

REBUILDING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: US-EU RELATIONS IN THE POST-IRAQ ERA

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**REBUILDING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP:
US-EU RELATIONS IN THE POST-IRAQ ERA**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The relationships between international actors are always subject to different circumstances that affect their interests and behaviors. The relations between the United States and the European Union (EU) are not an exception to this rule. However, the history and the future of the US and the EU are so much tied together that both need to understand each other to confront jointly their common challenges and interests.

The US-EU partnership has gone through different phases, some tense and some more friendly. Although the transatlantic gap was already a fact before 9-11, the reactions on both sides of the Atlantic to the unprecedented terrorist attacks on US soil did not fix or improve the fragile link, but rather weakened it further.

However, the second Bush administration has provided a new scenario for improving or, at least, stopping the growing divergence that had become a trend in US-EU relations. There is no doubt that the willingness for renewed and improved relations between the US and the EU already exists. Both parts now have the responsibility to

rebuild a robust relationship and to create opportunities to reinforce a partnership that is vital for a better and more secure world.

REBUILDING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: US-EU RELATIONS IN THE POST-IRAQ ERA

The relations between the United States and the European Union (EU) have always been quite uneven. This fact should not surprise anyone. The relationships between international actors are subject to different circumstances that may affect their interests and behaviors. A status quo between nations is almost impossible in a fast changing and globalizing world. The change of governments due to elections, economic changes, different world events, and differing views towards emerging or existing conflicts, are just a few examples of different issues that affect perceptions and, consequently, political decisions and international relations. The relations between the US and the EU are no exception to this fact.

This Strategy Research Project will show how tied together the history and the future of the US and the EU are. It will firstly describe the most important bodies within the EU that deal with security and defense issues at the highest levels and how the new Treaty of Lisbon will affect in these areas. It will later go through the different and changing relations that the US and the EU have experienced before and after 9/11. Thirdly, it will describe the future scenario where new opportunities for better understanding and cooperation need to be fostered and developed. Finally, I will provide several recommendations that could be followed in order to help rebuild the US-EU transatlantic partnership.

The Security and Defense Dimensions of the EU

US-EU relations bear little resemblance to US bilateral relations with Russia, Argentina or any other nation. The EU is an international organization and as such it is

formed by a conglomerate of member states and a number of permanent common institutions. Not all European nations are part of the EU (Switzerland, Croatia, Andorra and Norway are some examples) and not all the nations that are part of the EU participate in the different mechanisms established within the Union (the UK is not part of the Eurozone,¹ Denmark does not participate in the military organizations within the ESDP, etc). On top of that, and notwithstanding the importance and depth of the steps being taken towards the integration and co-operation of its members, the EU is a very young organization and it has neither completed its structural and institutional building process nor has fully clarified its goals and objectives within the international system.

Regarding its structural and institutional building process, many countries including the US, have complained about the complexity of the mechanisms. Different representatives and authorities within the EU have international voice and responsibilities. The current structures are even difficult to digest for most Europeans, including some politicians not directly involved in international matters. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission are some examples of EU leaders who can interact in the international system with different responsibilities and levels of accountability. In order to become a credible, relevant and effective international organization the EU should have one only voice in the international arena.

Within the context of the CFSP, the Union continues to develop a common policy, covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a shared European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This policy could lead to a

common defense, should the European Council so decide (the Treaty of Lisbon already mentions this possible trend), subject to a decision adopted by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

In addition to appointing Javier Solana as the first High Representative for the CFSP, the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. That same European Council decided that *"the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO"*.

