

A CASE STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT PLANNING IN AN
ORGANIZATION UNDERGOING TRANSFORMATION TO JOINT FORCE
HEADQUARTERS IN ONE STATE

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degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Joint Planning

by

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ABSTRACT

A CASE STUDY OF JOINT PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION IN AN ORGANIZATION UNDERGOING TRANSFORMATION TO JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN ONE STATE, by Major Stephen G. Lind, 147 pages.

The National Guard has been in a nearly constant state of change, in one form or another, since its inception. The events that have transpired since the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 demonstrated the need for the next major evolution of the National Guard.

The National Guard began the process of transforming the State Military Headquarters in all 54 states and territories by converting from an Administrative and Oversight Headquarters to a Joint Operational Activity in 2003. This study investigates the changes brought about by the implementation of the joint planning process with relation to the transformation to Joint Force headquarters in California. It explores the impact of the joint planning process to current operational plans within California and the challenges and successes experienced during the process. In doing so, it focuses on the effects the JFHQ transformation process has had in California.

One critical component to operating in a joint environment is the ability for the organization to conduct Joint Planning using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format. All of the existing plans for each state would have to be updated and converted to the JOPES format, adding to the challenges of learning a new planning format and training planners to use the new format.

This study finds that resourcing has been the most significant challenge to the transformation process with regards to joint planning. The planning staff within the J-5 has suffered from a lack of sufficient personnel to conduct both strategic and operational planning simultaneously. Strategic planning has been extremely effective while operational planning has produced mixed results. Personnel within the joint staff have not been trained on the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) which further hampers its operational planning capability. The lack of trained planners has slowed attempts to update and transition current “on the shelf” plans from the old “scenario” based plans (earthquake, civil disturbance, flood, etc.) to new “capabilities” based plans (transportation, security, RSOI, etc.).

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ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component (Active Duty)
AC/RC	Active Component/Reserve Component
ADSW	Active Duty Special Work
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AMA	American Management Association
ANG	Air National Guard
AR	Army Reserve
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation Model
ARNG	Army National Guard
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirements
CMD	California Military Department
CNG	California National Guard
CNGB	Chief National Guard Bureau
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COG	Continuity of Governance
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
COOP	Continuity of Operations
CPX	Command Post Exercise

CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DA	Department of the Army
DoD	Department of Defense
DSM	Decision Support Matrix
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EXORD	Execution Order
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FCS	Future Combat Systems
FIRO	Force Integration Readiness Officer
FM	Field Manual
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FTM	Full-Time Manning
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GWOT	Global War on Terror
JAEP	Joint Air Execution Plan
JAOPP	Joint Air Operations Planning Process
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFHQ	Joint Force headquarters
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	Joint Operation Planning Process

JP	Joint Publication
JPG	Joint Planning Group
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JPOC	Joint Planning Orientation Course
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging and Onward Integration
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTF	Joint Task Force
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MOB	Mobilization Officer
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NG/R	National Guard/Reserve
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORTHCOM	US Northern Command
OC	Observer Controller
OES	Office of Emergency Services
OPG	Operations Planning Group
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
OPTEMPO	Operations Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

OTS	Off the Shelf
PEC	Professional Education Center
PME	Professional Military Education
POC	Point of Contact
POMSO	Plans, Operations and Military Support Officer (J-3)
POTO	Plans, Operations and Training Officer (G-3)
PTDO	Prepare to Deploy Order
RC	Reserve Component
SAD	State Active Duty
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECFOR	Security Forces
SMD	State Military Department
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMH	State Military Headquarters
SMR	State Military Reserve
SR	Strategic Reserve
STARC	State Area Command
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TF	Task Force
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USARC	US Army Reserve Component

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The National Guard is the oldest military organization in the United States. The concept of the National Guard came from England. It was initially created as a militia to protect the holdings and settlements when the colonists settled in the New World. It was formed on December 13, 1636, in Salem, Massachusetts. This date is the recognized birthday of the National Guard.

In 1637, the English settlements in North America were a tiny fringe along the Eastern seaboard. As settlements pushed west into the interior, the institution of the militia, which the colonists brought with them from England, went with them. The militia tradition meant citizens organizing themselves into military units, responsible for their own defense. The militia, later called the National Guard, has fought in all the nation's major wars, as it fights today in Iraq and Afghanistan. (NGB 2007)

The National Guard has undergone many changes since its inception. It contained the majority of the US military forces in the 19th century and provided the bulk of troops during the Mexican War, the early months of the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War (NGB 2007). National Defense legislation increased the role of the National Guard and officially designated it as a Reserve force for the U.S. Army in 1903 (NGB 2007). National Guard aviation units were split from the Army and re-formed to create the Air National Guard after World War II.

The National Guard has been in a nearly constant state of change, in one form or another, since its inception. Some of these changes have been necessary to keep the National Guard relevant to the changes that occurred on in the United States over time.

Some changes, however, were profound and changed the very organization and structure of the National Guard.

The Militia Act of 1903, (also known as the Dick Act), changed the structure of the National Guard and standardized its organization within each state across the Nation. The 1903 Militia Act, which replaced the old Militia Act of 1792, divided all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 into the organized militia (National Guard) and the reserve militia. In addition, it mandated that, within five years, the pay, discipline and equipment of the National Guard would be the same as that of the Regular Army (Snook (1), 2008).

Increased federal funding would compensate Guardsmen for summer training camps and joint maneuvers with the Regular Army. States were required to hold at least 24 drills (instructional periods) each year, and some National Guard officers could now attend Regular Army schools. The War Department assigned Regular Army officers to each state as advisors, instructors and inspectors and enabled states to exchange outdated weapons and equipment for current issue items.

The War Department also created the Division of Militia Affairs, the forerunner of the National Guard Bureau, to oversee National Guard organization and training. The Dick Act was a landmark. It created a stronger and more professional National Guard to serve as the nation's second line of defense. (Snook (1), 2008)

During World War II, the National Guard experienced a full mobilization and fought alongside its counterparts in the active duty military. In September 1940, the first peacetime draft in American history was authorized by Congress. In conjunction with the Selective Service Act, the National Guard of the United States was ordered into active

military service for one year of preparedness training to ensure it was adequately trained should the nation enter the looming conflict.

The phased mobilization began on September 16, 1940, and was finally completed in early spring of 1941. Thus, when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II at the end of 1941, America was not wholly unprepared. National Guard forces had been mobilized for almost a year. (Snook (2), 2008)

The Air Force was organized as a separate military branch after World War II and the National Guard transformed again to create the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. By July 1, 1946, the Army National Guard was organized into 5,150 federally recognized units, with a total strength slightly in excess of 350,000 soldiers. At the same time the Air National Guard was organized into 527 federally recognized units, consisting of 27 combat wings with a total strength of nearly 50,000 airmen. Recruiting by both organizations was greatly assisted by the reintroduction of a peacetime draft in 1948. Nevertheless, the reorganization of both the Army and Air National Guard was accomplished with amazing speed and efficiency. (Snook (3), 2008)

The next major change came as a result of the Goldwater/Nichols Act in 1986 when the military, as a whole, was required to train and work together as a joint entity. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, caused a major reorganization of the Department of Defense (DoD). It was the most significant change since the National Security Act of 1947.

Operational authority of the DoD was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. The Act established the position of Vice-Chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commanders. (NDU, 2008)

The various services and components within the Department of Defense, including the National Guard, had been operating as separate organizations up to this point, even when involved in the same operations. The methods of communicating within those agencies were not standardized so communication, in many instances, was not possible and coordination was almost non-existent

Background of the Problem

Reserve and National Guard units were configured as a strategic reserve for the Cold War that would assist active duty forces in time of war. They are now being used as regular operational forces to augment and supplement the active duty forces during continuing operations. The policies, budgets, mobilization plans, and training governing those units may need to be modified in order for them to transform from a strategic reserve to an operational force. There was a large surge of National Guard and Reserve forces for the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The Guard and Reserve have been called upon to accept more missions in support of the active Army ever since that time. Most of these missions were stability operations of limited duration. However, the current wars are much longer than expected or planned and all U.S. military forces are stretched to the breaking point. (Woodring 2007, 4-5)

The events that have occurred since the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 demonstrate the need for the next major evolution of the National Guard. The mobilizations and troop rotations used to support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have taxed the entire military structure. The National Guard was tasked to step up to support both operations and is currently providing that support. Our political leadership, Soldiers, families and, our nation must come to an understanding of the changed role of the reserve component.

LTG James J. Lovelace, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army, testifying before the Commission on National Guard and Reserves on 12 April 2007, had this to say about the National Guard and Reserves, “As a part of the operational force pool, RC units will no longer deploy every now and again; they must be ready for deployment every five years—our nation requires it.” (Lovelace, 2004, 8)

As a result of the new strategic environment, the National Guard is no longer being used as the strategic reserve force that it had been organized into and funded for by the Department of Defense. The number and frequency of current mobilizations require that the National Guard be trained, equipped and funded to the same levels as their active duty counterparts. The National Guard needs a better organizational structure to support the current mobilizations. It also needs a structure that would ensure seamless transfer of authority and an organizational structure to adequately support domestic operations during state emergencies and regional disasters.

Statement of the Problem

The National Guard began the process of transforming the State Military Headquarters in all fifty-four states and territories by transforming from an

Administrative & Oversight Headquarters to a Joint Operational Activity in 2003.

Lieutenant General (LTG) H. Steven Blum, the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), announced that the headquarters of all fifty states, three territories, and the District of Columbia would begin transforming to a Joint Force headquarters structure at a Pentagon press conference on Friday, 16 May 2003. He said, "We will transform the National Guard, both the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, to be a joint team, a team with the five other services - the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard - and the seven Reserve Components, so that the citizens of our great nation get the best of all of their capabilities and the effects that a joint team can produce." (Defense Link Online, 2003)

The transformation to a joint operating activity provided a universal command structure that allows the states to create joint task force (JTF) units to support state emergencies and provide support to other states during times of disaster. It also creates a dual status commander that allows the National Guard to support and be supported by federal troops (NGB C&IP, 2006, iii, iv).

There was never a need for personnel trained in joint planning in the National Guard State Headquarters previous to this announcement. Each state headquarters consisted of an Army Guard headquarters staff, an Air Guard headquarters staff and the State Military Department (SMD) headquarters staff. The state headquarters organization in California prior to the JFHQ transformation was unique in that it contained a state militia within the headquarters structure, in addition to the other state military headquarters. (See figure 1). California did not have any Navy, Marine or Coast Guard members assigned to the state military headquarters, nor were there any positions

specified. Each Service Component staff worked primarily in its own areas and operated according to its own service specific doctrine.

Former Organization of the CANG




Figure 1. California Military Department Organization (Pre-2003)

Source: Krauss, W. Fritz, J-5, California National Guard, 2008

Each Joint Force headquarters is expected to operate in a fully joint environment when the transformation is completed. One of the critical functions of operating in a fully joint environment is the ability to conduct joint planning. The transformation process created some unique challenges in that the states were tasked to convert their state military headquarters to Joint Force headquarters (JFHQ) elements with no

resourcing and no additional manpower. The NGB Concept and Implementation Plan (C& IP) states:

“Implementation of the Concept Plan is not contingent on receiving resources from the DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Departments of the Army and Air Force above and beyond those resources already programmed for the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG). There will be no growth of ARNG or ANG manpower. The JFHQ-State will be built using existing requirements from the States’ Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and from the Unit Manning Document (UMD)” (NGB C&IP, 2006, 1).

Each position that transformed from a service specific position to a joint position had to be filled using available manpower and without any additional funding or resources for these newly created positions. One critical component to operating in a joint environment is the ability for the organization to conduct the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and organize joint plans in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution (JOPES) format. In addition to the challenges of learning a new planning process and training planners to use the new format, all of the existing plans for each state would have to be updated and converted to the JOPES format.

These changes created some unique challenges within each state headquarters; 1) the transformation of the State Headquarters from an Operation Headquarters to Joint Force headquarters; 2) new mission requirements; 3) a new organizational structure; 4) new planning process; and 5) the need to ensure all critical joint positions were filled with trained and qualified personnel (NGB C&IP, 2006, 1-2, 11-12). To date, all fifty-four states and territories have started the transformation process but none of them have completed it. The process cannot be completed until the organization has been designated a Joint Operating Activity by DoD through the Joint Staff (NGB J-5, 8). The

requirements needed to complete the JFHQ transformation process are outlined in chapter two.

The primary question addressed by this paper is: ***“What are the most significant challenges to the implementation of a doctrinally correct joint planning process when transforming from a state military headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters in California?”*** To answer this question, several secondary questions need to be addressed.

- How is Joint Planning currently conducted?
- How was planning conducted prior to transformation?
- What checks are conducted to ensure that joint planning is conducted in a doctrinally correct format?
- What are the resource documents?
- How is the training of joint planners conducted?
- How is training documented?
- What is the current training plan?
- What is the impact on existing plans?
- What training has been conducted to convert existing plans to the joint planning format?

The Purpose of the Study

This study investigates the changes brought about by the implementation of the joint planning process with relation to the transformation to a Joint Force headquarters in California. It explores the impact of the joint planning process on current operational plans within California and the challenges and successes experienced during the process. In doing so, it will focus on what effects this process has had in California.

Research Objective

The research objective for this paper is to identify the challenges joint planners face when transforming to a doctrinally correct Joint Force headquarters in a formerly non-joint organization. The process of Joint Force headquarters transformation still continues in each of the fifty-four states and territories. This study will also identify any successes and solutions to the challenges of transformation. The results of this research will be presented to the planning sections in the J-3 and J-5 at the National Guard Bureau headquarters to assist them in addressing issues related to the Joint Force headquarters transformation process.

Scope

The focus of this paper is limited to the challenges experienced in implementing a doctrinally correct joint planning process within a Joint Force headquarters undergoing transformation in California. Research includes guidance issued from the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Department of Defense (DoD) specific to Joint Force headquarters transformation and implementation.

Research for this paper does not include challenges experienced when implementing a doctrinally correct joint planning process within a Joint Force headquarters undergoing transformation in any other state. The differences in organizational structure and size of forces assigned to each state are significant enough to warrant research outside the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

BACKGROUND

A review of the literature is necessary to create an understanding of the dynamics involved in the process of joint planning and the guidance issued to the states during the transformation to Joint Force headquarters process.

This thesis began by outlining the origins and transformations in the National Guard structure, both statutorily and organizationally, by describing how it has changed through the years to meet the changing needs of the nation and the active duty military. It also identified the need for the National Guard to undergo further transformation due to the nature and relative frequency of significant federal mobilizations since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. This need for further transformation led to the current transition of the State Military Headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters.

The transformation to a Joint Force headquarters created the need for personnel trained in joint planning. Planners also need to understand how the JOPP works and determine whether contingency planning or crisis action planning would be appropriate.

Review of the Literature

Existing literature related to the question, “What are the most significant challenges to the implementation of a doctrinally correct joint planning process when transforming from a state military headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters in California”, falls into five broad categories: 1) Transformation, 2) Joint Planning, 3)

Doctrine, 4) California Specific Documents, and 5) Working Issues that state Joint Force headquarters staffs are addressing. Each category addresses several secondary questions and provides key information for answering the primary question. This paper covers each of these categories and the appropriate references individually. The information gathered that related directly to the JFHQ transformation and guidance issued to the states in support of the transformation was limited to literature written after April 2003. The initial guidance that started the transformation process was issued in this month, therefore information regarding JFHQ transformation written prior to February 2003 is not current enough to provide any data relevant to the research scope of this paper.

Transformation

“Transformation is a state of mind. It is about how we think, organize and approach the future. It is how we employ our citizen soldiers and airmen, their units, equipment and capabilities in new and more effective ways.”

—LTG H. Steven Blum¹

There is a tremendous amount of data available on the subject of transformation. Most of this documentation focuses on modernizing the military forces and a significant amount of material that focuses on Joint Force headquarters transformation. This section also contains guidance regarding JFHQ transformation issued by both the Department of Defense (DoD), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The literature contained in this section focuses on information related to transformation and, specifically, JFHQ transformation that was used to answer the questions outlined in this paper.

Stephenson and Kem both provide additional insight into the military transformation concept, Stephenson from a philosophical standpoint, and Kem from a

¹ Source: Haskell, Bob. “Blum Addresses the Commanders in Chief,” *The On Guard*, April 2004, vol XXXII, 5, p. 6

practical standpoint. Stephenson draws the parallels between the current military transformation model described by then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker and the paradoxical trinity described by Carl von Clausewitz in his book, “On War”. He goes on to describe how the “Trinity of Transformation”, Conceptual, Technological and Logistical can be directly associated with Clausewitz’s “Paradoxical Trinity”, Passion, Policy and Probability (Stephenson 2006).

Kem’s view of transformation focuses on the practical viewpoint and tackles the concept from an “Ends, Ways, and Means” perspective. He asserts that transformation “addresses three major areas – how we do business inside the department, how we work with interagency and multinational partners, and how we fight” (Kem 2006). He describes transformation as being like the “transformer” toy. It looks like an ordinary vehicle initially but the parts move and bend to reshape the vehicle into a robot warrior with a totally different purpose, appearance and way of performing (Kem 2006).

The “transformer” toy represents a different mindset when looking at military transformation showing how changes can completely alter the look and structure of an organization. The organizational structure, functions and operational aspects of the State Joint Force headquarters will be vastly different from the traditional state military headquarters when transformation is complete. The processes used by the traditional state military headquarters no longer apply to the joint environment. The addition of the joint staff completely changes the relationships between the Service Components and sets up a single (joint) staff structure to exercise operational control over all assigned military forces.

