analysis of operational requirements. Capabilities are identified based on the tasks required... Once the required capability inventory is defined, the most cost effective and efficient options to satisfy the requirements are sought... It starts by asking questions regarding what we need to do, rather than what equipment are we replacing.” Joint Systems and Analysis Group, Technical Panel 3 of the Technical Cooperation Program. (2004, October 1). *Guide to Capabilities-Based Planning*, pp.1-2. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at http://www.mors.org/meetings/cbp/read/TP-3_CBP.pdf

¹²³ “Collaborative planning is a process where-by individuals, agencies, and organizations, often with widely varied interests, work together to share knowledge and resources, and achieve mutually beneficial goals and enduring solutions through structured, civil dialogue.” Sonoran Institute. (2004). Collaborative Planning. Retrieved on February 16, 2008 at http://www.trustland.org/challenges/collab_planning.cfm

¹²⁴ For example, San Francisco EMS identifies minimum standards and planning requirements for a variety of types of events, including mass gatherings at Candlestick Park. Department of Public Health, City and County of San Francisco. San Francisco Emergency Medical Services Agency: EMS Plan for Mass Gatherings. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.sanfranciscoems.org/index.php?cat=no&name=massGathering&exten=html>.

In another example, “for the assessment on medical response capacity for disaster in local area (such as rescue capacity, transport capacity and treatment capacity), it is necessary to... understand how many sufferers from disaster the hospital can respond to.” Takahashi A, Ishii N, Kawashima T, and Nakao H. (2007, January 16). Assessment of Medical Response Capacity in the time of Disaster: the Estimated Formula of Hospital Treatment Capacity (HTC), the Maximum Receivable Number of Patients in Hospital. *Kobe Journal of Medical Science* 54(5): 189. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.med.kobe-u.ac.jp/journal/contents/53/189.pdf>.

¹²⁵ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

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House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe's Motor Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

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House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

¹²⁶ For example, State public safety personnel balance the security needs of multiple mass gatherings occurring at the same time against the limits of the resources at their disposal. "Most events on the Esplanade, such as the Pops Fourth of July concert, do not undergo the same level of scrutiny...but...given the fact that there's a National Special Security Event going on at the same time that is drawing manpower and resources, the security analysis is warranted...Kerry's proposed concert has raised objections from some convention planners, who feared that the July 28 event would strain resources on the same night that security personnel are focused on vice presidential nominee John Edward's speech to the convention." Estes A. (2004, July 7). Kerry's Concert Faces Scrutiny. *The Boston Globe*. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/07/07/kerrys_concert_faces_scrutiny/.

In another example, while the races were occurring at the Talladega Super Speedway, the Alabama Highway Patrol had to stay on alert for hurricanes, provide support for two major university football games that were occurring at Auburn and the University of Alabama, and be ready to deal with a strike was occurring in the northwest part of the State – all with limited resources. They are fully aware that should any of these situations become large crises, they would not be able to stretch far enough to handle them adequately. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

¹²⁷ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

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¹³² House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

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House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Assistant Director Alan Thompson, Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

¹³³ For example, mass evacuation needs have been visited and revisited in planning for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad. (2007, November 15). Olympic Boxing Venue Gets One More Entrance for Evacuation Needs. Retrieved on February 13, 2008 at <http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/nst/headlines/n214197307.shtml>.

¹³⁴ "When evacuation to shelters is either inappropriate or impossible, you may be asked to stay where you are." New York City Office of Emergency Management. In an Emergency: Shelter in Place. Retrieved on February 13, 2008 at http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/ready/emergency_sip.shtml

"When these events occur, emergency response officials have two basic tools to protect the threatened public. One is to evacuate the public out of the area affected by the hazardous material release. The other is to request that the public shelter in place...The goal of sheltering in place during hazardous materials accidents is to minimize the exposure of the threatened public to the dangerous chemical(s). Sheltering in place uses a structure and its indoor atmosphere to temporarily separate people from a hazardous outdoor atmosphere." National Institute for Chemical Studies. (2001, June). Sheltering in Place as a Public Protective Action, p.2. Charleston, WV: National Institute for Chemical Studies.

¹³⁵ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

¹³⁶ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

¹³⁷ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

¹³⁸ Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

¹³⁹ Methodology as communicated by the Department of Homeland Security during the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11).

¹⁴⁰ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

¹⁴¹ Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

¹⁴² Comments made to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11).

¹⁴³ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

Comments made to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11).

¹⁴⁴ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5).



House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Sheriff Jimmy Harris, Dekalb County, Fort Payne, Alabama, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Emergency Management Coordinator Jim Sells, City of Concord, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Captain Jeff Smith, Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation Management Center, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe's Motor Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Assistant Director Alan Thompson, Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

¹⁴⁵ For comparative information, see <http://www.statemaster.com>.

¹⁴⁶ Comparative information can be found at <http://www.statemaster.com>.

