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**SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
SUB-REGION: STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA**

by

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June 2008

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**SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA SUB-REGION:
STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA**

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ABSTRACT

The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) sub-region has large deposits of hydrocarbons and other natural resources. There is now a stiff international competition among industrialized nations including the United States, some European countries, China, Japan, and India that are looking for new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy as a result of the Middle East crisis. Extra-regional competitions for oil, while boosting the economy of the sub-region have also exposed the area to increased security risks. Sub-regional resources and potential are presently being undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. These challenge the sub-regional states, including Nigeria, with limited capacity for maritime security. Assessment of the sub-regional naval forces based on their Order of Battle, shows that most of the navies cannot police beyond their territorial waters.

This study presents an integrated collective maritime security strategy for the sub-region. The strategy proposes measures to protect the maritime environment from unauthorized use and to develop member states' capabilities to deal with the emerging security threats. Additionally, it would encourage collaboration with extra-regional powers and oil majors in efforts to transform naval capabilities and improve interoperability to meet the challenges of the changing security threats within the sub-regional maritime domain.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND SYMBOLS

AFRICOM	African Regional Combatant Command
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AOR	Area of Responsibility
API	American Petroleum Institute
AU	African Union
BP	British Petroleum
BPD	Barrels Per Day
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
FAC	Fast Attack Craft
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FOB	Forward Operational Base
FPB	Fast Patrol Boat
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
GN	Ghanaian Navy
GNP	Gross National Product
GoG	Gulf of Guinea
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HQ	Headquarters
IA	Interagency
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IORARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security

LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Sea Truck
LPA	Troop Transportation Boat
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
NLNG	Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas
NN	Nigerian Navy
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessels
ORBAT	Order of Battle
PB	Patrol Boat
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEDEF	U.S. Secretary of Defense
SLOC	Sea Lanes of Communications
SNEPCO	Shell Nigeria Exploration Production Company
SNG	Shell Nigeria Gas
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNTAD	U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
UN	United Nations
URS	Underway Replenishment Ship
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
U.S.	United States
VHF	Very High Frequency

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The end of the Cold War in 1989, the collapse of communism, and the breakup of the Soviet Union led to remarkable changes, transforming global international relations from bipolar to uni-polar politics. The main actors today are the United States and its allies. At the same time, democratic and economic reforms across the globe create a focal point for international attention. Its emergence as the sole super-power puts the United States, with its focus on globalization and the enthronelement of democratic governance worldwide, in a position to dictate major global economic, political, social and security issues.¹

Nevertheless, the world faces widespread threats and uncertainties. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States brought a new dimension to the war on terror, giving it the center stage in emerging global politics.² Meanwhile, ongoing Middle East crises, instability in the Persian Gulf Region, and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have exacerbated global energy instability.³

Some analysts ascribe these situations to a stepped up struggle for political control over oil and natural gas. The politics of oil have always been of strategic interest to both producers and consumers. Some major countries have become wary of the reliability and security of their traditional sources of oil and natural gas because of unstable political and security situations in regions where these resources are abundant. Hence, the most industrialized nations, including the United States, Japan, China and many European Union (EU) countries, now seek new, safer and more reliable sources of supply.⁴ As a result, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), with its abundant economic resources, has emerged as one of such area of interest.

¹ Mark T. Berger, *The Battle of Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 123.

² Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 142.

³ Anyu J. Ndumbe, "West African Oil, U.S. Energy Policy and African's Development Strategies," Article online; available from <http://muse.jhu.edu>; Internet: accessed 20 October 2007.

⁴ Ibid.

The GoG sub-regional oil fields are increasingly attractive to oil companies because they deliver higher profits per barrel than oil from most other parts of the world.⁵ Similarly, the sub-region has proven reserves of 46 billion barrels, and with extensive exploration and exploitation efforts underway, this is expected to hit 100 billion barrels by the year 2010.⁶ Oil industry experts predict that by 2022, the industry will have invested more than \$40 billion in the sub-region. Furthermore, according to the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate Report, oil supply levels from the sub-region to the United States are expected to grow from the current 16 percent of U.S. oil imports to 25 percent by the year 2015.⁷ In addition, the natural gas production potential of the GoG sub-region is another reason for increased interest of the world's major energy consumers.

