

THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN ENABLING POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION: A
CATALYST FOR CHANGE FROM REPUBLIC TO EMPIRE

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Military History

by

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ABSTRACT

THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN ENABLING POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION: A CATALYST FOR CHANGE FROM REPUBLIC TO EMPIRE by MAJ Thomas. M. Duckworth II, USA, 118 pages.

This study explores the role of the military as an instrument of national power in the transformation of Republics to Empires. It concentrates on two case studies. The first is the Athenian transformation from Radical Democracy to an Informal Empire during the period following the Second Greco-Persian war to the end of the Peloponnesian War (479-404 B.C.). The second is the Roman Republican Empire's transformation to Formal Empire during the period from the Marian military reforms to the Augustan Principate (107-27 B.C.). The central thesis of this study is that the professionalization of a republican military resulting from a transformation required to face an extraordinary threat to the existence of the state, enables expansionist imperial foreign policy when the immediate threat passes. The now fully professional force becomes increasingly dissociated from and exerts an indirect or direct transformative influence upon the parent state. The implication is that the forces that changed republics to empires in classical antiquity operate still yet. There are parallels between the Athenian, Roman, and American experiences. The study concludes that an understanding of macro historical factors is important for the military professional in the service of the United States as it exercises *de facto* imperial practice.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
ILLUSTRATIONS	viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Army for Empire?	1
Political and Social Consequences of the Use of Military Power	1
The Military's Responsibility in Empire Creation	4
CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS	12
Concepts of Republicanism and Democracy	12
Greek Conception of Democracy	13
Roman Conception of Republicanism	17
Concepts of Empire	20
State Power and the Use of Military Force	25
Role of the Warfare in a Republic	26
Military Organization in Response to View of War	29
CHAPTER 3 THE GREEK EXPERIENCE: THE ATHENIAN TRANSFORMATION	36
Timeline	36
Overview	36
Greek Concept of War	38
Historical Narrative	42
Creation of Informal Empire	48
Consequences of Transformation to Informal Empire	53
Reflections in Political and Philosophical Thought	58
Impact of a Professionalized Military	60
CHAPTER 4 THE ROMAN EXPERIENCE: INFORMAL TO FORMAL EMPIRE	65
Timeline	65
Overview	66
Roman Attitudes Toward War	67
The Second Punic War	72

Jugurthine and Cimbrian Wars	73
Contributing Social and Economic Conditions	74
Marian Military Reforms Professionalize the Force.....	75
Military Identity and Role in Civil Transformation.....	80
Perception Versus Reality.....	81
Impact of a Professional Military	82
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	86
Conclusion	86
Recommendations.....	91
Value to the Military Professional	92
APPENDIX A ILLUSTRATIONS.....	96
Transformation from Republic to Empire	96
The Greek Experience	99
The Roman Experience.....	104
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	107
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	110

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Imperial Transition.....	96
Figure 2. Routine Internecine Warfare.....	96
Figure 3. Reaction to Significant Threat	97
Figure 4. Economic and Political Expansion	97
Figure 5. Political Disunity	98
Figure 6. Consolidation of Power.....	98
Figure 7. Ancient Greek World.....	99
Figure 8. Persian Invasion Routes.....	100
Figure 9. The Battle of Salamis.....	101
Figure 10. Peloponnesian War	102
Figure 11. Athens and Piraeus.....	103
Figure 12. Second Punic War.....	104
Figure 13. Roman Expansion in the Second Century B.C.	105
Figure 14. Roman Republic 49-44 B.C.....	106

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Army for Empire?

How military organization and the practical execution of power affects the socio-political factors is the subject of this thesis. A comparison and contrast of Athenian and Roman experiences in the transition to empire and the transformation's effect on their respective societies will serve as examples. The focus of this investigation is on the period after the defeat of the Persians at Salamis and Plataea during the Second Greco-Persian War (479 B.C.) to the close of the Second Peloponnesian War (404 B.C.) for the Athenians. For the Romans, it is the period between the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) to the Augustan military reforms. The historical and cultural conditions during these time-periods were crucial to the transformation of the military and to the exercise of political-military power that set the conditions for transformation of republic to empire for both societies. For the Athenians, it led to transformation to informal democratic empire followed by backlash against the excesses of democracy. Defeat by the Spartans led to the replacement of the democracy by tyrannical government. For the Romans, it led to the transformation from informal republican empire to formal empire - from a society of citizens to a society of subjects.

Political and Social Consequences of the Use of Military Power

The structure and application of what is now called the military instrument of national power was fundamental in shaping the political and social structures in ancient societies.¹ For Athenians and Romans, extraordinary external threats that put the

survival of their societies in peril demanded changes to the existing organizational structure and intellectual conception of the use of military force. Their respective militaries became comparatively larger and fundamentally changed from ones composed of free-landed citizen soldiers to armies of professional soldiers drawn from all segments of a society. This changed the balance of political power

Contrasted to authoritarian regimes that conscripted subjects into compulsory service or paid mercenary armies, republics relied on a limited citizen-soldier class that voluntarily mustered under arms to compose the main force of its military ranks. In times of great crisis to its survival, states sometimes enacted emergency measures that offered greater access to military power to previously disenfranchised classes. Military service offered upward mobility and increased political power that would prove impossible to recall. Owing to the particular context that included the growth of political influence, these nominally republican citizen militaries gained an institutional momentum that prevented their de-mobilization after the crises had passed.

Standing professional military forces replaced citizen-soldier militias that campaigned seasonally. Military force in the conduct of foreign affairs was then an effective and more easily employable option to use to resolve political problems. Having a competent and capable military seemed to incline policy makers to more readily favor force over other elements of national power. Military practice, when successful, reinforced this tendency.

The use of military force abroad increased the political and economic power of the state at home. A professional military seemed to generate significant revenue despite

its enormous cost. Militaries enabled economic growth by protecting expansionist mercantile exchange, by enforcing direct tributary payments from subject states, and by plundering defeated enemies. This bolstered the conviction by the Athenians and Romans of the inherent right of force. However, this introduced contradictory cultural elements into a society that resolved in fundamental cultural/political change. Geoffrey Parker, in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, notes the paradox that confounded Western powers, and the Athenians and Romans in particular, as the “socio-military predicament...the success of dynamic armies abroad calls into question – and sometimes undermines - the ideological premises of the established social order at home.”²

In an imperial relationship, there is a dominant and a subordinate society in which the subordinate society serves the needs of the dominant society while suppressing its own desires and needs. Democratic or republican societies tend to value universal justice and human rights. The dominant society cannot extend domestic rights to subordinate populations without admitting equality. Therefore, a society cannot effectively administer an empire without transforming to such an extent as to compromise the values that mark it as democratic. In that respect, the United States in the early 21st century shares similar geopolitical circumstances with ancient Athens and Rome.

It is that citizens of the United States are hesitant to call themselves Imperialists, while at the same time assuming and assuming *de facto* imperial responsibilities. As Victor Davis Hansen in *Carnage and Culture* expresses it:

It is almost as if with great power comes greater Western insecurity; at a time of unprecedented global influence, Americans appear to express less confidence in their culture's morality and capabilities than did the Greeks, Romans, and Italians at the point of near extinction.³

This is demonstrative of the cultural incongruities experienced by a democratic people exercising imperial influence. This is not a new sociological phenomenon in world history. The administration of domestic and foreign policy in the national strategic interest often comes into conflict with the ideals of a society.

Further complicating this practical expression of imperial power for the United States is in the popular imagination the founders created the Republic in part in response to the imperial practices of British colonialism. The United States sees itself as a revolutionary power that fought a protracted and honorable struggle against a world superpower. We celebrate our victory over great odds to preserve freedom, dignity, and human rights of all.⁴

The Military's Responsibility in Empire Creation

The practical demands of empire, growth of the military and the expansionist use of force, had a similarly divisive effect upon Athenian and Roman societies. The military became increasingly dissociated from society as it professionalized. The influence of military power on the essentially democratic body politic (or *polis*) changed from that of a temporary extension of the core society to that of a permanently separated external influence on the state. Military power moved from its basis on the citizen soldier who was fully involved in the decision to use force and its execution to a professional military caste largely divorced from the day-to-day politics of the citizenry. The decision to use military force and the portion of a society that exercised it were now only loosely associated with the citizen body. The military could exert pressure on a domestic society that often failed to effectively check its influence as its military power grew.

While the mere presence of a large standing professional military is not necessarily the cause of the transition from republican to imperial government, it can enable the transformation in a catalytic fashion. A professionalized military is both a cause and an effect of imperial expansion. Owing to an increasing military influence through the process of expansion, imperialism can become self-serving. Military power changes from a means to an end in and of itself. The manifestation of politico-military power is sometimes termed a “military machine” or a “military industrial complex” that exerts independent political influence and determines strategic direction. The disconnection of the core body politic from formulation of strategic policy is one of the characteristics of imperial governance. For Athens and Rome, the rapid expansion and professionalization of the military exerted an influence that transformed them from representative to imperial forms of government.

The experiences of the Athenians and the Romans may be instructive for the professional military soldier in the 21st century. Since the end of the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States has been a formal imperial power. Knowledge of the macro socio-political factors that shaped these ancient societies may be of benefit to the modern practitioner of the military profession.

Seen as examples of the Western cultural tradition, an analysis of the salient factors of Greek and Roman transformation has significance for modern republics. The United States is the self-avowed cultural inheritor of the western rational tradition, as developed by the Greeks and modified by the Romans. Admittedly, even though the framers of the Constitution looked to the Greeks and Romans for examples of republican

government, the Greek and Roman forms of government and political thought are as different from each other as they are from modern expressions of Republicanism.

The concept of freedom serves as an example. The Greek conception of freedom largely centered on freedom to participate in the affairs of state or of access to political power. The Roman conception of freedom centered on individual liberties, as does the modern one. However, different they may be, they share enough similarities that are easily recognizable to us over the span of millennia. Modern democracies (or more accurately, republics) share a kinship and affinity with their cultural progenitors that spans the gulf of time of over 2,500 years. The United States thus informs its thought and action in the context of this cultural heritage.

Athens saw the spread of democracy as essential to its cultural and economic preeminence. The theory, then as now, was that the spread of like-minded democracies and democratic institutions lead to less political and military conflict and increased economic prosperity for compliant trading partners. Ostensibly, an international order of rational and like-minded governments makes the implementation of national political will easier to accomplish through the more economical means of diplomatic discourse. However, conflict inevitable ensued and defense of the empire became an imperative in its own right. In practice, the spread of democracy is no less self-serving for the United States than it was for the Athenians. Towards that end, the United States exhibits traits of imperial, and if not that then hegemonic, powers that have come before.

A principal assumption of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) at the beginning of the 21st century is that the spread of like-minded democratic

governments promotes world security and is in the best national interest of the United States.⁵ In the tradition of democratically elected or representative republics, the government of the United States executes the political will of the people of the United States through their elected representatives. The economic and political will of the people expresses itself domestically and internationally through the elements of national power; diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). In an ideal world, all the elements of national power work in concert to achieve a synergistic effect oriented in the desired strategic direction. In practice, applications of the elements of national power serve their desired purpose, but also have sometimes unintended transformative consequences on the domestic society. Extra-national exercise of military power is one of those applications that can have a significantly divisive effect on a society. This is as true of the United States in the modern context, as it was for the Athenians and the Romans in classical antiquity.

What initially interested me about this about this topic was the development of philosophical thought in its historical context. In an academic environment, philosophy and history instructors (whether limited by the demands of time and complexity or by inability) can present culturally significant ideas as isolated “events” devoid of their rich and dynamic historical contextual setting. Instructors can present these ideas as born of the genius of great men. In fact, historically significant actors are intimately involved in and influenced by their cultural and political surroundings. For example, Socrates, the founder of the Western philosophical tradition, was an Athenian citizen and hoplite soldier who fought in the phalanx at the battles of Amphipolis, Delium, and Potidaea and

was not merely an objective observer of contemporary society.⁶ As a matter of historiography, it is the contextual historical setting, the abilities and proclivities of the individual historical actors, and a large degree of serendipity that allow the survival of historically significant ideas. How does the concept of a representative republic survive for over 2,500 years in the face of transformative pressures that have tended to consolidate republican societal power centers and transform into empires? Recognizing operative factors in the “broad” view can inform current decision-making.

To what degree and by what process was the exercise of military power influential in the transformation of preceding republican societies is the more focused question that interested the author as he conducted research into the topic. Was the military a subject or an actor in the model transformation from republican to imperial government? What was the critical event and what were the salient features of the military’s contribution to the transformation? Additionally, what could a military professional do to influence the outcome of this process, if anything?

If the right conditions (power vacuum, weak neighbors and requirement for access to natural resources, perception of danger to the survival of the state) are present in a society with sufficient economic and military capability and the philosophical and political will do so, that society can exert hegemonic or imperial influence upon other states. The manifestation of this potential can range from formal empire to lead nation in multi-party leagues of states. The administration of this imperial responsibility renders a society susceptible to a set of potentially transformative forces. The demand for a militarily effective application of power to answer a significant threat develops a

professional military/diplomatic class that is increasingly divorced from the ruling class and citizenry at large. This process leads to the accretion of wealth and power into a relatively small percentage of the domestic population. This concentration of wealth and disparity of power creates a divisive influence in the society. A society's adaptability to the transformative forces and the development of its philosophical and political character in *response* to the demands of empire has implications for the survival of its fundamental character.

Can a society synthesize the demands of domestic and imperial administration? The key question is, can a republic exercise imperial responsibility while resisting (let alone recognizing) the transformative pressures that lead to the destruction of republic and transformation into dictatorship? Can a republic run an empire and maintain its cultural identity as a republic? Can it do so without internal fracture? If so what concomitant changes will likely result from the exercise of hegemonic/imperial power and to what degree? Unfortunately, Dabney Park, in "History's Catch-22: The Peloponnesian War," in *The History Teacher*, relates that the historical record is somewhat pessimistic.

(I)s it possible for a country to conduct a truly democratic foreign policy that is at the same time in its own best interest? The answer: history tells us that few if any democracies have ever achieved this.⁷

In the West, representative governance survives despite the weight of historical evidence that throughout most of history the majority of human population has lived in varying degrees of servitude to authoritarian government. Representative governments whose principal focus is the best interest of the people are the exception, rather than the norm.

Chapter Two will present terms, definitions, and processes that describe the overall transformation from Republic to Informal Empire to Formal Empire. Chapter Three will present the Athenian experience, focusing on the transformation from Radical Democracy to Informal Empire. Chapter Four will present the Republican Roman experience, focusing on the transformation from Informal Empire to Formal Empire. The implication of the case studies presented herein is that the same forces that affected societies in classical antiquity operate in 21st century.

¹ In Book IV of *Politics*, Aristotle posits that the variegated forms of government were a result of specific sociological contexts. However, the role and organization of the military in that context contributed to the organization of the state. Thus, the social and political framework of a society is significantly linked to the military organization of that society (Bk IV, CH 4, 1291a).

² Parker, Geoffrey, ed. *The Cambridge History of Warfare*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 49.

³ Hansen, Victor Davis. *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. (New York: Random House, 2001), 463.

⁴ A more comprehensive analysis of history reveals that a significant factor in the United States' success in its revolution was ensured, in large part, due to the greater global Franco-British struggle for power between the Seven Years War and the Napoleonic Wars.

⁵ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionII.html> (accessed March 17, 2008. 2006). The National Security Strategy, Chapter II, C. *The Way Ahead*, states: Championing freedom advances our interests because the survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad. Governments that honor their citizens' dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct toward other nations, while governments that brutalize their people also threaten the peace and stability of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.

⁶ Hansen, Victor Davis. *The Wars of the Ancient Greeks and Their Invention of Western Military Culture*. (London: Cassell, 1999). 19.

