THE FUTURE OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: IS THE MODULAR
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM THE RIGHT ORGANIZATION?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE FUTURE OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: IS THE MODULAR
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Escandon, 122 pages.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directs the Military Services to develop, within
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the Modular BCT is the optimal solution, but only if the Army can change cultural norms
that have the potential to impede effectiveness.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BPC	Building Partnership Capacity
CN	Counter Narcotics
COCOM	Combatant Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CT	Counterterrorism
CTFP	Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
DoD	Department of Defense
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FSF	Foreign Security Forces
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GPF	General-Purpose Forces
GWOT	Global War On Terrorism
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IW	Irregular Warfare
IWER	Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap
MAAG	Military Assistance and Advisory Group

MTT	Mobile Training Team
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NMSP-WOT	National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSVI	National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
SA	Security Assistance
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SF	Special Forces
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TAAP	Train, Advise, Assist, Partner
TMAAG	Theater Military Advising and Assistance Group
TT	Transition Team
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is
not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our
partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of
indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key
mission for the military as a whole. (2007)
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Speaking at Kansas State University

Secretary of Defense Gates' comments reflect, given six years of experience in

Iraq and Afghanistan, the emerging strategic view amongst the civilian and military

leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD) that the U.S. military must be as capable

of training and advising foreign security forces as it is at waging conventional war.

Nonetheless, Secretary Gates' comments did not initiate this apparent radical shift in

defense policy. Rather, this change in policy was first articulated in the 2006 Quadrennial

Defense Review (*QDR*). The *QDR* directs the Military Services to develop, within their

general-purpose forces (GPF), the capability to train and advise foreign security forces

(FSF) (*QDR* 2006, 42). This directive presents the Services with a complex strategy

issue. While the Services recognize that winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

requires enabling our partners, the ways for doing so, in this case bolstering the

capabilities of foreign security forces, remain an unorthodox and uncomfortable mission.

While the Services understand the task at hand, the exact means for doing so still remain

an unanswered question. Current operational requirements for advising FSF are being

met through the use of military transition teams (TTs). These provisional teams are a

tailored solution, established to meet the requirements of Operation Iraqi Freedom and

Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF). Almost by default, a serious debate concerning

how the Services are going to meet the *QDR* directed capability requirements never fully matured. The Army, focused on current operations, chose to champion the use of forces capable of full spectrum operations vice the creation of specialized forces (*Inside the Pentagon* 2007, 1). Opposing the Army's position are policy makers and defense experts, both outside and inside the Army, who advocate the creation of a specialized and permanent organization. Adherents of this approach have subsequently dominated the discussion, forcing the Army leadership to answer the question of why the Army is not organizing permanent advisor organizations, as well as establishing a branch for advisor personnel. Hence, any other solutions, such as the use of brigade combat teams, have never been seriously examined. Nonetheless, the author's initial view is that while TTs have definitely proven their worth in Iraq and Afghanistan, ultimately, it is the U.S. Army Modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT) that is the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to *train, advise, assist and partner* with foreign security forces.

Background

A key focus of the 2006 *QDR* is to initiate an intellectual "re-balancing" of the Department of Defense. The attacks of September 11, 2001 underscore that the enemies, and potential enemies, of the United States will use asymmetric means to attack our vulnerabilities. Although the U.S. military has implemented numerous institutional changes in order to meet the irregular challenges encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, the force still looks as if it is organized, trained, and equipped for large-scale conventional combat. As a change agent, the *QDR* compels the Services to adopt new force structure, training, doctrine, leader development, and personnel policies in order to address four challenge areas: traditional, catastrophic, disruptive, and irregular (*QDR*

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2006, 19). While asymmetric means have been used throughout the history of warfare, DoD is taking a much broader view of the so-called "indirect" approach. DoD policy established Irregular Warfare (IW) as a form of warfare that links ends, ways, and means. As such, IW brings several types of operations under its wide umbrella. These operations and activities include, but are not limited to, counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism (CT), stability operations (SO), and foreign internal defense (FID).

Several of these missions are traditionally the purview of special operations forces (SOF), especially UW and CT. However, FID, a term traditionally used to describe the training of FSF, is a mission set that may require an increase beyond the current capacity of SOF. The initial indications that an increase in capacity is required materialized soon after the decision to disband the Iraqi Army in the summer of 2003. This decision presented the military with an unforeseen requirement – how to build, organize, train, and equip a national army capable of conducting internal security, and eventually deterring Iraq's regional adversaries.

From the early 1970s to 2003, FID was viewed primarily as a U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) mission, and therefore ignored by conventional forces. Suddenly, the military was forced to find a way to raise and train an Iraqi national army. This effort was further exasperated by the finite amount of BCTs and Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) available to meet the rotational demands required to sustain a counterinsurgency. The solution to this problem was to organize, train and employ TTs of various kinds. These teams were sourced from individual replacements, so as not to disrupt BCT manpower requirements.

Training foreign armies is not totally unfamiliar ground for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Prior to World War II, the Army trained local security forces in the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, and numerous other places. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps was scattered throughout Latin America and the Caribbean training local police and military forces in order to establish security and the rule of law in such places as Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Army Special Forces developed the capability to train and employ indigenous insurgent forces capable of operating behind Soviet lines and waging unconventional warfare (Bonn 1999, 148).

This expertise was put to good use during the Vietnam War, when SF developed several of Vietnam's ethnic minority groups into highly effective fighting units that interdicted North Vietnamese movement in the Central Highlands. While SF focused on ethnic minorities, the conventional Army developed a robust advisory structure to train and mentor the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). During the early stages of the war, advising the South Vietnamese Army was the main effort; but as American combat battalions, brigades, and divisions poured into Vietnam to fight the North Vietnamese Army, advising became a sideshow. Nonetheless, advising became a priority again as part of the Nixon administration's *Vietnamization* strategy. Unfortunately, the Army flushed all advisory related organization, doctrine, and training after the war and switched focus to conventional warfare and the Soviet threat. In the post-Vietnam world, SF proved critical to executing FID, as evidenced by their successful employment in El Salvador. Although some personnel and units from the

conventional Army contributed, the Army continued to view FID as a primarily Special

Forces mission.

At the same time that the Army was beginning to field TTs to Iraq and

Afghanistan, DoD began to consider military requirements for the future strategic

environment. As part of the rebalancing of forces, theater security cooperation, shaping

operations and stability operations began to receive far greater attention. For the purposes

of this work the term *shaping operations* refers to security force assistance (SFA)

activities associated with phase 0 of the phasing model outlined in Joint Publication 3-0

Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0, 2006, IV-27). *Stability operations* refer to those SFA

activities conducted in phase IV of the phasing model. Ironically, shaping operations are

now considered not only critical, but the preferred method, for deterring conflict. One of

the key tasks associated with this line of thinking is building the capacity of foreign

security forces. Conducting SFA serves two purposes: (1) well-trained local security

forces can engage terrorists and insurgents operating in ungoverned areas; If these groups

are fighting for their lives, then they are not attacking the American Homeland; (2)

providing America's partners and allies with the capability to achieve U.S. national

security objectives is a far more attractive solution than using Americans, who do not

understand the local language and culture, as the main effort. Through the *QDR*, DoD

tasked ground, air, and maritime general-purpose forces to develop the capability to train

foreign security forces. At the same time, it directed special operations forces to focus on

mission areas that are critical for executing the GWOT (*QDR* 2006, 44).

Since the publication of the *QDR*, there has been significant debate concerning

the use of GPF to train foreign armies. While operations in OIF and OEF have shown that

GPF are capable of conducting the mission, several issues remain unresolved. First, the capacity required to meet the global demand for training FSF has not been adequately captured. Initially, DoD spent considerable effort developing a solution to address the capacity "gap." This perceived gap stems from SF's current operational tempo. Without a doubt, SF is stretched thin in order to support OIF and OEF requirements, and unable to fulfill theater security cooperation requirements outside the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. In effect, DoD directed the Army to build, train, and equip forces to provide a capability that has not been clearly defined. Unable to define the gap, DoD directed that the military as a whole be able to conduct security force assistance, a more specific term than FID.

Secondly, DoD has directed SF to move away from training FSF. Nevertheless, many officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the SF community, as well as some senior officers inside the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), believe that the directed shift in focus is a mistake (Naylor 2007). They would prefer that SF continue to train and employ FSF as part of their traditional FID and UW roles, and believe that this will be possible once OIF and OEF requirements are significantly reduced (Naylor 2007). Another question concerns the scope of SFA. The role of SF will ultimately determine GPF security force assistance requirements. Given the current level of effort in Iraq and Afghanistan it is likely that GPF must be prepared to advise, train, assist and partner with FSF. Finally, questions persist concerning the ability of GPF to conduct all types of FSF training missions traditionally conducted by SF, to include those that are politically sensitive. All of these questions must be addressed before a definitive solution for SFA is implemented.

<u>Primary and Secondary Research Questions</u>

The purpose and background sections of chapter one outlined the reasons for examination of SFA. The following research questions help to narrow the focus of the research to be conducted.

<u>Primary Research Question</u>: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to train, advise, assist and partner (TAAP) with foreign security forces?

In order to effectively answer the primary research question, this paper examines several secondary questions:

1. What are the future requirements (beyond OIF / OEF) for security force assistance (SFA)?

2. What specific capabilities must the Army possess to meet SFA requirements?

3. Is there a delineation of mission sets between special operations forces and general-purpose forces?

4. What kind of advisors does the Army need?

5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of creating a permanent advisor structure to meet future requirements?

6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using BCTs to meet future requirements?

Assumptions

For the purposes of this paper, the following assumptions are necessary:

1. Basic assumptions and policy outlined in the 2006 QDR, such as the force-sizing construct, will not be significantly altered by the incoming (2009) presidential administration.

2. U.S. military personnel end-strength, to include the programmed increases announced in 2007, will remain relatively unchanged.

3. At some point ("Beyond OIF/OEF"), operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will be reduced to a steady state posture; thereby, relieving the current level of stress on units and personnel. This allows the Army to execute the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), whereby units deploy one out of every three years.

4. USSOCOM will retain SFA as a core competency, and will train and advise FSF in support of GWOT objectives.

5. U.S. strategy, as outlined in the *National Security Strategy* (*NSS*), *National Defense Strategy* (*NDS*), *National Military Strategy* (*NMS*), and the *QDR* will not be significantly greater than the resources of the DoD budget.

Definition of Key Terms

Irregular Warfare (IW): A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will (*Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept v. 1.0*, 2007, 6).

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 1996, GL-5).

Counterinsurgency (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 1996, GL-4).

Unconventional Warfare (UW): A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 1996, GL-5).

Security Cooperation (SC): Involves all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multi-national operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (FM 3-0, 2008, GL-13).

Security Assistance (SA): Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 1996, GL-5).

Security Force Assistance (SFA): (Definition proposed by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance) Unified action by Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) participation, to generate, employ, sustain, and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA): This definition and acronym is currently being used by DoD to describe the tasks that compose SFA:

Train: To teach, through instruction and practice, members and units of military and security forces the skills necessary to accomplish their assigned missions.

Advise: To provide advice, counsel, mentoring, and support to partner military and security personnel or units undergoing training or conducting operations.

Assist: To provide equipment, materiel, logistics, or other military support to partner military and security forces to support or sustain their capacity to accomplish their assigned missions.

For the purpose of this work, the author has added the term *partner* to the TAA framework to rectify a gap in the above definition. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces are partnering with host nation forces to increase the latter's proficiency and to build confidence.

Partner with Foreign Security Forces: The process whereby U.S. forces work with and/or cross-attach units with host nation forces during combat and/or non-combat operations in order to increase FSF tactical and technical proficiency (author's definition).

Limitations and Delimitations

This paper is framed by several limitations. First, the topic is the subject of on-going debate. This poses two unique problems. The first problem is that the base of

available literature, as well as resources for research, continues to expand. The second

issue concerns the timeliness of the debate. If DoD issues a directed course of action to

the Services with regard to SFA capabilities, then this paper may prove to be untimely.

Given these factors, April 15, 2008 will conclude the research process. The final draft of

this paper will be completed no later than May 23, 2008. The third issue concerns the

secondary research questions. This paper will use the secondary questions as a basis for

answering the primary research question, but will not definitively answer the secondary

questions. For instance, the purpose of this paper is not to provide a recommended

solution concerning the roles and missions of SOF. Neither is the purpose to provide a

predictor of total requirements for training FSF. Rather, this paper will explore these

issues to determine if the BCT is indeed the optimal solution. Finally, research, analysis,

and conclusions associated with this paper will not exceed a classification of

UNCLASSIFIED. Unfortunately, much of the work associated with this subject area

remains classified, or has distribution restrictions. This fact provides some difficulty in

answering the secondary research questions, and as such, may require the use of

additional assumptions. Finally, while the primary research question may be narrow in

scope, the topic of SFA is extremely wide. This paper will not examine related issues

(e.g., whether U.S. military forces should train foreign police forces) in order to retain

focus on the primary research question.

<u>Significance</u>

So, why is this research question critically important as an aspect of defense

policy? Our Cold War victory produced a phenomenon previously unknown in the course

of America's engagement with the rest of the world. Instead of dramatically decreasing

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the size of the U.S. Armed Forces to a level commensurate with continental defense, policy makers chose to maintain a military superior to that of any enemy, threat, or potential adversary. However, without a clearly defined threat (e.g., the Soviet Union) the U.S. military must rely on capabilities based planning. Instead of analyzing the threat to determine force structure, capabilities based planning attempts to determine the wide spectrum of capabilities required to defeat known and unforeseen threats. Unfortunately, capabilities based planning cannot always determine "how much" of a certain capability is enough (Keegan, 31).

Building the capacity of our partners has been identified as a critical capability. Nonetheless, determining the capacity for doing so continues to remain fluid. The conclusions derived from this research will not attempt to specifically answer the question of "how much" is required, but rather "what types" (i.e. SOF and GPF) are needed. This determination will assist in generating force structure requirements (i.e. advisor units and/or BCTs). In a politically and budgetarily constrained environment DoD and the Services cannot afford to waste any force structure. The following chapter will review literature pertaining to both the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this paper is to answer the following primary research question: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to train, advise, assist, and partner with foreign security forces? The previous chapter provided an overview of the problem, namely determining how to meet future SFA requirements. In order to answer the primary research question, a review of the available literature regarding this subject must be undertaken. Most people familiar with this subject agree that SFA is the key to effectively shaping the future security environment. Nonetheless, how the Army builds the capability to do this is the subject of considerable debate. Two schools of thought have emerged concerning the subject. The first school advocates the development of forces that are organized and trained to perform specialized missions. Ample literature exists concerning this approach, and some very persuasive arguments have been presented. The other school of thought argues that forces organized and trained to conduct full spectrum operations should be utilized to meet this capability requirement. This school believes that building specialized forces decreases the ability of the Army to meet numerous, simultaneous challenges. While they recommend the BCT as the solution, current literature does not specifically articulate just how a BCT would provide the required capabilities. In some instances, the secondary questions outlined in the introductory chapter have their own body of literature that compliments the material referred to above.

Building Partner Capacity

Numerous U.S. Government strategy documents emphasize the need to increase America's ability to provide security assistance to our partners and allies. Policy documents such as the *NSS*, the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (*NSVI*), the *NDS*, the *NMS*, and the *QDR* all direct an increase in capability and capacity. An extension of the QDR is the *Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap*, which attempts to operationalize the strategy by providing a list of tasks aimed at transforming the capabilities of the Services to meet the requirements for building partner capacity. Most experts seem to agree that this approach is not only necessary, but also vital. In a report for the Center for a New American Security, an independent think tank, Michèle Flournoy and Tammy Schultz conclude that "Assisting partner governments to combat terrorism and insurgency and to enhance their own security capabilities will be core missions of U.S. ground forces for years to come." They further stipulate that advisors and trainers will be critical to this effort (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 18). While there is almost no debate concerning this shift in policy, Flournoy and Schultz advocate that Congress should "insist that the Army, Marine Corps, and USSOCOM provide more in-depth assessments of future demand…(Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 5). Herein lays a key problem – what exactly is the demand, both in terms of capability and capacity, for training, advising, assisting and partnering with FSF? Unfortunately, there is very little open source literature that addresses this question. Therefore, this question is a key secondary question that must be examined in order to answer the primary research question.

Changing the Paradigm?

While the world is changing at what seems an exponential rate, many critics argue that the Army has been painfully slow to make the adjustments required to meet irregular challenges. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Army have engaged in just such a discussion through the *Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap* (*IWER*) forum, another product of the *QDR*. Unfortunately, current literature provides little insight into that debate, as the *IWER* is classified. At the heart of the discussion is the issue over specialized forces vice full spectrum forces. OSD, as well as many defense analysts, would like to see the Army create specialized forces to conduct stability operations, as well as SFA. From this point of view, development of new organizations equates to new capability. Opposing this viewpoint is the Army's belief in forces capable of conducting full spectrum operations. According to the Army's approach, military organization alone does not equate to capability. Instead, all elements of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materials, leadership, personnel, and facilities) generate capability. Two leading defense analysts, Robert Scales and Andrew Krepinevich, represent these points of view.

Major General (retired) Robert Scales, former Commandant of the Army War College, clearly views the solution as more than simply organizational. His following quote highlights the importance of preparing people to meet the challenge of training FSF: "Our success in coalition building will depend on the ability to create and improve partner armies, then we must select, promote, and put into positions of authority those who can do so. We must cultivate, amplify, research, and inculcate these skills in educational institutions reserved specifically for that purpose" (Scales 2007, 18).

