Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War
Abstract
This strategic research paper discusses the traditional importance of unity of command in American doctrine and practice from World War One until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of military command for Afghanistan. It examines how there was an unprecedented departure from the principle of unity of command in Afghanistan in 2006, when Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) passed control of the ground fight to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and operations became split between several unified or supreme commanders in charge of US Central Command (CENTCOM), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It argues for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command, and recommends that the United States revert to the application of this principle by amending the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to invest one supreme commander with responsibility for the current Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Joint Operations Area (JOA).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA482251
Entities
People
- Ian Hope
Organizations
- United States Army War College