

HOW AFGHANISTAN CAN ASSUME OWNERSHIP FOR THE ONGOING CONFLICT

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HOW AFGHANISTAN CAN ASSUME OWNERSHIP FOR THE ONGOING CONFLICT

by

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ABSTRACT

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In view of United States global commitments and larger Global War on Terror (GWOT) strategy, the ultimate security goal in Afghanistan must be for the Afghans to assume ownership of the counterinsurgency struggle. The United States and coalition partners are fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to achieve several national security goals; 1) champion human dignity, 2) strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and prevent future attacks against the United States and its friends, and 3) ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade. The Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorist and insurgent groups, are working hard to push the West out of the region in pursuit of establishing a larger caliphate. A persistent United States challenge is helping the Afghans help themselves and take on a larger role in the counterinsurgency struggle. This paper will outline two strategies vital to enhancing Afghanistan's ability to play a larger role in the ongoing GWOT. The two strategies are: to provide security to local communities and extending economic and political development to the lowest level possible. Additionally, this paper will explain why it is vitally important for the United States to make these strategies a reality.

HOW AFGHANISTAN CAN ASSUME OWNERSHIP FOR THE ONGOING CONFLICT

Al Qaeda is still dangerous to people of good will, no matter which society one is from; America, Europe, Afghanistan, or other countries in the wider community.

—Mr Kurt Volker

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

In view of the United States global commitments and its larger Global War on Terror (GWOT) strategy, the ultimate security goal in Afghanistan must be for the Afghans to assume ownership of the counterinsurgency struggle. The United States and its coalition partners are fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to achieve several national security goals; 1) champion aspirations for human dignity, 2) strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent future attacks against the United States and its friends, and 3) ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade. The Taliban, al Qaeda, along with other terrorist and insurgent groups, are working even harder to push the West out of the region in pursuit of establishing the dream of a larger caliphate. A persistent United States challenge is helping the Afghans help themselves and take on a larger role. This paper will lay out two strategies that are vital to enhancing Afghanistan's ability to play a larger role in the ongoing GWOT, enabling the United States, coalition partners, and others to return the country to the people of Afghanistan. The two strategies are: to provide security to local communities and extending economic and political development to the lowest level possible. Additionally, this paper will explain why it is vitally important for the United States to make these strategies a reality

Why Helping Afghanistan Matters

Afghanistan is mountainous with countless remote areas, riddled with corruption, has ill-trained police forces, is burdened by a drug trade, and lacks local security. These factors significantly complicate the achievement of a secure, democratic, and less drug dependent nation. Despite these complications, helping Afghanistan matters because the rising conflict has created such strains in the Alliance. Afghanistan is testing the relevance of NATO and the idea of collective security.

According to the Washington Times, Afghanistan has become “NATO’s Achilles heel.”¹ Al Qaeda and the Taliban are driven by cultural fragmentation, schooled in the most sophisticated technologies, and fueled by transnational crime.² Extremists such as the Taliban and al Qaeda know they cannot win in open battle in open debate of ideas. So the only chance they have to succeed is through brutal and dramatic attacks that have no strategic value other than to create an impression of fear and failure. The exploitation of violent extremism expands when Afghanistan became a failed state and a haven for terrorists. This was Afghanistan under the brutal repression of the Taliban. There was an open door for al Qaeda to train thousand of extremists and terrorists, using Afghan territory and facilities. Neighbors and nations of good will have a long term, wider struggle with the issue of violent extremism, and groups like al Qaeda. We have a critical interest in not allowing groups like the Taliban or al Qaeda to (1) reassert control in Afghanistan and (2) exploit Afghanistan through violence and violent ideology within the region and the broader Middle East.

This enemy is forcing corporations and individuals to develop new ways of defending themselves. The integration of all elements of national power is not the same compared to the world wars, the Korean War, or even Desert Storm because America’s

superiority in conventional warfare has forced adversaries to adopt asymmetric warfare.³ Terrorism and insurgency now describe modern conflicts, issuing forth an age of the amorphous, agile enemy. Future wars will probably continue to evolve, widening the gap of integration of elements of power.⁴ Interstate conflicts will likely decline because of the changing nature of threats and how states adapt to them. Current threats to Afghanistan offer no such conveniences. Modern warfare has expanded beyond interstate warfare, transcending armed conflict between military forces.

