

PERSONNEL POLICIES FOR AN OPERATIONAL ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

PERSONNEL POLICIES FOR AN OPERATIONAL ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, by Barry K. Vincent, 98 pages.

The Army recognizes that the Army National Guard (ARNG) must transition to an operational reserve to meet current and future demands. Yet, current policies surrounding enlisted accessions, unit stabilization, mobilizations, and medical and dental benefits are still representative of a bygone era where the ARNG mobilizes and deploys in a Title 10 capacity in the event of partial or full mobilization. The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the policies that negatively influence unit readiness. The aim is to provide fully manned units without cross-leveling Soldiers. Changes are required for the ARNG to effectively, and efficiently meet the personnel readiness requirements of the Combatant Commanders and Governors as they employ ARNG units to accomplish federal and state missions. This thesis examines the policies affecting unit stabilization, medical and dental readiness, mobilization, and individuals account.

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ACRONYMS

AKO	Army Knowledge Online
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARI	Army Research Institute
ARNG	Army National Guard
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
DEERS	Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DTP	Delayed Training Program
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTUS	Full-Time Unit Support
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
IET	Initial Entry Training
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
MOS	Military Occupational Skill
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NGB	National Guard Bureau
RC	Army's Reserve Components
RSP	Recruit Sustainment Program
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances

TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPU	Troop Program Unit
TTHS	Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students
USAR	United States Army Reserve
WTC	Warrior Transition Course

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We must adapt our reserve components. Our reserve components are performing magnificently. They are no longer a strategic reserve only mobilized in national emergencies. They are now an operational reserve employed on a cyclical basis to allow us to sustain these extended operations. We must continue to adapt our reserve components for a future of persistent conflict. Operationalizing the reserve components will require national and state consensus and support, as well as continued commitment from employers, Soldiers and Families. It will require changes in the way we train, equip, resource, and mobilize and to cumbersome Cold War administrative policies to build the truly total force we have been working toward for so many years. We have changed the paradigm for our reserve component Soldiers and Families, and we owe it to them to make this transition rapidly.

General George W. Casey Jr., Association of the United States Army Eisenhower Luncheon Remarks, October 2007

Background

In February 1974 General Creighton Abrams, then Army Chief of Staff, testified before the House Armed Services Committee and expressed his strategy to “maintain a peacetime deterrent force structure of sufficient size, quality and readiness by using our manpower more efficiently” (Abrams 1974, 28). He outlined four key points that make it necessary to improve readiness of the Army’s reserve components in his prepared remarks.

“First, our force structure is much smaller than it has been in more than two decades and smaller by almost 40 percent than the 1968 Vietnam peak. [...] Second, FY 1975 will complete the transition to the All-Volunteer Force. [...] Third, we must improve the organization and readiness of the Reserve and National Guard so that they can assume their increasingly important role in our total security posture. [...] And finally, we must do all of this at as low a cost as is possible, since manpower already consumes approximately 55 percent of the Defense Budget and

further increases would jeopardize both needed improvement in readiness and weapons development programs” (Abrams 1974, 28).

He further outlined the round-out concept that provided depth to active Army divisions by aligning a reserve component brigade to the active division thus, maximizing training opportunities, relationships, and costs (Abrams 1974, 284). Having just concluded the Vietnam conflict General Abrams’ vision was that America would never again fight a war without its reserve component. These key points became known as the Abrams Doctrine.

At the same committee hearing, then Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Howard H. Callaway testified in his summary remarks:

“The third challenge is to make full use of the capability of our Reserve Component resources as a distinct but integral and essential part of the One Army –our Total Force policy. Today, reserve forces must be ready to fight within two or three months. [...]This nation owes a great debt of gratitude to the hardy Guardsmen and Reservist, who with limited time and resources for training, are striving to attain the readiness goals established” (Callaway 1974, 261).

Upon Congress’ declaration of war, reserve component Soldiers mobilize with enough lead-time for the nation’s industrial base to refocus to fill equipment shortages, transfer Inactive National Guard or Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers to fill personnel shortages, and provide ample time to raise training proficiency in deploying reserve component units.

As demonstrated in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the nation will employ reserve component forces for federal operations. Use of the ARNG will likely continue given the current and future strategic environment. “Analysts generally agree that the next decades will be ones of persistent conflict” when the nation

must prepare for a “protracted confrontation among states, non-state and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends” (Casey AUSA 2007). Furthermore, General Abrams vision of mobilizing America through mobilization of the Army’s reserve components is still valid today.




Figure 1. All Army Soldiers Mobilized 2000-2006
 Source: Author created graph using data provided by HQDA-G3, Mobilizations, 2008.

The graph above represents the three Army components involvement in the contemporary operating environment. The blue line depicts deployment of the Active Army (Compo 1). The red line depicts mobilization, and in most cases, deployment of the Army National Guard (ARNG) (Compo 2). Similarly, the black line represents mobilization and deployment of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) (Compo 3). To maintain operational security of deployed forces, the data provided by Headquarters,

Department of the Army (HQDA), G3, Mobilization Office does not include any unit mobilizations or deployments of units that were deployed as of January 2008. Since February 2003, troop requirements in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have averaged 221,443 Soldiers per month. The data suggests significant contributions to the current operating environment.

During the Vietnam War, the Army chose to maintain the same units deployed in theater and continually refill them with a rotation of individuals (Mahon 1983, 266). To alleviate stress upon personnel and to maintain unit integrity, the Army has employed unit rotations vice the individual replacement system. The Army leadership recognizes that if the sum total of these requirements were borne solely by the Active Army it would come at a devastating cost in terms of personnel and equipment fatigue. The Congressionally mandated active Army end strength of 547,000 is not sufficient to meet all of the troop requirements and still provide Soldiers adequate time at home with Families. Thus, prosecution of this persistent conflict requires the ARNG transition to an operational reserve deployable on a cyclical basis (Casey 2007, 17).

The Army recognizes that maintaining its reserve components as a strategic reserve could come at a distressing consequence. According to J.A. Sellers in his 1990 book titled *Military Lessons: The British Perspective*, the British attempted to rely on a strategic reserve during the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis. They adopted the strategic reserve concept as a cost savings measure anticipating the use of their reserves after a deliberate build up period that would allow them to increase manning, training and equipment levels prior to deployment. During the Suez Canal Crisis, they simply could not mobilize their reserve forces in a timely manner to positively influence the outcome of that conflict.

The United States does not want to re-learn the lessons of the Suez Canal Crisis.




Figure 2. ARNG Not Available Fiscal Year 2001-2007

Source: Author created graph using data provided by ARNG, Army Resourcing Manning, Selected Reserve, 2008

The ARNG has taken a deliberate approach to personnel policy. Current accession policy in the ARNG assigns new enlistees to a specific paragraph and line number in a Troop Program Unit (TPU). The above graph depicts the percentage of the total ARNG population assigned to units that is not available to deploy. This policy of assigning new enlistees directly into units contributed to an average of approximately 10.3% of the ARNG force unready for deployment during the past six years. Soldiers are not available for deployment while they are undergoing or awaiting training. During the same six-year period, 21 various other reasons kept Soldiers from being ready to deploy. These reasons, including legal processing, permanent profile, temporary profile, dental readiness, or Lautenberg Amendment category (see glossary for definition), account for another approximately 5.4% of the ARNG force being unready for deployment (Pheil

2008, data emailed to author January 7). This results in an overall non-available percentage of 15.7%. To transform to an operational reserve, the ARNG should reduce this number to 6%.

Research Objective

The objective of this research is to identify and provide recommendations to critical policies hindering the ARNG from providing fully manned units to the Combatant Commanders and Governors. The primary research question is: *What policies need to change for the ARNG to successfully transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve while maintaining the all-volunteer force?* To answer this question the research must first establish definitions for rudimentary elements of the primary question. What is the meaning of the term strategic reserve? What is the meaning of the term operational reserve in the context used by senior Army leaders? Understanding the difference between these definitions forms the basis to identify the specific policies that need to change.

The research will attempt to capture responses concentrating on the unit and state levels within the ARNG. The ARNG is playing a significant role in the GWOT as demonstrated previously in this chapter. This research attempts to identify methods to enable an increase to unit readiness levels and gain efficiencies so that the ARNG is better postured to meet mobilization requirements.

Significance

This topic significantly impacts the National Security Strategy for the United States. Congress' decision to maintain approximately 500,000 in active Army end

strength requires use of the ARNG to assist in prosecution of the GWOT. Constrained resources require programming decisions to provide the most competent, capable, and ready force to defend the interests of the United States. The ARNG uses only 12 percent of the Army budget, yet provides 32 percent of the overall capabilities (Blum 2006, 15). It is imperative that the ARNG remain a healthy, vibrant force capable of sustaining its involvement in the GWOT as part of the Total Force concept.

The first step to providing the required force is having the people in the organization. The ARNG is enjoying unprecedented success recruiting new members during this era of persistent conflict, where deployment is accepted and expected as part of an initial enlistment. Taking care of these Guardsmen is the next step. It is critical that the Army support Families and employers during this transition period to operationalize the ARNG. In general, Soldiers want to belong to an organization that cares about them and their Families. Families and employers deserve the most efficient policies to minimize impact to them, which in turn lessens the burden on the Soldier.

Delimitations

This analysis will be limited to examination of policies that need to change to enhance unit readiness in the ARNG. The study will focus on exploration of accession policies, unit stabilization, and other facets that bolster unit readiness. This thesis will recommend solutions to these areas that will afford the ARNG the opportunity to provide fully manned units to this and future conflicts without the need to cross-level Soldiers. A thorough explanation of the concept of personnel cross-leveling is in Chapter 4.

Although the ARNG largely consists of part-time citizen Soldiers, the ARNG requires some full-time officers and non-commissioned officers to function effectively

and efficiently. Full-time support position requirements historically have been significantly underfunded. This underfunding of full-time manning authorizations is not included in this study, although it remains a point of emphasis for the ARNG. Furthermore, it represents a glaring shortfall in the ability to become an operational reserve. “Fighting the GWOT underscores the vital role full-time support personnel hold in preparing ARNG units for a multitude of missions both at home and abroad” (Vaughn 2007, 2).

As the transition to an operational reserve began and mobilizations increased, the state Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) staffs assumed many additional tasks while preparing units to deploy. Recruiting became more challenging as the conflict persisted. Bonus and incentive programs increased in an effort to reverse negative recruiting trends requiring more tracking and additional paperwork to administer these programs with little additional labor provided (Bode 2007). The ARNG personnel services Soldiers have simply done more without receiving additional resources.

The last Manpower Allocation Requirements Criteria study of the ARNG occurred in 1974 and much has changed since then. Soldiers then, accomplished many processes by pen, paper, and typewriter. Technology has also progressed to allow accomplishment of more tasks down at the unit level previously accomplished by higher echelon headquarters. Additionally, there has been an enormous change in force structure for nearly every state as a result of Army transformation to the modular, brigade centric formations and ARNG Rebalance. ARNG Rebalance affected 34 states and over 55,000 spaces of force structure. Full-time staffing within the ARNG deserves a new, in-depth study of its own. Therefore, the broad issue of full-time staffing will not be

included within the scope of this thesis.

