

SPlicing THE RESERVE COMPONENT STOVEPIPE – JOINT RESERVE COMMAND

BY


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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**SPLICING THE RESERVE COMPONENT STOVEPIPE – JOINT RESERVE
COMMAND**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Reliance upon the Reserve Components (RC) is greater now than at any time since the Second World War. RC assets serve as key force providers meeting both expeditionary and domestic mission needs as part of the operational force prosecuting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Less recognized is the increasing role the RC forces play in meeting strategic or operational requirements where authorized Service force structure is not available, becoming Joint forces to meet joint needs. Such uses include meeting in-lieu-of mission requirements, augmenting depleted operational or strategic assets, and providing for requirements not previously anticipated. Over 8,000 individual Reservists from across the services were mobilized and deployed to meet critical joint needs during Fiscal Year 2007 (FY-07) alone. Using RC assets in this way presents leadership and organizational challenges not reflected in the traditional “stovepipe” relationships between the Services and their respective reserve components. This essay argues that meeting current Joint needs for development of policy and doctrine for the mobilization, training and deployment of RC forces to meet Joint requirements

can be best met by development of a “joint reserve command” to get the best benefits of the unique war-fighting capabilities /enablers found (established) within the service RCs.

SPLICING THE RESERVE COMPONENT STOVEPIPE – JOINT RESERVE COMMAND

This nation was put together and made great by vertical enterprise. Some people call that stovepipes, others call it vertical centers of excellence. I don't care what you call it, but you have to be able to go horizontal when it's appropriate.¹

—General James E Cartwright, USMC
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

It is common knowledge throughout both the military services and America that since 2001 reliance upon the Reserve Components (RC) is greater now than at any time since the Second World War.² Widely recognized as being key force providers meeting both expeditionary and domestic mission needs, Reserve assets, including both unit and organizational formations and individuals, have become part of the operational force prosecuting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Less widely known or acknowledged is the increasing role the RC plays in meeting strategic or operational requirements where authorized Service force structure is not available; in essence becoming Joint forces to meet joint needs.³ Such uses include meeting in-lieu-of mission requirements, augmenting depleted operational or strategic assets, and providing for requirements not previously anticipated. More than 8,000 individual Reservists from across the services were mobilized and deployed to meet critical personnel and mission shortages in such joint needs during Fiscal Year 2007 (FY-07) alone. Using RC assets in this way presents leadership and organizational challenges not reflected in the traditional “stovepipe” relationships between the Services and their respective reserve components. (*Stovepipe* - meaning an organization with strict, narrowly-defined or closely controlled set of duties, conditions or responsibilities and

tight control from bottom to top.)⁴ Falling into the seams between the formal and well-established direct authority Services have over their respective Reserves and current Joint needs, development of policy and doctrine for the mobilization, training and deployment of RC forces to meet Joint requirements has occurred on an ad-hoc, informal basis with minimum command oversight .

What is the scope of this problem? Is such an “adhocracy” the best or most appropriate way to meet these Joint needs? Are other solutions possible, and if so which solution might best meet the growing requirement for Joint Forces interoperability? Should there be formal, established means to lead joint force integration and training as necessary within the RCs, blending these functions where appropriate out of the separate services’ control? In other words, is it time to “splice the stovepipe”?

What is the scope of this problem? What is “joint”, and what are “Joint forces”? According to Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (hereafter referred to as JP 1-02), the term “joint” refers to “activities, operations, organizations, etc. in which elements of two or more military departments participate.”⁵ A “joint force” applies to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. ⁶ Given these definitions, when reserve component forces from two or more different Services are assigned or task organized together to meet a specific need or capability, it is a joint mission. Such joint applications occur when:

- A Service RC is tasked to provide resources, (either Soldiers or units) to meet mission requirements outside of the designated roles/missions of their respective Service.
- Composite units are task organized to fill requirements due to redundant capabilities in roles/missions reflected within their respective Services.
- Joint operational needs exceed the capabilities of the Service responsible to provide that support.