The United States must understand the policy implications of asymmetric warfare on military operations. The United States' involvement in four generations of warfare suggests a paradigm shift has occurred. This paradigm shift targets the political leadership and its will, rather than the traditional destruction of armies. To further demonstrate the complexities associated with enabling Afghanistan to assume a greater role in the counterinsurgency struggle, it is important to outline its geo-strategic and socio-economic arena.

Afghanistan is a propped-up failed state, with a medieval economy, poor infrastructure, a limited government, and low literacy. It is riddled with corruption, smuggling, narcotic trades, crime, and decades of conflict. The narcotics market is 50-60 percent of the Afghan GDP, and the Taliban funds upwards of 40-50 percent of their operations through opium poppies.⁵

Afghanistan presents a greater long term security challenge to the West because it serves as a buffer state for its neighbors. All of Afghanistan's neighbors suffer from domestic instability and hence an increased probability of conflict breaking out. Although the Iraqi conflict consumes greater attention and resources, Afghanistan's

poor infrastructure, tribal political tradition, poor economic potential, and diffused population present greater challenges for creating a functional government in Afghanistan.⁶ The question remains whether the West is willing to stay the course in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the West does not wish Afghanistan to become a safe haven for terrorists once again. Al Qaeda continues to threaten and plot against non-Muslim and apostate-Muslim governments, hoping to spark a global jihad. Al Qaeda is looking for opportunities to attack throughout the world, especially Europe. Europeans are keenly aware of the threat and it serves as an incentive for European countries to remain engaged in Afghanistan. Both the Madrid bombing in March of 2004 and the London bombings in July of 2005 are excellent reminders.⁷

In the realm of Realpolitik, Afghanistan has little to no intrinsic strategic importance to the West. Hence, it becomes imperative for the Afghan government to assume the main political and security burden before its benefactors lose patience.

Security Issues

NATO can assist Afghanistan in assuming the main security burden by focusing on both short and long-term security issues. Two strategies vital to enhancing Afghanistan's ability to take on a larger role in the counterinsurgency struggle are: to provide security to its local communities, and to extend economic and political development to the lowest levels possible, through a bottom-up approach. Enhancing the security posture in Afghanistan rests on two pillars: national and local. The national pillar could be achieved through police reforms and from the Army. The national pillar requires a professional, sufficiently sized, and well-equipped Afghan National Army and

Afghan National Police. The international community has recognized this need and focused a great deal of attention on both of these institutions. The local pillar is at the community level. It has received less attention, which is disturbing, since it is here that insurgencies and criminal organizations flourish. Achieving local security is possible through cadres, auxiliary police, and militias. Regardless of the types of security forces used, the goal of creating security for local communities is a counterinsurgency and development imperative for combating extremists.

Tactically, extremists use terrorism to intimidate the local populace to the point of gaining compliance, which is a principle means of gaining control of the population. The export of violent ideological extremism and use of terrorism do great danger to all United States and coalition activities and interests in Afghanistan. It hinders progress. Bringing a sharp focus on community-level security can have an effective impact on this violent tactic. Reducing the effectiveness of this violent tactic will better align loyalties from tribal chiefs and warlords and ultimately aid in governance over the population.

With much of Afghan societies centering on loyalties to local chieftains and/or warlords, the United States needs to factor tribalism into the course of COIN development and state building. The reality is that a state may be nothing more than a collection of tribes or fiefdoms functioning autonomously.⁸ In third world countries like Afghanistan, families and tribes provide the majority of needs as identified in Maslow's hierarchy of needs.⁹ In light of the pervasiveness of tribalism, using local police to combat insurgents is much more effective than using coalition forces to implement local security initiatives (e.g. neighborhood watch, census taking, curfews, investigations, etc.)