⁷ Dabney Park, Jr. "History's Catch-22: The Peloponnesian War," *The History Teacher*, Vol. 5, No 4. (May, 1972): 23-27.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Concepts of Republicanism and Democracy

In order to develop a coherent theoretical framework, one must first begin with definitions of republicanism, democracy, and empire for the purposes of this thesis. In addressing what is the meaning of a democratic republic, it is necessary to distinguish modern liberal democracy from the more limited participatory character of the Greek and Roman forms of republican government. An Athenian or Roman citizen transported through time to the United States in the 21st century would likely recognize similar structural components of representative government, but would reject the modern concept of universal suffrage. Indeed, outside the Athenian state and its like-minded democratic subject states, Greek contemporaries viewed democracy as excessive and potentially destructive. Athenians, and later the Romans, saw the inherent dangers of the possibility of demagoguery and mob rule in universal suffrage.

Democracy as a form of government is a relative historical anachronism that carried negative connotations until the late eighteenth century in Western European cultures. For the French, the excesses of Revolution manifested themselves in the Reign of Terror. In the United States, it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that democracy again became fashionable. In direct contrast to a popular misconception, the framers of the constitution of the United States did not intend direct participatory democracy. They looked more to the Greek and Roman conception of landed agrarian citizen soldier as a guarantor of the rights of the individual and of support to the state. It

was only through military, political, and civil efforts of disenfranchised populations and sympathetic citizens up to and including the Civil Rights movement in the mid to late twentieth century that disenfranchised segments of the population gained the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship.¹ Thus, in modern democracies the classical conception of citizen-soldier as the principal component of a military culture is a historical anachronism. In the current context, primary state defense responsibility lies not with citizens who see their obligation to perform military service, but with a military that sees itself primarily as a professional body who are also citizens.

Although still formally organized as a representative republic, the United States in the 21st century no longer denies citizenship based on race or gender. The United States grants citizenship benefits as a birthright that involves only a minimal expectation of civic responsibility. A resident illegal immigrant population notwithstanding, a tiered or caste system of citizen and non-citizen wherein one segment of the population is empowered and another is subject to the political will of a minority and exists without representation is not a formalized part of the United States political system. As a sign of magnanimity and beneficence, the United States even extends limited civil rights to resident non-citizens and illegal aliens. This spirit of beneficence presents a logical inconsistency that prevents a democratic people from exercising imperial power.

Greek Conception of Democracy

Poleis, or city-states, were the basic political and economic organization of the Greek world in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. They were republican in that they had assemblies of citizens, advisory councils, and elected executive bodies. Their forms

ranged from democratic, in the case of Athens, to oligarchic, in the case of Sparta. However, a limited citizen class that had access to political and economic power marked them all.

The free land-owning citizen, with obligations to the state as a prerequisite to benefit from the privileges thereof is quite different from the modern conception of citizen in a democracy. Bettany Hughes estimates the citizen body of fifth century democratic Athens to have been no more than approximately 6,000 full citizens based on the amount of people that could physically fit in the assembly.² Land ownership vested one in the society and was a requirement to be a citizen. Additionally, the individual and both parents had to be Athenian born. Responsibility to the state was fundamental to the concept of being an Athenian citizen. In fact, not to participate in political life was to be not fully human. The Athenians referred to one who did not voluntarily participate in political affairs as an *idiotes*, or one who was incapable of reasoning, is the source of the modern word idiot.³

Athenian democracy was a direct democracy of a limited land owning class. Citizens expected to support the *polis* through exercise of civic responsibility and partake in the duties of administration of the state. They expected to participate in the assembly. A random method chose a chairman of the assembly to serve for a one-month term. They rotated duty serving on the 500-member council, which set the agenda for the assembly. Finally, they served at random on juries of their peers.⁴

The citizen body funded the state. In effect, the state treasury was the possession of the citizenry in joint ownership. Taxation to fund the military campaign was the

responsibility of the citizenry (and to a lesser degree the wealthy non-citizen class). The payment of the *eisphora*, or war tax, was an obligation of being a citizen. If the budgetary surplus of the state treasury could not fund military campaign, the citizen assumed the burden on a 'fair share basis.' Public credit based funding fueled war economies and at times, it was a direct levy. John Rich notes the degree to which the citizenry funded the war effort during times of crisis: "In Athens, during and particularly after the Peloponnesian war, a substantial proportion of the cost of waging war seems to have fallen directly on the elite, without even the use of loans."⁵

Finally, the citizen body of Greece expected to muster for military duty through direct participation in military campaigns in the defense of the state and its interests. This conception was a prerequisite for citizenship and all who were able participated. Under the democratic government, Greek hoplites provided their own arms at great expense.⁶ The Soldierly elected military leadership and, on campaign, the entire body made military decisions by vote. Leaders were directly accountable to the state for their performance and, in turn, military leaders had direct input into the decisions to wage war, when and, how. Military leadership was not only political, it was partisan and extremely self interested at times.⁷

The Greek Phalanx taught the fundamentally democratic lesson about the shared lot and equality of every man. Everyone depended on those to his left and right for his very survival, each supporting his peers by overlapping protection of bronze shield, and providing moral and physical impetus for the onward push of the whole. The discipline and unity of effort, where the actions of the whole mattered more than the individual,

reinforced the importance of the group rather than the individual in a political body. It was the Greek conception and practice of war that would be the greatest factor in the drive toward imperial expansion.

Athenians more keenly felt the effects of the Clausewitzian “paradoxical trinity,” wherein the government, the people, and the military exert polar influences each upon the other. The dynamic effect of an influence of any the three operative forces of the poles is greater when the government, the military and the people are one in the same, as was the case (at least initially) in democratic Athens. The power of influence was greater as the poles bound more tightly without an intermediary.

However, democracy in Athens was an extended control by the elite that barred nine of ten people from voting. A significant portion of the population in this patriarchal society, women, were barred from citizenship. As the transition from limited participatory democracy to empire progressed, a non-citizen mercantile class increased its economic power owing to extra-territorial trade. At the lower end of the economic spectrum were the tradesmen. Slaves, representing one in three people in Athens were at the bottom of the social order. As a further indication of the stratification of Athenian society, citizens considered slaves and barbarian populations as sub-human.⁸ The total population contributed to the political and economic well being of the *polis*, but only a portion was able to have a say in the politico-military-economic decisions that affected their lives.

The concept of Athenian citizenship radically changed as a direct result of the strategic decisions of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). Military manpower

changed from the citizen who saw his duty to participate in military action in common defense of the state to state-funded professional sailors and soldiers. In Athens, the political center of gravity transferred from the landed citizen to the disenfranchised and fickle mob.

Still though, Athenian direct democracy was a revolutionary concept that was relatively unseen in its contemporary context. In the Aegean, an estimated one city in 1,000 was democratic, a condition that changed under the Athenian empire. Democratic Athens sowed the seeds of the western rational tradition and forms of modern government. However, it differed markedly from the Roman and modern conceptions of republicanism and citizenship.

Roman Conception of Republicanism

Although the Roman city-state was a contemporary of the Athenian Greeks, in the later Republican era they supplanted the Greeks and eclipsed their power in the Mediterranean. The Roman mind, and thus culture, was more pragmatic than that of the Greek. The Romans coupled this pragmatism with a facility for organization that was unrivaled in the ancient world. Not being particularly xenophobic, Romans easily accepted and integrated cultural and technological aspects of cultures with which they came into contact. While respecting the rational and proto-scientific tradition of the Greeks, the Romans were cautious about accepting Greek intellectual and cultural concepts wholesale. M.L. Clarke, in *The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius*, relates the dual nature of Roman thought. “...(T)he Roman tended to live in two worlds, the Greek world of the rational, intellectual

speculation and the Roman world of sentiment and tradition, and the two were never completely harmonized.”⁹ Polybius, himself a Greek held hostage by the Romans in the period following the 2nd Punic War, believed that Athens had ruined itself by its folly and inconstancy. In attempting to extol the virtues of Roman rule to his fellow Greeks, he purported that a mixed constitution was best. This mixed aristocratic, oligarchic, and democratic tendencies and resembled the cautious approach to majority rule expressed by other Greeks in the wake of the Peloponnesian Wars. The power of the Roman state was at the same time diffused and curtailed in the limited ruling class of the Senate.

The historical experiences of Rome created sensitivity to tyrannical autocratic rule. Initially established as a kingdom, the Romans dethroned last king in 509 B.C. After successfully gaining independence, the Romans established themselves as a Republic that diffused power amongst the founding tribes. Restriction on individual power was an important concept for the Romans. Initially, the Senate granted the two Consular positions for a single one-year term. Under cases of extreme emergency, the Senate granted dictatorial powers for a six-month term only. Although Rome transformed first to an informal then formal empire, its first acknowledged emperor, Augustus, ensured that it retained the appearance of a Republican government, the *Res Publica*.

Even though the early Roman Republic was relatively more inclusive than previous Roman and Etruscan monarchies, Rome remained a tiered society organized by class. Romans derived political power from personal and familial reputation and rank. Originally divided between patricians and plebeians, Roman social structure morphed as their society evolved. The level of vested societal power grew to range, in decreasing

order, from the nobility, to the senatorial, to the equestrian, to the census classes based on land ownership and wealth, to the landless poor (who had no voting rights), to freedmen, to women, and finally, to slaves.

Under the Republic, the political power that flowed from the military power resided with the middle class citizen-soldier farmer as it had in the earlier Greek *poleis*. Inherited from the Hellenized Etruscans, phalanx based hoplite warfare heavily influenced Roman military organization and employment. Like the Greeks before them, Republican Romans saw civic obligation as part of their citizenship identity. To receive the rights of citizenship, one had to serve the state. Military service was an obligation and a right of a citizen. Like the Greeks, Roman citizens provide their own arms. They viewed themselves as citizens first and soldiers second. Soldiering was a component of their citizenship. Ability to fund one's own arms predicated access to military service. It was further restricted based on social class. The following indicates the high degree of participation of Roman citizenry in the military: "Republican Rome combined a high level of social stratification with a high level of military participation."¹⁰ Although the degree to which one had access to power was a subject of his class, one could increase his standing through the social mobility gained in public service. If a Roman aspired to high office, he was obliged to serve undergo the *cursus honorum*, of which military service was a component.

Social mobility was extended in various forms in the development of the Empire. Rome extended limited and then full citizenship rights first to the Latin allies, then eventually to anyone who served in the Roman military. The Roman lack of xenophobia

was a critical component of the gradual Roman extension of citizenship rights to non-“Roman” imperial subjects. It allowed the political integration crucial to the later Empire. It was, however, out of a perceived necessity rather than a desire to extend political rights that saw the extension of citizenship that enabled the change from Republic to Empire.

For the purposes of this thesis, democratic republics will be characterized as a form of government wherein a citizenry (limited or not) has a direct or representative voice and oversight rights and responsibilities in the conduct and execution of the political affairs of the state. In this form of government, elected representatives and agents of the state are accountable to the citizenry it serves (however limited it may be). Under Empire, the government changed to serve the imperial interests of the state and not the state itself.

Concepts of Empire

Mason Hammond, in “Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, provides an understanding of the modern theoretical conception of empire in the following:

The term “imperialism” appeared about 1860 to signify: “an imperial system of government; the rule of an emperor, especially when despotic or arbitrary.”... in the 1890s (it became) a political catchword which denoted either “the principle or spirit of empire” or more specifically, “the principle or policy of seeking an extension of empire.”... Though the word “imperialism” itself is modern, this drive has characterized certain peoples as far back as history reaches. In particular, it characterized the Persians, the Athenians, the Macedonians, and the Romans.¹¹

As is generally understood, imperialism is the formal practice of empire wherein an

imperial power formally annexes and administers territories in a dominant-subordinate relationship that benefits the dominant power. It is, however, much broader and more nuanced than it appears from that limited definition.

For Michael Doyle, imperial rule involves not only international relationships, but also the domestic politics of both the subject country and the ruling country. For Doyle, an analysis of imperial power must take into account both the stronger and weaker power. It is the nature of the relationship between the two that marks empire and what form it will take. Centralized government, differentiated economies, and political loyalty characterize the stronger power, or metropole. The weaker power, or periphery, is characterized by a highly divided government, undifferentiated economics, and absent or divided political loyalty. It is the socio-political conditions present in the two societies and the interaction of the two that create the degree and form of imperial relationship.¹²

Doyle offers four different theories that facilitate and motivate societies to empire. The three traditional theoretical explanations for motivation to empire are metropolitan dispositional, peripheral, and the systemic model of international power politics. In addition, Doyle adds another more workable concept: political control over *effective* sovereignty. All theoretical constructs, however, share the common thematic undertones of operative economic and strategic military factors.¹³

In a metrocentric dispositional model, the internal drives of the stronger state are cause for transformation to empire. Doyle uses the Roman experience as a vehicle to demonstrate the three traditional views. Doyle references William V. Harris', *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.* to demonstrate the metrocentric theory

that it is the desire for domestic political and aristocratic power that drives militaristic expansionism:

Since it was necessary for a Roman aristocrat who wanted high office to demonstrate military skill, fortitude, and success, the repeated skirmishes between Gauls and Romans became forums for political ambition. A victory took a family one-step closer to aristocratic status; a campaign was a crucial manifestation of fitness for higher office.¹⁴

In other words, it was principally domestic pressure for social prestige that drove the desire to expand.

Under the peripheral model, it is the conditions in the peripheral states that lead to expansion of empire. The Second Macedonian War of 200-196 B.C. led to an informal Roman Empire in Greece. In response to pleas from its Greek protectorates from the aggressive posturing of Philip V of Macedon, Rome entered into a conflict that saw a defeated Macedon and the establishment of Roman political and social influence on the Greek mainland. The ensuing consolidation of power saw Rome extend a domestic client relationship to its international dealings and thereby made itself the “protector” of Greece. Although nominally independent, Greece was now part of the Roman Republican Empire.¹⁵

The peripheral theory of empire explains the “frontier problem.” This motivation arises from the incompatibility of peripheral societies to “neatly” interface with metropolitan economic and political systems. When conventional diplomatic and economic practices fail to produce favorable international relations between the metropolitan and the peripheral powers, the metropolises try to isolate their interests by extraterritorial means. Where isolation fails, “metropolises feel compelled to impose

imperial rule.”¹⁶ This strategic policy is defensive while, at the same time, expansionist. Familiar to the American experience, it pushes the defensive frontier of the empire outward in the name of physical and economic security.

The systemic theory posits that the establishment of empire is a result of conditions in the international order wherein the disparity in the balance of power drives imperialist motives. Imperial and subject states are merely playing their part in a deterministic historical narrative. Jacqueline de Romilly demonstrates this determinism in her systems approach. Romilly posits that the root causes of imperial expansion are the “motives and opportunities attributable to the anarchy of the international order.”¹⁷ Romilly sees the imperial domination as the “purest expression of the power-systemic approach, is a necessary result of the relations between powerful and weak states.”¹⁸

In this theoretical construct, economics is the principal motivating factor for metropolitan powers. The military instrument of the state supports, defends, and expands domestic free trade and capitalist overseas interests. In particular, the state’s military that serves the expansion of the state. The “philosophical law of necessity of force,” or the law of the Melian Dialogue, postulated by Thucydides, states that “the strong do what they will and that the weak do what they must.”¹⁹ It is in this point that one finds a modern democratic peoples’ difficulty with the administration of imperial power. For the Greeks, international justice was not a consideration when the modern concept of a realpolitik choice was between being dominated and dominating.

Both Athens and Rome serve as examples of political control over effective sovereignty. According to Thucydides, the nature of the relationship between the

member states of the Delian League and Athens fundamentally changed when tribute and membership became mandatory and voluntary withdrawal from the league became impossible. “Athens’ allies, though independent in name, were in fact caught up in an empire - a controlled informal relationship with Athens.”²⁰ Informal or not, the relationship between Athens and subordinate states was marked by a compulsory and tributary obligation of the subordinate to the dominant state.

Later, the Romans approach to the conception of empire was an equally realistic one. Harris relates the pragmatic approach to Roman imperialism in the following: “(T)hey usually thought of it not as being the area covered by the formally annexed provinces, but rather as consisting of all the places over which Rome exercised power.”²¹ It incorporated both the formal and informal aspects of imperial power. The exercise of influence and the use of power to affect favorable political and economic outcomes thus extended to neighboring territories. However, these peripheries also exerted a return influence on the metropolitan power.

