

HOMELAND SECURITY: THE ROAD AHEAD FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Homeland security protects the United States from hazards both man-made and natural. Executing this protective task is challenging. Terrorist threats are omnipresent and must be countered on a daily basis. Additionally, natural disasters are a pervasive threat to homeland security. Their magnitude and frequency appear to be increasing. When a disaster strikes, U.S. citizens deserve the best response possible.

To strengthen homeland security, collaboration and unity of effort are essential from sharing of information in attempts to prevent a terrorist attack to ensuring assistance efforts are adequately coordinated when responding to a disaster. The following research project addresses these issues and provides recommendations on how to continue the success that has been achieved. Finally, it addresses areas that should be more closely monitored such as continuing collaborative efforts and ensuring unity of effort.

HOMELAND SECURITY: THE ROAD AHEAD FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS

The United States continued as the world's hegemon at the end of the 20th century. U.S. citizens enjoyed individual freedoms that were unequaled anywhere. The United States was a nation at peace. It had seen the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and was postured to enjoy the prosperities of peace. Other parts of the world were not as fortunate though. They were struggling with political unrest, lack of international recognition, and global competition – but not the United States. The United States was the world's superpower.

With superpower status came freedoms other countries were not fortunate enough to have, most notably being freedom from terrorism. About the only time terrorism was even mentioned was when military personnel scheduled for overseas travel were briefed on terrorist threats abroad. This training focused on protecting the individuals while abroad but not here in the United States. No one would ever think about attacking the United States – it was the world's superpower. Regardless, even the world's superpower can be caught off guard. And it was. The United States was an unsuspecting nation caught off guard by terrorists.

The events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) changed the lives of Americans forever. Nearly 3,000 people died when al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked commercial jet airliners and crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City and into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. These terroristic actions showed the world that the United States was vulnerable to terrorist attacks within its borders. It redefined United States homeland security. It also was the catalyst for change within the federal government,

as appointed commissions were charged to determine how such an act could occur and what restructuring was needed to prevent another attack in the future.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 “created the Department of Homeland Security in the largest government reorganization in 50 years.”¹ Over 180,000 personnel from nearly 30 programs and agencies throughout the federal government were consolidated to create the Department of Homeland Security.² The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to lead a unified national effort to secure America. This mission is extremely challenging and continually evolving. Security of the American homeland is not a simple or easy task. The threats to the nation’s security are complex and countering them requires detailed planning and execution to ensure that the public is protected and that assets are properly positioned to respond to a crisis.

Security of the homeland is a core national interest of the United States. As defined by the National Strategy for Homeland Security, homeland security is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”³ Obviously, the primary goal is to prevent the attacks.

Homeland security goes beyond defending against terrorism. Effective preparedness and response to disasters increases the security of the Homeland. “Homeland security is the term generally used to refer to the broad national effort by all levels of government – federal, state, local and tribal – to protect the territory of the United States from hazards both internal and external, natural and man-made.”⁴

To explore how the terrorist attacks of 9/11 could happen without prior knowledge and warning from the intelligence community, the 9/11 Commission was

established. The central theme of this investigation was the fact that the intelligence community did not share information among its disparate agencies. These findings were not new. Similar findings were published in a 1998 report on Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a Nation Policy. This report recommended the reallocation of agency responsibilities to prepare the nation better for the emerging threat of catastrophic terrorism:

Today the U.S. intelligence community lacks a place to perform 'all-source' planning for collecting information, where the possible yields from efforts in overhead reconnaissance, electronic surveillance, clandestine agents, law enforcement databases and informants, and reports from foreign governments, can be sifted and organized for maximum complementary effect...We believe the U.S. needs a new institution to gather intelligence on terrorism, with particular attention to the threat of catastrophic terrorism.⁵

Not until the aftermath of 9/11 did the creation of such an organization occur.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence leads the intelligence community and serves as the principal advisor to the President for intelligence matters. He establishes objectives and priorities for the 16 agencies within the U.S. intelligence community and "manages and directs tasking of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence."⁶ Some objected that reform within the intelligence community was not needed; they said competition among the intelligence agencies was good. However, competition was not the issue. Information sharing had not been effectively exchanged among the agencies. Change was necessary.