One way local police and local authorities could be effective is best exemplified through General D. McNeill's comments to the Army War College on 4 March 2008: "Usually the bad guys are new faces in the crowds, I have trouble identifying new faces, but there are others among us, who do not; such as the local population."¹⁰ If it is their will to cast out, defeat, or identify insurgents, it will become a reality and combat operations can ensue. With elders and other leaders assuming greater responsibility for the security and development of their communities, the Government of Afghanistan (GAO) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will not be overwhelmed by the details.

The Afghan National Army (ANA)

The ANA is critical to protecting Afghanistan from external threats and internal paramilitary threats. Finding the right balance of security forces at community levels, could position the military to take on a much broader role in national security, as it should. It took years to build the ANA. The ANA can never attain the sufficient size required to provide security everywhere at all times.

It took the United States, along with assistance from coalition partners, approximately five years to create a professional 70,000-man army in Afghanistan with a presence in each of the five regions. Despite reaching sufficient maturity between 2003-2008, the military, along with other security forces, still requires time to grow and improve. Other than during the Soviet intervention, Afghanistan has not had large, robust armed forces historically. In the past, cultural factors prevented standing up a non-tribal military.¹¹ Because of the attention paid to achieving ethnic balance in the ANA, cultural factors no longer have a detrimental effect on the military culture.

However, the ANA will likely remain relatively small due to budget constraints and available recruits. Although a 70,000-strong ANA will be a sufficient peace-time force, the on-going insurgency will strain resources, influences, and transitions, which explains why government officials want to increase its size.

Although decades of external influences, such as the Soviet military model, have complicated this transition to a professional military, the dedication of trainers and mentors from several western militaries has created an exemplary military institution. Equipping the ANA with modern weapons, providing better facilities, and providing ethics-based military training all support the primary ANA objective of being the lead for all land-based military operations. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the ANA cannot combat the criminal organizations plaguing the nation, at the same time it fights an insurgency. Not only have these factors prevented the nation from gaining political and economic momentum, but they also allowed the Taliban to re-organize and build its network unnoticed in the south.

In the past few years, the Taliban have been able to recover and establish an insurgency network in the southern region, which erupted into open warfare in 2006 when NATO/GOA expanded its geographic control to the south. With the resurgence of the Taliban in Southeastern Afghanistan, 2007 turned into the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since the Taliban government was ousted in 2001. Coalition police and military experts on the ground are working to counter the Taliban through the creation of professional Afghan National Police forces.¹²

The necessity for a large police force during an insurgency is clear. To avoid overextension and exhaustion through protracted conflict, the ANA must limit its

missions to fighting organized paramilitary forces and pushing insurgents away from population centers, while the police focus on securing population centers. The military cannot secure the entire country. No military force can secure an entire country. This is the conundrum of COIN.

Insurgents have mastered the tactic of abandoning safe havens when pressured. They relocate to other areas and begin their subversion cycle all over again.¹³ As insurgents move from location to location, the military could very easily exhaust itself deploying from one insurgent area to the next. This could very quickly become an endless cycle. To avoid overextension, authorities must secure population centers with local security forces (e.g. local police and perhaps militias), even in stable areas. In this manner, they prevent insurgents from infiltrating into local communities. Moreover, local security forces can also focus on combating local criminals and not just military threats. Instead of attempting to quash every little uprising, military leaders would instead focus on pushing insurgents away from population centers. Success from this dual-pronged strategy would result in fewer places for insurgents to operate within Afghanistan.

As a side note, a program which had deleterious effects on Afghan security was Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Even though the disbandment of warlord militias through DDR, (later called Disbanding of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)) was justified in terms of stemming corruption, depredations, and local power brokers, the attendant security vacuum created was filled by the Taliban and criminal organizations. Thus, disbanding warlord militias without a replacement made the cure worse than the disease.