The necessity of using RC assets to meet joint strategic and operational needs has been acknowledged since the end of the 1991 Gulf war. ⁷ By 1998, reservists from all Services were filling key billets on the Combatant Command (COCOM) warfighting staffs as individual mobilization augmentees (IMA).⁸ Since 2003, joint RC taskings have included such operational enablers as: theater-level movement control and terminal operations; manning and fielding regional security forces; mission training teams; provincial reconstruction teams and; detainee and prisoner-of-war (PW) security of high-value or high-visibility individuals (i.e., Guantanamo). In FY-2007, these needs required 8,311 individual personnel mobilized from across the available Reserve Components (a force equivalent to two brigade combat team-sized units), training at eight separate installations to meet 27 different joint missions. ⁹ The following case - Task Force-385 (TF-385) in 2004 - illustrates how such joint reserve forces can come into the fight.

In December 2003, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 385th Transportation Battalion, (a US Army Reserve Transportation Corps headquarters element primarily trained to conduct marine terminal and joint logistics-over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations) was mobilized and deployed to Kuwait to operate the Port of Ash

Shuaybah in support of the surge of forces from OIF-1 to OIF-2 (the largest single logistics movement since D-Day, 1944). Prior to mobilization, the 385th TC BN had not been resourced with the cargo transfer company (CTC) and port crane company (POCC) authorized for marine terminal battalions, nor were there any such units available for attachment within the Army Reserve or the active US Army. Since these were the critical assets needed to conduct port operations, some kind of comparable capability was necessary – either another service would have to provide it, or a provisional CTC and POCC would have to be formed, trained and deployed from scratch. Fortunately, the US Naval Reserve (USNR) had such capabilities, and successfully formed, mobilized and deployed a composite organization - the Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force (NAVELSF), some 350 sailors to meet the capabilities shortfall. Once arriving in theater, NAVELSF was attached to the 385th TC BN as a direct reporting unit, under operational control for all but US Navy-specific personnel functions.

This solution presented numerous administrative and operational challenges, to include: command and control; communication and information system interoperability; property and equipment maintenance and accountability; personnel administration – the care and feeding of mixed services, and common language and culture. Prior to arrival in theater, the total time available to find solutions to these challenges was four days of inactive duty training time (i.e., week-end drill periods). Beyond those four days, forging the unit – TF-385 – happened on the ground and on-the-job. Operating the Port of Ash Shuaybah was a mission of strategic importance, requiring the use of joint forces to meet a joint need; the lack of common doctrine, organization, training, and equipment

prior to deployment presented significant risk to mission accomplishment. The undertaking was a success, but success was not the result of a well developed and resourced plan. There simply was no common doctrine, training, post-mobilization or deployment guidance to build upon.

In the current warfight, joint forces built from RC elements are frequently filling roles as “joint enablers,” meeting needs that fall within the gaps and seams of traditional or commonly accepted Service roles and missions. Such joint RC applications are consistent and suitable under current U.S. military policy. The growth and development of joint forces is a principal objective within the current US National Military Strategy (NMS) as outlined by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. The NMS states that, “joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are ‘born joint...the goal is to design joint force capabilities that increase the range of options – from kinetic to non-kinetic.”¹⁰ The challenge with using the Reserve Components is that there is currently no formal, deliberate planning or common doctrinal method for building, generating or utilizing them for joint applications.

At the foundational level, the Services’ Reserve Components are not structured for joint applications as discussed above – they exist to augment the needs of the Active Component. In short, they are “stovepipe organizations.” United States Code (USC) Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective Reserve Component formations. Stovepipe organizations such as these can work quite effectively in circumstances of long-term stability within a steady, predictable operating environment.¹¹ Thus, during the Cold War the Reserve Components were structured with a strategic focus, designed to be activated, mobilized and deployed to

meet clearly-defined (and presumable predictable) needs of the parent Services.¹² The significant variations between the various Reserve Components reflect the high degree of stovepipe control the parent Services have over their respective RCs. They also illustrate the considerable differences that must be overcome to meet joint force requirements.