According to Doyle, it is the control of international and domestic politics by a ruling state over a subject state that marks formal empire. The subordinate state loses its sovereign status and is a subject. However, as is seen with Athens, effective control is a more important metric for determining whether a relationship between states is imperial or not. Athens was eventually an informal imperial power in its lead of the Delian League. The concept of effective control of sovereignty as a hallmark of empire admits a broader framework for the understanding of imperial power dynamics and its effect on the imperial society. Effective control of sovereignty more realistically expresses the

power dynamic between a dominant and subordinate power. The essence of an empire is thus influence rather than formal control.

As a matter of distinction, one must differentiate the concept of empire from the concept of hegemony. In hegemonic relationships, the stronger state controls the external but not internal politics of dependant states. The subordinate states maintain sovereign power, but are subject to limited economic, social, and political constraints. In contrast to imperial Athens, Sparta was a hegemon that led the Peloponnesian League. The states in confederation with Sparta were free to run their domestic affairs, but deferred to Sparta in decisions relating to the common defense. Additionally, the states had the right to vote on matters of foreign policy, but deferred to Sparta in practice.²²

State Power and the Use of Military Force

Edward N. Luttwak provides a working definition of the relation of state power and military force in the following: “*Military Power* is normally defined, in functional terms, more or less as ‘...the ability of states to affect the will and the behavior of other states by armed coercion.’”²³ Although Luttwak acknowledges that many think that the terms power and force indistinguishable, he differentiates them by their static and active natures. He believes that power is a non-physical phenomenon that is largely a matter of perception of the recipients the means used to obtain that power. Force, on the other hand, is the physical manifestation of that power and is subject to degradation through its use.

Military force then is the application of the political will of the state through military means to either extend or maintain state power. It is not to be confused with

operational or tactical battle. Leveraging influence through the application of military force can take the form of either actual use or the threat of use. The Athenians and the Romans predicated the exercise of empire on the combination of the threat and actual use of military force to achieve the compliance of peripheral states.

The Athenians undertook a more marital approach than did the Romans and were quick to resort to direct military force. Although the Roman imperial experience evolved over a much greater span, it was always more nuanced in its inclusive application of all the elements of state power. The client state relationships of the Roman Republican Empire are an example of the threat of force to induce nominally independent states to comply with the metropolitan political agenda.

Although it is but one element of the DIME construct, military force is arguably the most powerful element. However, it is inextricably intertwined with the economic instrument. More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, historically it is either that element of a society that executes military power or that element that controls it that has the largest impact on the formation of political structure the political direction of the state. Additionally, this influence is directed simultaneously both outward and inward. The transformation of a republic to an empire is directly related to the structure and use of military power.

Role of the Warfare in a Republic

For Republics, war is a temporary phenomenon. Its citizens muster in common to protect the state from an immediate threat. The citizen sees his obligation to the state and his duty to mobilize for military action in its defense. While Republics maintain a cadre

of professional soldiers and officers, the bulk of its fighting force is a militia. Further, in ancient Republics, citizens bore the cost of producing and maintaining their arms. This arrangement is resultant from a narrowly defined condition in which military force is used, defense of the state from unambiguous threats. It also greatly limited the duration of the use of military force. A citizen militia could not stay on extended campaign without a detrimental effect on the economy. As the dynamism of Republican societies led to their expansion, they encountered more complex and unfamiliar definitions of organized societal violence. The complexity of the continuum of war is something that a Republican military is ill equipped with which to deal. The response to that complexity inevitably leads a transformation of the Republican military. The degree to which this alters the society as well is the subject at hand.

Organized societal groups conduct war in a broad variety of means. In the modern context, the commonly accepted understanding of war is armed conflict between organized states, sub-groups within states, or non-state organized groups. However, culturally distinct populations may exist independently of and across state borders and may have divergent interests from the legitimate governments. Armed conflict with a variety of non-state actors is probabilistically greater than armed conflict with states. Armed non-state actors include; organized crime and drug groups, terrorist and paramilitary organizations, pirates, private military contractors, and mercenaries. These seemingly disparate groups have complicated interrelationships and can be mutually supportive. For example, for the Greek states of the Delian League, the security from both the Persians and from piracy that the Athenian fleet provided was a principal

motivating force to remain under the imperial influence of Athens.²⁴

Many simplistically see war as a temporal event with a definite beginning and end. In practice, it is much more complex. However, if one admits a less restrictive understanding of the term, it unveils a broader understanding of conflict at large.

Warfare exists as a part of the wide range of human social interaction. It is an instrument of power executed using the methodology of violence. At its most basic form, it is one form of political interaction between social groups. It is not under the sole purview of the state. It predates and transcends the state. John Rich demonstrates this theme in the following quote from *War and Society in the Greek World*:

Warfare clearly transcends the nation state; there were wars long before the modern state system existed. What is more important is to merge the concept of wars in to that of social violence in general, and even dissolve the boundaries between particular episodes of peace and war.²⁵

Warfare then is organized societal violence directed at another group for the furtherance of political and or economic ends.

In order to get at a more widely useful understanding of war for the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to widen the scope of application of the term to more than an isolated limited temporal event. It is then necessary to think of it as a mode of social interaction. Although the application of military power discussed in this thesis occurred long before the ideas of Clausewitz coalesced in the nineteenth century, his astute insights can illuminate the political transformation occurring from applying military means. Clausewitz in *On War* characterized war as “...not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”²⁶ Clausewitz posits that political policy directs the means of war, and is in turn

influenced and altered through its own adaptation to execute those means. At its root, war is fundamentally a political event. One cannot dissociate military means as a foreign policy instrument from the domestic political sphere.

Military Organization in Response to View of War

A state's organization of its military is central to its form of government. The military necessity to transform in response to demands on an existing military, such as a requirement for extended extra-national involvement with a military unsuited for the purpose, has a significant effect on the society at large. This serves to further the degree of military transformation. Society's attitudes toward warfare reflect this change. It is a conception of warfare from an anomalous event to routine business and a pragmatic approach to imperial responsibility. Philosophical and political thought reflect this conception. This change leads to an acceptance of more authoritarian rule in a republic, which, at least initially, seeks to maintain the trappings of republicanism. Adcock demonstrates the Roman need to present the appearance of a republican government to the populace in *The Roman Art of War Under the Republic*: “Even after the formation of a standing army by Augustus, the need to preserve the ‘civilian’ character of the principate dictated its posting to Spain vice Northern Italy.”²⁷

The economic effect is an increased accrual of wealth into the hands of the ruling elite. The attendant political effect is a polarization of the population, and a subsequent internal fracture and decline. An increase in dissociation of the military from civil society compounds this fracturing. Figure 1 represents the transformation of a society from Democracy/Republic to Informal Empire and the transformation from Informal

Empire to Formal Empire (Appendix A, page 96). Commensurate with and enabling this transformation is the transformation of the military apparatus of the state from a citizen soldier militia to a fully professionalized military force. Athens is illustrative of this transformation from Republic to Informal Empire. Rome is illustrative of the transformation from Informal Empire to Formal Empire.

Joseph Schumpeter posits that a central causal factor in the transformation from agrarian republican society to empire is the growth of a large standing professional army. He claims that it is necessary to the process. Prior to the growth a large standing professional army, Greek hoplite warfare as developed by oligarchic city-states in approximately 700 BCE was a limited, controlled, and largely ritualized practice wherein landed Greek armored infantry met for decisive shock battle. As soon as the citizen-soldier/farmer dispensed with the immediate threat, he demobilized and reintegrated back into the society from which he came. Figure 2 represents such a model (Appendix A, page 96).

According to Schumpeter, the growth of a “war machine” is a necessary and sufficient cause of imperialism. In other words, the military is the cause of the empire. If a society possesses the capability to respond militarily when faced with an external threat that endangers the survival of the state, the society’s growth as a military power irrevocably alters the nature of that state. In this case, the society cannot resist transformation. The economic and social impact of the military component of imperial practice serves to facilitate the transformation. The military transformation creates an influence loop that causes a military revolution in the society that can spiral out of the

bounds of its originally intended purpose. The unintended consequences can materially greatly either benefit or greatly harm the society in question. Irrespective, change is certain.²⁸

The creation of hoplite battle harnessed and codified the extremely destructive forces western warfare; the use of advanced technology, superior discipline, ingenuity in response, a broad shared military observance, choice of decisive engagement, dominance of infantry, systematic application of capital to war making, and a moral opposition to militarism.²⁹ The Greeks would wrestle with the two competing forces engendered by the tenets of western warfare that they created: a “genius for applying economic and political prowess to the battlefield, and the effort to harness the lethal results within a framework of largely ethical and moral considerations.”³⁰ The relative military power unleashed by the Greeks would, when faced with the threat of the Persians, grow out of proportion to its originally designed intent and transform their society. Figure 3 represents the reaction to a significant enough threat that the society reorganizes and professionalizes its military in response to that threat and the resultant influences on the parent society (Appendix A, page 97).

With the growth of a war machine, the objectively directed motivation for the growth of military power as the defense of the state has the potential to become objectless and avaricious. The war machine then acts to serve its own ends. Its protection and furtherance of extra-national economic trade draws the military, and thus the state, into increasing levels of international involvement and conflict. Repetitive economic and martial success further reinforces the process.³¹ Figure 4 represents the use of military

to exert power over peripheral states in extra-national campaign to secure and expand national economic and political interests, with the accompanying influx of political and economic capital to the metropolitan society (Appendix A, page 97).

Schumpeter further states that a standing national army is not, in and of itself, a definitive war machine. The criterion for a military establishment to be a war machine is that it becomes an active political power. In transformation from Informal to Formal Empire, the military establishment consolidates power and eliminates domestic conflict created by the transformative pressures of imperial practice. Figures 5 and 6 represent this process (Appendix A, page 98).

In a war machine proper, the military caste exerts political influence over the diplomatic class. Doyle uses the Egyptians as an example of the growth of military power and its effect on the transformation of a society into an empire. Although not a Republic, the Egyptian experience exhibits similar operative factors to other transformations. In response to the Asiatic Hyksos invasion and rule, over a 150-year period, the Egyptians developed a military capable of expelling the threat. The resulting changes necessary to support a large army “militarized” the society.³² A professional military caste developed into a military aristocracy that practiced external conquest in order to maintain its social and professional position. The corresponding influx of wealth served as motivation to continue expansionist policies. The economic and military forces further reinforced the political transformation to a more efficient imperial bureaucracy (for imperial purposes) and the consolidation and centralization of domestic power by imperial forces.³³

The Athenian transformation from Democracy to Informal Empire is illustrative of the impact of the unintended consequences of a self-serving “war machine” which creates a military revolution in the parent society. Athens’ experience in defense of its society against the Persians unleashed forces that would alter its intellectual approach and practical application of the use of military force. Athens’ transformation brought it into conflict with its neighbors that would ultimately lead to its destruction.

¹ United States Constitution. The need to modify the U.S. Constitution to extend citizenship rights is evident by the following amendments: XV (right to vote extended to those previously denied based on race, color, or previous servitude), XIX (right to vote extended to women), XXIV (right to vote not abridged by failure to pay taxes), and XXVI (age restriction set at eighteen years of age).

² Bettany Hughes, *Athens: The Dawn of Democracy*, PBS Video, Washington D.C., 2007.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John Rich and Graham Shipley, eds. *War and Society in the Greek World*. (New York: Routledge, 1993), 186.

⁶ Bettany Hughes.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Clarke, M.L. *The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius*. (New York: W.W. Morton & Company, 1968). 60.

¹⁰ Rich, John and Graham Shipley, eds. *War and Society in the Roman World*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 96.

¹¹ Mason Hammond, “Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol 58. (1948), 105.

¹² Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 12.

- ¹³ Ibid, 21.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, 24.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, 26.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 28.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. (1996. New York: Touchstone, 1998), 350-357.
- ²⁰ Ibid, 30.
- ²¹ Harris, William V., *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 B.C.* (1979. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2000), 105. This can be thought of as similar to the military concept of area of operations and area of influence when assigning battle-space.
- ²² Doyle, 59.
- ²³ Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third*. (1976. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 195. Here Luttwak cites Robert E. Osgood, in Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), p.3
- ²⁴ Bettany Hughes.
- ²⁵ Rich and Shipley, *Greek World*, 7-8.
- ²⁶ Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret, eds. *Carl Von Clausewitz: On War*. (1976. Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1984), 87.
- ²⁷ Adcock, F.E. *The Roman Art of War Under the Republic*. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1995), 93. The late Republican Dictators and Principate Emperors were cognizant of the need to preserve the facade of a Republican society; the population must be convinced that they are not subjects but still citizens. One such manner is the injunction against the posting of legions in the Italian peninsula made the population feel safe from military overthrow. After the reign of the Second Triumvirate, Octavian briefly restored the Roman Republic while maintaining power until he formally assumed the title of Emperor.

²⁸ Doyle, 157. Doyle here quotes Joseph Schumpeter, in “The Sociology of Imperialism,” *Imperialism and Social Classes*(Cleveland, 1955), first published in *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial politik*. Vol 46 (1919), 25.

²⁹ Hansen, *Ancient Greeks*, 23-27. The tenets of western warfare remain as valid today as they did in 700 BCE. Of note for a republic is the moral opposition to militarism that stands in direct contrast to the requirements of exercising imperial responsibilities.

³⁰ Ibid, 27. Western societies struggle with these conflicting issues to this day, especially as the conduct of war has grown exponentially more lethal.

³¹ Doyle, 157.

³² This is the key question as to whether a democracy can maintain its character while transforming to an imperial power. What happens if the state cannot demobilize? Can a society reverse the path from empire back to Republic? If so, how does it extricate itself from international entanglements?

³³ Doyle, 157.

CHAPTER 3

THE GREEK EXPERIENCE: THE ATHENIAN TRANSFORMATION

Timeline¹

- 750-650 B.C.E Rise of the Greek City-State; appearance of hoplite warfare
- 507 Revolt and creation of Democracy in Athens
- 499-494 Revolts of Ionian Greeks against Persians
- 490 First Persian War, Battle of Marathon
- 480-479 Second Persia War (Persian fleet defeat by combined Greek fleet led by Athenians at the Straits of Salamis; Athens destroyed).
- 479 Battles of Plataea and Mycale (Hellenic league fractures in to the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, and Delian League, led by Athens)
- 479 - 431 Athenian naval domination and consolidation of power (Pentecontaetia)
- 460 – 445 First Peloponnesian War
- 466 Battle of Eurymedon (Ionian Greeks liberated)
- 454 Transfer of the Delian League treasury to Athens
- 449 (450) Peace of Callias (for the Delian League, formally marking the end of the Second Persian War)
- 445 Thirty-Year Peace signed with Sparta (Athenian Empire fully in place)
- 431 Start of Second Peloponnesian War (only 14 years after Thirty Years Peace signed)
- 430 Athenian Plague
- 415-413 Athenian Expedition to Sicily
- 404 End of the Peloponnesian War and defeat of Athens.

Overview

The approximate fifty-year period from the close of the Second Greco-Persian War (479) through the start of the Peloponnesian War (431) is known as the Pentecontaetia. It is during this period that a limited participatory democracy in Athens

recovered from the destruction of its city at the hands of the Persians under Xerxes and arose as the preeminent economic, political, and military power in the Aegean. The transformation of the Athenian military in response to the Persian invasion left the Athenians with the tool that they used to exert indirect and direct influence over the political affairs of their nominal allies. It was through their use of naval power that the Athenians changed from a lead party in a mutual defense pact against the Persians to an Informal Empire. Figure 7, the Ancient Greek World, represents the range over which the Athenians conducted naval campaign (Appendix A, page 99).

The change in the organization of and, more importantly, the intellectual conception about the use of the military instrument of power fundamentally altered the social and political character of the Athenian state. The *polis* changed from one that served the limited needs of the middle class to one that served the imperial and economic interests of the entire state. The nexus of military and political power changed from the agrarian hoplite to landless sailors and professionalized specialty soldiers. The use of naval power in the implementation of imperial foreign policy was prohibitively expensive for middling farmers. Only a central state could afford to wage war as it developed under Athenian imperial expansion and subsequent Peloponnesian War. The social change effectively manifested itself as a change from timocracy to demagoguery as the nexus of political power changed from the middle class citizen-soldier to the radically democratic poor.