It was on that basis that continued efforts led to the establishment of permanent political and military structures and to the development of civilian and military capabilities, including the formulation by the EU of a set of crisis management concepts and procedures. The Union has also concluded arrangements for the consultation and participation of third countries in crisis management. In addition, the EU has defined a framework for its relations with NATO. This includes arrangements allowing the Union to have recourse to NATO's assets and capabilities (referred to as the Berlin Plus Agreements). This support would be provided within the framework of ESDP operations and with the approval of all NATO members.²

The recently signed Treaty of Lisbon has addressed the issue of CFSP and ESDP and has simplified the structures and positions with responsibilities in international relations. The new Treaty includes a new position of the President of the European Council that will be elected for a period of two and a half years (instead of the current six month rotational system in which the head of government of a nation gets the task to

chair the Council for that period of time). The fundamental linkage between the first pillar (common policies such as agriculture or finance) and the second pillar (foreign and security policies) has also been established in this last Treaty with the creation of another new position: the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will also be the Vice-President of the European Commission. This new European leader will increase the impact, coherence and visibility of the EU's external actions, including its security and defense dimensions, with more executive powers. Consequently, in the near future the internal mechanisms of the EU will be less accessible to other international actors. On the other hand, the relations will be more comprehensive and simple. These new positions will certainly have a positive impact on US-EU relations as well.

With regard to the future role of the EU in the international system, a lot remains to be seen. It is not a secret that the security and defense presence of the Union in the world does not match its commercial, financial or industrial capabilities and international relevance. However, the Nice Treaty, in December 2000, established for the first time permanent military and political structures that would take responsibility for the planning, decisions and implementation of security and defense issues. In these eight years, the EU has deployed and successfully completed several operations around the world³ and maintains the responsibility for other missions such as those in Bosnia, Chad, Palestinian Territories, and others.⁴ These police and military missions are carried out under the umbrella of the ESDP which allows only for Petersberg tasks⁵ within the framework of crisis management operations.

The Petersberg tasks were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and include: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks for combat forces, such as crisis management and peacemaking. Although this last option could be regarded as pure military intervention in a hostile environment, so far there has not been any discussion at the ESDP bodies about the potential deployment of military peacemaking operations.

The EU body where discussions and recommendations for security and defense issues take place is the Political and Security Committee (PSC). In this Committee each member state is represented by a permanent ambassador.⁶ Once the PSC agrees on a certain proposal, it is included in the agenda of the COREPER (Permanent Representatives Committee) for discussion before it is passed to the next level, the European Council. The Council, at the Foreign Affairs Minister level, is the first body where decisions can be taken regarding the deployment of civil or military forces.

All these bodies and mechanisms are a clear sign that the EU wants to be perceived as a credible international actor in security and defense issues. However, there are essentially two circumstances that are critical obstacles to building a strong military instrument capable of reacting quickly to world events. The first is the fact that each and every European government is accountable to its own national parliament and constituency when deciding to commit its military forces. The second is that the concessions provided by each member state to the EU in international affairs gradually degrade each nation's sovereignty, which can negatively influence its national interests. These facts slow the decision making process and sometimes force the governments to

take difficult decisions that must keep a fair balance between their national interests and those of the EU.

Pre-Iraq US-EU Relations

The EU, as mentioned above, is very much a living organization that is currently evolving and will certainly continue to do so. However, it is very important to stress, and many Europeans ignore this fact, that the US has been a precursor and a very important catalyst in the process of the creation and evolution of the Union.

In 1950, when the Allies' occupation of Germany was coming to an end, Jean Monnet, a visionary French businessman, had convinced his foreign minister, Robert Schuman, that the "old idea of uniting Europe politically under one grand design would never work; centuries of European enmity had put that idea to rest. To him, the secret to a united Europe lay in achieving the integration in small steps."⁷ The first step would be the creation of a supranational economic organization based on the elimination of barriers to competing states, mainly France and Germany. This would begin the process of binding those countries into a broad economic community. Coal and steel were part of the fundamental and basic industrial and energy needs, especially in the post-war period. Additionally, Schuman and Monnet concluded that "the secret to successfully launching the European integration plan was to get the Americans on board."⁸ So it was not until Schuman got the backing of US State Secretary Acheson, and through him, President Truman, that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) became a reality. Thanks to that initial US support, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris in April 1951.