¹⁴⁷ Department of Homeland Security. (2007, January 5). *Overview: FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program*, p. 5. Retrieved on February 13, 2008 at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grants-2007-program-overview-010507.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ Regarding the 2004 Republican National Convention, "Mr. Ridge said it was too soon to spell out the kinds of resources the Secret Service would deploy. But he and city officials tried to dispel any notion that the New York Police Department was being pushed aside. Rather, he said, the agency would form a partnership with the Police Department, which would still be in charge of maintaining order on the streets and guarding many sites, and would play a leading role in devising security plans." Archibold RC. (2003, July 10). *GOP Convention Has Top Security Status*. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E3DF103DF933A25754C0A9659C8B63>.



¹⁴⁹ “For example, in Denver, the Democratic National Convention executive steering committee includes representatives from the Denver Police Department, Denver Fire Department, FBI, FEMA, Colorado Department of Public Safety, Denver Office of Emergency Preparedness, Colorado State Patrol, Denver Health Medical Center, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Pepsi Center Management, and the Secret Service.” Koerner T.J. (2007, August 10). Prepared remarks of Timothy J. Koerner, Assistant Director, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment.

¹⁵⁰ Some of the topics addressed at the 2008 Security Summit included but were not limited to: the FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system, incident command, access control, support provided by various Federal entities, and evacuation. NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13).

¹⁵¹ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

¹⁵² For example, counterterrorism training was provided by the Office of Bombing Prevention of the Department of Homeland Security at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9).

¹⁵³ Such opinions were solicited from the audience by Summit facilitators at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13).

¹⁵⁴ For example, NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner served as the main meeting facilitator at the 2008 Summit. NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13).

¹⁵⁵ NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13).

¹⁵⁶ “The Committee on Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the importance of getting specific, actionable information to our first preventers in law enforcement and other emergency response providers. I urge you to follow up on your “gut feeling” and share whatever information our nation’s first preventers need to be on alert and prepared. Otherwise, we run the risk of communities taking it upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat. This not only would result in communities depleting their scarce homeland security resources but runs contrary to your efforts to move toward a risk-based approach to homeland security.” Thompson, B.G. (2007, July 11). Letter to Secretary Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at <http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=241>

¹⁵⁷ For example, the State of Vermont has generated guidance specific to its State when the National Threat Level changes. For more information, see <http://www.dps.state.vt.us/homeland/terrorism.html>.

¹⁵⁸ For example, a discussion regarding the implications of changes in the National Threat Level at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 10).

¹⁵⁹ For example, training regarding the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) is provided as part of professional development to personnel in the Alabama Fusion Center. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

In another example, emergency and disaster response training is provided as part of professional to public health personnel. In addition to the training and continuing education they must obtain to maintain accreditation in their profession. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

In another example, professional development training regarding crowd management is felt to be necessary and is provided as funds are available to police officers in the Talladega County Sheriff’s Department. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Jimmy Kilgore, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Talladega County Sheriff’s Department, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

In another example, tactical medicine programs are sought from and provided by Guilford Technical Community College to emergency medical technicians. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).



In another example, ongoing additionally Federal training regarding explosives is a priority for bomb squads at the State and local levels. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

In another example, the Mecklenberg County Emergency Medical Services Agency provides hands-on training using cadavers for emergency medical technician certification. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe's Motor Speedway Medical Director, and Mr. Joe Penner, MEDIC Executive Director at MEDIC (Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services Agency), Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 12).

In another example, safety training specific to the Lowe's Motor Speedway is provided at the Speedway Safety School, as a requirement to provide safety services at the track. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Norris Baird, EMS Director, Lowe's Motor Speedway, at Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 12).

¹⁶⁰ For example, the Alabama Fusion Center would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

The Alabama Department of Health would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

The Talladega County Sheriff's Department would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Jimmy Kilgore, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Talladega County Sheriff's Department, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

The Concord Police Department would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

The Cabarrus County Bomb Squad would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina (2007, October 11).

Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe's Motor Speedway Medical Director, and Mr. Joe Penner, MEDIC Executive Director at MEDIC (Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services Agency), Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 12).

¹⁶¹ For example, the Alabama Department of Health wants to pursue training for its employees, but specifically needs "...additional funding to provide coverage, which would allow staff to go to training." House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

¹⁶² "The Secret Service also provides federal, state and local law enforcement partners, who give substantial, critical support to the mission, with the necessary guidance and training regarding their role in the overall operational security plans." Department of Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm.

"The goal of the cooperating agencies is to provide a safe and secure environment for Secret Service protectees, other dignitaries, the event participants and the general public. There is a tremendous amount of advance planning and coordination in preparation for these events, particularly in the areas of venue and motorcade route security, communications, credentialing and training." U.S. Secret Service. (2008). National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml>



¹⁶³ An example of a Federal agency providing training for non-NSSEs, counterterrorism training was provided by the Office of Bombing Prevention of the Department of Homeland Security to help safety and security personnel that provide support at NASCAR venues execute their counter-bombing responsibilities and requirements. This training occurred at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9).

Recognizing that events that are not designated as NSSEs have significant requirements, the U.S. Secret Service also "...regularly sponsors training seminars for command-level law enforcement and public safety officials from jurisdictions all over the country to provide fundamental principles for managing security aspects of major events and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities related to terrorism and other criminal acts. Seminars discuss key strategies and lessons learned from past events." Department of Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm.

