After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq
Abstract
Major combat operations in Iraq lasted approximately three weeks, but stabilization efforts in that country are, as of this writing, ongoing. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps are increasingly taxed by the demands of the continuing insurgency, with more than 100,000 troops expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future. The evidence suggests that the United States had neither the people nor the plans in place to handle the situation that arose after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Looters took to the streets, damaging much of Iraq's infrastructure that had remained intact throughout major combat. Iraqi police and military units were nowhere to be found, having largely dispersed during combat. U.S. military forces in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country were not prepared to respond rapidly to the initial looting and subsequent large-scale public unrest. These conditions enabled the insurgency to take root, and the Army and Marine Corps have been battling the insurgents ever since. Why was the United States so unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq? As part of a larger study of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), RAND Arroyo Center examined prewar planning for postwar Iraq and the subsequent occupation to seek an answer to this question and to draw lessons and recommendations from the Iraq experience.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA483265
Entities
People
- Andrew Rathmell
- Heather S. Gregg
- Keith Crane
- Nora Bensahel
- Olga Oliker
- Richard R. Brennan Jr.
- Thomas Sullivan
Organizations
- RAND Corporation