The US agreed at that time, probably because of the growing threat coming from the USSR, which had already begun testing nuclear weapons, that the option of unifying Europe through economic ties, instead of political ones, would bring stability and permanent peace between rival nations. Maybe Truman was not aware of the fact that, as Monnet had proposed, the creation of the ECSC was only a first step of an itinerary that would eventually lead Europe to unification. In 1951, when the Treaty of Paris was signed, George Kennan's Strategy of Containment was in full swing. One of its pillars was that, in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet bloc, there was a need for a strong transatlantic community. This required a unified Europe instead of a divided one. Expediency and rapid response to the new and increasingly powerful Soviet threat helped in supporting European initiatives.⁹

Along the next steps in the European integration process, the US took a much more passive role as a mere observer. Very soon after the Treaty of Paris a common market was formed and the European Economic Community, from 1957, started to integrate new members (Denmark, Ireland and the UK). New social and environmental policies were implemented, and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established in 1975. In 1979 the first elections to the European Parliament took place and by 1986 new members arrived: Greece, Spain and Portugal.

However, right after the fall of the Berlin Wall the process took a big leap forward. The Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union and opened the door to a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in December 1991. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU on 1 January 1995 and the single currency (the euro) emerged as a relevant and important actor in world finance in 1999. In the mid-1990s, the former

Soviet Republics or Soviet-bloc countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), one of the republics of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia) and two Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and Malta) started their process of integration to the EU. A new and unprecedented enlargement phase was about to begin.

The EU considered its expansion to be an unbeatable chance to stabilize the European continent, bringing a new era of credible, sustainable and permanent peace. The enlargement to 25 countries took place in May 2004 when ten of the candidates joined the Union. Less than two year later Bulgaria and Romania acceded making the current number of 27 member states.¹⁰

Meanwhile, US political leaders have reacted to the European unifying process with differing views and, sometimes, with a certain degree of suspicion. However, most regard the EU as a reality with which the US has to negotiate in a friendly manner. This is true especially bearing in mind the common values and interests that both share. Former President George H.W. Bush mentioned that "...the Europeans are in the process of trying to forge a common understanding about security and foreign policy. So it's important for the United States to participate in the dialogue from the beginning, which will ensure that America is treated as the ally that it is and not a competitor."¹¹

The fall of the Berlin Wall brought a new world scenario where the US and the EU would have to strengthen or redirect the transatlantic community fostered during the Cold War. The threat upon which NATO was created disappeared. While the Alliance was looking for a *raison d'être*, the EU continued its integration and enlargement processes. The transatlantic link was put under stress during the creation of the US-led

Coalition formed in 1991 for the first Iraq War. However, the world consensus was almost unanimous at that point and the UN, as well as most Arab nations, provided an outstanding backing to the war effort. The background of the still recent collapse of the Soviet Union and the full legitimacy of the US-led coalition against the Iraqi regime in the last decade of the 20th century was a peak in US-EU relations.

However, the conflict in the Balkans, and especially the intolerable situation in Bosnia brought to the stage the reality of the inefficacy of European institutions and, in this case, of the UN as well. NATO's reaction came somewhat late (Operation Deliberate Force, 1995) but prompted an American solution to the crisis. The commitment and resolution of the US to put an end to the atrocities, by bringing the warring parties to the negotiation table in Dayton, showed its supremacy in crisis management on the European continent.

New views and perceptions to crisis management between the EU and the US emerged in the Balkans. Kosovo brought a different scenario, because no UNSC resolution backed the use of military force. The EU was, again, incapable of diplomatically deterring Serbia from using military force against unarmed civilians. However, the intolerable situation on the ground, where there was clear evidence of massive ethnic cleansing, helped to forge a NATO response for an air campaign. It was because of the US influence, determination and military capability within the Alliance (including the employment of massive air power), that Milosevic reversed his policies in Kosovo.