¹⁶⁴ For example, the Lowe's Motor Speedway requires that public safety personnel coming to the venue to help provide emergency services complete certain training programs that address special requirements specific to the race facility, extracting race car drivers from crashed race cars, etc. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Norris Baird, EMS Director, Lowe's Motor Speedway, at Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 12).

¹⁶⁵ For more information on the University of Southern Mississippi Center for Spectator Sports Security Management, see <http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php>.

¹⁶⁶ "A myriad of issues constituting potential and actual threats to the ongoing security and safety of sporting events and venues are addressed including: terrorist activities and attacks, weapons of mass destruction, explosions, crowd control, societal and fan violence, natural disasters." Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php>.

¹⁶⁷ "Training objectives are to: create and deliver courses in sports event security management; create knowledge through research activities; [and] disseminate knowledge through academic programs, professional forums, and workshops." Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php>.

¹⁶⁸ "These programs are aimed at: sports managers; facility personnel; special event organizers; law enforcement and emergency responders; [and] outsourced security staff." Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php>.

¹⁶⁹ "Law enforcement and private security guards are not the only employees in need of training for a venue to be safe. Everyone from ticket takers and ushers to the people approving credentials must be vigilant." The Associated Press. (2007, December 25). Experts Worry About College Stadium Security. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22394686/>.

¹⁷⁰ "The NYPD has developed a useful course entitled Chemical, Ordinance, Biological, and Radiological Awareness (COBRA) training. For the 2004 RNC, thousands of officers received this training." Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.56. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

¹⁷¹ "The NYPD has developed a useful course entitled Chemical, Ordinance, Biological, and Radiological Awareness (COBRA) training. For the 2004 RNC, thousands of officers received this training." Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.56. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

¹⁷² For example, EMS personnel have participated in mass gathering exercises with other local and Federal agencies. One of the exercises involved the simulated air release of a biological agent at a local mass gathering venue. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Jim Sells, City of Concord Emergency Management Coordinator, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. 2007, October 11).

¹⁷³ For example, the State of California Office of Homeland Security "conducts the California Large Stadium Initiative which is a series of exercises that explore the commonalities of large stadium/mass gathering venues related to preparedness issues and assist in developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. The program: assists large stadiums and mass gathering venues in establishing state-wide best practices for security and response procedures; assists in developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities; and provides large stadium partners with customized training including venue roles and responsibilities, mass care and shelter issues, and crisis communication." State of California Office of Homeland Security. (200X). OHS Initiatives. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://homeland.ca.gov/pdf/hseep/OHS_Initiatives_11-7.pdf

¹⁷⁴ "Since 2005, OHS had conducted multiple exercises throughout California involving high profile venues such as Dodger Stadium, Monster Park, SBC (AT&T) Park, Staples Center, ARCO Arena, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, and others. The exercises included:



three regional seminars; two workshops; [and] eight tabletop exercises.' State of California Office of Homeland Security. (200X). OHS Initiatives. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://homeland.ca.gov/pdf/hseep/OHS_Initiatives_11-7.pdf

¹⁷⁵ "...Standards measure an institution's effectiveness according to the profession's expectations for high quality...preparation as America enters the 21st century." National Council for Teacher Accreditation. (2001). Professional Standards for the Accreditation of Schools, Colleges, and Departments of Education, p. 7. Washington, DC: NCATE.

¹⁷⁶ For example, standards are required for teacher accreditation. National Council for Teacher Accreditation. (2001). Professional Standards for the Accreditation of Schools, Colleges, and Departments of Education, p.8. Washington, DC: NCATE.

¹⁷⁷ For example, "All 50 States require certification for each of the [Emergency Medical Technician] EMT levels. In most States and the District of Columbia registration with the NREMT is required at some or all levels of certification. Other States administer their own certification examination or provide the option of taking either the NREMT or State examination. To maintain certification, EMTs and paramedics must recertify, usually every two years. Generally, they must be working as an EMT or paramedic and meet a continuing education requirement." Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2008-09 Edition, Emergency Medical Technicians and Paramedics. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos101.htm>.

¹⁷⁸ NASCAR. (2008, January 7). NASCAR Minimum Security Standards '08.

¹⁷⁹ For example, standards have been incorporated in the Emergency Action Plan for the Lowe's Motor Speedway. Lowe's Motor Speedway Emergency Action Plan: 2007 October Races. Reviewed by House Committee on Homeland Security Staff at the Lowe's Motor Speedway Joint Operations Center, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

¹⁸⁰ The National Collegiate Athletic Association. NCAA Security-Planning Options. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/emergency_planning/security_options.

¹⁸¹ Davidson J. (2006 July/August). Finding the Value in Lessons Learned Databases. *Knowledge Management Review*. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5362/is_200607/ai_n21394347

¹⁸² "An essential element of the operational security planning process is information sharing regarding lessons learned from previous NSSEs. Based on our experiences, we are able to provide detailed observations and recommendations regarding areas of success and areas for improvement that are invaluable to future event security planners." Koerner TJ. (2007, August 10). Prepared remarks of Timothy J. Koerner, Assistant Director, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment.

¹⁸³ For more information, see www.leo.gov.

