

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT CHALLENGES: FINDING THE BALANCE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY W. JOHNSON
United States Army National Guard

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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BALANCE**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W. Johnson
United States Army National Guard

Dr. John Bonin
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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The Army has grievously neglected the Army National Guard's operational readiness for over 65 years. Army National Guard (ARNG) equipment shortfalls due to limited funding are hampering ARNG units in their role as an operational reserve force. Equipment issues for some ARNG units vary: some inherited antiquated equipment handed down by their active component counterparts; some did not acquire new equipment until they were scheduled for mobilization during the pre-mobilization phase. Current ARNG equipment shortfalls could prevent the ARNG from sustaining itself as an operational reserve force transformed to 21st century standards. Equipment shortfalls will also impact future state and federal missions. This SRP addresses the strategic issues of balancing ARNG state missions, federal missions, new equipment training, theater-provided equipment, and role in Army Force Generation. It recommends ways to support and equip the ARNG so it can serve as a fully functional operational force capable of supporting the 21st century national strategy.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT CHALLENGES: FINDING THE BALANCE

The Army National Guard's ability to support its state missions, federal missions, homeland security mission, and its designated role in the Army Forces Generation Model for expeditionary operations will diminish rapidly if promises of a "payback plan" for replacement equipment are not fulfilled and sustained. In compliance with the Army G3's directive, ARNG units serving in Iraq and Afghanistan left their equipment in theater when they redeployed back home. As a member of the initial Stay Behind Equipment (SBE) Tiger Team formed on 22 September 2002 at Fort Gillem, Georgia, I served with COL James Torgler, representing Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) G3; Dr. Larry Povah, representing Forces Command Headquarters (FORSCOM) ; and several other Major Army Command (MACOM) representatives. Our mission was to implement the SBE process.

The Army derived the SBE concept in part from an ad-hoc Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) created from Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), Combat Equipment Group Europe (CEGE) sites, and pre-positioning of material configured to unit sets (POMCUS) sites. Tiger Team, FORSCOM, United States Army Europe (USAEUR), National Guard Bureau (NGB), Army Material Command (AMC) and numerous supporting MACOMs crossleveled equipment acquired through the equipment pass-back process.

"In Afghanistan 2002, an Army National Guard Engineer Battalion's asphalt maker / rock crusher was the first piece of equipment directed as SBE which in fact paved new roads enabling broader communications and commerce for the Afghan people." ¹ The Task Force Falcon and Task Force Eagle TDAs became a permanent fixture of selected

Modified Table of Organizational Equipment (MTOE) sets tailored to meet the peacekeeping mission logistical support requirements of a heavy and light organizational footprint in the Balkans. For example, deployed active and mobilized reserve units fell in on pre-positioned mission-essential equipment used by both Task Forces Falcon and Eagle. This early pre-positioning of strategic equipment saved the government millions of dollars in movement costs normally associated with shipping tons of military equipment through each Balkan semi-annual and annual rotational cycle. This SBE concept to save money by eliminating organizational equipment shipping costs theoretically replicated Task Force Falcon and Eagle TDAs. The vast difference, of course, was that the SBE (which is now called Theater Provided Equipment [TPE]) was acquired from individual units or cross-leveled from other units, but not taken from APS and POMCUS sites.

However, the equipment pass-back process similarly involved requesting equipment from a higher headquarters and then passing that equipment down to a subordinate organization. Since September 2002, our former SBE team members and current TPE Team members have processed over 135 SBE/TPE fragmented orders authorized by HQDA G3, with more to follow. The second- and third-order effects on ARNG equipment readiness and availability through their participation in the Balkans were minimal compared to the dramatic effects on ARNG equipment readiness and availability through of participation in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The new player in the SBE/TPE role is the Department of the Army Equipment Common Operation Picture (DA ECOP), which approves Operational Needs Statements (ONS) submitted by units up to the Department of the Army (DA). "The Government

Accountability Office found that the heavy reliance on National Guard Forces capability for overseas and homeland mission since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not sustainable over time.”² SBE losses have second- and third-order effects on Guard mission readiness and support capabilities at home and abroad. Indeed the ARNG is currently unable to carry out some state and federal missions effectively and efficiently in catastrophic and non-catastrophic situations in both the Continental United States (CONUS) and Overseas Continental United States (OCONUS).