Greek Concept of War

For the Greeks of Athens in the fifth century B.C., war was a traditionally accepted and usual state of political affairs. It was one of the normal dangers of life.

Plato described this condition in *The Laws*:

The legislator's position would be that what most men call 'peace' is really only a fiction, and that in cold fact all states are by nature fighting an undeclared war against every other state.²

Indeed, for the Greeks, *Polemos* (pl. *polemoi*) was a term used to describe violent inter-communal conflict. War was merely "fighting" writ large. More properly understood the Greek concept of internecine fighting was war as opposed to War.

The Homeric epics, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, present a window into Greek thought about war. The Greeks glorified the virtues of war that the poems of Homer exemplified. These myths predated the fifth century by 200-300 years. The Greeks wove these myths into the fabric of their everyday lives. Youth would have learned them from childhood. Although representative of individual heroic combat, their characters were exemplars of virtue that served to motivate citizen hoplites. The lessons of these myths were in part that violence as a normal and ever-present part of the human condition. While the use of military force could be destructive and cruel, it also brought to the fore the virtues of endurance, courage and, self-sacrifice. Simone Weil in *L'Iliade ou le Poeme de la Force* posits that the central strategic theme of the *Iliad* is man's use of force:

The true hero, the true subject, the center of the *Iliad*, is force. Force as a man's instrument, force as man's master, force before which human flesh shrinks back. The human soul, in this poem, is shown always in its relation to force: swept away, blinded by the force it thinks it can direct, bent under the pressure of the

force to which it is subjected... those who can see that force, today as in the past, is at the center of all human history, find the *Iliad* its most beautiful, its purest mirror.³

For the Athenians, the use of military force was just and the manifest right of a stronger power over a weaker one. Hoplite warfare was a limited and largely ritualistic practice that evolved in a particular geographic and political context of the rural Greek mainland. However, the martial forces unleashed by hoplite battle found other broader applications.

Even though warfare played a crucial role in shaping and changing the social and political structures of the ancient world, the Peloponnesian war was particularly egregious in its excesses and its transformative impact on Greek society. The near constant warfare altered the political and philosophical thought of the Athenian *polis*. The growth of Athenian power during the Pentecontaetia and the impact on Athens of the Peloponnesian war would have profound impacts on the “collective consciousness” of Greek thought.⁴ Gilbert Murray, in “Reactions to the Peloponnesian War in Greek Thought and Practice,” *The Journal of Hellenistic Studies*, illustrates this process in the following:

A long war or a repetition of wars has two contradictory effects. On the conscious and rational plane the horrors of the war produce a determination to prevent –or at least avoid-any recurrence of such evils: on the unconscious and irrational plane the horrors become customary incidents of life, ‘all pity choked with custom of fell deeds.’ Fears and practices that go with them cease to shock us, and we accept war as a natural phenomenon to be expected, a duty to be faced, and therefore an art to be sedulously cultivated. And with men in the mass, no doubt, the unconscious effect is far stronger than the conscious.⁵

The two major military factors that contributed to the Athenian military revolution and growth of informal empire were the shift to primarily naval-based defense in response to the Persian threat during the Second Greco-Persian War and the two-pronged Periclean

strategic policy during the Peloponnesian War of ceding Attica and conducting a war of attrition against Sparta and its allies.

Although Thucydides was an Athenian and recounts the tale of the Peloponnesian War from the perspective of the Delian League, his view is partially biased. Written from the Spartan perspective it may well have been the Delian War. Even though Thucydides purports that the main cause of the war to be Athenian excess and lust for power, one can also interpret the conflict as a clash of ideals between the old order and the new order, represented by Sparta and Athens. The Athenian conception of democratic popular rule (however limited) threatened the established oligarchic and aristocratic political structure that had existed in Greece for hundreds of years prior to the democratic revolution. The spread of at least nominal if not forced democracy in the Delian League threatened the very Spartan, and by extension traditional oligarchic Greek, way of life. One can interpret the First and Second Peloponnesian Wars as pre-emptive defensive wars conducted by the Spartans against the expansionist and revolutionary policies of the Athenians. It involved coalition warfare and played out local rivalries in the context of the greater struggle. However, at its root, the Peloponnesian war was a clash of fundamentally incompatible ideals about the way that men were to be governed. Although occurring at various times as cold war, civil war and series of proxy wars between Sparta and Athens, it was fundamentally a clash of culture.⁶ Its two opposing views about the manner of government were a direct result of the military structure of their respective societies. For the Spartans, it was the traditional oligarchic hoplite infantry formation (albeit in its most proficient and professional expression). For the

Athenians, it was a fully professionalized military consisting of naval and land components.

The conditions in which the Greeks found themselves in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. and the philosophical and political changes that ensued would have a lasting effect on the world. The strategic decision to build a large fleet in order to defend against second Persian invasion of the Greek mainland and the requirements of maintaining that fleet, created the conditions that necessitated changes to the fabric of Athenian and larger Greek society.

“The Athenian Golden Age” is the period following the second Persian Invasion through the defeat of the Athenians by the Spartans, roughly from 480 BC to 404 BC. During this time period, philosophy, natural science, and democratic government were developed. These were the precursors to the modern critical analysis, scientific methodology, and representative government. The development of the core tenets of Western culture and the western rational tradition happened over a period of barely over 50 years. As a measure of the brief incubating period of the Greek renaissance, the Athenian Empire lasted just over 73 years. In the contingent nature of the history of ideas, the Western rational tradition could just as easily not have happened. The military both enabled and prevented this flourishing of ideas. Defeat of the Persians and subsequent militarily enabled economic expansion allowed the surplus production capacity that permitted the “leisure” activities of critical reflection, proto-science, and the arts. However, it was also political and military overextension embodied in the Peloponnesian War that nearly destroyed these same advances.

Historical Narrative

As representative of the tenuous nature of this remarkable development, Themistocles stands as the single most influential historical figure in the history of the West. The nascent western rational tradition barely escaped destruction by the contemporary superpower of the monarchical Persian Empire. The Greeks could have just as easily become a minor satrapy in the western empire, forever extinguishing the ideas of western rational and political tradition. Notwithstanding the heroic efforts conducted by 10,000 Athenians and Plataeans at Marathon and Athens during the first Persian Invasion, the Hellenic league wisely decided to defend itself with both naval and land power in response to the second Persian invasion. At Athens' behest, largely through Themistocles' efforts, the Hellenic League adopted a strategy that would be able to counter the Persian naval operational capability. Athens would lead the naval effort, while Sparta would lead the land component.

After the defeat of the Persians at Marathon in the First Greco-Persian War, the Athenians embarked on a vigorous naval construction program. The Athenians rightly predicted that they would have to face the Persians again and decided the best manner in which to do so was to face them on both the land *and* sea. The Athenians needed to master naval warfare in order to defeat the Persians with the largest navy in the world. Producing over 200 triremes, the organization and nature of the military instrument of national power (for Athens) shifted from land-based heavy infantry to naval power. From an operational perspective, this greatly enhanced mobility. From a strategic sense, this gave the Athenians power projection capability. The social consequence and growth

of economic incentive for the previously non-military lower classes, the need to pay rowers, would change Athenian society and lead to empire.

In an effort to avenge the unsuccessful invasion of Darius I, Xerxes undertook a larger invasion of the Greek mainland in 480-479 B.C. Figure 8, Persian Invasion Routes depicts the predicted invasion routes (Appendix A, page 100). Through the combined effects of inclement weather and the combined Greek trireme fleet at Salamis, Xerxes failed in its efforts to defeat the Greek fleet. The decision to defend at Salamis was not popular with the allies and it was only the threat of Athens pulling out entirely that held the coalition together. In fact, Athens provided over half of the fleet. Were it not for Themistocles' "wooden wall," democracy would have faltered and died. In 480 B.C., the Athenian led fleet defeated the Persian naval forces at the Straits of Salamis, effectively cutting off the main Persian invasion force from its sea lines of communication.

Targeting the logistical center of gravity proved decisive in the Greek expulsion of the Persians from the Aegean. The difficulty the Persians found maintaining extended overland lines of communication and the loss of operational mobility contributed to Greek victory. Xerxes, recognizing this fact immediately, retreated to Persia and left his General Mardonius with a reduced force to face the Hellenic League.⁷

Figure 9, depicts the critical Battle of Salamis (Appendix A, page 101).

The following year in 479 B.C. at Plataea, the Greek land forces, led by the Spartan General Pausanias, decisively defeated the Persians in the last major defensive land battle of the Persian invasion. Simultaneously, the naval battle at Mycale ensured the neutralization of near future Persian influence in the Aegean. Following the

expulsion of the Persians from the Greek mainland, the Hellenic League looked to Athens to assume leadership of the Greek military force in order to consolidate gains and exact revenge upon the Persians. The league looked to replace the Spartans for two reasons: Pausanias' oligarchic political position and the lack of Spartan interest in continuing the war outside the Greece.

The Hellenic league fractured into the Peloponnesian League, led by the Spartans, and the Delian League, led by the Athenians. Ironically, the cities that chose to ally with democratic Athens found themselves under a greater imperial tyranny than they would have under a hegemonic Sparta.⁸ Athens viewed herself as the defender of the Greeks against future Persian invasion. The fleet served as insurance against what they believed would almost certainly be future conflict with Persia. They had suffered significant loss in the burning of their city and had borne the cost of a large percentage of the combined fleet. They desired compensation and felt it their right to utilize the Delian League treasury to do so.

After the immediate crisis of the Persians had passed, the consequences would be drastic change. Greek warfare expanded from the almost exclusive use of hoplite infantry to include previously "undignified" weaponry and tactics including torsion catapults, mercenary skirmishers, skilled archers, slingers, stone-throwers.⁹ Greek warfare was now no longer limited by the convention of a campaign season. The change to year round campaign, manpower requirements, and new technologies of war required funding would shift the balance of power in Athens.

Most significant to this social change was the development of a permanent navy.

One hundred and seventy paid oarsmen acting in unison were required to operate a Greek trireme. It was simply not practical to enlist slaves to row. The political consequences of which meant that the military power and defense of the state literally rested on the backs of the poorest segment of society. Military power resided in the fleet and political power followed. The relative advantages of professional democratic oarsmen over conscript navies may not be immediately apparent. However, paid sailors are vested in the benefits of the outcome to a greater degree than are slaves. Their motivation to fight is more than for mere survival, for they share in the spoils of victory. Professional sailors that routinely patrolled were proficient in their craft (literally and figuratively). The changes to Greek society resulting from a reliance on a fleet of professional sailors were monumental.¹⁰ This strategic military decision led to the, perhaps, the unintended consequence of significant cultural power shift. Heretofore, Athenian (and, by extension, larger Greek) social status was intimately tied to military service. Landed citizens served in the phalanx and exercised civic duty in the *polis*. The shift from reliance on hoplite infantry to a fleet brought significant social change.

The divergent interests of landed citizens and of poor oarsmen were expressed as a reliance on the status quo of agrarian yeoman on the one hand and a growth of centralized state power on the other. Prior to Salamis, naval service was deemed as inferior as is demonstrated in the following by Victor Davis Hansen in *The Wars of the Ancient Greeks and Their Invention of Western Military Culture*: “If infantry service earned repute, rowing was confirmation of poverty, ignorance, and an inferior pedigree.”¹¹ After Salamis, the demonstrated power of the fleet led to a shift in domestic

economic and political power.

The apparatus required to maintain the fleet required the growth of a centralized state capable of sustaining the cost of dry docks and ship construction. In comparison to a seasonal hoplite infantry army, the cost of maintaining a militarily significant navy was staggering. It cost a little over 100 man-days of labor to pay for a complete set of armor and weapons and over 10,000 man-hours to construct and outfit a single trireme. 20,000 drachmas paid for a 10,000-man hoplite army. Approximately one million drachmas paid for a fleet of 100 triremes. The cost of a week's worth of a 10,000-man hoplite army on campaign was 70,000 drachmas. The cost of a fleet of 100 triremes on patrol for a month was twenty times as much (1,400,000 drachmas).¹²

This new manner of making war (for the Greeks) was costly in not only equipping and arms, but in the practice of conquest. The nine-month siege of Samos in 440 B.C. cost an estimated 1,200 to 1,800 talents or the equivalent of over 8 million man-days of labor. This was more than the total twenty-year cost for the construction of the Parthenon.¹³ While the Athenian silver mines at Laurion funded the initial construction of the fleet, the militarily enabled expansionist trade policy funded the continued existence of the same state and its enterprises. The military revolution created by the rise of imperial democracy changed the entire practice and vastly increased the cost of Hellenic warfare.¹⁴

The resources required led to the shift in power dynamics away from the landed agrarian farmer to the landless poor who supported a strong central government. A middling hoplite soldier paid for his own arms and maintained them at his residence. The

fleet was a public endeavor. Hansen describes the social change:

Thus the need to fight the Persians at sea upset not merely the rules of Greek warfare, but also the social and economic equilibrium of the city-state itself. The elevation of the navy – and its crews - to a coequal status ensured the increasing radicalization of Athenian democracy for the next half century.¹⁵

The conditions were now set for the military revolution in Athenian society that not only transformed it from democracy to empire, but also ripped the social fabric of Athens and the larger Greek world. The ensuing conflict between Athens, Sparta, and Thebes would weaken them individually so that they could not answer collectively the threat from conquest by Macedonian forces under Phillip II. The death knell of Athenian and Theban military resistance to Hellenistic expansion was the Battle of Chaeroneia in 338 B.C.

The military machine, supported by the passion of the populace, led to the growth of the state to serve the needs of the fleet. It was the convergent interests of the newly empowered social class and the near biological need of the fleet as a meta-entity for survival that led to the transformation of the society. A feedback loop was established, wherein the state supported the fleet, and the fleet, in turn, supported the state.¹⁶

The fleet reinforced the growth of the state through the enabling of economic growth. The economic interest of the population of Athens was a Clausewitzian passion that reinforced the impetus to grow the power of the fleet. Owing to the influx of cheap slave labor enabled by imperial expansion, the non-citizen free class of Athens grew in power. They were now free to focus on small-scale manufacture and exchange.¹⁷ This reinforced imperial commercial expansion. As mercantile processes became more pervasive and efficient, Athenians established or found additional extra-national markets in order to support the economic viability of domestic market goods.

Imperial conquest generated material benefits. Naval superiority allowed slave agriculture, imperial tribute, and imperial mines, which led to monetary supremacy. Commercial supremacy, in turn, allowed maintenance of a fleet and naval superiority. Naval superiority, then, allowed a sustained empire. The initial expediency of needing to counter the operational advantage of the Persian fleet led to unintended strategic potential that significantly altered the organization of the Athenian government and the very social fabric of Athens. Henceforth, the Athenians saw maritime power and the employment of poor on triremes as essential to the survival of popular democratic governments. Non-aristocrats wrested power from the agrarian landed class through election to power based on ensuring political access of the democratic rabble.¹⁸

Creation of Informal Empire

During the fifty-year period from 479 to 431 immediately following the practical¹⁹ end of the Second Greco-Persian War, known as the Pentecontaetia, Athens used its military instrument of national power principally in the form of its navy to consolidate economic and political power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The criteria for use of military power changed from that of defense of the state to that of defense of the interests of the state. Athenian informal empire evolved from alliance to empire in three stages.²⁰ Firstly, Athens enslaved and repopulated cities that the Delian League captured. Secondly, Athens forcibly compelled league members into compliance when they chafed at Athenian influence. Thirdly, Athenian emissaries (*hellenotamiai*) ostensibly emplaced to supervise payments of tribute to the league treasury, exercised political influence upon subordinate states. Athens thusly established imperial control through informal means.

Member states were nominally and legally independent, but were, in fact, dependent states of Athens. Athens determined external and internal politics. As examples to other states, reluctant allies paid with forfeiture of land and tribute.