¹⁸⁴ LEO is currently being used at a number of the tracks that host NASCAR races, as well as some other venues that host sporting events. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

¹⁸⁵ For more information, see www.llis.gov.

¹⁸⁶ For example, decisions could be made during such a planning activity that relate directly to a public health mission. Yet representatives from the local or State Department of Health may not have been invited or present to guide or even inform that planning. However, there are good models for the inclusion of public health, such as the George State Public Health Laboratory's involvement in the planning for the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, and the Utah State Public Health Laboratory's involvement in planning for the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

¹⁸⁷ For example, during discussion regarding the implications of changes in the National Threat Level, local public sector personnel willingly discussed possible requirements, but were clear that no commitments would be made to fulfill requirements put forward by NASCAR Corporate Security until they were discussed with those in the public and private sectors back in their home States, who had decision-making authority and control of funding. Discussion at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 10).

¹⁸⁸ "The objective of this activity is to ensure that individuals assigned to a project are provided the requisite training in order to perform the job and that key goals and responsibilities are identified for the team members at the start of the project." Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html.



¹⁸⁹ "As an outcome of your community's or organization's emergency planning process, plans should be in place that specify how you prepare for emergencies, how you will respond if an emergency occurs, how you will mitigate the potential effects of emergencies, and how you will recover. Practice is an important aspect of the preparation process. Experience and data show that exercises are a practical, efficient, and cost-effective way for organizations in the government, nonprofit, and private sectors to prepare for emergency response and recovery." Emergency Management Institute. (2007, May 24). IS-139 Exercise Design: Course Overview. Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is139.asp>.

¹⁹⁰ "The objective of this activity is to ensure that the project team meets the project requirements and that all requisite quality criteria are met." Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html.

¹⁹¹ "The objective of this activity is to ensure that the lessons learned during the project are documented and incorporated in the knowledge base for future use." Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html.

¹⁹² "The objective of this activity is to ensure that the lessons learned during the project are documented and incorporated in the knowledge base for future use." Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html.

¹⁹³ Livada G. (2007, March 12). Disaster Plans Cover Host of Woes. *Democrat and Chronicle*. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.democratandchronicle.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070312/NEWS01/703120337/1002/NEWS>.

¹⁹⁴ For example, Vermont Technical College has produced an emergency action plan. Vermont Technical College. (2003, September 29). Emergency Action Plan for Randolph Center Campus. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.vtc.edu/Downloads/EmergencyActionPlan.pdf>.

Another example was produced by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. Special Event Emergency Action Plan Guide. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.pema.state.pa.us/pema/lib/pema/Special%20Event%20Emergency%20Action%20Plan%20Guide.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has produced an emergency action planning template for facilities. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2004). Emergency Action Plan (Template). Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2004-101/emrgact/emrgact1.html>.

Another example was produced by the University of California at San Francisco. University of California at San Francisco. (2006). UCSF Emergency Action Plan. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.police.ucsf.edu/documents/EAP_Template_2006.doc.

¹⁹⁶ "Isolation of these agencies from...planning will lead to potentially significant hindrances in caring for the public in the event of an emergency incident during the special event." Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.51. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

¹⁹⁷ "In planning security for major special events, law enforcement must always consider the risk from hazardous materials and weapons of mass destruction." Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.53. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

¹⁹⁸ For example, "In the case of Hurricane Katrina, across 476 locations with a total of \$42 billion in insured property exposed to the hurricane's impact, FM Global clients collectively spent \$2.3 million to prevent a projected \$480 million in loss, with cost of those improvements averaging only \$7,400 per facility. That's a 208 to 1 payback or in other words for every \$1 spent on targeted preparedness measures \$208 in resources were saved, in one single event." International Center for Enterprise Preparedness. (2006, October 9). Lost Cost Preparedness Efforts Significantly Mitigate Loss (an InterCEP mini-case study), p. 1. New York: New York University.

¹⁹⁹ "Having effective corporate emergency preparedness programs can result in relatively lower insurance costs and better policy terms for companies. This can be an important financial consideration in evaluating investment in corporate preparedness and may not be widely known." Raisch WG and Statler M. (2006, October 17). Insurance Incentives for Corporate Preparedness (discussion draft white paper), p.1. New York: New York University.

²⁰⁰ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).



Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

²⁰¹ For example, questions such as, “How will you ensure team awareness and preparedness?” and “What controls will be implemented to manage the incident?” are too vague, and lead to so many other questions as to be of little use when trying to plan for an evacuation. Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot, p. 6. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

²⁰² For example, questions such as, “What are you relocating from” have so many answers that they are of little use when trying to plan for an evacuation. In fact, taking the time to answer such questions completely can cause the entire process to grind to a halt. Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot, p. 11. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

²⁰³ Comments made by track security personnel attending the summit to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11).

²⁰⁴ Comments made to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11).

²⁰⁵ There are five Special Event Assessment Rating levels. “Level 1 - Events of significant National and/or international importance that may require extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness. Level 2 - Significant events with National and/or international importance that may require direct National-level Federal support and situational awareness. Level 3 - Events of National and/or international importance that require only limited direct Federal support to augment local capabilities. Level 4 - Events with limited National importance that are generally handled at the State and local level. Level 5 - Events that may be nationally recognized but generally have local or State importance.” Electronic communication from Margaret Laubscher, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Legislative Affairs with Asha M. George, DrPH, Senior Professional Staff, Committee on Homeland Security, Democratic Majority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 29, 2008. Email on file with the Committee.