The current ARNG business model is contributing to the unacceptable shortages of equipment. For example, by July 2005 deploying units received over 101,000 items of equipment from non-deploying sister units, leaving them without such critical items as radios and generators.

According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report:

Under tiered resourcing, those units expected to deploy early in a conflict receive first priority for equipment, and most Army National Guard units were expected to deploy after the active component units to serve as follow-on forces. The Army therefore accepted some operational risks by providing lower priority Army National Guard units with less equipment than they would need for their mission under the assumption that there would be time to provide additional equipment that they would need for their mission under the assumption that there would be time to provide additional equipment to these units before they would deployed. For example, Army National Guard enhanced brigades are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment they require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which comprise the majority of the Guard's combat forces, are supplied with about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern equipment, so much of the Guard's equipment is older and less modern than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more modern items.³

Further, redeploying units are being directed to leave their equipment in theater when they return home. The ARNG currently estimates that it has left over 64,000

items, worth approximately \$1.2 billion, in Iraq and Afghanistan. To make matters worse, the Army cannot account for most of these items and has made no plans to replace them. Non-deployed ARNG units now have only about one-third of their equipment; they are far from fully prepared to carry out domestic operations – to say nothing about their preparedness to deploy.

According to the Government Accountability Office, DOD and Congress have no current plans to remedy this critical national security problem. The ARNG is no longer a strategic reserve but now an operational reserve force. Guard units need the right balance of equipment for fighting wars in the 21st century and for providing civil military support to its 54 states and territories. ARNG's ability to participate in the ARFORGEN Process depends on the availability of critical dual-purpose equipment and required supporting systems specified in the Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) wartrace missions. Funding for ARNG equipment must not be delayed, diverted, decreased, or diminished over time. Otherwise, the ARNG will be unable to support the nation when needed.

Balancing the Army Force Generation Process to Re-Equip Army National Guard

ARFORGEN places units into three categories: The Reset and Train Pool has units recently returned from a deployment and to not be redeployed until entering the Ready Pool. Then it may be assigned to the Available Pool, which qualifies it for redeployment. This process produces a cycle of “trained, ready, and cohesive units.” These units are designated as “modular expeditionary forces.” They are trained and tailored to support operational plans of the Combatant Commanders. To qualify as “Ready,” they must be fully manned and properly trained and equipped. Inadequately

equipped ARNG units therefore cannot be cycled through AFORGEN; they simply are unready for redeployment.

According to the 2008 Army Campaign Plan, “The Army refines expeditionary force packages in the ARFORGEN synchronization process as operational requirements mature over time. Mission requirements determine unit resource priorities and readiness reporting (“ready for what = resourced for what & when = report against what metrics.)”⁴ See Figure 1.




Figure 1: ARFORGEN Process

ARNG must redress equipment shortfalls to support the goals of transformation and to cycle through ARFORGEN, which now includes Homeland Defense and Homeland Security mission requirements. “The goal is to achieve a sustained, more

predictable posture to generate trained and ready modular forces. Tailored for joint mission requirements, these forces preserve the capability to defend the homeland; to provide defense support to civil authorities; to deter conflict in critical regions; to surge to conduct major combat operations when required; and are managed in a way that maintains the quality and overall health of our All Volunteer Force.”⁵ The strategic impacts of equipment shortfalls will directly impact ARNG’s Reset/Train Pool, Ready Pool, and Available Pool. For example, an ARNG unit returning from Iraq or Afghanistan enters the ARFORGEN cycle in the Reset and Train Pool. However, since 60 percent of their MTOE was SBE/TPE, this ARNG unit is unprepared to Reset and Train. The proverbial downtime to refresh that unit with 40 percent of equipment on hand limits its ability to participate effectively in the Reset and Train Pool in its first, second, third, and fourth years. This shortfall also strategically detracts from the ARNG state mission requirement.