The US Air Force Reserve (USAFR) represents the most individualized structure of reserve assets. The US Air Force keeps the focus of their reserve units on individuals, and uses its force structure as a source pool of highly trained and qualified individuals available upon mobilization to augment existing AC units and billets. Additionally, the Air National Guard (ANG) serves as the Air Force's unit-based reserve. The ANG (like the Army National Guard) also serves as the part of the individual states' Militia under authority of USC Title 32.¹³

The US Naval Reserve (USNR) has a structure and function similar to the USAFR. Although organized into units for administrative and training accountability, most reservists expect to be mobilized individually as necessary to fill billets and duty assignments in active units as necessary to bring crews and organizations up to full strength as necessary. Two-thirds of the USNR force structure consists of such assets. The balance of its force structure is made up of "commissioned units", those which are complete operational entities which train and expect to mobilize and deploy as units. Such assets include construction battalions, cargo handling battalions, and certain vessels and air crews.¹⁴ The United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) is the smallest and most specific of the various Service RCs, and is resourced with a much higher level of Active Component leadership and oversight at the unit level. This allows

for close integration within Marine Corps expeditionary forces upon activation and deployment. Like the USNR, it augments the Active Component with either trained individuals (usually at the regimental level and above) or as units (at the battalion level and below).¹⁵

The largest element within the Services' reserve components, the Army Reserve Component includes both the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG). Army Reserve Component Soldiers might serve either as individual replacements, or as those that train, mobilize and deploy as units (Troops Program Units – TPU). USAR Soldiers are frequently mobilized and deployed as individuals as well as members of units. However, as with the ANG, mobilization access to the ARNG is limited by the Title 32 authority due to its dual status as the respective states' militia. Consequently, National Guard assets mobilize and deploy far more often as units to meet their Services' needs rather than as individuals.

Given the stovepipe environment in which each of the Reserve Components exists, how are Joint forces composed of RC personnel built when needed? Since 2003, the Joint Staff has been the lowest command level which has had visibility of this problem; however the Joint Staff itself is not organized or oriented to directly work specific force resourcing solutions.¹⁶ Since there is no standing, single organization which exercises unity of command, responsibility or oversight of reserve components (no single “belly-button”), an “**adhocracy**” has formed to meet the need.¹⁷ An “adhocracy” (from the Latin *ad hoc*) literally means ‘an organization led for this purpose,’ or an organization with little or no formal structure which develops to meet a particular need outside of the bureaucratic norm.

The system as it currently functions works on a case-by-case basis. When a capabilities gap or shortfall within a particular Service is identified (e.g., the US Army not having enough cargo transfer or port crane companies to meet mission requirements), the Joint Staff directs the other Services to provide forces to meet the need.¹⁸ The other Services provide forces as tasked and as available – most often in the form of Reserve Component assets – which have comparable skills or capabilities. The gaining service is responsible for insuring that post-mobilization training is completed, and the re-missioned RC element (frequently composed of reservists from two or more RC sources) is deployed and integrated into the appropriate command.¹⁹

As the US Army element with responsibility to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for allocation of US Army forces to meet requirements, Forces Command (FORSCOM) has been the designated headquarters (HQ) with responsibility for planning, coordinating and executing the necessary training to the other Services' Reserve components when such RC forces are assigned by their respective services meet mission requirements. Why does FORSCOM get the responsibility? It is because most of the missions currently most difficult to fill are doctrinally Army responsibilities. Below FORSCOM, First (US) Army has been tasked to be the executive agent for Joint RC training. First (US) Army (1A) is itself a mixed AC and RC organization, (commonly referred to as mutli-component, or MULTICOMPO) that has primary responsibility for pre-and post-mobilization training of US Army RC Soldiers. Having significant numbers of assigned USAR Soldiers makes 1A personnel uniquely qualified to understand the challenges of working with a wide spectrum of Reservists from other Services. This brings into sharp focus the unusual nature of this situation: RC personnel from one

service are responsible for training RC personnel from other Services to meet a joint force requirement that can not be met by available AC assets.

The processes that have evolved to build, train, mobilize and deploy joint reserve forces can best be described as an adhocracy in three key characteristics. First, they are not designed primarily to perform such functions. Second, they operate largely above the Title 10 authorizations for the administration of Reserve Components. Third, these processes have not been drawn into the institutional establishment governing either active joint organizations or standard, service-specific reserve roles and missions.