²⁰⁶ The Special Event Assessment Rating scheme used by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice “...incorporates a risk methodology that prioritizes special events submitted to the Federal government for their awareness and consideration of support. The system uses seven factors in its risk assessment process to arrive at five Special Event Assessment Rating levels (for example, SEAR-I: full U.S. Government support to SEAR-V: require State and local resources).” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.16. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

²⁰⁷ Only limited information on National Special Security Events seems to be readily and/or easily available at www.dhs.gov.

²⁰⁸ The Special Event Assessment Rating scheme used by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice “...incorporates a risk methodology that prioritizes special events submitted to the Federal government for their awareness and consideration of support. The system uses seven factors in its risk assessment process to arrive at five Special Event Assessment Rating levels (for example, SEAR-I: full U.S. Government support to SEAR-V: require State and local resources).” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.16. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

²⁰⁹ “The Committee on Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the importance of getting specific, actionable information to our first preventers in law enforcement and other emergency response providers. I urge you to follow up on your “gut feeling” and share whatever information our nation’s first preventers need to be on alert and prepared. Otherwise, we run the risk of communities taking it upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat. This not only would result in communities depleting their scarce homeland security resources but runs contrary to your efforts to move toward a risk-based approach to homeland security.” Thompson, BG. (2007, July 11). Letter to Secretary Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at <http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=241>.

²¹⁰ For example, Alabama has found that exercise funding cannot be used for training, even when the personnel that need to participate in the exercise have not been trained to do what the exercise would require of them. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

²¹¹ For example, Alabama has found that exercise funding cannot be used for training, even when the personnel that need to participate in the exercise have not been trained to do what the exercise would require of them. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff



Interview with Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

²¹² State Secretaries of Homeland Security have not been able to get the information (or meetings to better procure that information) from the Department of Homeland Security. Both Secretary of Homeland Security Walker and North Carolina Secretary of Homeland Security Beatty has been trying to get a meetings with the Department of Homeland Security to get more information about the threat to their States, the Department of Homeland Security's view on facilities within their States, how grant eligibility was determined for their States, etc. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5). House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

²¹³ Department of Homeland Security. (2008, February 1). Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on February 2, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xinfo/share/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm.

²¹⁴ "According to the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. industry loses between \$200 and \$250 billion annually to counterfeit products and other intellectual property rights (IPR) Violations. As the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, ICE plays a leading role in targeting criminal organizations responsible for producing, smuggling, and distributing counterfeit products." Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Department of Homeland Security. (2005, May 3).

²¹⁵ "The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (referred to as the Stafford Act - 42 U.S.C. 5721 et seq.) authorizes the President to issue major disaster or emergency declarations before or after catastrophes occur." McCarthy FX. (2007, August 27). CRS Report for Congress – FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: a primer, p. 2. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved at February 16, 2008 at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34146_20070827.pdf.

²¹⁶ The Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinator and Primary Agency for ESF#13 is the Department of Justice. Department of Homeland Security. (January 2008). The National Response Framework: Emergency Support Function #13 – Public Safety and Security Annex, pp. ESF#13 – 1-12. Retrieved on February 10, 2008 at <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-13.pdf>.

²¹⁷ For example, the FBI partners with local law enforcement at both the Talladega Super Speedway and the Lowe's Motor Speedway – to differing extents – to address potential acts of terrorism at these venues. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

The same is true in North Carolina. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15).

²¹⁸ For example, ICE has partnered with NASCAR and local law enforcement to seize counterfeit merchandise and prosecute those who have brought this merchandise over the border and into the U.S. to sell illegally. At the Talladega Super Speedway and the Bristol Motor Speedway, this is known as "Operation Race Day." House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ICE Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge Dwight McDaniel at the ICE Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

²¹⁹ For example, the Alabama State Emergency Management Agency partners with the Porch Creek Indians to provide aid in response to disasters that occur in the State. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Regional Coordinator Ricky Little, Alabama State Emergency Management Agency, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6 and 7).

²²⁰ For example, The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI continue to have problems in this regard. "Since the CIA's birth in 1947, its relationship with the much-older FBI has rarely, if ever, been close. For decades, the two agencies' interactions were hostile and sporadic. Since 9/11, though, their shared desire to prevent another terrorist attack on the U.S. has forced them to try to move beyond turf wars and talk to each other. But the organizations' institutional cultures are so different that real coordination will be very difficult to achieve." Gorman S. (2003, August 1). FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0803/080103nj1.htm>

²²¹ For more information on the City of New York Police Department (NYPD), see <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/home/home.shtml>.

²²² For more information on the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), see <http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/home2.shtml>.

²²³ "Interoperability simply refers to the ability of public safety personnel to communicate by radio (or another communication device) with staff from other agencies, on demand and in real time. Interoperability is important because responses during emergencies and disasters require a joint response by all first responder personnel—police, fire, and emergency medical services." New York City



Council. (2006, November 16). Oversight: Improvements in Communication Technology among First Responders. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/75263.htm?CFID=1316018&CFTOKEN=30510853>.