Noonan and Lewis argue that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986 was a result of the inter-service rivalry and the inability of the US military forces to work effectively together in joint operations. They describe the Iranian hostage rescue attempt (1980) and the invasion of Grenada (1983) as examples of this problem (Noonan, Lewis 2003). Goldwater-Nichols was the catalyst for the current command structure we see in today's military and provided the framework for the development of the current Joint Force headquarters concept.

Logan, in his strategy research project for the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), described the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications of the JFHQ transformation process. He also talked about funding, which was a primary concern for the states in implementing the process. He said, "There are three implications of funding for the JFHQ. The first is that the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) only identifies within a Service budget, funding for their appropriate Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), or Unit Manning Document (UMD). The second implication is, who is the identified executive agent that will provide administrative and resource funding for the JFHQ? The final implication is whomever is the executive agent will provide funding for their appropriate Service personnel and equipment; however, the other Services, such as, the Army, Air Force, Marine, or Navy Reserve, will have to provide funding to the executive agent for their appropriate manpower and equipment within the JFHQ." (Logan, 2004, 3-4)

Another issue Logan addressed was the guidance issued to the states to implement the JFHQ transformation process. He said, "Although guidance was provided for the

joint staff portion of the JFHQ, NGB did not constrain the states to further develop their headquarters. Each state has its own uniqueness and subsequently there could be 54 different JFHQ constructs. The NGB will have to consolidate these into a common JFHQ construct and seek guidance from the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and then approval from OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense). This will probably take some time, but the issue is whether OSD will concur with NGB's proposed JFHQ construct. The implication here is that it could take several iterations between JCS and OSD for final approval of a JFHQ. Meanwhile, the states are implementing their construct without additional guidance.” (Logan, 2004, 3-4)

The Department of Defense (DoD) issued their transformation planning guidance in April 2003. The guidance defined transformation as, “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.” (DoD 2003, 3)

The planning guidance identified the scope of the DoD’s transformation and described the three areas where they would focus their efforts. These areas are:

- 1) How we fight, which includes a detailed approach to force transformation, development of future joint warfighting concepts and includes the full range of supporting military capability areas: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities

- 2) How we do business inside the DoD. It means pursuing transformational business and planning practices such as adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial, future-

oriented, capabilities-based resource allocation planning process, accelerated acquisition cycles built on spiral development, output-based management, and a reformed analytic support agenda

3) How the DoD works with interagency and multinational partners, which provides instruction on developing better working relationships with interagency partners on defense issues and implementing our defense strategy through regional partnerships, however, more guidance is required with respect to multinational transformation cooperation (DoD 2003, 6-7).

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) issued several “all states” memorandums that provided information and guidance to the states regarding implantation of the JFHQ transformation process. All States Log #P03-0038 is the initial memorandum, issued on 01 July 2003, regarding JFHQ transformation. It states:

“The National Guard must transform in order to remain ready, relevant, and proactive. Transformation within the National Guard will build our warfighting capabilities and enhance what we already have to be able to deal with new threats and emerging realities” (NGB P03-0038, 2003, 1).

The memorandum continues by directing portions of the NGB staff to begin operating immediately as a joint staff. It also directs that the entire NGB staff be operational as a joint staff by 01 October 2003(NGB P03-0038, 2003, 1).

All States Log #P03-0044, issued on 14 July 2003, is the initial memorandum directing all states transform to their state headquarters to JFHQ. The memorandum directs all states to achieve initial operational capability (IOC) as a JFHQ by 01 October 2003.

The memorandum continues by stating: “We will continue the transformation process for the foreseeable future. The Directors of the Army and Air National Guard

and I agree that this is not simply an act changing office symbols. The mid-range goal of this process is to achieve full operational capability (FOC) of each JFHQ-State within three years, to include doctrinally sound joint operations performed by the JFHQ-State based on formerly approved joint manning documents and joint duty positions (NGB P03-0044, 2003, 2).

The NGB Joint Manpower Implementing Guidance for JFHQ-State provides interim implementation guidance for the transformation process. The intent of the guidance is to include interim joint policy guidance, procedures, submission and reporting requirements for states in developing their respective state Mission, Organization and Functions (O&F) manual, Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), and Joint Duty Assignment – Reserve (JDAR) nomination packets. The guidance also states that the transition to JFHQ will take place using existing resources. The process includes transitioning positions from the State Area Command (STARC) TDA to the JTD and states that the actions are normally “zero balance” actions to realign existing positions to meet the changing mission needs and do not affect the total number of joint manpower positions (NGB JMIG, 2004, 13-14).

The NGB JFHQ-State Concept and Implementation plan replaced the NGB Joint Manpower Implementing Guidance for JFHQ-State. The current version, dated 14 February 2006, outlines the background and latest changes to the JFHQ transformation process. It states:

“This Concept Plan supports a reorganization requirement for the National Guard State Headquarters of the 50 States, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, hereafter referred to as “States and Territories” (NGB C&IP, 2006, 1).

Implementation of the Concept Plan is not contingent on receiving resources from the DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Departments of the Army and Air Force above and beyond those resources already programmed for the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG). There will be no growth of ARNG or ANG manpower. The JFHQ-State will be built using existing requirements from the States' Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and from the Unit Manning Document (UMD).

Any future requirements for other Services staff representation will be submitted in accordance with established JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Committee) procedures for other Service integrators. Some proposed future requirements are identified in Annex E and will require validation by the Joint Staff and the Services" (NGB C&IP, 2006, 1)

The NGB JFHQ-State Concept and Implementation plan also includes the guidance needed for states to implement transition and complete the JFHQ transformation process. The final step in the process is the FOC validation. It states that Full Operational Capability (FOC) will be established over four phases: Implementation Planning, Transition, Maturation and FOC Validation.

FOC Validation is a formal process, conducted in concert with the NGB at the request of the Adjutant General of each state. FOC will be validated by each JFHQ-State through submission of required documentation and demonstration of the ability of the organization to accomplish their Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) tasks through exercises or actual events. Target completion date was FY 06 (NGB C&IP, 2006, 13, 14). A briefing from the NGB J-5 provides the criteria and guidelines for FOC validation (see figure 2) (NGB J-5, 8)

JFHQ-State Full Operational Capability (FOC) Guidelines

- **Doctrine** - 1. State O&FM approved by TAG and provided to NGB; 2. DOD policy establishes JFHQ-State as a joint activity.
- **Organization** - 1. JFHQ-State JTD approved by DOD and NGB; 2. Supporting HLD/CS CONPLANS submitted thru NGB to appropriate CoCom. 3. JOC SOP completed.
- **Training** - 1. JFHQ-State has demonstrated JMETL proficiency in appropriate NGB-approved CoCom joint exercise or real world event.
- **Materiel** – 1. JFHQ-State has 85% of supporting TDA/ASC-authorized equipment. 2. JFHQ-State has required C4 capabilities for JOC, forward JTF, other key C2 nodes and to support deployed NG forces at an incident site.
- **Leadership** – 1. TAG routinely employs JFHQ-State Joint Staff as the principal coordinating staff; 2. JPME needs identified and initiated.
- **Personnel** – 1. Personnel identified for 90% of the authorizations on the JTD; 2. JOC manning planned for 24/7 contingency ops for 30 days
- **Facilities** - 1. JOC conforms to approved security and infrastructure criteria; 2. JFHQ-State has a functional alternate JOC site and RSO/BSI facility capable of supporting transient personnel and equipment for 30 days.

As of 25 Jan 06.

Figure 2. JFHQ-State FOC Guidelines

Source: National Guard Bureau. J-5, JFHQ-State Briefing to all states, January 2006, slide. 8

There is other information regarding National Guard Joint Force headquarters transformation found in news articles and press releases. This literature has an effect on the implementation of the JFHQ transformation process in California by providing information regarding the direction and intent of LTG Blum's guidance to the states.

Caruso, Moniz and Maze all discuss legislative changes and provide current operational information regarding the National Guard Joint Force headquarters transformation process. Caruso and Moniz also discuss the National Guard transformation process and provide information directly from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG H. Steven Blum.

Caruso discusses the actual transformation process and structure that LTG Blum briefed to The Adjutants General (TAGs) in all fifty-four states and territories on May 16, 2003. LTG Blum reorganized the state headquarters by “merging the separate Army, Air, and state National Guard headquarters from fifty-four states and territories into a single Joint Force headquarters in each state” (Caruso 2004).

Moniz provided further information on the National Guard Joint Force headquarters transformation process by discussing changes to the force structure, in addition to the changes in the state headquarters itself. He reported that one of the most significant changes is a move to convert 5,000 artillery soldiers into military police to guard military bases and maintain order in Iraq. (Moniz 2003). He further described the different status of National Guard troops, saying, “The Guard is a unique state and federal force whose troops report to the governors in peacetime but can be called up for federal military duty at home or overseas” (Moniz 2003). This underscores some of the difficulties experienced by the National Guard when undergoing the process to transform into a Joint Force headquarters in each state.

Press releases discussed the progress of the transformation efforts in each state expressed by LTG Blum. They wrote about how LTG Blum was amazed by the progress of the transformation process. LTG Blum stated, “The National Guard I joined was a strategic reserve – deliberately under-resourced, deliberately undermanned and deliberately under-equipped” (Agency Group 09 (1) 2006). He explained that the transformation process has allowed the National Guard to be better prepared to answer the nation’s call, when needed. LTG Blum said, “We’re trying to be a ready force, and I think your Guard today is more ready than it’s ever been” (Agency Group 09 (2) 2006).

Joint Planning

There is a significant amount of research data available on the subject of joint planning. For the purposes of this paper, joint planning is divided into two broad categories, strategic planning and operational planning. Operational planning is further divided into two categories, contingency planning and crisis action planning. The majority of the information regarding joint planning is contained in doctrinal publications and will be discussed in the next category. The remaining literature discusses the practical aspects of joint planning and its application in real world scenarios.

Bartholomees put together a comprehensive set of contemporary articles for the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) for their *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*. This book is used by the USAWC for their National Security Policy and Strategy block of instruction. The book divides the articles into five chapters, 1) The National Security Environment, 2) Strategic Theory and Formulation, 3) Elements of Power, 4) National Security Policymaking, and 5) Strategic Issues (Bartholomees, 2006, iv)

Bartholomees article in chapter II discusses the theory of strategy and its evolution. He explains that the military definition of strategy is derived from military theorists Carl von Clausewitz, who said that strategy is “the use of engagements for the object of war”. (Clausewitz, 1993, 146) and Basil Liddell Hart, who defined strategy as “The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Bartholomees, 2006, 81). He also discusses the many variations of the definition being used by today’s military:

“The U.S. military has an approved joint definition of strategy: “The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”

The explanation in the Joint Encyclopedia goes a little further: “These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means).” That is more satisfactory, although still focused exclusively on national security issues, which is understandable considering the source. However, the joint definition of national military strategy shows that the joint community is divided or at least inconsistent on this subject.

“National Military Strategy - The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace or war.” is a pure “how to” definition—at best a correlation of objectives with methods with the emphasis on methods. There is no consideration of or recognition of the importance of developing means; there is also no consideration of developing military objectives to accomplish national objectives.

The U.S. Army War College defines strategy in two ways: “Conceptually, we define strategy as the relationship among ends, ways, and means.” Alternatively, “Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.” (Bartholomees, 2006, 84)

Meinhart discusses the recent evolution of military strategies and the strategic planning system. He explains that the four Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1990—Generals Colin Powell (1989-93), John Shalikashvili (1993-97), Henry Shelton (1997-2001) and Richard Myers (2001-05)—used an unclassified national military strategy to provide advice on the military’s strategic direction to the President and Secretary of Defense, and communicated that direction to Congress and the American people. The Chairman’s responsibilities as the nation’s senior military advisor to provide this strategic advice, along with many other tasks, are specified in Title 10 U.S. Code.

These increased responsibilities were a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), considered to be the most significant piece of defense legislation since the National Security Defense Act of 1947 that established the Defense Department (Meinhart, 2006, 303). He further discusses the strategic planning system and how it

evolved from pre-1990 status to the current status in 2005 (see figure 3) (Meinhart, 2006, 306).




Figure 3. Strategic Planning Process

Source: Meinhart, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2006, 303

Meinhart also discusses how the strategic planning process was used to develop the current National Military Strategy. He concluded the article by saying,

“The National Military Strategy is the keystone document of an overarching strategic planning system that enabled the Chairman as the nation’s senior military advisor to execute his formal leadership responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Since 1990, each of the four strategies examined identified the broad military ends, ways, and means to meet the nation’s security challenges identified by the President in his *National Security Strategy* and integrated advice by the Secretary of Defense from other documents.

The unclassified nature of the strategy and its signature by the Chairman to integrate this civilian advice was a leadership legacy started by Chairman Powell that continues today. Most importantly, this strategy directly communicates to the American people the need for a military, what that military will do, and how it will do it to provide for our nation's security" (Meinhart, 2006, 303).

Klein discusses the Adaptive Planning (AP) process and its application in Joint Operations Planning. Adaptive Planning is the joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require (Klein 2007, 84). This planning model updates and adds flexibility to the outdated German General Staff planning process. The classic example of this planning model is the Alfred Graf von Schlieffen plan for the German invasion of France through the Netherlands and Belgium executed in 1914.

The Schlieffen plan (see figure 4) was designed on the concept of rapid mobilization and took months to put together. The problem with this plan is that it was not flexible and could not be adapted to a changing situation.




Figure 4. Schlieffen Plan

Source: Klein, Robert M. 2007. Adaptive Planning: Not your Great Grandfathers Schlieffen Plan. *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 45, 2nd quarter: pg. 85

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was frustrated by the lack of flexibility in the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) during the planning prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The JOPP was a formalized process based on the German General Staff planning model and had many of the same drawbacks. Some of the drawbacks to this planning model that Secretary Rumsfeld identified during the initial planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are:

- 1) It was a single, defensive option.
- 2) The original assumptions, assessments, and forces were not relevant to the actual situation.
- 3) Policy makers wanted multiple options, including an offensive one.
- 4) The planning process and technology made it difficult to modify the plan and put it into execution quickly.
- 5) The plan required extraordinary effort to adapt successfully to the rapidly changing environment (see figure 5).

Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the initial plan, based on Operation Desert Storm, to be re-written and demanded alternatives and “out-of-the-box thinking (Klein 2007, 85).




Figure 5. Adaptive Planning Concept

Source: Klein, Robert M. 2007. Adaptive Planning: Not your Great Grandfathers Schlieffen Plan. *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 45, 2nd quarter: pg. 86

The result was an update to the JOPP that relied on the Adaptive Planning (AP) process. This process allowed for contingency planning but provided a streamlined process for crisis action planning that dramatically reduced the time required, when necessary, to build and complete a joint operations plan. The resulting plan (see figure 6) was approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on December 13, 2005 (Klein 2007, 85).




Figure 6. Adaptive Planning Processes

Source: Klein, Robert M. 2007. Adaptive Planning: Not your Great Grandfathers Schlieffen Plan. *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 45, 2nd quarter: pg. 88

Doctrine

Most descriptions of joint planning and operations focus on outlining requirements for organizations and guidance for implementation. To answer the questions outlined in this paper, it is necessary to examine the literature on current doctrine and previous doctrine, as well as guidance from NGB and DoD dealing with Joint Force headquarters transformation and implementation.

JP 5.0, *Joint Operations Planning*, provides the basis for operations planning in the joint environment. It covers all aspects of planning at the strategic and operational levels. JP 5.0 reflects current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and

multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations (JP 5-0 2006, intro.). It incorporates the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) in the joint planning arena (See figure 7) and updates the previous doctrine to incorporate the Adaptive Planning Roadmap signed by the Secretary of Defense on December 13, 2005. The process allows for joint planning to be conducted as a deliberate process for contingency planning when there is sufficient time to conduct a thorough planning process, or as an abbreviated process for crisis action planning when planning is conducted in a time sensitive environment.




Figure 7. Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP)

Source: Department of Defense. Joint Operation Planning, *Joint Publication 5-0*, 26 December 2006, pg. III-20

JP 5-0 describes the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) as, “An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action against criteria of success and each other; select the best course of action; and produce a joint operation plan or order.” (JP 5-0, 2006, GL-15). It also outlines the process for the conduct of joint planning and identifies the planning products that should be produced by the JOPP (See figure 8).




Figure 8. Joint Operations Planning Products

Source: Department of Defense. Joint Operation Planning, *Joint Publication 5-0*, 26 December 2006, pg. I-24

Crisis action planning is a form of joint planning that allows for planners to produce results much quicker than when using the contingency planning process. The process also allows for planning to be conducted during the execution phase of operations. Planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping sequences (JP 5-0, III-58), current operations planning, near term planning, and future operations planning. (See figure 9).




Figure 9. Planning During Execution

Source: Department of Defense. Joint Operation Planning, *Joint Publication 5-0*, 26 December 2006, pg. III-58

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, provides the framework for operating in a joint environment. It discusses the strategic context, joint operations fundamentals, functions, plans and assessment, crisis response, contingency operations and considerations for all levels of joint operations. JP 3.0 reflects the current guidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the full range of military operations (JP 3-0, 2006 intro.).

CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats (hereafter referred to as JOPES) provides the actual framework and basis for Joint Operations Plans. JOPES lays out the specifics on how a joint operations plan is supposed to be structured, as well as the specific information that is to be included in joint plans. It discusses administrative guidance, commander's estimate, plan front matter², basic plan and appendixes, annexes, tabs and exhibits (CJCSM, 2006, vii).