By 2005, more than 200 local commanders were disarmed and tens of thousands of arms and ammunitions were collected in Afghanistan.¹⁴ Since the completion of DDR, the government of Afghanistan, backed by the UN, has continued focusing on ridding Afghanistan of illegally armed groups through DIAG. The unintended consequences of DDR/DIAG are: (1) some armed warlords used DDR as an opportunity to weaken their adversaries; (2) some have become more powerful since others cannot balance against them; (3) these imbalances in power have created security vacuums which the Taliban filled; (4) the ANA does not have the capability to redeem the security vacuum; (5) DIAG appears to focus more on collecting weapons than on disbanding illegally armed groups; and (6) the criminals and drug traffickers did not disarm, and are well-supported with top shelf weapons. Hence, a plentitude of weapons, mostly obsolete and broken, have been collected, but as mentioned, well-armed groups still abound.

The Afghan National Police (ANP)

The formal establishment of the Afghan National Police is the critical component in establishing security to Afghan communities. As already mentioned, having a permanent police presence in all population centers would not only relieve the ANA from policing every locale (an impossible task), but it would also serve as the front line against inchoate insurgent and criminal threats. Building the capacity of national and local police forces to provide increasing security at the lowest level is one of the most effective means of gaining control of the Afghan population.

Gaining control of the population is tied directly to the size and budget of the ANP. Like the ANA, this restricts ANP presence in Afghanistan. Consequently, the ANP is

limited to establishing its presence at the provincial level and to the district level to an extent. However, below that, the police presence is virtually nonexistent. Perhaps more troubling, building the ANP has taken years and will require a much larger force than the Army. The ANP is currently 62,000 strong with an ultimate manpower goal of 82,000. In spite of these numbers, the ANP suffers from inadequate equipment and training. Coalition advisors and mentors are working to redress ANP salary rates. More critical, rife with corruption, the ANP has insufficient public trust.

ANP reforms, increased funding, and extending a police presence to local communities will eventually extend the authority of the central government and create much needed stability in local communities. However, the short term threat posed by insurgents and criminal organizations require immediate attention or else Afghan society may cease to view the current Afghan government as legitimate, turning instead to the Taliban for security.

The crux to local security is to enable villages to defend against initial insurgent infiltration as well as insurgent attacks, thus depriving the insurgents access to the population. This will ultimately buttress national security. At the national level, strength and security would come through police reforms and from the military. Although use of auxiliary police is the fastest solution, (e.g. hiring local people as policemen), the problems of mixed loyalties, insufficient training, poor discipline, and the like would create more problems in the long run. Creating security for local communities cannot be attained through ad hoc initiatives. The more reformed police forces populate Afghanistan's lowest levels the less need there is for conventional forces. Additionally, border police are providing protection along the borders. These border activities are

aiding in decreasing smuggling and reducing insurgents movement. Establishing security in local communities throughout the country is a key building block to Afghanistan national security and to its future development.

Cadres

The Afghan government and coalition must consider ways in which to establish an immediate, permanent security presence at the local communities in order to separate insurgents from the population. Permitting the provinces to stand up auxiliary police and militias for local communities will certainly resolve the problem of security and may be necessary in an emergency. However, without proper discipline, instilled values, and commitment to the local communities, they can become rapacious and predatory. In short, the community would exchange one oppressor for another.

Security is fundamental to the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, and one of the best methods to achieving internal security is through the creation of local security forces.¹⁵ In both Loya Jirgas, the national assemblies held in 2002 and 2003, hundreds of delegates noted in their addresses to the plenary sessions that “security” was the top priority for their people, and that without security development and a return to normal life were impossible.¹⁶ Local security forces will serve as the front line of public protection, giving the ANP room to grow and mature. This level of protection and security will permit police reforms to take hold. It will enable the ANP to train its police force better and populate the police with loyal members and competent leaders, as well as weeding out corruption. In this manner, local security forces will have an enduring impact on Afghanistan’s overall security.