Another respected defense analyst, Andrew Krepinevich, amplifies Scales'

argument. In Krepinevich's view, the Army must enhance TT assignments. According to

Krepinevich, "To attract our best soldiers to serve as advisors, Army promotion boards

must be instructed to give preference to those officers and sergeants who serve capably in

this position" (Krepinevich 2006). While Krepinevich advocates some DOTMLPF

solutions, he is nonetheless a prominent voice for building specialized units, in other

words, changing the current organizational paradigm. Since the early 1990s, some

defense analysts have argued that the Army should organize units solely for the purpose

of conducting stability operations. Krepinevich has become the leading proponent for

such action, and has briefed his proposals to both Congress and OSD. His most

noteworthy proposal is the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) concept, a

rehash of the early Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The proposal advocates

replacing a significant amount of BCTs and Marine RCTs with organizations designed

specifically to train and advise FSF, as well as develop governmental and civilian

infrastructure (Krepinevich, Schadlow, and Strmecki 2006). Interest in Krepinevich's

proposal has paved the way for those who advocate creating permanent advisor units in

lieu of TTs.

The Argument for Advisors and Advisor Units

Proponents of a permanent corps of advisors point to the history of U.S. advising

efforts in order to illustrate the need for a just such an organization to meet future

requirements. Several sources exist that detail the American advisory experience. The

first resource consists of a two-volume set by Andrew Birtle entitled *U.S.*

Counterinsurgency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941 and *1942-1976*. Although Birtle's

work is not specific to advisors or advising organizations, his detailed coverage of U.S.

counterinsurgency efforts highlights the work of advisors. His survey includes work done

by conventional military units in places such as the Philippines, Haiti, and the Dominican

Republic, as well as provides an overview of Vietnam era advisors and advisor units. For

the purpose of this study, Birtle's work provides an excellent historical backdrop, but

does not provide adequate insight for addressing the primary and secondary research

questions.

A key resource for informing this debate is *Advising Indigenous Forces:*

American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador by Robert Ramsey, and

published as an occasional paper for the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute Press. The

institute's director outlines the significance of this work in the foreword.

> The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign
> militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere around the globe. We are
> simultaneously engaged in a huge effort to learn how to conduct those missions
> for which we do not consistently prepare… Mr. Robert Ramsey's historical study
> examines three cases in which the U.S. Army has performed this same mission in
> the last half of the 20th century…The author makes several key arguments about
> the lessons the Army thought it learned at the time…However, they were often
> forgotten as the Army prepared for the next major conventional conflict (Ramsey
> 2006, iii).

Ramsey's most important contributions are the conclusions that he draws from his

examination of U.S. advising efforts. These include his analysis of the selection and

training of advisors, the lack of language training and cultural preparation, tour length,

the indifference of indigenous forces, and the cultural challenges that advisors faced.

Nonetheless, Ramsey's most important conclusion is significant to the debate concerning

today's advisory efforts.

Advisory duty was never the primary focus in Korea, South Vietnam, or El Salvador. It was an important effort, but secondary nonetheless. As such it received less support, fewer resources, little guidance, and often outdated or inappropriate equipment (Ramsey 2006, 112).

Ramsey's conclusion, along with the views of disgruntled advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan has propelled policy makers within OSD, as well as defense analysts, to conclude that the lack of focus and resources for advisors in past conflicts is ample reason why a permanent advisory organization is required in the future.

Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl has become the leading voice for those seeking to create specialized units to train FSF. Nagl's acclaimed book, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, argues that the U.S. Army struggled to effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam because, unlike the British in Malaya, the Army was not a learning organization capable of making necessary changes to doctrine, organization, personnel policies, and a host of other factors. Nagl's follow-up work, *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps*, published by the Center for a New American Security, applies his ideas with regard to the advisor issue. According to Nagl, who also commands one of the Army's battalions responsible for training TTs, the Army should not use its recent authorization in end-strength to build more BCTs, but should "create an Army Advisor Corps of 20,000 Combat Advisors…organized, equipped, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad" (Nagl 2007, 3). From the Army's standpoint, Nagl's proposal is a radical shift in thinking and runs contrary to the Army's belief in maintaining forces capable of full spectrum operations. Nonetheless, to Nagl, and supporters of the advisor corps

concept, creation of a permanent advisor corps is an obvious and logical step to meet the needs of a changing environment, and one that a true learning organization must take.

<u>The Argument for Full Spectrum Forces</u>

Since the specialization debate of the 1990s, the Army has consistently maintained the position that forces capable of full spectrum operations, and not specialized forces, are the best solution for meeting the needs of protecting the nation's interests. In a September 2007 interview, Major General Anthony Cucolo, the Army's Chief of Public Affairs, articulated the Army's position. Cucolo provided two reasons for the Army's rejection of John Nagl's Advisor Corps proposal. First, training foreign security forces is a Special Forces capability. Secondly, the Army is building the capabilities that are requested by the combatant commanders; in other words, brigade combat teams with increased capabilities to conduct stability operations (*Inside the Pentagon* 2007, 1). Another senior Army leader, Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, the senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, stated that the Army must have forces capable of conducting full spectrum operations, which have the ability to train FSF "when the mission becomes too large for the Special Forces" (Chiarelli and Smith 2007, 8). Advocates of full spectrum forces tend to voice the Army's position, rather than articulate the argument in writing. Hence, no adequate body of literature exists that articulates whether or not a BCT has the capability to train FSF, and if so, how the BCT would perform the task.

The Debate Concerning Special Operations Forces

The issue of advising FSF has been largely dominated by the role of general-purpose forces, whether they are advisors or more traditional units. This discussion is the result of two factors. First, the advisor discussion, as well as a possible radical shift in the organization of the Army, has generated a public debate that has overshadowed the second factor. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the *QDR* directed that special operations forces transition to other missions, and away from what has been one of their traditional mission sets – training and advising indigenous forces. Nonetheless, the departure of Donald Rumsfeld from the Pentagon and the infusion of new leadership at the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), opened a window for debate concerning the *QDR* directed shift away from training FSF. Many members of the Army Special Forces community believe that the move towards direct action is the wrong approach and will degrade SF's ability to conduct unconventional warfare. In a recent article, Sean Naylor captured the essence of the debate. Basically, many in the Special Forces community are advocating the creation of an unconventional warfare command. This development underscores the rift that has developed between USSOCOM's direct action forces and the SF community (Naylor 2007, 1). Such a debate would not have been possible without the highly successful initial phases of the invasion of Afghanistan, which was a classic UW operation, and highlighted the need to increase our unconventional warfare capabilities.

While the purpose of this work is not to inform that debate, there are some associated issues that impact one of the secondary research questions. Two key works make critical observations. First, Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) professor Hy

Rothstein, in his book *Afghanistan and The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare,* addresses the debate concerning the evolving role of GPF in some irregular warfare missions.

> …Conventional forces are not the best military forces for such missions. These situations are characterized by a lack of a defined enemy; the need for influence, negotiation, and even community leadership and the ability to resort to deadly force if necessary. The component of the U.S. military best prepared for these environments is the SOF (Rothstein 2006, 17).

David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, also NPS professors, provide several excellent insights in their book *United States Special Operations Forces*. However, Tucker and Lamb take a different view of the role of GPF as it relates to training FSF. They specifically address the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism nature of the GWOT, noting, "the desire to share SOF missions with conventional forces coincides with and is best explained by the spike in demand for SOF following the terror attacks on September 11, 2001" (Tucker and Lamb 2007, 192). The authors then present the following conclusion:

> Instead of passing missions *in toto* to conventional forces, SOF is just discriminating qualitatively between missions on a case-by-case basis, trying to take those it considers most difficult and leaving the less demanding ones for conventional forces. Thus, neither new technology nor the immediate pressures of the war on terrorism have led to new apportionment of missions between SOF and conventional forces, but rather to a somewhat confusing case-by-case division of labor (Tucker and Lamb 2007, 193).

While this conclusion is important for examining the secondary research question concerning the role of SOF in training and advising FSF, both the Rothstein and the Tucker/Lamb books also question the *QDR* assumption that SOF will transition to other tasks, thereby leaving a large gap that that must be filled by GPF. However, the conclusions of these authors point to an alternate outcome – a "division of labor," or

delineation of tasks between SOF and GPF. In fact, the idea of a division of labor has significant consequences for determining what kind of GPF solution will meet the requirements, as well as determining how much GPF participation will be required. If these questions are not adequately addressed, the Army, as well as the other Services, assumes significant risk with regard to force structure.

The Modular Brigade Combat Team

The literature review provided thus far suggests several conclusions. First, the U.S. military must expand its capacity to conduct SFA under various types of conditions. Secondly, past experience and current operations point to the need for a permanent advisor corps. This view has become for many, with the exception of the Army, a foregone conclusion. Lastly, the assumption that SOF will shift focus to other missions, thereby leaving a large gap to be filled by GPF, is very likely incorrect. While the Army emphatically states that the BCT can meet the requirements for advising and training foreign security forces, no specific literature exists that examines the suitability of the BCT for the mission. The most recent version of the Army's FM 3-0 *Operations* does not specifically discuss use of the BCT to conduct SFA, or more specifically TAAP. Nonetheless, FM 3-0 states that Army forces are capable of conducting irregular warfare operations, of which SFA is a key component (FM 3-0, 2008, 2-4). Additionally, no literature compares the BCT to other possible solutions, such as the advisor corps or the MAAG concepts, against a set of criteria to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of each. The author's purpose here is not to discredit the advisor corps or MAAG concepts, but to determine if the Modular BCT is the optimal solution for meeting future requirements.

Abundant literature does exist that explains why the Army is transforming into a modular force capable of full spectrum operations. The *Army Posture Statement* provides the intellectual underpinnings for the need to move away from an Army centered on divisions to one centered on modular brigades.

Modular conversion is the main effort of our transformation. To sustain a steadily increasing demand for military forces, we are building a modular force centered on Brigade Combat Teams as the basic building block of our fighting capability. Our modular conversion of active and reserve components is designed to create brigade based modules able to 'plug into' joint and coalition task forces in expeditionary and campaign settings. These forces will be better organized to accept advanced new capabilities and technology in order to meet the demands of the current war, sustain other global commitments, establish the organizational structure needed to accelerate modernization, and support a new global basing posture that will rely more heavily on rotational presence (*Army Posture Statement* 2007, A-2).

A 2004 document, *The Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity*, provides insight into the specific goals associated with creation of brigade combat teams. According to the guide, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) sought to accomplish three objectives: (1) increase the number of brigade-sized units, while providing them with organic capabilities previously found at the division level; (2) meet the demands of the combatant commanders; and (3) "redesign brigades to perform as an integral part of the joint team" (*The Army Guide to Modularity Version 1.0*, 2004, 6-1). In addition, this guide discusses the capabilities of the Modular BCT.

BCTs are designed to maneuver against and destroy enemy forces using combined arms and supported by all available joint capabilities. Although the primary purpose is offensive, HBCTs [heavy brigade combat teams] and IBCTs [infantry brigade combat teams] also are the primary forces for the execution of defensive and stability operations. BCTs will conduct support missions incident to offense, defense, or stability operations, or in the case of domestic operations, as the primary task. BCTs execute offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as required in contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operation (AOs). Within their individual AOs, BCT commanders are the supported commander, unless otherwise specified by the UEx [i.e. division] or higher headquarters (*The Army Guide to Modularity Version 1.0*, 2004, 6-2).

The modular force is based on brigade-sized elements, and as such, there are various types of brigades. The base force consists of three types of brigade combat teams – heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs), infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs), and stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs). Additionally, the Army has modular support brigades which support BCTs assigned to divisions and corps. These brigades include battlefield surveillance brigades, fires brigades, combat aviation brigades, sustainment brigades, and maneuver enhancement brigades. There are also a number of functional brigades (e.g. military police, medical) that support Army operations.

Certainly, a lot has happened since this document was published in 2004. Several years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has reinforced the Army's belief in modularity. FM 3-0, the cornerstone of Army doctrine, codified the concepts discussed above, clearly articulating that Army forces are capable of full spectrum operations. In other words, the BCT must be able to function across any number of operational themes, which include major combat operations, irregular warfare, peace operations, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagement (FM 3-0, 2008, 2-5). In two specific cases, security force assistance is specified. Peacetime military engagement identifies security assistance as a joint military operation, while irregular warfare includes foreign internal defense (FM 3-0, 2008, 2-4). Accordingly, "Full spectrum operations require simultaneous combinations of four elements – offense, defense, and stability or civil support." Listed as a primary task for stability operations is "support to governance" (FM 3-0, 2008, 3-7). This task undoubtedly implies SFA.

Numerous additional literature exists which discusses modularity and the BCT. A prime example is a *Military Review* article entitled "Why Small Brigade Combat Teams

Undermine Modularity." This document does not discuss the use of BCTs to conduct

SFA, but it does question the size and organization of the BCT, making the argument that

the current structure of two maneuver battalions per BCT, excluding the Stryker BCTs,

reduces combat power and does not meet the Army's objective of creating more

formations to ease rotational requirements (Melton 2005, 58). This shortfall in manpower

could be significant, considering that SFA is a manpower intensive endeavor. Manpower

is but one issue that contributes to any discussion of using BCTs to train, advise, assist,

and partner with foreign security forces. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Army

doctrine provides the framework for developing a concept for using BCTs to conduct

these missions.

This chapter provided a broad overview of the issues associated with answering

the primary research question. The purpose of the literature review is to examine the

various arguments encompassing many of the secondary research questions. This

foundation provides perspective for the development of the research methodology, as

well as the analysis of the research, as described in chapter four. The next chapter will

discuss the research methodology used to answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the research methodology used to answer the primary research question: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to train, advise, assist, and partner with foreign security forces? As stated in chapter one there are a number of secondary research questions that will be explored in order to answer the primary research question. Chapter two discussed the literature and the various arguments associated with the primary and secondary research questions. The intent is not to provide a definitive answer for every secondary research question. In some instances, simply exploring the question in order to gain an understanding of how that question informs the primary research question is all that is required. With this objective in mind, conclusions will be drawn for each secondary research question (SRQ). This paper is organized around the secondary research questions (SRQ). Hence, a description of the methodology to be used will be examined in this framework.

SRQ # 1: What are the future requirements (beyond OIF/OEF) for SFA?

The purpose of this question is to gain an understanding of the anticipated future demand for SFA. This question is sufficiently answered when the overall requirements, or "demand signal" has been identified. Identifying the scope and totality of the requirements will help frame the problem. In order to generate capabilities the Army must understand the problem and how Army forces fit into the overall strategy. The demand signal refers to requirements for conducting SFA in phase 0 and phase IV operations, as identified within DoD's phasing model. To obtain this answer it is

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necessary to review unclassified studies that pertain to this issue, as well as interview

senior civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and senior military officers in

the Department of the Army who oversee these issues. These senior leaders will be

referred to as "key players."

SRQ # 2: What specific capabilities must the Army possess to meet SFA requirements?

The purpose of this question is to identify the capabilities that will be required to

conduct SFA in both phase 0 and phase IV operations. This question is sufficiently

answered when the capability requirements at the tactical level have been identified. SFA

requirements reside at the strategic/institutional, operational, and tactical levels.

Nonetheless, the purpose of this paper is to determine if the BCT, a tactical organization,

is the optimal solution. Therefore, while requirements at all levels will be discussed,

tactical level SFA requirements are the primary focus and means for addressing the

question. The means for providing an answer will include reviewing the previously

mentioned studies, as well as interviews with key players.

SRQ # 3: Is there a delineation of mission sets between SOF and GPF?

The purpose of this question is to gain an understanding of what kind of

capabilities the Army must generate in order to meet the Secretary of Defense's guidance

that both GPF and SOF be capable of conducting SFA. This statement does not imply

that GPF and SOF must have redundant capabilities. While there will be some overlap,

the Army must build capabilities that: (1) are matched to GPF skill sets and (2) that allow

SF to focus on GWOT priorities. This question is sufficiently answered when an

understanding of the basic differences between SOF and GPF capabilities to conduct SFA

is achieved. Means for exploring this question include discussing the future of SOF

capabilities, as well as possible processes for determining the delineation of missions between SOF and GPF. Answering the question will be accomplished by examining current literature focused on the future of SOF, as well as interviews with members of the Army Staff who are working on this issue.

SRQ # 4: What kind of advisors does the Army need?

The purpose of this question is to determine what quality of capability is required to conduct SFA at the tactical level. Of the possible realm of tasks – *train, advise, assist, and partner – advise* is the most difficult, as well as the task that requires a skill set that allows an individual or unit to successfully accomplish the other tasks. The question is sufficiently answered when advisor capability requirements have been identified and the skill sets required by advisors have been identified. In order to answer this question, a review of the modern history of advisors is required in order to determine the effectiveness of advising efforts. Historical evidence suggests that the advising efforts in Vietnam were plagued by numerous problems. Current analysis suggests that many of those problems are present in Iraq. Hence, determining if and why these problems exist is crucial. Another area of interest is the current state of advising efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as embodied in the TT program. The means for examining these issues is to review several studies discussing advisors, conduct interviews with personnel from the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), as well as advisors with recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The purpose of secondary research questions one thru four is to attempt to frame the problem with regard to generating an Army capability to meet TAAP GPF requirements for both phase 0 and phase IV operations. In order to successfully answer

the primary research question, possible solutions, other than the Modular BCT, require examination. Therefore, SRQ # 5 and SRQ # 6 will each examine the advantages and disadvantages associated with specific organizations. A description of each organization will be provided. Additionally, each organization will be compared to the current TT structure being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, each organization will be evaluated according to criteria that will be introduced in chapter four.

SRQ # 5: What are the advantages and disadvantages of creating a permanent advisor structure to meet future requirements?

The purpose of this question is to examine the permanent *advisor corps* concept as a possible solution for meeting the requirements outlined above. This question is sufficiently answered when the concept has been evaluated according to the criteria and conclusions can be drawn. In this case, John Nagl's permanent *advisor corps* concept will be used. The concept will be evaluated according to the criteria established by the author.

SRQ # 6: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using BCTs to meet future requirements?