Individuals seldom embrace change, but at times change within an organization is necessary. So far the change within the intelligence community is working. These

changes have ensured “a more collaborative, comprehensive approach to intelligence support for national security.”⁷ This greater collaboration is vital, according to Mike McConnell, current Director of National Intelligence, because no single agency has the capacity to survey all the information collected. “The U.S. intelligence community collects more than one billion pieces of information every day. Agencies will never have enough analysts to fully examine all the data that is collected but the ones they do have can do their job better by developing new ways of analyzing and distributing information in a more integrated community.”⁸

As a fundamental responsibility, “the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for assessing the nation’s vulnerabilities.”⁹ The Office of Intelligence and Analysis within Homeland Security is responsible for integrating information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the United States. One of the greatest threats that exist is another 9/11 attack. On 17 November 2007, David Cohen, Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for the New York City Police Department, informed U.S. Army War College (USAWC) students that the threat to New York City is just as imminent today as it was five years ago. NYPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau detects numerous threats and plots that are directed at New York City. Intelligence is constantly shared among federal, state, city, and local agencies to optimize prevention efforts.

Collaboration efforts between federal, state, and local entities extend beyond intelligence sharing. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Interagency and International Services Program is an example of this collaboration effort. It provides technical assistance to other federal agencies, state and local governments, and tribal

nations. The Interagency and International Service Program uses USACE capabilities to support the objective of National Security.¹⁰

On 15 November 2007, Joseph Seebode, District Harbor Program Manager for the New York District, informed a small group of USAWC students that USACE completed numerous projects for New York City under the Interagency and International Services Program to reduce the vulnerability of key infrastructure facilities to a terrorist attack. Some of the completed projects included upgrade of the New York City water supply security system, installation of blast shields and critical component reinforcement on key bridges, and denial barriers at key strategic facilities throughout the city. New York City also compiled an updated coastal storm plan after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast; USACE subsequently reviewed the plan. USACE modeled four Category 1 through 5 hurricanes hitting New York City and provided recommendations based upon the modeled projections. These collaborative efforts among governmental agencies help ensure citizens are protected and strengthen homeland security.

Homeland security also involves deterrence. “DOD’s efforts to secure the United States from direct attack are intrinsically linked to the concept of deterrence.”¹¹ The employment of military forces to conduct missions on U.S. territory is constrained by law and historic public policy. The scope of DOD’s role in preventing terrorist attacks within the United States is legally prescribed in the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief; DOD’s domestic authority is limited by statutory regulations to military support of civilian law enforcement. “Newly expanded authorities under Title 32 of U.S. Code provide Governors and state officials with the authority to use National Guard units to perform homeland defense activities. National Guard forces may provide

security for critical infrastructure when the Secretary of Defense determines that doing so is both necessary and appropriate.”¹²

Joint Task Force Empire Shield exemplifies a deterrent effort that is reducing the threat of another terrorist attack on New York City. New York’s Division of Military and Naval Affairs has provided a force of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen performing security duties in a state active duty status since 9/11. The force size has fluctuated depending upon the mission requirements, but approximately 500 members are currently on duty at New York City’s airports and train stations, as well as at upstate New York nuclear power plants. Its mission is to deter, detect, defeat, and mitigate terrorist acts. LTG Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, claims “New York’s use of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen in a full-time Homeland Security role is a model for what the Guard should be doing around the country.”¹³

Natural Disasters – An Ever Increasing Threat

Natural disasters are an increasing threat to U.S. homeland security. These threats appear to be increasing in intensity and frequency, so they have emerged at the forefront of national preparedness. Preparing to respond to disasters is a primary requirement of government, which is the care of its citizens. Continued urbanization compounds this requirement. If a disaster strikes a concentrated population base, the results could be devastating. This was the case with Hurricane Katrina.

“Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in our nation’s history.”¹⁴ Over 1,800 people lost their lives when this Category 5 hurricane struck the Gulf Coast states of Louisiana and Mississippi on 29 August 2005. It was the third-strongest hurricane on record to make landfall in the United States. Damages caused

by Hurricane Katrina were estimated at \$81.2 billion, “making it the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history.”¹⁵ It impacted nearly 93,000 square miles of the Gulf Coast. The winds and storm surge overwhelmed levees and flooded approximately 80 percent of New Orleans – destroying the nation’s thirty-fifth largest city.¹⁶

Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, NORTHCOM began implementing alert and coordination procedures for federal military assistance and response. The Defense Department also assessed the resources that would be needed to respond effectively and started deployment preparations:

