Retooling Deterrence for the Long War
Abstract
The 2006 National Security Strategy solicited new approaches to deterrence that will affect terrorists who are not deterrable through traditional means. Recent national strategy and doctrine documents have answered the call by redefining deterrence so that the traditional defensive, reactive concept is conflated with offensive preemptive action. This re-imagining of deterrence was misguided. Theory suggests that the new approach weakened deterrence instead of strengthening it and exchanged long-term progress for short-term risk avoidance. This project examines deterrence in history, exposes the divergence between traditional deterrence and current strategy, and proposes a new model of deterrence that illustrates the limitations of a strategy based on the physical effects generated by preemptive conventional weapons in a war against terrorists. The paper then recommends changes in policy that unlink preemption from deterrence, emphasize psychological effects and influence, and set realistic expectations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA482267
Entities
People
- Norman M. Worthen
Organizations
- United States Army War College