Athens maintained this newly established informal empire through two instruments of national power, military and political. Direct use of military power was the overt power base that maintained an empire. Political complicity of peripheral states was the more subtle use of diplomatic and economic influence to maintain empire.

Athens readily undertook military intervention when dependant states challenged Athenian power or desired to secede. Enabled by the operational reach of her navy, Athens militarily overmatched her nominal allies and subordinate states. This was, ironically for the subordinate states of the Delian League, partially underwritten by tribute and direct contribution of ships by the members of the league. The “allies” (Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra) contributed ships and men, and the subordinates paid tribute, which was used to construct Athenian ships manned by Athenians. The Delian League members both funded and were dependent on the very fleet that threatened them for protection from the Persians.²¹ The common good became the Athenian good.²²

The Athenians were not hesitant to conduct successive punitive expeditions to subdue rebellious dependencies including: Thasos in 463 B.C, to Samos in 440 B.C, to Mytilene in 428 B.C., Corcyra in 427 B.C., Melos in 427-426 and 416 B.C., and to Sicily in 427 and 416 B.C.²³ Military intervention resulted in the establishment of a pro-Athenian government, replacement of the native population with an Athenian colony, or the establishment of an Athenian military garrison. The role of the military in

suppressing revolt further cemented the role of the military in enabling imperial expansion. While one can interpret most of these rebellions as political posturing by weaker states in the context of the larger conflict between the Athenians and the Spartans, the most striking example of military intervention by Athens is the second expedition to Melos in 416 B.C.

Melos desired to remain neutral in the Peloponnesian War. However, the Athenians desired that the Melians ally themselves with the Delian League. The tension is demonstrated the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' *History*. As related by Thucydides, after having conducted an expedition to Melos only ten years before the relevant expedition (427-426 B.C.), the Athenians were not in a conciliatory mood toward the Melians. The Melian Dialogue presents the Athenian position that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."²⁴ Herein, one finds a crux of Athenian hubris. It is the tension between the rational and the powerful. Power exercised for an objectively derived reason and the objectless avaricious desires enabled by a military capable of conquest. Despite the rational pleas of the Melians, the Athenians massacred the entire adult male population and sold the women and children into slavery, replacing the population with Athenian colonists.

Apart from preventing their destruction at the hands of the Persians, political complicity with Athens on the part of subordinate allies was seen as the "lesser evils," between Athens on the one hand and Persian or oligarchic domination on the other.²⁵ Membership in the Delian League also conferred material and political benefits to the subject state. Athens effectively controlled trade and shipping in the Mediterranean (and

in the Aegean in particular). Submission to Athens ensured access to international trade, goods, and protection from piracy.

The military instrument enabled the economic instrument of national power. Athens controlled Greek shipping and access to the Delian League markets through her naval power. Military protection and control of trade routes, market access, and tribute enforcement directly reinforced economic expansion. However, this commercial expansion required imperial expansion.²⁶ Protection of commerce from piracy and rival states required a patrolling fleet, which required naval outposts. Access to patrolling bases and the conduct of punitive expeditions was accomplished by the land forces (army), enabled by the navy. The breaking into trade monopolies required the efforts of a naval and land force.

In 449 B.C., Artaxerxes I, ruler of Persia (465-425), sued the Delian League for peace. The “Peace of Callias” marked the formal end of the Second Greco-Persian War. It should have also marked the end of the requirement for a mutual defense pact against the threat of Persia. However, the Delian League members found themselves inextricably bound to Athens as she faced the threat of Sparta. The method of fighting that Athens adopted required the influx and maintenance of economic growth that only an empire could provide.

The nature of the relationship between Athens and the allies of the Delian League fundamentally changed when contributions to the treasury for common defense became compulsory and secession from the league impossible. Athens’ allies were nominally independent, but were, in fact, caught in an informal empire. Mason Hammond, in

“Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, demonstrates the degree to which the nominal allies were, in fact, ensnared in the Athenian Empire:

When Athens, by her courage during the Persian Wars, won the preeminence from Sparta after 479 B.C., she too attempted at first only a hegemony (sic) of communities, particularly of those in the Aegean area, who had formed a common league with its headquarters at the island shrine of Delos. But the Athenian populace began to throw off the restraints of the old-fashioned conservative control which had previously been exercised by the well-to-do landed families. They soon realized what the empire might mean to them in jobs and revenue and their appetites were whetted by the new demagogic leaders, Ephialtes and Pericles. In 454 B.C. the treasury of the League was shifted from Delos to Athens. Thereafter the Athenians treated the allied states as subjects, subjects to be sure of the same language and race, but subjects who enjoyed under Athenian domination their local political and cultural life.²⁷

Thus in 454 B.C., with the move of the Delian League’s treasury from Delos to Athens, the nature of the Delian League formally changed to acknowledge a *de facto* condition. Athens had become an imperial metropole exercising largely informal imperial influence over the member states of the Delian League.

The accretion of imperial wealth and power and the attempts to hold onto them, led Athens toward external conquest and internal strife. By 430 B.C., Athenians had experienced a plague and taken losses in Attica from a Spartan invasion. Popular support waned as the people blamed Pericles for their sufferings. Pericles appealed to the people to support the empire out of self-interest. "It was too late for them to abandon the empire, for the rule which they held was like a tyranny... which, unjust though it may have been to assume, was certainly dangerous to let go. Only a subject state, not an imperial one, could afford the luxury of submission."²⁸ The attempts to placate the masses through increasingly expensive extra-national campaigning led to overextension and inability to

resist the Spartans. Athens surrendered to Lysander, in 404 B.C.. Lysander forced Athens to tear down its defensive walls and replaced the democratic assembly with an oligarchy, the “Thirty Tyrants.”

Consequences of Transformation to Informal Empire

The cultural conflict between a traditional agrarian based oligarchic timocracy, represented by the Spartan led Peloponnesian League on the one hand, and revolutionary and expansionist imperial democracy, represented by the Athenian Empire on the other, would manifest itself in military conflict of heretofore-unseen levels of state sanctioned violence during the 27-year Peloponnesian War. Figure 10, The Peloponnesian War, represents the three major phases of the conflict (Appendix A, page 102). Largely ritualistic hoplite battle that was formulated approximately three-hundred years prior bound the violence was unleashed as the passions of the populations were increasingly influenced by the contemporary environmental conditions, massive increase in scale of economic funding, and unchecked use of military force to achieve political ends. The Greeks had already seen the rise of this “new” way of war in the Second Greco-Persian War. In pure scale and manner of execution, the pivotal battles of Salamis and Plataea were previously unseen in the Aegean. The largest hoplite army in history assembled at Plataea (479) and included as many as 60,000 hoplites and up to 60,000 lightly armed auxiliaries and cavalry.²⁹

The historical precedent, intellectual framework, and material conditions within which the Athenians transformed were set at the close of the Second Greco-Persian War. Hansen demonstrates the ambition with which the Athenians approached their

transformation in the following:

The Persian challenge brought that truth home, demonstrating that, in the century to come, more than hoplites were needed to realize the new Greek political and economic ambitions in the Aegean and Mediterranean.³⁰

Thereafter, the Athenians and Spartans saw little need to limit warfare to previously largely ritualized phalangite battle.³¹ The lessons of Salamis suggested to the Athenians that reliance on hoplite battle was strategically unnecessary. This conclusion would later inform Periclean strategy with respect to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War.

Pericles' funeral oration, as related by Thucydides in *The Peloponnesian War*, describes the Athenian's readiness to adopt a naval strategy in the face of the Spartan military machine. Pericles asserts that naval warfare requires a professionalized force. Owing to the professional nature of seamanship, Pericles argues that the Peloponnesian yeoman farmer could not sufficiently master naval warfare to challenge the Athenian fleet:

It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything else, is a matter requiring skill, and will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.³²

Pericles' speech is indicative of just how different Athens had become from Sparta and its own traditional culture of its founding.

During the "First Peloponnesian War" (461-446), Athenian strategy was to confine Sparta to the Peloponnese using both naval and land military power. During the "Second Peloponnesian War" (431-404), Athens faced a two front war: the Spartans in the South from the Peloponnese and the Boeotians in the North. Realizing that they stood

little chance of defeating the other two major powers in Greece on land, Pericles formulated a strategy that limited the power of its enemies and leveraged its own strengths.³³ Athenian strategy was to cede Attica by pulling back to its walled fortifications encompassing Athens and its port city, Piraeus. The other part of this two-pronged strategy was to defend against invasion and harass the Peloponnesians from the sea. This strategic vision required fortifications that defended the city and allowed uninterrupted access to the sea. Figure 11 illustrates the fortifications, or “Long Walls” that defended Athens and Piraeus (Appendix A, page 103).

The initial weaknesses of Spartan naval and engineering capabilities allowed Athens to wage a partially successful defensive campaign against the Peloponnesians. The Spartans lacked the logistical and technical skill sets to conduct effective siege craft against a prepared and integrated Athenian defense.³⁴ The Athenians could hold out within their walls and import the grain and other essential supplies they needed. Hansen states that during the first phase of the war, or the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.), “(T)he Peloponnesians enter(ed) Attica five times in the decade, hoping either to draw Athenian hoplites out to battle or to ruin the agriculture of Attica.”³⁵ In addition to the inability of the Spartans to force the Athenians in to a decisive battle, the Athenians additionally used their secure harbor to wage naval and naval enabled campaign against the Peloponnesian rear areas and isolated allies.

This military strategy was a major shift in the method of Greek warfare that stood in contrast to the tenets of hoplite battle and had unintended consequences for the Athenian social structure. Hansen discusses the change in approach to the problem of

military application of power below:

This strategic dilemma - itself a rejection of the 300-year tradition of hoplite battle as the sole mode of war – quickly led all belligerents to innovation and adaption and in the process unleashed as never before the Greek genius for technology and tactics.³⁶

Owing to strategic necessity, Athenians formulated a deliberate war of passive defense at home and attrition abroad. This violated the fundamental tenet of decisive battle. The voluntary ceding of land to foreign invaders was a significant cultural shift. For a society of citizens that viewed themselves and their social status through their land, this was monumental. However, Athens formed the strategic vision as a response to ameliorate a specific threat condition and intended it as a temporary measure only. Over the span of an extended military conflict, it became the norm.

Concentrating the population of Athens had two consequences: the creation of conditions that led to the rapid spread of communicable disease and the increased reliance on the state and concomitant increase in political power of those that supported the growth of central power over the agrarian citizen power base. Pericles died in the plague of 430 to 428 B.C.. He formulated the strategic defense of Athens. With Pericles' loss, the moderating force that guided the strategic policy was gone. The personal influence of Pericles, which checked the influence of the demagogues, was gone. Pericles had warned against "schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of war," foreshadowing the Sicilian campaign.³⁷ Once the tools of war became delinked from the deliberate defensive strategic plan that guided them, they were then used principally for expansionist and self-aggrandizement of the Athenian state. The passions of the people, represented by the demagogues could be fickle and self-serving. After Pericles died,

there was no check and balance on the “fever” of expansion.

In response to the stalemate of the Archidamian War (431-421), the Peloponnesian War saw the introduction of heretofore-unseen costs, methodology of employment of military force, and unleashed violence. The war precipitated a major shift in the method of fighting in the Greek peninsula. Hansen describes this in the following: “...(D)uring the entire course of the Peloponnesian War there was not more than three or four hoplite battles of the old style.”³⁸ Unable to force a decisive engagement in the traditional sense by either side, the Peloponnesian Wars devolved into a series of proxy wars between the member states of opposing Leagues. Hansen posits that perhaps misguided by the dual elements of denial and self-aggrandizement, Athens sought a solution to the strategic impasse by attacking Sicily.

Ostensibly, Sicily seemed a logical prize; its large navy challenged Athenian naval supremacy, and its mercenaries and transport ships had on occasion lent aid to the Peloponnesians. Moreover, to the Athenian Assembly, the conquest of Syracuse, Sicily’s largest city, promised rich booty and additional imperial revenues.³⁹

For the Athenians, the loss proved prohibitive. The loss of 40,000 hoplites and the cost of the abortive campaign, led to the fracture and disintegration of Athenian democracy and empire.

In *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, Robert Strassler posits that, for Thucydides, the decline of the Athenian Empire and way of life was intricately linked to the excesses of the Sicilian campaign:

The expedition to Sicily was not so much a mistake in judgment, considering the enemy they went against, as much as a case of mismanagement on the part of the planners, who did not afterwards take the necessary measures to support those

first troops they sent out. Instead, they turned to personal rivalries over the leadership of the people, and consequently not only conducted the war in the field half-heartedly, but also brought civil discord for the first time to the home front... And yet they did not fail until they at last turned on each other and fell into private quarrels that brought their ruin.⁴⁰

A poorly conceived and ill-fated foreign campaign proved to be the seminal event that led to the defeat of the Athenian Empire. The Peloponnesian War produced domestic suffering, which led to unrest, and then to political violence. The response to this violence was a political leadership that sacrificed the state for its own ends.⁴¹ The cost to the Athenian Informal Democratic Empire state was its eventual destruction in 404 B.C. after the loss of its fleet and emplacement of a tyrannical oligarchy by the Spartan General, Lysander.⁴² Although it would overthrow the oligarchy and reinstate democratic government, Athens never recovered its former power.

Reflections in Political and Philosophical Thought

The degree to which the society had changed because of the military transformation can be discerned in the surviving philosophical and political writings of the time. In stark contrast to the “golden” Periclean age of the democratic *polis*, Athenian defeat led to the installation of a tyrannical government by Sparta. In an attempt to make sense of the contemporary environment and provide the “best” manner of living, Plato and Aristotle both argued for forms of aristocratic rule and the limitation of imperialistic influence beyond the narrow confines of what the city-state could effectively manage. Hansen summarizes the contemporary philosophical argument in the following:

All philosophers deplored the naval triumphs of the Persian wars and were frightened by the bellicosity of the rabble of the Athenian Assembly. Plato went so far as to say that the stunning victory at Salamis that saved western civilization

made the Greeks ‘worse’ as a people, while Aristotle linked the sea-battles of the Persian wars with a sense of demagoguery itself. In their eyes, it was almost better to lose heroically on the hoplite battlefield than to win at sea with the help of an impoverished and poorly educated crowd, who would demand ever more entitlement and overseas booty to pay for it.⁴³

For Plato, the answer to the excesses of democracy and tyranny came in the form of the *Republic*, wherein philosopher kings rationally lead utopian *poleis*. Plato sees this as harnessing the best attributes of Spartan martial tradition controlled by the intellectual class that grew out of the Periclean Greece.⁴⁴

Aristotle’s answer came in the *Politics* in the form of Oligarchy, wherein a few rule the many. Both are, by no means, an endorsement of the democratic system. They are attacks on the excesses and failings of democratic government. Of note, neither of them proposed that war is not a natural condition, only that the Athenian democracy had not handled it well and offered their perceptions better forms of government in its place. The backlash against the excesses and failings of Athenian democracy was dangerous for the survival of the political form as any external threat. Mason Hammond, in “Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, further reinforces the backlash against the political-military excesses of the Peloponnesian War in the following:

And, in fact, Athens was ruined and her ruin left a lasting conviction among Greek and Roman political thinkers that popular democratic rule was as dangerous, if not more so, as the much hated tyranny.⁴⁵

The writings of the Greeks informed future political theorists. The Romans, who came later, heeded the warnings of the excesses of democracy. Although their form of Republicanism would manifest itself differently than it did for the Greeks, they would be subject to the same opportunities and transformative forces that their particular

application of military power enabled.

Impact of a Professionalized Military

Although it was short lived, the Athenian Empire demonstrates the role of a professionalized military in the creation and maintenance of an informal empire. It also demonstrates the significant social and political consequences of the structure and use of military power. An experience that forever changed the social character of Greek society, the military power that was unleashed as a direct result of the Persian invasion led to the destruction of a traditional agrarian way of life and left the Greeks susceptible to invasion and rule by the Macedonians. In the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, both Athens and Sparta would become second-rate powers susceptible to the eventual invasion and rule by the Macedonians.