NORTHCOM’s first responses to Katrina’s approach began the week prior to its August 29 landfall. On Wednesday, August 24, NORTHCOM issued its first warning orders to Regional Emergency Preparedness Officers, State Emergency Preparedness Officers, and the Senior Army Advisors (Guard) in the states expected to be affected. The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi declared states of emergency on August 26 and 27, respectively. President Bush declared a state of emergency for Louisiana on August 27 and NORTHCOM began to deploy the forward elements of what was to become Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-Katrina). On Monday, August 29, after Katrina made landfall, President Bush issued a federal declaration of emergency, and on Tuesday, August 30, JTF-Katrina was officially activated. That evening, in response to levee breaches and consequent flooding in New Orleans, the DHS Secretary declared Katrina an Incident of National Significance. By Wednesday, August 31, DOD medical airlift operations from the affected area were underway, and the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan arrived off New Orleans. On Thursday, September 1, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division were placed on alert. The 5,200 troops from these units began deploying on September 3 and arrived in the area on September 5. By September 6, a second amphibious assault ship, the USS Iwo Jima, and the aircraft carrier USS Truman had also arrived. By September 7, DOD assets in the affected area included 42,990 National Guard personnel, 17,417 active duty personnel, 20 U.S. ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed wing aircraft.¹⁷

Taking into consideration the current OPTEMPO within DOD, the military response to Hurricane Katrina was quite impressive:

The federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that the Department of Defense has the capability to play a critical role in the

Nation's response to catastrophic events. DOD, including both National Guard and active duty forces, demonstrated that along with the Coast Guard it was one of the only federal departments that possessed real operational capabilities to translate Presidential decisions into prompt, effective action on the ground. In addition to possessing operational personnel in large numbers that have been trained and equipped for their missions, DOD brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities.¹⁸

Nonetheless, in any operation, there are areas that can be improved upon.

Deputy Defense Secretary for Homeland Defense Paul McHale admitted this need when he said, "The U.S. military performed admirably as it responded to Hurricane Katrina during the largest, fastest civil support mission in U.S. history – but it needs to do better in the future."¹⁹

The main problem that surfaced was unity of effort among active duty forces and the National Guard. Their separate command structures hindered the unity of effort. In the rush to rescue victims stranded in the stricken region, the National Guard, active duty units, and civilian agencies provided helicopter response but sometimes all embarked on the same missions without realizing it.²⁰ NORTHCOM commanded active duty forces while the Governors commanded their own National Guard forces. For the first two days of Katrina response operations, NORTHCOM did not have situational awareness of what forces the National Guard had on the ground. JTF-Katrina could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked visibility of over half the military forces in the disaster area. Also, without an established formal command relationship between active duty forces and the National Guard, confusion resulted over the roles and responsibilities of the two organizations. This confusion "highlights the need for a more unified command structure."²¹

The military was not the only responding organization criticized for its performance. The federal government was heavily criticized for its slow response in responding to Hurricane Katrina. Officials at all levels of government lacked a fundamental understanding of the National Response Plan, as well as state and local response plans.²² Fundamentally, nobody was prepared for a catastrophe of such magnitude. "Hurricane Katrina exposed significant flaws in federal, state, and local preparedness for catastrophic events and the capacity to respond to them."²³

Even so, the National Response Plan was designed to facilitate a comprehensive, coordinated response to such disasters. "The National Response Plan is an all-hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents across all levels of government and across a spectrum of activities that includes prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery."²⁴ It was adopted by the federal government in December 2004. As a result, Hurricane Katrina provided the first real test of the plan. Deficiencies were evident within the newly adopted National Response Plan, especially its capability to deal with catastrophic events. In an effort to fix the deficiencies identified within the plan, a new guide, the National Response Framework, was developed to refine the nation's all-hazards incident response. The National Response Framework focuses "on how the federal government is organized to support communities and states in catastrophic incidents."²⁵

Incident management is part of the National Response Framework; it is executed in three phases: prepare, respond, and recover. "Effective preparedness is essential for a successful response."²⁶ Six tasks form the preparedness cycle. They are plan, organize, train, equip, exercise, and evaluate. Planning is first and foremost. "Planning

is a foundational element of incident response and thus an essential homeland security activity.”²⁷

Planning and preparedness must begin at the lowest level possible. Individual citizens themselves need to take the initiative to prepare. Individuals are responsible for their own safety. They need to develop emergency plans and be prepared for disasters. Not only do these plans need developed, but they also must be shared with family members and practiced so everyone knows what to do in the case on an emergency. If every family is prepared to take care of themselves, then more response resources can be committed to saving lives during responses to a disaster. Although being prepared at the individual level won’t ensure flawless response efforts to a catastrophe, individual preparedness definitely will help. “Preparedness today will save lives tomorrow.”²⁸