As stated in 2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement, “Units in the Reset and Train force pool are not ready or available for major combat operations. However, they should be ready to respond to homeland defense requirements and provide defense support to civil authorities at all times.”⁶ So the second- and third-order of strategic effects of equipment shortfalls have been felt throughout the United States. Likewise, the second- and third-order effects have been echoed in the halls of Congress. Further, some of the strategic decision-makers in ARNG’s 54 states and territories have sounded the alarm. For example, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi declared: “The war in Iraq has had a serious impact on the National Guard and its ability to protect and assist Americans in times of disaster here at home.”⁷ For example, on Friday, 4 May 2007, a

massive tornado ripped through the town of Greensburg, Kansas, killing at least ten people and leaving the town in ruins. Then “Kansas Gov. Kathleen Sebelius told the media that the recovery effort has been hampered by the National Guard’s lack of equipment as a result of the Iraq war.” ⁸

Well, states all over the country are not only missing personnel, National Guard troops are — about 40 percent of the troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan — but we’re missing the equipment. When the troops get deployed, the equipment goes with them. So, here in Kansas, about 50 percent of our trucks are gone. We need trucks. We’re missing Humvees; we’re missing all kinds of equipment that can help us respond to this kind of emergency. ⁹

Again, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi confirmed the Governor’s claims: “The warnings about National Guard readiness have been clear – states are not as ready as they should be to respond to natural disasters and other emergencies here at home.” ¹⁰

A January 2007 GAO Report affirmed Pelosi’s claims: “The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home.” ¹¹ According to General Peter J. Schoomaker, “Providing our soldiers with the best possible equipment is our highest priority.” ¹² According to the Adjutant Generals (TAGs) and Governors across the United States the equipment priority is not only having the best equipment but having it readily available at all times. The message is clear to the governors across the country: the commander-in-chiefs of their National Guard forces that they are held accountable for the overall safety and well being of each citizen they govern. Speaking for the governors, North Carolina Governor Michael Easley, Co-lead on National Guard issues for the National Governors Association, complained that “We the governors rely on the Guard to respond to natural disasters, a

pandemic or terrorist attack...Currently, we don't have the manpower or the equipment to perform that 'dual role' of responding to both state and federal needs.”¹³

Congressional leaders are well aware of this problem: “In an impassioned speech on 9 May 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Co-Chair of the Senate National Guard Caucus, challenged President Bush to acknowledge the President's blatant dismissal (through a spokesman) of the problem and endorsed Kansas Governor Sebelius' complaint about under-equipped ARNG units.”¹⁴ He noted that often states' adjutants-general and governors have documented the problem. He cited a \$24 billion shortfall in equipment, which does not include Air National Guard shortfalls. He noted that new equipment acquired for the Guard is often diverted to the active force. He cited the urgency to equip ARNG to respond to natural disasters and domestic incidents. He disputed SECDEF Gates' estimate that the ARNG is 56 percent equipped, claiming that 33 percent is a more accurate estimate. He urged the White House to stop denying the problem. The Army National Guard must be appropriately equipped to serve as a viable operational reserve force in the 21st century.

The National Guard Bureau Logistics Division has done an outstanding job in cross-leveling equipment across the 54 states and territories in order to mitigate equipment shortfalls for units' mission requirements both at home and abroad. However, the strategic impacts of cross-leveling equipment among the 54 states and territories over time is like borrowing money from the bank and then hoping someone else repays it. For example, in the cross-leveling process, the National Guard Bureau Army Logistics Division could direct the South Carolina Army National Guard's Logistics representative to loan 65 generators, 50 trucks, and 120 radios to the North Carolina

Army National Guard Logistics representatives in support of the 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team's (HBCT) rotation to Iraq. But while in Iraq, the 30th HBCT was issued a Fragmented Order from HQDA G3 to leave its cross-leveled / loaned 65 generators, 50 trucks, and 120 radios in theater. The second- and third-order effects then strategically impair the South Carolina Army National Guard's ability to cross-level equipment within its own state in support of civil military operations, federal missions, and balancing units for the ARFORGEN cycle.