The purpose of this question is to examine the BCT as a possible solution for meeting the requirements outlined above. This question is sufficiently answered when the concept has been evaluated according to the criteria, and conclusions can be drawn. In this case, a proposed Army *advisory* BCT concept will be used as a model. The concept will be evaluated according to the criteria established by the author.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Preliminary conclusions will be provided for each secondary research question in chapter four. Chapter five will provide a final conclusion for each secondary research question. Provided this analysis, the primary research

question will then be answered and recommendations provided. These recommendations will enhance the conclusions of the secondary research questions, the primary research question, and possible areas for further study.

Chapter three discussed the research methodology to be used to answer the secondary research questions, and ultimately the primary research question. The methodology provided above is structured in a purpose, ends, ways, and means construct. Table 1, below, provides an overview of the research methodology for quick reference. The next chapter, chapter four, provides the results of the research and analysis conducted in order to answer the secondary research questions.

Table 1.   Research Methodology

	SRQ	Purpose	Ends	Ways	Means
1	What are the future requirements (beyond OIF/OEF) for SFA?	Gain an understanding of the anticipated future demand	Overall requirements, or "demand signal" identified	Examine phase 0 and phase IV requirements	Published studies; interviews with key players
2	What specific capabilities must the Army possess to meet SFA requirements?	Identify specific capabilities required for phase 0 and phase IV	Capability requirements at the tactical level identified	Review strategic/institutional, operational, and tactical requirements	Published studies; interviews with key players
3	Is there a delineation of mission sets between SOF and GPF?	Gain an understanding of GPF and SOF capabilities	Gain an understanding of the basic differences between SOF and GPF capabilities	Examine future of SOF roles and missions; examine GPF skill sets; examine process for SOF and GPF delineation	Examine literature; interview members of the Army Staff
4	What kind of advisors does the Army need?	Determine what quality of capability is required to conduct TAAP	Advisor capability requirements and skill sets identified	Review past and current advising efforts	Examine current literature; interview JCISFA staff; interview advisors
5	What are the advantages and disadvantages of creating a permanent advisor corps to meet future requirements?	Examine the permanent advisor corps concept	Concept evaluated according to established criteria	Established criteria	Examine Nagl's paper
6	What are the advantages and disadvantages of using BCTs to meet future requirements?	Examine BCT as a possible solution	Concept evaluated according to established criteria	Established criteria	Examine 1st Infantry Division concept

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The preceding three chapters identified the problem to be examined, reviewed pertinent literature, and discussed the research methodology to be used. The purpose of chapter four is to provide the findings of the research and analysis conducted in order to answer the primary research question: Is the Modular BCT the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to train, advise, assist and partner (TAAP) with FSF? Chapter four is divided into six sections. Each section serves to address a specific secondary research question that will contribute to answering the primary research question. Questions one, two, and three will determine the capabilities and capacity required to meet future SFA requirements, and what that means to the Army as a generating force. Question four is aimed at determining what kind of advisors the Army will need to meet those requirements. Questions five and six will analyze two possible organizational solutions for meeting the requirements.

One of these solutions, addressed in section five, is the proposed *advisor corps*. The other solution, addressed in section six, will be referred to as the advisory brigade combat team, or *advisory* BCT. The term *advisory* is used here to designate the BCT's mission, and does not indicate a new organization or type of BCT. Any of the three types of BCTs, HBCT, IBCT, or SBCT, could be designated as an *advisory* BCT. While the term *advisory* focuses on one particular task, the word is meant to serve as an overarching term for all tasks associated with TAAP. In the appropriate section, five for the *advisor corps* and six for the *advisory* BCT, the proposed organization is described. The

discussion also addresses how the proposed organization is an improvement over the current TT model. Both advantages and disadvantages for each organization are provided throughout the section. Final conclusions concerning the primary research question, as well as recommendations, will be discussed in chapter five.

<u>Secondary Research Question #1</u>

To determine whether or not the BCT is the optimal solution for training, advising, assisting and partnering with foreign security forces, the requirements for such a mission must be established. The purpose of this section is to answer the first secondary research question: What are the future requirements (beyond OIF/OEF) for security force assistance? Answering this question requires examination of the numerous drivers of these requirements. Chapters one and two provided the background necessary to explain the history of why DoD believes there will be greater requirements in the future for SFA. Over the past couple of years, DoD conducted several studies aimed at determining the capabilities and capacity required for future SFA. One major study, along with several lesser studies, provided DoD with conclusions suggesting that a large capacity is required. Unfortunately, these studies remain classified. As such, they will not be specifically discussed in this paper. Instead, an independent study called *Shaping U.S. Ground Forces for the Future: Getting Expansion Right* is used as a means for examining future requirements.

Before discussing the previously mentioned study, gaining an understanding of the capacity issue is necessary. A recent article helps to frame the problem. According to *Inside Defense,* "A closely held Pentagon report forms the backdrop for all these efforts. A study by the Institute for Defense Analyses recently concluded the U.S. military will

have an enduring requirement for 5,000 land-based trainers of foreign security forces"

(Sprenger 2007). Unfortunately, the article does not expand on what exactly the number

5,000 actually represents. Does 5,000 also include advisors? Does 5,000 include all types

of trainers? Does the number include personnel to train strategic and operational level

staffs, as well as trainers/advisors for tactical units? While the report is not specific, these

questions illustrate the problems associated with determining "how much" and "what

kind" is required.

An external-DoD study conducted by Michèle A. Flournoy and Tammy Schultz

of the Center for a New American Security provides an alternative source for studying

the problem. Flournoy and Schultz's report focuses on what they see as future challenges

that will drive the demand for ground forces. These challenges are: (1) Deterring and

responding to traditional military threats; (2) Combating violent Islamist terrorists; (3)

combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; (4) Addressing conflict and

instability arising from weak and failing states; and (5) responding to humanitarian crises

(Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 16). The most interesting aspects of the Flournoy and

Schultz report covers the security environment that the U.S. military will be required to

deal with in the future, beyond operations in Iraq.

In sum, even after the Iraq-driven demand signal is significantly reduced, U.S. ground forces must be prepared to conduct a more demanding set of steady state and surge missions than they did pre-September 11, 2001. Day to day, the overwhelming demand for U.S. ground forces will likely fall on the irregular warfare end of the spectrum, and operations lasting years rather than months will be the norm. Consequently, U.S. ground forces must be able not only to surge for major contingencies, but also to sustain multiple rotations to long-duration missions over time. This will require ensuring that the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and SOF have adequate rotation bases, particularly in the capacity areas that will be in highest demand. Taken together these demands will require some growth in U.S. ground forces. More importantly, they will require substantial change in U.S. ground forces' orientation, training, and mix of capabilities to be better prepared to deal with the demands of a much broader range of operations, especially irregular operations (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 18).

Of course, one of the high demand capacity areas will be SFA. As can be seen, many of these missions will require some level of SFA. Flournoy and Schultz also state that "assisting partner governments to combat terrorism and insurgency and to enhance their own security capabilities will be core missions of U.S. ground forces in the years to come" (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 18). Included are trainers and advisors.

While this study indicates that there will be an increased need to conduct SFA in the future, not all participants of this debate agree that building additional capacity is as obvious as Flournoy and Schultz's study may indicate. Major General David Fastabend, the Army Staff's director for strategy, plans and policy disagrees with the results of some of DoD's assessments. Fastabend agrees that there will be an enduring requirement for trainers and advisors, but cautions that the demand signal still remains dynamic. He argues, "how the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking" (Fastabend 2008). In other words, the Services should not rush to build capability and capacity. Fastabend's deputy, Colonel (Promotable) Gary Cheek holds a similar opinion, and emphasizes two key points. First, determining requirements for SFA must take into account the fact that

requirements for shaping operations, or phase 0, are much different than those associated with phase IV operations. In other words, SFA will require different capabilities in phase 0, where environments will tend to be more permissive, with greater requirements for training and assistance, but few for combat advisors. On the other hand, phase IV stability operations will require a large commitment of advisors and the ability to partner with FSF, as is currently the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also present is the possibility that the U.S. military will conduct phase 0 shaping operations globally, while also surging for a large-scale phase IV stability operation. Obviously, this means that both trainers and advisors could be in high demand.

Colonel Cheek also provided a unique insight into the debate. His organization has Army Staff responsibility for foreign area officers and international affairs, as they relate to the Army. Thus, he oftentimes meets with senior military officers from other nations to conduct staff talks. According to Colonel Cheek very few nations are interested in American advisors. However, they do remain interested in trainers, or training opportunities with U.S. forces, to improve their capabilities (Cheek, 2008). Of course, not many of the countries that will require SFA, such as those that are failing or have failed, participate in staff talks. But again, both Fastabend and Cheek emphasize that phase 0 and phase IV operations have different requirements where SFA is concerned.

Major General Geoffrey Lambert, a retired Special Forces officer who previously commanded Special Operations Command Europe and the United States Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, supports Fastabend and Cheek's views. As a career Special Forces officer, Lambert has vast experience with SFA. During a recent SFA conference conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in January of 2008,

Lambert questioned the assumption that a greatly increased capacity would be required. In a subsequent interview with the Leavenworth Times, Lambert "argued the United States should take a more sophisticated approach to handling combat advisors in the future because large numbers of advisors would not be needed. 'My contention is the number of countries that will allow us to do combat advising on their soil after we come out of Iraq is about Zero,' he said" (Menning 2008).

Several additional issues complicate understanding the requirements for SFA. At the SFA conference most attendees agreed that there was a need to increase the number of advisors, but were concerned that "the various roles that Special Forces, the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development and the four Services would play remained ambiguous" (Menning 2008). Part of the issue revolves around Pre-9/11 SFA, as well as SFA that is conducted outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Under normal circumstances, the Department of State has responsibility for security assistance issues. In most cases, the State Department provides the funding and the oversight, while the various combatant commanders provide the forces. The exceptions to this rule are Iraq and Afghanistan, where DoD has the lead, as well as the additional authority to train police and ministry of the interior security forces. In other countries, the military, in accordance with U.S. law, is prohibited form training such forces. Nonetheless, this relationship has the potential to change, as both DoD and the State Department are pushing for changes to various legal authorities, which would transfer responsibility for security assistance and SFA to DoD (Shanker 2008).

When asked at the Fort Leavenworth conference what the demand signal will be, Celeste Ward, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

Capabilities, stated "We don't know, but we believe that the demand signal will be higher that pre-OEF [September 11, 2001] levels." Several weeks later in her Pentagon office, the author conducted an interview with Ms. Ward. Again, she stated that "demand from the user is going to be higher than pre-OEF. It's part of our strategy to work with and through others and to help our partners to secure their own territories" (Ward 2008). So, just who is the "user?" In this case it means the COCOMs, and not potential host nations or U.S. ambassadors. Ward further stated that she believes that there is currently suppressed demand from the combatant commands. Suppressed demand refers to the reality that, with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan requiring vast amounts of resources, little is left over for the other combatant commands for the purposes of conducting security cooperation tasks, whether they are advising or training FSF. One other problem associated with this issue is that only combatant commands have been queried concerning SFA requirements. U.S. ambassadors and country teams don't seem to be part of the equation. Certainly, each embassy will have strong opinions concerning the kinds and levels of SFA that are being conducted in their particular country. Ultimately, this means that current approaches to determining SFA requirements are DoD-centric. While DoD can control operations during phase IV, especially in large-scale stability operations such as Iraq, DoD will not be the lead where phase 0 shaping operations are concerned. However, Congress could change the law, as the Bush Administration has requested.

Considering the opposing views of what capabilities and capacity are required to be developed, no clear method for predicting the future demand signal presents itself. The possibility exists that post-OIF/OEF requirements will remain low, especially considering waning public support for the war in Iraq. Nonetheless, building capability and capacity

must conform to the overall strategy, meaning that there will be requirements for GPF to train, advise, assist, and partner with foreign security forces in two types of environments. First, GPF will need to have the capability to conduct phase IV stability operations, as former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld dictated that stability operations are on par with conventional operations (DoDD 3000.05, 2005, 2). Secondly, logic dictates that phase 0 shaping operations be used to prepare GPF to conduct large-scale phase IV operations. Whatever force, or mix of forces, is developed must be able to provide these capabilities.

Answering secondary research question # 1 is difficult at best. The Flournoy and Schutlz study, while not offering any numbers, concludes that the demand for SFA will exceed current requirements. On the other hand, some observers remain skeptical that the demand will be as high as these studies recommend. This disagreement poses a major challenge for capabilities based planning; as it seems that "how much is enough" cannot be adequately answered until the United States is actually in the post-OIF/OEF world. Only then will the actual requirements emerge. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the anticipated demand signal will not be as great as some have indicated. Therefore, the Army, at least in the near term, should not rush to build mountains of specialized capability.

<u>Secondary Research Question #2</u>

Secondary research question # 1 helped to frame the problem by determining that DoD will require the capability to conduct SFA in both phase 0 shaping and phase IV stability operations. This section will start where the last question left off, and that is to discuss what types of requirements are associated with these operations. The purpose of

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this section is to answer secondary research question # 2: What specific capabilities must

the Army possess to meet SFA requirements? This section will examine several key

aspects of this question. First, an examination of the types of mission sets that could be

required in the future will be discussed. Second, the levels of these mission sets will be

examined. Finally, this section will provide a brief discussion and assessment of some of

the Army's current and/or possible programs that are available to meet these

requirements. The result will be a clear understanding of where the Army needs to build

capability.

Flournoy and Schultz's study provides an idea of the possible range of capabilities

that will be required in order to conduct the GWOT and other operations. According to

their report, the following key capabilities will be required (Flournoy and Schultz 2007).

Psychological Operations
Information Operations
Public Affairs
Civil Affairs
Military Police
Construction Engineers
Trainers and Advisors
Special Forces Teams
Medical Units
Legal Affairs
Intelligence (especially Human Intelligence, HUMINT)
Counterintelligence
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Foreign Affairs Officers
Linguists

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven the need for more of these types of

capabilities. In many instances, the Army has already begun to rebalance approximately

100,000 personnel spaces to increase the capacity of what were once known as low-

density, high demand capabilities (*Army Posture Statement* 2007, A-2). Without a doubt,

in the future these capabilities will continue to be in high demand, whether it be a phase

IV operation, such as Iraq/Afghanistan, or as part of building partner capacity in phase 0.

However, for the purposes of this paper we are only concerned about "trainers and

advisors" and "Special Forces Teams." According to the authors, trainers and advisors

"train host nation security forces in simulated conditions and mentor them during actual

combat operations" (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 22). Special Forces Teams "Conduct

special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare (a broad spectrum of

military and paramilitary operations conducted by, with, or through indigenous or

surrogate forces)" (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 22). Of course, Special Forces teams also

train and advise, either as part of their unconventional warfare mission (e.g. Iraq and

Afghanistan), or in support of COCOM theater security cooperation efforts. Supporting

these efforts affords Special Forces the opportunity to work in nations where they may

one day need to operate. These opportunities also provide SF personnel with a training

opportunity, for when they are required to conduct unconventional warfare.

While Flournoy and Schultz provide a comprehensive list of capabilities and

occupational specialties, they do not provide an adequate discussion of how all of these

pieces ultimately fit together. Capabilities by themselves rarely produce the desired

effects and end-state of a military operation. Ultimately, it is the organization,

employment and synchronization of sets of capabilities that produce results. Special

Forces teams are the only element that are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct

operations independent of other capabilities. Of course, this situation assumes an austere

unconventional warfare environment whereby the covert nature and political sensitivity

of the mission would require the smallest footprint possible. Other than those

circumstances, even Special Forces teams will be task organized with other capabilities

such as psychological operations, civil affairs, and Air Force terminal air controllers.

GPF "trainers and advisors," on the other hand, will most often be task organized with

other capabilities. Unlike Special Forces teams, they do not have the rigorous selection

standards and years of training the SF teams possess, nor do they have the high

proficiency in skills such as weapons, medical, engineering, communications, and

intelligence. The point of all of this is that "trainers and advisors" by themselves are not a

stand-alone capability.

In phase 0 shaping operations, GPF trainers and advisors will require other

capabilities to be effective. For instance, some missions may require medical support

beyond the standard Army medic, or may even require deployment of a medical unit. In

another scenario, a standard team of advisors may require augmentation of engineers, or

even explosive ordnance disposal teams. In many cases, standard trainers and advisors, as

envisioned by some in the Pentagon, will not suffice to train foreign armies in the most

technical skills, such as gathering intelligence, developing maintenance programs, and

flying helicopters. Some skills require specified experience that most advisors and

trainers will not possess, such as assisting a host nation to establish their own version of

the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command or even a national level defense staff.

The best personnel to advise and teach are personnel who have served in these kinds of personnel assignments and Army organizations.

Another aspect of assistance that has been largely ignored, until recently, is the various levels of SFA – strategic/institutional, operational, and tactical. While most news accounts about advisors have been those who are at the tactical level training and advising Iraqi/Afghan battalions, brigades, and divisions, there are other efforts that are being conducted. For example, the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) trains and advises the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior. This aspect is critical because it assist the Iraqis in building viable security institutions. MNSTC-I also provides assistance with the institutional aspects of the Iraqi Army. For example, they assist the Iraqis to develop training and education programs. At the operational level, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) advises the operational levels of the Iraqi Army. The point in describing all of this is to illustrate that SFA is conducted at all three levels of war, and is not limited to the tactical arena.