California Specific Documents

The literature in this section identifies documents that are currently in use by the JFHQ in California. They include standing operating procedures (SOP), California specific manuals and guidelines.

CA-JFHQM 5000-1 is the California National Guard, Joint Force headquarters, Organizations and Functions Manual. This manual is applicable to all elements of the California Military Department and the JFHQ. It describes the organization and functions of the Joint Force headquarters (JFHQ) in California.

² Plan front matter consists of those things contained in the front of a joint plan. They include the cover page, approval memorandum, letter of transmittal and security instructions and record of changes. (CJCSM 3122.03B, vii)

The JFHQ functions in a unique role, as both a federal entity, and a state agency, with distinct requirements, responsibilities, resources, and functions that must be integrated into a single operational entity equally responsive to both the state and federal missions. This manual reflects the first integrated organization and function document to address both the state and federal missions since the federally directed re-organization from State Area Command (STARC) to Joint Force headquarters-State (JFHQ) (CA-JFHQM 5000-1, 2).

The manual describes the six major functions within the California Military Department (CMD) and its mission. It also recognizes that there are overlapping mission sets and mission requirements between Homeland Defense (federal mission), Homeland Security (federal or state mission), Emergency Preparedness (state mission), and Civil Security (state mission) (See figure 10) (CA-JFHQM 5000-1, 8)




Figure 10. Overlapping Mission Requirements

Source: California Military Department, Joint Force headquarters, Organizations and Functions Manual, CA-JFHQM 5000-1, June 2007, pg 11

The manual also describes the organization and functions for each staff within the JFHQ; primary, special and personal staffs, service component (Army and Air) staffs and the State Military Reserve (SMR) staff. Each staff area contains, at a minimum, the mission and essential tasks for that staff. Larger staffs also contain an organization chart and breakdown, by organizational structure, the mission and essential tasks within that organization that support the larger, overall staff section mission and the mission supporting the joint mission essential task list (JMETL) (CA-JFHQM 5000-1, 9-10).

The CMD strategic plan is the primary document used to plan the future of the California Military Department. This document recognizes the need for the CMD to plan ahead, as a department and not as just Service Components with the state headquarters.

The Department is undergoing dramatic change in mission, function, and organization to better respond to the needs of the State of California and the nation. This transformation is impacting all elements of the Department, and is reflected in the form and scope of the current Strategic Plan. The extent of transformation, initiated by both federal and state requirements limited the scope of this plan to completing transformation actions and preparing for new directions at the completion of transition. Future updates to this plan will generate a longer range focus.

The Headquarters of the California National Guard and the Military Department of California, following several years of exploring alternative organizational structures and alignments, is now actively transforming to a Joint Force headquarters under a doctrinally accurate organizational structure, that once complete, will afford the State a much greater level of support response from not only the California Military Department and California National Guard, but will deepen the capabilities pool to include Department of Defense assets previously not available to the State.

The California Army National Guard is transforming from a strategic reserve force to an operational force, with modular capabilities better suited to meet the federal needs of the United States Army, the needs of the State of California, and to be prepared to operate in a joint environment (CMD, 2007, 3).

The CMD strategic plan describes the vision (see figure 11), mission (see figure 12), and core competencies (see figure 13) that must be sustained for the CMD to be effective as a military organization.




Figure 11. California Military Department Vision

Source: California Military Department, California National Guard Strategic Plan, May 2006, pg 7




Figure 12. California Military Department Mission

Source: California Military Department, California National Guard Strategic Plan, May 2006, pg 8




Figure 13. California Military Department Core Competencies

Source: California Military Department, California National Guard Strategic Plan, May 2006, pg 10

The plan also contains organizational priority issues, organizational goals, and operational goals for the Joint Force headquarters, each of the Service Components (Army and Air), and the State Military Reserve. These goals are reviewed annually to ensure the CMD is on track with its strategic plan and allow them to make adjustments to ensure future goals continue to be met.

California has recently fielded a Joint Planning Group (JPG) Standing operating Procedures SOP manual to the JFHQ staff. The SOP is being exercised to validate the procedures contained in the manual and will be finalized later this year.

The SOP describes the organization and procedures used by the California Military Department for accomplishing “future planning”. Future operational planning

will be accomplished by the joint planning group (JPG). The JPG is composed of representatives from all staff sections and components that may be involved in conducting or supporting the mission for which the plan is being developed.

“Future planning” refers to a deliberate process used for planning potential or expected mission requirements in advance of the need to implement the plan. Future planning may include planning for contingencies that can be reasonably expected (such as responding to a future earthquake in California) or may include planning for the follow-on phase of an ongoing operation (such as the ordered demobilization from a major operation in preparation for an anticipated change in mission)

Contingency planning will be conducted using the joint operations planning process (JOPP) and joint operations planning and execution system (JOPES) and all plans developed will comply with the standard joint format. The uses of JOPES provides continuity of plans and ensures all stakeholders, regardless of component are able to quickly and accurately convert the plan to an operations order capable of being implemented with a minimum of delay and confusion (CMD JPG SOP, 2007, 1).

The SOP also provides the organization and composition of the Joint Planning Group (JPG). The group is divided into a core planning element and a support element with the appropriate staff representation to prepare a comprehensive plan (see figure 14). The core element is always formed, and the support element will be formed as needed, according to the situation.




Figure 14. CMD Joint Planning Group Composition

Source: California Military Department, Joint Force headquarters Joint Planning SOP, June 2007, pg 5

The SOP also contains a JPG action checklist (see figure 15). The checklist is divided into 3 parts and can be used by anyone on the JPG. Each part identifies specific items that can be delegated to members of the JPG and tracked to ensure all steps are completed.

JPG Action Checklist			
Item	Action/Task	Responsible	Complete ?
1	Coordinate Commanders Intent	Dir, J-5	
2	Identify JPG Facilitator	Dir J-5	
3	Schedule JPG Meetings	JPG Coordinator	
4	Conduct 1 st JPG Meeting for Directors/Deputies	Dir J-5	
5	Conduct Subsequent JPG Meetings	JPG Coordinator	
6	Develop Re-Call Roster	Plans NCO	
7	Develop Portal Site	Plans NCO	
8	Schedule in-progress briefings	Dir, J-5	
9	Schedule//Conduct JPG (JOPES) Training	Dir, J-5	
10	Develop Functional Products & Annexes	JPG Members	
11	Coordinate Staffing and Review of products in development	JPG Members	
12	Coordinate Staffing and functional Review of completed draft plan with staff sections	Dir, J-5	
13	Coordinate Staffing and Operational Review of completed draft plan with J-3	Dir, J-5	
14	Coordinate Plans Brief to Senior Leadership	Dir, J-5 & J-3	
15	Post approved plan to portal and distribute	Plans NCO	
16	Coordinate any directed edits/corrections	JPG Coordinator	
17	Conduct Plans hand-off to J3	Dir, J-5	
18	Schedule periodic update	Dir, J-3	

JPG Member Checklist			
Item	Issue	Responsible	Complete ?
1	Requested by JPG Coordinator	JPG Coordinator	
2	Appointed by Memorandum	Staff Director	
3	Verify Completed Training (or)	JPG Coordinator	
3a	Schedule and complete JOPES training	JPG Member	
4	Recall Roster Updated	Plans NCO	
5	Security Clearance Verified	JPG Coordinator	
6	Portal Access verified	Plans NCO	
7	Clarification of products and Expectations	JPG Coordinator	
8	Confirm anticipated schedule for meetings & products	JPG Coordinator	
9	Develop staff products and processes on schedule	JPG Member	
10	Participate in reviewing and staffing products	JPG Members	
11	Participate in plans brief to Senior Leadership	JPG Members	
12	Complete edits and updates as directed	JPG Members	
13	Participate in plans hand-off to J-3	JPG Members	
14	Prepare acknowledgment/Verification documentation	JPG Coordinator	

Joint Operations Planning Process Steps		
Step	Outcome	Complete
1	Initiation (receive Commanders Intent)	
2	Mission Analysis	
3	Course of Action Development	
4	Course of Action Analysis	
5	Course of Action Comparison	
6	Course of Action Approval	
7	Orders Production	

Figure 15. CMD Joint Planning Group Action Checklist

Source: California Military Department, Joint Force headquarters Joint Planning SOP, June 2007, pg 8

California has also fielded a draft operational planning group (OPG) SOP for personnel working in the J-3 and assigned to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) during emergency operations. The OPG SOP focus of effort is conducting Crisis Action Planning (CAP), mission analysis and planning near-term future operations. JFHQ J3/Future Operations Division (J35) represents J3 in the operational planning process to ensure continuity between the COG and JPG regarding plans and orders, commander's intent, approved end states and operational objectives. During a contingency, the OPG plans operations within the current phase and accomplishes the refined coordination of plans developed by the JPG. The plans are based on updated situation awareness and ongoing refinements required to synchronize the pending operations (see figure 16).

Responsibilities include:

- Coordinate with other staffs and commands as necessary for a complete review of a potential crisis

- Produce messages, reports, orders, briefs and other documents providing decision makers with the information required to make informed decisions

- Modify plans developed by the JPG based upon the current situation

- Develop modified plans into orders, (Warning Order [WARNORD], Prepare To Deploy Order [PTDO], OPORD or EXORD) and pass to the COG for execution, along with situational CCIRs, Decision Support Matrix, execution timeline and point of contract (POC) coordination list

- Develop and assess the current operation and project future status of friendly forces for the next 96 hours. These projections, in conjunction with C2 projections for threat actions, determine the need for modification and development of current and anticipated operations to achieve the intended end state

- Task organize staff members to manage or execute up to three multiple or simultaneous events. More than three simultaneous events require close coordination with the JPG for planning and execution (CMD OPG SOP, 2007, 2).




Figure 16. OPG Plans and Operations Synchronization

Source: California Military Department, JFHQ Operations Planning SOP, June 2007, pg 3

This SOP is currently being exercised by JFHQ personnel to validate the document.

Working Issues

There is additional research data available on working issues that need to be addressed to answer some of the secondary questions outlined in chapter 1. The information regarding these working issues cover areas such as resourcing issues, monetary considerations, state emergency response requirements and effects of mobilizations on the transformation process. Although each topic area is significant,

there is not enough literature in each of these areas to warrant creating a separate category for each topic.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has published several reports regarding various aspects of the National Guard transformation process. The GAO published two reports in June 2007. The first report, presented in testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, discusses the fiscal, security and human impact of developing a revised business model for the Reserve Component. The GAO reported that the Department of Defense's (DoD) "reliance on the Reserve Components in recent years to support military operations and homeland security needs has highlighted the need to better align the reserves' business model with their 21st century roles" (GAO (1) 2007, 3).

The second report, delivered to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, discusses the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and how enhancing EMAC's collaborative and administrative capacity should improve national disaster response. The significance of this report is that it streamlines the process to expedite the delivery of resources for disaster response and specifically, National Guard support. The effect of EMAC on the Joint Planning process at the state level is that it allows the National Guard in each state to look at the available resources of other states that participate in EMAC when planning for state emergencies that may overwhelm existing resources in that state (GAO (2) 2007, 4).

Summary of the Literature

The available literature in the areas of Transformation, Leadership, Doctrine, California Specific Documents and Working Issues provide the background information

needed for this research. Each category provided sufficient information to give the reader a solid foundation about the issues related to the Joint Force Headquarters transformation process.

Transformation provides information about the process and guidance issued. It includes detailed information regarding specific guidance that was issued from the DoD and NGB to California on the process of transformation, the expected timelines, resource issues and milestones for completion of the process.

Joint Planning provides information and background data regarding the process used by joint planners and the differences planners experience when transitioning from a service-centric planning system to a joint planning system. The majority of the literature about joint planning is contained in doctrinal publications and will be discussed in the next category. The remaining literature discusses the practical aspects of joint planning and its application in real world scenarios.

Doctrine covers the institutional guidelines and focuses on outlining requirements for organizations and guidance for implementation. It covers literature on current doctrine and previous doctrine, as well as guidance from NGB, DoD and DA specific to Joint Force Headquarters transformation and implementation that is necessary to answer the questions outlined in this paper.

JP 5-0 serves as the base document and guidance for joint planning. This publication covers the deliberate process of the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP), as well as the abbreviated crisis action planning process used in a time constrained environment.

California Specific documents cover the literature created and used by California

to execute the Joint Force headquarters transformation in that state. It also covers the documents California has created to provide guidance in the conduct of contingency planning, crisis action planning and strategic planning.

Working issues covered the remaining areas of consideration about the Joint Force Headquarters transformation process. This area contains significant information about specific topics that did not have enough literature to create a separate category. Need to summarize the rest of the literature.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter looks at the four major areas of information gathered while collecting research for this topic. All documents that were collected and reviewed are available in open source. It also contains a description of the items and areas to be analyzed. It identifies and develops the procedures that were used for the analysis in the next chapter. It also addresses the possible objections to the validity of the analysis process.

Interviews comprised a large portion of the qualitative data collected. These interviews were critical to the success of this paper as they filled in the gaps created by doctrine and guidance, and provided insight into how doctrinal procedures were implemented. The interviews were conducted telephonically and in person.

Description of Items to Be Analyzed

The research plan for this thesis was to do a qualitative analysis of the Joint Force headquarters transformation process and the effect that leaders have in implementing the process. This paper studied the directions and implementation instructions disseminated by DoD and NGB and given to the states to begin the process of transformation and the guidance given to the planning staffs in particular. It examines existing doctrine regarding Joint Force headquarters in the National Guard and the changes from previous doctrine.

This paper looked at the joint planning process itself, researching existing doctrine and implementation practices. It reviews what training is available for joint

planners and what training is required for qualification as a joint planner. It also looks at the changes required to convert existing service specific plans to doctrinally correct joint plans and the magnitude of work required to complete the process.

Interviews

Part of the research plan was to conduct interviews with leaders and planners in key positions within the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Joint Force headquarters in California during the transformation process. As the research began to unfold, it became clear that interviews with leaders and planners at the National Guard Bureau would be unnecessary. All information that had been disseminated to the states was available through open source documents, eliminating the need for interviews with personnel within the National Guard Bureau.

I conducted nine interviews were conducted with JFHQ senior leaders, joint staff directors, joint planners within the various directorates, planners and force providers between the ranks of O-4 (Major) to O-7 (Brigadier General) within the Army and Air Guard directorates, and planning facilitators within the J-5. The initial plan included five interviews but the conduct of initial interviews revealed the need to expand the process to include leaders and planners within each of the specific services (Army and Air Force), in addition to the intended interviews of leaders and planners assigned to the Joint Staff.

These interviews identified common challenges and successes in both the transformation process, and joint planning issues. They also helped identify potential challenges that still need to be overcome to complete the transformation process and the conversion of remaining service specific plans to doctrinally correct joint plans.

Interviews with key personnel assigned to the G-3 Plans and A-3 Plans sections at the state headquarters in California. These personnel were JFHQ senior leaders, joint staff directors, joint planners within the various directorates, planners and force providers within the Army and Air Guard directorates, and planning facilitators within the J-5 who provided the answer to how they conducted planning prior to the JFHQ transformation. The interviews provided information on the practical application of the service specific doctrine and how each service contributed to the state plans.

I conducted interviews with key members of the joint staff in California to find out what checks are conducted to ensure that joint planning is conducted in a doctrinally correct format and the practical application of how those checks are handled and tracked.

Interviews with key personnel in the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policies Section at the Joint Force headquarters in California answered the question of how training is documented and determine what impact it has on existing plans. Researching doctrine and reporting requirements completed the answer to this question.

Converting existing service specific plans into doctrinally correct joint plans is a time consuming and laborious project. Interviews with key personnel in the J-3 Operations Sections and J-5 Strategic Plans and Policies Sections at the Joint Force headquarters in California helped to determine what training had been conducted to convert existing plans to the joint planning format.

Research

Current doctrine and existing guidance and directions issued from the Department of Defense (DoD), The Joint Staff, and the NGB to the states were examined to answer the question of how joint planning is conducted. Current doctrine provides the primary

resource to answer this question but state specific guidance and organizational structure must also be considered to provide practical solutions to the implementation of current doctrine.

Research of current doctrine, joint publications and specific guidance issued by DoD, The Joint Staff and NGB helped determine what checks are conducted to ensure that joint planning is conducted in a doctrinally correct format. Researching existing doctrine provided the information to answer what the resource material documents are.

Research on what training is available for joint planners and what training is required for qualification as a joint planner was needed to answer the question of how the training of joint planners is conducted.

Doctrine identified the training requirements but didn't necessarily answer the question of what the current training plan is. Interviews with key personnel in the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policies Section and J-7 Training at the Joint Force headquarters in California provided the answer to this question.

Methods of Analysis

The two most common methods of analysis are the qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative analysis provides information by using statistical data and numerical analysis to produce charts and graphs that show trends and predict outcomes based on that data. Qualitative analysis seeks to discover patterns such as changes over time or possible causal links between variables. The quantitative method will be used when employing tables and other numeric data.

Qualitative analysis shows depth of analysis by asking questions regarding specific information. It is the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data by

observing what people do and say. It analyzes and gives insight to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things.

Qualitative research consists mainly of individual, in-depth interviews and focus groups. The nature of this type of research is exploratory and open-ended where small numbers of people are interviewed in-depth and the data analyzed based on relevancy of its content, not the quantity of its content.

Analysis of the information collected helped identify key implications related to the primary question of, “What are the most significant challenges to the implementation of a doctrinally correct joint planning process when transforming from a state military headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters in California?”. The most important part of the analysis process was the qualitative analysis of the interviews that were conducted during the research for this paper. This information provided the answers to the secondary questions and provided the basis to answer the primary thesis question.