Is such an “adhocracy” the best or most appropriate way to meet these Joint needs? The experiences of 1A as discussed above representing the training load for the 2007 training year might suggest the answer is yes. Further examination strongly suggests otherwise. To start with, a survey of redundant capabilities available within the Reserves demonstrates clearly that interoperability crosses Service parochial boundaries. Transportation and engineering/construction assets are found within four separate RCs (USAR, USNR, USMCR and the USAFR.) These reflect 54% and 34% (respectively) of the Total Force assets available. Medical services (43%), material/supply support (71%), personnel services (29%) and MP/detainee security (57%) are found in three Service RCs, (USAR, USNR and USAFR). Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (98%) are found in both the USAR and USMCR.²⁰

Given this demonstrated interoperability, it is reasonable to expect that after five years of unprecedented operational employment, Joint doctrine addressing training, mobilization and deployment would have been developed. Such is not the case – both individuals and units from the separate Services continue to work under widely varying

standards for pre- and post-mobilization training, alert notification in advance of mobilization, and mission taskings outside the scope of occupational specialties - “in-lieu-of” (ILO) missions.²¹ The only established operating “doctrine” is the “Business Rules” developed between 1A and the customer units it is responsible for training – and these are written not as regulations, but only as set of negotiated guidelines.²²

Research reveals that this adhococracy is not a new problem. The need for policy and organizational reform for RC integration into the Joint forces was identified clearly as early as 1998.²³ The Secretary of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) review of significant issues, recommendations and actions regarding mobilization reform in October 2003 discussed how the lack of DoD and Service guidance had resulted in interoperability failures within the mobilization process,²⁴ and there was a need for unified command and control of joint Reserve Component mobilization.²⁵ The RFPB 2004 Annual Report used even stronger language than in their earlier mobilization report, stating,

Joint solutions should be sought to source Reserve capabilities and to ease the pressure on stressed skill sets within the RCs. Joint RC sourcing solutions should be sought that are judicious and prudent to meet all requirements externally to the Services and support their internal Service requirements for additional activated forces.²⁶

In 2005, the National Defense University published a series of four essays on the topic of RC transformation.²⁷ A common theme within all of four of these articles is the need for deliberate joint reserve component force development to meet key strategic capabilities, to include stability and reconstruction operations,²⁸ civil affairs and psychological operations²⁹ and homeland security.³⁰

Currently there is no single command or Service organization that has responsibility for review, oversight, or to serve as advisor of roles and missions for the

various Service RCs to JFCOM, the Joint Staff or the Department of Defense (DoD). No one headquarters has responsibility for designating or making assignments of the various reserve components to meet ILO missions, based upon best-fit criteria of all available forces. Who evaluates operational risk? Who has responsibility for coordinating doctrine and training requirements, resourcing pre-and post-mobilization training, and joint RC mobilization and deployment oversight? Right now, there is no command (meaning, no commander) tasked with these responsibilities. Utilization of the RC in a joint environment (other than as individual staff officers augmenting COCOM staffs) operates in an on-going “adhocracy”, with each problem or challenge being temporarily fixed only so far as necessary to meet the immediate need, rather than with a long-term, systemic solution that addresses the transformational needs of resourcing the Long War.

Are other solutions possible, and if so which solution might best meet the growing requirement for Joint Forces interoperability? The existing adhocracy is flawed because there is no one headquarters responsible for all facets of Joint RC interoperability. A better solution is one that establishes unity of command. There needs to be a single command organization that has oversight responsibility for joint reserve force requirements. According to the current Unified Command Plan (UCP), US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has responsibility for leading the development and integration of joint forces, including recommendations for changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to integrate Services’ capabilities.³¹ However, the UCP does not explicitly assign JFCOM with responsibility for joint RC development and integration of the

various Services' RC into common missions, training, mobilization, and deployment doctrine and utilization. Consequently, JFCOM has not recognized this mission as their responsibility or as a joint requirement. Given this situation where no clear unity of command exists in the development and integration of joint RC forces, three possible solutions to solve this problem are available:

- A. Formalize the status-quo – Institutionalize the adhococracy and make FORSCOM the Joint RC Command as an additional mission.
- B. Build a Joint reserve forces command and control element using the established doctrinal Joint forces development process.
- C. Build a Joint Reserve Command out of existing JFCOM resources.