Iraq is not the only place where these kinds of operations are being conducted. Since the end of World War II, DoD, and especially the Army, has provided security assistance to many countries. Most security assistance programs encompass providing technical assistance to the host nation. Prime examples are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Each of these nations has bought U.S. equipment, and the U.S. has assigned military personnel to provide technical assistance. In other words, training host nation security forces how to use the equipment. According to an Army information paper, "in FY07, the Army deployed 65 separate teams to 39 countries to support security assistance efforts. These teams logged more than 80,000 workdays overseas as they provided technical assistance,

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extended training service, mobile training teams, and pre-deployment site surveys"

(Army Information Paper 2008, 1). The Army also provides a tremendous amount of

what is referred to as International Military Education and Training (IMET). IMET

programs provide foreign officers and non-commissioned officers the opportunity to train

at U.S. Army schools. According to the previously mentioned information paper, "In

FY07, the institutional Army trained and educated over 7,700 students at 15 CONUS

[continental United States] locations. This included FMS [foreign military sales], IMET,

CN [counternarcotics] and CTFP [Counterterrorism Fellowship Programs] funded

programs supporting all five GCCs" (Army Information Paper 2008, 1). The point here is

that the Army has maintained a robust SFA capability for decades, but has not put all of

these efforts under the umbrella of one organization, something that critics advocate.

The Army has also studied possible development of the Theater Military

Advisory and Assistance Group (TMAAG), a proposal that can cover some of the gaps.

TMAAG provides the Army Service Component Commands forces to execute
specified theater security cooperation tasks or activities in support of the Theater Security
Cooperation Plan during the period of shaping operations (Phase 0). Each TMAAG
consists of a small administrative/support HQ and three assigned training teams (22
personnel each) to execute specific security cooperation missions with host nation
militaries. They can train host nation forces, conduct detailed assessments, and facilitate
participation of Army-provided rotational GPF forces. Training is targeted at the tactical
level and can be tailored with additional capabilities as required (Army Information Paper
2008, 1).

However, the Army recently decided not to further develop or field the concept.

According to Colonel (Retired) Robert Killibrew the proposal would have interfered with

the current arrangements whereby ambassadors, along with their military component at

the embassy, "variously called a MAAG, Milgroup or some other acronym acceptable to

the host country" coordinate SFA efforts (Killibrew 2008). Killibrew goes on to say "If

the host country and the U.S. jointly agree to provide U.S. military advisors to local security forces, they are assigned to the in-country Milgroup supporting the U.S. mission" (Killibrew, 2008). Of course, this relationship only applies to phase 0 shaping operations. In Phase IV stability operations, a COCOM, and not the embassy, will decide the disposition of advisors.

The bottom line is that training and advising encompasses a large swath of activities, whether they are at the strategic/institutional, operational, or tactical levels. Further complicating the issue is whether or not the environment is phase 0 shaping operations, or phase IV stability operations. Obviously, there are numerous capabilities that must be developed within the force structure in order to meet all of the requirements associated with either building partner capacity or nation building. The U.S. Army already possessed a lot of capability to train and advise foreign security forces prior to 9-11. Part of the problem is that the original discussion, as identified in the *QDR*, has been narrowed to "get Iraq right the next time." While the Army already possessed a significant amount of capability and capacity, it never anticipated having to completely rebuild a foreign security force, both army and police, from the ground up. That's something that the U.S. military didn't even have to do in Vietnam. The author's observations of this debate in the Pentagon reflect that conclusion. When the strategy for increasing global security through building partner capacity generated the increased requirement, OSD staffers concluded that the Services should build large and permanent TT structures. Of course, at the time, the Army was struggling to put TTs into the field. The conclusion was that the Army refused to consider or support innovative solutions that detracted from the modular force.

So, how does all of this fit into answering secondary research question # 2? The purpose of this discussion was to determine where the "trainers and advisors" described by Flournoy and Schultz fit into the SFA equation. As established in the previous section, SFA will be conducted in phase 0 shaping operations and phase IV stability operations. This section established that for each of these phases different capabilities and capacity are required. Clearly, attempting to build specialized organizations to accomplish SFA at every level, and across the spectrum of SFA, will result in two distinct armies – a fighting force and an advising, or stability force. This conclusion is consistent with the proposed Krepinevich concept for creating a specialized stability operations force. Under this concept, 27 out of 42 BCTs, 3 Marine RCTs, and 15 National Guard brigades would be converted into stability operations organizations, effectively splitting the force (Krepinevich, Schadlow, and Strmecki 2006, 43).

As previously shown, the Army has many ways of providing assistance to our partners and allies. The desire for greater capacity stems from the GWOT strategy, as well as the need to rebuild the entire Iraqi and Afghan security infrastructures. That is really where the Army fell short. The Army did not have GPF forces capable of building Iraqi combat security forces. In terms of military forces, this means combat arms (infantry, armor), combat support (engineers), and combat service support (quartermaster, transportation) units. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, security forces also include ministry of the interior security forces, to include local police, national police, border police, and special police. How the military will train police forces in the future remains a legal and interagency issue. For the purposes of this discussion the parameters will be confined to training tactical level units (division and below) that encompass combat arms,

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combat support, and combat service support. This set of parameters is especially important considering that these kinds of units are the boots on the ground that provide security, conduct counterinsurgency, and defend a nation's borders.

<u>Secondary Research Question #3</u>

To determine whether or not the BCT is the optimal solution for training, advising, assisting and partnering with foreign security forces a discussion of the role of special operations forces in SFA is required. The purpose of this section is to answer the third secondary research question: Is there a delineation of mission sets between SOF and GPF? Answering this question requires an examination of the numerous drivers of these requirements. Chapters one and two examined some aspects of the debate concerning the role of SOF. In order to answer this question, a review of why DoD believes that GPF should assume, or at least share, some of the traditional missions associated with SOF, is necessary. Then an examination of the on-going debate inside the special operations community concerning these roles will be reviewed. Finally, a discussion of the delineation of tasks between GPF and SOF will be presented. The conclusions provide additional insight into what missions are applicable for GPF and how it should be determined when and how GPF is best utilized.

As stated in chapters one and two, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom SFA was viewed as a SOF mission, and primarily as a Special Forces task. Two key events changed this paradigm. First, the immense task of organizing a new Iraqi Army was well beyond the capacity of SOF, especially given the fact that resources were focused on conducting direct action and intelligence gathering in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Naylor 2007). In part, this led to the 2006 *QDR*'s direction that SOF move away from some of its

traditional roles and missions, such as SFA, in order to focus on counterterrorism

operations. Additionally, general-purpose forces were tasked to assume some of these

roles, especially SFA. Without a doubt GPF is capable of conducting some of the

traditional SFA missions. After all, GPF is currently training and advising the Iraqi and

Afghan security forces. Additionally, a review of pre-9-11 mission requirements indicates

that SF conducted missions such as training Honduran infantry units in basic skills

(author's experience). Although providing a training opportunity for SF, these missions,

due to their low level of risk and the proficiency level required, could have easily been

conducted by GPF. Tucker and Lamb, in their book *United States Special Operations*

Forces capture the essence of the debate within the SOF community.

> Much of the confused division of labor between SOF and conventional forces in
> the war on terror originates in the mistaken assumption that SOF direct action makes the
> greatest contributions to the war effort. To reduce stress on overextended SOF, the
> Pentagon and SOCOM relieved Special Forces of their counterinsurgency and
> counterterrorist training missions in some key states contending with terrorism (Tucker
> and Lamb 2007, 193).

Like conventional Army units, SOF has been stretched thin, thereby requiring relief from

some of these missions (Associated Press 2008). At the same time, GPF has increased its

capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations and train foreign security forces.

Nonetheless, a significant question has been raised concerning the role of SOF once

Operation Iraqi Freedom has been reduced in scope. Given a significant decrease in

requirements, it is a reasonable assumption that SOF will want to assume some of the

missions that were once its primary domain. Again, Tucker and Lamb provide insight

into this debate.

Instead of passing missions in toto to conventional forces, SOF is just discriminating qualitatively between missions on a case-by-case basis, trying to take those it considers most difficult and leaving the less demanding ones for conventional forces. Thus, neither new technology nor the immediate pressures of the war on terrorism have led to new apportionment of missions between SOF and conventional forces, but rather a somewhat confusing case-by-case division of labor (Tucker and Lamb 2007, 193).

This "division of labor" led OSD to underscore the need for GPF to become more "SOF-like," capable of conducting some SOF missions, thereby freeing SOF for what they see as more important work – direct action against terrorist organizations. Although both SF and the conventional Army scoff at this characterization, there is ample evidence that Army GPF has increased its capability to conduct operations that were once the sole purview of SOF. The counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan find GPF conducting missions and using tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that were once the province of SOF. At the same time, the "have" and "have-not" system whereby equipment was fielded according to a tier system has been largely eradicated. Under the old system, units such as the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Division were fielded equipment before other units, who may not ever receive the equipment. Now, all units are being provided with new equipment in accordance with the deployment schedule. Additionally, TTPs and training are being shared across the force. Ultimately, these policies significantly increased the capability of the total force. Most units in Iraq and Afghanistan are capable of conducting raids, an operation normally associated with SOF. Of course, the GPF can't match the level of precision, nor does it have equipment as advanced as that of SOF, but there is some truth that GPF has moved into the spectrum of operations that were once considered SOF unique.

With regard to roles and missions, there is disagreement within the Special Forces

community. As Hy Rothstein points out, "This disagreement is reflected in a division of

opinion within the special operations community as to whether they ought to be 'shooters

or social workers'" (Rothstein 2006, 18). In other words, should the focus be on direct

action or unconventional warfare. Rothstein makes another interesting observation that is

germane to the debate. This observation highlights the difference in definitions of *special*

operations between USSOCOM, and its Army component, known as the U.S. Army

Special Operations Command (USASOC).

> USSOCOM's definition indicates that SOF are special because they have unique
> equipment and perform tasks that 'exceed the routine capabilities of conventional
> forces.' The tasks and methods themselves are by implication, conventional. The
> stress in the USASOC definition is on the use of these forces for 'political,
> economic or informational objectives,' beyond ordinary military ones and
> employing something called 'unconventional means.' This reflects an important
> difference about what is special about special operations. Are these essentially
> conventional soldiers with a very high level of proficiency? Or are they something
> else, dedicated to purposes and functions that are different and using methods that
> are outside the conventional mold of most military forces, that is, unconventional
> (Rothstein 2006, 18)?

The purpose for quoting this passage is to provide some perspective on determining the

level to which GPF can assume some of SOF's missions. The key component here is the

USASOC definition, which focuses on unconventional means to conduct operations in

support of specific political, economic or informational objectives. This definition proves

useful in determining a possible delineation between SOF and GPF tasks, where TAAP is

involved.

In the author's experience, OSD and the Joint Staff have not been inclined to

examine a possible delineation for TAAP between SOF and GPF. Instead, OSD staffers

have focused on Secretary Gates' view that SFA is a task that both SOF and GPF must be

capable of conducting. While correctly identifying that capability and capacity must be present in the GPF, OSD has not answered the question of "how much is enough?" When using capabilities based planning, it is critical to know at least what kind of baseline is required. Otherwise, capacity cannot be effectively matched to specified capabilities. This observation is not to be confused with the discussion of secondary research question # 1. The baseline being discussed here has to do with determining how much SOF and GPF is needed to conduct the total requirement. Both the Army and USSOCOM have attempted to determine a formula for mission apportionment.

Major Zach Miller, the Army Staff's lead action officer for SFA capabilities, has established some parameters for determining whether or not a SFA mission is SOF or GPF peculiar. Miller sees the delineation of missions in terms of the following: (1) *GPF appropriate*; (2) *SOF appropriate*; (3) *GPF exclusive*; and (4) *SOF exclusive* (Miller 2008). The delineation between the terms *appropriate* and *exclusive* will become important as this paper examines the primary research question. According to Miller *GPF appropriate* are those missions that are within the capability of GPF. In other words, these missions reflect the core competencies of GPF – small unit tactics, marksmanship, planning, medical, and so forth. Of importance is the term "in-kind" force. In other words, GPF is best used to train foreign forces attempting to build similar capabilities. Given Army and Marine Corps experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, tasks such as counterinsurgency, once the sole purview of SOF, are now GPF core competencies. *SOF appropriate* tasks are those tasks that are very much similar to GPF tasks, but become *SOF appropriate* when they are deemed to benefit SOF in some way, such as providing SOF with access to a key country or region (Miller 2008). One example could be the use

of SOF to train sub-Saharan African forces in rifle marksmanship. While this task is *GPF appropriate*, it benefits SOF by providing them access to an area vital to the GWOT (Miller 2008). *GPF exclusive* tasks are those tasks that SOF is incapable of doing. "For instance, building institutions, advising above the brigade level, or conducting large-scale engineering or medical projects" (Miller 2008). *SOF exclusive* tasks are those that are *SOF appropriate* due to the training/advising requirement, or due to the area where they are conducted (Miller 2008). One example may be training the counterterrorist unit of a nation that is critical to the GWOT, and the mission profile demands low-visibility.

The Army and USSOCOM believe that some process should be developed whereby the Global Force Management Board in the Pentagon can determine what forces, either GPF or SOF, to assign to any given mission (Miller 2008). Such a process would require criteria by which each COCOM request for forces could be evaluated. Major Miller believes that several key questions should be asked: (1) Why is this SFA mission being requested? (2) To what end are we conducting the SFA mission? (3) What is the long-term U.S. strategy related to this country? (4) Is the overall intent of the effort to operate with the force being trained, or is it to operate alongside the force? (5) Is the intent to enable the force to be trained to protect its own sovereignty or is it to prepare the force for a specific mission of particular interest? (6) Is it a question of building relationships for long-term engagement and access (Miller 2008)? Answering such questions will assist in determining the best force for the job.

Miller provides four key criteria for answering the above questions. First, is the issue of political acceptability for both the U.S. and the host nation. Acceptability includes the issues of visibility and footprint. Either the U.S., the host nation, or both may

require the U.S. force to have a low signature or footprint. Another critical aspect is the level of risk associated with the mission. Will the U.S. force be operating in a hostile, uncertain, or friendly environment? Finally, the host nation, or even the American country team may request a certain type of force, such as Special Forces. The second criterion involves access. Is this the first time that a U.S. force is conducting operations in the host nation? Lack of a historical relationship with the host nation provides an excellent reason as to why SOF would be more appropriate for the mission. Conversely, the mission may involve a nation where there has been a significant U.S. presence for decades. Is the area governed, under-governed, or ungoverned? Is the environment permissive, semi-permissive, or denied? And finally, what is the state of the partner nation infrastructure. Host nation infrastructure is a major consideration because, unlike SOF, GPF is not trained to operate in austere or denied environments for prolonged periods of time. The next criterion involves the need for specialized forces, equipment, or skills. This includes the necessity of immediate execution, advanced language and cultural skills. What is the duration of the mission? And finally, what kind of footprint is required when the above factors have been considered? The final criterion involves the risk of non-execution. In other words, what is the impact if the mission is not conducted? Are there potential strategic and operational risks? Will not supporting the mission damage the relationship between the United States and the host nation? Can the mission be delayed (Miller 2008)? These are just some of the questions that will need to be resolved before the United States deploys GPF or SOF into an area for the purpose of TAAP. While imperfect, they nevertheless serve as the starting point to build a credible process for assigning the right force to the right mission.

One other aspect that deserves consideration is capability overlap. The Georgia train and equip mission is perhaps the best example whereby SOF and GPF shared a particular mission. This mission began with SOF training the Georgian army. At the beginning of the mission access was a primary concern. After a period of several months, the mission was assumed by GPF, in this case the U.S. Marine Corps. As Major Miller points out, the reverse could happen as well, with GPF conducting the initial mission in order provide the host nation force with basic skills. At a designated point, SOF could assume the mission in order to provide the FSF with more specialized skills (Miller 2008).

The fact remains that some process is required to determine the appropriate force for the appropriate mission. The above framework provides an excellent starting point in attempting to determine what kind of capability the GPF must build in order to meet future requirements since, without the presence of historical data, a true delineation of tasks cannot be established. Finally, the question of what direction USSOCOM will take once post-OIF/OEF requirements have appreciably decreased remains to be answered. With many in the SOF community wanting to focus on unconventional warfare vice direct action, as well as the programmed addition of five more Special Forces battalions, the Services, and especially the Army, will assume institutional risk. To use an analogy, the Army and Marine Corps are in effect being told to put together a barbeque for a lot of people, but not told how much steak, chicken, and ribs to purchase. And by the way, USSOCOM is having a barbeque right next door on the same day and at the same time, and will get to pick and choose which guests it wants. The odds are that there will be a lot of meat left over that may go bad.

Secondary Research Question #4

Secondary research questions one thru three helped to frame the problem by providing insight into what capabilities and capacity are required for future SFA. While definitive answers to those questions were not provided, the discussion provides an appreciation for the issues involved. The purpose of this section is to answer secondary research question # 4: What kind of advisors does the Army need? This examination will include a discussion of two key areas: (1) What do advisors contribute to mission accomplishment and (2) What criteria should be used to determine the adequacy of advisors? Examination of these two questions will reveal that there are areas of the advisor debate that remain unexplored.

The advisor issue is of vital importance to DoD and the Army because the U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan depends in large part on these security forces being viable and capable of operating with reduced U.S. and Coalition support. As President Bush has stated: "As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down" (Banusiewicz 2005, 1). This paper will not examine whether or not TTs have been successful. This paper will assume that at this time the U.S. advisory effort has increased the capability of Iraqi security forces. Although, there are numerous factors that could be attributable to an increase in the performance of the security forces, to include political reconciliation and a larger Iraqi feeling that the violence and chaos must be stopped, as well as a resurrection of Iraqi nationalism. Mixed with the experience of those Iraqis who served in the Saddam era military, this could very well be attributable to a positive increase in performance. Nonetheless, the efforts of the TTs must be considered as a key component. As Colonel Michael Clark, the deputy-director of the Joint Center for International Security Force

Assistance (JCISFA), and a former advisor in Iraq, recently stated: "I firmly believe that the advisors on the ground in Iraq made a significant difference every day…there was a big difference in the performance of Iraqi units that had advisors compared to those that did not" (Menning 2008).