A side-by-side comparison was used to compare the current organizational model of the California National Guard and the organizational model that was in place prior to the Joint Force headquarters transformation. This comparison shows the functions that were shared in common between the current and old organizational structure and contrasted the differences between the two models.

An examination of the guidance issued by the NGB to the states and the associated source documents will show how they either support or do not support the California’s transformation to JFHQ.

Conclusions

Research will conclude in chapter 5 with an assessment and review of the information collected; its relevance, and recommendations for future research and actions. These conclusions and recommendations may assist leaders in other organizations undergoing the process of transformation in their state. The results of this research will be presented to the planning sections in the J-3 and J-5 at the National Guard Bureau headquarters to assist them in addressing issues related to joint planning and the Joint Force headquarters transformation process.

Threats to the Objectivity of the Research Challenged

Much of the research regarding guidance from NGB and DoD is contained in press releases and news articles. Press releases and news articles have the potential to be biased. No matter how fair or impartial an author attempts to be, everyone has some sort of bias that may be reflected in the written work.

Press releases and news articles can be biased in depth and breadth and based on either omitted information or incomplete information. This information can be used to promote a policy or point of view. The potential for bias must be taken into account when reviewing any source and make judgments as to the worth or value of the gathered information. Every effort has been made to verify information in press releases and news articles through either independent corroboration or through reference to multiple sources to minimize the potential for bias in this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the guidance, as well as the issues, pertaining to joint planning that surfaced as a result of the guidance that was issued while transforming from a state military headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters. Although the transformation to JFHQ is not yet complete, there is sufficient data available to analyze and identify the issues and challenges experienced during the process. There is also sufficient data available to identify and capture successes that were achieved during the process.

Military Decision Making Process

To understand the significance and impact the JFHQ transformation process has had on operational planning, a comparison of the old and new planning formats is necessary. Although they both appear to be similar in format and content, they are significantly different.

The Army planning process (called MDMP) is described in detail in FM 5-0. Because the CMD state headquarters was, primarily, an Army state headquarters, the MDMP was the primary tool for planners in that organization. FM 5-0 describes the MDMP process:

The military decision making process is a planning model that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or order. The MDMP applies across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations. Commanders with an assigned staff use the MDMP to organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders (FM 5-0, 2005, 3-1).

There are seven steps listed in the MDMP (see figure 16). They are: 1) receipt of the mission, 2) mission analysis, 3) course of action development, 4) course of action

analysis, 5) course of action comparison, 6) course of action approval, and 7) orders production (see figure 17) (FM 5-0, 2005, 3-11). The formal process always begins with step 1, receipt of the mission and moves through the subsequent steps until the process is complete.




Figure 17. Figure 9, Steps of the MDMP process

Source: Department of the Army, Army Planning and Orders Production, FM 5-0, January 2005, pg 3-11

Each step begins with inputs that build on previous steps. The outputs of each step drive subsequent steps. Errors committed in earlier steps will affect the outputs of later steps. Although the steps are listed in sequence, they do not necessarily stop when the next step starts. Some steps, mission analysis for instance, occur throughout the entire

process. It is convenient to describe the MDMP in terms of steps; nonetheless, planners compare the process to current requirements, set priorities, and perform the necessary tasks in an order that produces the required product on time (FM 5-0, 2005, 3-11).

Each staff member has specific tasks that need to be accomplished for the MDMP to move forward. These tasks ensure that planners have the most current information and provide the rest of the staff with critical information on which to base their decisions.

The staff performs the following critical tasks during planning:

- Develop and maintain staff estimates.
- Identify specified and implied tasks.
- Identify constraints.
- Identify key facts and assumptions.
- Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Formulate the concepts of operations and support in line with the commander's intent.
- Develop the scheme of maneuver to support the COA.
- Prepare, authenticate, and distribute their portion of the plan or order, annexes, estimates, appendixes, and supporting plans (FM 5-0, 2005, 3-9).

The performance of these tasks throughout the MDMP steps ensure that the staff considers all aspects of the military mission and provides the best possible solution based on the information provided. They also provide the basis for the orders production process, the last step in the MDMP.

Orders production consists of those actions taken by the staff to produce a complete operations order. There are many types of orders that can be produced through the MDMP; operation orders (OPORD), service support orders, movement orders,

warning orders and fragmentary orders. For the purposes of this paper, we will concentrate on the operation order.

FM 5-0 states that an *operation order* is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation (JP 1-02). Traditionally called the five paragraph field order, an OPORD contains the following:

- Task organization.
- Situation.
- Mission.
- Execution.
- Administrative and logistic support.
- Command and signal for the specified operation (FM 5-0, 2005, G-5).

The OPORD follows a specific format (see figures 18 and 19) to ensure the same information can be found in the same location on any operations order. Annexes to the OPORD also follow a specific format for the same reason (see figure 20).

[Classification] [Change from verbal orders, if any] OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name] References Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: Task Organization 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy forces. b. Friendly forces. c. Environment (1). Terrain. (2). Weather. (3). Civil Considerations. d. Attachments and detachments. e. Assumptions. 2. MISSION. 3. EXECUTION. Intent: a. Concept of operations. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. (4) Intelligence. (5) Engineer. (6) Air and Missile Defense. (7) Information Operations. (8). Nuclear, Biological, Chemical. (9). Military Police. (10) Civil-Military Operations. b. Tasks to maneuver units. c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Time or condition when the plan/order becomes effective. (2) CCIR (PIR, FFIR). (3) Risk reduction control measures. (4) Rules of engagement. (5) Environmental considerations. (6) Force protection. (7) As required. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT (Support Concept). [Classification]	Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number
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Figure 18. OPOrd format (page 1)

Source: Department of the Army, Army Planning and Orders Production, *FM 5-0*, January 2005, pg G-18 – G-19

[Classification]	
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]	
b. Materiel and services. c. Health service support. d. Personnel. e. As required.	
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.	
a. Command. b. Signal.	
ACKNOWLEDGE:	[Commander's last name] [Commander's rank]
OFFICIAL:	
[Authenticator's Name]	
[Authenticator's Position]	
ANNEXES:	
DISTRIBUTION:	
[Classification]	

Figure 19. OPORD format (page 2)

Source: Department of the Army, Army Planning and Orders Production, *FM 5-0*, January 2005, pg G-18 – G-19

Annex A (Task Organization)	Appendix 5 (Legal)
Annex B (Intelligence)	Appendix 6 (Religious Support)
Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)	Appendix 7 (Foreign and Host-Nation Support)
Appendix 2 (Intelligence Synchronization Plan)	Appendix 8 (Contracting Support)
Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence)	Appendix 9 (Reports)
Appendix 4 (Weather)	Annex J (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations)
Appendix 5 (IPB Products)	Annex K (Provost Marshal)
Annex C (Operation Overlay)	Annex L (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations)
Annex D (Fire Support)	Appendix 1 (ISR Tasking Plan/Matrix.)
Appendix 1 (Air Support)	Appendix 2 (ISR Overlay)
Appendix 2 (Field Artillery Support)	Annex M (Rear Area and Base Security)
Appendix 3 (Naval Gunfire Support)	Annex N (Space)
Annex E (Rules of Engagement)	Annex O (Army Airspace Command and Control)
Appendix 1 (ROE Card)	Annex P (Information Operations)
Annex F (Engineer)	Appendix 1 (OPSEC)
Appendix 1 (Obstacle Overlay)	Appendix 2 (PSYOP)
Appendix 2 (Environmental Considerations)	Appendix 3 (Military Deception)
Appendix 3 (Terrain)	Appendix 4 (Electronic Warfare)
Appendix 4 (Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability Execution Matrix and Timeline)	Appendix 5 (IO Execution Matrix)
Appendix 5 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal)	Annex Q (Civil-Military Operations)
Annex G (Air and Missile Defense)	Annex R (Public Affairs)
Annex H (Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Operations)	
Annex I (Service Support)	
Appendix 1 (Service Support Matrix)	
Appendix 2 (Service Support Overlay)	
Appendix 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control)	
Tab A (Traffic Circulation Overlay)	
Tab B (Road Movement Table)	
Tab C (Highway Regulation)	
Appendix 4 (Personnel)	

Figure 20. OPOD Annexes

Source: Department of the Army, Army Planning and Orders Production, *FM 5-0*, January 2005, pg G-20

The full MDMP provides the foundation on which planning in a time constrained environment is based. Before a unit can effectively conduct planning in a time-constrained environment, it must master the steps in the full MDMP. A unit can only shorten the process if it fully understands the role of each and every step of the process and the requirement to produce the necessary products. The advantages of using the full MDMP are—

It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs to identify the best possible friendly COA.

- It produces the greatest coordination and synchronization in plans and orders.
- It minimizes the chance of overlooking critical aspects of the operation.
- It helps identify contingencies for branch and sequel development.
- The disadvantage of using the full MDMP is that it is time-consuming. The longer the higher headquarters spends planning, the less time for subordinates to plan, prepare, and execute operations (FM 5-0, 2005, 3-3, 3-4).

The abbreviated MDMP is a process that has been discussed as a method used for planning by several of the interviewees. This method is covered in FM 5-0 this way:

The steps of an abbreviated MDMP are the same as those for the full process; however, the commander performs many of them mentally or with less staff involvement. The products developed during an abbreviated MDMP may be the same as those developed for the full process; however, they are usually less detailed. Some may be omitted altogether. Unit SOPs state how to abbreviate the MDMP based on the commander's preferences.

The advantages of abbreviating the MDMP are—

- It maximizes the use of available time.
- It allows subordinates more planning time.

- It focuses staff efforts on the commander's guidance.
- It facilitates adapting to a rapidly changing situation.
- It allows for the commander's experience to compensate for an inexperienced staff.

The disadvantages of abbreviating the MDMP are—

- It is much more directive and limits staff flexibility and initiative.
- It does not explore all available options when developing friendly COAs.
- It increases the risk of overlooking a key factor or not uncovering a significantly better option.
- It may decrease coordination and synchronization of the plan. (FM 5-0, 2005, 3-59).

The abbreviated MDMP is a powerful tool that, used correctly, would greatly reduce the planning time required to produce OPORDs and plans in a time constrained environment. It is not, however, the method of choice when trying to produce complete, detailed OPLANs³.

Joint Operation Planning Process

The transition to JFHQ created the necessity for planners to transition from the Army-centric MDMP, to the JOPP to produce joint plans for the organization. The JPG

³ OPORD is an operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

OPLAN is an operation plan. 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) (JP 5-0, 2006, GL-20)

process was incorporated as the best way to incorporate the JOPP at the JFHQ in California.

The joint operations planning process (called JOPP) is described in detail in JP 5-0. JP 5-0 describes the term, joint operation planning, as planning activities associated with the preparation of joint operation plans and operation orders for the conduct of military operations by joint force commanders (JP 5-0, 2006, 1-11).

As described earlier, JOPP is an adaptive process that allows clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners. The process helps to promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable, embedded options and, on the interaction between an organization's commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs (JP 5-0, 2006, 1-11).

The JOPP, like the MDMP, contains seven steps and uses almost the same titles for each step. (See figure 21). The difference is not in the number of steps or the names of those steps, it is in the way the process is executed.




Figure 21. MDMP vs. JOPP Comparison

The first step in the JOPP is initiation of the process itself. The CMD does not normally receive a mission prior to the conduct of JOPP. The process is usually initiated prior to a request for assistance from the Office of Emergency Services (OES), based on an anticipated need, or the likelihood there will be a need for the plan at a later time.

When the JOPP is initiated, the commander, in this case the commander of joint staff CMD, orders the formation of a joint planning group (JPG) to conduct the planning and prepare a plan. JP 5-00.2 describes the formation and composition of a JPG.

Composition of the JPG may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. There are no “hard and fast” rules on how to determine the precise number of personnel required to staff the JPG. A task specific organization may work best. Figure 22 depicts one approach to JPG organization.

Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure. These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, components, or organizations.

Often, representatives from the supported combatant command will augment the JPG. The heart of the JPG is the planning cell (see figure 20). This cell is a core of 10-12 personnel who are familiar with the CAP process and JOPES products. A small group of core planners is recommended, since large groups tend to become less focused and unmanageable. A focused effort is critical during the initial phases of CAP.(JP 5-00.2, 1999, IX-7)




Figure 22. Joint Planning group Composition

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, *Joint Publication 5-00.2*, 13 January 1999, pg IX-6

The next step in the JOPP, after the formation of the JPG is to conduct a mission analysis. The mission analysis, although similar to MDMP is different in that there are many other factors that have to be considered in the JOPP (see figure 23). These factors and considerations, such as 1) determine own military end state, objectives, and initial effects, 2) determine own & enemy's center(s) of gravity and critical factors, 3) review

strategic communication guidance (when applicable), and 4) Conduct initial force structure analysis are not normally a part of the MDMP process and there is no crossover. This is another area where OJT will not be able to provide sufficient expertise for persons not trained on the JOPP to get that expertise. Joint staff planners who rely on their MDMP background to accomplish the JOPP will, likely, miss a significant portion of the mission analysis process.

Mission Analysis - Joint vs. Army




Figure 23. Mission Analysis – Joint vs. Army Comparison

When a request is received from OES and there is not a plan already developed, the commander of the joint staff will convene a JPG to conduct crisis action planning (CAP). CAP is similar to the abbreviated MDMP. The steps are abbreviated and the

process is accelerated (see figure 24). The CAP process, also like the abbreviated MDMP, requires more direct involvement from the commander and relies on JPG members to be fully trained on JOPP for contingency planning.




Figure 24. Crisis Action Planning Process

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, *Joint Publication 5-00.2*, 13 January 1999, pg IX-15

California Military Department Organizational Structure

To understand the significance of the changes to joint planning as a result of the JFHQ transformation process, it is necessary to discuss how the organizational structure of the California Military Department (CMD) has changed. These changes directly affected the CMD's planning capability and provided direction for their future capabilities.

The CMD began changing its organizational structure in May 2003. This change was in response to the directive issued by the Chief National Guard Bureau, LTG F. Steven Blum. The CMD consisted of the Adjutant General (TAG), his personal and special staffs, and representatives from the Army Guard, Air Guard, state militia, and two

support divisions (see figure 25). The civil support division handled all of the operational requirements for the CMD and the resource services division handled all of the remaining functions, personnel, facilities, and fiscal support.

Former Organization of the CANG




Figure 25. California Military Department Organizational Structure (pre-2003)

Source: Krauss, W. Fritz, J-5, California National Guard, 2008

The TAGs personal and special staffs were usually provided by the service that the TAG belonged to when he was appointed. An Army Guard TAG primarily had an Army Guard personal and special staffs while an Air Guard TAG relied primarily on Air Guard personal and special staffs.

The changes brought about by the JFHQ transformation to the organizational structure in California were profound. The transformation process dissolved the civil

service division and resources service divisions. It created a true joint staff, consisting of members from both the Army and Air Guard components. It created the positions of Director and Chief of Staff (CoS) for the joint staff, and moved the state militia and special staff functions under the control of the joint staff (see figure 26).

Organization of the CANG




Figure 26. Current California Military Department Organizational Structure

Source: Krauss, W. Fritz, J-5, California National Guard, 2008

The creation of the joint staff represented a significant shift in the capabilities of the CMD headquarters staff. Coordination between the staff and Service Components improved due to the constant interaction within the various staff sections.

The joint staff now has the ability to task the Service Components to provide resources to support state missions. That tasking authority created the requirement for the staff to conduct joint planning to support those missions. The capabilities of the joint staff increased but so did the requirements that were placed on them.

The J-5 began to take on responsibilities to assist the planning efforts of other state agencies. This increase in planning support requirements, along with the existing requirements to convert existing plans to the joint format, requires a more robust planning capability in the J-5 shop than currently exists.

The Interview Process

The next section discusses and analyzes the interviews that were collected during the research for this paper. The interviews consisted of ten open ended questions. These questions were designed and worded to draw out candid comments from the interviewees and encourage further discussion.

The first two questions are intended to show the wide range of positions and experience that information was gathered from. They were also asked to ensure there were no information gaps in the remaining questions and that the subject interviewed has ample knowledge of his/her position and the impact on joint planning during the JFHQ transformation process.

Question #1

What is/was your position in the Joint Force headquarters during the transformation?

Nine of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. This question showed the wide range of positions covered by the interview process. Interviews were

conducted with JFHQ senior leaders, joint staff directors, joint planners within the various directorates, planners and force providers between the ranks of O-4 (Major) to O-7 (Brigadier General) within the Army and Air Guard directorates, and planning facilitators within the J-5. Their answers confirmed that the executors of the planning process and the force providers for that process were queried. Their answers also showed that the persons interviewed were in a position to provide firsthand knowledge of the changes and impact the JFHQ transformation process had on joint planning.

Question #2

How long have you been assigned to that position within the Joint Force headquarters?

Nine of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. This question determined that all nine had been assigned to their current position for at least three years. Eight of nine had been assigned to either their current position or another senior leader position since the JFHQ transformation in 2003. Their answers showed that the persons interviewed had all been involved in the execution of the JFHQ transformation process and had been in their positions long enough to see how the process impacted joint planning.

Question #3

From your perspective as a senior staff officer, how is planning accomplished in the JFHQ?

Nine of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. Five of the nine persons interviewed answered this question by first explaining how contingency planning

was conducted prior to the JFHQ transformation process. They described the process and level of participation that was given to the planners responsible for writing the plan.