This study will not consider the policy of awarding leave to Soldiers relating to the 12-month long mobilization and when that leave is taken, or under Title 10 or 32 of United States Code. This issue is receiving attention at very senior levels for satisfactory resolution.

Definitions

The definitions to the terms listed below represent how each is understood for the purposes of this document.

1. Assign – To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (FM 1-02, 2004).
2. Attach – The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary (FM 1-02, 2004).
3. Available – Soldiers are considered to be available if they are attached or assigned to the measured unit/headquarters, are physically present, or can be present within the prescribed response time and are not restricted by Army policy from deploying or employing with the unit (AR 220-1, 2006).
4. Individuals Account – An administrative account to assign Soldiers that are not available to fill spaces in units due to their temporary status in one of six sub-accounts of trainees, officer accession students, transients, holdees, students, and United States Military Academy cadets. The Army's individuals account is commonly referred to as "TTHS" which stands for Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (Lord, 289).

5. Lautenberg Amendment, Title 18, USC 921 (A)(33), 922 (D)(9), 922 (G)(9) – Soldiers known to have, or Soldiers whom commanders have reasonable cause to believe have, a conviction of a misdemeanor or felony crime of domestic violence are non-available for missions that require possession of firearms or ammunition (AR 220-1, 124), (USC referenced from Carlson, 2003).

Neither Joint nor Army doctrine defines the terms listed as items 6 – 8 below though they are used frequently as if they are well defined and understood. This thesis will offer definitions of these terms for consideration.

6. Operational Force – Generally understood as active duty units organizationally interchangeable, fully manned, equipped, and trained to execute full spectrum operations. Units can be comprised of Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). Excludes institutional Army organizations such as Forces Command (FORSCOM) or HQDA as these organizations are not organized to perform wartime missions and do not typically deploy. The operational force should expect to deploy at a frequency of one year out of three (author proposed definition). For the purpose of this study, the term Operational Force should not be confused with the term Operational Army used in Total Army Analysis (TAA).

7. Operational Reserve – A military organization composed of reserve component units resourced to provide ready and trained units to Combatant Commanders and to support Civil Authorities. These units are resourced to attain and maintain at least 90% trained and available personnel, 90% of mission essential equipment, and collective training of company level or higher. Operational reserve units should be available to mobilize in a Title 10 United States Code status once every six years, but no more often than once

every four years.

8. Strategic Reserve – A military organization composed of part-time military personnel typically resourced below required levels to reduce peacetime military expenditures. Strategic reserve units can mobilize in support of a major conflict over a protracted period of time, which provides ample time to fill personnel and equipment shortages and increase collective training readiness to sufficient war time levels before deployment. Strategic reserve units could conceivably stay in training indefinitely with no anticipation of deployment.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Due to the demands of this new century, and our transformation to an operational force, we are asking more of our Soldiers as we prepare them for the challenges they will face both overseas and domestically in this new, continuous state of mobilization. Our commitment to readiness is driving how we train, support, and retain our Warrior Citizens.

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve, 2007 Army Reserve Posture Statement

Primary source research of General Creighton Abrams' Congressional testimony in 1974 establishes the broad historical context for this thesis. That testimony was the baseline for understanding strategic reserve doctrine. Research for contemporary related works revealed quite a large number of documents pertaining to operationalizing the Army's Reserve Components in four categories: government reports, testimony and speeches, military publications, and research papers. Additionally, interviews produced perceptive material to help uncover problem areas. The following discussion will dissect the five categories.

Government Reports

A 2004 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report indicates a mismatch between existing personnel unit strengths and the personnel readiness required by Combatant Commanders (GAO Report 05-21, 12-13). Since that time, a subsequent 2006 GAO report highlighted the disparate situation between the strategic reserve policy of tiered resourcing and the Combatant Commander's expectation to deploy reserve component units fully manned (GAO Report 06-1109T, 13-14). This report states,

“Without a comprehensive reassessment of its reserve staffing policies, the reserve component will have difficulty improving readiness.”

Testimony and Speeches

General George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, addressed the Association of the United States Army saying: “Our reserve components are performing magnificently, but in an operational role for which they were neither designed nor resourced” (Casey 2007). Congressional Committee testimony by General Richard A. Cody, Army Vice-Chief of Staff, states that, “By necessity, the Army’s Reserve Components have become an operational reserve with – in the case of the ARNG – concurrent state mission responsibilities.” General Cody goes on to describe the reorganization of the Army following September 11: “to ensure that the formations for all our components – Active, Guard, Reserve – were fully manned, equipped, and trained to meet their operational and domestic mission responsibilities” (Cody 2006, 2). Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace Jr., Army G3, stated to the Commission on National Guard and Reserves that, “the increased global demands of this long war, require the reserve components to fill a much larger and more active part of the operational force pool.” The dedication and commitment of resources by these senior Army officers “to make reserve component units organizationally interchangeable with their active component counterparts” (Lovelace 2007, 3) will ensure seamless utilization of the Total Force.

Military Publications

Publications such as the “Army Game Plan, 2006,” the “Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006,” and the “Army Modernization Plan, 2006” all recognize a requirement

for ARNG units to be “fully manned,” however, none of them offer or provide any means to achieve that end.

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB), stated in an article in *Joint Forces Quarterly* that, “We have transformed the Guard from a strategic reserve to an operational force” (Blum 2006, 17). Likewise, Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn, Director, ARNG proclaimed his “commitment to completing the transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force capable of both supporting the war fight and serving the Governors (Vaughn 2007, 2).” Although the ARNG wholeheartedly joined in the effort to defeat global terrorism during this period, much work remains to transform the policies necessary to achieve a truly operational reserve. The above-mentioned documents establish the vision for the organization’s direction. The research must identify the specific policies that must change to achieve the desired results.

To identify specific policies hindering the ARNG from achieving success as an operational reserve, the research must examine a range of sources such as ARNG Enlistment Criteria, Army Regulation 220-1, Personnel Policy Guidance, and Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System. These documents establish the policy for many aspects of unit readiness beginning with assignment of enlisted personnel, to individual availability criteria, through unit mobilization procedures and are at the crux of the issue.

Other important references necessary to establish a common understanding of key terms include *How the Army Runs*, Field Manual 1-02, and Joint Publication 1-02.

Research Papers

The research papers written relating to this topic exposed varying ideas ranging from Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) to Mobile Training Teams (MTT) as possible solutions to personnel readiness problems. The purpose of ARFORGEN is to serve as a predictability model for future deployment availability. The cyclic nature of the model as related to personnel readiness has the second order effect of providing a clear picture to achieve equipping and training strategies. It does nothing to correct the inherent problem of decades old strategic reserve policy that limits personnel readiness in the force. For the active component, the ARFORGEN cycle provides a systematic approach for Human Resources Command to project shortages and supply Soldiers to fill vacancies. This approach is not feasible for the ARNG since the strength of this organization is in its community base. MTTs can provide acute training corrections for units that have the necessary assigned personnel, but lack the MOS qualification for their assigned position to make them “available” for deployment. MTTs are a short-term solution to treat a symptom, not necessarily the solution for the duration or to correct the larger root problem.

Interviews

Interviews with a variety of people within the Active Army and ARNG will provide information from the user level critical to the authors understanding of the issues. Additionally, the interviews will afford the author the opportunity to gain perspective from the interviewees. Intended subjects for interview include select members of the Missouri ARNG JFHQ, specifically targeting those persons able to identify negative impacts to unit readiness. This target group is the Chief Personnel Officer (J1), the

Deputy Personnel Officer (DJ1), the Recruiting Retention Commander and key staff from the battalion, the Mobilization Readiness Officer, the Medical Officer, the Employer Support to the Guard and Reserve Coordinator, and the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Interface Branch Chief. This group of leaders is representative of the state level view. The expectation is that most other states and territories share issues raised by this group. A survey of similar positions from all the states to determine the extent of problems raised by this group will provide clarity. A Brigade Command Sergeant Major going through a mobilization station provides a current view of the problems filling a deployment manning roster, individual training issues, and a perspective of the possible benefits garnered by an individual's account. An interview with a Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) Site Security Manager would provide insight to possible solutions to correct enrollment status problems some Guardsmen experience when mobilizing for a deployment. The HQDA Command Plan Manager interview provides specific contextual information regarding TAA 08-13 where the Army established an Individuals Account with 8,000 spaces within the ARNG force structure. Throughout all these proposed interviews, the thesis will attempt to improve unit readiness while recalling sound force management practices.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Through the process of research, this thesis aims to identify, analyze and present the views held and expressed by leaders of the ARNG concerning the way forward to accomplish transition to an operational reserve as described in chapters one and two. The thesis will use quantitative research to measure the strength of respondent's remarks. Quantitative research analysis will allow presentation of views free from bias.

Quantitative research is the systematic scientific investigation of properties and phenomena and their relationships. Quantitative research is widely used in both the natural sciences and social sciences, from physics and biology to sociology and journalism. The objective of quantitative research is to develop and employ mathematical models, theories and hypotheses pertaining to natural phenomena. The process of measurement is central to quantitative research because it provides the fundamental connection between empirical observation and mathematical expression of quantitative relationships (Free Dictionary 2008).

Survey is the research instrument used to develop this thesis. The research will begin by conducting a sensing session with a very small group of ARNG leaders to identify current policies that prevent the ARNG from providing fully manned units to the Combatant Commanders and Governors. Next is to construct a survey with questions that address each of the topics identified by the sensing session. A small group must test the survey to determine if questions are not clear or concise for comprehension in a single rapid reading. Once revisions are complete the survey must be approved by the Command and General Staff College Quality Assurance Officer and receive a control number from the Army Research Institute (ARI).

The Missouri ARNG staff is the group participating in the sensing session due to their physical proximity to Fort Leavenworth and the time constraints for travel. The

target audience within this organization is the personnel administration offices, the operations office, and the subordinate mobilization branch. They are significant due to the nature of their jobs in managing ARNG personnel readiness and specific focus to providing ready units to the war-fight. They are working within the constraints of current policy doing the best job they can to overcome challenges presented by cold war policy. Their firsthand knowledge and understanding is critical to identifying all, or most, of the policies that need to change.

The author will confer with the thesis committee to ensure the policies identified by the sensing session group meet the scope of this thesis before proceeding. With the list of topics approved, it is necessary to develop a survey to measure the depth and breadth of these issues. Conducting the survey will ensure the issues identified are not unique to that specific state. An open-ended question is included to allow identification of other policies not previously identified by the sensing session group.

A test group of four ARNG Command and General Staff College students validate the questions by proof reading them and focusing on clarity, ease of understanding, and conciseness. Any question found inconsistent with the directions above was re-written. Instructions to the test group to that effect accompany the initial question list.

Permission to conduct the survey is required from the ARI since the survey respondents are outside the Command and General Staff College. The college Quality Assurance Officer receives access to review the survey and edit it for brevity, clarity, and conciseness. Once the Quality Assurance Officer approves the survey, ARI analysts

receive the survey for their review and approval. The conclusion of this process is issuance of a control number to include in the text of the survey instructions.