Nonetheless, numerous problems have plagued the TT program from its inception. Two key issues are at the heart of this problem. First, the quality of personnel selected to serve on TTs, and secondly, the development and training of teams at Fort Riley, Kansas. The first issue deals with the selection of TT personnel. The first transition teams were composed of personnel serving in various institutional assignments (e.g. instructor, staff officer, etc.) who had not served in OIF or OEF (author's experience). The Army did not strip the BCTs of experienced officers and NCOs who were needed to lead American forces that, at the time, had to provide security and conduct COIN against an increasingly effective insurgency. This led to the view by some in DoD that the Army was not providing its "best and brightest" to serve in units that were the priority for winning the war. The second issue concerns the ad-hoc nature of the TTs. Individual soldiers were re-assigned to Fort Riley, Kansas. These officers and NCOs were then formed into teams and provided approximately sixty days of training. Unfortunately, this training was geared primarily toward individual and collective combat skills focused on force protection, rather than advising. A rudimentary amount of language and culture training was provided, but very little in the way of how to advise, train, and mentor foreign soldiers and police (Sprenger 2008, 1).

A recent internal Army report cited many of the problems associated with the TT program. According to *Inside the Army*, which obtained a copy of the report, several

officers from the Army Staff reviewed operations at Fort Riley. One excerpt from their report states that: "The training of transition teams (TT) at Fort Riley is currently being severely hampered by the quality and diversity of individuals assigned [to serve on these teams], the inadequacy of the curriculum, the lack of experience of the instructors, and overall lack of external support" (Sprenger 2008, 1). The article also highlighted several other issues. First, the brigade responsible for TT training "is short on personnel, and too few transition team members with theater experience return to share their expertise with teams in training" (Sprenger 2008, 1). The Army report also noted problems in Iraq. "Due to the limited size of the teams, and force protection requirements, TTs generally can only be in one place at a time" (Sprenger 2008, 1). While this is a recent report concerning the TT program, many of the problems highlighted in the report have been widely discussed in the Pentagon over the last several years. The author's own experience serves as an example. When discussing future requirements for advisors, several OSD staffers voiced the view that the Army was not adequately resourcing the TT mission, and in actuality was hampering the mission. OSD staff members voiced the opinion that the Army viewed advising as less than career enhancing, and as such was not sending the high caliber of officers and NCOs required. The conclusion of several OSD staffers was that future force structure requires permanent advisor units. This organizational solution was seen as the way to reform the Army's conventional war culture.

Proponents of this view cite the issues associated with Vietnam-era advisors as ample proof that the Army does not value advisors, and that the assignment in not career enhancing, and therefore, is not sought after by the Army's most capable officers. Robert Ramsey has chronicled the American advising efforts in Korea, Vietnam, and El

Salvador, and provides tremendous insight into the subject. This paper will not attempt to

recount the history of advising or examine all of his findings. Nonetheless, from

Ramsey's analysis it is apparent that advising is a task that the Army has never done very

well. Many of the problems outlined above were experienced before, especially during

the Vietnam era. One of Ramsey's concluding points highlights the Army's struggle with

advising.

> Careful selection and screening of advisory personnel is required. Not everybody
> can or should do advisory duty. Former advisors acknowledge this; studies reinforce it.
> This means that 'to have a valid set of selection criteria that works, the military has to
> formulate a hard set of required skills for advisor duty. It should…then test them to
> ensure some level of proficiency.' 'Good Marines [and good soldiers] do not invariably
> make good advisors…[for many] lacked the patience to work with a culture that places
> little emphasis on qualities that we regard as…indispensable to military life…The 'drill
> instructor' type of instruction is not generally effective in training indigenous soldiers."
> Those soldiers considered the best and most experienced are not always well suited for
> advisory duty; often the normal approach is also not well suited (Ramsey 2006, 114).

Ramsey leaves little doubt that the Army has failed to understand what a successful

advising effort entails. Instead, the Army applied its standards for effectiveness against a

mission that required a vastly different approach.

> Ramsey, as well as many critics of the Army's TT program, argues that not just

any soldier or marine can be an advisor, that there should be some sort of selection

process for officers and NCOs. Thomas D. Affourtit, a retired Marine officer and Ph.D.,

conducted a motivational comparison between Marine advisor trainees and Arab

Muslims, as one means for determining who makes a good advisor. For the purposes of

the study he interviewed 258 Marine advisors, ranging in rank from sergeant to Colonel,

to determine their motivational characteristics. These included the need for order,

endurance, nurturance, succorance, and abasement. He then compared the Marine sample

to that of a sample of male college students in Jordan. Dr. Affourtit found that there was a

wide degree of variance between Marine and Arab attitudes. These differences in

motivation could definitely impact the ability of advisors to successfully advise, train,

and assist Arab Muslims (Affourtit 2006, 1).

Affourtit also discusses the issue of culture shock. He found that "Marine advisors

returning from Iraq report two types of dysfunctional behavior displayed by men in the

field. Some go 'native,' align themselves with their counterpart group, assimilate their

characteristics, and thereby are rendered ineffective. Others display a 'bad ass' character.

This is an overreaction to the trainees, manifested in tone gestures, and attitude." He

concludes, "All such behavior, however, is contingent upon the situation and the

preparation of the Marine" (Affourtit 2006, 4). Affourtit's final analysis is that:

> Selection criteria have not yet been established for military advisors. Such criteria
> would require considerable field research, and consideration of other factors necessary
> for effectiveness, e.g., professional and technical competence, language capability,
> knowledge of and experience with the culture are all essential advisor characteristics, not
> to mention intelligence and maturity. Finally, if criteria were established, could the
> Marine Corps meet the demand, given the number of advisors needed in the current
> global environment (Affourtit 2006, 4)?

Ramsey also notes the willingness of both the organization and the individual to pursue

advisor duty.

> Combat arms volunteers eager to serve in a combat environment filled most of the
> two-man MACV battalion advisory teams in 1962-63…Advisory duty remained
> desirable until the buildup of US combat units in 1965-66. By 1966, emphasis shifted
> from sending the best personnel to the advisory effort to sending them to US combat
> units (Ramsey 2006, 38).

In another example, Ramsey notes that when the CSA developed a program to attract the

best-qualified officers, former battalion commanders, to serve as province senior

advisors, it failed. As Ramsey notes, "Yet this program – full of personal and

professional incentives and personally supported by the CSA – challenging the best

qualified officers to become province senior advisors, received only a 35 percent

acceptance rate from the initial group of letters (Ramsey 2006, 39).

Evidence seems to indicate that attracting advisors may be more than a

bureaucratic pitfall. Culturally, it seems that many American officers and NCOs were

willing to be advisors when U.S. forces were not directly involved in combat operations.

But once U.S. units were committed, many sought duty in those units, as well as the

opportunity to lead U.S. soldiers. The author's experience observing students at the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College seems to validate this statement. Many

officers selected to serve on TTs are usually the ones without combat experience. This

outcome emanates from the Army's need to manage the amount of OIF/OEF tours

individual officers have. At the same time there are requirements for majors in BCTs.

Promotion is based upon an officer fulfilling key developmental assignments in a brigade

position, such as battalion operations or executive officer. Those who have previously

served on a TT have found the experience rewarding, but want to serve in U.S. units. The

bottom line is that there doesn't seem to be a process whereby the Army is selectively

sending its undesirable personnel to TT assignments. A host of other factors are involved

in the process. It appears that officers who served in TTs previously, as well as served as

company commanders in OIF and OEF, seem equally comfortable in either environment.

So, if a selection process is so important, how does the military go about picking

the right person to be an advisor? In 1967 the Institute for Defense Analysis published a

study entitled *Conflicts of Culture and the Military Advisor*. The author, George Guthrie,

examined several issues concerning the effectiveness of advising.

It would appear that there is general agreement concerning the importance of training and selection activities, but there is little agreement concerning the method or content of training programs nor the qualities one should look for in selection. Even with agreement on the latter topic, there would still remain the problem of developing valid selection techniques. Before any of these matters can be resolved, however, it would seem necessary that careful studies be done in the field in order to analyze the nature of effective technical assistance. It would be necessary to bear in mind that there are many ways of accomplishing one's purpose and possibly even a greater number of ways to fail. Only then would it be possible to reach some estimate of the distribution of the variance in performance attributable to the lifelong qualities of the assistant on the one hand and skills acquired on the job on the other (Guthrie 1967, 47).

Gutherie illustrates a valuable point in mentioning that the effectiveness of advisors must be examined. In further discussing effectiveness, Guthrie uses a case study done in the Philippines to determine the effectiveness of Peace Corps workers.

> This study dramatized the difference in criteria held by Americans and Filipinos where the former emphasized that a good volunteer was one who innovated, learned the language, and worked hard at his job. The Filipinos felt an effective volunteer must first of all present a pleasing personality. In contrast to American raters, the Filipinos were not particularly impressed by the skills of the volunteer nor were they, surprisingly, inclined to rate him more highly because he learned the dialect (Guthrie 1967, 48).

This study's conclusion is at odds with the widely held understanding of what it takes to be a good advisor. Is language proficiency and culture training the linchpin to advising? Is there a selection process that will produce the desired product? Would advisors, who are considered effective in Iraq, be just as effective in another part of the world? It seems that more research probably needs to be conducted in order to answer these questions. Nonetheless, with the possibility of a large requirement, as identified by the various assessments, it seems that a selection, even a basic one, would whittle the likely candidates down to a number below the perceived requirements. Additionally, the possibility exists that many of the personnel, those who appear to be the best candidates, may already be serving in the Special Forces.

Another aspect of advising offers insight for answering this question, and it has nothing to do with culture, language, or a pleasing personality. This aspect concerns what advisors can provide to their counterparts – access to U.S. enablers. In discussions with advisors that have returned from Iraq, some of those advisors articulated that what the Iraqis really wanted from U.S. advisors was access to "enablers" such as air support, medical evacuation, fire support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The previously noted Congressional Research Office report also mentions that TTs are "teaching them [Iraqis] basic tactics and planning and providing them with intelligence, air power, and other support, as well as monitoring their operations for signs of sectarian activity and other abuses" (Congressional Research Office 2008, 9). Finally, Ramsey also notes that "when lower-level advisors could provide their counterpart something of value, such as combat support assets as they did in Korea and South Vietnam or pacification assets as in South Vietnam, then the counterpart had a personal incentive to work more closely with his advisor" (Ramsey, 112). This conclusion brings into question the overall *raison d'être* of advisors, especially in conflicts like Vietnam and Iraq, where the host nation's military personnel have plenty of experience in fighting, but may lack the will.

So, what kind of advisors does the Army need? The author's observations in the Pentagon revealed that there are some who believe that the ideal advisor measures up to Lawrence of Arabia. This "Lawrence of Arabia syndrome" fails to recognize that men such as Lawrence and Gordon of Khartoum were remarkable and unique men that cannot be reproduced, even in small numbers. On the other hand, competent and experienced personnel who can be trained may be all that is required to provide foreign security forces

with the enablers that they require, monitor their adherence to human rights and their

loyalty to the government, and deter their swing over to sectarianism. Attempting to

conduct a selection process for advisors may be a bridge too far. This route will lead the

Army to produce very few advisors. Instead, the U.S. military probably needs a spectrum

of advisors, ranging from the selected, highly skilled, and highly adaptive (i.e. Special

Forces) to the trained, competent, and adaptive (i.e. general purpose forces).

So, what are the requirements for creating successful advisors and advisor

organizations? JCISFA is attempting to answer this question. Established as a DoD center

of excellence to improve the joint force's ability to conduct SFA, JCISFA is the only

organization within DoD focused on the problem, as well as providing assistance at all

levels of SFA. According to Colonel Sean Ryan, the JCISFA chief of staff, success in

SFA requires two key components: (1) Operate with little operational authority and great

responsibility; and (2) Gain results indirectly (Ryan 2008).

The first component is at the crux of the advising issue for general-purpose forces,

and in particular the Army. American officers are typically type "A" personalities that

strive for excellence as well as become personally involved in solving problems. In the

case of many advisors, they set the bar much too high for those they are advising; as

evidenced by Dr. Affourtit's study (Affourtit 2006, 4). The commonly held perception is

that the American Army's ethos is to personally take charge of a situation in order to get

the mission accomplished. Advising, on the other hand requires just the opposite

approach. When advising foreign security forces, advisors hold no legal or command

authority over the indigenous force. An advisor cannot give orders to his counterpart. He

therefore has "little operational authority," an aspect of advising that many advisors

initially find frustrating. Nonetheless, the advisor does have great responsibility. He is an American officer or NCO, and as such he has an obligation, really a "responsibility" to improve the forces that he is advising. Improving capabilities is the mission of the advisor. The real battle is to understand this and find ways in which to accomplish the mission.

"Gaining results indirectly" is the second component and is tied to the first. The advisor must find a way to win over his foreign counterpart. This is the essence of influencing his counterpart to consider his advice and accept his ideas. According to Colonel Ryan, doing two things gain results. The first involves "influence." So, what does an advisor bring to the table? First is "value." Some benefit must be gained by having the advisor around. As an example, Colonel Ryan mentioned the infamous "lieutenant advisors" in Vietnam (Ryan 2008). One must ask what a lieutenant, probably without combat experience, provides to a Vietnamese battalion commander with twenty-five years of combat experience. Well, that lieutenant was able to provide enablers such as close air support and medical evacuation by helicopter. The advisor's ability to do this provides value to the host nation commander. Credibility is the second component of influence. Credibility usually boils down to rank and combat experience. In a perfect world the host nation battalion commander, who has combat experience, should be paired with an American with just as much combat experience, and who is a former battalion commander himself. However, it usually doesn't happen this way. There are numerous stories of Special Forces officers pinning-on a higher rank in order to gain access to their host-nation counterpart. Therefore, credibility usually comes in the form of competence and interpersonal skills. This means getting the host nation battalion commander to

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recognize that the American advisor is a professional with experience and ideas worthy of acknowledgement. The last key component is to "build and keep rapport." There are three aspects to this component: (1) Understanding; (2) Respect; and (3) Trust (Ryan 2008). The relationship between the advisor and the host nation soldier being advised must be a mutual one. According to Colonel Ryan the order is important. An advisor must gain understanding of the host nation force. The bottom line is that the advisor cannot measure them by American standards. Secondly, the advisor must respect the host nation soldier, even if there is only one thing that he finds worthy of respecting. Finally, the advisor must trust his host nation counterpart (Ryan 2008).

In addition, JCISFA also developed a set of skill requirements (Figure 1). According to Colonel Ryan "advisor effectiveness is largely based on individual knowledge and skills." The skill sets include: (1) technical skills; (2) advisor skills; and (3) situational skills (Ryan 2008). So, with all of these requirements, are BCTs capable of conducting SFA? According to Colonel Ryan, the BCT is capable of conducting most SFA requirements. Nonetheless, he believes that two things are necessary for the BCT to be capable of such a mission. First, the BCT will require approximately 65 more additional officers and NCOs if the BCT conducts combat operations and SFA simultaneously. The other factor is that the commanders must change their mind-set. When a BCT conducts SFA it really becomes a force provider, and not a combat force. In effect the BCT provides teams to advise or train host nation forces. As such, these teams must work to meet the intent and objectives of the host nation's ministry of defense. BCT commanders and leaders at all levels must recognize this requirement and plan accordingly to ensure that both U.S. and host nation objectives are met.

Advisor Skill Sets

Figure 1.   Advisor Skill Sets
Source: Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance.

The experiences of two advisors illustrate the importance of the JCISFA model, as well as highlight some of the issues associated with advisors and advising. The first advisor is Major Anthony Bailey, an armor officer who served as an advisor to the Afghan border police from February 2007 to January of 2008. The second advisor is Major Aaron Reisinger, an engineer officer who, at the time of this writing, is serving in Iraq advising the Iraqi Army. The author asked both of these officers several specific questions aimed at providing answers for this paper. The fist question was: "What effects do advisors achieve?" Tied to that question were two subsequent questions: "What do advisors truly provide to host nation forces? Do host nation forces simply tolerate the advisors, or do the host nation forces value the advisors?

Major Bailey felt that the advising efforts were being effective. From the perspective of the Afghan border police, they wanted the U.S. presence for two reasons –

prestige and money. Bailey stated that the U.S. presence, in the form of advisors, "is an endorsement of their [Afghan border police] legitimacy" (Bailey 2008). The U.S. presence is an endorsement of their leadership. Secondly, the Afghan's wanted money for operations and salaries. As far as effectiveness goes, Bailey stated that when U.S. advisors are present the Afghans are less likely to harass the local population. As far as training goes, the Afghans were receptive to learning U.S. methods. Bailey's approach was not to teach the Afghans how to do things the American way, but to demonstrate U.S. techniques, and then let the Afghans either adopt the technique, or develop something similar that they were comfortable with. Bailey stated that his team spent about one-third of the time training and two-thirds of the time advising. He stated the hardest part was attempting to build an NCO corps, a concept which many non-Western nations have a tough time conceptualizing. As far as his team went, Bailey had at least three U.S. soldiers that didn't want to be advisors, but this was not necessarily due to the mission, as it was due to personal reasons such as being close to retirement (Bailey 2008).

Major Reisinger's experience seemed to be similar to that of Major Bailey. He stated that there was no real way to measure the true effectiveness of the advisor. That is something that will take a long time. He stated that "the intangibles are what we do that is important. We teach morality, standards, ethics, etc…We also force them to do the right thing – this makes a difference. Where once I never saw anyone caring for an injured detainee, they now take all to the CCP [casualty collection point] for a medical check…over a very long time it makes a difference" (Reinsinger 2008). Reinsinger also believes that the Iraqis have benefited from U.S. tactical expertise. "Can they do basic

operations on their own? The answer is yes. But, they need help understanding what zero defect is, how to establish bureaucratic processes, care of equipment and soldier's duty, etc. They need us to help build confidence. They do need enablers and want us there, but that gives them confidence." He also stated that "We really don't do much babysitting – some do [meaning other teams]. We give recommendations, conduct training, stand side by side on the objective, do AARs [after action reviews]" (Reinsinger 2008). Like Bailey, Reinsinger noted that he had a couple of advisors on his team that hadn't embraced the advising mission.