²²⁴ "...First-person interviews with FDNY and NYPD personnel showed that at times some issues related to a given department's operational responsibility and the competitive nature of departments did exist." Lawson JR and Vettori RL. (2005, September). Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: The Emergency Response Operations (Draft for Public Comment), p.160. Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/NISTNCSTAR1-81.pdf>.

²²⁵ "America's first responders today face a crisis that drastically reduces their ability to effectively address emergency situations. Across the country, public safety departments cannot talk to one another, because their radios and communications systems are not interoperable. Different technologies, a lack of radio spectrum and frequencies, uncoordinated work on finding solutions, and insufficient funding have all contributed to this problem." First Response Coalition. Issue Background. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.firstresponsecoalition.org/issues.shtml>.

²²⁶ The CIA and FBI continue to have problems in this regard. "Since the CIA's birth in 1947, its relationship with the much-older FBI has rarely, if ever, been close. For decades, the two agencies' interactions were hostile and sporadic. Since 9/11, though, their shared desire to prevent another terrorist attack on the U.S. has forced them to try to move beyond turf wars and talk to each other. But the organizations' institutional cultures are so different that real coordination will be very difficult to achieve." Gorman S. (2003, August 1). FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0803/080103nj1.htm>

²²⁷ For more information about the Association of Public Health Laboratories, see www.aphl.org.

²²⁸ The Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism was established in 1999. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Facts about the Laboratory Response Network. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp>.

²²⁹ For more information on State and other public health laboratories, see www.aphl.org.

²³⁰ George AM, Becker SJ, Anders DL, and Decker S. (2000, November 15). Public Health Laboratory Infrastructure: don't counter terrorism without it. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://apha.confex.com/apha/128am/techprogram/paper_13590.htm.

²³¹ Electronic communication from Scott J. Becker, Executive Director, Association of Public Health Laboratories with Asha M. George, Senior Professional Staff, Committee on Homeland Security, Democratic Majority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 19, 2008. Email on file with the Committee.

²³² Electronic communication from Scott J. Becker, Executive Director, Association of Public Health Laboratories with Asha M. George, DrPH, Senior Professional Staff, Committee on Homeland Security, Democratic Majority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 19, 2008. Email on file with the Committee.

²³³ Brownson OA. (1866). The American Republic: Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny. New York: P O'Shea.

²³⁴ "Conceptually, fusion centers differ from their predecessors in that they are intended to broaden sources of data for analysis and integration beyond criminal intelligence, to include Federal intelligence as well as public and private sector data. Furthermore, fusion centers broaden the scope of State and local analysis to include homeland security and counterterrorism issues." Masse T and Rollins J. (2007, September 19). CRS Report for Congress – A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, p. 2. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at <http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL34177.pdf>.

²³⁵ "State, local, and tribal law enforcement and public sector agencies are in a unique position to make observations and collect information that may be central to...threat assessment...." Masse T and Rollins J. (2007, September 19). CRS Report for Congress – A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, p. 3. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at <http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL34177.pdf>.

²³⁶ Masse T and Rollins J. (2007, September 19). CRS Report for Congress – A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, p.11. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at <http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL34177.pdf>.

²³⁷ "...Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development—from operational to early in the planning stages." U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered State and Local Information Fusion Centers, p. 5. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.



²³⁸ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

²³⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered State and Local Information Fusion Centers, p. 5. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

²⁴⁰ "To support fusion centers, as of September 2007, DHS had assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational fusion centers we contacted, and the FBI had assigned personnel to about three quarters of the fusion centers we contacted." Masse T and Rollins J. (2007, September 19). U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered State and Local Information Fusion Centers, p. 7. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

²⁴¹ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

²⁴² House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

²⁴³ Department of Homeland Security. (2008, March 14). 911 Act, Title V Briefing to House Committee on Homeland Security Staff. On file with author.

²⁴⁴ Criminal databases, information systems, and portals utilized by the Alabama fusion center include but are not limited to: the Criminal Justice Information System and ALACOP. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3).

Criminal databases, information systems, and portals utilized by the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center include but are not limited to: GangNet and the FPOS Network. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

²⁴⁵ For example, the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center keeps track of all major events scheduled in the State through an online calendar. These events include but are not limited to: the U.S. Open, NASCAR races, large/popular football games and other widely-attended sporting events, the State Fair, etc. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

²⁴⁶ In North Carolina there is a taskforce entitled Taskforce 21 that addresses the biological threat and is composed of a number of different and non-traditional partners. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

²⁴⁷ Members of Task Force 21 are now looking to address other threats than just the biological and not become stagnant. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).