The survey will target distinct positions within the ARNG at the state level. The target audience includes 100% of the personnel holding these positions across the force due to the small number of persons holding them. The positions are Personnel Administration Officer (J1/G1), Deputy Personnel Administration Officer (DJ1/DG1), Human Resources Officer (HRO), Recruiting Retention Commander (RRC), Recruiting Retention Sergeant's Major, Operations Officer (J3/G3), Mobilization Readiness Officer (MRO), and Unit Commanders at the rank of Major or above in the ARNG. This audience numbers over 670 strong. Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels, and Brigadier Generals hold these positions with a vast wealth of firsthand experience dealing with the exact policies that interfere with the ARNG ability to accomplish readiness objectives. Many of these individuals have recent experience mobilizing Soldiers and/or units, or were mobilized themselves to deploy in support of the GWOT.

The Command and General Staff College has made Blackboard software available for student use though Masters of Military Art and Science students have not previously used it. The Blackboard survey management tool is the specific portion of Blackboard used to create the survey. The Command and General Staff College system administrator establishes a site within Blackboard to allow the thesis author to serve as the survey administrator. The author types the description of the survey, instructions and questions into the survey file and establishes the answer format for each survey question. The administrator then creates user access for each person intended to take the survey by selecting his or her email address from the global address book or manually loading his

or her email address. The survey audience will receive an email message with the purpose of the survey and instructions for accessing and completing the survey on the Blackboard site. Appendix A contains the instructions and survey sent to the respondents.

Most of the survey questions are formulated as statements soliciting one of six responses on the Likert scale of: 1. strongly agree, 2. agree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. disagree, 5. strongly disagree, 6. I don't know. A seventh category accounts for any question left unanswered. The statements are in positive prose to prevent confusion in determining the most accurate response. The statements surround five areas: Unit Stop Loss or Stabilization, Medical and Dental readiness, Mobilization, Training, and Individuals Account. The final question is open-ended soliciting a written response to allow identification of further policies not previously identified by the Missouri staff. The Likert scale does not measure the responses to this question.

Conduct of the survey using Blackboard affords the highest possible security of the data provided by the respondents. Each individual using his or her Army Knowledge Online (AKO) username and password accesses the college Blackboard site. The AKO firewall secures the Blackboard site thus, securing the survey responses. Only the system administrator and the author will have access to the survey responses in the Blackboard repository.

It is necessary to collect certain administrative data such as rank, length of time in current position, length of time in related positions, and number of mobilizations they have been involved with in an effort to dissect the responses to the survey. For example, a statement regarding who should be responsible for training new enlistees may yield

quite varied responses between the Recruiting Retention Commanders currently responsible, and the Operations Officers overseeing the Regional Training Institutes offered as an option to become responsible for that training. Having administrative data, including length of time in current position may allow weighting of responses from respondents with multiple years' experience over those with very little experience. Collecting this administrative data will allow the sorting and filtering of the data to ascertain whether perceptions differ based on any factor of that data.

The strength of the survey method is that it provides a quantitative approach to understanding the severity of the statements made. Mathematically measuring respondents' views allows the author to draw conclusions relatively free from bias. Additional strength of this approach is the breadth of respondents queried. A case study of a single state will uncover some challenges worthy of corrections, but the scope of this thesis aims to identify the challenges that span across the 54 states and territories. Thus, it is necessary to attempt to gain perspective from each of the states and territories.

Following the survey, it is necessary to conduct additional interviews from subject matter experts. Conclusions drawn from a single respondent would be a relative weakness. It is possible that only one respondent will identify an area of concern. However, using the administrative data collected to determine the length of time that respondent has worked in a related field will lend credibility to that response. Follow-up interviews with subject matter experts concerning the single reported policy will strengthen the conclusion. The credibility of subjects selected for interview will mitigate the weakness of the single source respondent if the interview subject corroborates that position. Conversely, an interview with a subject matter expert that discounts a

respondent position may leave no conclusion drawn. In this instance, the topic may require further study to reach a conclusion about the subject. Interviewing multiple subject matter experts in a focus area will also aid to negate this weakness. Multiple statements made by survey respondents will allow conclusion that the issue raised is of broad nature requiring corrective action without the need to conduct additional interviews.

The survey is comprised of six sections and a free text question. Statements 1-4 concern unit stabilization and stop loss policy. Statements 5-10 address medical and dental issues. Statements 11-16 address mobilization concerns. Statements 17-21 address training issues. Statements 22-28 address the creation and administration of an individual's account. Question 29 is open-ended soliciting a written response to identify additional policies not discussed elsewhere in the survey. The administrative data collected in the final section is rank, position, state, months in position, years in related field, and have taken part in how many mobilizations.

Consulting Creative Research Systems' survey calculation tools provide a determination of the appropriate survey sample size and confidence interval. Given the total population size of the target audience is only 672 people and a minimum acceptable confidence level of 95% to allow generalizability, a minimum of 145 respondents is necessary to achieve an interval of +/- 7.2 (Creative Research Systems). This calculation provides justification that the survey respondent pool is of adequate size to allow the author to draw conclusions from the data that the remaining population would report within a margin of error +/- 7.2 with 95% certainty.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Survey Overview

This section will breakdown the expected respondent pool compared to the actual pool. The previous chapter described the target positions to receive the survey and the purpose for that selection. With the exception of the commanders, the respondents all hold positions at the state JFHQ. Given there are 50 states and four territories times the seven target positions results in a target audience of 378 people. However, two variables account for discrepancies to that number.

The first is that not every state JFHQ TDA authorizes filling the same positions. Smaller states understandably are authorized fewer people while the larger are authorized more. For instance, the Alaska J3 also performs the duty of the Mobilization Readiness Officer. His duplicate email address appeared on both duty position lists. Analysis of the consolidated email address list filtered out duplicates so potential respondents received only one survey invitation. This factor accounted for a reduction of 12 potential respondents. On the other hand, some states have up to three Recruiting and Retention Sergeant's Major positions. This group numbered 76 potential respondents instead of the expected 54.

The second factor is that command waivers allow Active Guard and Reserve leaders to hold a traditional drilling position in command of a unit while simultaneously assigned to their full-time position elsewhere. The commander list contained 365 names, but only 297 email addresses. The author did not expend additional effort to obtain the missing 68 email addresses. A deletion of duplicates left 285 commander's email

addresses. Of the 672 AKO addresses loaded into Blackboard, only five messages were “undeliverable” (see table 1).

Table 1. Survey Demographics									
	Total	CDRs	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Potential Respondents	672	285	52	52	54	76	49	54	50
Actual Respondents	147	73	11	10	12	9	7	11	14
Percentage	22%	26%	21%	19%	22%	12%	14%	20%	28%

Source: Author, Survey Demographics, 2008.

Unit Stabilization

The issue of unit stabilization has become very important to the leadership of the ARNG as implementation of the Department of Defense policy goes into effect. The policy limits reserve component Soldier mobilizations to 12 months including post-mobilization training time. Units are now responsible to accomplish most individual and many small unit collective tasks before arriving at the mobilization station. The Adjutants General certify that all Soldiers have received the training and the Director of the ARNG validates that training. Prior to this policy the deployment manning documents were in a state of flux up to the last minute prior to the unit’s departure from home station. In order to decrease post-mobilization training time to maximize “boots on the ground” time in theater, it is imperative to stabilize the mobilizing unit well in advance of the mobilization day.

There is a strong desire from the survey respondents to stabilize ARNG units prior to an impending mobilization. The survey asked whether the current reserve

component stop-loss policy (90 days prior to mobilization day) is sufficient to stabilize a unit before mobilization. Exactly 75 % of respondents reported in the negative, of which 44% said they “strongly disagreed” with the current policy. However, 22 % said the policy is sufficient to accomplish the purpose. The highlighted portion of the table below draws attention to the respondents least involved with mobilizing Soldiers. The reason for their contrary response could be due to their lack of understanding of the difficulty stabilizing a unit prior to mobilization. These leaders are doing a remarkable job recruiting Soldiers into the force, so it is conceivable that they may not be aware of the stabilization issues (see table 2).

Table 2. Current Stop-Loss										
1. Current RC stop loss policy (90 days prior to mobilization day) is sufficient to stabilize a unit before mobilization.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MR O
Strongly Agree	3%	4	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Agree	19%	28	12	1	1	5	5	1	0	3
Neither Agree nor Disagree	3%	4	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Disagree	31%	46	25	3	2	3	2	3	6	2
Strongly Disagree	44%	65	32	7	7	4	0	1	5	9
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 1, 2008.

It has long been the policy of the ARNG to allow its citizen Soldiers to conduct inter-state transfers freely to pursue educational or job related opportunities. The survey asked if Soldiers separating or transferring to other components or states prior to

mobilization is a problem. Since the question combined these various elements of this issue, it is difficult to dissect. Yet, 60 % of respondents stated a desire to prevent separations and transfers prior to an impending mobilization. Some would argue that such a policy has connotations of a “back-door draft,” and that any hint of infringement upon the all-volunteer force is unacceptable (Casey 2008). This assertion is noted and leaders from the unit level through Congress should take substantial measures to prevent infraction of the all-volunteer concept. At some point, though, the Army must be able to hold Soldiers accountable for their commitment to serve. The Army Force Generation model is well publicized and understood. Soldiers know, generally, when their unit is scheduled to be available for the next deployment. If a Soldier chooses to transfer from his/her mobilizing unit, it must be early enough to obtain a replacement and complete pre-mobilization training prior to the deployment. The conclusion drawn from the survey respondents to this question is a desire to improve upon the current policy and thus, the unit’s ability to stabilize prior to mobilization to accomplish pre-mobilization training tasks. Determining the best way to accomplish that objective remains to be done (see table 3 on the next page).

Table 3. Separations and Transfers										
2. Soldiers separating or transferring to other components or states prior to mobilization is a problem.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	14%	21	9	2	2	2	3	1	1	1
Agree	45%	66	39	4	4	5	1	2	4	7
Neither Agree nor Disagree	17%	25	12	1	2	3	2	1	2	2
Disagree	22%	32	12	3	2	2	3	3	3	4
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	1%	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 2, 2008.

Question #3 directly asked if extending the stop-loss policy to 12 months prior to mobilization would enhance unit deployment preparation. Nearly 44% “strongly agreed” and 39% said they “agreed” thus, bringing the total stating in the affirmative to equal 83%. This data demonstrates clear support in favor of shutting the back door to those Soldiers that hold a position in the alerted unit. Unfortunately, no question asked respondents if they preferred re-enlistment incentives to stop-loss policy changes. What is clear is the overwhelming support to stabilize the unit (see table 4 on the following page).

Table 4. Extend Stop-Loss to 12 Months										
3. Extending stop loss to 12 months prior to Mobilization enhances unit deployment preparation.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	44%	64	32	8	4	4	2	2	4	8
Agree	40%	59	30	2	5	7	2	3	6	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	6%	9	5	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Disagree	7%	10	4	0	1	1	4	0	0	0
Strongly Disagree	3%	5	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 3, 2008.

Question #4 introduced a new twist on the stabilization concept by asking respondents to state their opinion about a policy that effectively “stops movement” from a unit upon alert with the objective of unit stabilization. Over 88% of respondents answered positively toward this idea. Only 4% responded in the negative and the balance had no definitive opinion. It is important to draw distinctions between the reasons Soldiers move within a unit. Soldiers that have reached their Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) make up the population that a stop-loss policy targets for stabilization. For some, this aspect draws too near an involuntary situation to maintain the all-volunteer force concept. Other reasons Soldiers migrate include, but are not limited to enlisted promotion, officer or warrant officer candidate school, lateral transfer, interstate transfer caused by educational or job related opportunities, or transfer to another Army component or sister service.