When asked about the future structure of advising both Bailey and Reinsinger believed that a Nagl-like advisor corps model was the best approach. It appeared that this belief stems from the few "bad apples" on their respective teams, as well as the current relationship that some advisors have with brigade combat teams in the field. While Bailey took this view, Reinsinger did not. The BCT commanders have expectations that advisors are conduits through which they can command and control host nation forces. Of course, this stems from having both host nation and American units operating in the same battle space. American commanders are trained that they are ultimately responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen in their assigned area of responsibility; hence, the desire to control the TTs and the Iraqi forces. In the author's discussions with other former advisors, the very same issues have been mentioned. Another factor drives the attitudes and perceptions of advisors. For many of them, this is the first time that they worked on a small team charged with a tremendous amount of responsibility, and an expectation from higher headquarters that they use their initiative, as well as imagination, to get the mission accomplished, while receiving little or no guidance. Advising duty is

the first time in their Army careers that they had such a tremendous amount of autonomy.

Conflicts between the advisors and senior officers from BCTs reinforce for them that

advisors need to be a special breed and separated from the "conventional" Army and its

traditional mind-set. Reinsinger, whose comments are below, believes that the future of

advising must include some form of specialized units.

> Nobody can realistically answer that question unless they spell out the problem –
> country, culture, level, etc., etc. There is no doubt that we will need advisors in the future.
> Without knowing the problem, you have to design something that can be easily built
> upon when the problems get big. You also have to have something that keeps up doctrine
> and study. I think that organization looks like a mini-Nagl. Maintain the core competency
> we have developed over the past five years. This organization has to provide the
> incentive and motivation, strong motivation, for people to want to be in it. Sounds a lot
> like Special Forces, but I'd argue Special Forces does not meet the first criteria as it can't
> easily be built upon when the problem gets big. We can't just add 5000 special operators.
> We can select 5000 conventional guys to rotate through training and go out to be
> adequate advisors…simplistic but no need to recreate anything dramatic. Go with what
> we already know and build it (Reinsinger 2008).

This section discussed a wide range of issues aimed at determining what kind of

advisors the Army will need in the future. The research of several experts provides key

conclusions for answering this question. Without doubt, Ramsey wrote the definitive

history of U.S. military advising, and his insights are extremely valuable. Nonetheless,

his assertion that advisors must be specially selected is derived from a narrow point of

view, namely the advisors themselves. While the best advisors possess the required

personal attributes and skills to be successful advisors, there are a sufficient number of

personnel assigned to advising duty that do not. Hence, the best advisors conclude that

advising requires a rigorous selection process. Ramsey, as well as many advisors, does

not properly consider any other approach, such as changing Army culture to view

advising as a critical skill set required of all Army leaders. Affourtit concludes that

American military professionals possess attitudes that put them at odds with advising

duty. However, he questions the practicality of a selection process. Colonel Ryan, of JCISFA, takes a different approach to producing advisors. As illustrated above, he provides a model by which U.S. military personnel can be trained to be adequate advisors. The term *adequate* is important because Colonel Ryan, unlike many other observers, questions the assumption that every advisor must approach the Lawrence of Arabia model.

During the SFA conference at Fort Leavenworth, a Special Forces Colonel from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School made a very interesting point during the discussion focused on the prospect of building an advisor school. He stated that Special Forces, which have been held-up as a sort of model for advising, does not train SF soldiers how to be advisors. They are trained to be adaptive, and that's what makes them excellent advisors (Author's observation). When considering the amount of advisors that may be needed in the future, attempting to select the next Lawrence of Arabia, or at least something like that, is not achievable. Instead, the Army must focus on training all leaders, officers and NCOs alike, to be as good at advising foreign armies as they are at fighting them. This requires institutionalizing advising as a necessary and desirable skill. As the Army transitions its leader development program to focus on building adaptive leaders, advising should be a critical aspect of that approach. The Army will be well served if it adopts the Marine Corps view that leaders are made, not born. The same goes for advisors.

Interim Conclusions and Evaluation Criteria

At this point it is necessary to provide an overview of the secondary research questions discussed in sections one thru four. The purpose of this discussion is to

establish criteria by which the two concepts in sections five and six can be evaluated. Secondary research question #1 suggests that determining the exact capacity required for conducting SFA remains elusive, at least at this point. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Army will need to build the capability to conduct SFA in both phase 0 shaping and phase IV stability operations. Hence, the optimal solution must be capable of meeting both of these requirements. Secondary research question # 2 suggests that SFA will require numerous capabilities beyond just a standard advising organization. Research also suggests that the optimal solution must possess the capability to conduct a range of tasks, to include train, advise, assist, and partner (TAAP) with foreign security forces. Examination of secondary research question # 3 indicates that the transition of SOF to new roles and missions, thereby significantly decreasing participation in SFA missions, may prove to be a faulty assumption. If SOF, and in particular Special Forces, continue to conduct a high volume of train and advise missions, the need for a vastly expanded GPF capacity may not be required. While there is no doubt that GPF needs to build the capability to conduct TAAP, producing a large capacity, as some suggest, could mean significant institutional risk for the Army, as well as the other Services. Therefore, the optimal organization must be "tailorable" in order to meet steady state and surge requirements. Finally, secondary research question # 4 suggests that in order to meet strategy requirements, the Army must have a significant number of adequate advisors in lieu of a force of highly skilled advisors. Based upon these conclusions the following criteria have been developed for examining secondary research questions five and six.

Table 2.   Evaluation Criteria

	Criteria	SRQ
1	Does the proposed organization meet requirements for conducting both phase 0 shaping and phase IV stability operations?	1
2	How much additional support does the proposed organization require to accomplish the missions outlined in criteria 1?	2
3	Can the organization conduct train, advise, assist, and partner (TAAP) at the tactical level?	2
4	What institutional risk is associated with the proposed solution?	3
5	Does the proposed solution provide adequately trained advisors?	4

Source: Author, *Advisory Organization Evaluation Criteria*

Secondary Research Question #5

In order to answer the primary research question of whether or not the BCT can meet future TAAP requirements, an examination of possible alternative solutions must be undertaken, especially since so many observers and defense analysts have criticized the Army's desire to use the BCT to meet SFA requirements. In this case, the alternate solutions are Krepinevich's stability operations force and Nagl's proposed *advisor corps*. Krepinevich's proposal has already been identified as impractical because it would in effect create two separate armies. Therefore, the concept will not be evaluated. The purpose of this section is to answer secondary research question #5: What are the advantages and disadvantages of creating a permanent advisor structure to meet future requirements? Many of the problems associated with the current TT structure have previously been identified. Based upon that evidence it is clear that TTs are not a viable solution. Nonetheless, a permanent *advisor corps* is a possible solution and must be

examined in order to discern if the BCT is the optimal solution. First, a description of the *advisor corps* concept will be provided, to include how the advisor corps solves some of the issues associated with TTs. Next, the *advisor corps* concept will be evaluated according to the criteria established in chapter four.

Table 3.   Evaluation Criteria

	Criteria	SRQ
1	Does the proposed organization meet requirements for conducting both phase 0 shaping and phase IV stability operations?	1
2	How much additional support does the proposed organization require to accomplish the missions outlined in criteria 1?	2
3	Can the organization conduct train, advise, assist, and partner (TAAP) at the tactical level?	2
4	What institutional risk is associated with the proposed solution?	3
5	Does the proposed solution provide adequately trained advisors?	4

Source: Author, *Advisory Organization Evaluation Criteria*

In June 2007, the Center for a New American Security published

Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps, by John

Nagl. In this article Nagl makes his basic argument for the *advisor corps*.

> The counterinsurgency campaigns that are likely to continue to be the face of battle in the 21st century will require that we build a very different United States Army than the enormously capable but conventionally focused one we have today. The long-overdue increase in the size of the Army announced by President George W. Bush in December 2006 can play a pivotal role in helping build it. The best way to use the additional soldiers is not simply to create additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as currently planned by the Army. Indeed, demand for such forces is likely to shrink as the American combat role in Iraq diminishes. Instead, the Army should create a permanent standing Advisor Corps of 20,000 Combat Advisors – men and women organized, equipped, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad (Nagl 2006, 3).

The concept itself is meant to directly address the "ad-hoc" nature of the TTs, especially

the personnel issues as described in the previous section (Nagl 2006, 4). Nagl's view is

that "it is past time for the Army to institutionalize and professionalize the manning and

training of combat advisors in permanent force structure" (Nagl 2006, 5).

According to the concept, the *advisor corps* "would develop doctrine and oversee

training and deployment of 750 advisory teams of 25-soldiers each, organized into three

250-team divisions" (Nagl 2006, 5). While the *advisor corps* concept reflects many

aspects of the TTs, the corps would indeed institutionalize advisors and advising units.

First, the *advisor corps* provides a dedicated institutional and operational force structure,

something that the current TT system lacks. In the *advisor corps* concept there is a

lieutenant general in command of the organization who serves as a focal point for

administration, doctrine, training, and logistics. This commander can also serve as an

advisor to a host nation ministry of defense. Most importantly, there is a senior Army

leader who not only provides oversight, but also can ensure that the organization and

advising effort are provided with adequate resources and will fight for improvements to

personnel policies.

Under the corps are three advisor divisions, each commanded by a major general.

Each advisor division is composed of division advisor teams (8 per division), brigade

advisor teams (5 per division team), and battalion advisor teams (5 per brigade advisor

teams). Each of these units has a commander, something that the current battalion TTs do

not. Nagl also increases the size of battalion teams, providing them with a dedicated

security force. Additionally, centrally selected colonels and lieutenant colonels would

command division and brigade advisor teams. These commands would be equivalent to

battalion and brigade commands. Nagl also proposes that those serving as advisors be

given a competitive advantage over those who have not served as advisors. Nagl

concludes his article with the following assessment.

> Under the current plan, as time goes on, the Army will have to continue stripping
> soldiers from an even greater number of BCTs to create more ad hoc advisory
> teams – reducing the effectiveness of the BCTs and weakening the institutional
> Army, while still failing to provide the kind of trained advisors formed into
> capable, coherent teams that the counterinsurgency mission demands (Nagl 2006,
> 8).

Undoubtedly, the *advisor corps* is indeed a product improvement over the current TT

structure. Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether or not a product improvement

of an "ad-hoc" organization established to meet the requirements of phase IV stability

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan can adequately meet future requirements.

So, is the *advisor corps* capable of meeting the requirements of both phase 0

shaping operations and phase IV stability operations? Addressing the latter question is

much easier. As previously stated the advisor corps appears to resolve many of the

problems of the TTs. So, it would appear that the advisor corps is capable of advising

foreign security forces during phase IV stability operations. A permanent force structure also provides the Army with an enduring and adaptable capability, which can be applied to the problem of reducing the American commitment in Iraq. As the U.S. removes itself from active counterinsurgency operations and OIF becomes more of an advising effort, the MNF-I and the Army will need to re-package the force structure and command and control relationships to adjust to the new mission. The *advisor corps* would eliminate much of this requirement, as it can act much like a corps headquarters, which can be provided with additional capability, such as combat power, as needed. And, the focus will be on advising, not combat operations. Addressing phase 0 shaping operations is more complex. Again, to determine exactly what the requirements for GPF will include, proves difficult. One thing that is certain is that the effort could require the need for a large number of smaller teams dispersed across various COCOM areas of responsibility. In areas that are permissive, advisor teams should have no problems. However, in non-permissive areas where there is no large presence of U.S. combat forces for force protection, the *advisor corps* teams don't possess the requisite training and skills required to conduct combat advising. Only specially selected and trained individuals, such as Special Forces soldiers, will be capable of advising and training in high-risk situations and unconventional warfare environments.

How much additional support will the advisor corps require to accomplish the missions outlined above? In his proposal Nagl focuses on advisor structure, but does not discuss the support elements required to efficiently operate such a large organization. Nonetheless, it must be assumed that these elements are part of his equation. But what about assets such as combat arms, combat support and combat service support? These

enablers would be key to providing support to host nation forces, but are not part of the structure. These assets would have to come from BCTs or functional brigades that were either assigned to the advisor corps, or its divisions, or were sharing the battlespace with host nation forces. Many of the requirements will not exist in phase 0 stability operations. Nonetheless, any advisory effort will require some level of support, whether it is communications, engineers, logistics, etc. These assets will have to be task organized with the advising teams.

There is no doubt that the *advisor corps* would be capable of advising host nation forces at the tactical, and perhaps even the operational level, in most environments. Advisors also have the capability to train host nation forces, as long as they have the requisite skill sets to do so. One area where the *advisor corps* may fall short is its ability to train large amounts of soldiers in basic individual and collective skills. One issue may be that the smallest element of the *advisor corps*, the battalion advisor team, is structured to advise the host nation commander and his staff. Although, the fact that TTs in Iraq have been very adept at reaching into all levels of a battalion to assist with improvements as required, must be acknowledged (author's observation). So, the *advisor corps* is capable of advising and assisting, as well as training. The only area lacking is the ability to partner with host nation forces, as either part of an exercise, or in actual combat operations.

So, what institutional risk is associated with creating an advisor corps? The primary issue concerning the *advisor corps* is one of force structure and personnel management. Proponents of a permanent *advisor corps* see the Army's lack of enthusiasm as a result of having to produce less BCTs in order to man the *advisor corps*.

The problem is actually more complex. An *advisor corps* of 20,000 will require the Army to build and maintain a rank heavy personnel structure. According to Nagl's proposal, the *advisor corps* will consist of three advisor divisions. Each one of these divisions will consist of eight division advisor teams, each with five brigade advisor teams. Finally, each brigade team will have five battalion advisor teams. The additional personnel required, especially in the officer and senior NCO ranks, are staggering. For example, six hundred more officers at the rank of major will be required to man the battalion advisory teams. An additional five hundred majors (a low estimate) will be required to operate brigade advisor teams. Of course this does not take into consideration the additional officers required to fill positions on division advisor teams, division staffs, and the corps headquarters. Basically, one thousand more majors (again, a low estimate) will be required. Currently, the Army has approximately16, 000 majors on active duty (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008a). While majors are but one example, large increases in senior NCOs and captains will also be required. Growing this force structure will take considerable time, at the very least a decade. Such growth will also reduce Army readiness as both the institutional and warfighting structures of the Army are stripped of critical personnel in order to give birth to the *advisor corps*.

An additional factor raises the question of whether or not the Army will be able to sustain such an influx of personnel in its current force structure. The *advisor corps* concept does not address this issue. However, here is one possible outcome. Majors serving in advisor billets will not have the opportunity to return to a brigade combat team to do key developmental assignments and become qualified in their respective branches. Nagl attempts to solve this problem by making advisor duty a key developmental

assignment (Nagl 2006, 7). Unfortunately, these individuals will remain in the *advisor corps* for a three-year tour, thereby preventing them from serving in a brigade combat team. This will preclude these personnel from further assignment in their branches. It is doubtful that a major who has served as an advisor, but not as a battalion operations officer or division staff officer is best qualified to command an infantry battalion. There's an experience differential between advising foreign personnel and leading and employing American units and soldiers in full spectrum operations.

This problem is not new. Stratification has usually been the result when the Army has attempted to move personnel back and forth between branches. In past situations, the Army created new branches, such as Special Forces and aviation, in order to solve "a number of long-standing personnel management and professional development inadequacies" (Bonn 1999, 146). Branch management of personnel allows soldiers to build and maintain critical skills, as well as contributes to increased unit cohesion and readiness. In order for the *advisor corps* to remain relevant, as well as to prevent massive disruption of the Army personnel system, an "advisor branch," with a specified career field will be required. An advisor branch will generate the need for a process to select personnel with the right temperament for advisor duty. Unfortunately, this path will simply generate a cheap version of Special Forces. However, unlike SF, the *advisor corps* will have no utility beyond advising, and could very well become a capability that waits on the shelf until the next large-scale phase IV stability operation.

The final aspect of the organization that must be examined is whether or not the *advisor corps* will provide adequate advisors. If an *advisor corps* was to be activated, there is no doubt that it would be the Army's first serious effort to train and provide

adequate advisors. As previously mentioned, a selection process is unrealistic if advisor capacity requirements are large, and Nagl does not propose such a process. His approach is to attract quality personnel by providing advisors with incentives such as special consideration during selection boards and credit for battalion and brigade command (Nagl 2006, 7). Unfortunately, this approach has a couple of negative aspects. In effect, special consideration of advisor duty will create the same system of "haves" and "have-nots" that are present when advising duty is viewed as a negative discriminator for promotion. A reasonable argument exists that commanding a brigade advisor team does not adequately prepare a lieutenant colonel to command a brigade combat team. As for the quality of advisors, the *advisor corps* would provide a period of one year to prepare advisors for all aspects of their job – how to be an advisor, language and culture, combat skills, force protection – and this is definitely an advantage, as it would produce advisors that are more than adequate to the task.

This section provided an overview of the *advisor corps* concept, as well as evaluated the concept in accordance with the previously established criteria. The numerous advantages and disadvantages have also been highlighted. This section will not provide a definitive assessment of the *advisor corps*. The final assessment will be provided in chapter five, when the *advisor corps* is compared to the *advisory* BCT.

<u>Secondary Research Question #6</u>

The first three secondary research questions established the capacity and capability requirements needed to answer the primary research question. The fourth secondary research question served to determine what kind of advisors the Army will need, and to help frame the problem of what type of organization is suitable. The fifth

secondary research question examined the advantages and disadvantages of building a permanent *advisor corps*. The purpose of this section is to answer the sixth, and final, secondary research question: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using BCTs to meet future requirements? First, a description of a concept for using the BCT for TAAP will be provided, to include how the concept solves some of the issues associated with TTs. Next, the *advisory* BCT concept will be evaluated according to the criteria established in the previous sections.