Using coalition cadres to establish security forces (police and/or militia) at the lowest level is one possible solution to establishing local security. Each cadre should have three basic charters for raising local security forces: 1) provide population centers with capabilities to defend themselves; 2) establish an early warning network against insurgent incursions; and 3) serve as conduit for ombudsmanship with respect to local corruption and criminal activity.¹⁷ Rapport is especially critical because the cadre's safety is intimately linked to the benevolence of the local authorities.¹⁸ The cadre recruits (in consultation with the local authorities), organize, equip, train, and pay local police forces. The cadre will also have the essential task of instilling discipline and values in the force. According to Raymond Millen:

Cadre-led forces also ameliorate the problems associated with pre-existing local police and auxiliary police forces in terms of mixed loyalties, corruption, and weak commitment to the community they serve and protect.¹⁹

After a period of evaluation and consultation with the local authorities, the cadre selects those personnel with the greatest leadership potential for formal police training. Upon their return, the trained personnel assume the leadership positions, permitting the cadre to step back and assume a mentor role. To avoid long term problems associated with rogue militias, cadres are paramount and should have a military background.²⁰

Because the police come from the local communities, they have an established rapport with the local people and can more readily identify and apprehend criminals or insurgent agents. Caution must be given to police protecting local criminals, if they are from the same clan. Recognizing that cadres cannot be inserted into high-threat areas willy-nilly, Millen cautions. "In contested or ambiguous threat areas, military prudence suggests that cadres accompany military units as they sweep villages or city

neighborhoods and remain in place once the military moves on.”²¹ In the case of full-blown insurgency, military units should remain in support of the cadres until they have established or re-established local security. At the grass roots and for the cadre concept to work, they must obtain permission to operate and establish rapport with local authorities (i.e., chieftain, tribal elders, mayor, etc.) to explain their presence. The ANA and coalition can assist in the separation of the insurgents from local communities by conducting small unit missions in the surrounding areas to push insurgent and criminal bands farther away from population centers.

Economic and Political Development

The Coalition can assist authorities to govern by empowering local communities through economic and political development as well as strengthening a sense of community. Democracy in Afghanistan is not a counterinsurgency strategy, but a process. Because of widespread violence, the state is unable to hold a monopoly on the use of force. State authority is undercut by a number of competing factions of local and regional commanders engaged in regular fighting.²² Armed regional and local private militia leaders establish their own rules for the provision of welfare, security, the distribution of wealth and booty, and clientelism.²³ The democratically elected government needs to be recognized as the people’s government in both the eyes of the Afghan people as well as the region.

Before economic and political development can thrive, security has to first be established. Economic prosperity and well-being are subsets of any security policy or regional stability. Economic development springs from the bottom-up rather than top-down, which ameliorates the problem of corruption that lurks among the various strata

of government and society.²⁴ Shifting the thought process to raise the economic level would have to parallel military effects.

After conferring with local authorities, cadres can contact the local provincial reconstruction team (PRT) to arrange for construction and development projects directly for their community. This approach is much more effective in providing benefits to small villages and neighborhoods, which might be ignored by national development programs.

Often, communities are shattered by insurgencies or even totalitarian regimes. In order to repair the damage, cadres can organize and channel resources for the establishment of sports teams, clubs, community volunteer services, etc, in order to promote social interaction. Nurturing this sense of community encourages the people and the police, making them more apt to defend their homes from criminal and insurgent threats.

Cadres can encourage construction and development agencies to provide materials, equipment, and training for local labor. By this approach, the local people learn a vocation and begin improvements to the community. In this manner, local economies blossom, creating prosperity from below.

In order to extend its reach and gain legitimacy with the people, the Afghan government needs to provide electricity, roads, water services, and other utilities to outlying areas. Afghanistan also needs other civil projects such as clinics, schools, wells, and bridges. USAID and NGOs can provide skills training, equipment, and materials as well for local projects. With the exception of security requirements, Afghanistan can achieve this through blue collar and low level technical contracts from companies willing to (a) provide jobs and skills training to locals, (b) aid local companies

in becoming independent, (c) solidify agreements to have tribal leaders take the lead against insurgents and criminal threats through use of cadre lead police forces, and (d) reinvest a large portion of their earning back into the local economy.