Not all responses and recovery actions can be handled at the individual level. When further assistance is required, the incidents need to be handled at the lowest jurisdiction possible. When a local government exhausts its resources, it then requests specific additional resources from the county level. This request process proceeds similarly from the county to the state to the federal government as additional needs are identified.²⁹

“In a catastrophic scenario that overwhelms or incapacitates local and state capabilities, the federal government must be prepared to assume incident command and get assistance directly to those in need until state and local authorities are reconstituted.”³⁰ However, federal responders will not stand by idly until they are called:

Prior to and during catastrophic events the federal government may take proactive measures to mobilize and deploy assets in anticipation of a request from a state. Proactive federal response protocols are used to ensure that federal response resources reach the scene in a timely

manner despite any disruption to normal function of state or local governments. Protocols for proactive federal response are most likely to be implemented for catastrophic events involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive weapons of mass destruction, or large-magnitude earthquakes or other natural or technological disasters in or near heavily populated areas.³¹

To plan and prepare for potential disasters, the National Response Framework presented 15 National Planning Scenarios that depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios, ranging from terrorist attacks employing WMD to catastrophic natural disasters. “These scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning for homeland security preparedness work at all levels of government and with the private sector. The 15 scenarios form the basis for coordinated federal planning, training and exercises.”³²

It is essential that the private sector is an integral part of the planning and response network:

The private sector owns and operates 85% of our nation’s critical infrastructure. Private sector preparation and response is vital to mitigating the national impact of disasters. Governments cannot plan to adequately respond unless the private sector helps them understand what infrastructure truly is critical. To maximize the nation’s preparedness, federal, state, and local governments must join with the private sector to collaboratively develop plans to respond to major disasters.³³

DOD plays a large role in disaster preparedness and response, especially response to catastrophic disasters. “Absent the development of greater civilian capabilities in disaster response, the expectation will remain that DOD will provide substantial assistance in instances of catastrophic disasters.”³⁴ DOD has designated its domestic response command. “NORTHCOM has the operational responsibility for civil support for most of the United States. It carries out civil support missions with forces assigned as required from all the armed services.”³⁵ NORTHCOM has a Defense

Coordinating Element located in each of the ten FEMA Regional Headquarter offices. They are the subject matter experts for their region. The Defense Coordinating Element is NORTHCOM's representative with FEMA, other government agencies, state emergency responders, and the state's National Guard within their region. The Defense Coordinating Element plays a critical role in ensuring that DOD is aware of situational requirements so they can be prepared to provide the required support:

One of NORTHCOM's principal roles is to study the gaps between what a state and the National Guard Bureau, through its emergency management compacts, can provide in the event of a disaster, and where the federal government, in terms of the military, may be asked to provide support. NORTHCOM's role, as a potential natural disaster is seen coming, is to anticipate the places landfall might occur and to identify the gaps in that state and begin to posture support.³⁶

The 15 National Planning Scenarios presented in the National Response Framework involve DOD Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). To ensure the federal government is prepared to respond in these potential scenarios, multiple training exercises are conducted annually to test the full range of knowledge and ability to effectively respond at the local, state, and federal levels. DOD is a critical player in these training exercises. As stated in the 2007 National Strategy For Homeland Security,

While defending the Homeland is appropriately a top priority for the Department of Defense, the country's active, reserve, and National Guard forces also must continue to enhance their ability to provide support to civil authorities, not only to help prevent terrorism but also to respond to and recover from man-made and natural disasters that do occur. Working with the nation's Governors and State Adjutants General, the Department of Defense must develop operational plans based upon unity of effort in support of homeland security missions across the nation. These plans will determine specific military requirements and capabilities for accomplishing homeland security missions that will most effectively be met by the combined effort of active, reserve, and National Guard forces.³⁷

Post Katrina Disaster Operations

“A series of wildfires began burning across Southern California on 20 October 2007. At least 1,500 homes were destroyed and over 500,000 acres of land burned. Nine people died as a result of the fires while 85 others were injured. The last fire was fully contained on 9 November 2007. The fires forced approximately 500,000 people to evacuate their homes, the largest evacuation in the region’s history.”³⁸

The California wildfires of October 2007 received national attention. These wildfires were the largest natural disaster in the United States since Hurricane Katrina. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared the wildfires had created a state of emergency. President George W. Bush ordered federal aid to supplement state and local response efforts. The President’s action authorized FEMA to coordinate all disaster relief efforts that have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures. It also authorized FEMA “to identify, mobilize, and provide equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency.”³⁹