Table 4.   Evaluation Criteria

	Criteria	SRQ
1	Does the proposed organization meet requirements for conducting both phase 0 shaping and phase IV stability operations?	1
2	How much additional support does the proposed organization require to accomplish the missions outlined in criteria 1?	2
3	Can the organization conduct train, advise, assist, and partner (TAAP) at the tactical level?	2
4	What institutional risk is associated with the proposed solution?	3
5	Does the proposed solution provide adequately trained advisors?	4

Source: Author, *Advisory Organization Evaluation Criteria*

As mentioned in chapters one and two, the Army has always contended that the BCT is capable of meeting the requirements to train, advise, assist, and partner with foreign security forces. As such, the Army has consistently argued that forces capable of full spectrum operations will meet current and future requirements, and that specialized forces do not have the capability to operate in the contemporary operating environment. A Congressional Research Office Report issued in January of 2008 captures this

argument.

The Army's insistence that specialized forces are not needed and that full-spectrum units can meet the operational challenges of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advising appears to be 'more of the same' or 'the path of least resistance' to some, but the Army cites experiences in Iraq as validation of its position. The Army maintains that its BCTs particularly in Iraq, have been required to rapidly transition between counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory missions on a frequent and unpredictable basis. Because there is not a predictable linear progression from one type of an operation to another it would become both difficult and risky to replace a BCT with specialized stabilization units, particularly when the tactical situation could rapidly and unexpectedly deteriorate into open conflict (U.S. Congress Congressional Research Office 2008,16).

The Army makes a very valid point when it speaks of a "rapid transition" between various types of operations. Indeed, Iraq has shown this to be the case. For example, in November of 2004 operations in Iraq comprised various configurations of offense, defense, and stability operations. In Anbar province, the emphasis was on the conduct of offensive operations, especially with regard to operations aimed at removing insurgents and terrorists from the town of Fallujah. However, in the north central portion of Iraq, U.S. forces were focused primarily on conducting stability operations, along with offense and defensive operations. While many observers view Iraq as a stability operation, in reality, the environment is a lethal one, and is constantly shifting and requiring units to transition between offense, defense, and stability operations (AUSA 2006, 20).

Without a doubt, specialized units such as those envisioned by Andrew Krepinevich and others do not have the capabilities required to simultaneously execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations. One additional aspect reinforces the Army's argument concerning full spectrum capabilities, concerns training and advising. While much has been written about the TT concept, very little has been said about the internally resourced TTs. A little known fact, most of the TTs operating in Iraq are

resourced from within BCTs (Miller 2008). In some cases this means that BCTs have

provided entire teams to conduct TAAP. In other instances, BCTs have provided

personnel to round-out TTs. Nevertheless, not much is known about the effectiveness of

these advisors, as well as the impact that this program has on the BCT and its subordinate

units. For example, in many cases key leaders such as field grade officers and senior

NCOs were taken out of critical staff and leadership positions in order to form TTs.

Hence, there is some doubt as to the overall effectiveness of a BCT that simultaneously

conducts combat operations and TAAP.

Until recently, the Army had not explained exactly how a BCT could be used to

conduct TAAP. However, a recent news article shed light on an Army initiative aimed at

finally resolving this issue.

The Army's considerations to make the training of foreign security forces a core
mission for BCTs comes amid a flurry of new initiatives at the Pentagon aimed at
improving the military's capabilities in this area…If Army leaders green light the
proposal to ready BCTs to train Iraqis or Afghans by March of 2008, the first such unit
could deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan by the fall of that year, one Army source estimated
*(*Sprenger 2007).

The Army's First Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, the same organization that

prepares TTs for deployment, is currently developing the concept. According to an

electronic presentation, several key aspects make the BCT suitable for TAAP missions:

(1) The modular BCT is the foundation of the Army's brigade-based force structure

enabled by ARFORGEN; (2) The BCT can be tailored to perform the advisory mission to

conduct security assistance in support of the long war [i.e. GWOT]; (3) Advisors, at all

grades, must have credibility (select and train best qualified for leadership and quality

NCO corps are currently in the Army's BCTs); (4) A BCT with an advisor mission takes

on (assumes) the combat capability of the indigenous force being advised and is

enhanced by U.S./Coalition enablers (U.S. Army First Infantry Division Presentation:

Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept 2007). The basic premise of this concept is that

the BCT, given the time and resources to train, can assume an advisory mission. The

illustrations below show how this concept will be applied. The most important point is

that the BCT's focus will be advising, not conducting combat operations. With this

mission, the BCT commander will assign various units to advise various echelons of Iraqi

units. In this example, U.S. platoons advise Iraqi companies, U.S. companies advise Iraqi

battalions, U.S. battalions advise Iraqi brigades, and the U.S. brigade advises the Iraqi

division.

Figure 2.   Iraq - BCT Sourced Model
Source: Army Staff, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policies, G-35; First Infantry Division
Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept*.

Afghanistan - BCT Sourced Model

Traditional Transition Team

BCT Coverage

| Senior Mentor |
| Assistant Team Chief (CPT) |
| OPS/ Intelligence (CPT) |
| Logistics Officer (CPT) |
| HHC Mentor (CPT) |
| Company Mentor (CPT) |
| Company Mentor (CPT) |
| Personnel Officer (CPT) |
| SGM (SGM) |
| OPS NCOIC |
| CO NCO Mentor |
| HHC NCOIC |
| CO NCO Mentor |
| CO NCO Mentor |
| CO NCO Mentor |

399 PAX
Req Specialty Skills Training

Additional Capability
Security
CSS/CS
Combat Power

1x11 @ Corps

5x11 @ BDE

15 x11 @ BN

42x4 @ CO

| Brigade Commander |
| Brigade S3 |
| Brigade S2 |
| Brigade S2 NCOIC |
| Brigade S4 |
| Brigade S4 NCOIC |
| Brigade S6 |
| HHC BDE Commander |
| Brigade FSO |
| Brigade FSO NCO |
| Medic/Corpsman |

| BN Commander |
| BN S3 |
| BN S2 |
| BN S2 NCOIC |
| BN S4 |
| BN S4 NCOIC |
| BN S6 |
| HHC Commander |
| BN FSO |
| BN FSO NCO |
| Medic/Corpsman |

| CO Commander |
| CO XO |
| 1 PL (Intel) |
| 1 PSG (Intel) |
| 2 PL (Log) |
| 2 PSG (Log) |
| Brigade S6 |
| 3 PL (HHC) |
| CO FIST |
| CO FIST NCO |
| Medic/Corpsman |

| 1 SL (Maneuver) |
| 1 SQ (Fires) |
| 1SQ (LOG) |
| CBT Lifesaver |

First Infantry Division G-3/5/7
Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM Cell – G3)

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Figure 3.   Afghanistan – BCT Sourced Model
Source: Army Staff, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policies, G-35; First Infantry Division Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept*.

The illustrations above provide an overview of how a single BCT could, if assigned the mission, be task organized to conduct TAAP in either Iraq or Afghanistan. What the slides show, but may be difficult to see, is that the BCT staff has been task organized to form a team to advise an Iraqi division (figure 2), or an Afghan Corps (figure 3). Key members of the BCT headquarters, to include the brigade commander, operations officer, intelligence officer, logistics officer, communications officer, fire support officer, and headquarters company commander, form the advisory team. Similar

teams will be formed at the battalion and company levels to advise Iraqi brigades (U.S. battalion) and Iraqi battalions (U.S. company). On the left hand of the slide is a chart that shows the current TT structure. For the most part, skill and rank structures are comparable between the TTs and the BCT advisor teams. The main problem seems to be at the U.S. company level, where skill sets and rank structure are not adequate. For example, currently, an American major advises an Iraqi battalion. The other American officers are usually captains that may have some experience with battalion operations. A U.S. maneuver company has junior lieutenants, who usually have very limited experience, serving not only as platoon leaders, but also as soldiers. In this concept, the platoon leaders will be advising the Iraqi battalion staff concerning intelligence, logistics, and communications. Even if given additional training, uncertainty remains that they would provide much value to an Iraqi battalion staff.

When the Army Staff first proposed this concept numerous skeptics wanted to know what the "left-over" soldiers, or those not advising host nation forces, were going to do. A few even assumed that lower ranking enlisted soldiers, such as privates would be used to advise (author's experience). As the slides indicate, while many key personnel assume advising duties, there are squads, platoons, and staffs remaining that are not serving as advisors. One of the primary issues associated with the TTs is that they lack sufficient security, logistics, and communications capabilities (Bailey 2008). In most cases these capabilities are provided by BCTs who are operating in the same geographic area as the TTs. This support sometimes entails a squad or platoon to provide the TT with security as well as personnel to operate a small tactical operations center that is required for communication. TTs must also rely on the BCTs for maintenance support. Ordering

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parts to fix a vehicle means going to the BCT motor pool. As noted in the slides above, a BCT used in the advisory role can sustain itself. There are squads and platoons available to provide security for advisor teams, thereby allowing the advisors to operate in smaller elements and distribute themselves more widely across the Iraqi unit. The BCT can also provide quick reaction forces, as well as secure forward operating bases needed for operations. Finally, the BCT has what Iraqi forces want most of all – U.S. enablers. The BCT will have its organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as well as transportation and artillery, and can access enablers at higher echelons (FM 3-0, 2008, C-6). In extreme circumstances, the BCT can reconfigure some combat power to assist the Iraqi force as the situation moves form stability operations to offensive operations – what the Army has termed "escalation dominance."

The below slides (figures 4 thru 6) illustrate the concept for preparing a BCT for deployment to theater in the advisory role. In this concept, an advisor mobile training team (MTT) would assist the BCT with preparing for mission assumption. The focus of this effort would be to train personnel to serve in an advisor capacity. The capstone exercise would be a mission readiness exercise or combat training center rotation that would validate the BCT's ability to advise the host nation force. The concept is valuable because it emphasizes use of a dedicated program for training personnel to serve as advisors and trainers.

BCT Advisory Team Training Concept within ARFORGEN

RESET	READY	AVAILABLE

Road to War

BCT HOME STATION "READY" TEMPLATE

P4 P3 P2 P1

Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4

DMETL Proficiency

Advisory Specific DMETL Proficiency

BCT requests additional specialty TNG

Advisor MTT
Phase I

Phase II: Advisory Train the Trainer

CTC MRX
Phase III

Home Station Training (individual, crew, collective)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Advisor Academy MTT/ TRADOC

- Phase I: MTT Arrives at BCT Home-station from CTC during train up
- Phase II: Train the trainer, advisor skills, improved FSF abilities for BCT
- Phase III: Resident Advisor Academy reinforces lessons learned during CTC rotation

First Infantry Division G-3/5/7
Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM Cell – G3)   7

Figure 4.   BCT Advisory Team Training Concept
Source: Army Staff, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policies, G-35; First Infantry Division
Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept*.

MISSION SPECIFIC TRAINING REQUIRING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

Training Programs of Instruction	Time	Instructor	Number of Instructors: FRTM (Recommend)
Cultural Training		NGIC / FRTM	4 (6)
History Culture of Islam	4 Hours		
History Culture of Iraq/Afghanistan	4 Hours		
Iraqi/Afghan Army 101	4 Hours		
Iraqi/Afghan Staffing, Planning, Orders, Etc	4 Hours		
Role of Advisor		FRTM (recommend JFKSWC)	2 (6)
Basic Advising	4 Hours		
Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA)	2 Hours		
Advisor Ethics	4 Hours		
Advanced Advising	8 Hours		
Meyers-Brigs Test	4 Hours		
COIN 1, (Fundamentals) — COIN for TTs			
COIN 2 (Advanced COIN)		Fort Leavenworth / FRTM	4 (8)
Information Operations	8 Hours		
Social Network Analysis	4 Hours		
Targeting	4 Hours		
ASCOPE	4 Hours		
Clear-Hold-Build	4 Hours		
Campaign Planning	4 Hours		
Building Legitimacy	4 Hours		
Gain Influence (Negotiations)		LDESP / FRTM	20 (37)
Conducting Negotions	4 Hours		
Working w/ an Interpreter	2 Hours		
Working w/o an Interpreter	2 Hours		
HN Assessment	4 Hours		
Warning Signs: Dealing w/ troubled HN Units	4 Hours		
Leader Meets (every other day)	2 Hours		
Former TT Panel	8 Hours		
Language Training	2 Hours Daily	DLI	9 (9)
Optional Training (if BCT doesn't have capability)	**Time**	**Instructor**	
Personnel Recovery (PR) Training/Operations	8 Hours	DA PR Team	2 (4)
Foreign Weapons Training	4 Hours	Operational Service Support	1 (6)
Foreign Equipment Training (OEF Only)	4 Hours	Yuma Proving Grounds	0 (6)
Joint Fires Familiarization (JFF) (2 Team members)	1.5 Days	BCT/ASOS/Fort Sill	2 (4)
Biometrics	1 Day	Language Technology Office	2 (4)

"Advisor Academy"
- TRADOC is proponent
- Resides at one of the CTCs
- Comprised of resident expert contractors
- Exportable
- Several agencies/organizations involved

Expertise Resident in Existing Organizations:

- National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC): Cultural Awareness
- Joint Improved Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO): Counter-IED / IED Defeat
- Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP): Negotiations/Gaining Influence
- Fort Leavenworth: COIN Seminar
- Defense Language Institute (DLI): Language Training
- DA: Personnel Recovery Team
- Operational Service Support (OSS): Foreign Weapons Training
- Fort Sill: Joint Fires Familiarization (JFF)
- Fort Huachuca: Biometrics
- Yuma Proving Grounds: Foreign Equipment
- TT/ETT Veteran Visits: Role of the Advisor
- JFK Special Warfare Center: Role of the Advisor

86 Contractors Required

Figure 5.   BCT Advisory Team Training Plan

Source: Army Staff, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policies, G-35; First Infantry Division Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept*.

ONE WAY: ADVISOR ACADEMY POI-One Block

(Exportable package with training in a continuous block)

			Culture		Negotiations		
Block 1	Travel	Intro	History Culture of Islam	Iraq/Afghan Army/Police 101	Conducting Negotiations	Host Nation Assessment	Makeup Tng
		Language/lab setup					
	Admin	Team Building	History Culture of Iraq/Afghan	Iraqi/Afghan Staff Proceedures	Working with an Interpreter / Working without an Interpreter	Warning Signs: Dealing with Troubled HN Units	Homework Assignment 1
		Language	Language	Language	Language	Language Test 1	Lang Test Makeup
	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10	Day 11	Day 12	Day 13	Day 14
				COIN			
		Negotiations					
Block 2		Leader Meet 1	Information Operations	Social Network Analysis	ASCOPE	Campaign Planning	Makeup Tng
		Leader Meet 2					
		Meyers-Brigs Test		Targeting	Clear Hold Build	Building Legitamcy	Homework Assignment 2
		Language	Language	Language	Language	Language Test 2	Lang Test Makeup
	Day 15	Day 16	Day 17	Day 18	Day 19	Day 20	Day 21
				Advising			
Block 3		Former TT Panel	Basic Advising	Advanced Advising	Advising PE1	Operational Readiness Assessment	Makeup Tng
		Leader Meet 3	Advisor Ethics		Advising PE2	Graduation	Homework Assignment 3
		Leader Meet 4				Admin/Travel	
		Language	Language	Language	Language Test 3	Language Test 3	Lang Test Makeup
	Day 22	Day 23	Day 24	Day 25	Day 26	Day 27	Day 28
				Electives			
Block 4		Foreign Weapons	Personnel Recovery	JFF	JFF	Biometrics	Advanced Commo
		Foreign Equipment			Leader Meet 5		Graduation
					Leader Meet 6		Travel
		Language	Language	Language	Language Test 4		

- Throughput: 100 PAX per block/400 total
- Start academy early in the ARFORGEN Model
- CTC managed
- Uses existing organizations
- BCT provides training facilities
- Upon completion of advisory training, attend CTC rotation

Figure 6.   Advisory Team Training Plan
Source: Army Staff, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policies, G-35; First Infantry Division
Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept*.

According to the First Infantry Division's presentation this concept provides
several key advantages: (1) unit cohesion is retained; (2) provides advisors with security,
communications, and sustainment; (3) BCT retains ability to secure a forward operating
base, as well as provide combat support, and combat service support to U.S. units; (4) the
BCT is tailored to conduct advisor operations (Division to company level); and (5) BCTs
can reconfigure to conduct limited full spectrum operations if the need arises (U.S. Army
First Infantry Division Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept* 2007). A
final slide (not shown here) provides a list of advantages over the current TT operation:

(1) applicable for both Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) significant cost savings at key mid-level grades [as opposed to the tremendous strain that the TT mission is placing on the Army as a whole]; (3) works within the ARFORGEN cycle; (4) provides organic security – escalation dominance [again, this point is addressing current issues associated with TTs. With only eleven personnel and a three vehicle requirement to move outside of a forward operating base, TTs do not have organic security, although they sometimes get security provided to them by BCTs]; (5) achieves unity of command / unity of effort [this bullet addresses the fact that TTs trained at Fort Riley and then sent to an Iraqi unit have not worked with the BCT that is in their area of operations, thereby contributing to friction between the two units] (U.S. Army First Infantry Division Presentation: *Brigade Advisory Team Training Concept* 2007).

Nonetheless, a number of disadvantages must be evaluated. The primary disadvantage is that the BCT is just what the name implies, a brigade *combat* team. There is a certain mind-set that goes with being in a BCT, and anyone with any experience must wonder if the combat focused culture associated with the BCT can be changed to meet the requirements of advising. Can BCT commanders focus on being advisors instead of commanders? Will commanders at all levels be capable of allowing their subordinates the necessary initiative and imagination required to advise? Advising a host nation force requires that the advisor recognize that each individual host nation unit is different, a factor especially prevalent in Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders have a tendency to want to use statistics to measure progress, something that does not necessarily work in advising. In the author's opinion the reason that most officers have enjoyed serving as advisors is that they have the opportunity to operate freely, to use unique solutions to

solve problems, and to be adaptive. There are countless stories relating the problems between advisors and BCTs. In actuality, these problems amount to a clash of cultures.