In considering each of the possible solutions, it is necessary to have a common means of evaluation; a good starting point is to consider the Joint Force Attributes. Established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these are the characteristics an ideal Joint Force ought to have: Fully-integrated, Expeditionary, Networked, Decentralized, Adaptable, Decision superiority, and Lethality.³² Applied in the context of developing and integrating joint reserve forces, these attributes lead to the following critical questions:

- Fully integrated – Will it establish the means to better and more effectively focus RC assets and forces toward achieving strategic objectives or accomplishing strategic missions (theater-level movement, regional security efforts, mission training teams and provincial reconstruction teams dedicated to strategic end-states, prisoner security of high-value detainees and prisoners such as al-Qaeda members at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) - building unified purpose?

- Expeditionary – Does it improve rapid deployability (less time wasted in post-mob training) and employment (more ‘boots-on-the-ground’ time for joint RC forces?)
- Networked – Does the solution provide a framework (and foundation for integrated architecture) for shared doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership & education, personnel and facilities?
- Decentralized – Will the solution build a synergistic organization where the benefits and best-practices developed can be transferred through the Service reserve components, improving both joint and traditional RC capabilities?
- Adaptable – Does it capture the responsiveness and initiative of the “adhocracy”, but filters out the Service parochialisms and predisposition to overlook systemic problems once the immediate crisis or “flash-point” is successfully resolved?
- Decision superiority – Does the solution lead to improved planning by strategic leaders by insuring that the best possible force packages are available to meet required capabilities with regard to access and utilization of the reserve components?
- Lethality – Will it improve lethality of kinetic assets through improved efficiency (better integrating all available forces into the Total Force structure)

Of the three possible solutions being considered, the best solution is the one which results in achieving the widest range of Joint Force Attributes when generating joint RC forces.

Solution A. Formalize the status-quo – Institutionalize the adhocracy and make FORSCOM the Joint RC Command as an additional mission. This course of action is simplest, and requires the least amount of resources. It would simply require the Joint

Staff (through JFCOM) to assign the institutional responsibility for command and control of Joint RC functions to the organization that is currently minimally performing them.

This solution has several advantages - It has lowest cost and least impact to existing command relationships. Formalizing the status-quo would provide strong benefits of adaptability, as it is closest to the existing adhococracy. However, this option does not offer improvements to the current problems identified and documented since 2002. Of the Joint Force Attributes, it only offers improvement in one attribute out of the seven being considered (adaptable). Additionally, it presents potential problems for future Joint RC applications. In the event that in some future conflict, some other Service rather than the Army is the principal force requiring Joint RC solutions, will an Army sub-unified command be best or most responsive? What if the next operation in the Global war on Terror (GWOT) is reliant upon USMC forces, and joint sourcing of intra-theater sealift and JLOTS assets are needed – Does the current FORSCOM/1A organization have the authority needed to work through the existing Service stovepipes?

Solution B. Build a Joint reserve forces command and control element using the established doctrinal Joint forces development process. The doctrinal mechanism for joint forces for development and fielding is the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS).³³ JCIDS is a Joint Staff function that operates in support of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). JCIDS starts when a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) identifies a shortfall in within the Joint force, either in how it is operating, how it is integrated, or how it will fight within a concept of operation. The assessment identifies requirements for mission success and existing gaps in

capabilities, functions or processes. It identifies possible solutions as well as operations risks associated with taking no action correcting the capability gaps. The CBA provides its analysis to the JROC in either a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) or an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). The JROC reviews and authorizes action based on the assessment, and may address the capability gap through equipment or material means, or through a non-material approach (modifying existing organizations, doctrine, systems, etc.) The JROC may also decide that the operational risk is acceptable, and recommend no action at all. Once an action is approved, it will be tasked to the appropriate Service or DoD agency for further developed analysis, to include planning, programming, budgeting and execution as appropriate.

This solution has the advantage of being the most deliberative and functional at the Joint level, being a Joint Staff process. It can be expected to yield the most well-developed command element to meet the needs of Joint RC forces and missions. By design, this option meets four of the seven desired Joint Force attributes: it is fully-integrated, networked, supports decentralized organization and can be adaptable. By operating within the Joint forces development process, it works above the Services' Title 10 authority, and so can be expected to minimize Service parochialisms. Unfortunately, this option has the disadvantage of being very time consuming. JCIDS is a time-intensive process³⁴ of careful staff analysis and research to develop products and recommendations. It would not support the expeditionary, decision superiority and lethality attributes desired in integrated Joint Reserve forces. JCIDS should work well to develop timely and effective solutions to improve the Joint force. This has not happened with regard to Joint RC integration. Reasons for the failure of the process to address the