DOD deployed a wide range of personnel and assets to assist with fighting the wildfires. Over 2,700 National Guard and more than 200 active duty military personnel were deployed to Southern California to support the fire fighting efforts. DOD equipment consisted of 23 helicopters, 17 fire trucks, and 12 C-130 Hercules cargo planes equipped with Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems.⁴⁰ Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, stated in a 23 October 2007 Pentagon news conference that “Defense Department officials have provided everything that

California officials have asked for and are leaning forward to anticipate what they might need next.”⁴¹ General Gene Renuart, commander of NORTHCOM, briefed reporters on 23 October 2007, informing them that

lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina helped NORTHCOM and its interagency partners efficiently and effectively support the wildfire response in California. A lot was learned from Hurricane Katrina on how to prepare for a disaster by training and building a real planning culture among all of the interagency participants. The involvement of DOD response would not have been possible if the interagency community and NORTHCOM had not applied and practiced the lessons learned during the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005.⁴²

General Renuart also stated that DOD’s job “is not to come in and take over an operation in a state. DOD’s job is to ensure that as the Governor and the Adjutant General see the need, DOD is on the doorstep with the right kinds of capabilities for them to continue their response. DOD’s role is to make sure that the things the Governors need are ready when they need them.”⁴³

Thus, the response system has improved due to lessons learned and changes made following Hurricane Katrina. Shawn Waters, Chief of Staff at FEMA Region 2, echoed some of General Renuart’s comments. On 16 November 2007, Waters informed USAWC students during a small group visit to FEMA that the federal government is becoming more proactive in dealing with disasters. The federal government now provides a surge capacity by prepositioning assets and assistance when intelligence predicts impending disasters. A lot of the requirements that will be needed in a particular crisis are known beforehand, provided by a gap analysis performed to determine what assets an entity may lack or not be able to provide themselves. Waters also reported that attention has been focused upon building

relationships between the state and federal entities to foster a more collaborative environment.

The response to the California wildfires worked well and support was provided when it was needed, but all the problems have not been addressed and solved concerning MSCA during disasters operations. Although a severe disaster for the State of California, the wildfires of October 2007 were of neither the scale nor magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, nor did they require a comparable amount of federal assistance in response. California faces threats from fires on a regular basis. Local, state, and U.S. Forest Service officials are experienced not only in fighting fires but also in working with other federal agencies in requesting and receiving assistance. DOD also has experience supporting fighting forest fires in the western United States. This experience facilitated support operations and collaboration efforts between all involved parties during the Southern California wildfires.

Unlike in the response to Hurricane Katrina, unity of effort was achieved during the Southern California wildfires even though separate command structures existed between active duty forces and the National Guard. Much of the success achieved during the wildfires can be attributed to experience, to the collaborative efforts that are continually taking place between all levels of government, and to the relatively small size of the active duty response required and the size of the disaster itself. The coordination and response efforts would not have been as effective in California if the disaster had been much larger and the response had required many additional assets. The response would not have run as smoothly as it did if the disaster required the coordinated effort of additional active duty and National Guard forces. The U.S. still

needs to establish a unified command structure to facilitate federal support to future disaster operations to ensure unity of effort is always achieved.

A unified command structure cannot be established between the National Guard while in state active duty status or in Title 32 status and active duty forces while in Title 10 status. "Pursuant to the Constitution, the militia is under the exclusive command and control of the Governor until called into federal service. Thus, federal status military officers cannot exercise command and control over state status National Guard members nor can state status National Guard members exercise command and control over federal troops."⁴⁴ This was the case until the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act made statutory changes that made unified command a reality between National Guard and active duty forces when providing MSCA:

Statute 32 U.S.C. 325 as amended by the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act allows a National Guard officer to serve in both a federal and state status while serving on active duty in command of a National Guard unit if the President authorizes such service in both duty statuses and the Governor of the State consents to such service in both duty statuses. This command option provides unity of command and effort and facilitates the maintenance of a common operating picture for both the federal and state military chains of command. A Memorandum of Agreement is required between the two mutually exclusive federal and state military commands outlining the responsibilities and authority of the dual status commander. While the dual status commander may receive orders from two chains of command, those chains of command must recognize and respect that the dual status commander exercises all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner, either in a federal or state status but never in both statuses at the same time.⁴⁵