Interviewee #1 said, “Before transformation, the responsibility for contingency planning rested on the office or directorate that was responsible for overall operations of the military department. All plans were written within that department with little or no input from the rest of the departments within the headquarters. Similar to how you would expect to see a plan developed at the battalion level. The S-3 would direct what they are going to do and the rest of the departments would follow. The operations section for the state headquarters would write the plans and hand them over to the rest of the departments and say, ‘Here is your plan, now go forth and implement.’ We looked at how we were operating and realized that we needed to be more closely aligned doctrinally to how planning should be occurring.”

This view is consistent with the information provided by Interviewees #4, 7, 8 and 9 who said that contingency planning was conducted by the civil service division prior to the JFHQ transformation. Interviewee #4 said, “The requirements were handed out to the various planners who then did their research and wrote the plans. There was not a lot of coordination with other directorates within the state headquarters back then until the plans needed to be implemented. When plans needed to be exercised, they were pulled from the shelves and updated to fit the situation they were being used for and coordination was accomplished to complete the mission.”

Interviewee # 1 continued answering this question by describing the current contingency planning process and how it has affected planning for the CMD. He said “the process changed and that operational planning moved over to the J-5 and they were

given the responsibility to do contingency planning with a joint planning group. Now plans are drafted in an iterative process⁴ using JOPES as our format and we do the contingency planning. Current operations planning and crisis action planning still occurs within the J-3 planning staff.” This view of planning conflicts with interviews # 2, 3 and 4. They described the planning being conducted currently as disjointed and haphazard.

Interviewee #3 described the current conduct of contingency planning by saying, “How we say it’s accomplished is through joint planning groups where we receive intent from the commanding general and the joint staff and we do contingency planning where all the directors participate in JPG periodically to help develop and pump out joint plans. In reality, there is no deliberate joint planning that’s done.”

Interviewee # 3 described the current planning process by explaining, “We do crisis action planning here in the J-3 with some help from the J-5 shop. During operational planning the J-5 planners, who are mostly majors, try to set up JPGs but they don’t have much luck in pinning the generals down to get intent and guidance. They also receive nominal support and participation by the directors. They often get second and third stringers to participate in the JPGs with no consistency from any shop about who shows up. The (J-5) planners usually just throw their hands in the air and try to do the work themselves.”

Interviewee #2 answered the question by explaining that it “depends upon the situation and the mission we are planning for. Long range joint planning is done through joint planning groups using JOPP and the goal is to create a CONPLAN. Most often,

⁴ An iterative process is a process for calculating a desired result by means of a repeated cycle of operations. An iterative process should be convergent, i.e., it should come closer to the desired result as the number of iterations increases (Principia Cybernetica, 2008)

however, the requirement to produce a plan evolves very quickly and there is not enough time to exercise the contingency planning process. When that happens, it is usually a small number of people who are directed to conduct crisis action planning and produce a plan.

Disaster planning is usually dictated as a crisis action planning process and that process, unfortunately, happens in a very small vacuum. Although we do have operations planning groups lined up, we don't always have everyone available when we need to do planning."

Interviewee #2 continued, "A lot of times it is a J-3 planner who receives guidance and direction from the J-3 and does the coordination with the G-3 and the A-3 to conduct an abbreviated MDMP process. The Director, J-3 is involved and directs a course of action so there is no course of action (COA) comparison. The COA is directed and the planning process consists of putting together task and purpose and ensuring the capabilities exist within the units that are going to execute the plan. The bottom line is that most planning occurs as crisis action planning with a very small group and very little input from the rest of the headquarters.

As the operation begins to develop, we'll form an operations planning group to plan 24-96 hours out and produce FRAGOS for the operation. It's just a matter of getting the right people at the table to do the planning and produce the products. I think it's a challenge with the little training that goes on and the training that's actually available".

Interviewee #4 described the current contingency planning process saying, "From a joint perspective, it's conducted haphazardly [sic] at best. The planning is haphazard because the vast bulk of the staff is from the land component. Which means, by and

large, the Air Component gets dragged into doing planning via the Army National Guard mentality, not through true DoD Joint Planning Processes.”

Interviewee # 4 continued, saying, “Another challenge is that there is not enough manpower. The Air staff and the Army staff all have their normal functions that they have to perform. There is some extra manpower that the Army has leveraged into the joint staff but, by and large, those are positions that are one deep. Those folks often times have collateral duties back in their Service Components and it’s a real challenge to get Army Air and joint into these meetings (JPGs) for a lot of these different planning process because there is simply not enough folks to go to them. Often times, what happens is secondary or tertiary individuals get tasked to attend the JPG planning meetings. They are not the right people for the job and may not have the expertise to provide good information to the group. The result is that a less than perfect product comes out of the planning group.”

Interviewees # 2 and 5 described the results of the current contingency planning process. Interviewee #2 said, “The net result is that we have not published any operational plans since we created the J-5 shop, with the exception of the Continuity of Operations – Continuity of Governance (COOP-COG) plan which was originally written by someone from the J-3 shop who was writing for someone in the J-5 shop. All of this is for operational planning. For strategic planning, we have a fairly effective strategic planning effort because the J-5’s good at strategic planning and that goes pretty well. The one thing we have not done, because we can’t wrap our arms around it, is tying our resources together. We have not tied the resources to strategic planning goals so the

available resources are doled out without regard to whether or not they reinforce our strategic goals.”

Interviewee #5 explained that the current contingency planning process was going, “Not very well at this headquarters from my perspective but we’re constantly looking at that and, in fact, we’re getting ready to re-organize. Planning is supposed to be done in the J-5 shop to develop operational plans for us to direct field exercises. Since I have been here, no matter how much effort we have put in, we have received zero plans out of the J-5 shop so we are going to take a look at changing that and see if there is a better way to do that but we’re not doing well at all with our operational plans.

The only plan that we have published was the COOP plan but it was a painful year and a half process. Now, we are working on the JRSOI plan. We have been working on that for a year and a half and we still have no solid plan.

Analysis:

The interviews show that operational planning was conducted by the Civil Service Division operations cell prior to the JFHQ transformation process (see figure 24, page 64). They also show that there was little to no coordination or input from the other staff sections during the planning process.

Operational planning was moved from the Civil Service Division to the J-5 during the JFHQ transformation and the Civil Service Division evolved into the J-3. Current operations planning and crisis action planning remained in the J-3. These moves are consistent with the planning doctrine laid out in JP 5-0:

- (1) The joint force J-5’s effort focuses on *future plans*. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, JFC’s desires, and other

factors. Typically the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

- (2) Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (*future operations planning*). The timeframe of focus for *future operations* planning varies according to the factors listed for *future plans*, but the period typically is more near-term than the *future plans* timeframe. *Future* planning could occur in the J-5 or JPG, while *future operations planning* could occur in the joint operations center or J-3.
- (3) Finally, *current operations* planning addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations center or J-3 (JP 5-0, 2006, III-57).

It is not clear whether all staff directorates and planners within the JFHQ understand the contingency planning process and how it is supposed to work doctrinally. California's JPG SOP is consistent with both JP 5-0 and JP 5-00.2 in the organization, composition and conduct of the JPG. Recognizing that this document has recently been fielded to the joint staff sections, adequate time is needed for the joint staff sections to understand and become comfortable with the document and the JPG process. The JPG SOP should certainly help the process and its validation is a definite step in the right direction.

Analysis of the interviews identify JOPP as the current contingency planning process, outlined in JP 5-0, and the JOPES format used for the structure of the plan itself. JP 5-0 uses the same format as the one identified in CJCSM 3122.03B. The joint plan format is listed in JP 5-0; annex C (JP 5-0, 2006, C-1). The JOPES plan format identified in CJCSM 3122.03B was used because JP 5-0 was not released for distribution until December 2006, ten months after CJCSM 3122.03B was released for distribution.

It appears that there is not enough emphasis from the joint staff directorates to ensure adequate participation in the process. When the staff begins the JPG process, there is no consistency from the various joint staff directorates on who is supposed to participate in the process. The result is a JPG process full of stops and starts, with a staff that has to constantly go over the same information because the membership and composition of the JPG keeps changing. The few plans produced by the J-5 is evidence of this lack of consistency.

Another significant issue is that because the joint staff has such difficulty exercising the JPG process, required contingency plans are not being developed as rapidly as they need to be. When the need arises to exercise a plan, it is either not complete or has not been developed yet, creating the necessity to exercise the CAP process. It appears as though the CAP process is the norm, rather than the exception, when it comes to joint planning.

Another issue that was raised is the lack of available manpower and resources has had a negative impact on joint planning capability. The shortage of planners in the J-5 and shortage of other available personnel from the other joint staff sections to man and operate the JPG has hampered efforts to complete and publish operational plans.

The analysis of the interviews appears to show that resources are not tied to the strategic goals for the CMD. The strategic plan is an excellent resource to use to ensure this area is reviewed and adjusted to ensure that resources are in line with the CMD's strategic goals.

Question #4

Explain how the transformation to JFHQ has changed the requirements for planning and how that differs from how planning was conducted before the transformation.

Six of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. Interviewee #1 answered this question by explaining, “The transformation to JFHQ has required us to become far more formal in our planning process. Meaning if we are going to do plans that are doctrinally correct, we need to use the doctrinal processes outlined in JOPES and the JOPP processes to accomplish our planning. This has resulted in two significant outcomes. One I see as being very positive and the other as very challenging.

The positive aspect is that to do the planning; we are using a joint planning group which means that every staff section and every staff directorate participates in the planning process. Being involved in the planning process allows them to develop their annexes and develop plans that they are familiar with and they understand and that it reflects their ability to support the overall operation of the department (CMD). This gets them integrated into the process from the very beginning so there are no major surprises out there when we have to go operational with these plans.

This was not the case with the old process because the way we used to do it, the plan was written and just handed to them and people didn’t always take the time to read them or understand the implications of the plan until it was time to actually initiate the plan and that was when we discovered there were all sorts of challenges. The positive is that we have a lot of people now involved in the planning process, providing information to the planners that were not involved in the past. This makes our plans far more credible, far more accurate and far more implementable.

The downside to the new process is that it takes a lot longer to accomplish a plan because there are so many moving parts and it is a challenge with our limited staffing to get everybody together at the same time and move forward in an expeditious manner. The other downside is that in most of our staff sections we tend to be just one or two people deep. With limited resources from the Service Components it is probable that from one JPG meeting to the next, you will not have the same list of participants because someone who participated last week got pulled off to perform some other critical task so there is a constant re-training and backing-up that is necessary to bring everybody up to speed. I think that plays a real role in extending the amount of time it takes to get plans approved and on the shelf.”

Interviewee # 9 agreed with interviewee #1, saying, “We have a directed joint planning process now, a JPG and OPG process that basically did not exist before the transformation. Now you have an individual that is the lead planner and you have the chief of staff that is, at least, steering the process by giving his guidance and marching orders from the general officers. You’ve also got other staff members to do the coordination with the Service Components so that’s a significant change.

Before the transformation you had a couple of guys running around conducting crisis action planning, doing as much coordination as they could and a lot of it was done in a vacuum. Now I think you do have the participation from all of the staff sections providing all of the details that need to get into the plan. At least it works that way on the long range planning; crisis action planning is still at the level it was prior to the transformation with a couple guys sitting down to write up an order quickly. I think that will change as the long range plans and CONPLANS are developed, and we staff the J-3

shop with the level of operational planners that we need there might be a little more contingency planning and a larger group that's coordinating so I think it'll get better."

Interviewee #8 also agreed with Interviewees #1 and #9, saying, "We now do planning right out of doctrinal publications like JP 5-0 for crisis action planning since the transformation. How that differs from before is, for example, we would take a captain or a lieutenant and tell them write the emergency operation plan or emergency procedures manual plan and they would do it in a vacuum. It's sort of a legacy way of doing it. I could see a way of doing it where junior planners would write the plan and publish these plans and we would put them on a shelf. Nobody would read the plan or even look at it again until the emergency hit. So, while we kind of continue to do planning that way, at least we have the road map and the realization that the requirement needs to be something different."

Interviewee #5, although agreeing that the JFHQ transformation has allowed the planning process to become more formalized, is a little more critical about the execution portion of the planning process. He said, "Transformation has made the planning process more formalized and thus, more labor and time intensive." I would argue that at this point in the JFHQ transformation, things are less efficient than they used to be. Part of that has to do with the expectations of the civilian leadership of the National Guard.

There is an expectation that the National Guard be prepared to respond in a far greater fashion than it has traditionally has been expected to respond. In decades past, three days was acceptable to muster a force and get out in the field. Now, that expectation from the governor is that we be prepared to have a force out on the street within 12 – 24 hours. This requires a tremendously different level of planning and

execution capability. This has driven a requirement for far more intensive planning and pre-coordination with field organizations and units.”

Interviewee #3 describes the transformation process as merely an extension of how California was moving forward before the JFHQ transformation process began. He said, “We have always had some sort of all hazards plan within the state to execute for emergencies. Now we are refining those and doing a better job of defining the plans and identifying things such as rules for the use of force, Joint Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (JRSOI) and things we had not specifically identified before. We would have still done those things, just under a different name but with the same outcomes. We are trying to tweak our plans to make them better, we have a better process now, rather just a have couple of majors using MDMP and sitting in the corner writing plans like we have in the past.

Before the transformation, missions were service-centric. When requirements came down to support state missions, the Army Guard would do its own thing and the Air Guard would do its own thing based on the mission requirements. There was no Joint Task Force where one chain of command was in charge and directed both services. During state missions Army and Air Guard units may be working together in the same area but they reported to different chains of command.”

Interviewee #3 goes further in his explanation and compares the processes used before and after the transformation. He also describes some problems with the process saying, “This process has changed a lot since the transformation. Everybody is part of the process and everybody has input to include the annexes so they are joint plans but they are painfully slow in coming.

Assuming we had a very efficient planning cell that actually cranked out plans, I could answer this question differently, but right now I cannot. So what we end up doing is we take general plans and we write OPORDS out of the J-3 shop. We just develop the order specifically for the mission and then we execute. The off-the-shelf (OTS) stuff just is not working right now.

What we need is a J-5 shop with an operational planner running it, fully staffed, with a plan to say what plans are needed and prioritize them with funding placed against those plans to write and exercise them. Lacking that, we need a J-5 shop with good planners on the staff that can do all these things.

Right now we have a J-5 shop with good planners but they run up against other staff sections that don't want to support the JPG process because the planners are just a bunch of majors telling them what they need to do. What we may need to do is move operational plans under the direction of an operational planner, possibly the J-3, until we can fix this and then move the plans back to the J-5 where they are supposed to be. No matter how doctrinally sound your organizational structures, it is personalities that drive this process. Sometimes they work really well and sometimes they do not. One of the things we need make clear is that the J-staff is great. They really work well together and are morphing to fit our needs.

The JPG process is also personality driven. You may have some staff sections that support the process, take everything seriously and work very hard to produce a good product. Other sections may not be supportive and may only pay lip service to the process. When this happens, the planners either have to write the plans themselves or spend lots of time chasing people down to get them to complete their sections of the plan

Analysis

The interviews show that the current operational planning process is conducted more formally than prior to the JFHQ transformation. The positive aspects of this change show that there is more involvement and input from the other staff sections into the planning process. This results in better familiarity with the completed plans and ensures the capabilities of the other staff sections are fully integrated into the plans. It also makes the completed plans more credible with fewer adjustments required when they need to be exercised.

The negative aspects of the more formalized process include an increased planning timeline due to the increase in coordination required to exercise the process. Validation of the California JPG SOP and familiarity with the JPG process would certainly help alleviate this problem.

Another problem is that participation in the JPG process places additional strain on the joint staff sections and Service Components because of limited resources available. Some joint staff sections do not have sufficient personnel available to provide dedicated support to the JPG process. The result is inconsistent participation and high turnover from the various staff section supporting in the JPG process. It also results in the JPG having to constantly re-train new members and re-visit previous steps to get the new members up to speed so the process can move forward. Analysis of the information from the previous question reinforces this aspect about JPG participation.

One of the more profound changes brought out during the interviews is in the area of expectation management. Prior to the JFHQ transformation, the CMD was required to be prepared to provide support to the Office of Emergency Services (OES) for state

emergencies. The expected response time to that request was three days. Currently, the requirement still exists for the CMD to provide the same level of support to OES but the expected response time had dropped from three days to between twelve and twenty-four hours, possibly sooner, depending on the emergency.

This dramatic drop in response time places additional requirements on the operational planners to provide more detailed plans, and increased pre-coordination efforts from the J-3 to ensure that the execution timelines can be met.

One aspect that does not appear to have changed is the lack of consistent support from the various staff sections and Service Components for the operation planning efforts. Several interviewees attribute this lack of support to lack of resources, but not all. The interviews indicate that some of the problems resulting in the lack of support to the JPG process may be personality driven. One interviewee mentioned that if a staff section does not support the JPG process and only pays “lip service”, the other staff sections are either forced to pick up the slack or the process may extend indefinitely. This may be a contributing factor in the lack of completed plans produced from the J-5.

The interviews reiterate that operational planning was conducted by the Civil Service Division operations cell prior to the JFHQ transformation process and reinforce the view that there was very little coordination or input from the other staff sections during the planning process. This lack of coordination and input resulted in a lack of understanding of the plan content, requiring multiple changes and more time before the plans could be executed.

Another issue is that, prior to the JFHQ transformation, operational plans were service specific. The Army and Air Guard were tasked for missions but, normally did not

coordinate with each other. Each Service Component provided support based on its own, service-centric, mission requirements. During state emergencies, there might have been both Army and Air Guard units working on the same type mission and in the same area but they did not coordinate with each other and reported through different chains of command.