current situation may include some or all of the following factors. First, the JCIDS process is structured to be “top-down”, starting with prioritized needs as identified by published Joint Operations Concepts.³⁵ Because the emergence and use of reserve components to meet joint and strategic needs has developed from “bottom-up” requirements, it simply has not fit into the paradigm of joint force development. Second, although the problems and challenges associated with joint RC applications have been identified continuously since 2003, there has been no “catastrophic break-down”, no system failure that would justify close command attention – each Service RC has stepped-up to meet missions never expected within the existing roles, missions and force structures. Finally, Service cultures work against Joint RC integration. The Reserve Components represent the last bastion of Service independence in an increasing Joint world. There continues to be strong resistance among many in the military community to the idea that joint interoperability between the various Service Reserve Components is a combat multiplier.

Solution C. Build a Joint Reserve Command (JRC) out of existing JFCOM resources. Augment Reserve assets currently assigned to JFCOM to establish a sub-unified command command-and-control (C2) element which would exercise responsibility for joint RC development and integration of the various service RC into common missions, training, mobilization, and deployment doctrine and utilization.

This path offers a number of immediate advantages. It presents a “middle-ground” approach between the low-cost, low-impact approach of solution A, and the high-investment, far-horizon option of JCIDS. The means to execute it are within the funding available to the Joint Staff (TJS) and JFCOM, without impacting the Service budgets for

their respective Reserve Components.³⁶ It places the responsibility for RC integration into Joint Forces development at the appropriate level (within JFCOM), and will strengthen all seven of the desired attributes by insuring that RC integration is built –in up-front. This option has the disadvantages of requiring JFCOM to re-mission the existing Reserve Forces Directorate (JRD) to become the framework for a new, sub-unified level Joint command, and combine the JRD's current work load into the co-located Joint Reserve Unit (JRU). (Currently, the JRD and JRU are two RC-based organizations with overlapping or redundant missions – that of providing RC integration to the JFCOM staff.) It also requires TJS to allocate the additional personnel funding necessary to increase the authorized manning to an appropriate rank (i.e., a Lieutenant General - LTG/O9) and support staff.

Solution C offers the best opportunity to insure unity of command for RC Joint integration that meets all the desired Joint Force attributes. Because of the greater advantages offered by Solution C over either A or B, it is worth discussing further. If implemented, this option would require thorough consideration of a number of challenges to fully address a number of valid concerns.

Firstly, it can be argued that USJFCOM is already responsible for these needs (common missions, training, mobilization, and deployment doctrine and utilization of the Reserves within Joint Forces); Experience and research has shown that this is not a mission they have accepted. As discussed above, there are two RC organizations within the JFCOM HQ: the Joint Reserve Directorate (JRD) and the Joint Reserve Unit (JRU). The stated mission of the JRD is “to administer and track the movement and operations of the USJFCOM reserve personnel assigned to the command,”³⁷ and the mission of

the JRU is, “a command and control organization responsible for...administrative, training and security functions common to all RC service elements.”³⁸ As is illustrated, there is a certain degree of over-lap between the two sections. Also, while every unified combatant command is authorized a JRU to provide administrative support and structure for RC personnel filling augmentation and mobilization billets within the COCOM staff, only USJFCOM has the JRD, ostensibly to meet their greater needs to integrate individual RC personnel within their organization. Regardless of original intent, neither the JRD or the JRU at JFCOM is performing the tasks needed to fully meet the command and control needs of joint RC employment. JFCOM has the authority to build joint force structure as needed under USC Title 10 § 166a (a) and (b), and could use this statutory authority to modify the existing organization to better meet these requirements.

Secondly, there is the valid concern that a JRC under JFCOM might negatively impact the Services' Title 10 authority over their respective reserve components. Any acceptable solution to provide unity of command to the integration of RC assets to Joint forces must be predicated upon complying with existing statutory law. The authority each Service exercises over its respective RC under Title 10 must be respected. The function of a JRC would not be to diminish or reduce the tactical functionality of the existing reserve component structure; it is to enable and develop a true integrated, joint functionality across the RC spectrum.