In the National Guard 2007 Posture Statement, Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn reported that:

Following the best traditions of the Army National Guard, all 54 states and territories engaged in one or more of the following operations: Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Winter Freeze, Operation Unified Assistance (Tsunami Relief), Hurricane Recovery Operations for Katrina, Rita and Wilma, Stabilization Force Bosnia, Kosovo Force, Horn of Africa, Multi-National Force Observers, Guantanamo Bay Operations, Force Protection Europe, and numerous other missions. As we enter the fifth year of the Global war on Terrorism, we anticipate a slight downward trend in Overseas Continental United States (OCONUS) operations. We face some critical shortages that must be addressed over the coming year to ensure we continue to accomplish our mission. ¹⁵

New Equipment Training

ARNGs procurement of modular equipment and training must be sufficient to support the ARFORGEN Process. In ARNG's new role as an operational force, it must achieve the balance of meeting its operational requirements while keeping pace with its force structure change due to modularity. The U.S. Congress has programmed over 36 billion dollars to provide the ARNG with up to 75 percent of its modernized equipment. Fulfilling ARNG's operational requirements critically enables ARNG units to participate in the RESET and TRAIN POOL of the ARFORGEN model. For example, "in the Reset

and Train phase – forces redeploy from operations, receive and stabilize personnel, reset equipment and conduct individual and collective training.”¹⁶

The New Equipment Training (NET) requirement assures that the right soldiers with the right skill sets undergo individual and collective training during this cycle of the ARFORGEN model. The NET enacts a complex plan to receive, process, store, integrate, and maintain the enormous amount of modern equipment required for the ARNG to meet its operational force equipping challenges in the 21st century. Finally, the overall strategic equipping balance for NET requires the ARNG and the senior leadership in the 54 states and territories to work together in developing flexible and adaptable short- and long-range equipping plans.

On 27 March 2007 LTG H. Steven Blum testified to the 110th Congress about ARNG equipment shortfalls:

If we are to be successful in our goal of providing our soldiers a shorter total mobilization period and maximize time in theater for the combatant commanders, it is imperative that we reduce post-mobilization training time prior to deployment and accomplish more of it at home station prior to the mobilization to active duty. We need the equipment to do that training. If units train regularly at home with the best equipment, then little is needed in the post-mobilization period immediately prior to deployment. A 100 % optimally equipped ARNG will allow training for possible homeland missions and deployments to all occur simultaneously.¹⁷

A report dated September 2007 by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism has a challenging view on the availability of equipment during the required pre-mobilization training at home station. According to the Defense Science Board Task Force: “The availability of equipment needed for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to accomplish the required pre-mobilization training at their home station is still an issue.”¹⁸ ARNG will require more resources and new equipment in addition to

its unaccounted equipment and Theater Provided-Equipment (TPE) in order to meet the Army's proposed one year pre-mobilization training prior to mobilization.

ARNG's Logistics, Acquisition, Personnel, Training and Operations Divisions, along with other Divisions, work as a team to keep the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of Army National Guard abreast on all issues concerning equipping, training, manning, mobilization, and procurement. In the National Guard 2007 Posture Statement, Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn declared that "The Army National Guard's focus is to organize and equip current and new modularized units with the most modern equipment. This modernization ensures our ability to continue support of deployments, homeland security and defense efforts while maintaining our highest war fighting readiness." ¹⁹

Theater Provided Equipment

ARNG is no longer a strategic reserve force; ARNG has emerged as a critical component of the operational Army. When ARNG units were recently directed to leave equipment behind in Iraq and Afghanistan, they did not redeploy to find replacement equipment, as regular units do. This operational ARNG must be re-equipped in order to participate in the ARFORGEN Process and to sustain its operational capabilities—to say nothing of fulfilling its domestic support as the states' homeland security and emergency response force. The operational ARNG needs a comprehensive plan for ongoing acquisition of equipment. Senior Army Leaders must monitor ARNG resources and include ARNG's new roles and responsibilities in the National Military Strategy. As an operational force, ARNG must be regarded and funded just as the active force is.

LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, Vice Chief and Director of the Army National Guard rightly observed that “Equipment shortfalls present challenges to all components of the Army including the ARNG and the availability of equipment for the ARNG is a significant readiness focus of the Army’s senior leadership.”²⁰ The critical first step in strategically balancing ARNG’s equipping shortfalls was formally enacted on 9 October 2007 by means of a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the Army National Guard. The MOU was signed by Richard A. Cody, General, United States Army Vice Chief of Staff; Clyde A. Vaughn, Lieutenant General, Director Army National Guard; and Bennett C. Landreneau, Major General, LAARNG Chairman, AGAUS Force Structure Army Committee. According to the ARNG’s Rebalance Plan, “the total cost to fully equip the new force which is funded in President’s Budget (PB) 08, Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2009-2013 ... includes funds requested in the Fiscal Year 2009 Global War on Terror Supplemental appropriation request will be \$4.8 billion dollars.”²¹ In addition, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will receive an annual statement on the distribution and status of equipment that directly impacts the 54 states and territories.

In his 27 March 2007 testimony before Congress, LTG H. Steven Blum also addressed the ARFORGEN issue:

The Army Force Generation model works on the assumption that units have equipment for training. This model is going to be less effective if this assumption is not met. Currently the Army National Guard has on-hand 40% of its equipment and an additional 11% is either deployed or stay-behind-equipment.²²

ARNG Logistics Division is currently synchronizing its strategic equipping plans with the Army Campaign Plan. According to the Army National Guard Logistics Transformation Strategic Plan, “The Army Campaign Plan will support this effort by

focusing the Army attention and resources on this process. This will be a continuous process that will adjust for each rotation's battle losses and Theater Provided Equipment as well as other inventory adjustments and procurements." ²³ ARNG's ability to provide logistical support to units participating in federal and state missions as a strategic reserve force was successful, yet challenging. The complex nature of ARNG's role as an operational reserve force brings even more logistical support challenges along with a broad spectrum of global mission requirements. The residues from ARNG's participation in the SBE/TPE process over the years must be cleaned up so that the ARNG units entering the ARFORGEN Process are prepared for their roles.

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense

ARNG is balancing its equipping priorities with the Nation's and Army's highest priority of securing the homeland. ARNG's challenge to equip and sustain its numerous state missions' operational requirements like the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) in response to Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) incidents, will require an innovative approach to mitigate its equipment shortfalls. ARNG's operational and strategic planners at National Guard Bureau created a rock solid foundation through hard work and innovative collaboration. For example, the ARNG Logistics and Acquisition Divisions were involved in developing the Critical Dual-Use Line Identification Numbers (LINs) in a series of Army Equipping Conferences. "The last Army Equipping Conference 3.1 held on 2 November 2005 identified 342 Critical Dual Use LINs used in both state and federal missions." ²⁴

ARNG has met the past equipping challenges since 9/11 in supporting state missions such as Airport Security missions, Border Security missions, Operation

Northern Watch, CONUS base force protection missions, and OCONUS base force protection missions. The state mission requires the ARNG to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities as well. The federal mission requires the ARNG to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere as directed by the President. The Critical Dual Purpose equipment listed under each of the Essential Ten Capabilities will support ARNGs ARFORGEN process in support of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions. In addition, the Essential Ten Capabilities for the ARNG must be resourced and maintained in order to meet the ARFORGEN requirements. See Figure 2.