Ironically, there was a broad transatlantic consensus about what had happened during the Kosovo War: the Europeans had generally proven to be operationally irrelevant, and the Americans had made and carried out operational decisions unilaterally. To Washington's frustration, their

operational irrelevance did not stop the Europeans from expecting to have a major say in the development of NATO strategy. To the Europeans' frustration, in the end, whatever their opinion, the Americans had the capabilities to ignore them and act alone.¹²

The Origins of the Crisis

All the above analysis shows that the growing US-EU gap was already a fact before 9-11, although its dimensions and second order effects were not still clear. It is now evident that the reactions on both sides of the Atlantic to the unprecedented and unexpected terrorist attacks on US soil did not fix or improve the transatlantic link, but instead further weakened it.

The first US reaction to the 9-11 attacks against the Taliban government of Afghanistan was perceived in Europe as legitimate. However, American decisions and unpredictable reactions to the terrorist attacks resulted in the Europeans feeling uncertain about the unexpected development of the world situation. The US received enough international backing and political support to oust the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and to capture Al Qaeda members while destroying the latter's infrastructure that allowed it to organize, train and direct terrorist actions throughout the globe. However, at that point, the American military reaction was quite unilateral. The planning and execution of military operations aimed at helping the Northern Alliance defeat the Taliban regime, was not undertaken by a coalition. It was a US operation with an anecdotal representation of a few other nations. If the threat was a common concern to the US and the EU alike, why was the reaction essentially unilateral?

Very quickly it became evident that Afghanistan was only the first step in the US's reaction to 9/11. "Rumsfeld showed up toward the end of the session and made a

broader point. Yes, it was important to topple the Taliban as quickly as the US could, but that would not be enough.”¹³

Very soon after the military intervention in Afghanistan, the issue of how to address the WMD uncertainties of Iraq began to unfold. This issue “tested not only the cohesion and strategic orientation of the European Union, it also put a real strain on transatlantic relations...Many citizens on both sides of the Atlantic had become distrustful of one another because the US administration insisted on adopting unilateral policies that it called upon all its allies to support without question.”¹⁴ The different national positions taken within different International Organizations, such as NATO but especially at the UN, were a reflection of a growing divergence of perceptions and opinions. “As the attacks against terrorist targets in Afghanistan changed to talk of a global war on terrorism to a clash between the forces of good and evil, Europeans and Americans stopped seeing eye-to-eye.”¹⁵

European citizens opposed the Iraqi invasion by overwhelming majorities. Levels of opposition were 90 percent in Spain, 87 in Italy, 79 percent in Poland and over 55 percent in the UK.¹⁶ Additionally, the EU was under internal strain by the US search for support using a bilateral, government to government, approach. Then and now, EU members were polarized by the Franco-German positions on one side and the UK approach on the other. The opposing European views at the UN Security Council were just a mere demonstration of this fact.

Even the European countries that supported the US “coalition of the willing” at the early stages, suffered incredible internal political tensions and popular reactions that resulted, in some of the cases, in a change of government in the following elections.

Such were the cases of Spain and Italy. Some saw the American unilateral approach as a show of disrespect for the European Union as a whole and others argued that Britain's unilateral support for American views from the very first moment resulted in a sharpened wedge that ripped through fragile US-EU relations. The misadventure in Iraq might never have been launched without the Blair government's self-serving and unequivocal support for the invasion.¹⁷

US-EU Relations Today

Most analysts agree that the second Bush administration has provided a new scenario for improving or, at least, stopping the growing divergence that had become a trend in US-EU relations. President Bush's meeting in Europe in February 2005, soon after his re-election, was an important change of attitude that showed a certain degree of reconciliation after a long period of tensions. "Meetings in both NATO and EU formats at summits in Brussels indicated that Washington placed high value on both institutions and viewed Europe as an important partner of the United States."¹⁸

At the same time, paradoxically, the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, which the Europeans had initially broadly supported, became a point of friction between the US and most European countries. There is currently a deep concern about the security situation in Afghanistan and the US is trying to draw new European forces into ISAF. However, at this point, the political rift for an increased European military effort within ISAF is taking place within NATO or bilaterally between the US and certain countries, such as Germany, Italy and Spain. This issue, so far, has not had an impact on US-EU relations.