Question #5

Please describe from your perspective what process or standards are used in the planning process within your organization?

Nine of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. Interviewee #1 described the processes but separated operational planning from strategic planning and allowed each process to be described independently. “In the operational planning aspect, we attempt to follow the JOPP process with JOPES as the format for the plan and annexes. The exception is that we do not work the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) process. We do not do that portion of the planning, which is critical in most joint staffs, because the level we are operating at is a little different.

We use the JOPP process which follows closely the Army’s Decision Making Process or MDMP. We seek to accomplish one step of the MDMP process with each JPG meeting so it may be two or three weeks, given time constraints, between individual steps of the process.

On the organizational side of strategic planning, we very much focus on using the strategic planning model that has been developed and is taught by the American Management Association (see Appendix A). It is basically an outgrowth of Michael

Porter's work from 1986 where we do an analysis and then we approach strategic planning from the five major planning questions. These questions are:

1. Where are we today as an organization?
2. Where do we want to be in the future?
3. How are we going to get there?
4. Who does what? and analyzing our progress
5. Are we on track? If not, do we need to change our procedure or our plan?

At the War College, it is often referred to as ends, ways and means. We try to stick with the terminologies described by the American Management Association because we are talking about organizational settings, rather than national strategic settings.”

Interviewees #2 and #3 both agreed that operational planning used a modified version of JOPP and explained that additional training on the JOPP was needed before the joint staff was able to move completely away from the Army-centric MDMP process and fully embrace the JOPP. Interviewee #3 further expounded on the information saying: “Our operational planning is trying to use the JOPP and JPG processes. However, there are only a couple of people who are even familiar with JOPP and the staff needs to have formal training to be able to fully transition to that process. Most people do not even have any operational planning experience. The only time they have done any planning was, most likely, at the tactical level. That is why most are at least semi-comfortable with the MDMP process. It is the only formal planning process they have been exposed to and that is what they revert to when put into a position where they need to do planning.”

Interviewees #4, #5 and #6 all described the planning process as MDMP or an abbreviated form of MDMP. Interviewees #7, #8 and #9 described the planning process the same way but didn't expand on the information.

Interviewee # 6 said, "We mainly use the Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) for long range planning. We use MDMP that is colored a bit by joint publications for contingency planning. We also have internal SOPs. For instance, we have Operational Planning Group (OPG) SOP (see chapter 2) for crisis action planning in the J-3 shop. The OPG SOP works future planning for current operations and looks out 12 to 72 hours as opposed to what the J-5 shop does when it leads JPGs that focus the planning efforts further out for future operations and CONPLANS (contingency plans)."

Interviewee #5 expanded on the description used by Interviewee #4, but went further by adding Army specific issues, saying "We use the abbreviated MDMP. We make every attempt to use the deliberate MDMP but time is usually against us so that is the process we use. We have a couple of doctrinal planning publications that we use but a lot of it is institutional knowledge drawn from the way the Army does things.

We try to incorporate those doctrinal procedures from the joint planning perspective with the joint planning publications and joint terminology documents used for the standards of the joint plan. I think that it is very limited because you have a lot of legacy people that look at it predominately from the Army side because this headquarters is predominately Army so planning has a decidedly Army flavor to it."

Interviewee #4 added additional information about Air Guard specific issues, saying, "The primary process or standard is the Army version of MDMP. The Air Guard uses a highly modified version of the MDMP that probably would not look terribly

similar to the Army. Unfortunately Air Guard personnel feel very spiteful in some of these JPG meetings that seem to take an eternal amount of time and produce little or no results.”

I asked the following question, looking for clarification about his highly modified version of the MDMP that the Air Guard was using. When you are talking about planning in the Air Guard, you are talking about the Joint Air Operations Planning Process (JAOPP)?

Interviewee #4 responded, “I’m talking about just the decision making process from the time I receive a requirement until I have some kind of solution ready to go. I believe that process within the Air Guard happens far faster than the Army Guard when the leadership allows that to occur.

Sometimes the Air Guard component in the joint staff is restrained by leadership when they want this kind of a process to occur because that is the way they were trained. The JFHQ piece only adds more trouble to that because now you are not only taking the Service Component MDMP process from the Army; you are leveraging it across the joint spectrum into the Air Guard as well, which does not normally use that process.”

Analysis

The answers to this question indicate that there is a definite distinction between strategic planning and operational planning at the JFHQ level. The interviewee description of the model shows that it follows the military strategic planning and asks some of the same basic questions to get to the results of ends, ways and means. However, the model appears more applicable in the environment it is being used by the CMD.

The AMA model (see Appendix A) described by the interviewee is a business model that has definite advantages because it is used by various other state agencies in California. It is a model that state planners are familiar with and understand. The five questions that are used in the AMA model are:

- Where are we today as an organization?
- Where do we want to be in the future?
- How are we going to get there?
- Who does what? and analyzing our progress
- Are we on track? If not, do we need to change our procedure or our plan?

These questions are similar to the three questions outlined in the DoD transformation planning guidance and the transformation article by Kem:

- How we fight
- How we do business
- How we work with our interagency and multinational partners

While these questions were identified specifically to transformation and the process, both sets of questions can be used for either strategic planning or transformation planning and one set could be used to answer the questions outlined in the other set.

This question raised more concerns, particularly with the application of the JOPP. Many of the interviewees use the terms JOPP and MDMP almost synonymously as though the two processes are the same. Although they are similar, they are different processes, using different terminology and steps. I was unable to get clarification regarding the Air Guard's "highly modified version of MDMP".

Another concern that surfaced is the lack of personnel trained to use the JOPP. Lack of trained personnel can only hinder the planning process, requiring more time to be spent on training the process, rather than writing and producing actual plans. This lack of training has been discussed in earlier interview questions but bears particular discussion in this area.

The lack of trained personnel in the JOPP, and the fact that there are very few people on the joint staff who are trained to do operational planning at any level have a negative impact on the staff's operational planning capability. In addition, planners are trying to apply the planning skills they have, Army MDMP at the tactical level, to write joint plans at the operational level.

Question #6

Please describe the actions and efforts taken to train or prepare the people involved in joint planning. First, to prepare you as a director or senior staff officer, then, for the individuals involved in the planning process.

Six of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. Interviewees #1 and #2 described the formal training processes for themselves and within their staff sections.

Interviewee #1 described the process in three steps. "Personally, I have taken a number of classes on MDMP. I have also taken several JOPES courses through the Joint Knowledge Center on JKO. I have been to training courses provided by the joint training command and have had a great deal of interaction with my peers in other states to help nail down specifically how we would conduct joint planning. I've also done some facilitation of the planning process.

In terms of the folks on the J-5 staff, everyone has taken some courses through the joint force command and several have taken the Joint Planners Orientation Course

(JPOC). We just had one of our folks take the week long course put on by the NORTHCOM on Defense Support Civil Authorities (DSCA) planning. We assist each other as a team in terms of facilitating and co-facilitating planning meetings so that we can build skill sets within the J-5.”

“The final piece of the package is how the individual members of the joint planning group prepare for their stint in joint planning. We had originally started out doing a multiple session course on joint planning and teaching the MDMP process independent of any particular plan. The intent was to train everyone in the entire process and then we would initiate planning.

What we discovered was that, with the shortage of people and a constantly changing environment, we would end up teaching the same thing over and over again. It was not very effective so now what we do is teach a small amount of the process and immediately begin working with the group of people we have to accomplish that part of the process. We train as we go, explain to people what it is we need to do and then actually do it. The next time we get back together we talk about the next stage of the process, and then we accomplish that.”

Interviewee #2 described the process for the leaders and joint staff sections. He said, “For the leaders, most of them receive some staff training at their service staff schools or senior staff schools. We have not sent more than a couple of people to joint staff schools because of funding issues. Priority of school funding goes to military occupational specialty (MOS) schools and service specific professional military education (PME). There is not a lot of money left over for joint schools and we have to

make sure we are not preventing anyone from attending MOS or PME courses before we commit funds to joint courses.

Training for individuals within the various joint staff sections follows the same process as the leadership so we do not get a lot of opportunities to send folks to the joint schools. What we have done here in California is try to provide some training for the folks in the various staff sections. The J-5 put together a joint MDMP (JOPP) course a while back and trained a bunch of folks. The problem was that not everyone was able to attend all the training so it was not as effective as it could have been.”

Interviewee #8 agreed with some of the comments from interviewees #1 and #2. He said, “We have had to train several different ways. Several staff members have taken online and distance learning courses. The Joint Planning Orientation Course (JPOC), put on by the Joint Force Staff College is one of several courses that have been used to train joint staff officers. There are distance-learning courses for JOPES that are available through the Joint Knowledge Data Base online. There is also a recent course called the Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) course co-sponsored by NORTHCOM and by ARNORTH and we have had the first of our folks that have attended that course.

In terms of the training of the participants in the other directorates, we have discovered that we were getting constant turn over, that is why we got away from trying to train the entire process up front. We were expecting that training to stick through the entire JPG process but there was too much for them to digest. The amount of time between sessions caused us to have to re-train the process every time we got together.

Interviewees #5 and #6 both described the joint training process as primarily on the job training (OJT). Interviewee #5 said, “I know that the J-5 is trying to conduct

some training on the joint version of the military decision making process, the JOPP. For most folks it is primarily self teaching, OJT, and relying on formal military education and schools to learn those processes. A lot of the OJT is just working through the process and that is the level of training that has gone into it. I know the J-5 is working to train the Joint Planning Group but a lot of it is really military education. That is why we try to make sure the field grades and groups have been exposed to military education so they have a base to build from.”

Interviewee #6 also responded about OJT saying, “The process to transition to JOPP and how it works will be automatic. We have not done any formal training, in house, on how to do planning other than the real world experience our staff has. For individual training we send people to ILE and we send people to the joint qualifications courses but whom we send is not tied to what our needs are for planning. For me personally, nobody here in this headquarters has done anything to train me. Everything I bring is from my experience as a commander or a joint staff officer.

We do OJT in the J-3 shop for planning and, for everybody else; we run our own table top exercises. These exercises help to shape what needs to get done in the planners shop. We do not invite anyone else because we want to get our own house in order before we take on the J-7 and train the rest of the joint staff.”

Interviewee #4 also talked about joint training and OJT but added some insights regarding joint training at the Service Component level. He said, “The actions and efforts to train on planning are self directed within the Air staff. We have our folks do a lot of reading and a lot of self training to provide understanding about how the joint process

works and there is a lot of OJT. We talked earlier about some of the different training venues there are, or are not available to the components.

Formalized schools that teach joint training need to be taught to officers at the O-4 level, since that is where you usually see them enter the joint environment. Right now, they do not get that training, in most cases until they reach the senior staff college.

The joint planning process, once again, is an educational process. Those are primary actions for a staff officer. I believe that is a real disservice and directly affects a senior staff officer's ability to plan, organize, and so forth because that is a big part of the senior service school.

Some attempts at formalized training in the joint staff has been offered for joint positions, however I would argue that the training offered was offered by in house personnel including myself. I don't think anybody had been to any DoD joint school at that time and it was, essentially, the blind teaching the blind.

Some JPME opportunities have been made available but I don't know how many quotas have been made available and I don't know how many folks have been given an opportunity to attend these schools. I know it has a real challenge to get folks to go because there has not been a joint funded school slot.

Joint training is not career enhancing so it does not make sense to spend the money. There is, currently, no requirement for Service Component staff officers attend JPME courses, unless they are assigned to the joint staff, and only if those positions are joint qualifying positions.

Funding for JPME courses has to be filled through a DoD requirement. If there is a DoD requirement, ideally congress will appropriate the money for it. If the Joint Staff

tells the Combatant Commander (COCOM), in this case NORTHCOM, that there is a requirement for the National Guard to be trained and equipped for JFHQ, they need to allocate funds for that training and equipment. They cannot expect us to meet the requirement if they do not give us the resources to do so.”

Analysis

The interviews demonstrate that the J-5 appears to be the only joint staff directorate making a concerted effort to train their staff in joint planning and the JOPP process. It was noted several times that the J-5 had made repeated attempts to train the other staff sections on the JOPP and JPG processes with mixed results. Several interviewees mentioned in-house training or training conducted by J-5. The mixed success illustrates the lack of consistent effort on the part of the other staff directorates to support the JOPP and JPG processes.

The information gathered gives the impression that support for the JOPP and JPG increases when command emphasis is placed on the process and products. When that command emphasis wanes, that support wanes as well.

Several interviewees mentioned OJT as a viable training source. The issue with using OJT as a training source relates directly to the number of personnel trained to conduct joint planning. OJT is not an effective training tool unless you have a sufficient number of personnel trained and experienced in the area that OJT is occurring. In this case, there is a recognized lack of sufficient personnel trained to conduct joint operational planning to have any effective OJT program in this area.

An issue raised by one of the Service Components was the lack of funding for JPME courses and the resistance of the Service Components to fund such courses. The

interviewee mentioned that Service Components are very hesitant to fund such training because joint training is not considered career enhancing by the Service Components. This lack of support to fund joint courses compounds the issues mentioned earlier about joint staff support for the JOPP and JPG processes, as well as the lack of completed and published plans from the J-5.

Question #7

When you think about planning in the JFHQ, what works well with the current planning process? What would you change?

Six of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. Every person interviewed had positive things to say about the joint planning process since the transformation to JFHQ. Some of the recommendations were very insightful and everyone seemed genuinely interested in finding ways to improve the process.

Interviewee #1 said, “Having all of the staff sections involved in the planning process is a marked improvement over how it used to be done. Getting larger participation creates better buy in. The staff provides input and it gives them the opportunity to feel like they have a say in what the plan is going to look like.

What I would change is I would have dedicated representatives that were given the planning process as a primary job responsibility. This would improve the overall operational planning process because we would not have a constant shifting of people in and out. It would also allow us to accelerate the planning timeline. We would not have to continually retrain so we could get plans completed more quickly.”

Interviewees #3, #5, and #6, all recommended changes to the current planning process. Interviewee # 3 said, “The current planning process, although it is getting better,

still needs some work. Before the transformation, we had the J-3 shop, although it was called the civil support division, responsible for building our contingency plans. The plans were usually created without a whole lot of input from the other staff sections.

The difference now is that we have a lot more involvement from the other staff sections to provide input for the plans. That is a good thing, except we have not been able to complete any plans to put them on the shelf. We did complete the COOP-COG plan but it was only after a whole lot of heavy emphasis from the leadership and flag officers because there was a state mandated submission date we had to comply with.

When operational planning was in the J-3 shop, they were able to crank out the plans they needed. The plans needed a lot of adjustments before we could execute them for state emergencies but at least we had plans to work from.

We need to either change the way we are currently doing operational planning or look at how we are supporting the J-5 planning section. One of the things we need to decide on is whether operational planning should be done in the J-5 shop, where it is now, or move it back to the J-3 shop, where it was before the transformation.

Doctrinally, the J-5 shop has the responsibility to conduct operational planning. That's an issue right now because the J-5 shop does not have enough planners to do all of the planning that is required from their shop. The J-5 does an excellent job at strategic planning for the California Military Department. They are very good at it and I would not want to change that at all.

The J-5 is having problems getting plans out on the operational planning side. I know they are short planners and, maybe, that is the problem we need to address. With the shortage of planners in the J-5, the planners they do have are being tasked to do both

strategic and operational planning. They do not have enough planners to provide for both efforts and something has to fall out. In this instance, it is the operational planning that is suffering.

The J-3 shop has the operational planning capability and the planners who can do the work. Maybe we should move operational planning back to the J-3 and let them do the planning.”

Interviewee #6 said nearly the same thing as Interviewee #3. He said, “Crisis action planning works very well but we need more leadership emphasis on planning involvement for the contingency planning process to get better. Two years ago the J-3 shop made the decisions and had the responsibility for deliberate operational planning. We moved the operational planning process to the J-5 because, doctrinally, that is where it is supposed to be. I think that was a failure because the skill sets and focus is not on operational planning, it is more on strategic planning.

We need to bring the operational planning back to the J-3 shop where we have the time and energy to focus on it. The other advantage is that the guys that are writing the plans are the guys that will execute it. We should move the operational planning to J-3 and leave the strategic planning to J-5.

Interviewee #5 also suggested changes to the operational planning process but from a slightly different view. He said, “I think the process of the planning groups, the OPG and JPG, works well. During the San Diego fire storm in 2007, we conducted the operations planning group (OPG) to do planning and, as it went through the process, it began to work better and provide more detail in some functional areas that needed to be covered in the fragmentary orders (FRAGOS). I’m not a logistician nor am I an

administrative person, so having those people involved in the planning process is of great benefit. You now get their input whereas before that did not exist and it was just one person's perspective.

What I would change is to have the operations planning group meet intermittently during the crisis action planning process to look further out. It is too late to try to meet initially during the battle rhythm. There is a lot more planning and coordination that needs to be done earlier, in order to push the planning process ahead of the current planning cycle. Instead of looking 12 hours out, you are actually able to look out 72 hours."

What I would also change is that I would put a future operations planning cell back in the G-3 and A-3 shops so they could do some of the initial coordination. They could bring the initial planning to the table to coordinate with the rest of the staff. It would allow you to push your planning out further."

Interviewee #2 also had concerns about the planning process but considered it part of a larger problem, saying, "Here is the biggest problem, we are trying to run a JFHQ on a TDA that was designed many years ago for a totally different type of headquarters and it doesn't work. You take the TDA positions that you have, 354 in California, and split them up between the joint staff and the Army Guard staff. Right off the bat, the Army Guard is reluctant because they had all those positions before and they now have to give a bunch of them up, 138 positions.