Given the critical shortage of ARNG officers - 9,101 nationwide (Michael Warrington, NGB-ARM, April 24, 2008, telephone conversation with author) - to fill the

ranks of the ARNG, it is hard to conceive of much support to prevent Soldiers from attending officer and warrant officer training. Attending officer training should not abridge the enlisted term of service or simply displace the Soldier in an attempt to avoid the deployment. Leaders must afford Soldiers the opportunity to seek self-improvement for the long-term benefit of the organization.

The promotion aspect of stabilization deserves reasonable attention. Inserting oneself into the enlisted Soldiers' position allows one to envision a "stop movement" policy as unfairly prohibitive. If such a policy is ever to gain consent from both leaders and subordinates it must allow enlisted promotions to continue unabated. If the promotion is within the same unit the promotion and position change needs to occur effective immediately. If the promotion requires the Soldier to transfer to another unit not alerted for mobilization, then the Soldier should be promoted, but not transferred to the gaining unit until after the deployment. Such a policy would serve the enlisted Soldier by allowing progression and the mobilizing unit would maintain cohesiveness. The gaining unit would eventually receive a recent combat veteran adding depth and realistic experiences invaluable to unit training once joined. The Soldier must also understand the deployment cycle of their new unit of assignment may cause a shortened dwell time before redeploying.

Transfer requests to another Army component or sister service deserve summary denial until the unit returns from the deployment. There are few viable reasons that warrant urgent action that delaying 12 to 24 months would matter. The negative impact on the losing unit prior to a deployment is much greater than the benefit garnered by the gaining unit (see table 5 on page 41).

Table 5. Stop Movement										
4. A policy that effectively "stops movement" from a unit upon alert benefits unit stabilization.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	35%	51	28	6	2	3	3	0	3	6
Agree	54%	79	38	2	7	9	5	4	7	7
Neither Agree nor Disagree	7%	10	4	0	1	0	1	2	1	1
Disagree	3%	5	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	1%	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 4, 2008.

The conclusion drawn from the data concerning unit stabilization is that significant change to current policy is desirable to those responding to the survey. The data suggests amending the current stop-loss policy to extend out to twelve months prior to mobilization, or the creation of a “stop movement” policy, which would function to sufficiently, stabilize units prior to deployment. Further discussion surrounding unit stabilization is found in Chapter 5.

Medical and Dental

The six questions the survey asked surrounding medical and dental issues received near universal approval. The lowest percentage of positive responses topped 80%. The question receiving the highest percentage of positive responses was fully 98% with the balance answering in the undecided category.

Question #5 asked respondents to state their opinion regarding breaks in Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) enrollment causing problems for

Soldier’s Families. Eighty-nine percent reported to the affirmative with 52% reporting in the “strongly agree,” category (see table 6).

Table 6. Breaks in DEERS										
5. Breaks in DEERS enrollment cause problems for Soldier's Families.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	52%	77	35	7	6	6	7	5	4	7
Agree	37%	55	27	4	4	5	2	2	5	6
Neither Agree nor Disagree	5%	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Disagree	1%	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Strongly Disagree	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	3%	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Unanswered	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 5, 2008.

Similarly, question #6 asked if continuous DEERS enrollment would have a positive impact on Family morale. When 98% of respondents state a positive response to this question there is clearly a problem in desperate need of repair. The problem extends beyond the Missouri staff and the author’s narrow personal experiences to the reaches of the distant territories. Many times Families discover this error after the Soldier deploys when the Family attempts to see a doctor out of necessity only to find they have no medical coverage (see table 7 on the next page).

Table 7. DEERS and Family Morale

6.Continuous DEERS enrollment would have a positive impact on Family morale.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	63%	92	44	8	6	7	8	4	6	9
Agree	35%	52	27	3	4	4	1	3	5	5
Neither Agree nor Disagree	2%	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strongly Disagree	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 6, 2008.

To begin to understand the DEERS quandary, it is necessary to gain an appreciation for the process to determine where that process breaks down. The primary source for this information is an interview with the Fort Leavenworth DEERS site security manager, Ms. Melinda Thompson.

The process begins with the unit mobilization order as the initial substantiating document granting eligibility of medical benefits to the members of that unit. Individual mobilization orders are manually loaded into the DEERS workstation. When a mobile workstation is used, the data must be “system saved” to enter the system triggering the initiation of medical coverage. Otherwise, it simply resides on the mobile workstation having not gone anywhere. According to Ms. Thompson, this is the most common error she encounters. The data, correctly entered into the mobile workstation, is never transmitted authorizing benefits to begin. Chapter 5 contains recommendations to correct this deficiency.

Although question #7 received overwhelming positive support, it is surprising to note that 12% of the respondents replied negatively that Guardsmen should receive medical benefits at no additional cost to them (see table 8).

Table 8. Medical Coverage										
7. ARNG Soldiers should receive full time medical coverage at no additional cost to them.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	50%	74	42	4	2	6	7	4	3	6
Agree	30%	44	18	5	5	3	1	3	5	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	7%	11	3	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
Disagree	11%	16	10	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Strongly Disagree	1%	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 7, 2008.

The section of the survey covering dental benefits drew strong support as well. A strong 83% of respondents replied that Guardsmen should receive full-time dental coverage at no cost to them (see table 9 on the next page).

Table 9. Dental Coverage										
8. ARNG Soldiers should receive full time dental coverage at no cost to them.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	54%	80	46	4	2	6	7	6	2	7
Agree	29%	42	17	5	4	4	1	1	6	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	7%	10	3	0	3	1	0	0	2	1
Disagree	9%	13	7	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Strongly Disagree	1%	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 8, 2008.

Slightly less believed the added benefit might positively influence recruiting of Soldiers to the ARNG, yet the number was an even 80% (see table 10).

Table 10. Dental Coverage and Recruiting										
9. Adding preventative dental coverage will increase recruiting of ARNG Soldiers.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	41%	60	33	6	1	6	5	3	1	5
Agree	39%	58	27	2	6	5	4	1	6	7
Neither Agree nor Disagree	15%	22	11	1	3	0	0	3	3	1
Disagree	4%	6	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	1
Strongly Disagree	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 9, 2008.

Question #10 asked respondents if adding preventative dental coverage will reduce training distractions at the mobilization station. Not surprising was the 94% responding in the positive. Every moment at the mobilization station is precious. Rather

than measure the cost in dollars, it should be in days spent at the mobilization station and not in theater. The data suggests the respondent's belief that providing preventative dental coverage will lessen distractions during this critical time to conduct unit training (see table 11).

Table 11. Reducing Training Distractions										
10. Adding preventative dental coverage will reduce training distractions at the mobilization station.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	63%	92	49	9	4	8	5	5	3	9
Agree	31%	46	19	2	6	3	3	2	8	3
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4%	6	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Disagree	2%	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Strongly Disagree	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 10, 2008.

Of the various topical areas the survey asked respondents to opine, the medical and dental issues received the highest unilateral support. Correction of the DEERS enrollment problems is an aspect that reaches beyond the Soldier to the Family and employer. As support for the Soldiers' service erodes by spouse and employer, so goes the Soldier's willingness to serve. Serious consideration and thought needs to be given to correcting this problem.

Mobilization

The aspects of mobilization addressed by the survey focus on the 25-day rule in the Personnel Policy Guide (PPG) and the method Combatant Commanders request ARNG Soldiers and units for mobilization and subsequent deployment. At the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the medical screening accomplished by the States of Guardsmen's fitness was not standardized, nor thorough enough to identify all the medical problems. Several factors contributed to this problem.

The first was the small amount of time between "alert" and "mobilization-day." The alert order initiates funding to accomplish Soldier Readiness Processing. Alert orders delivered to units inside 60 days from mobilization, left little time to evaluate and correct medical and dental deficiencies. Progress to correct this problem is resulting in alert orders arriving at units near the target of 12 months from mobilization day. Another aspect that contributed to the problem was the lack of Army-wide standards applied the same at the various mobilization stations. This factor has seen a marked improvement, but is not completely rectified. Lastly, there was a general perception that states were sending non-deployable Soldiers to the mobilization stations in an attempt to obtain medical care for them. Thus, the advent of the 25-day rule that allowed the Army to make a more thorough evaluation of fitness during the first 25 days after Guardsmen arrive at the mobilization station. The policy allows the Army to Return From Active Duty (REFRAD) any Soldier not physically fit to perform his/her duties.

The PPG specifically excludes injuries sustained at the mobilization station from the 25-day rule. According to the Missouri staff, mobilization stations routinely ignore that exception. Soldiers are REFRAD, under the 25-day rule, that sustained injury at the

mobilization station and will require follow-on care and initiation of a line of duty investigation to ensure care is provided at the government's expense (Bode 2007). To determine the extent of this misapplication, the survey asked whether this phenomenon had occurred to Soldiers from the respondent's states (see table 12).

Table 12. Extent of Misapplication of 25-Day Rule										
12. My state has experienced Soldiers REFRAD for injuries sustained during post-mobilization training at the mobilization station.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Yes	93%	137	69	11	8	10	9	7	10	13
No	7%	10	4	0	2	2	0	0	1	1
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 12, 2008.

According to the survey results, an overwhelming 93% of respondents reported having experienced this problem in their states. This reported frequency is clearly unacceptable.

The author hypothesized that the sensing session's discontent with the 25-day rule may warrant a change to it. Perhaps the respondents would opt to shorten the timeframe to assess the Soldier's fitness (see table 13 on the next page).

Table 13. Changes to 25-Day Rule										
11. The 25-day rule in the Personnel Policy Guidance to determine Soldier's fitness should be shortened.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	7%	10	5	0	1	0	2	1	1	0
Agree	21%	31	15	3	2	3	0	2	4	2
Neither Agree nor Disagree	31%	46	22	3	4	3	2	3	2	7
Disagree	28%	41	20	3	3	2	5	1	3	4
Strongly Disagree	2%	3	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
I don't know	10%	15	9	1	0	3	0	0	1	1
Unanswered	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 11, 2008.

The table above represents a nearly equal distribution of positive and negative responses. Correct application of the current policy is essential now; however, survey responses indicate that no change to the current 25-day policy is necessary.

The issue of Combatant Commanders requesting ARNG forces by function rather than by unit is problematic at all levels from the Soldier all the way through NGB. This practice is an in-lieu of sourcing where Guardsmen deploy to perform a mission other than their normally assigned mission according to their unit Table of Organization and Equipment. The name of the resultant structure roster is a Deployment Manning Document (DMD). Most often, the function required in theater is for general-purpose security forces. Rather than mobilize an entire infantry battalion to cover the various security requirements of an area of the theater, requests for forces specify a DMD closely resembling a military police combat security company. For example, to achieve mobilization of the number and rank of Soldiers to fill the DMD, it requires the State to

cross-level portions of two infantry companies, or two artillery batteries, or two transportation companies. These units are not built with sufficient positions, or of the correct rank structure to fill the DMD with a single unit. As Chapter 1 mentioned, the ARNG is a full partner in support of the nation’s defense. The ARNG continues to prove its flexibility by meeting sourcing requests for forces even when the exact force structure is no longer available (see table 14).