Several events, such as the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005 and political summits after President Bush's re-election, show that an "ongoing *rapprochement* in transatlantic relations is happening against a background of domestic difficulties on both sides of the Atlantic."¹⁹ The general trend is certainly pointing towards a better understanding of new opportunities for better cooperation and collaboration. Some of the agreements reached in the latest summits are a clear indication of approaching postures. The following are just representative of the most relevant issues, related to security and defense, covered in the latest summits.

In June 2005, six months after the re-election of President Bush, a US-EU summit was organized in Washington D.C. The two main points for discussion and agreement referred to the enhancing of cooperation in the field of non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism (note that the term "fight" is used instead of "war" in US-EU relations). For the first time, a Joint Program of Work on Non-proliferation was agreed upon and implemented.

The next US-EU summit took place in Vienna (Austria) in June 2006. The summit declaration mentioned the decision to further strengthen the strategic partnership by adopting a number of priority actions to support cooperation in several areas. One of them was especially relevant in defense and security: "confronting global challenges, including security."²⁰ The Progress Report on Political and Security issues agreed to in Vienna highlighted the cooperation between the US and the EU in the Western Balkans and Africa.²¹ Finally, with regard to crisis management, working contacts between EU institutions and their U.S. counterparts have multiplied, both in Brussels and in crisis areas. Informal consultation and cooperation mechanisms have been established

between EU representatives and the U.S. Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. It was acknowledged that, for the first time, the European Union had hosted a series of briefings for the yearly U.S. politico-military conference in Brussels.

The next US-EU summit took place in Washington D.C. April 30, 2007. The points covered in this summit highlight the improving relations and the trend towards a better understanding and cooperation between the US and the EU. The summit declaration acknowledged that the Western Balkans was at a crucial juncture. The US welcomed the EU's decision to establish an ESDP police force and rule of law mission in Kosovo and the desire for American participation in that mission was mentioned. There was also a common position to take immediate action to stop the fighting and human suffering in Darfur and to find a political solution to end that conflict. The Summit agreed, for the first time, on the creation of a bilateral US-EU body called the Transatlantic Economic Council. This Council is certainly an important benchmark in the transatlantic link that could clear the way for new types of collaboration in other fields, such as security or defense.

In addition, the EU has recently acknowledged the importance of the first military cooperation between EU structures and the US armed forces. A EU Military Staff delegation participated in the Multinational Experiment-5 sponsored by the US Joint Forces Command (JFC).

At this point, it becomes evident that there has been a certain degree of progress in US-EU relations, especially during the second Bush administration. These improved relations have also reached the military institutions, not only on an informal basis in

Brussels but also in the fields of operations (in DR of Congo) and through exercises such as the above mentioned Multinational Experiment 5.

Slovenia, who is holding the EU Presidency for the first time during the first semester of 2008, will focus the Union's attention on the Balkans. Kosovo in particular, will remain the focus of interest. The government of Kosovo's unilateral announcement of independence and the resultant new split in its recognition by different nations will probably delay the implementation of an EU police force. With the EU in the lead of military operations in Bosnia and the future deployment of the police forces in Kosovo, it gains relevance and importance in the international arena. Although the Balkans will remain an important test bed for the commitment and resolution of the EU, there appears to be a wide margin for possible future collaboration and cooperation with the US in other areas of the world. Darfur will also be an issue as the EU tries to establish its humanitarian mission in Chad.²²

The President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, expressed in February 2005 that "the relationship between the United States and Europe constitutes the world's strongest, most comprehensive and strategically most important partnership."²³ President Bush answered back in similar terms saying "Today, security and justice and prosperity for our world depend on America and Europe working in common purpose. That makes our transatlantic ties as vital as they have ever been."²⁴

The Way Ahead.