²⁴⁸ “Law enforcement also shares canine resources. For example, in Columbus, Ohio, providing public safety at Ohio State University football games (110,000 people) involves four police agencies: the Columbus Police Department, Franklin County Sheriff’s Department, State Highway Patrol, and Ohio State University police. The stadium is swept by dogs from the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department and State Highway Patrol.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.9. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

²⁴⁹ For example, ATF provides video equipment, canines, and its own personnel (among other resources) to the races at Lowe’s Motor Speedway and other NASCAR venues, in accordance with requests for assistance, and as other ATF missions and priorities allow. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

²⁵⁰ ATF equipment and other resources at these venues remain under the control of ATF. ATF grants access to the video feeds by non-ATF personnel, but neither the equipment nor the data are handed-off entirely. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

²⁵¹ In this case, ATF grants access to the video feeds by local police and track security, lending them the necessary equipment to achieve that access as well. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina (2007, October 13).

²⁵² “...ATF’s Explosives Program provides vital resources to local communities to investigate explosives incidents and arson-for-profit schemes.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Programs: Arson and Explosives. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.atf.treas.gov/about/programs/proex.htm>.

²⁵³ For example, the FBI brings its Visual Communications Center (VCC) to a number of mass gathering venues. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15)

²⁵⁴ “Each team has two large pieces of equipment, a mobile analytical laboratory that it deploys with, that is utilized for field analysis of chemical or biological agents, and they also have a uniform command suite that has the ability through multiplexing systems to provide interoperability of communications to the various and sundry responders who may be on scene.” Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm>.

²⁵⁵ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

²⁵⁶ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

²⁵⁷ “...North Carolina’s transportation system is one of the finest in the country, providing its citizens with the Nation’s second largest State highway system and the largest ferry system on the east coast.” The North Carolina Department of Transportation offers “...a full-service, multi-modal transportation network encompassing all forms of travel – land, air and sea.” North Carolina Department of Transportation. (2005, July 20). Quick Facts. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at <http://www.ncdot.org/download/about/ncdot/quickFacts.pdf>.

²⁵⁸ The North Carolina “...Highway Patrol now employs 1,813 Troopers to cover more than 78,000 miles of North Carolina roadways [and] has eight troop locations throughout the State.” Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at <http://www.nccrimecontrol.org/Index2.cfm?a=000003,000014>.

²⁵⁹ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

²⁶⁰ The Alabama Department of Transportation, “...is organized into nine geographic regions called Divisions, with a Central Office located in Montgomery. The Central Office is organized into the Office of the Transportation Director and the Office of the Chief Engineer with Bureaus and Divisions reporting to the Chief Engineer. Additionally, the department has several other boards and committees that operate either within a bureau or as a cooperative effort among several bureaus and/or divisions.” The mission of the Alabama Department of Transportation is, “...to provide a safe, efficient, environmentally sound intermodal transportation system for all



users, especially the taxpayers of Alabama. To also facilitate economic and social development and prosperity through the efficient movement of people and goods and to facilitate intermodal connections within Alabama. Alabama Department of Transportation must also demand excellence in transportation and to be involved in promoting adequate funding to promote and maintain Alabama's transportation infrastructure." Alabama Department of Transportation. Alabama Department of Transportation Organization Information. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.dot.state.al.us/Docs/Bureaus/Public+Affairs/Mission+Statement.htm>.

²⁶¹ The Alabama "Highway Patrol Division troopers patrol approximately 69,465 miles of rural roadways in the State's 67 counties. During the fiscal year, Highway Patrol troopers worked approximately 884,086 hours and traveled 12.5 million miles in the performance of their duties. They recorded approximately 615,000 motorist contacts, up 139,000 from the previous year. During the fiscal year, HP troopers made 367,295 arrests, an increase of 106,556 compared with FY 2004-2005." Alabama Department of Public Safety. 71st Annual Report FY 2005-2006, p. 26. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://dps.alabama.gov/Information/pdf/AnnualReports/2005_2006.pdf.

²⁶² House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

²⁶³ Gray B. (1993). Collaboration: the constructive management of differences. In Lewicki RJ, Litterer JA, Saunders DM and Minton JW (Eds.). (1993). *Negotiation*, p. 113-4. Burr Ridge, Illinois: Irwin.

²⁶⁴ "During a Washington Redskins NFL game, which draws over 90,000 spectators to FedEx Field in Lanham, Maryland, leadership is shared among the stadium wonder, the Prince George's County Police Department, and the Fire Department, depending on the nature of the decision that has to be made." Connors E. (2007, March). *Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement*, p.9. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

²⁶⁵ "Physicians provided medical care at the athletic village hospital, where an epidemiology unit conducted surveillance while the village was open." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. *MMRW Weekly* 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm>.

²⁶⁶ "Staff in the epidemiology unit analyzed data daily and shared reports with games officials." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. *MMRW Weekly* 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm>.

²⁶⁷ Congressional Budget Office. (2004, December). Homeland Security and the Private Sector. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=6042&type=0&sequence=0>.