Table 14. Cause for Cross-Leveling										
13. ARNG units must cross-level to perform missions other than their MTOE design.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	44%	64	31	7	5	3	5	2	3	8
Agree	41%	61	30	3	5	5	3	5	6	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	7%	10	3	1	0	2	1	0	2	1
Disagree	5%	8	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
Strongly Disagree	3%	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 13, 2008.

As the table above shows, 85% of respondents are aware of the in-lieu-of sourcing and the subsequent requirement to cross-level Soldiers to fill DMDs. This situation has the effect of breaking down the unit cohesion established over the course of years training together. It is reminiscent of the individual filler method of sourcing units used in the Vietnam War where “[...]the manpower policy used in Vietnam made the American Soldier a lonely person, not much convinced that he was fighting for a national interest significant enough for him to be willing to lay down his life” (Mahon 1983, 266).

Soldiers' anticipation of combat is enough to challenge their morale level without further deflating them by throwing together makeshift units immediately prior to deploying.

The Missouri staff voiced strong discontent with the practice of mobilizing and deploying makeshift units. To clarify the point, their discontent is not with mobilizing whole units for missions other than their intended purpose, or in-lieu-of sourcing, it is with the ad hoc structure required in theater. The next question on the survey asked respondents their opinion if units should mobilize as whole units for deployments. The term "AA" shown below refers to the last two digits of the Unit Identification Code that describes an entire unit. The last two digits of the Unit Identification Code as "A0" for Company A, "B0" for Company B, and so on depict a part of a unit. Force developers spend tireless hours working to anticipate future conflicts to determine the appropriate capabilities to defeat that threat. The process of determining future required capabilities is anything but a perfect science. It is unlikely that force developers will ever get it exactly right. They must resist the temptation to develop a force to defeat the current threat. Instead, they must focus on the future threat. The survey respondents overwhelmingly support mobilizing whole units for deployment as 76% of them recorded positive responses (see table 15 on the next page).

Table 15. Mobilize "AA" Only

14. Units should mobilize at no lower than the "AA" level for deployment.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	41%	61	35	5	5	2	2	2	4	6
Agree	35%	52	22	4	4	7	2	2	5	6
Neither Agree nor Disagree	12%	18	10	2	0	1	2	2	1	0
Disagree	8%	12	4	0	1	2	2	1	1	1
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
I don't know	2%	3	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 14, 2008.

In an attempt to ascertain the ARNG leader's desired use of the ARNG Brigade Combat Teams, the next question asked whether or not to maintain integrity of those Brigade Combat Teams. The active Army's 42 Brigade Combat Teams are deploying at a much faster rate than the Army Force Generation model goal of one year deployed and two years at home station. The hypothesis is that the ARNG Brigade Combat Teams could relieve some of that burden if they deployed intact to perform full-spectrum operations instead of a few active Army Brigade Combat Teams. As shown below, the respondents mildly support this hypothesis with 55% recording positively (see table 16 on page 53).

Table 16. Mobilize "FF" Only										
15. Brigade Combat Teams should mobilize at no lower than the "FF" level for deployment.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	27%	40	19	5	3	1	1	1	5	5
Agree	28%	41	23	1	2	4	3	2	3	3
Neither Agree nor Disagree	21%	31	16	2	3	4	2	2	0	2
Disagree	14%	21	8	2	1	1	1	2	3	3
Strongly Disagree	3%	4	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
I don't know	7%	10	5	1	1	1	2	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 15, 2008.

The next question concerns the pre-mobilization home station training strategy. As the Adjutant Generals and the Director of the ARNG certify and validate pre-mobilization training tasks, respectively, prior to the mobilization day, states have struggled to determine how best to conduct that training (Bode 2007). Oklahoma's 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) performed two separate annual training periods to ensure proper completion of all individual tasks. This strategy accomplished the training objective, but negatively affected the Families and employers as the Soldiers were seemingly gone for a while, then back, then gone again (Bridges 2007). While this approach provides opportunity for retraining, the negative impact to the Family morale and employer support is not beneficial to the long-term relationship all leaders should aim to foster. The hypothesis is that the pre-mobilization training tasks should occur during a single block immediately prior to the mobilization. Table 17 demonstrates a strong willingness to consolidate the training by the responding Commanders of 67%, an

even distribution for and against by the state Operations Officers (J3), and a negative majority of Mobilization Readiness Officers of 38% for, and 61% against (see table 17).

Table 17. Pre-Mobilization Training Block										
16. Home station pre-mobilization training should occur as a single block immediately prior to mobilization.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	31%	46	27	6	2	2	3	1	3	2
Agree	31%	46	22	0	4	7	5	4	1	3
Neither Agree nor Disagree	12%	17	6	5	2	0	0	0	3	1
Disagree	20%	30	15	0	2	3	0	2	3	5
Strongly Disagree	5%	7	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
I don't know	1%	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 16, 2008.

Training

As research proceeded into the training issues surveyed, it became apparent that fixing these issues would produce only marginal gains toward the purpose of this thesis. For this reason, the author chose to simply, include the collected data for consideration by others interested in improving these training issues.

Table 18. Warrior Transition Course Seats										
17. Obtaining seats in the WTC is a problem.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	19%	28	8	2	0	7	8	2	0	1
Agree	27%	39	24	2	3	4	0	2	2	2
Neither Agree nor Disagree	23%	34	15	4	4	1	0	2	5	3
Disagree	19%	28	17	1	1	0	0	1	4	4
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	12%	17	8	2	2	0	1	0	0	4
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 17, 2008.

Table 19. Initial Entry Training Seats										
20. Obtaining seats for IET is a problem.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	10%	15	6	2	1	2	1	2	1	0
Agree	27%	39	14	4	2	8	3	1	3	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	26%	38	23	1	2	1	3	2	2	4
Disagree	24%	36	19	3	3	1	1	1	4	4
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	12%	18	10	1	2	0	1	1	1	2
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 20, 2008.

Table 20. Captain's Career Course

21. The Reserve Component Captain's Career Course does not adequately prepare Company Commanders for the responsibilities of an operational reserve.

	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	14%	20	12	2	0	1	1	2	2	0
Agree	28%	41	21	1	4	3	0	2	6	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	22%	33	14	3	2	4	4	1	1	4
Disagree	22%	32	21	2	1	3	0	0	1	4
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	14%	20	4	3	3	1	4	2	1	2
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 21, 2008.

Individuals Account

In 2006 during TAA 08-13, the Army implemented Individuals Accounts for both of its reserve components to account for individual personnel not deployable due to their status as Trainees, Transients, Holdees, or Students, called TTHS accounts. The US Army Reserve eagerly invested 20,500 spaces of their 210,000 end strength authorizations in their TTHS and chose immediate implementation. The ARNG was not so eager to invest any spaces of the congressionally mandated 350,000 end strength authorizations toward the creation of a TTHS account. The Army insisted that the ARNG comply with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2006 Army Plan to provide fully manned, trained, and equipped units. The belief was that an Individuals Account was necessary to create and sustain fully manned units. The ARNG reluctantly agreed to implement 8,000 spaces at the rate of 2,000 per year until complete in 2011 (John Runkle, January 23, 2008, e-mail message to author). At slightly higher than 2%

of the total end strength, the ARNG believed that the Individuals Account the Army intended to create for the ARNG was inconsequential and ill conceived for its unique structure (Strong 2007). In a conversation with the author on May 12, 2008, Brigadier General Leodis Jennings affirmed that the TTHS account has a different meaning in the ARNG as all Soldiers are assigned to a paragraph and line number in a unit. The issue is whether readiness would improve by spreading 8,000 spaces across 54 states and territories.




Figure 3. ARNG Not Available Personnel Fiscal Year 2002-2007

Source: Author created graph using data provided by ARNG, Army Resourcing Manning, Selected Reserve, 2008.

The above chart represents a breakdown of the ARNG force over time. The chart shows the overall assigned strength, the portion of the force that is non-deployable due to

IET training not complete, and the portion that is non-available due to the 21 various other reasons Soldiers are non-deployable. The focus of the following is on the training pipeline and the Recruit Sustainment Program (RSP) as an initial step toward providing fully manned units.

In fiscal year 2006, the ARNG established the RSP. The RSP functions to separate new enlistees from the TPU and its wartime focused training. Soldiers attached to the RSP receive training focused on individual warrior tasks in preparation for Initial Entry Training (IET). They begin to develop a sense of pride in their service by exposing them to history of their unit of assignment. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the TPUs augment the recruiting force to provide training for the new enlistees in the RSP. The positive aspects of this program are; 1. the new enlistees are receiving the appropriate level of training commensurate with their skill level, 2. they gain pride in the organization they have joined due to the exposure to unit history, and myths about IET are dispelled by Soldiers that have recently returned from training.

The negative aspects are threefold; the new enlistees count against the readiness of the TPU, the primary instructors for the RSP belong to the TPU, and there are not full-time unit support staff authorizations to properly conduct administration and training functions. The trainers either volunteer for additional drills which, further burdens their Families and employers, or they are unavailable to train with their unit of assignment degrading collective training by their absence. Mobilization of the trainer's unit of assignment causes further disruption to the RSP as the trainer deploys with their unit. Additionally, the recruiters assigned the function of performing the administrative tasks for the new enlistees are still responsible for recruiting new Soldiers. NCOs assigned the

administrative duties for the RSP must be relieved of the additional recruiting responsibility.

Chapter 1 pointed out that current accession policy for the ARNG assigns new enlistees directly into specific positions within the units. Soldiers are subsequently attached to the RSP. This flaw in current policy contributes to perpetual un-readiness across the entire ARNG force. The table below represents the respondent’s belief that the RSP will help improve readiness over the long-term. The tan highlighted portion of the below table demonstrates that those most closely involved with the program, Recruiting and Retention Commanders and Sergeants Major, near unanimously believe that assigning new enlistees to the RSP is the correct way to prepare them for the rigors of IET and improve unit readiness over time. The state Operations Officers highlighted in blue also recorded strong support for the benefit of the RSP to long-term readiness. The cumulative 75% positive responses provide strong support for the program.

Table 21. Recruit Sustainment Benefit to Readiness										
22. Assigning new Soldiers to the RSP will improve unit readiness over the long term.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	39%	58	18	5	3	10	7	5	4	6
Agree	44%	64	39	4	5	2	1	2	6	5
Neither Agree nor Disagree	10%	15	11	1	0	0	1	0	1	1
Disagree	4%	6	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Strongly Disagree	1%	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	1%	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 22, 2008.

Question 23 below, hypothesized that the RSP should have its own authorized strength. Since each state has a specified force structure allocation of differing strength, the corresponding RSP would also need tailoring to each state. Respondents affirmed that presumption by 66% of them recording positive responses (see table 22).

Table 22. RSP as a Separate Organization										
23. The RSP should have authorized strength.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	33%	48	12	7	3	9	6	5	3	3
Agree	30%	44	26	0	3	1	1	2	5	6
Neither Agree nor Disagree	14%	20	12	2	3	2	0	0	0	1
Disagree	18%	26	17	1	0	0	2	0	3	3
Strongly Disagree	3%	5	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	3%	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 23, 2008.

Question 24 below, seeks to establish respondents opinion for establishing full-time unit support (FTUS) authorizations specifically for the RSP. Indicative of respondents' support is the 94% positive responses that the RSP needs FTUS authorized to support the program (see table 23 on the next page). Currently, the ARNG supports the RSP through a variety of short-term methods to include reassignment of recruiting personnel, hiring traditional Guardsmen for active duty for special work, and hiring contractors.