As the political turmoil and rift that emerged during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq between the US and the EU fades away, mainly due to the passage of time and to the change²⁵ or potential change of some governments and political leaders on both

sides of the Atlantic, new opportunities will continue to arise to rebuild US-EU relations. Although the trend of a growing transatlantic gap has been reversed, the US-EU partnership still has to decide how to address the future and the extent to which both sides want to rebuild the link. "The EU and the US should reach a new understanding in responding to global security challenges, such as the combating of transnational terrorism and the crystallization of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, through a process of transparent dialogue and constructive consultation."²⁶

The process of rebuilding the post-Iraq US-EU transatlantic bond, with present and future world scenarios, offers new opportunities for the crafting of stronger ties. However, these new regional and international environments could prompt new mutual perceptions that might hamper such a process leading to a weaker or antagonistic relationship. If the US has to face the fundamental question of uni-polarity or multi-polarity, Europe has to decide whether it will take the course of close cooperation with the US or seek to balance its power.²⁷

There is no doubt that the willingness for renewed and improved relations between the US and the EU already exists. Although the new path seems to be open, the strategy for the way ahead is not yet clear. The foundations for the new relations are based on solid grounds. The joint statement following the April 2007 summit declared, "We, the leaders of the European Union and the United States of America, met today in Washington to deepen our strategic partnership."²⁸

Many authors argue that the logical option for cooperation in foreign and security issues between the US and the EU should be through NATO. However, there is a need to explore new genuine mechanisms that bring renewed confidence and the best

possible synchronization of efforts and interests between the two sides of the Atlantic. The main reason for this need is the recognition of the EU as a different and separate international actor.

For the US, the Union is becoming, more and more, an alternative channel for communicating with Europe. From the EU perspective, there is an urgent need to reinforce and redesign an alternative defensive and military link to the US from NATO. There is no reason to force all relations between the US and Europe, related to peace and stability around the world, through the Alliance. A new separate and unique mechanism is not only viable but also necessary. The US has to understand that NATO and the EU are different in nature, goals and capabilities. Having two different mechanisms, instead of one, that link America with its European partners is an added value and an opportunity for conducting its foreign policy and interests with different procedures, capabilities and perceptions in the international system.

Undoubtedly, the continuing reinforcement of US-EU relations would also be perceived by the rest of the world as an undisputable sign of the prevalence of the Western model, not only in terms of economic power but also with regard to the potential employment of coordinated military and civilian capabilities in the world scene. Although the task of finding common ground leading to an agreement on the use of force is not an easy task, there is no reason to believe that a solid starting point cannot be found. A new strong bond between America and the Union would also bring shared responsibilities for conflict prevention and crisis management. The spread of freedom and human rights is a goal that both sides of the Atlantic must strive for.

Recommendations

A study of the current strategies of the US (NSS or National Security Strategy) and the EU (ESS or European Security Strategy) “reveals a host of common features, particularly with respect to their fundamental remarks on values and goals and their perceptions of challenges and threats.”²⁹ The main difference in the approach taken in each strategy emerges with the use of force, specifically in “the importance that is attached to military action as a means of achieving their goals, and in their attitudes to multilateralism.”³⁰ This also happens within the framework of NATO, so it should not be an obstacle to finding new ways of understanding not only in the application of military force but, most importantly, in the complementary actions of both strategies. Such an approach would reinforce the effects and the strength of an agreed foreign policy.

Some of the new mechanisms that could help reinforce an agreed US-EU security and defense policy could include:

- The creation of a Transatlantic Foreign Policy and Defense Council, similar to the recently created Transatlantic Economic Council. This Council would constitute a bilateral body where conflict prevention and crisis management issues would be discussed and potential common decisions and positions adopted. In order to support the work of this Council and to provide continuity to the implementation of the decisions taken, a permanent US-EU Foreign Policy and Defense Staff should be created. It would be manned by European and American civilian and military personnel.
- The establishment of relations and regular meetings at the military level (mil to mil relations). A US delegation could participate regularly or when requested, at

the EU Military Committee for updates regarding ongoing operations and on possible new deployments. This bilateral forum would also help to foster a better mutual understanding and would provide the growing ground for improved cooperation and coordination in military issues and operations throughout the world.