The Athenian grand strategy of the Peloponnesian war, as developed by Pericles, demonstrates the change in Greek conception of warfare. It was a radical shift from decisive and largely ritualized hoplite warfare that had dominated the Greek martial tradition since 700 B.C. It also required a disciplined approach to the use of military power. The lack of a stabilizing political influence after Pericles' death allowed the desire for emotional self-aggrandizement and economic gain of the democratic population to overextend itself. Unmediated by rational control, warfare ceased to serve the best interests of the populace and instead took on a life of its own. This made the Athenians susceptible to strategic error as to what was properly in their national interest and led to its destruction as an imperial power.

¹ Hansen, *Ancient Greeks*, 10-11.

² Plato, *The Laws*. Translated by Trevor J. Saunders. (1970. London and New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 5. Found in paragraph 1.626a, another translation reads: For every state war is always incessant and lifelong against every other state.... For what most men call "peace," this is really only a name - in truth, all states by their very nature are always engaged in an informal war against all other states.

³ Homer. *The Iliad*. Translated by Robert Fagles. (1990. New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 29.

⁴ The two major influences of shift to naval power as the primary means of defense and the strategic vision of the Second Peloponnesian war would contribute to a military revolution, which saw a change from the experiment of limited agrarian democracy to the excesses of mass popular democracy. The forces unleashed by the change in Athenian society would lead to its own and its principal competitor's (Sparta) destruction. These changes in were seen in later philosophical works and by subsequent societies as potentially dangerous.

⁵ Gilbert Murray, "Reactions to the Peloponnesian War in Greek Thought and Practice," *The Journal of Hellenistic Studies*, 64. (1944): p. 4-5.

⁶ This is the author's supposition based on the Spartan support to traditional oligarchic social structures and the Athenian support to revolutionary democratic social structures. Sparta could not admit the increasingly "universal" nature of Athenian suffrage without fundamentally altering its tiered social structure wherein the *helot* slave class and free *perioikoi* provided the material and economic benefits that allowed the full citizen *Spartiates* to attain political and military supremacy. As opposed to the Athenian *polis*, wherein slaves constituted approximately 30% of the population, Spartan *helots* comprised roughly 90% of the population. This demonstrates a greater reliance on institutionalized slave labor at the foundation of the Spartan economy and a key difference in the two societies. Athenian foreign expansion supported the growth of a mercantile class that became less reliant traditional agrarian practice. Further, as Athenian democracy became further radicalized, demagogues exerted greater influence on domestic and foreign policy thereby extending effective if not actual political power to a more diffuse polity. Additionally, Spartan society was seen as excessive in the enslavement of other "Greeks" as opposed to barbarians.

⁷ Ironically, the operational analysis and attack of the decisive point would be portrayed as being performed by the Oracle at Delphi, rather than any insight on the part of the military leadership of the Athenians. The Athenian Themistocles convinced the Athenian democracy to spend its surplus capital on a naval fleet of triremes that would be the "wooden wall" prophesized by the Oracle.

⁸ The Spartan led Peloponnesian League was in fact a hegemonic relationship of Sparta over the other states of the league wherein Sparta exercised external, but not internal control over the political decisions of the league members (See Chapter 2). In theory, member states voted on league policy. In practice, the subordinate member states deferred to Sparta in joint decisions. However, as long as they remained traditionally oligarchic, Sparta did not interfere in the internal workings of the member states. Sparta would prove to be an ineffectual imperial power.

⁹ Parker, *Cambridge History*, 31.

¹⁰ Doyle, *Empires*, 67.

¹¹ Hansen, 100.

¹² Ibid, 101. The standard coin in the Aegean from 510 to 38 B.C. was the attic standard wherein one tetradrachmon (4 x drachma) equaled 4.3 ounces of silver. One days wage for a hoplite in the 5th and 4th centuries was one drachma. For comparison 6,000 drachma = 1 talent or about 57 lbs of silver. Although not minted, it was the equivalent weight standard for combinations of coinage and commodities paid in tribute to Athens by members of the Delian League. Accessed 3-12-08 at <http://www.fleur-decoin.com/currency/greekcoinshistory.asp>

¹³ Ibid, 108.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid, 101.

¹⁶ This is the author's supposition based on the mutually reinforcing economic benefits of naval protection of foreign trade.

¹⁷ Doyle, 67.

¹⁸ Hansen, 103.

¹⁹ The formal end of the Second Greco-Persian War is marked by the Peace of Callias in 449 B.C.

²⁰ Doyle, 79.

²¹ Whether, after Salamis and Plataea, the Persians remained a viable threat to the Aegean is a debatable point. It is the threat of invasion that is a more important motivating factor.

²² This is the author's supposition based on the Athenian cooption of the Delian treasury for domestic reconstruction efforts. The Athenians felt that, as they had

sacrificed their city in an to the common defense from the Persians, they had the right to the preponderance of the spoils as a reward for their efforts.

- ²³ Doyle, 79.
- ²⁴ Strassler, *Landmark Thucydides*, 352 (5.89.)
- ²⁵ Doyle, 57.
- ²⁶ Ibid, 68.
- ²⁷ Hammond, “Ancient Imperialism”, p.109.
- ²⁸ Ibid, 110.
- ²⁹ Hansen, 104.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid, 106.
- ³² Strassler, 82 (1.142.9).
- ³³ Ibid, 108.
- ³⁴ Hansen, 108.
- ³⁵ Ibid, 109.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Strassler, 83.
- ³⁸ Ibid, 116
- ³⁹ Ibid, 116-117.
- ⁴⁰ Strassler, 1.
- ⁴¹ Doyle, 73. Here Doyle paraphrases J. Finley.
- ⁴² Hansen, 118
- ⁴³ Ibid, 103.
- ⁴⁴ Plato. *The Republic*, Translated by G.M.A. Grube. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 132-133. (475c)

⁴⁵ Hammond, 111

CHAPTER 4

THE ROMAN EXPERIENCE: INFORMAL TO FORMAL EMPIRE

Timeline¹

- 509 B.C – Establishment of the Roman Republic
- 396 B.C. - Pay is introduced for Roman soldiers for the first time.
- 340-338 B.C. – Great Latin War: Rome conquers the seaport of Antium.
- 338 B.C. - Latin League dissolved²
- 264-241 B.C. - The First Punic War (with Carthage)
- 218-202 B.C. – The Second Punic War
- 216 B.C. - Battle of Cannae.
- 214-205 – First Macedonian War
- 211 B.C. – Hannibal’s march on Rome.
- 202 B.C. – Battle of Zama. End of the Second Punic War.
- 200-197 – Second Macedonian War
- 171-168 – Third Macedonian War
- 150 B.C. – Fourth Macedonian War
- 149-146 B.C. – Third Punic War
- 113-101 B.C. – Cimbrian War (Cimbri and Teutones)
- 112-105 B.C. – Jugurthine War (Numidia)
- 107 B.C. - G. Marius elected Consul
- 105 B.C. – Battle of Arausio (Cimbrian War)³
- 91 – 88 B.C. - Social War between Rome and its Italian allies.
- 83 B.C. – Sulla wages civil war against Marius.
- 81 B.C. - Sulla appointed dictator.
- 60-53 B.C. – First Triumvirate between Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey.
- 49 -45 B.C. - Civil War between Caesar and Pompey.
- 43 -33 B.C. –Second Triumvirate between Octavian, Antony and Lepidus.

- 32-30 B.C. – Civil War between Octavian and Antony
- 27 B.C. - Octavian named Augustus, establishes Principate.
- 23 B.C. - The Senate grants Augustus the titles and powers of *Imperium proconsulare maius* and *tribunicia potestas* for life, giving him complete control of the State and ending the Roman Republic

Overview

A pragmatic people, the Romans were heedful of the Greek experience. The stratified and limited citizen class of Roman society was mindful of the excesses of popular democratic rule. However, the short-term military demands resulting from an extraordinary threat to the Republican Empire in the form of the Cimbrian War would, as with the Greeks before them, diffuse and extend political influence to a large and previously disenfranchised segment of society. Like the Greeks before them, political power resided with those that held military power. By the period under investigation in this case study, the Romans had established the Republic as an Informal Empire⁴ and had been able to retain a limited ruling class in the form of the Senate.

Roman imperial practice reflected their conception of power. As opposed to the more direct conception of empire as practiced by the Athenians, the Roman approach to empire was more nuanced. The manner in which Rome approached her peripheral states ranged from formal provincial organization, to areas of political control, to areas of greater and then lesser influence in the form of client states and relationships of suzerainty. In light of the historical hindsight, Roman Republican imperial expansion can

be seen as having a directed purpose. However, a sense of directed purpose is illusory as Geoffrey Parker, in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, relates:

The outward expansion of Roman power is on the whole steadily persistent, and this gives to it an air of continued purpose. But if one looks more closely, one will see that in Roman policy there is often an element of improvisation on the one hand and on the other a readiness to halt and see if problems would solve themselves.⁵

If there was any grand strategic organization to the varied relationships, one must interpret it in the context of the role the periphery played in the defense of the empire. Peripheral states became areas in which to conduct surveillance, operate lines of communication, utilize for basing, or transit routes. It was the perception of military practicality that indirectly formulated the strategic vision with which the Romans approached imperial expansion and gradual transformation.

The requirements for a professional military enabled the transition to Formal Empire. The Roman state lasted for a longer duration than did the Athenian state, allowing for a greater degree of change over time. However, the Roman creation of a codified and fully professional soldiery, while it answered military threats to the state, resulted in the transformation of that society. The change was a direct result of the shift of the political loyalty of the military from the state to military leadership. It allowed a consolidation of power through direct application of military means. The consolidation of political power and sublimation of Roman identity from the Roman *polis* to the Roman State marked the creation of Formal Empire.

Roman Attitudes Toward War

Republican Romans did not consider the conduct of war as unusual. They conducted warfare for a specific purpose or campaign. Adcock expresses this sentiment

in the following:

Rome usually took to war easily: she did not in general regard it as a violent interruption of her normal life, an interruption that must be ended as soon as possible. This was not because to Rome war was a glorious adventure; it was a necessary evil, but the necessity was to Rome more apparent than evilness.⁶

The geographic positioning of Rome in the middle of the Italian peninsula all but ensured it would come into conflict with neighboring powers. Romans viewed warfare and expansion under the Republic and transition to empire not only as defensive in nature, but also as a method of social advancement and aggrandizement.

The First Punic War (264-241 B.C.) was a watershed moment for Rome. It was through its conflict with and eventual defeat of Carthage that Rome learned how to conduct extra-national war as a state enterprise. It was the first time Roman legions campaigned outside of the Italian Peninsula. This required the creation and the development of skill in the use of naval power. It saw the establishment of the first non-Italian provinces of Sicily then Sardinia and Corsica and brought her into conflict with other regional powers besides Carthage.⁷

In response to these new threats, Rome saw herself as conducting a strategic defense by periodically radially expanding its defensive perimeter and establishing new frontiers. The “frontier problem,” however, had a logical limitation. When Rome ameliorated one threat, a new one appeared over the horizon thereby necessitating the pushing of the frontier further back. Rome initially conducted its strategic defense with military power in an area defense role coupled with political influence exerted upon border client states. This was an economy of force measure, for which the Republican Army was prepared.

However, the Roman Republic's attitude toward war changed in the third century B.C. from one of preventing war through policy to one of preparing for war through policy.⁸ After the eventually successful Roman experience in the First and Second Punic Wars, the military instrument of national power became the instrument of choice thus raising its importance from a strategic policy-formulation perspective. This change in attitude shows how war transformed from the means to "the end of foreign policy" and that diplomacy became "the handmaiden of war."⁹ Thus the military's role as a wealth generating mechanism, through protection of mercantile exchange and direct income from booty and slaves, served as a change agent from Republic to Informal Republican Empire. The military's role changed from strict defense of the Republic to that of serving state interests. The military of the Republic, however, became increasingly strained by the demands it encountered in an imperial context and eventually required transformation. This transformation had unintended consequences that changed the political character of the state.

Transformation was required to answer increasing and varied threats. The Romans inherited phalangite battle from the Etruscans. While adequate for localized intertribal conflict, when faced with the Alexandrian successor armies, the Romans responded by changing their military to face the increased threat. The Romans were successful at integration of technology and techniques under the challenge and response paradigm. This strength, when coupled with the ability of Rome to muster sufficient military manpower when faced with crises, allowed the Romans to defeat regional and international powers. These two factors, while necessary and beneficial for the military

enterprise, greatly strained the Roman civil-state mechanisms.

Under the Republic, the legions drew upon the Greek tradition of shock and decisive battle, the Macedonian integration of combined arms, and a Roman skill at command and control at tactical maneuver during engagement.¹⁰ Rome organized the legion as a formation in Italy in the fourth and third Centuries B.C.¹¹ The limitations of the phalanx when facing the Macedonian successor armies had necessitated military transformation as Rome expanded and faced a greater variety of threats.

It was during this time -frame that Rome standardized three tiered *triplex acies* legionary formation of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. It broke the columnar phalangite formation into the smaller and more flexible tactical unit of the *maniple* (handful). *Maniples* were composed of two centuries of approximately 60-70 “Italian farmers led by a skilled centurion” each.¹² The legions abandoned the traditional round shield (*hoplon*) and spear in favor of the long shield (*scutum*), throwing javelin (*pilum*), and short-sword (*gladius*). By the second Century B.C., the legion’s strength was approximately 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry divided into three successive lines of ten maniples, each separated from its adjacent maniple by about the width of its own formation. Thus, the ten independent *maniples* had maneuver space to its sides, front, and rear.¹³ The key to the legionary success was its flexibility in tactical employment. Smaller units allowed holding actions, flank attack, feints, retreats, and encirclement.¹⁴

By the late second and early first century B.C., however, foreign campaigning stretched the manipular legionary Roman army thin. It required restructuring again in order to be able to perform the requisite tasks of an expeditionary army. The demands

placed upon the army by the realities of foreign policy dictated long term garrisoning of foreign provinces. This prevented the immediate de-mobilization of legionaries and their return to civilian lives. Further, the skills now required of its legionaries were beyond the expectations of citizen soldiers such as construction, siegecraft, and local policing. As an example, they were required to create infrastructure in the provinces and in so doing, they expanded beyond their strictly military function and brought the benefits of Roman civilization to conquered peoples.¹⁵

In order to do all of this effectively, Rome required a full-time professional military force. The Roman Army evolved over nearly a millennia from a system recognizable by the Greeks of Italian yeoman infantry to hired mercenaries that were drawn from across the empire. John Rich, in *War and Society in the Roman World*, relates the degree of change in the following:

Thus war and the army, which under the Republic had played a central part in Roman life, were under the principate banished to the periphery. Military service had ceased to be an obligation to which all citizens were liable and which most of them underwent. Instead soldiers formed a separate section of society, viewed with a mixture of respect, incomprehension and dislike by the civilian population. The armies were stationed in the frontier provinces and only occasionally had major wars to fight. Guaranteed by the armed forces, the rest of the empire's subjects enjoyed the *pax Roman* – The Roman peace.¹⁶

In the process, the military changed from defenders of the Republic to an instrument of Imperial power.¹⁷ How did the Roman conception of participation in and use of military force change to such a degree over the span of the 400 years? The main factor appears to be a requirement for competent military manpower in response to imperial practice.

The Second Punic War

The conditions for the reforms that professionalized the military were set during the Second Punic War, a war that saw a Carthaginian army invade the Italian peninsula and threaten Rome itself. At the Battles of Trebia (218 B.C.) and Lake Trasimene (217 B.C.), Hannibal dealt the Romans defeats. Thereafter, pursuing what came to be known the Fabian strategy; the Romans declined to decisively engage the Carthaginians and pursued a policy of attrition until it could build its army to a sufficient size to counter the threat.