We have a G-3 shop on the Army side but every time I walk in that door, I do not see a G-3 shop. I do not see any future planners or current planners. What I see in there is a POTO (Plans, Operations and Training Officer) office. They have a MOB

(Mobilization) officer, a training officer and they have a FIRO (Force Integration and Readiness Officer). We say we have a G-3 but we really don't.

Downstairs, in the J-3 we have a POMSO (Plans, Operations and Military Support Office). We're calling it the J-3 and it is closer to a true J-3 than the G-3 is to a true G-3 because the J-3 has a planning cell and they have planners. We make it work because of our full time state active duty (SAD)⁵ system here in California.

If we were relying on technicians and AGRs, we would not be in the situation we are in right now. We would be in the same position as most other states, dual-hatting everybody and J-staff directorates that were only one and two deep, trying to get additional ADSW money so we could get extra people to do the work that needs to be done.

We have a funding system here in California that allows us to organize our state headquarters so we can staff a full time J-1 through J-8 on the joint staff side and have an Army and Air staff. That is a real benefit and it allows us to have a J-34 (operations support), a J-35 (operations planning) and a J-37 (operations training). It allows us to have a number of planners in the J-5 and a number of training and exercise people in the J-7. It has now allowed us to start up and staff a J-4 shop, all because of our state active duty (SAD) system.

⁵The SAD system mimics the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) system by providing full time soldiers to fill positions. The primary difference between a Title 32 AGR and an SAD soldier is that Title 32 AGR soldiers are federally activated while SAD soldiers are activated through a state funded system. Another major difference is that SAD soldiers receive retirement benefits through the California State Personnel Retirement System (CALPERS) and Title 32 AGR retirement is through the federal military retirement system. SAD soldiers provide the JFHQ with the manpower it needs to operate the JFHQ at the level they are expected to operate to support current mission requirements (CA-JFHQM 5000-1, 66).

At the national level, this is not going to work real well unless you dual-hat everybody and throw resources at it. It works in California because we have thrown the resources at it. Right now, California is not the model, it's an anomaly.

If we had a chance to do it all over again I think I would have gotten the JFHQ approval process completed first. The National Defense Authorization Act and other things they have tried to accomplish through the National Guard Bureau have always been requirements without resources. When you have the requirements being directed by the legislative branch of government, and the Senate or Congress is behind the process, you are directed to do it. The good thing about that process is that resources are given to make the process happen and, as we implement, it becomes much easier because it is law and it is codified.

We did it exactly the opposite of how we should have done it. We made it work, took it "out of hide", and invented stuff while we tried to figure out what we were going to do. The whole time we were fighting the Army and the Air Guard as we went through it. Now, that is easy to say the correct process could be followed in an idealistic world, but the chances of us ever getting it done that way is slim to none so we had to prove ourselves first. It came about but not without great pain.

I think we have helped ourselves in this process with the J-5 and his staff and the work they did to help us get through the transformation process from the very beginning. The national committees that the J-5 worked on helped him to do that. I think the J-5 helped California led the way in the JFHQ transformation process through his work on the state initiatives. The J-5 was instrumental in helping us get through it. I came in a

couple of years after that got started but I give a lot of credit to the J-5 and his staff because they worked on it (the JFHQ transformation process).”

Interviewee #4 also focused on larger, organizational issues to answer this question. He said, “The fact that the Air Component, the Army Component, and the joint staff are all co-located is certainly helpful. The relationships we have developed throughout the years in a professional sense, and in a personal sense with other staff officers certainly help. Those types of relationships work well with the current planning process.

In my opinion, the different staff directorates need better organization and supervision. Some of the staffing and directorates seem disjointed and do not appear to stay focused on their job duties. Part of that is due to people coming and going, people deploying, it’s also very much, at times, subject to the senior leadership and the protocol leadership in the state. Units in the southern part of the state might be very focused on something and all of a sudden a political concern comes down that takes everybody’s attention off of what they normally are doing to take care of the latest and greatest emergency.”

Analysis

All nine persons interviewed agreed that the JFHQ transformation has improved the joint planning process. Although only six responded to this question, the responses given throughout the interview process support this assertion. They commented that there is much more involvement and interaction with the other joint staff sections. The increased involvement from the other joint staff sections translates to better; more detailed plans, primarily because the subject matter experts (SMEs) provide input to their

particular portion of the plans. They also cautioned that the support from the other joint staff sections was intermittent and inconsistent and needs to be improved. Validation of the California JPG SOP may help improve this inconsistency but there has not been enough time since it was issued to determine what effects, if any, it will have on the process.

The biggest concern with the process since the JFHQ transformation continues to be the lack of published, complete plans from the J-5. Many interviewees praised the successful efforts from the J-5 and his staff in the area of strategic planning and recognized that those efforts needed to continue.

The interviewees provided several recommendations and potential solutions to some of the challenges they were experiencing. One recommendation was to create additional duty assignments for the personnel from the various joint staff sections for the JPG process. This recommendation would add some weight to the JPG process and send the message that the JFHQ leadership supports the JOPP and JPG processes. It would also provide a valid basis for comments on the annual evaluations of those personnel assigned to the JPG.

Another recommendation was either to provide more support to the J-5 planners or move the operational planning process over to the planning section in the J-3. Both of these recommendations have merit and are worthy of consideration. The J-5 section has a limited number of planners and the operational requirements to do both strategic and operational planning. One fix would be to increase the number of planners in the J-5, creating a strategic planning section and an operational planning section. This

recommendation would be the most doctrinally correct solution, keeping the responsibilities for planning in the J-5 where they belong.

Another recommendation, moving the operational planning responsibilities to the J-3 also has some merit. The J-3 already has an operational planning capability in the J-35, operations planning section. Moving the responsibility for operational planning would relieve the J-5 of that requirement, allowing them to concentrate fully on strategic planning; and area where they have already received accolades. It would also place the responsibility to conduct operational planning into a planning section that already has planning experience, but also place that responsibility under the direction of the joint staff section that has the requirement to execute those plans.

Another recommendation was to place future operations planning capability back into the G-3 and A-3 sections. This would give the Service Components the ability to, not only provide a planning capability, but also give them the ability to conduct initial coordination at the onset of plan execution. It would also provide the J-3 with a surge planning capability during the execution of plans for state emergencies.

A serious concern was raised regarding the fact that the JFHQ was still operating on the old state area command (STARC) table of distribution and allowances (TDA). The TDA structure is not compatible with the JFHQ model as the positions in the headquarters do not line up with the actual positions in the JFHQ, and, there are no joint positions. The TDA has to be updated to match the joint table of distribution (JTD) or replaced with the JTD for the structure to work effectively.

One solution that has worked for the JFHQ to allow them to effectively operate the JFHQ has been the state active duty (SAD) system in California. The SAD system

mimics the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) system by providing full time soldiers to fill positions. The primary difference between a Title 32 AGR and an SAD soldier is that Title 32 AGR soldiers are federally activated while SAD soldiers are activated through a state funded system. Another major difference is that SAD soldiers receive retirement benefits through the California State Personnel Retirement System (CALPERS) and Title 32 AGR retirement is through the federal military retirement system. SAD soldiers provide the JFHQ with the manpower it needs to operate the JFHQ at the level they are expected to operate to support current mission requirements.

Another concern has been that the JFHQ transformation process was initiated and directed down to the states before it had been resourced and approved. There have been no resources or funding given to the states to execute the JFHQ transformation process. The resources were gathered “out of hide” to meet the requirements issued by NGB (NGB C&IP, 2007, 1).

Question #8

Now that your organization is well on the road to transformation, what, in retrospect would you do differently to improve the planning process? Do you believe these changes are related only to your organization or are they likely to be applicable to similar organizations?

Four of nine persons interviewed responded to this question. Interviewee #1 said, "Some of the answer to this question goes with the previous question of what you would change. One of the things I would do differently is to start off with an organization and functions manual. I would have a specific pull out section that addresses planning that could act as an SOP and we are starting to work that now. I would have a much better handle with our SOP, the ability to explain to people the purpose of planning and the role

of planners so that people would understand that planning is every bit as critical as implementing and operating.

I would approach the leadership to get the folks that are dedicated put on additional duty appointment orders. It would allow the leadership to clearly identify the responsibility and priority so that individuals who are tasked with planning do not have to decipher what their number one priority is today.

I hear from some of my counterparts in other states about similar things happening in their states. One of the other states similar to ours is on version 22B of trying to sort out how they are going to operate in terms of planning and operations. It is indicative of how everyone is trying to learn to play the violin while on center stage in Carnegie Hall.”

Interviewees #4 and #5 also talked about creating an SOP that covers the specific aspects of joint operational planning. Interviewee #5 said, “I think that what we are doing looking at the long range contingency planning, that process works well. I think we need an SOP that covers the implementation, the manning and the developing procedures of how that works. The SOP needs to cover what staff sections should be part of that group and who should be assigned. There is already excellent doctrine out there about this but we have not been using it. In retrospect, we needed to grasp those processes sooner by taking what the Army already figured out.

I think that if the J-5 is doing the long range planning, their organization needs to be more robust. It needs to be filled with the people who have the right skill sets and it takes time to make that change. I think everyone will have an issue with getting involved

with any kind of change to reorganize but I think it is necessary for our organization to move forward.”

Interviewee #4 was a little more specific and talked about a manning document for the JFHQ. He said, “I would very carefully build a joint manning document on the DoD side of the house and get the best qualified individuals in there. I would keep the shops relatively small with well defined missions outlining what each staff director would do. Provide, obviously, the training and everything else that goes with that. I think these changes would certainly improve things,

I believe challenges that we seeing at our level in our state are probably very much applicable to other states, however there are problems that we see in this state that may be exacerbated because we are such a large state with lots of other emergencies and other challenges. Other states that have a very small state headquarters, with very few things happening have a lot of these challenges hidden to them. They do not run into the same concerns that we run into, therefore, a lot of the problems that we experience in California do not get experienced in their state. I would argue that states like Florida, Texas and other hurricane states that tend to have a lot more civil support requirements probably experience very much of the same things we do.”

Interviewee #6 said, “These recommendations may be unique to our organization but keeping the strategic planning and operational planning functions separate could be applicable to both California and other states.

A lot of this is personality driven. I am an operator and I do operations planning. The J-5 is a strategic planner and he does strategic planning. I would not want to do his strategic planning and he does not like me doing the operational planning except maybe

that it makes sense. The focus of the J-3 is to do domestic operations response and they should be responsible for those plans. The J-5 does strategic planning and resource planning and all that other stuff and, like I said, the J-5 shop does that very, very well.”

Analysis

There was not a lot of new information covered in the responses to this question. The information gathered re-enforced some of the information provided to earlier questions.

The preponderance of responses to this question addressed the creation and use of a joint planning SOP. Two interviewees mentioned the creation of an Organization and Functions (O&F) Manual and a joint manning document (JMD).

The JMD, a document similar to the Air Force Unit Manning Document (UMD), is currently being considered for JFHQ manning but there is no further information available on the process. The O&F manual and JPG SOP are complete and being exercised by the JFHQ staff in California to validate the documents.

Question #9

Is there anything you would like to add regarding the conduct of planning before, during, or after the transformation to the JFHQ?

Three of nine responded to this question. Interviewee #6 merely commented, “I would just add a memo that planning is way better than it was before the transformation but we are nowhere near where we need to be.”

Interviewee # 1 added, “I believe in our organization, the conduct of planning, while still not smooth, has a much higher level of attention and focus than it used to have

because all of the staff sections are required to get involved. They are required to understand what is going on and they are required to step up to the plate.

One of things that we did not talk about in the other questions was, as we transition to a Joint Force headquarters, it dramatically changes the interaction with other responder organizations in the state and the federal government. Our responsibility to support planning external to the department has grown exponentially and I think that it is, predominantly [sic], a result of becoming a Joint Force headquarters. Looking at ourselves differently has caused other people and agencies to look at us differently.”

Interviewee #2 added, “I just think JFHQ is more functional after the transformation because the TAG has his own staff and the things he needs to have done, get done in a joint environment. The Service Components can focus on those things that they need to do. They can task organize and provide forces to support joint missions. When the mission is done they can pack up their stuff and go home. That leaves the joint staff to do the planning and execution so I think it smoothes things out quite a bit. It solves some of the inter-service issues by forcing some of these people to accept tasking from the joint staff.

When an OPORD comes out of the J-3, it provides tasking to the Service Components, Army Guard and Air Guard, and they are speaking on behalf of the TAG. Transformation to JFHQ has forced everybody into that mode to work together. We did it in the past but the Service Components were kept separate. Air Guard would go do some air missions to support emergencies and Army Guard would do Army support but they never really worked together.

The way we are doing things now is much more effective. Desert One taught us that. We killed a bunch of people in the desert because the services would not work together and everybody had to have their own stuff. They could not talk and they could not train together. We ended up getting a bunch of people killed because of it.

Goldwater-Nichols was a direct result of that failure and we were forced into the situation we have now, but it has made a huge difference. The joint planning capability is getting better, even though it is still a struggle but at least we are moving in the right direction; sometimes at a gradual pace, sometimes pretty fast.”

Interviewee #5 added, “I think that the JFHQ transformation process has created a staff. Before it was just department heads but now you have a staff that works with a guideline and a purpose. I think that joint planning is much better as a result. The transformation process has ensured that the staff is working together to help complete the plans. Rather than have a department responsible, you have all the staff sections responsible for the plans, even though one staff section might be responsible for the paperwork. So it is the staff that functions on it. It is more applicable to the way the military does business. It is a good idea that we are going in the right direction. There are some legacy people that will argue that we are not a joint organization. I disagree. I think we are now, and will stay a joint organization because we function better that way. We are a staff, not an island of office heads. As that mentality goes away slowly we will function better.”

Analysis

This question did not generate a lot of new information. The significance of the responses reinforces the conclusion that the transformation to JFHQ has resulted in a

better organized, better functioning staff with tasking authority to create and execute JTF operations with forces from the Army and Air Components. The responses also recognize the challenges experienced in the JOPP and JPG processes but acknowledge that they are getting better.

An unforeseen result of the JFHQ transformation process has been the exponential increase in requirements to the J-5 to support planning outside the CMD. The CMD is a recognized leader in providing planning capabilities to other state agencies and the requests for planning support from these agencies continues to increase. This requirement creates another argument in support of the increase in planning capability to the J-5 described earlier.

Question #10

Is there anything related to planning in the JFHQ that I might have missed or that you would like to add?

Two of nine responded to this question. Interviewees #2, #3, #4, #7, #8, #9 and #10 did not have any final comments they wanted to add. Interviewees # 1 added, "Our becoming a JFHQ has impacted how much we interact with other agencies in terms of planning. The results of 9/11 and a lot of other things like the national response framework, the Department of Homeland Security grants gave us an overall awareness of how much is involved in preparing for emergency response.

There has been an exponential increase in planning requirements for other state agencies. Here in California, the Office of Emergency Services (OES), Office of Emergency Medical Services (OEMS), the California Highway Patrol (CHP). The state

is completely rewriting their emergency plan right now and there is a tremendous amount of planning that is being done to provide the ability to respond.

A lot of this effort is the result of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006⁶. State agencies that have primacy for planning in one area or another, be it mass fatality or emergency medical response, or whatever it is, have been looking at the Guard to assist their planning efforts. They see that we have a tremendous level of experience in planning so we've been asked to participate in the planning committees for virtually every state organization that is out there.

What that has done is it puts us in a position where we have had to assign each of our planners to interact with a number of different agencies. The planners are no longer working just internally on our planning, but working externally to help other agencies with their planning.

The Emergency Mutual Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a state to state compact that has to be ratified and put into law. It is an agreement that says that participating states agree to a common process to share resources, during emergencies, with other states and to receive reimbursement for those resources.

There is a process in place that goes into EMAC that includes things like accepting each other's accreditation so, if you get medical support, the accreditation is accepted by the other state. It's a way to allow planning across states where you will share and access resources in other states and how you would reimburse those states. It allows you, when you plan, to have the opportunity to look at other states for planning when your own resources are stripped.

⁶ Note: The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was never enacted. It was last discussed on the congressional floor in August 2006 and never voted on. (GovTrack.us, 2008)

At the CMD level we have no say in whether or not the EMAC will be initiated. There is only one agency in each state that has the authority vested by the governing legislature. In our state it is the state Office of Emergency Services (OES). We do have the ability, when OES calls us and says they need some resources, to say we do not have those right now. We can say that you can call a neighboring state and, if you want to make contact, they can make those resources available through EMAC.”

Interviewee #5 added, “I think that the individuals involved in crisis action planning, the documents involved and processed and the information that goes into those plans somehow needs to be steered at a higher level during the process. The generals and O-6s don’t usually go through the crisis action planning process. It is condensed and takes some practice to get used to it. I think that is something we need to put on paper as far as who is a part of that team. We need to conduct training on that planning process so that we actually go through crisis action planning as a team and it is not just one individual getting a phone call without involving the other key individuals.”

Interviewee #6 added, “The way to fix this for our headquarters is we should have a “warfighter-like” exercise every other year where we have Title 10, preferable Title 10 trainers and observer controllers (OCs) come in. It should probably be the exercise trainers from Fort Leavenworth except they need to be tuned up on domestic operations. Bring them in and take us through the process.