This statutory change allows a National Guard commander familiar with state and local areas of operations to serve both in a federal and state status, thereby providing both unity of command and unity of effort while commanding both state and federal forces. To prepare potential dual-status commanders, the National Guard Bureau has established a Joint Task Force Commander Training Course. This course is open to

federally recognized officers of the line in the grades of O6 – O8 from the active duty, National Guard, and Army Reserve; it is designed to develop a pool of trained leaders ready to execute Title 10/32 Command Authority. As of June 2007, a total of 243 officers had completed the training.⁴⁶

Recommendations for Improved Homeland Security Conditions

The following recommendations seek to build upon recent successes and improve areas that need attention. Successful efforts that have improved homeland security conditions must continue to ensure U.S. citizens remain protected at all times while concentrating on and improving unity of effort.

The collaborative efforts that have been developed among federal, state, and local entities – both in intelligence sharing and providing technical assistance should continue. Agencies must continue cooperating; all levels of government must continue to work together to reduce the risk of another 9/11 attack. It is essential that all information collected is analyzed and distributed throughout the entire intelligence community. These collaborative efforts are essential; they must be sustained.

All levels of government must be aware of the various assistance programs that are available to help mitigate, deter, and plan for disasters. USACE's Interagency and International Service Program is an example of an assistance program that all "mega" cities need to take advantage of to help mitigate vulnerabilities of key infrastructure and facilities. Homeland Security and FEMA support USACE's efforts to continue the hurricane-modeling program for other cities on the East Coast to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and to prevent catastrophic events.

The detection, mitigation, and deterrence initiatives currently employed within New York City must be sustained. These efforts remain successful to date and can serve as a model for other “mega” cities within the United States to detect, mitigate, and deter terrorist attacks.

A command and control (C2) relationship between National Guard and active duty forces to assure unity of effort when responding to disasters should be created. Current doctrine does not address C2 between National Guard and active duty forces when providing MSCA. Lack of doctrine complicates the efforts of the responding forces to achieve unity of effort.

“Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective.”⁴⁷ Without established doctrine when responding to a disaster as a combined response force, National Guard and active duty forces, unity of effort is difficult to achieve. During a symposium on Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crisis held at the USAWC on 11-12 July 2007, B. F. Giffard advised that “our traditional notions of C2 required a cultural migration away from ‘command and control’ toward a broader concept of ‘command, control, and collaboration’.”⁴⁸ Without defined C2, desired effects are left up to collaboration. Memoranda of understanding and agreement of sets of circumstances establish operating norms when a doctrinal C2 structure should be established. These operating norms usually will work for smaller disaster response operations, but to ensure unity of effort in all response operations, unified military command structure is necessary.

Smaller disasters or frequently recurring disasters (western forest fires) that do not require a large response force are easier to coordinate, and in such incidents, the

lack of unity of effort between National Guard and active duty forces is not an issue. In these scenarios, active duty forces are controlled by a Defense Coordinating Officer who is under Operational Control (OPCON) to NORTHCOM while National Guard assets remain under state control. Response efforts are usually coordinated due to the smaller size of the response and the responder's experience with similar operations. Regardless, a command structure should still be established, rather than controlling response efforts through reliance on previous collaboration efforts.

Lack of an appropriate established command structure becomes quite apparent when facing a disaster of catastrophic proportions, one that cannot be addressed with state assets and which requires a large number of active duty forces to assist with relief efforts. This scenario will exhibit lack of unity of effort due to the number of circumstances. Accomplishing missions without a unified command relationship is difficult and often protracted. With a unified C2 relationship, unity of effort can be accomplished more effectively and efficiently. A dual-status C2 structure between National Guard and active duty forces when responding to a disaster should be established. A previously trained dual-status commander who exercises unity of command over the response force and who will then be able to ensure unity of effort should be identified and appointed.

Conclusion

Substantial progress has been made in homeland security since the events of 9/11, but improvements are still needed in some areas. Governments must continue to work together in protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks and in recovering from

natural disasters. The role of government, to care for the people, needs to remain at the forefront at all times.

The recommendations focus on two critical objectives for continued success: collaboration and unity of effort. These objectives need to be more than mere words. They need to become a way of life within the government so it can respond to citizens' greatest needs in the most dire circumstances. Only when parochialism is put aside and the needs of the people are the only thing that matters will collaboration and unity of effort be achieved. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England said, the most important task that the government has is "defending the U.S. homeland – our people, property, and freedom. It is our most fundamental duty. Failure is not an option."⁴⁹

Endnotes

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