Third, there are significant challenges presented by standing up a new sub-unified command led by a LTG regarding personnel and organization. Such a command element would have significantly greater support requirements than the current JRD.

Perhaps, but not necessarily – the JRC offers an opportunity to experiment and build a HQ staff that reflects the same positive attributes required for effective Joint forces. In particular, it can be decentralized, making use of network and information sharing systems to build a “virtual staff” throughout the various Services’ RC component headquarters. Additionally, the JRC would provide a ready framework for RC officers to serve in joint billets, with the separate RC’s having the opportunity and means to allocate additional resources to fund more billets as appropriate.

Conclusion

The conditions and circumstances defined by the Global War on Terror (the “Long War”) have changed the strategic environment from one of stability and predictability to one of increasing instability and volatility. As a result, the Reserve Components have changed from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, and the old model of rigid, stovepipe control does not reflect the current on-going need to build Joint forces as conditions and circumstances require. The future fight will require flexible and adaptive forces that can operate across the physical, virtual and human domains simultaneously, and conduct synchronized and synergistic measures. It will necessitate power projection and sustainment over both intra- and intertheater distances, and be able to effectively influence the actors and conditions within complex systems to achieve desired effects. Joint forces will be required to influence and control the pace of operations, either accelerating or slowing action as needed while transitioning between levels of effort seamlessly.³⁹ The Reserve Components will be required to continue meeting the adaptive and flexible needs of the Joint force as well as the Title 10 missions in direct support of the Active Components.

The development of a Joint Reserve Command will establish the appropriate unity of command for joint RC development and integration of common missions, training, mobilization, and deployment doctrine and utilization to meet these needs as required. It would provide a valued-added service, serving as a test-bed for further experimentation and development for greater AC/RC integration within the Total Force. A JRC would support and enhance JFCOM's statutory responsibilities and duties, and would provide the foundation for greater further restructuring and rebalancing of the Reserve Components.⁴⁰ Future benefits might include the development of a joint unified subcommand for Stabilization and Reconstruction within Special Forces Command (SOCOM) encompassing RC Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Information Operations assets; another might be to provide greater interagency efficiency regarding Homeland defense and security. The JRC could also serve as the lead integrator for facilitating, monitoring and validating RC personnel in full joint qualification.⁴¹

Ultimately, fielding of a JRC offers the best solution for meeting the needs of the Joint force, insuring that the Reserve Components become fully integrated across the spectrum of the Total Force.

Endnotes

¹ GEN James E. Cartwright, Presentation, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 28 February 2008.

² GEN R.A. Cody, Anton Myrer Army Leader Day, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 24 October 2007.

³ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *2003 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004), 17.

⁴ Paul McFedries, "Stovepipe Organization," 1995-2007, available from <http://www.wordspy.com/words/stovepipeorganization.asp>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2007.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 283.

⁶ Ibid., 287.

⁷ Donna I. Hopkins, "Joint Reserve Forces: An Evolution in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 123.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ CPT Josh Kaser, S3 Plans Officer, 191st INF BDE, "JSTO Mobstation Tracking as of 3 DEC 07", via e-mail correspondence with author, 10 December 2007. The following table (Table 1) is the author's compilation of the Training Year 2007 Data for mobilization station training conducted by 1 (US) Army units to meet joint requirements as defined in this work.

Location	Training Days Required	Number of Personnel	Training Scope*
FT Bliss, TX	1029	2070	17
FT Dix, NJ	1240	708	14
FT Lewis, WA	1413	2016	17
FT McCoy, WI	2176	2001	20
FT Sill, OK	237	563	11
FT Hood, TX	1346	281	27
CP Atterbury	28	5	1
CP Shelby. MS	1056	667	5
TOTAL	8525	8311	AVE: 14

* **Training Scope** represents the number of different types of unit or mission training required, as reported by the training or mob station. Repeated cycles or multiple iterations of the same training sets were not included in these numbers.

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004), 15. Hereafter cited as CJCS, NMS.

¹¹ Stephen E. Browning, "PM – It's More Than a Name Change," HQUSACE (Headquarters, US Army Corps of Engineers), 1998, available from <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/pubs/feb98/story3.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2007. This web-based article was the earliest use of the term "stovepipe" I found to describe a US Army organization (the Corps of Engineers). It dates to 1998. It can be used to substantiate the common use of the term within the military community (10 years at least).