This would catapult the Afghan economy and its job market while fostering entrepreneurship and economic reinvestment. It would also eventually lead to a limited, but increasing economic independence. The more people increase their economic footing and stability, the more they are inclined to protect the source of that livelihood. Economic progression will likely blossom once the security environment is established.

Conclusion

One of the most persistent challenges for the United States to date is getting the Afghans to assume ownership for the ongoing conflict. This paper laid out two strategies that are vital to enhancing Afghanistan's ability to play a larger role in the ongoing GWOT. Providing security to the local communities and extending economic and political development to the lowest level possible are the two primary strategies for a better Afghanistan. Additionally, this paper explained why it is vitally important for the United States to make these strategies a reality. With improvements in all or most of the areas outlined in the paper, the government of Afghanistan can reduce its reliance on the coalition. In turn, the coalition can reduce its presence in Afghanistan. The ultimate goal is for Afghanistan to work its way to a fully independent and self-sustaining nation and for the United States to resolve its involvement without endless financial expenditures and without major military deployments.

It is clear that by providing both local security and economic development down to the local level will deliver many additional benefits to the maturing government of

Afghanistan. Enabling local communities to not only sufficiently defend themselves against insurgency, but criminal organizations as well, will foster an increased hope within Afghanistan for a better future. Hope will provide focus for Afghan inhabitants. Hope will also serve for improving the standard of living for Afghan families, the acquisition of new job skills in an expanding economy, sending children to school, and making improvements to the community through new construction, repairs, and maintenance.

Within a secure, economically improving environment, democratic institutions have a greater chance of blossoming. As stated, democracy is not a strategy but a political process. If security is not assured, insurgent and criminal organizations will expand and act unimpeded. Security provides the opportunity for political development as well as the establishment of law and order. The introduction of democracy into the Afghan society, a society that is unaccustomed to political choices, will most likely fail to result in the election of candidates from the general population. It is all the more likely that the local power brokers (e.g., warlords, chieftains, village elders, etc.) will be elected in the early years. However, as the people begin to prosper, they will begin to demand more from political leaders. If the leaders fail to deliver, the belief is that the populace will elect leaders who will. Naturally, this is not a linear process, but the history of democracies suggest this to be a central tendency. As the Afghan economy evolves to give birth to a middle class, the accountability of political leaders to their constituents will increase to the point that corruption will slowly be reduced as a major feature of society.

The exploding poppy problem is essentially linked to political control of many local communities. Regardless of what farmers want to grow, drug lords and insurgents will

force them to grow poppies for illicit profits. In order to slow down poppy production or maintain positive control and enforce a counternarcotics policy, the government must use police and perhaps some military forces to ensure compliance. Crop eradication is achieved by plowing up poppy fields within secured areas and providing farmers with alternative crops, either on the spot or within an extremely short timeframe. The agencies in charge of crop eradication should not accept help or advice from local power brokers because these broker may direct agencies to eradicate poppy fields of their enemies, competitors, or even other tribes. Additionally, if the power brokers are unaware of targeted fields, they cannot organize resistance or plant IEDs in advance. This approach offers a solution for the farmer's dilemma regarding choice in crops.

As outlined earlier, cadres are central to creating vibrant local communities. With this in mind, the United States may find it useful to establish cadres training courses aimed at issues such as law enforcement, development, economic, and information operations issues. Within the coalition framework and as the prominent representatives of the community, United Nations agencies, nongovernment organizations, and international organizations need to be able to precisely conceptualize what the community needs and how to fulfill this need. One such idea that may assist local communities is the solicitation of U.S. cities and/or towns to adopt a town or city. This could also be extended to or used to encourage European communities to do the same. Western communities can host donation drives on the behalf of their adopted cities or towns. Clothing, kitchen utensils, computers, school furniture, farming equipment, tools, and other such items are but a few examples of items that can be donated. Naturally, the coalition or government of Afghanistan would need to make transportation