Table 23. RSP Full-time Unit Support										
24. The RSP needs full-time manning authorized.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	55%	81	31	8	5	12	7	5	6	7
Agree	39%	58	37	3	4	0	2	2	4	6
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4%	6	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Disagree	1%	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Strongly Disagree	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 24, 2008.

Question 25 asked respondents if the ratio of one FTUS Soldier to 50 RSP trainees is adequate. Fully 60% of respondents affirm the proposed ratio as adequate opposed to only 20% that disagree. The balance of respondents held no definitive position (see table 24). The FTUS ratio should follow a similar model as other types of units. For instance, an infantry rifle company with required and authorized unit strength of 131 Soldiers is authorized one Sergeant First Class as the Readiness NCO and four Staff Sergeants to fulfill duties as Administrative NCOs, Training NCO, and Supply NCO (Phyllis Sheetz 2008, NGB-ARM, phone conversation with author, May 1). That ratio is 1:26.2. Since the training plan is centrally managed, well established, and requires few external resources to coordinate, the RSP headquarters element should perform that function for all the subordinate sites, thus streamlining the training section. Additionally, there is no unit equipment to manage, only individual clothing to issue. In terms of administrative duties, the Soldiers enter the RSP with current personnel data

requiring few changes. Therefore, some efficiencies exist that could result in lower requirements. “The area where the RSP requires additional full-time staff is in recovery of Soldiers who fail to attend drills” (Casey Reed, OK-RSP Commander, April 26, 2008, conversation with author).

Table 24. RSP Full-time Cadre to Trainee Ratio										
25. Authorization for 1 Full Time Unit Support Soldier per 50 RSP authorizations is adequate.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	19%	28	10	2	1	6	5	1	1	2
Agree	41%	61	31	6	2	5	2	2	4	9
Neither Agree nor Disagree	12%	17	8	0	1	0	1	2	4	1
Disagree	17%	25	14	2	2	1	0	2	2	2
Strongly Disagree	3%	5	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
I don't know	7%	11	7	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 25, 2008.

Questions 26 and 27 asked the respondents to state their opinion who should be responsible for training the new enlistees in the RSP. Currently, that responsibility rests with the Recruiting Command. The hypothesis is that the Regional Training Institutes (RTI), who conducts leadership and military skill training, could assume this responsibility. The holistic view of the data reveals little to warrant a change in training responsibility. A focused look at the responses from the two positions surveyed from the Recruiting Command, reveal a different story. The Recruiting and Retention Commanders and Sergeants Major recorded strong support to keep training responsibility within their command. They rejected the notion that RTIs are better suited to conduct the

RSP training (see tables 25 & 26).

Table 25. Recruiters Continue Training RSP										
26. Recruiters should continue to have RSP training responsibility.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	17%	25	6	3	1	7	4	1	0	3
Agree	36%	53	29	3	4	2	4	2	7	2
Neither Agree nor Disagree	17%	25	13	1	2	1	1	3	1	3
Disagree	21%	31	15	4	2	1	0	0	3	6
Strongly Disagree	6%	9	7	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
I don't know	3%	4	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 26, 2008.

Table 26. RTIs Begin RSP Training										
27. RTIs should have RSP training responsibility.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	13%	19	12	0	1	1	2	1	1	1
Agree	33%	49	23	5	5	2	2	2	6	4
Neither Agree nor Disagree	13%	19	9	2	1	1	0	3	0	3
Disagree	24%	35	19	2	2	2	3	0	4	3
Strongly Disagree	12%	17	4	2	1	6	2	0	0	2
I don't know	5%	8	6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Unanswered	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 27, 2008.

The question here is why give more credence to the respondents from the Recruiting Command than the other respondents. The reason is that the Recruiting Command is responsible for new enlistees from the time of accession into the ARNG, through the training pipeline, to the time the new enlistee completes IET. Upon

completion of IET, responsibility for the new enlistees goes to their unit of assignment. The data reveals that the Recruiting Command respondents are resistant to allow another entity to become responsible for RSP training.

Question 28 sought respondents' view as to whether or not the RSP training plan is better than years past when each unit was responsible for new enlistee training. The RSP training strategy is to separate the new Guardsmen from their unit of assignment collecting them together regionally and focusing their training on skills they must possess before graduating IET. Respondents overwhelmingly support the RSP training strategy as 78% recorded positive responses indicating their belief that the strategy will positively reduce the ARNG training pipeline losses (see table 27).

Table 27. RSP Training Better Than Unit Training										
28. RSP training reduces training pipeline losses better than unit training for new enlistees.										
	%	Total	CDR	J1	DJ1	RRC	SGM	HRO	J3	MRO
Strongly Agree	37%	55	19	5	4	10	7	3	3	4
Agree	41%	60	32	2	4	1	1	3	8	9
Neither Agree nor Disagree	7%	11	9	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Disagree	7%	11	9	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Strongly Disagree	1%	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't know	5%	8	4	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	1%	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Source: Author, Survey Question 28, 2008.

The below chart represents three truck companies that are 100% fully manned, but only 84% are available in each one. The 16 % non-available pool is due to 10.5% of the Soldiers on or awaiting training and other factors accounting for 5.5%. Truck Co 1

receives an alert order requiring the 16% non-available personnel to be cross-leveled from Truck Co 3 so Truck Co 1 can arrive at the mobilization station fully manned and MOS qualified.




Figure 4. Hypothetical Example of Three Truck Companies in One State
Source: Author constructed, 2008.

The next chart below depicts the cross-leveling described above to allow Truck Co 1 to deploy at the required personnel readiness level of 100% fully manned.




Figure 5. Hypothetical Cross-Leveling to Deploy Truck Company 1
 Source: Author constructed, 2008.

Truck Co 2 receives an alert order and the state begins the same procedure as before to cross-level the non-available Soldiers to Truck Co 3 as shown below.




Figure 6. Hypothetical Cross-Leveling to Deploy Truck Company 2
 Source: Author constructed, 2008.

This chart depicts the devastating effect the previous cross-leveling has had on Truck Co 3. This company is in no condition to perform its wartime mission. The available strength stands at 52%, non-available strength due to training at 31.5%, and non-available strength due to other reasons is 16.5%. Compounding the issue even further is the fact that the cross-leveled Soldiers, all new enlistees or prior service enlistees, are now driving several hours to a location away from their home community to Truck Co 3's home station for drills. This experience has a very negative impact on the morale of the new Soldiers as they feel the organization is not acting in their best interests. These Soldiers frequently spend drill pay on gas money. In some cases, the state allows these stay-behind Soldiers to drill with another unit located nearby. While this practice may be good for the morale of the stay-behind Soldier and his wallet, it is

not in the best interest of the organization unless he continues to train within his chosen skill area. Certain multipurpose skills such as cooks, transportation, supply, and communications are skills readily trained in any location due to their general nature. Other skills such as intelligence, maintenance, aviation, special forces, artillery, and infantry require either special equipment or specific formations to train effectively. It is simply not effective to allow the Soldiers to drill with other units over a long period that do not have the same skill requirements.

Returning to the case of Truck Co 3, they receive an alert order for an impending mobilization. In some cases, Truck Co 1 has returned from deployment and the cross-leveling is continued all over again to fill Truck Co 3 with available Soldiers volunteering for another deployment. Some time has elapsed and some of the previously non-deployable Soldiers have completed training and have become deployable. Commonly, vacancies still exist in Truck Co 3 and the state broadens the cross-leveling to other units that possess the required skills of suitable rank. Positions that the state still cannot fill are passed back to NGB to fill from another state.

The ARNG currently operates with a negative operational strength deviation. The size of the operating force within the ARNG is approximately 321,000 spaces. The spaces allocated to administration and training to generate the force account for the remaining 37,000 of the congressionally authorized end strength of 358,200 spaces. The chart on the next page illustrates a macro view of the ARNG force structure versus end strength over time as it projects out to fiscal year 2013.




Figure 7. ARNG Force Structure to End Strength Over Time and Needed End Strength for Positive Operational Strength Deviation
 Source: Director, ARNG authorized release of this slide produced by ARNG, Army Resourcing Manning, Selected Reserve, 2008.

A study of the chart above shows a significant decrease in the overall ARNG force structure allowance, depicted by the yellow line, to a point below the actual, assigned end strength occurring in the fall of 2007. This decline in force structure below end strength means that ARNG units have people assigned to nearly every position, though not all of them are trained and deployable. Until 2007, the ARNG assigned strength was below the required end strength. Reversing that trend and achieving more people assigned than there are positions occurs for the first time in fiscal year 2008. This is a step in the right direction. To achieve the long-term objective of a positive operational strength deviation requires Congress to authorize a substantial Individuals' Account above the current mandated 358,200 end strength so trainees are in positions outside the deploying units. The chart above depicts the needed authorizations by the

dashed black line and shaded red cross-hatched lines from October 2008 to October 2010.

The ARNG Force Management Division works with the states to station force structure within each state. The process looks at years two through seven in the future to program the units and allow the states to plan for their existence. The process involves analysis by each state to determine the type of capability necessary to respond to disasters and emergencies within their state. It also involves analysis by the state to determine the types of skills they believe they can successfully recruit. For example, Colorado determined they did not have enough general-purpose capability and believed they had the capacity to recruit infantry Soldiers if they had structure with that particular skill. Infantry Soldiers leaving the active Army from Fort Carson could not simply join the Colorado ARNG and remain infantry. ARNG force managers worked with the HQDA force managers to establish an infantry battalion in Colorado to provide that capability.

The states are generally satisfied with the type and number of units programmed for their states. Their desire is to maintain the current programmed units without any reduction in force structure. To build capability within those units requires authorization to establish a substantial TDA above current force structure to assign new enlistees in the training pipeline to make way for a positive operational strength deviation.

Free Text Remarks

The final survey question asked respondents to identify other policies that require change to allow the ARNG to transition to an operational reserve. Of the 147 leaders responding to the survey, 112 supplied comments identifying at least one policy they felt must change. Most respondents mentioned multiple policies; however, some of these policies were not different from those covered in the survey. Rather, some respondents

took the opportunity to clarify their perspective on a given topic. This thesis simply cannot explore the quantity and variety of topics raised by respondents to the free text question. The following will address the two topics receiving the most comments by respondents. Chapter 5 will reveal the balance of the topics raised.

The policy receiving the most comments was unit stabilization mentioned by 22% of respondents answering this question. Responses varied regarding the preferred method to accomplish unit stabilization. One respondent wrote, “Units identified for mobilization must be notified one year out. Stop loss should go into affect then.” Another respondent said, “I believe that a 6 month stop-loss would greatly eliminate training distractions, increase unit stabilization and be a realistic compromise from the current 90 days. One year would not be fair to Soldiers.” Another wrote, “Stop-loss is the biggest issue we face, with 12 months of pre-mobilization preparation and only three months of stabilization.” According to another respondent, “My biggest concern was addressed in this survey, that stop loss take effect upon alert. A 90-day stop loss impacts the Commander's ability to build teams and conduct productive training well in advance of a deployment.” These responses are evidence of the deeply rooted desire to successfully, prepare ARNG units for an impending deployment. Respondents are familiar with the stop loss policy and the short-term result that policy provides. However, a well, crafted stop movement policy could accomplish these leaders’ intent while making the outcome more palatable to the affected Guardsman.