- The establishment of a military liaison mechanism between the US and the EU to improve the coordination of the ongoing and future operations as well as other common security and defense issues. This mechanism needs to begin with an EU effort to post a European Defense Attaché to all EU Delegations worldwide.

There are many other options that could be explored to reinforce the transatlantic link. Better US-EU relations and new additional mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration will bring more robust ties and stronger multilateral actions for reaching common goals and interests.

The ESDP is not a peer competitor to NATO. It is a natural development of the EU and has to be considered as such. It is a new possibility, and source of new opportunities for European nations and the US to address current and potential conflicts.

Western civilization has footprints on both sides of the Atlantic. A better understanding between the US and the EU is not only possible but necessary. More than six years have passed since the tragic events of 9/11 brought new tensions to already strained US-EU relations. Both parts of the transatlantic link now have the

responsibility to rebuild a robust relationship and to create opportunities to reinforce a partnership that is vital for a better and more secure world.

Endnotes

¹ The Eurozone is the term used for the group of 12 EU member states that have adopted the Euro instead of their own national currencies (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).

² The term “Berlin +” refers to the EU-NATO declaration on ESDP and includes the support of NATO’s planning and command and control capabilities to the EU as set out in the NAC decision on 13 December 2002 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm>).

³ Two in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Macedonia, and the following police missions: EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT), EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima), EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (Eujust Themis) and EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa).

⁴ EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), EU Planning team in Kosovo (EULEX), EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah), EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex), EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) and EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo).

⁵ These tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992. On that occasion, the WEU Member States declared their readiness to make available to the WEU, but also to NATO and the European Union, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces.

⁶ For specific military recommendations, the PSC is advised and supported by the Military Committee (EUMC). The EUMC, very similarly to NATO’s Military Committee, is supported by a permanent staff called EU Military Staff (EUMS) located in Brussels.

⁷ Sarwar A. Kashmeri, *America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 63.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Facts taken from http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_2/index_en.htm

¹¹ Kashmeri.

¹² Edwina S. Campbell, *Strategic Studies Quarterly* “From Kosovo to the War on Terror” (The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999-2002), fall 2007.

¹³ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 18.

¹⁴ George A. Papandreu. *EU-US Relations. Repairing the Transatlantic Rift* (Hamshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), xi.

¹⁵ Kashmeri, 35.

¹⁶ Research conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the US and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations by MORI, UK, 2002.

¹⁷ Kashmeri, 5.

¹⁸ Januz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, *America's New Allies* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 62.

¹⁹ Marcin Zaborowski, *Friends again? EU-US Relations after the Crisis* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 225.

²⁰ Vienna Summit Declaration, http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/US_EU_Summits/Jun2106_Vienna_Declaration.asp; Internet; accessed 24 January 2008.

²¹ The Report specifically mentioned the situation in Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia and the DR of Congo.

²² Facts in the paragraphs related to US-EU summits taken from the site of the EU Delegation in the US, <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/euusrelations/AgendasDialoguesSummits.htm>; Internet; accessed 03 January 2008.

²³ Press conference, US-EU Summit in Washington, 2005. http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/US_EU_Summits/Jun2005_Washington_Summit.asp#post-summit; Internet; accessed 09 January 2008.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Such as the governments of France, Italy or Poland.

²⁶ Georgios Papastamkos, *EU-US Relations. Repairing the Transatlantic Rift* (Hamshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).

²⁷ Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras, *EU-US Relations. Repairing the Transatlantic Rift* (Hamshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).

²⁸ The statement continues "This partnership is based on common values, in particular on the deeply shared conviction that peace, prosperity and human development depend upon the protection of individual liberty, human rights, the rule of law, economic freedom, energy security, environmental protection and the growth of strong, democratic societies". Joint EU-US statement following annual summit, April 30, 2007.

²⁹ Volker Heise, *The ESDP and the Transatlantic Relationship* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007), 7.

³⁰ Ibid.