Figure 2: Critical Dual Purpose Equipment List

In the National Guard 2007 Posture Statement, LTG Clyde A. Vaughn reported that “Although all shortages are important, the Army National Guard is placing special emphasis on ‘dual use’ equipment such as the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, channel hopping Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), Joint Network Node, and Movement Tracking System. Filling these shortages ensures

interoperability with the active force and increases the Army National Guard's ability to respond to natural disasters or in a homeland defense role.”²⁵

ARNG must stay ready to help ensure the integrity and security of the United States by staying fully equipped to carry out its assigned tasks or missions effectively. For example, ARNG's role in the continuity of operations (COOP) exercises ensures continuation of minimum command and control capabilities during threats within our Homeland. These include terrorist acts and natural disasters such as earthquakes, pandemics, and hurricanes. ARNG's COOP planning exercises are conducted in an undisclosed alternate facility that requires force protection, operating procedures, communications, and, most importantly, equipment. The equipment must be interoperable with the surrounding local, state, and federal agencies in order to facilitate the coordination of rescue operations during catastrophic and non-catastrophic events. ARNG's state mission roles and responsibilities are equally important as its federal mission roles and responsibilities, so maintaining ARNG's strategic balance by fulfilling equipping needs requires a constant stream of financial resources that must not be diverted, decreased, or shut completely off.

Command and Control Structure for Army National Guard Forces

The current command and control structure of the Army National Guard (ARNG) Headquarters at the state level has changed dramatically over the past several years. The 54 former State Area Commands (STARCs) and territories are now consolidated into Joint Force Headquarters (JFH) which consists of an equitable mix of Air National Guard soldiers. The JFH provides mobilization oversight to ARNG units within its state or territory. For example, ARNG units in support of Defense Support of Civil Authorities

(DSCA) missions or Department of Defense (DOD) missions receive organizational guidance, training, planning, and coordination from the JFH in order to meet their mission and mobilization requirements. The overall performance of mobilization of an ARNG unit falls directly on the shoulders of the JFH.

Command and control complexities arise because of ARNG's unique federal mission and state mission responsibilities. For example, during ARNG's state missions, the governor through the State Adjutant General (TAG), commands Guard forces. All governors have the authority to order the Guard into State Active Duty during local or statewide man-made or natural catastrophic events. Likewise, the President has the authority to call the Guard into Federal Active Duty in defense of America both home and abroad. Since both the state and the federal government can control the Army National Guard, the decision to combine Title 32 ARNG forces and Title 10 under one "dual-hatted" National Guard officer as commander for Civil Support Operations is both logical and feasible.

To implement this decision, governors and the TAGs must place all National Guard actions under a dual-hatted National Guard officer for command and control during all missions. These dual-hatted Guard officers should be assigned to U. S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), since the USNORTHCOM commander is responsible for planning, exercising, and command and control of Title 10 (federal) forces responding to a domestic contingency.

Current law that enables both Title 32 forces and Title 10 (federal) forces to engage in Civil Support operations should be amended to designate these forces as one and the same. The advantages of having a dual-hatted National Guard officer as

Commander of USNORTHCOM operations reduces the command and control complexities and provides reliable and predictable programmed resources in order to properly train, sustain, and equip forces. For example, a National Guard officer in charge of USNORTHCOM can directly influence and control resources by setting up the Integrated Priority List (IPL) annually to support Programmed Objective Memorandum (POM) planning and Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in support of our Homeland.

The Guard commander could influence Discretionary and Non-Defense Discretionary resources required to create a sustainable operational reserve force. Finally, the requirement to balance and sustain the ARNG's equipment shortfalls through unconstrained resources is a step in the right direction, since the current practice of appealing to Congress annually for ARNG equipment may become less successful over time due to under funding from a reluctant Congress.

Recommendations

"The active Army and the Army Reserve are under-equipped today," reports LTG H. Steven Blum.²⁶ The message is loud and clear that equipment challenges facing the ARNG in the 21st century will negatively impact both state and federal missions unless viable and permanent solutions are implemented. The permanent solution requires a combination of unrestricted resources and creative innovations to mitigate the inevitable equipment shortfalls as the required \$48 billion dollars worth of new equipment reaches ARNG units by the end fiscal year 2014. Next, modular equipment training sets that matches the ARNG unit's MTOEs must be prepositioned at designated

validation / training sites to enable ARNG units to effectively and efficiently negotiate and master the ARFORGEN process.