However, for reasons of both political pressure and to secure critical supplies, the Romans engaged Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae (216 B.C.). The Romans suffered a significant tactical defeat, although not a strategic one. Figure 12 depicts the three main actions of the Second Punic War on the Italian Peninsula (Appendix A, page 104). The loss at Cannae and the appearance of Roman weakness, however, precipitated the Macedonian War and the loss of several Italian allies. Owing to their ability to harness manpower, the Romans eventually prevailed and forced the war to North Africa

It must have been maddening for Hannibal to have tactically defeated multiple Roman field armies in the Italian peninsula and still achieve strategic defeat.¹⁸ As when faced with the Cimbrian threat after the Battle of Arausio, Rome itself was saved by the failure of its enemy to maintain the initiative and press its attack on the city. It is this very strength of the Roman military reforms, the opening of military service to increasingly lower census classes and through limited conscription that allowed it to fill its ranks to replace battlefield casualties. Rome was able to expel Hannibal, carry the

fight to North Africa, and defeat Carthage. Rome entered a period of “persistent conflict” that saw its consolidation of power in the Mediterranean and the expansion its frontiers. Figure 13 depicts Roman Republican expansion in the Second Century B.C. (Appendix A, page 105). Rome would not face a similarly significant threat to the Italian peninsula again until the Cimbrian War (113-101 B.C.) nearly 100 years later. The effect on the military in response to the Second Punic War was a loosening of the qualifications for military service and thus access to citizenship. The period until the Cimbrian War saw a gradual reduction of the property and wealth qualification that extended the right of military service to the fifth census class that had only to have 3,000 sesterces.¹⁹ Even that degree of inclusivity proved to be insufficient to resource the military against future threats.

Jugurthine and Cimbrian Wars

In 113 B.C., the Roman Republican Empire faced a threat in Gaul from migrating Germanic Cimbri and Teuton populations from the north. A combined force faced the Romans and handed them the single largest tactical defeat they ever endured. At the Battle of Arausio in 105 B.C. (near modern day Orange, France) in Gaul, two Roman field Armies were defeated with the loss of 80,000 men.²⁰ Inexplicably, the Cimbri did not maintain the initiative and press the fight to Rome. Instead, they consolidated their position in Gaul with a portion of their force and turned south toward the Pyrenees with the other portion. This gave Rome the “breathing room” it needed to reconsolidate its force

Exacerbating the strategically significant loss at Arausio was the Jugurthine War (112-106 B.C.) in Numidia, North Africa. The Romans fought against Jugurtha's attempt to wrest power from its nominal ally, the Numidians. Fought initially in a series of indecisive battles, there were also allegations of impropriety on the part of the Roman leadership for failing to secure victory in a timely manner. The failure to achieve decisive victory in Numidia with a field army while Rome faced a significant threat from the Cimbrians proved a strategic drain on Rome's ability to mass military power. After Arausio, Rome withdrew its army from Numidia and sent it to Northern Italy to fight the Cimbrians. Elected junior Consul in 107 B.C., Marius, the Senate tasked him with concluding the Jugurthine wars. However, he had no army with which to accomplish this task.

Contributing Social and Economic Conditions

In the late Second and early First Centuries B.C., the practice of empire saw, as it had for the Greeks, the militarily enabled rapid influx of wealth. The dual factors of casualties of repetitive warfare and the growth of mercantile practice radically altered Roman economic society. The traditional agrarian society fundamentally changed as incoming wealth coalesced into the hands of the elite. Predatory land acquisition and slave labor forced out previously lower middle class and laborers. The *latifundia* or estate farms replaced the agrarian system of private small plot land ownership.²¹ This had the effect of increasing the urban poor population and political tension resulted from the disparity of wealth and political power.

Further increasing the “pressure cooker” of the growing population of poor was the lack of an outlet of social mobility. Prior to the late 170’s B.C., Rome repopulated its poor to colonies, thereby allowing them viable economic means to survive. This solved Rome’s disaffected population problem while simultaneously extending Roman political influence through a culturally Roman presence. Between 200 and 177 B.C., Rome established 15 Roman and 4 Latin colonies in recently conquered areas.²² Rome ceased colonizing after this period and it would not reestablish the practice until it gave land grants to veterans.

Marian Military Reforms Professionalize the Force

Because of the acute manpower crises created during the Cimbrian War and exacerbated by the Jugurthine War and the economic and social conditions created by imperial practice, the conditions had been set, by 107 B.C. under Marius, upon his election as consul, to alter radically the manner of manning a Roman Army. There is some debate as to the genesis of the military reforms. Whether Marius enacted the reforms, Marius merely codified a pre-existing condition, or Augustus enacted the reforms that transformed the military is irrelevant in practical terms. It is more likely transformation was a gradual process starting with Scipio and ending with Augustus that transformed the military:

Scipio's revolution changed the way of the legions. Rome was now to use proper tactics on the battlefield, rather than merely relying on the fighting superiority of the legionaries. Henceforth the Roman soldiers would be led by clever men seeking to outmanoeuvre (sic) their foe rather than merely being lined up and marched at the enemy. If Rome had the best soldiers it now should also acquire the best generals.²³

What is important is that there is a distinction marking the change from citizen-soldier to

professional soldier.

Faced with the daunting task of concluding the Jugurthine War, Marius raised an army. Under a perceived extraordinary threat to the state, the Senate granted him extraordinary authority to expand those eligible for military service. He extended access to military service to the *capite sensi*, or landless headcount census class and volunteers came in droves. The *capite sensi* and *voluntarii* (freed slaves) had previously been used, but in support and militia functions.²⁴

The previously disenfranchised masses found the opportunity for pay and training as professional soldiers. This was, however, anathema to the idea of land owning citizen soldiers in obligatory service to the Roman state and Senate. Prior to the Marian reforms, the potential benefits of military service, apart from social advancement, were not clear or predictable. When a soldier volunteered (or was conscripted) it was for a specific campaign rather than a specified number of years. Although became increasingly uncommon for a soldier to return home immediately after a campaign.²⁵ It was generally recognized that an active duty term of service would be for no more than six years with a 16-year term of reserve status.²⁶ One could enlist for successive campaigns, but could not expect to receive the same rank or status upon re-enlistment. Land donatives were the exception rather than the rule. It was impractical to make the military a career and any social advancement was accidental or through investment of capital acquired in foreign conquest.²⁷

Marius exhibited a tactical genius in the standardization of organization and training of the legion. Marius reorganized the legion from a manipular to a cohort

formation. The Marian legion was composed of ten cohorts and stood at approximately 4,800 like armed infantry soldiers. A legion based upon infantry *histati* and *principes* replaced the *triplex acies* organization of dissimilarly armed *histati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. (The allied forces assumed the skirmishing, missile troops, and light cavalry roles.) The cohort, vice maniple, became the standardized tactical formation of the Roman Army. The cohort was, in a sense, a “mini-legion.” Further, the century was the smallest self-sustaining organization of the Army. Arrayed for battle the, the cohort legion deployed with four cohorts to the front, three in the middle, and three in the rear²⁸. This allowed even greater tactical flexibility and scalability in employment.

A professionalized army meant that it could devote time to training, thereby increasing its ability to employ its capabilities. A professionalized army also allowed greater skill in the leadership and employment of the formation. The military retained this skill through repetitive practice and use. Legions no longer de-mobilized after a campaign. They were a standing force. The logistical support to, the tactical flexibility of, and the professionalization of its forces were keys to subsequent Roman military success. Of greatest significance to the traditional social order of Republican Rome, however, was that Marius bypassed the property requirement for military service and equipped his recruits largely at state expense.²⁹

After the Marian reforms, a volunteer enlistee could expect a negotiable, but definite, term of service with a land donative expected upon retirement. He could expect to have his arms provided if he could not afford them, regular pay, and professional training. More important for the Roman enlistee, he found a route out of his

disenfranchised status to citizenship. Rome also granted full citizenship rights to the Latin allies, who had previously enjoyed *civitas sine suffragio* (rights of citizenship without a political voice). As a further sign of the extension of suffrage, non-Romans who aspired to citizenship could achieve suffrage after completion of their military service.

Marius eventually exacted revenge upon the Cimbrians at the Battle of Vercellae (101 B.C.), where the Romans inflicted an estimated 100,000 casualties and almost exterminated the two tribes. The forces that enabled this military success were not without their impact on the society. This impact manifested itself in two forms: indirect and direct. The effect of the military transformation was a professionalized army that dissociated from the Roman state and Senate. John Rich and Graham Shipley in *War and Society in the Roman World* express this sentiment in the following:

... (T)ensions were beginning to grow in a political system which had once been closely integrated with the military structure on which it relied for its security but from which it was now becoming increasingly detached.³⁰

Due to their expense, commanders bore an increasing cost of subsidizing foreign campaign.

This had the effect of increasing the influence of the traditional Roman concept of patronage. Patronage manifested itself not only in a direct monetary sense but also in a political sense. If equestrian or patrician wanted social advancement through military service, he had to secure the patronage of the generals, who held access to military leadership positions within “their” legions. Loyalty and military power thus shifted from the state to the commanders, who held the monetary and political power.

The raising of locals from the provinces further reinforced this political

dissociation and legionary identity. With the broad extension of citizenship, a Roman *and Allied Army* became a *Roman Army* whose identity was independent of the city-state of Rome proper. It was in effect, a cosmopolitan Army whose identity had sublimated from the city-state to the individual commander. By the second century, the soldiers that made up Rome's legions tended to come not from Rome itself, but from the more distant *ager Romanus* (Roman state owned land) or its allies. This meant that even if one was a citizen, one effectively could not exercise political power due to the distance from Rome.³¹

Commanders exerted the indirect influence of the legions through land grants to veterans. Commanders granted land donatives to veteran centurions and legionaries upon retirement. This practice, in effect, bought politically sympathetic populations in the provinces that a commander could call for support. A contentious issue, land grants to veterans was a political tool to increase support to influential commanders rather than a necessity.³² It was not the plight of the poor, but the military necessity that extended military service to the poor. It was the proper “care and feeding” of this newly empowered force that ensured political power. The effect in the provinces was veteran settlement through 13 B.C., when Augustus ceased the practice, opting instead to pay veterans a retirement donative out of his own pocket.³³

Commanders exerted direct military control through military action against competing elements in the state. The shift in loyalty effected a change in the relationship of military force with the state of Rome from one of its own utility to one to capable of use against it. The military's influence changed from directing foreign policy to direct

use of force against the state. Starting with Sulla's move against Marius, the shift in loyalty of the legions allowed 12 social, civil, and servile wars from 91-30 B.C. This is an example of the unstable political conditions caused from the practice of informal empire by a Republic. Individual factions had wrested the military instrument of national power from the state in an attempt to consolidate power. Marius, Sulla, the First Triumvirate, Julius Caesar, and the Second Triumvirate had all unsuccessfully attempted to gain advantage. It was finally Octavian, who wielded enough military and economic power to settle the question.

For whatever turmoil and strife the Civil Wars had caused to Roman society, the military benefited immensely. Augustus fixed the term of military service at 25 years.³⁴ In the final reform that marked a transition to professional Army, Augustus established an official treasury to pay soldier discharge donatives funded with taxes rather than from his own finds. Control over the military was wrested from the Republican state into individual hands owing to the effects of the practice of informal empire. Augustus had returned the military to the state, but this time it was a fully Imperial state.

Military Identity and Role in Civil Transformation

From the Second Punic War through the Augustan establishment of formal Empire, expansionist military practice served the economic and social advancement of the Senatorial class. Figure 14 depicts Roman expansion during this period (Appendix A, page 106). The economic motivation was land, grain supplies, trade markets, and slaves. The social motivation was the advancement of family prestige on which social status and thus political power depended. The Senate provided the political impetus through a sense

of danger that granted legitimacy to a pre-emptive and expansionist foreign policy. Further consolidating their domestic power, the Senate was purported to be the only body capable of answering that threat. Michael Doyle, in *Empires*, relates the political machinations of the senatorial class co-opting in the service of their economic interests in the following:

Roman imperialism from the Punic Wars to Augustus was a product of the *class interest* of the senatorial proprietors of latifundia and of their search for new land and slaves. The senatorial order, as a class, sought to maintain its leadership of Roman politics by fostering perceptions of international danger and by conducting wars that stimulated a sense of Roman glory. Both enhanced the position of the Senate by engendering threats that called for strategic direction which (sic) only the Senate was capable of providing.³⁵

Later, Augustus recognized the benefit of effective control of the military instrument of power that the Senate had previously held. He usurped the power of the Senate by controlling the military and reaped the same economic and political benefits. The effective control over the Roman Republican Senate gave Augustus unofficial but full authority over the state. His popularity with and control over the legions created the Schumpeterian military machine and enabled the transformation from informal republican empire to formal empire.

Perception Versus Reality

Even if Rome was an empire in all but name by the end of the Second Punic war, Romans of the 1st century B.C. did not see themselves as an Empire. They believed that *Res Publica* still existed. All the trappings of Republic remained, but it was a facade. Some of the same conditions exist today in the United States: a fully professional army, divisive and self-interested politics, and the accrual of power and money into small and

insular elite. In the process of its own transformation, the military enabled the transformation of the state into a body that served its own interests rather than those of its parent society. Doyle relates the estrangement and political control of the military, followed by the political construct of “*Roman-ness*” from the Roman Republican State is:

Among the reasons for striking persistence of imperial Rome was the Augustan revolution, which established the politically autonomous and imperially bureaucratic state and the political, economic, and cultural integration of the provincial people.³⁶

The dissociation of military service with citizenship rights and obligations would eventually see the destruction of the Roman Empire. There is a danger when citizens abdicate their responsibility and in effect contract it out. For the Romans, that is exactly what they did in the later empire. The dissociation of military service from the motivations of service to state is a very dangerous territory indeed

Impact of a Professional Military

The professionalization of the Roman military enabled by the Marian military reforms of 107 B.C. set the conditions for the fully professional military under Augustus by 23 B.C. Owing to demands for military manpower, the Senate gradually reduced land and property requirement in order to be able to serve in the military to a minimum level by this time. In the early and middle Republic, citizens saw military service as part of the obligations of citizenship and as part of the necessary social advancement of a citizen. In the late Republic, military service offered a reliable income, professional training, and upward social mobility. Citizens saw it as an avocation in and of itself. Citizenship was an added benefit thereof.

Further contributing to the diffusion of power resulting from military service was

the extension of citizenship rights, first to the Latins and then to all the provinces, as a benefit of long standing military service. Rome raised the legions, in part, in the provinces. While a legionary or centurion may have been “Roman”, his loyalty was not to the Roman city-state.

The political loyalty of the professionalized military under the Republic shifted away from the Roman Senate and state toward individual commanders. A commander’s personal wealth purchased loyalty of his subordinates in a system of patronage through social advancement, land grants, and cash donatives. A commander gained political influence through the direct fealty of his legions and the political influence of sympathetic veterans. With this loyalty, individual commanders were able to attempt to seize power away from the Senate. The military then exerted a direct influence on the state through application of military force on the state itself. After a series of civil and servile wars, Augustus was eventually able to consolidate power while preserving the trappings of Republicanism. His creation of a treasury to pay veterans’ pensions, wrested loyalty from individual commanders back to the state. However, a state that was markedly different from the Republic of even one hundred years prior. A professionalized military had directly enabled the transformation of Republican Informal Empire to Formal Empire.

¹ <http://www.unrv.com/empire/early-roman-timeline.php>, accessed March 23, 2008.

² <http://www.unrv.com/empire/latin-revolt.php>, accessed March 23, 2008
Some Latin states were fully integrated and some were given lesser *civitas sine suffragio*, (citizenship without the right to vote in the popular assemblies) Rome

now truly dominated all the Latins, and rather than acting as the most powerful member of an alliance, it became a centralized government.

³ This was Rome's greatest defeat in terms of manpower with estimates of up to 80,000 Roman and 40,000 allied casualties. Of significance, this battle was fought in Roman Gaul and threatened Italy for the first time since the Second Punic War. This defeat left Rome short of the manpower it needed to defend Italy. The threat to the Roman state influenced the populace and enabled Marius' ability to enact the reforms.

⁴ Although they had established provinces and "client states" outside of Rome itself, imperial bureaucracy had not fully formed. The transformation was *in process*. The tension between republicanism and imperialism had not fully resolved itself. Rome would not cross the Augustan threshold to formal empire until the principate.