The JFHQ staff should train and exercise through the exact same process that a brigade commander takes his staff through for warfighter and, at division level, that the division commander takes his staff through. It is a grueling staff exercise that forces everyone to push the envelope on how to learn and improve their staff processes and

products. Instead of battlefield command, it would be domestic operations command and staff synchronization, staff planning, and staff execution through a command post exercise (CPX). It would be like a battle command training program (BCTP) exercise for JFHQ.”

Analysis

The responses to this question provided some good insights about how the JFHQ transformation process has created opportunities and challenges for joint planning beyond the CMD. Inter-departmental interaction has created an increase in requests for planning support to other state agencies. This opportunity would have been difficult prior to the JFHQ transformation because of the separate planning functions of the Service Components.

There were two recommendations that came out of this question. The first recommendation was to have more senior level staff involvement and interaction into the joint planning process. This satisfies the recommendation made earlier about more senior level emphasis on the joint planning process and would encourage more consistent participation and support to the JOPP and JPG processes.

The other recommendation had to do with training the JFHQ staff and exercising the plans that have been developed. The interviewee recommended a “warfighter” type exercise that would evaluate the JFHQ staff process and validate the JOPP and JPG planning processes. This recommendation has a lot of merit and should be considered.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus of this study was to determine the most significant challenges to implement a doctrinally correct joint planning process when transforming from a state military headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters in California. In order to do this numerous interviews were conducted and the results of those interviews were analyzed and compared against each other and with the guidance issued to California during the JFHQ transformation process.

Summary of Findings from Chapter 4

The analysis in chapter 4 compared the interviews conducted with nine members of the JFHQ California staff to each other and the guidance issued to California during the JFHQ transformation process. The analysis is divided into three areas: 1) JFHQ joint planning challenges and concerns, 2) positive changes and successes, and 3) recommendations from the interviewees.

JFHQ Joint Planning Challenges And Concerns

Analysis of the interviews and guidance from NGB identified the challenges and concerns in the following areas:

Lack of published plans

The lack of published, complete plans from the J-5 is the biggest concern identified with the JFHQ transformation process. The joint staff has such difficulty exercising the JPG process that contingency plans are not being developed as rapidly as

they need to be. There appears to be not enough emphasis from the JFHQ leadership to the joint staff directorates to ensure adequate participation in the JPG process.

There is no consistency from the various joint staff directorates about who is supposed to participate in the JPG process. There is inconsistent participation and high turnover from the various staff section supporting the JPG process and the JPG must constantly re-train new members and re-visit previous steps to get these new members up to speed so the process can move forward. This inconsistency has resulted in more time needed for planning and increased coordination required to exercise the JPG process.

Participation in the JPG process places additional strain on the joint staff sections and Service Components because of limited resources available. Lack of available manpower and resources has negatively impacted the joint planning capability. Resources are not tied to the strategic goals for the CMD.

Lack of Trained Planners

The J-5 appears to be the only joint staff directorate making a concerted effort to train their staff in joint planning and the JOPP process. The lack of personnel trained to use the JOPP hinders the planning process, requiring more time to be spent on training the process, rather than writing and producing actual plans.

It is not clear whether all staff directorates and planners within the JFHQ understand the contingency planning process and how it is supposed to work doctrinally. The terms JOPP and MDMP are used almost synonymously, as though the two processes are the same. They are similar but different processes, using different terminology and steps. This misconception creates confusion within the JPG process and delays the completion of contingency plans.

There is a lack of funding for JPME courses and the resistance of the Service Components to fund such courses. Planners are trying to apply the planning skills they have, Army MDMP at the tactical level, to write joint plans at the operational level. Joint staff sections are using OJT to train planners in the JOPP. The fact that very few people on the joint staff are trained to do operational planning, at any level, significantly hinders this effort. OJT is not an effective training tool unless you have a sufficient number of personnel trained and experienced in the area that OJT is occurring. In this case, there is a recognized lack of sufficient personnel trained to conduct joint operational planning significantly hinders efforts to have any effective OJT program.

Organizational Structure and Resourcing

The JFHQ is still operating on the old state area command (STARC) table of distribution and allowances (TDA). The TDA structure is not compatible with the JFHQ model as the positions in the headquarters do not line up with the actual positions in the JFHQ, and, there are no joint positions. The transformation to a JFHQ was initiated and directed down to the states before it had been resourced and approved. There have been no resources or funding given to the states to execute the JFHQ transformation process. The resources were gathered “out of hide” to meet the requirements issued by NGB.

A review of the guidance issued to California during the JFHQ transformation process and the literature regarding joint planning showed that although guidance was issued to the states regarding implementation of the JFHQ transformation process, the majority of the guidance was vague and opens to a wide variety of interpretations (NGB P03-0044, 2003, 2).

Requirements for External Support

There has been an exponential increase in requirements to the J-5 to support planning outside the CMD. The CMD is a recognized leader in planning capabilities to state organizations and the requests for planning support from these other state agencies continues to increase. Inter-departmental interaction has created an increase in requests for planning support to other state agencies. The drop in expected CMD response time for state emergencies places additional requirements on the operational planners to provide more detailed plans, and increased pre-coordination efforts from the J-3 to ensure that the execution timelines can be met.

Positive changes

Analysis of the interviews and guidance from NGB identified the following positive changes resulting from the JFHQ transformation process:

More Formal Planning Process

The operational planning process is conducted more formally than prior to the JFHQ transformation with more involvement and input from the other staff sections. This is definitely a positive change to the operational planning process. The more formal process ensure all joint staff sections are aware of the requirements for planning and are involved in the content of the plans produced by the JPG.

Strategic Planning

The AMA model used for strategic planning is a business model that has definite advantages because it is also suitable for use at various other state agencies in California.

The efforts of the J-5 and his staff in the area of strategic planning have been very successful and these efforts must continue to move the CMD forward.

State Active Duty (SAD) System as a Force Provider

The state active duty (SAD) system in California has allowed the JFHQ to operate effectively. The SAD system mimics the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) system, but at the state level. It provides the JFHQ with the manpower it needs to operate the JFHQ at the level they are expected to operate to support current mission requirements. This process allows the CMD to operate at a much higher level that it would otherwise be able to using the existing federal structure of AGR and technician soldiers.

California Specific Documents

California has a complete O&F manual that identifies, by joint staff section, the duties and responsibilities of those staff sections. This manual is currently being exercised by the JFHQ staff in order to validate it. California has a complete joint operational planning SOP and a JPG SOP. Both documents are currently undergoing validation by the JFHQ staff in California.

These documents greatly assist the JFHQ transformation and joint planning processes by providing standardized procedures for the JPG and a breakdown of the each joint staff section and the functions that are required for each section. These documents are readily available to members of the JFHQ joint staff and written in an indexed and easily understood format.

Recommendations from the interviews

Analysis of the interviews identified the following recommendations from the interviewees:

Additional Duty Appointments for JPG Members

Create additional duty assignments for the personnel from the various joint staff section for the JPG process. This recommendation would add some weight to the JPG process and send the message that the JFHQ leadership supports the JOPP and JPG processes. It would also provide a valid basis for comments on the annual evaluations of those personnel assigned to the JPG.

Have more senior level staff involvement and interaction into the joint planning process. This satisfies the recommendation made earlier about more senior level emphasis on the joint planning process and would encourage more consistent participation and support to the JOPP and JPG processes.

Increase the Planning Capability of the J-5

Provide more support to the J-5 planners or move the operational planning process over to the planning section in the J-3. Both of these recommendations have merit and are worthy of consideration. The J-5 section has a limited number of planners and the operational requirements to do both strategic and operational planning. One fix would be to increase the number of planners in the J-5, creating a strategic planning section and an operational planning section. This recommendation would be the most doctrinally correct solution, keeping the responsibilities to do planning in the J-5 where they belong.

Move Operational Planning to the J-3

Move the operational planning responsibilities to the J-3. The J-3 already has an operational planning capability in the J-35, operations planning section. Moving the responsibility for operational planning would relieve the J-5 of that requirement, allowing them to concentrate fully on strategic planning; an area they have already received accolades for. It would also place the responsibility to conduct operational planning into a planning section that already has planning experience, but also place that responsibility under the direction of the joint staff section that has the requirement to execute those plans.

Return operational Planning Capability to Service Components

Place a future operations planning capability back into the G-3 and A-3 sections. This would give the Service Components the ability to, not only provide a planning capability, but also give them the ability to conduct initial coordination at the onset of plan execution. It would also provide the J-3 with a surge planning capability during the executions of plans for state emergencies.

What Do the Results Mean?

The results indicate that there is miscommunication and inconsistency of effort between the various directorates and the planners when conducting contingency planning. While there is an almost unanimous consensus on the success of strategic planning at the JFHQ in California, there is mixed success regarding operational planning.

The most significant fact affecting operational planning problems is a lack of resources, primarily, lack of available planners in the J-5 and lack of planning support in

the form of consistent personnel to man the JPG. Whether this is lack of resources for the JFHQ as a whole, or in the allocation of those resources across the various directorates is immaterial. The bottom line is that adequate resourcing can alleviate many of the problems that the JFHQ in California is experiencing in the area of joint operational planning.

The good news is that California has a very good strategic plan in place. Part of that plan requires that the processes involved in the success of the strategic plan are looked at every year to determine if they meet the strategic goals outlined for the California Military Department. The problem California is experiencing in the area of operational planning is being considered by the CMD leadership and will be addressed at the next strategic planning conference, scheduled for later this year.

Were There Any Unexpected Findings?

Some findings were unexpected. One finding that I found interesting was that although many of the persons interviewed acknowledged problems with the deliberate operation planning and JPG process, only two recognized that the number of available planners in the planning section of the J-5 needed to be increased.

Another unexpected finding was the fact that while nearly all of the persons interviewed identified lack of resources or inadequate allocation of resources as a problem for the operational planning process, none recommended an increase in personnel for the planning section of the J-5. Only three acknowledged that the planning section within the J-5 is being challenged by mission creep and competing requirements.

Recommendations

This study makes recommendations in the following areas to address and mitigate the shortfalls and concerns identified earlier:

Lack of published plans

The lack of published plans from the J-5 was identified as the biggest concern for the JFHQ in California. This paper makes several recommendations to correct this deficiency.

The lack of plans can be attributed to two general issues, the insufficient planning capability of the J-5 and insufficient leadership emphasis on the JPG process. The number of planners currently available in the J-5 is insufficient to adequately address both strategic and operational planning requirements. This study recommends an increase in the number of planners assigned to the J-5. Increasing the numbers of planners will increase the planning capability of the J-5 and allow the directorate to allocate enough resources to operational plans to correct this planning deficiency.

One of the issues regarding the effectiveness of the JPG process concerns the lack of commitment of personnel by the various directorates. This study recommends an approach to the JPG process that involves directing joint staff and special staff sections involved in the JPG process to assign a planner, in writing on an additional duty appointment order, from each of those joint staff and special staff sections. This planner would be the primary point of contact and information source from that staff section to the JPG and this assignment would remain in effect until the JPG process has concluded with the submission of a complete plan

Lack of Trained Planners

The lack of trained planners is a significant issue in the JFHQ. This study recommends the JFHQ leadership put more emphasis on formal training for planners and personnel assigned to the JPG. This emphasis would also include ensuring resources are available to send personnel needing training in this area to schools.

Currently, the JFHQ staff is using OJT to provide training and experience for personnel in operational planning. The lack of trained planners has already been identified as a concern by JFHQ leaders. This lack of personnel trained in operational planning severely hampers any attempts at OJT for operational planning. This study recommends that the JFHQ discontinue any OJT programs for operational planners until sufficient numbers of trained personnel are available to resume this practice.

Organizational Structure and Resource Issues

This study also recommends that the JFHQ leadership in California implement a cohesive and comprehensive plan to correct the planning deficiencies and set the CMD up for success in the future. The annual review of the CMD Strategic Plan is an excellent vehicle to accomplish this recommendation. Part of this plan would recommend taking a look at the allocation of personnel and resources and comparing them with the goals and objectives outlined in the California National Guard Strategic Plan to ensure they are synchronized and re-allocate them to meet the goals of the strategic plan if they are not. California already reviews their strategic plan annually. This annual review provides the perfect opportunity to look at this issue and make adjustments.

Another recommendation is that with the increased requirements placed on the JFHQ staff to support its missions, including the completion of CONPLANS to support

state and federal missions, a request be forwarded to NGB for additional resources to allow for all joint and special staff sections to be fully staffed.

Potential Areas for Further Study

Some recommendations that were not directly addressed in this study but have significant implications for the success of the JFHQ transformation process deals with a re-allocation of resources within the JFHQ. Addressing the question of re-allocation of personnel would require decision makers to be open to ideas that they perhaps have not considered before.

The first recommendation for further study has to do with re-allocation of resources and personnel within the JFHQ to determine if they are being used in the most effective manner. The CMD should complete an assessment of all current personnel assigned to the JFHQ to find the best solution to this problem.

Another area for further study would be the impact that the transformation process and joint planning has had on the force providers and field units supporting the process. Finally, similar studies can be done for other states to determine if the challenges and successes experienced in California are consistent in other states.

These are just some of the questions this study has raised that could provide areas for future research.

APPENDIX A

Strategic Planning Defined

The interviewees made a distinction between strategic planning and operational planning. Since operational planning was analyzed earlier in this paper, it is necessary to analyze strategic planning and the definition used for the purposes of this paper.

The military definition of strategic planning is derived from military theorists Carl von Clausewitz, who said that strategy is “the use of engagements for the object of war”. (Clausewitz, 1993, 146) and Basil Liddell Hart, who defined strategy as “The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Bartholomees, 2006, 81).

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines strategy as “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives (JP 3-0, 2006, GL-29). These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means).” (Bartholomees, 2006, 81). This definition of strategic planning focuses on national issues and is applicable to military planners at the MACOM level and higher. To adequately address strategic planning for JFHQ at the state level, a different definition is necessary.

According to the Special Libraries Association (SLA), Strategic planning is a tool for organizing the present on the basis of the projections of the desired future. That is, a strategic plan is a road map to lead an organization from where it is now to where it would like to be in five or ten years (SLA, 1997, 1). This definition best describes the context for the term used in this paper.

The strategic planning at the JFHQ level in California consists of the goals and objectives designed to move the California Military Department (CMD) forward. The CMD has a strategic plan that was updated on 16 May 06. The executive summary outlines the purpose and necessity for this plan. It states:

The Headquarters of the California National Guard and the Military Department of California, following several years of exploring alternative organizational structures and alignments, is now actively transforming to a Joint Force headquarters under a doctrinally accurate organizational structure, that once complete, will afford the State a much greater level of support response from not only the California Military Department and California National Guard, but will deepen the capabilities pool to include Department of Defense assets previously not available to the State.

The California Army National Guard is transforming from a strategic reserve force to an operational force, with modular capabilities better suited to meet the federal needs of the United States Army, the needs of the State of California, and to be prepared to operate in a joint environment.

The California Air National Guard is transforming from cold-war era missions to future missions including space, cyberspace, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and increasing the ability of the Air National Guard to operate in a joint environment.

The California State Military Reserve is transforming to take a more active role in joint operations and extend the capabilities of the entire Department including both the federal and State missions.

The format and process used in updating the California Military Department Strategic Plan is intended to posture the Department to utilize emerging technology and a balanced scorecard⁷ approach to track progress on the implementation of the plan. (CMD, 2006, 3)

The strategic plan is reviewed annually to ensure the goals and objectives of the CMD are on track and moving forward. Adjustments are made and new goals are set to ensure the CMD is able to achieve their strategic objectives.

⁷ The balanced scorecard is a strategic planning and management system that is used extensively in business and industry, government, and nonprofit organizations worldwide to align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization, improve internal and external communications, and monitor organization performance against strategic goals. It was originated by Drs. Robert Kaplan (Harvard Business School) and David Norton as a performance measurement framework that added strategic non-financial performance measures to traditional financial metrics to give managers and executives a more 'balanced' view of organizational performance. (balancedscorecard.org, 2008)

APPENDIX B

US Army Command and General Staff College

Title of project: *A Case Study Of The Implementation Of Joint Planning In An Organization Undergoing Transformation To Joint Force headquarters In One State.*

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Institutional Affiliation: The researcher is a graduate student in the Master of Military Arts and Science (Joint Planning) degree program at the US Army Command and General Staff College. This research is being conducted in fulfillment of degree requirements at the US Army Command and General Staff College.

The following questions will be used during interviews with key personnel within the National Guard Joint Force headquarters in California to answer the following thesis question:

What are the most significant challenges to implement a doctrinally correct joint planning process when transforming from a state military headquarters to a Joint Force headquarters in one state?

1. What is/was your position in the Joint Force headquarters during the transformation?
2. How long have/were you been assigned to that position within the Joint Force headquarters?
3. From your perspective as a senior staff officer, how is planning accomplished in the JFHQ?
4. Explain how the transformation to JFHQ has changed the requirements for planning and how that differs from how planning was conducted before the transformation.
5. Please describe from your perspective what process or standards are used in the planning process in your organization?
6. Please describe the actions and efforts taken to train or prepare the people involved in joint planning. First, to prepare you as a director or senior staff officer, then, for the individuals involved in the planning process.
7. When you think about planning in the JFHQ, what works well with the current planning process? What would you change?
8. Now that your organization is well on the road to transformation, what, in retrospect would you do differently to improve the planning process? Do you believe these

changes are related only to your organization or are they likely to be applicable to similar organizations?

9. Is there anything you would like to add regarding the conduct of planning before, during, or after the transformation to the JFHQ?

10. Is there anything related to planning in the JFHQ that I might have missed or that you would like to add?.

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