In addition, the prepositioned modular equipment sets should be properly maintained by ARNG Combat Service Support (CSS) Soldiers, similar to the concept established by the National Guard's Maintenance and Training Equipment Site (MATES) located in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Then, in order to satisfy the state mission requirements, all 54 states and territories must implement an interstate "dual-use" purpose compact equipment agreement that allows cross-leveling of equipment to mitigate shortfalls if a catastrophic event occurs within that particular state. Selected ARNG (CSS) soldiers from each of the 54 states and territories will manage, maintain, and distribute the "dual-use" purpose equipment in conjunction with the interstate compact agreement and Homeland Security Strategic Emergency Plan.

Finally, we must develop a conceptual framework for analyzing ARNG's state and federal mission requirements and capabilities that are incorporated into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This is paramount because as of 28 January 2008, the H.R. 4986, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 under Section 1814 requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to defend and protect our Homeland. According to section 1814, "Not later than June 1, 2008, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the United States Northern Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, shall prepare and submit to Congress a plan for coordinating the use of the National Guard and members of the Armed forces on active duty when responding to natural disasters, acts of

terrorism, and other man-made disasters as identified in the national planning scenarios described in subsection (e).”²⁷ The recommendations mentioned previously along with concerted joint and interagency cooperation to plan strategically can balance the equipping challenges and related issues. The proverbial “appalling gap, which puts the nation and its citizens at greater risk”²⁸ requires a highly innovative Homeland Security Strategic plan and unrestricted resources to close that gap completely.

Conclusion

In May 2007, the Army National Guard G4 reported having 49 percent of its equipment on hand. This report reflected a shortage of Dual-Use items such as 20,000 HUMVEES, 38,000 FMTV’s, 225,000 night vision goggles, numerous thermal sights, and crew-served weapons. These shortages will continue to impede disaster response relief efforts and mobilization preparation efforts within the ARFORGEN cycle.

In December 2007, the Army National Guard G4 reported having 53 percent of its equipment on hand, while the Army G8 reported that the ARNG had 79 percent of its equipment on hand. The discrepancies between the estimates of the Army G8 and the Army National Guard G4 have been attributed to conflicting data in the Standard Army Maintenance System (STAMIS) of Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) used by the Army National Guard and the Army Flow Model (AFM) used by the Army G8. The desirability of reporting actual equipment available should not be overshadowed by rhetoric, since deployed ARNG equipment is obviously not available for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions. The equipment on-hand numbers realistically identify needed resources to facilitate, maintain, and support the ARNG strategic equipping plan.

On 30 December 2007, the President Bush vetoed H.R. 1585: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2008. The second- and third-order effect of this veto directly impacts the ARNG's strategic equipping plans. For example, in Section 1801, the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007 is embedded within H.R. 1585, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, in which Section 533 increases the rank of Chief of the National Guard Bureau from lieutenant general to general. In addition, "it makes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) through the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff (CJCS) on matters involving the National Guard not employed in a federal status and other matters determined by the SECDEF." ²⁹

Further, in Section 1826, "The annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report now must include the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's certified inventory of equipment which was funded but not received by a National Guard unit by the end of that year." ³⁰ ARNG's critical leverage to review and mitigate annual equipment shortfalls would be lost if this vetoed bill is not passed. ARNG's ability to obtain the funding to eliminate equipment shortfalls and to prevent ARNG equipment from being diverted or decreased through the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process would also be lost since the Chief of the National Guard Bureau would not have the much-needed ear of the Secretary of Defense. The future strategic equipping problem goes beyond not having enough resources; the ARNG needs the organizational clout to sustain a well prepared, well-trained, and fully equipped force.

According to the Executive Memorandum No.1016, "While the military services should continue to direct the training and organizing of the National Guard as a federal

Reserve Component of the Army and the Air Force, the National Guard should have its own equipment budget. Specifically, the National Guard should have a separate account for equipment procurement within the annual defense spending bills.”³¹ ARNG must continue its aggressive quest for legislative support for sufficient funding and equipping from Congress and from the next President of the United States.