²⁶⁸ "...Fusion is a clearly defined, ongoing process that involves the delineation of roles and responsibilities; the creation of requirements; and the collection, blending, analysis, timely dissemination, and reevaluation of critical data, information, and intelligence." Department of Homeland Security – Homeland Security Advisory Council. (2005, April 28). Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: homeland security intelligence and information fusion, p.3. Washington, DC: Department of homeland Security. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_HSIntellInfoFusion_Apr05.pdf

²⁶⁹ "With logic you start out with certain ingredients just as in playing chess you start out with given pieces...In most real life situations the pieces are not given, we just assume they are there. We assume certain perceptions, certain concepts and certain boundaries. Lateral thinking is concerned not with playing with the existing pieces but with seeking to change those very pieces. Lateral thinking is concerned with the perception part of thinking." De Bono E. Lateral Thinking. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.edwdebono.com/debono/lateral.htm>

²⁷⁰ For example, "A week-long enforcement blitz led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting the sale of counterfeit sports merchandise during Super Bowl XLII led to the seizure of more than 9,500 pieces of clothing and sports memorabilia valued at nearly a half-million dollars. As part of the crackdown, ICE agents and officers from the Glendale and Phoenix police departments arrested 24 individuals who now face charges of trafficking in counterfeit goods. The ICE-led enforcement effort, which also included investigators under contract to the NFL, focused on counterfeit items being sold by stores and street vendors across the Phoenix metropolitan area." Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2008, February 7). ICE-led Task Force Seizes Nearly \$500,000 Worth of Phony NFL Merchandise and Sports Memorabilia. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080207phoenix.htm>.

²⁷¹ For example, "A week-long enforcement blitz led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting the sale of counterfeit sports merchandise during Super Bowl XLII led to the seizure of more than 9,500 pieces of clothing and sports memorabilia



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²⁷² Roman, P.J. (2008, February 13). The National Response Framework: the enduring challenges of Federal responses to large-scale incidents. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

²⁷³ For example, "as part of its mission and in accordance with the Homeland Security Act, DHS has responsibility for coordinating efforts to share homeland security information across all levels of government, including Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector." U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal efforts are helping to alleviate some challenges encountered State and local information fusion centers, p. 5. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

²⁷⁴ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4).

²⁷⁵ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). While Committee Staff were interviewing Deputy Sheriff Kilgore, a representative from the FBI offered to share the FBI's threat assessment for the track. The contents of the threat assessment had not been shared previously because the FBI believed there was no special threat to the Speedway.

²⁷⁶ House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6).

Unlike the situation for Talladega Super Speedway, the FBI in Charlotte, North Carolina develops and shares a threat assessment for the Lowe's Motor Speedway more broadly and in advance of the races in Concord. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15)

²⁷⁷ For example, the Alabama Fusion Center and the North Carolina Information and Analysis Center have described instances where different field offices of the same Federal law enforcement agency engage with these Centers to different extents, with one field office passing little information and the other passing more. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16).

²⁷⁸ For example, the Alabama Fusion Center generates some of its own threat assessments, but does not feel it has the assets to do so for every situation that comes up in the State of Alabama. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3)

²⁷⁹ For example, ATF assisted with securing Super Bowl XLII in Phoenix, Arizona. A cadre of special agents with explosives expertise, as well as explosives detection canines...deployed throughout the numerous Super Bowl venues in the Glendale, Phoenix area, including the University of Phoenix Stadium, the NFL Experience, and team hotels and practice facilities to name a few. ATF has the largest commitment of explosives experts assisting with security during Super Bowl week. These assets include Special Agent Bomb Technicians, Explosives Enforcement Officers, Certified Explosive Specialists, K-9's, robots, the explosives response truck and ATF's mobile forensic laboratory." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. (2008, January 24). ATF Agents Assist Arizona with Super Bowl XLII Security. *ATF Media Advisory*. Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at http://www.atf.gov/press/2008press/012408atf_superbowl-mediaadvisory.pdf.

In another example, ATF provides video equipment, canines, and its own personnel (among other resources) to the races at Lowe's Motor Speedway as and other NASCAR venues, in accordance with requests for assistance, and as other ATF missions and priorities allow. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe's Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

²⁸⁰ Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.



²⁸¹ “The Homeland Security Information Network is a computer-based counterterrorism communications system connecting all 50 States, five Territories, Washington, DC, and 50 major urban areas. The Homeland Security Information Network allows all States and major urban areas to collect and disseminate information between Federal, State, and local agencies involved in combating terrorism.” Department of Homeland Security. (2006, August 29). Homeland Security Information Network. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm.

²⁸² Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National Response Framework. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf>.

²⁸³ “By law and by Presidential directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the Principal Federal Official [PFO] responsible for coordination of all domestic incidents requiring multiagency Federal response. The Secretary may elect to designate a single individual to serve as his or her primary representative to ensure consistency of Federal support as well as the overall effectiveness of the Federal incident management. When appointed, such an individual serves in the field as the PFO for the incident.” Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National Response Framework, p.66. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf>.

²⁸⁴ “For Stafford Act incidents (i.e., emergencies or major disasters), upon the recommendation of the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of Homeland Security, the President appoints an FCO [Federal Coordinating Officer]. The FCO is a senior FEMA official trained, certified, and well experienced in emergency management, and specifically appointed to coordinate Federal support in the response to and recovery from emergencies and major disasters. The FCO executes Stafford Act authorities, including commitment of FEMA resources and the mission assignment of other Federal Departments or agencies. If a major disaster or emergency declaration covers a geographic area that spans all or parts of more than one State, the President may decide to appoint a single FCO for the entire incident, with other individuals as needed serving as Deputy FCOs.” Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National Response Framework, p.67. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf>.