arrangements for this initiative, but the benefits to the communities are so great that one can view the initiative as a counterinsurgency force multiplier. Furthermore, people from western communities can devote some time to assisting their sister communities, this is nothing more than a community exchange program. For instance, mayors, school principals, teachers, farmers, civic administrators, engineers, etc. can conduct visits or arrange for their counterparts to visit their communities. One can imagine that the use of technology can have a profound impact in this initiative as well. The use of computers and the internet has the potential for communities to exchange information through chat rooms or video teleconferencing. As cadres become ensconced in their communities, they can get a better feeling for how best to meet the needs of their people. The long pole in the tent is convincing the coalition leadership and the government of Afghanistan of the adoption initiative. This is a point that deserves serious debate.

Recommendations

- The United States in conjunction with coalition members continue to apply pressure to the Afghan government to provide internal security and economic opportunities to its citizens through a bottom-up approach.
- Continue funding U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan and synchronize this effort with a paradigm shift in the current strategy by focusing more on the pillar of security at the local-community level. As cited earlier, that pillar has received less attention and is precisely where insurgencies and criminal organizations flourish.
- Maximize use of local security through cadre-supported police forces

coordinated through local authorities.

- With local police providing immediate protection, continue reforms of ANA and ANP so they reach maturity as professional institutions.
- Improve and balance inadequate equipment and training deficiencies within both the ANA and the ANP and reduce corruption.
- Consider an adopt-a-community and/or a community exchange initiative to allow managed, but direct involvement from western communities
- Assist cadres with improving the standard of living, education, and administration of their assigned communities.

Endnotes

¹ "Winning in Afghanistan: A War NATO Cannot Lose," *Washington Times*, 31 October 2007 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20071031557212.html>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2007.

² John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007), 3.

³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, final draft, Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2006), 3.

⁴ LTG (Ret) David W. Barno, Director of the National Defense University's Near East, Southeast Asia Center for Strategic Studies, lecture given at the U.S. Army War College on 20 December 2007.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ LTC Raymond A. Millen interview by author, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 25 March 2007. Interview was conducted based on conversations with Millen on his deployment experience in Afghanistan.

⁷ Kurt Volker, U.S. Department of State, "Why Helping Afghanistan Matters," speech presented at the Atlantic Council of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 14 September 2007; available from <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/92096.htm>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2007.

⁸ LTC Raymond A. Millen, presentation titled "Community-Based State Building: A Bottom-Up Approach," given at a U.S. Army War College Joint Strategic Studies Institute-Austin Peay State University research colloquium, Clarksville, TN, 13-15 February 2008.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ GEN D. McNeill, Commander, International Security Assistance, Force, "Afghanistan – Commander's Perspective," VTC lecture given at the U.S. Army War College, Bliss Hall, 4 March 2008.

¹¹ *Global Security.org*, "Military, Afghanistan – Militia," available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/militia.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008.

¹² CPT Bob Everdeen, "Police Reform Aims to Strengthen Afghanistan," 5 December 2007, available from <http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123078198>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008.

¹³ LTC Raymond A. Millen, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 22 August 2007. Interview was conducted based on a final draft of Millen's article, "Thinking Small: Apply Hobbes to Counterinsurgency".

¹⁴ *Global Security.org: IRIN*, "Afghanistan: Process on Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups," 12 July 2005; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/07/mil-050712-irin02.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008.

¹⁵ Millen, "Community-Based State Building: A Bottom-Up Approach," 4.

¹⁶ Mr. Michael J. Metrisko, Ministry Reform Advisor, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, (PKSOI), interview by author, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 4 April 2008.

¹⁷ LTC Raymond A. Millen, "Thinking Small: Apply Hobbes to Counterinsurgency," final draft, 22 August 2008, 5. Millen provided draft copy to the author.

¹⁸ Ibid, 6

¹⁹ Ibid, 6

²⁰ Ibid, 7

²¹ Ibid, 6

²² *Global Security.org*, "Military, Afghanistan – Militia".

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Millen, "Thinking Small: Apply Hobbes to Counterinsurgency," 7.