The stakeholders involve all Americans, both at home and abroad: the next natural or catastrophic disaster like Katrina could impact any state. This is not just an ARNG problem; it has been a systemic Army problem – not enough equipment provided for the entire U.S. Army in DOD and Congressional budgets for over 50 years. Risk was accepted in the Army prior to 9/11 with less in the United States Air Force (USAF) and the United States Navy (USN).

On 28 January 2008, the President of the United States signed H.R. 4986: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into law. According to H.R. 4986: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 modifications, “To provide for the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as previously enrolled, with certain modifications to address the foreign sovereign immunities provisions of Title 28, United States Code, with respect to the attachment of property in certain judgments against Iraq, the lapse of authorities for the payment of bonuses, special pays, and similar benefits for members of the uniformed services, and for the other purposes.”³² So help should be on the way.

Endnotes

¹ Dr. Derek Povah, Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, GA “SBE Tiger Team” telephone interview by author, 27 November 2007.

² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Reserve Forces, Army National Guard's Role Organization, and Equipment Needs to be Re-examined* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005), 1.

³ Ibid., 9.

⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Draft Army Campaign Plan 2008* (ARFORGEN Implementation Plan) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2008), F-4

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement, Addendum H* (ARMY FORCE GENERATION) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007); available from http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum_print/h.html; Internet; accessed 07 November 2007.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Speaker Nancy Pelosi, "National Guard Readiness," 7 May 2007, linked from *The Gavel Blog Homepage* at "Archives," available from <http://www.speaker.gov/blog/?p=346>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2007.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army Posture Statement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2007), B-5.

¹³ Speaker Nancy Pelosi, "National Guard Readiness."

¹⁴ Senator Patrick Leahy, "National Guard Readiness," 9 May 2007, linked from *The Gavel Blog Homepage* at "Archives," available from <http://www.speaker.gov/blog/>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2007.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army National Guard, *2007 National Guard Posture Statement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Guard Bureau, 2007), 1.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement, Addendum H*.

¹⁷ LTG H. Steven Blum, *Executive Summary*, given before the 110th Congress on 27 March 2007, 4.

¹⁸ U.S. Defense Science Board, *Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2007), 22.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army National Guard, *2007 National Guard Posture Statement*, 7.

²⁰ LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, "Army National Guard Maintains Effectiveness through Transitions," *Army National Guard Magazine* (December 2006): 56.

²¹ Vice Chief of Staff General Cody, "Rebalance of the Army National Guard," G-3 memorandum for the U.S. Army National Guard, Washington, D.C., 9 October 2007.

²² LTG H. Steven Blum, *Executive Summary*, given before the 110th Congress on 27 March 2007, 3.

²³ U.S. Army National Guard, *Army National Guard Logistics Transformation Strategic Plan* (Arlington, VA: U.S. National Guard Bureau, Executive Advisory Group for Logistics Excellence (EAGLE) Committee, selected Title-Ten Logistics Officers, 2004), 22.

²⁴ Mr. Anthony (Tony) Skivo, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, VA, "ARNG EQUIPPING CHALLENGES" interview by author, 19 September 2007.

²⁵ U.S. Department of the Army National Guard, *2007 National Guard Posture Statement*, 7.

²⁶ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st –Century Operational Force*, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 31 January 2008), 225. Lieutenant General Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, transcript of May 3, 2006.

²⁷ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008*, Sec.1814; H.R. 4986 (2008). Signed by President Bush on 28 January 2008, it became Public Law No: 110-181; (110th Congress of the United States of America at the second session).

²⁸ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st –Century Operational Force*, 107.

²⁹ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008*, Sec. 533 and Sec. 1811; H.R. 1585. Vetoed by President Bush on 28 December 2007.

³⁰ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008*, Sec.1826; H.R. 1585. Vetoed by President Bush on 28 December 2007.

³¹ Mackenzie M. Eaglen, *Giving the National Guard What It Needs for the Future*, Executive Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 13 December 2006), 2.

³² *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008*, Sec.1814; H.R. 4986 (2008). Signed by President Bush on 28 January 2008, it became Public Law No: 110-181; (110th Congress of the United States of America at the second session).