¹² Arnold L. Punaro et al., "Final Report Executive Summary," *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 31 January 2008), 9.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*. Department of Defense Handbook

1215.15-H (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2000), 56. Web search of DoD website did not indicate any more-current version of this publication.

¹⁴ Ibid., 43.

¹⁵ Ibid., 47.

¹⁶ Punaro, 76.

¹⁷ Paul McFedries, “adhocracy” 1995-2007, available from <http://www.wordspy.com/words/adhocracy.asp>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2007. I thought I had invented the term ‘adhocracy’, since I had never seen or heard it used before. Alas, it is not so. While researching ‘stovepipe organization’, I discovered ‘adhocracy’ (“an organization with little or no structure; the opposite of a bureaucracy.”) It’s a good word, and captures the sense of what I’m arguing, so now I can use it with impunity...

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army Order #09-01 to US Army Forces Command, 31 Decembber 2007, para.1.

¹⁹ CPT Josh Kaser, S3 Plans Officer, 191st INF BDE, “Business Rules – First Army Installations, 1 October 2006”, e-mail to author, 10 December 2007.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense. *DoD Handbook 1215.15-H* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2000), 35-36. The following table (Table 2) details the comparable capabilities found within the Services’ Reserve Components under USC Title 10 authority. Data compilation and synthesis is the original work of the author. This table only represents a sample of the joint utilization of reserve components since 2002, based upon the last published DoD 1215.15-H. It does not represent an exhaustive or comprehensive list of common functions and capabilities within the current force structure.

Functions and Capabilities	Percentage of Total Force Capability (By Service)				
	USAR*	USNR	USMCR	USAFR	Joint Use ⁺
MP/Detainee Security	100%			14%	x
Civil Affairs and PSYOPS	95%		100%		x
Medical Services	74%	40%		16%	x
Material/Supply Support	59%	95%		59%	x
Transportation	68%	90%	25%	34%	x
Engineer/Construction	33%	60%	25%	17%	x
Personnel Services	46%	25%		15%	x

* For brevity, data for USAR has been combined and averaged where appropriate for comparison to other Service RCs: Material/Supply Support, Transportation and Personnel Services.

⁺ One or more deployments where cross-service deployment or in-lieu-of (ILO) tasking was required to meet geographic combatant command (GCC) mission capability.

²¹ CPT Josh Kaser, S3 Plans Officer, 191st INF BDE, “USCENTCOM 07-09 Joint Sourced Training Requirement”, e-mail to author, 10 December 2007.

²² Kaser, "Business Rules" 10 December 2007.

²³ Hopkins, 124.

²⁴ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Mobilization Reform: A Compilation of Significant Issues, Lessons Learned and Studies Developed Since September 11, 2001* (Washington, D.C., Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2003), 3. hereafter cited as RFPD

²⁵ Ibid., 9.

²⁶ RFPD, 17.

²⁷ Hans Binnendijk, Michael J. Baranick, Raymond E. Bell, Jr., Gina Cordero, Stephen M. Duncan, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz, *Transforming the Reserve Component: Four Essays* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2005), 1.

²⁸ Ibid., 3.

²⁹ Ibid., 31.

³⁰ Ibid., 7.

³¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Command Plan*, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), 7-10.

³² CJCS, NMS, 15.

³³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Instruction 3170.01D (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004), A-2, 3.

³⁴ Professor Harold W. Lord, Director Joint Processes and Landpower Development Course, e-mail query 26 February 2008.

³⁵ CJCS Instruction 3170.01D, A-3.

³⁶ Funding data for JFCOM is provided from multiple Defense authorizations, and so is difficult to identify through open-source documents. The principal bill-payer for JFCOM is the US Navy, however each Service contributes through their Title 10 authority to fund specific programs and needs such as augmentation by RC personnel. As such, JFCOM has discretionary spending authority to reorganize current existing force structure to stand-up a new sub-unified command.

³⁷ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "About USJFCOM: Joint Reserve Directorate," available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jrd.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 December 2007.

³⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "About USJFCOM: Joint Reserve Unit," available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

³⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), 16-20.

⁴⁰ Binnendijk, 5.

⁴¹ Punaro, 30-31.