Full time manning shortages received the second most comments by this group as 21% remarked toward increasing authorizations. The respondents were not told that full time manning was excluded from this study, so they were free to express concerns for

this topic as well. Since full time manning is not within the scope of this thesis, only a brief few statements will follow to provide a glimpse of the respondents' views toward this topic. A respondent stated, "We desperately need to get our complete FTUS authorization. We are at the point that each [Active Guard Reserve] AGR Soldier in the units must do the jobs of two people. We cannot adequately support the M-day [traditional] Soldier at this level and operational tempo." Another vigorously wrote, "FULL TIME UNIT MANNING! Two per company [is] inadequate, too much to do." For the ARNG to continue in an operational role on a cyclical basis requires rectifying the shortage of full time manning authorizations.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

Unit Stabilization

As the survey indicated, ARNG leaders desire establishment of a policy to stabilize units 12 months prior to an impending mobilization. The current 90-day stop-loss policy must remain in effect to prevent Soldiers from departing a unit that is alerted for mobilization. Nevertheless, this policy alone will not effectively stabilize units prior to mobilization. The long-term objective is to achieve a positive operational strength deviation that does not require cross-leveling or incentive-based solutions to fill units prior to mobilization. The short-term objective is to achieve and maintain fully manned units with strong unit cohesion while avoiding the negative connotations of an involuntary extension to the Soldier's term of service. Regrettably, the survey did not ask respondents more questions about their preference to solving this dilemma. Perhaps an incentive-based program will achieve the short-term objective described above.

To attain success in stabilizing ARNG units for mobilization, it is critical for FORSCOM and NGB to correctly identify the units they plan to mobilize 24 months prior to mobilization day. Congress should authorize and fund an incentive based extension program to maintain current members of the unit and reduce the number of Soldiers affected by stop-loss. The incentive program should cover the 12 months prior to, the 12 months of, and the 90 days following the mobilization/deployment for a total of 27 months. To receive the bonus, the Soldier's ETS must fall within the planned mobilizing unit's eligibility window. The Soldier must be assigned to a valid position within that unit and remain with the unit throughout the entire period described above.

The Soldier must execute an extension to cover the period defined above, or longer, and deploy with the alerted unit. The bonus should be recouped if the Soldier voluntarily transfers away from the alerted unit (including officer or warrant officer training or to fulfill a promotion obligation), or is transferred due to the Soldier's misconduct. Enlisted Soldiers should be allowed to accept promotions in the alerted unit and immediately assume those duties and responsibilities. If the promotion involves transferring away from the alerted unit, the Soldier should be allowed to accept the promotion, but remain in the deploying unit through the duration of the deployment.

Medical and Dental

Families of Guardsmen continue to struggle with non-continuous medical coverage. The Families learn of their lack of coverage when they attempt to receive treatment, usually after the Soldier is at the mobilization station or worse, deployed out of the country. Two possible solutions to this problem exist. The first is to add DEERS workstations down to the company level across the ARNG. The second possible solution is to provide medical coverage to Guardsmen and Families on a continual basis.

Each DEERS workstation includes five components at a cost of about \$2,000. The necessary components are computer (laptop or desktop), fingerprint identifier, laser jet printer, Common Access Card (CAC) pin re-setter, and a qualified site security manager. The hardware and software package is all dedicated equipment that is not available for other administrative functions (Thompson 2008).

Each location must have a trained site security manager. There is no additional cost associated with qualifying personnel to perform this function. The training package is available online. The training takes approximately eight hours to complete and

consists of three parts. Each part culminates with an online examination. The site security manager must possess a secret clearance.

The preferred solution is to provide medical coverage to Guardsmen and Families on a continual basis from initial entry into service through ETS or retirement. This would solve the problem of intermittent medical eligibility and the proven problem of medical coverage lapses. This benefit to the Guardsmen and their Families would also function as extending a benefit to employers of Guardsmen. The Commission for the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) mentioned developing a tax credit or stipend to employers of reservists from all branches of the military due to the operational role of frequent deployments and the burden to employers (CNGR 2008, 61). It is best to provide that benefit in the form of full time medical coverage to the Soldier and their Family relieving the employer of the burden of providing that benefit at all. The expanded role as an operational reserve justifies authorization of this benefit to the Soldier, his/her Family, and his/her employer. One survey respondent wrote the following:

“The best thing we can do for National Guard improvement in Availability with a[n] added recruiting and retention benefit is for Guardsmen to be fully covered under TRICARE for Medical and Dental. Currently ARNG Soldiers have to pay to serve their country through medical and dental payments to maintain their availability. By providing TRICARE medical and [United Concordia] dental coverage for the Soldier, we wouldn't financially burden our Soldiers with having to maintain medical and dental readiness in order to serve the country.”

Dental readiness causes innumerable problems to Guardsmen and units as they prepare for deployment. According to the survey data, it is unclear whether adding preventative dental coverage for Guardsmen will help with recruiting or not. What is clear is that the addition of this benefit will reduce the distractions to units conducting

post-mobilization collective training at the mobilization station. As with the medical benefits, the extension of benefits to the Guardsmen will have the second order effect of providing a benefit to employers of Guardsmen. Unlike the medical coverage, this benefit should only cover the Guardsmen. The Family coverage should continue to be at the Guardsmen's expense.

To improve medical and dental readiness, the United States government should shoulder the responsibility of medical coverage for Guardsmen and Families, and dental readiness of all Guardsmen from the beginning of their service until they leave the service. Providing the benefits described above to the Guardsmen the two other critical partners, Family and employer, also receive benefits. Morale of Guardsmen's Families improves, as does their willingness to allow them to serve as they realize the tangible consistency of medical coverage. Employers increase their willingness to continue to hire and employ Guardsmen who no longer must provide medical and dental coverage to their employee, thus strengthening the bond between businesses and the military.

Mobilization

The four areas examined under the mobilization heading were the 25-day rule, mobilizing whole units, mobilizing whole ARNG Brigade Combat Teams, and conducting pre-mobilization training as a single block. Survey respondents strengthened their positions concerning the last three topics above, and added spirited comments regarding several other aspects of mobilizing and deploying Guardsmen. The additional topics are recommended for further study.

Analysis of respondent answers concerning the 25-day rule, lead to the conclusion that the evaluation period is sufficient as written and should not change. The Army and

the ARNG must ensure that mobilization stations correctly apply the current policy. This means that the mobilization stations should do three things. First, cease REFRAD Soldiers that sustain injuries at the mobilization station. Second, for Soldiers that are injured at the mobilization station, initiate and complete a line of duty investigation to allow medical care for the Soldier and maintain them on Title 10 orders until they are cleared to return to duty or medically discharged. Lastly, notify the state JFHQ of any Soldier being REFRAD for any reason so the JFHQ can initiate individual replacement.

The Army should adopt the policy to mobilize whole units for deployment. Combatant Commanders should request required capabilities by unit type and FORSCOM should work with NGB to obtain candidate units to meet those requirements. When the ARNG exhausts the precise type of units in the force pool and in-lieu-of sourcing must occur, the Army must mobilize whole units to meet the theater requirements.

The Army should consider mobilizing ARNG BCTs intact to conduct full spectrum operations in the contemporary operating environment. As the ARNG continues to build capability in its force by increased experience and numbers of deployable personnel, the ARNG could deploy two or three of its BCTs instead of active Army BCTs. This would provide a respite to the active Army BCTs that are “spinning” at a faster rate than one year deployed to one year at home station. The ARNG BCTs are developing additional capacity in their combat skills due to their previous deployments in support of the GWOT. The ARNG BCTs are a viable solution to relieving the deployment pressure placed on the active Army BCTs.

Even though the survey data revealed no clear support for formal policy change to the pre-mobilization training strategy, the free text remarks from respondents did request a change. The first aspect of current policy that must change is a determination that unit commanders have the authority to certify that training is complete. “Pre deployment training needs to be executed and verified at the [company] level. States do not need to organize a Training [validation] Brigade [or battalion] out of non-deploying units to train and certify deploying units,” wrote one respondent. Several others believed battalion commanders should bear certification authority. Nonetheless, commanders must be accountable for training their Soldiers, not the Adjutant General of the state or the Director of the ARNG. Furthermore, First Army must accept the commander’s word that they conduct the training they certify. Another respondent said, “[ARNG] units should be treated the same as [active component] AC units in the training validation process.” The ARNG leaders are no less trustworthy than the active Army leaders. Therefore, “[t]he leadership of the National Guard should not be scrutinized at a different level than the active component.” Correcting this policy would have an enormous, positive impact in unifying the Army and the ARNG.

Individuals Account

The ARNG is not prepared for full-scale implementation of the Individuals Account at the current time. Incremental implementation of this policy change is desirable. Congress must recognize the need for a substantial ARNG Individuals Account. Congress must authorize an increase in ARNG end strength to 381,000 positions. This increase should not reduce the current programmed force structure. This end strength increase will accommodate the growth of the Individuals Account. The

Army must immediately authorize and establish a TDA specifically for the RSP cadre and trainees for each state. The TDA should list position requirements for full implementation, but only position authorizations for partial implementation in most states. Eleven states currently possess more people than positions and should become the test case for full implementation. For these eleven states, the ARNG should modify the FY07 ARNG Enlisted Criteria Manual policy for assigning new enlisted personnel, which reads:

“1-11. Position vacancy

a. All applicants will be *enlisted into authorized position vacancies*. A position under the “authorized” column of the MTOE/TDA (by paragraph and line number) is a valid vacancy if-

- (1) It is vacant and there are no qualified excess Soldiers in the unit that may be assigned to the position, or:
- (2) The position will be vacated within 12 months of the applicant's date of enlistment.

b. Applicants may enlist into position vacancies in newly approved MTOE/TDA authorization or reorganization documents that have a projected effective date, or upon receipt of a carrier UIC, (newly activating unit).” (FY 07 ARNG Enlistment Criteria Policy, October 2006)

For Minnesota, Idaho, California, Michigan, Arkansas, West Virginia, Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas, Indiana, and North Dakota the policy should read as follows:

“1-11. Position Vacancy

a. All applicants will *enlist into the state’s individual’s account TDA and be assigned to the regional Recruit Sustainment Program*. States will *forecast* position vacancies to determine quantity and location of MOS vacancies to determine availability.

b. MOS requirements are determined by-

1. A position under the “authorized” column of the MTOE/TDA (by paragraph and line number) is vacant and there are no qualified excess Soldiers in the unit that may be assigned to the position, or:

2. The position will be vacated within 12 months of the applicant's date of enlistment.
3. Applicants may enlist against position vacancies in newly approved MTOE/TDA authorization or reorganization documents that have a projected effective date, or upon receipt of a carrier UIC, (newly activating unit)."

Add other states as they develop the capacity to implement the above policy on an annual basis until achieving full implementation. Soldiers assigned to the Individual's Account TDA will not count towards the strength of the reporting units.

Much debate will likely occur in an effort to determine the appropriate size of each state's Individual's Account. The main objective is to achieve and maintain each state's operational force (MTOE units) at 100% fully manned with enough people in the training pipeline to replace that year's forecasted losses. The calculation should remove the state's generating force, as these non-deployable positions generally remain filled.