Now that that the *advisory* BCT concept has been described, it can be evaluated against the criteria provided at the beginning of chapter four. First, does the BCT meet the requirements for conducting both phase 0 shaping and phase IV stability operations? Again, the latter question is much easier to answer. The *advisory* BCT has the potential to be effective in phase IV stability operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, the *advisory* BCT possesses numerous advantages over the current TT model. Nonetheless, culture issues remain a question. One positive aspect is that the culture has changed significantly over the last several years, with officers and NCOs at all levels realizing that influencing the population to support U.S. objectives is more effective than focusing efforts to kill, and or, capture the insurgents. Commanders and soldiers now routinely engage the population, as well as military, religious, and government officials on a daily basis in order to gain their trust, which may lead to valuable intelligence concerning the insurgents. The change in culture will heavily influence any BCT commander who is given the mission to train and employ his BCT as an *advisory* BCT. Only time, and the conditions of Iraq and Afghanistan, will determine the exact answer.

Conducting Phase 0 shaping operations poses many of the same issues for an *advisory* BCT as it does for the *advisor corps*. The issue is really about the types of missions selected for BCTs, as outlined in the discussion concerning missions appropriate to GPF. The *advisory* BCT has an advantage in that it possesses many of the enablers that will be required for various missions. The one area where the BCT will experience problems is in its ability to task organize into small teams to cover multiple missions

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across a COCOM area of responsibility. Again, culture plays a significant role. It is doubtful that platoon leaders have the experience or training required to take their platoons, separated from a higher headquarters, to a host nation and train, let alone advise foreign security forces. Company commanders are about the lowest level capable of such operations. Even then, they are not trained to operate independently from their battalion for prolonged periods of time.

The number of maneuver company commanders in a BCT is also limited, perhaps between eleven (HBCT/IBCT) and thirteen (SBCT) depending on the unit, with the Stryker BCT having the most capability (ST 100- 3 *Battle Book* 2007, 2-16). In this key area the *advisor corps* has a distinct advantage, due in part, to the large number of organic advisor teams. On the other hand, the BCT does provide more capability than the *advisor corps* when all of the components of TAAP are considered. Interestingly, the Marine Corps is currently developing a similar concept called the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC-MAGTF). This concept has its roots in the Marine Expeditionary Unit, but is tailored to conduct security cooperation tasks, such as training, and possibly advising in a non-combat environment. In theory, the concept will allow the task force, built around an infantry battalion, to task organize into smaller elements, which will then be sent throughout an area of operations (Risio 2008).

Clearly, the BCT is a robust organization with tremendous capability. In phase IV stability operations, *advisory* BCTs should not need any additional support to conduct TAAP. For phase 0 operations, determining exactly what may be required to support the kind of distributed operations required, proves difficult. Nonetheless, the BCT does have assets such as engineer, medical, and communications that increase its depth, thereby

allowing its various elements to conduct operations, such as civic action and humanitarian assistance, beyond just advising and training. At the tactical level, the BCT is capable of conducting all elements of TAAP. Although, as previously stated, there are some rank/experience shortfalls that could impact the BCT's ability to advise host nation battalions.

From an institutional aspect, obvious advantages exist for using the BCT to do TAAP. First of all, the BCT is the Army's centerpiece formation. Generating combat power for the COCOMs means providing BCTs. All other organizations serve to support the BCT. Charging BCTs with the TAAP mission means that the Army is not forced to create specialized units for a multitude of tasks. Subsequently, the Army can provide the mission with the best personnel available while not having to rob institutional Army organizations such as the Training and Doctrine Command of key personnel. Another advantage is the distribution of knowledge and experience that using the BCT for phase 0 and phase IV operations provides. Unlike in Iraq, when future operations require large-scale phase IV stability operations, BCTs will have personnel fully capable of training and advising host nation forces. This capability will be present because many personnel, officers, NCOs, and soldiers, will have served in a BCT during the conduct of phase 0 shaping operations somewhere in the world.

The final question concerns whether or not the BCT can provide adequately trained advisors. The previous slides show BCTs will spend a year training personnel to serve as advisors. The challenge here will be ensuring that those to be trained are focused on the training instead of the normal distracters that accompany the garrison environment. For example, can the brigade operations officer, who will be assigned to the

division advisory team, really be provided the time to conduct advisor training, or will he be too busy being a brigade staff officer? It seems intuitive that the *advisor corps* could do a better job of training advisors. Nonetheless, the personnel assigned to BCTs should prove more than adequate advisors.

This section provided an overview of the *advisory* BCT concept, as well as evaluated the concept in accordance with the previously established criteria. The numerous advantages and disadvantages have also been highlighted. This section will not provide a definitive assessment of the *advisory* BCT. The final assessment will be provided in chapter five, where the *advisor corps* and *advisory* BCT are compared.

Chapter four examined six secondary research questions, all of which assist in answering the primary research question. Secondary research questions one thru three explored the requirements for future SFA. As previously stated, predicting a future requirement is difficult. One thing is for certain, and that is the Army will need to possess the capability to conduct TAAP in both phase 0 and phase IV operations. Examination of this topic also reveals that GPF and SOF must develop a process whereby each unique SFA mission is conducted by the force with the appropriate skills. While the question of "how much" cannot be answered at this time, clearly, the Army must be able to expand and contract capacity as required. This chapter also examined two possible organizational solutions, the *advisor corps* concept and the *advisory* BCT concept. While both solutions offer great improvements over the current TT structure, each has its weaknesses. The *advisor corps* will be costly in terms of personnel and institutional risk, and is incapable of meeting all TAAP requirements. On the other hand, the *advisory* BCT was not specifically developed to conduct TAAP. As such, there are organizational and cultural

issues that may inhibit its effectiveness. Chapter five will provide conclusions for each

secondary research question and the primary research question, as well as offer several

recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper is to answer the primary research question: Is the

Modular Brigade Combat Team the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to

train, advise, assist and partner (TAAP) with foreign security forces? To answer this

question, several secondary research questions have been explored. Final conclusions for

each secondary research question will now be drawn, which will facilitate answering the

primary research question.

Conclusions drawn from each secondary research question

SRQ #1: What are the future requirements (beyond OIF/OEF) for SFA?

Analysis of this question reveals that a definitive answer to the "how much is

required" question cannot be reached at this time. The majority opinion is that the future

requirements for SFA will far exceed pre-9/11 requirements, as well as current OIF/OEF

requirements. A minority opinion cautions that the requirement will decrease due to the

unwillingness of other nations to allow U.S. advisors and trainers on their soil. Until OIF

has been reduced to some level of steady state, and a supply of forces is available for

other missions, a clear indication of the demand signal will remain elusive. While many

analysts feel that the demand will be significant, sufficient evidence exists to suggest that

actual requirements will not meet the anticipated level. Only time will tell. While the true

demand signal remains unclear, U.S. national security and defense strategy is not.

The strategy calls for the military to be able to do two things. First, the military

must have the ability to conduct phase 0 shaping operations on a global scale. The

purpose is to build the capacity of our partners and allies, thereby enabling them to defend themselves against terrorism and subversion. Secondly, the U.S. must have the capability to conduct phase IV stability operations following major combat operations, or large-scale humanitarian interventions. The requirement for these capabilities will be present over the next several decades. Nonetheless, there are other threats that the military will need to be prepared to deter or defeat. The notion that military forces can be organized, trained, and equipped as specialized stability operations forces is misguided. Without a doubt, forces capable of full spectrum operations will always be required. Populating the military with a large number of specialized forces carries a great degree of risk. Therefore, forces that are capable of meeting both the phase 0 and phase IV SFA requirements should be given careful consideration. Building specialized forces capable only of stove-piped capabilities weakens the Army's ability to defend the nation against numerous types of threats.

SRQ #2: What specific capabilities must the Army possess to meet SFA requirements?

This question examined the wide range of requirements associated with SFA. During phase 0 and phase IV operations the U.S. military will be required to conduct SFA at the strategic/institutional, operational, and tactical levels. Much of the current debate is focused on advisor organizations at the tactical level, ignoring many of the programs that the Services, and in particular the Army, already possess. Assessing SFA capability will require a more holistic approach than has been utilized in the past. Nonetheless, current operations underscore the need for an enduring GPF capability to train FSF at the tactical level. The construct for this requirement is *train, advise, assist, and partner* (TAAP). Considering that advising is the most difficult task it is only

prudent that the emphasis be put on advising. If a soldier can advise, then he is capable of

training and assisting, while the capability to train and assist does not mean that there is a

congruent ability to advise. Due to fiscal and manpower constraints, it appears that

whatever organization is developed must be capable of conducting TAAP in both phase 0

and phase IV operations. Finally, the force must have the capability to not only conduct

those missions that are *GPF appropriate* and *exclusive*, but also have the capability to

conduct some mission requirements that overlap with SOF.

SRQ #3: Is there a delineation of mission sets between SOF and GPF?

Significant questions have been raised concerning the future of SOF. Although

highly unlikely that DoD will create a separate unconventional warfare command,

evidence suggests that the *QDR* decision to move SOF away from SFA and towards

direct action may prove to be unrealistic. The so-called "indirect" approach towards

fighting GWOT continues to gain traction at USSOCOM, meaning that SF will not only

retain its traditional unconventional warfare role, but will also place emphasis on SFA

missions in order to gain access to various regions (Naylor 2007, 1). Therefore,

USSOCOM may not be willing to turn over significant amounts of TAAP missions to

GPF. This reluctance poses problems for the Army, as it struggles to determine how

much capacity is required. To avoid force structure risk, the Army must have

organizations capable of full spectrum operations, and have the depth necessary to tailor

those forces to meet capacity requirements for various operations. Whatever the outcome

of this question, some process must be established to determine what missions are

appropriate for each force. Such a process will assist in determining the capacity

required.

SRQ #4: What kind of Advisors does the Army need?

This particular question is the key to answering the primary research question. There are strong indications that expectations for advisors are based upon lofty ideals. Without a doubt, advisors must be qualified and competent in their career specialty. They must have good leadership skills, and be willing to use these skills to interact with other cultures. Finally, they must be motivated to work with other cultures. Unfortunately, the Lawrence of Arabia syndrome has led to the misperception that advisors are born, and not made. Poor support for advisory efforts in the past has only reinforced the opinion that advisors must be specially selected, rigorously trained, and given special consideration. The point of view of foreign military forces has never been taken into consideration. Their view tends to focus on what American "advisors" bring to the table. Of course, the advisor must be capable of building a relationship that promotes mutual respect and trust. Given these observations, clearly, the real issue concerning advisors is one of Service culture, rather than organization.

SRQ #5 and #6: Comparison of the *advisor corps* and *advisory* BCT

Both the *advisor corps* and the *advisory* BCT concepts have been examined as possible solutions for developing a capability for SFA. Each organization was described in detail. Additionally, each organization was compared to the current TT structure. Advantages and disadvantages for each organization were identified. Finally, each organization was matched against a specific set of criteria aimed at determining if the organization meets the Army's requirements. Now, the two organizations will be compared within the framework of those criteria.

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Does the proposed organization meet the requirements for conducting both phase 0 shaping operations and phase IV stability operations? Both the *advisory* BCT and the *advisor corps* meet the requirements to conduct TAAP in phase IV stability operations. The BCT has some issues concerning the rank/experience match-up with FSF organizations, while the *advisor corps* is limited in its ability to train FSF, and cannot partner with host nation forces. In terms of phase 0 shaping operations, the BCT cannot generate the amount of advisor teams that the *advisor corps* can. However, uncertainty exists as to how well *advisor corps* teams would fare in environments where there are no additional U.S. forces in support.

How much additional support does the proposed organization require to accomplish the missions outlined in SRQs # 1 and # 2? The BCT possess a great amount of organic enablers that will support operations in phase 0 and, or, phase IV environments. The *advisor corps*, on the other hand, will require additional support for the conduct of operations in either phase.

 Can the organization conduct TAAP at the tactical level? While, the BCT is capable of all TAAP activities, it may fall short concerning advising. The question remains as to whether or not the *advisory* BCT can be task organized, as well as operate in the decentralized manner required for advising FSF. The *advisor corps*, as its name implies, is focused on advising, but is best suited for phase IV stability operations where BCTs are also present.

What institutional risk is associated with the proposed solution? The *advisor corps* carries a high degree of institutional risk. As previously noted, the personnel requirements are tremendous. Organizationally, the *advisor corps* has the potential to

transform into a highly specialized organization that will further drain quality officers and NCOs from the Army's combat formations and institutions. The BCT, on the other hand, is the Army's centerpiece organization, and poses little risk to force structure.

Does the proposed solution provide adequate advisors? The *advisor corps* will provide adequate advisors. Again, the *advisory* BCT's ability to provide adequate advisors is largely a product of Army culture and leadership. Commanders must completely reorient the *advisory* BCT away from combat operations and towards advising.

Conclusion / Answer to the Primary Research Question:

So, is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the optimal solution for meeting future requirements to conduct train, advise, assist and partner with FSF? At this time, no definitive answer to the question is available. Nonetheless, research and analysis suggests that the Modular BCT is the optimal solution. As stated above, future requirements will remain uncertain until the post-OIF/OEF world is a reality. Regardless of the requirement, the Army will still need to provide the capability to conduct SFA in phase IV stability operations. The Army will also have to conduct some phase 0 SFA as well. One thing is for certain; the *advisor corps* is not a viable solution. The corps is costly and has limited utility, but its primary weakness is that it prevents the Army from addressing its own culture issues. While developing new organizations is one way of changing culture, this method is the least desirable, especially in times of fiscal and personnel constraint. In his book, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, John Nagl argued that the Army failed to incorporate its lessons learned in Vietnam. The popularity of his book has put the term "learning organization" into the vernacular of the military, substantiating

Nagl's thesis. If a culture of learning is the key to success, then the following question

must be asked: Would Nagl's *advisor corps*, by itself, have allowed the U.S. Army to win

in Vietnam? The answer is no. Only a change in culture, and not a new organization,

could have forced the Army to apply lessons learned and improved its performance.

While the BCT has the potential to provide the required capability, traditional Army

thinking concerning command and control, as well as leadership hampers that potential.

Only a change in culture will allow the BCT to be an effective *advising* BCT.

<u>Recommendations</u>

The BCT can meet future requirements, but only if the following changes are

implemented.

1. <u>Regionally orient some BCTs</u>. Phase 0 SFA requirements for each COCOM will

   fluctuate on a yearly basis. Nonetheless, the Army can generate forces to meet

   these requirements by regionally orienting some BCTs during the ARFORGEN

   process. Geographic orientation will allow BCTs to focus on a dedicated region,

   which will assist with establishing credible language and culture training

   programs.

2. <u>Build institutional capability</u>. The Army must retain the capability and experience

   that has been gained over the last several years of war. As such, those with

   advising experience should be provided with an additional skill identifier.

   Promotion boards should view experience as an advisor as career enhancing.

   Additionally, a school should be established to train officers and NCOs as

advisors. Finally, a significant proportion of personnel spaces within every BCT should be coded for school-trained advisors.

3. Build a limited specialized capability. BCTs, by themselves, will never be capable of conducting every GPF TAAP mission. A limited number of GPF missions will require the use of small specialized teams of advisors. In other cases, BCTs may need to be augmented with additional advisors. To meet these requirements, the Army should increase the number of personnel serving as observer/controllers (OCs) at the combat training centers, as well as require OCs to attend the advisor school. Additionally, OCs should also be required to learn a foreign language. Such a program will provide the Army with the depth needed to meet unforeseen requirements.

4. Change the culture. Changing the culture is without a doubt the most difficult requirement to meet. In order for a BCT to effectively serve as an advisor organization, commanders must realize that the BCT is now a force provider organization. Teams of advisors, composed primarily of officers and NCOs, must be given the authority and responsibility to accomplish the mission. The job of the BCT is to support the advisor teams, not to "fight" them on the battlefield. Selection of brigade and battalion commanders for *advising* BCTs will be critical to mission success. Obviously, the Army should initially look to those with TT experience to set the proper tone. If the Army wants to use BCTs for this mission, then it must be willing to adapt. If the Army cannot do this, then the nation will be better served with a permanent *advisor corps*.

5. Additional Research: To continue to improve Army SFA capabilities additional

research must be conducted. While definitively answering SRQ # 1 at this time is an exercise in predicting the future, that very future is around the corner. Getting SFA right in the post-OIF/OEF environment, both in terms of capability and capacity, deserves a thoughtful analysis of requirements. The best way to proceed is to conduct a SFA focused study at the end of each year, the purpose being to create a set of "lessons learned" that can be used to determine requirements for the next five to ten years. Such research should examine all SFA missions, both GPF and SOF, conducted during the specified year to determine the level of success, as well as suitability to the particular force charged with the mission. At the same time, the Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, GWOT plans, and the COCOM security cooperation plans should be reviewed along with the SFA research. Finally, the views of the Department of State, to include the assessments of country teams, should be included in the study. Such a study will benefit the Services by providing a comprehensive and realistic analysis, as well as viable conclusions from which force structure decisions can be derived. This research should include a comprehensive study of advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine their effectiveness and capture lessons learned. Interviewing Iraqi commanders will provide valuable insight. Another study should review the relationship between TTs and BCTs in order to determine friction points encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any such study will assist BCT commanders in ensuring the development and utilization of their units in the *advisory* BCT role. Finally, the Army and USSOCOM should look at possible programs for migrating Special Forces skills into the BCTs. These programs

could possibly include allowing SF officers to serve in BCTs as battalion and brigade staff officers. Additionally, select non-SF officers and NCOs assigned to *advisory* BCTs could attend the Special Forces Qualification Course. The purpose of these programs would be to bring greater adaptation into the *advisory* BCTs, thereby strengthening their ability to execute TAAP.

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