⁵ Parker, *Cambridge History*, 93.

⁶ Adcock, *Roman Art*, 83.

⁷ <http://www.unrv.com/empire/first-punic-war.php>, accessed March 23, 2008.

⁸ Adcock, 76.

⁹ Ibid, 83.

¹⁰ Parker, 45.

¹¹ Ibid, 42.

¹² Ibid, 43.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, 44.

¹⁵ Adcock, 47.

¹⁶ Rich and Shipley, *Roman World*, 6.

¹⁷ Ibid, 41.

¹⁸ The U.S. faced a similar experience in Vietnam against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army in the 1960s and 1970s.

¹⁹ http://roman.etrusia.co.uk./roman_army_print, accessed April 10, 2008

²⁰ <http://www.unrv.com/empire/early-roman-timeline.php>, accessed March 23, 2008

- ²¹ Rich and Shipley, 106-107.
- ²² Ibid, 100.
- ²³ <http://www.roman-empire.net/army/army.html>, accessed 18 Jan 08.
- ²⁴ <http://www.unrv.com/empire/marius-reforms-legions.php>, accessed March 28, 2008.
- ²⁵ Rich and Shipley, 98.
- ²⁶ Ibid, 99.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Parker, 49.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Rich and Shipley, 107
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Ibid, 102.
- ³³ Ibid, 5.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Doyle, *Empires*, 157.
- ³⁶ Doyle, 116.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Whenever an activity deals primarily with the same things again and again - with the same ends and the same means, even though there may be minor variations and in infinite diversity of combinations - these things are susceptible of rational study. It is precisely that inquiry which is the most essential part of any *theory*, and which may quite appropriately claim that title. It is an analytic investigation leading to a close *acquaintance* with the subject; applied to experience - in our case to military history - it leads to thorough *familiarity* with it. The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent.¹ (1984, 141)

Clausewitz, *On War*,

The structure and application of the military instrument of national power can have a transformative cultural influence on the society exercising that power. A republican military, when transformed from a citizen-soldier based militia to a standing professional military, exerts a dominant influence on the political structures of the republic. A professionalized or fully professional military increasingly dissociates from the citizenry of the parent state and becomes a political faction in and of itself rather than an extension of the will of the citizenry. Even if the professional military is not deliberately self-serving, its existence independent from civil society allows the state to manifest avaricious and self-serving interests. With this independent military capability, the state can conduct aggressive expansionist trade practices (if not policy) that brings it into conflict with its neighbors that may resolve itself in an informal imperial relationship.

The practice of empire highlights the internal contradictions of republican values

with the *de facto* imperial practice that precipitates a domestic political divide within the state. More importantly, imperial practice necessitates transformation of the political structures and capabilities of the state in order to effectively administer the empire. Imperial political policy is by definition extra-national. Imperial administration, then, is a task for which a domestically focused republic is ill equipped to execute. Internal political division can lead a republic to formulate an inchoate and vacillant foreign policy that leads to political crisis. On the one extreme, it can lead to zealous over extension that betrays vulnerabilities to competitors and ultimately leads to a reduction of its imperial power or its destruction analogous to the Athenian experience.

Alternatively, military power can resolve the political conflict through a direct application of force by the parent state. This results in a consolidation of power and the crossing of the Augustan threshold with the establishment of a formal imperial political structure. This was the case for the Romans.

The Athenian experience is an example of a transformation from democracy to Informal Empire. In preparation for and in response to the Second Persian Invasion (480-479 B.C.), led by Xerxes as a punitive expedition against the Greek mainland, the Athenians transformed their military establishment from a force constructed in the main of hoplites centered on decisive phalangite battle into a professionalized naval force. This significant shift in the organization and conception of the use of military force was a departure from the traditional primacy of hoplite battle that had developed sometime between 750 and 650 B.C.

The unseen consequences of the transformation of military means to answer a

specific response were unleashed after the Hellenic League dispatched the Persian threat at Salamis (480 B.C.) and Plataea (479 B.C.). The application of the transformed military force found other outlets in the Athenian transformation of the Delian League to the Informal Athenian Empire. Motivated by militarily enabled expansionist trade practice, the conception of military power fundamentally changed the nature of the Athenian *polis*. The nexus of military and thus political power shifted from the agrarian citizen-soldier to the previously disenfranchised poor. Military power now served not merely to defend the state, but served domestic political and economic interests abroad.

The change in Athenian society brought it into a collision course with its main regional political and military rival, the Spartans, which manifested itself in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). The strategic vision with which Pericles sought to wage the war leveraged the strength of the Athenian Navy and minimized the strengths of the Spartan Army. He denied the Spartans decisive land battle by ceding Attica and conducted an attritional “campaign” against the Spartans using the navy to reposition land forces in the Spartan rear areas.

Pericles reinforced the change in conception of military power that Themistocles realized against the Persians against the Spartans. With Pericles’ death from plague in 430 B.C., his metering influence that had cautioned against excess was lost. The political disunity of the Athenians allowed the rise of the demagogues, whose answer to the base demands of the mob for aggrandizement led to the strategically flawed Sicilian campaign that drained its military strength and left it open to defeat by the Spartans.

The Roman experience is representative of a transition from Informal Empire

under the Republic to the establishment of a Formal Empire under the Augustan Principate. A pragmatic culture, the Romans were quick to adopt military organization and practices of those with which they came into conflict in a response counter-response model. Under the Republic, the Romans inherited phalangite warfare from the Etruscans that they integrated with the combined arms warfare form the successor kingdoms of the Macedonians, and applied both with an inherent talent for command and control.

This pragmatic approach to warfare, coupled with the ability to quickly reconstitute its losses were the twin strengths of the Roman republic as it expanded to informal empire. Added to this ability was the inclusive nature of the Roman state. Not particularly xenophobic, the Romans were increasingly able to leverage the manpower of their allies, client states, and provinces. Although the Romans were no strangers to war, the demands of near continual campaigns and the demand for militarily competent manpower when faced with extraordinary threats transformed the Republican citizen-soldier ideal.

The Second Punic War (218-202 B.C.) was a seminal event for the Roman Republican military. Hannibal's defeat of the Romans at Cannae was the largest defeat they had yet faced. The need to quickly raise manpower reduced the class and property requirements in order to serve. The Second Punic War set the conditions and precedent that saw the citizen-based military professionalize in the future.

While ostensibly still a citizen based army, by the Marian reforms of 107 B.C., the military had reduced its class and property requirements to a notional level. The losses and subsequent manpower crisis of the Cimbrian War (113-101 B.C.), exacerbated

by the Jugurthine War (112-105 B.C.), were extraordinary events that necessitated an extension of military service to virtually any willing man. At the Battle of Arausio (105 B.C.) during the Cimbrian War, the Romans are estimated to have lost up to 80,000 men. The defeat left the Italian peninsula open to invasion for the first time since the Second Punic War. The perceived threat to the survival of the Roman state allowed extraordinary transformative measures to change the military in response to an extraordinary threat.

The Marian reforms allow the conditions for Augustus to complete the transition to a professional military. As with the Greeks before them, the Romans did not dismantle the “emergency” measures that professionalized its military after the perceived threat to state survival had been defeated. However, unlike the Greeks, the Roman state was to survive for another six centuries. The individual soldier saw his military identity not as part of his citizen obligation, but as his primary identity. During the period following the Marian reforms, the loyalty of the legions shifted from the state to individual commanders. This loyalty shift away from the Senate was a result of institutionalized patronage and the extension of social influence of resettled veterans.

The loyalty of the legions allowed commanders to exercise influence through direct military force in the form of civil wars. Finally, Octavian was able to consolidate power at the Battle of Actium (31 B.C.). He fully professionalized the Roman military and returned the loyalty of the legions to the transformed Roman state, albeit a state manifest in the person of the Emperor rather than the representatives of the citizen assemblies.

A professionalized military can exert a divisive influence on the state through indirect influence, as with the Athenians. Alternatively, as in the case of the Romans, the professional military exerted a decisive influence on the state in the form of direct application of military force. With it, Octavian was able to consolidate power and formally transform the Republican Informal Empire to a Formal Empire.

Recommendations

Imperial responsibility and the inevitable transformation of the political-military establishment that maintains empire have the potential to alter the nature of a society. The United States exercises *de facto* imperial responsibility, irrespective of the degree of ideological self-deception or self-denial the body-politic exhibits. To what degree the military professional is aware of the responsibility and to what degree he has the potential to transform his society is of significant importance. A characteristic of a highly functioning representative republic is an educated and informed electorate. In such a state political power is manifest in the citizen body that is an actor and not a recipient of action. It is a body of citizens not subjects. Do the citizens of the United States understand the requirements of and the effects of implementing its military, political, and economic will in an imperial fashion? Do they recognize the harbingers of change and can they react in a fashion that is in accordance with the will of the body politic or are they subject to irrevocable historical forces? Even if they do not, the educated soldier must recognize this inherent responsibility.

An individual charged with executing the military affairs of a state, either as an appointed citizen soldier or as professional soldier, ought to be accountable to the citizen

body of the state. The Soldier is duty bound to provide the political power advice as to the best manner of employment and the anticipated effects of the adoption of a strategic direction (to the degree that it can be ascertained). Further, the strategic policy ought to direct operational and tactical employment. However, tactical or operational capabilities and employment techniques often exert an influence out of proportion to their intended purpose. Tactical success, divorced from valid and sound strategic direction, in no way guarantees military or political success. Tactical success can further entangle a state in a faulty strategic direction that can drive a state to ruin. For the military theorist, Carl Von Clausewitz, war was not an autonomous or isolated act of violence. He stated that it should express political purpose, and express it in a rational, utilitarian, manner. It should not take the place of the political purpose nor obliterate it. For Clausewitz, military forces should not exist for their own ends.² If they exist for their own purposes, rather than in the service of the state, the military application of power can transform the society to its own ends.

Value to the Military Professional

Military professionals in the business of strategy formulation and advisors to political authority should know the contextual strategic variables of the operating environment. Strategic policy should recognize the socio-political ramifications of strategic policy. It should recognize, to the degree possible, the effects of operational and tactical implementation of strategic direction. Strategic policy should recognize that while historical precedent is not deterministic, salient transformative factors reappear when a republican government exercises imperial responsibility such as are active in the

current United States strategic policy. Republics, as a rule, do not formulate cohesive and integrated grand strategy. In translating vague strategic guidance to workable operational and tactical plans, the military instrument of national power can and does influence strategic direction. Republics, when experimenting with imperial practice, can find themselves irrevocably changed.

“Republican” citizen-soldier warfare developed under a specific set of conditions in which necessity and social convention limited “war” to a specific subset decisive battle that allowed a clear division and subordination of military power from state political power. Further, citizen-soldier warfare is inherently defensive in nature. In a Republic, extended extra-national campaign is difficult at best. However, the power of this type of application of military force, when faced with an extraordinary threat and more complex political nature of war, can become unleashed. The changes can take place rapidly and deliberately, as with the Athenians, or they can take place slowly and subtly, as with the Romans. In either case if not recognized and mitigated, this transformed military power can be used in support of a self-serving and avaricious foreign policy. The influence of military force then becomes both outwardly directed towards other states and inwardly directed towards the parent state. The conclusion drawn from the case studies of Athens and Rome presented herein, unfortunately, is that professional armies that are necessary to implement imperial policy are very good at executing the military instrument of national power abroad, but have negative ramifications for maintaining the broadly representative liberal character of a republican state.

A republic can exercise imperial foreign policy without being a formal empire.

However, a republic that is exercising imperial practice cannot maintain its character if it expects to exercise imperial responsibility with any efficacy. The tension between domestic political ideals and the foreign policy and extra-national military practicalities force a change in the conception of republican values and goals. For the military of a republican empire, this tension is more than an academic issue. It results in a change in the very purpose of its existence. In the transition period between a republic and a formal empire, the *raison d'être* of the military changes from that of the defense of the state to the defense of state *interests*.

In a republic, the military ideal is a citizen-soldier with service obligations to the state as a precursor to access to political power and citizenship benefits. In a republican empire, a professionalized military identity exists in a state of tension between the traditional military ideal and the pragmatic exercise of imperialism. Under a formal empire, the dominant influence is that of a fully professional military that is largely socially divorced from the “citizen” base and is no longer concerned with a citizen-soldier identity. Hence, it is unfettered by the paradox between foreign military practice and domestic social ideals that I introduced in Chapter 1.

The United States, at the start of the 21st Century is clearly a republican-empire. Further, the transformation of the military to a fully professional body and its increasing dissociation from the citizen base of the state represents a threat to the vitality of the traditional conception of the republic. However, that threat is not to be understood as a self-serving and avaricious cabal. The litmus test for any military is its efficacy, its ability to accomplish its assigned mission. The transition to efficient and effective

imperial military organization and state bureaucracy is the unintended but inevitable consequence of a pragmatic approach to vague and inchoate strategic guidance on the part of well-intentioned military and diplomatic professionals.

The value of the knowledge of the historical precedents presented in this thesis is the ability to draw inferences about the potential consequences of decisions in the present. As Clausewitz stated, whenever an activity deals with the same things again and again it is susceptible to rational study. The United States military professional should recognize his true identity and role in a transition period devoid of the hyperbole and facade that preserves the image of traditional republicanism. Only then, when armed with an analytical and realistic approach, can he provide military advice that is truly rational and in accordance with the geopolitical realities that the United States finds itself in at the start of the 21st Century. Getting it right can, at worst, ensure the continued survival of the state. Getting it wrong can, at the worst, contribute to the destruction of the state.

¹ Howard and Paret, *On War*, 141.

² Ibid, 605-606.

APPENDIX A
ILLUSTRATIONS

Transformation from Republic to Empire





Figure 1. Imperial Transition




Routine Internecine Warfare

Figure 2. Routine Internecine Warfare




Significant Threat Requiring Military Transformation

Figure 3. Reaction to Significant Threat




Military Enabled Economic and Political Expansion

Figure 4. Economic and Political Expansion



Practice of empire leads to political disunity

Figure 5. Political Disunity



Dissociated military caste consolidates of power/creation of Formal Empire

Figure 6. Consolidation of Power

The Greek Experience



Figure 7. Ancient Greek World

Source: Bernard Suzanne, Map of Ancient Greek World (Southern Italy, Greece and Asia Minor), http://plato-dialogues.org/tools/gk_wrld.htm, December 13, 1998.



Figure 8. Persian Invasion Routes¹

Source: United States Military Academy History Department Atlas Database
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlasses/ancient%20warfare/AncientGIFS/PersianInvasion3rd.gif>, March 3, 2008.




Figure 9. The Battle of Salamis

Source: United States Military Academy History Department Atlas Database
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlasses/ancient%20warfare/AncientGIFS/SalamisBattle.gif>, March 3, 2008.




Figure 10. Peloponnesian War

Source: United States Military Academy History Department Atlas Database
[http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlas/ancient%20warfare/Ancient GIFS/PeloponnesianWarActionsV1.0.gif](http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlas/ancient%20warfare/Ancient%20GIFS/PeloponnesianWarActionsV1.0.gif), March 3, 2008.




Figure 11. Athens and Piraeus

Source: Bernard Suzanne, Map of Athens and Piraeus in Socrates and Plato's Time
<http://plato-dialogues.org/tools/athens.htm>, December 13, 1998.

The Roman Experience



Figure 12. Second Punic War

Source: United States Military Academy History Department Atlas Database
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlas/ancient%20warfare/HannibalDominates.gif>, March 3, 2008.




Figure 13. Roman Expansion in the Second Century B.C.

Source: United States Military Academy History Department Atlas Database,
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlas/ancient%20warfare/AncientGIFS/RomeExpansion2CentBC.gif>, March 3, 2008.



Figure 14. Roman Republic 49-44 B.C.

Source: United States Military Academy History Department Atlas Database
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ancient%20warfare/CaesarCivilWar.gif>, March 3, 2008.

¹. This source is marked as the Third Persian Invasion 480-479 B.C., and marks the Second Greco-Persian War. The First and Second Persian Invasions occurred in 492 and 490, marking the First Greco-Persian War.

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