One logical way to calculate a state's Individual's Account TDA is to take the state's (Force Structure Allowance – Generating Force) x 5yr Attrition Rate = RSP Trainees. For example, the calculation for Minnesota is $(9780 - 767) \times .20 = 1802$. The same computation could be applied at the national level once the ARNG is ready for full implementation.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Delimitations, the broad subject of full-time unit support is not within the scope of this paper. However, as the Individual's Account TDA is established, it must include FTUS personnel and traditional drilling cadre for the RSP. They will accomplish administration and training tasks critical to the success of the RSP.

Recommended Further Studies

Reduced full-time manning levels remain a point of strong contention for the ARNG and inhibit the ability to become an operational reserve. As the transition to an operational reserve began and mobilizations increased, the state JFHQ staffs have assumed many additional tasks to prepare units to deploy. Recruiting became more difficult as the conflict endured. To help recruiting, bonus and incentive programs increased. These new programs require tracking and additional paperwork to administer, but there is little to no additional labor provided. The personnel services Soldiers have simply done more work. Overall, full-time manning within the ARNG deserves an in-depth study of its own.

The Army desperately needs to examine the availability of IET seat requirements to determine the quantity of each MOS and immediately adjust the training base to support that requirement. Army Transformation and ARNG Rebalance have had a significant impact on the required number Soldiers of nearly every MOS in the force. The growth of the Army exacerbates this problem to a point where ARNG Soldiers' training dates are pushed out the maximum their contracts allow. The delay in training has a terrible affect on the Soldier's morale and the unit's available strength.

As the ARNG transitions from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, it is advisable to examine the method in which the ARNG trains leaders. The issue is whether or not reserve component leadership courses adequately prepare ARNG leaders for the operational role they are to perform. Several ARNG leaders voiced their concern through free text comments on the survey that reserve component courses were insufficient to prepare junior leaders. "In the contemporary operating environment, direct leaders –

noncommissioned officers and junior officers – making the right decisions in stressful situations has taken on a new significance (FM 6-22, 2006.) Unfortunately, most of the leader training programs were developed in the 1980s. Minimum requirements established in the 1980s to develop reserve component leadership courses appear to be grossly inadequate to properly, prepare the leaders of an operational reserve.

The USAR has acted in a proactive manner attempting to solve the unit readiness issues as mobilizations significantly increased after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom by adopting the Individuals Account commonly referred to as TTHS. Use of the Individuals Account has been modified by implementing “the Army Reserve Delayed Training Program (DTP) on 1 May 2007” under United States Army Recruiting Command Message 07-122. The policy states, “All Future Soldiers placed into the DTP will be assigned to the TTHS with duty at the future unit.” The assignment of the new Soldier to the DTP and subsequent attachment to the TPU has no negative impact on the unit’s readiness status as they count against the TTHS.

The policy has the positive effects of bringing the new enlistees into the unit early giving them the sense of belonging, allowing them to receive pay for attendance of drills prior to shipping to formal IET, and providing them some rudimentary Army training before the shock of Basic Combat Training. These positive effects will potentially reduce the number of enlistees annually who fail to complete IET. Losses that occur from the time of enlistment to completion of Advanced Individual Training are commonly referred to as “training pipeline losses”.

The two negative aspects are the focus of training and the administrative control of the new enlistees. The focus of the training that the new enlistees receive is on the

unit's mission instead of the individual training in preparation for IET. The USAR policy prohibits the unit from conducting individual training that is potentially dangerous to the new Soldier, such as marksmanship and driver training. Individual training could greatly benefit the Soldier at IET if they possessed marksmanship and driving skills upon arrival at the training site. Secondly, the recruiter and the FTUS personnel split administrative functions. The USAR might conduct a similar study to analyze how they prepare new enlistees before IET and how they could reduce training pipeline losses.

The additional topics revealed by respondents to the free text question were outside the scope of this thesis, but most appear worthy of investigation. The topics include lowering the age to receive retirement benefits for Guardsmen, increasing retention incentives, equipping the ARNG force, committing to the ARFORGEN model and the sticking to it, ways to increase the officer corps, and changing the policy regarding post-deployment drill attendance.

Conclusion

The young men and women currently joining the ARNG force expect to mobilize and deploy in support of the Nation. Before September 11, 2001, Soldiers enlisting in the ARNG believed that their federal service would occur in the context of a declared war or full mobilization. Over the past five years, however, the paradigm of an operational ARNG has taken root. The Guard experienced a reduction in the number of its senior Guardsmen. Many senior Guardsmen left the service to retire after deploying in support of the GWOT.

In summary, the Total Force concept described in 1974 by then Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Howard H. Callaway is very much alive and well. The high

operational demand for the United States Army around the globe coupled with the relatively small number of active Army Soldiers requires that the ARNG transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. Operationalizing the ARNG is a recognized requirement by the leaders of all three components of the Army. Personnel policies must now change to deliver the operational reserve the nation requires. Implementation of the recommended changes to policies made herein will go a long way toward transforming the ARNG from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve capable of providing fully manned units without the need to cross-level Soldiers.

GLOSSARY

Assign. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (FM 1-02, 1-15).

Attach. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary (FM 1-02, 1-15).

Available. Soldiers are considered to be available if they are attached or assigned to the measured unit/headquarters, are physically present, or can be present within the prescribed response time and are not restricted by Army policy from deploying or employing with the unit (AR 220-1, 30).

Individuals Account. Commonly referred to as “TTHS” which stands for (Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students). An administrative account to assign Soldiers that are not available to fill spaces in units due to their temporary status in one of six sub-accounts of trainees, officer accession students, transients, holdees, students, and USMA cadets (Lord, 289).

Lautenberg Amendment. Soldiers known to have, or Soldiers whom commanders have reasonable cause to believe have, a conviction of a misdemeanor or felony crime of domestic violence are non-available for missions that require possession of firearms or ammunition (AR 220-1, 124).

Operational Force. Generally understood as active duty units organizationally interchangeable, fully manned, equipped, and trained to execute full spectrum operations. Units can be comprised of Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). Excludes institutional Army organizations such as FORSCOM or Headquarters, Department of the Army as these organizations are not organized to perform wartime missions and do not typically deploy. The operational force should expect to deploy at a frequency of one year out of three (author proposed definition).

Operational Reserve. A military organization composed of reserve component units resourced to provide ready and trained units to Combatant Commanders and to support Civil Authorities. These units are resourced to attain and maintain at least 90% trained and available personnel, 90% of mission essential equipment, and collective training of company level or higher. Operational reserve units should be available to mobilize in a Title 10 United States Code status once every six years, but no more often than once every four years (author proposed definition).

Strategic Reserve. A military organization composed of part-time military personnel typically resourced below required levels reducing peacetime military expenditures that can mobilize in support of a major conflict over a protracted period providing ample time to fill personnel and equipment shortages, and increase collective training readiness to sufficient war time levels before deployment (author proposed definition).

APPENDIX A

SURVEY

Email Message

You have been selected to take this survey because of the position you currently hold and the experience you have in personnel and/or training management readying units for mobilization. It should take about ten minutes to complete. Your thoughtful responses will help shape future policies for the ARNG.

Your participation is strictly voluntary, yet encouraged. Your responses are completely confidential and will in no way be used to identify individual respondents. You may stop taking the survey at any point. The survey is active until 11 February 2008.

Point of contact is MAJ Barry Vincent at 405-820-9689, or email barry.vincent@us.army.mil.

Introduction

The Army recognizes that the ARNG must transition to become an operational reserve to meet current and future operational demands. Current policies surrounding enlisted accessions, unit stabilization, mobilizations practices, and medical and dental benefits are still representative of a strategic reserve expected to mobilize and deploy in a Title 10 capacity only in the event of a declared war. This survey aims to identify the depth and breadth of the issues that negatively impact unit readiness to ultimately provide fully manned units to the Combatant Commanders and Governors without the need to cross-level Soldiers.

Most of the responses are measured by the Likert scale of: a. strongly agree, b. agree, c. not sure/indifferent, d. disagree, e. strongly disagree. The last question is open-ended soliciting a written response and will not be measured by the Likert scale.

Directions

1. Click on the survey link.
2. Type your AKO username and password to access Blackboard.
3. Click on the “Policies and Procedures for Operational National Guard Survey” on the right side of the screen.
4. Click on the blue “survey” button in the upper left corner.
5. Click on the underlined “Policies and Procedures for Operational National Guard Survey” to begin the survey.
6. You may click “save” after each response or just click “submit” at the end.

Glossary of Acronyms

ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
DEERS	Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
MOS	Military Occupational Skill
PPG	Personnel Policy Guidance for Contingency Operations in the GWOT
RC	Reserve Components of the Army (National Guard and Army Reserves)
REFRAD	Release From Active Duty
RSP	Recruit Sustainment Program
WTC	Warrior Transition Course

Final Survey Questions

Questions 1-4 deal with Unit Stabilization

1. Current RC stop loss policy (90 days prior to mobilization day) is sufficient to stabilize a unit before mobilization.
2. Soldiers separating or transferring to other components or states prior to mobilization is a problem.
3. Extending stop loss to 12 months prior to Mobilization enhances unit deployment preparation.
4. A policy that effectively "stops movement" from a unit upon alert benefits unit stabilization.

Questions 5-10 deal with Medical and Dental Issues

5. Breaks in DEERS enrollment cause problems for Soldier's Families.
6. Continuous DEERS enrollment would have a positive impact on Family morale.
7. ARNG Soldiers should receive full time medical coverage at no additional cost to them.
8. ARNG Soldiers should receive full time dental coverage at no cost to them.
9. Adding preventative dental coverage will increase recruiting of ARNG Soldiers.
10. Adding preventative dental coverage will reduce training distractions at the mobilization station.

Questions 11-16 deal with Mobilization Issues

11. The 25-day rule in the Personnel Policy Guidance to determine Soldier's fitness should be shortened.
12. My state has experienced Soldiers REFRAD for injuries sustained during post-mobilization training at the mobilization station.
13. ARNG units must cross-level to perform missions other than their MTOE design.
14. Units should mobilize at no lower than the "AA" level for deployment.
15. Brigade Combat Teams should mobilize at no lower than the "FF" level for deployment.
16. Home station pre-mobilization training should occur as a single block immediately prior to mobilization.

Questions 17-21 deal with Training

17. Obtaining seats in the WTC is a problem.
18. The WTC should be offered at more locations across the nation.
19. My state is interested in sponsoring WTC training.
20. Obtaining seats for IET is a problem.
21. The Reserve Component Captain's Career Course does not adequately prepares Company Commanders for the responsibilities of an operational reserve.

Recruit Sustainment Program

22. Assigning new Soldiers to the RSP will improve unit readiness over the long term.
23. The RSP should have authorized strength.
24. The RSP needs full-time manning authorized.
25. Authorization for 1 Full Time Unit Support Soldier per 50 RSP authorizations is adequate.
26. Recruiters should continue to have RSP training responsibility.
27. RTIs should have RSP training responsibility.
28. RSP training reduces training pipeline losses better than unit training for new enlistees.

Free Text Question

29. What other policies or procedures need to change for the ARNG to be able to provide fully manned units for state and federal missions?

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