External interests in the sub-region have grown as competition for influence in the sub-region has taken on new dimensions. Against the backdrop of ongoing competition for crude oil resources between the United States and European countries, China, India and Japan have swiftly enlarged their interests with both positive and negative results. The presence of these external interests have resulted in huge investments and increased shipping activities. Multinational companies in the energy sector compete for oil exploration licenses and currently spend billions of dollars and euros to erect drilling platforms, pipelines and transport hubs. In addition to bringing positive prospects to the sub-region, these increased activities have created challenging security issues including increased piracy, poaching, terrorism, militant youth activities, environmental degradation, illegal bunkering, oil pipeline destruction and international conflicts.⁸ These security issues need to be addressed to make the maritime environment investor-friendly and to safeguard the interests of member-states of this sub-region, particularly Nigeria, which is the focus of this thesis.

⁵ Stephen Ellis, "Briefing: West African and Its Oil," *African Affairs*, Royal African Society, 102, (2003): 135-138.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ M. F. Kupolokun, "Petroleum and Security in Africa," paper presented to the Nigerian National Security Council, September 2003, 4.

Nigeria's defense policy seeks to ensure stability within the West African sub-region by 1) making the Nigerian Armed Forces one of the most capable and efficient in the continent, 2) becoming a full partner in United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) operations, and 3) becoming an effective partner in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁹ Ensuring stability and protection of sub-regional marine resources requires Nigeria to take the initiative in strengthening the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and ECOWAS. Nigeria needs to partner with member states to develop a strategy to stem growing security threats resulting from the new strategic importance of the sub-region.

1. Statement of the Problem

The emerging security threats, if left unchecked, can lead to instability in the sub-region and adversely impact its economic, social and political development. Also, the GoG's vast sea area presents great challenges to the Nigerian nation and the Nigerian Navy's (NN) capacity to sustain a protective presence. This problem is further compounded by the relatively low capacity of the navies of the sub-region's member states. The inability of most of these navies to police beyond their territorial waters exposes the vulnerable sea areas to exploitation.

2. Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how recent international interests in the GoG sub-region affect the maritime security arrangements there. The study examines the effectiveness of current Nigerian and sub-regional security strategies in addressing the emerging security environment. The inadequacy of current strategy leads to a proposal for a more robust strategy to counter evolving threats. Developing a new strategy requires answers to these questions:

- What is the geo-strategic importance of the GoG sub-region?
- Who are the stakeholders in the sub-region, including external interests?
- What are the emerging security challenges?

⁹ Rowland Oritsejafor, "National Defense Policy Objective," lecture delivered to the Nigerian National War College, October 2006, 24.

The main question of the thesis is what new strategy is most likely to stem the emerging security threats?

3. Relevance of the Study

This thesis will benefit policymakers and stakeholders at the Nigerian Defense, Naval Headquarters, and Naval Authorities of member states who are responsible for defense and security within the GoG sub-region. It will assist the formulation of appropriate policies for the maritime defense of the sub-region in general and Nigeria in particular. The study highlights the importance of protecting economic resources within the GoG maritime environment. Finally, the study is expected to contribute to knowledge, fill gaps in the literature on maritime defense and serve as resource material for future studies on the GoG maritime domain.

4. Methodology

The thesis is aimed at developing an integrated maritime security strategy to counter the emerging security challenges in the light of the growing strategic importance of the GoG sub-region. Accordingly, the research method is qualitative. Studies were carried out on naval maritime strategy, the concept of sea power, national interest, defense policy, and maritime environments. Primary information was collected through unstructured interviews with stakeholders and my experiences having come from the sub-region. Secondary information was sourced from libraries, archives and online. Secondary information include review of relevant works on the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean security arrangements to draw insights from their experiences, as these two regions share security challenges similar to those in the GoG maritime domain.

5. Experiences of Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean Regions

The Persian Gulf, bordered by 23 littoral states, is a strategic land bridge between three continents, a situation that presents many security challenges and attributes comparable to the GoG. Strategically, the Persian Gulf is important because of its

abundant oil reserves and sea lines of communication (SLOC).¹⁰ For centuries, the region has served as an arena of international concentration and rivalry. The involvement of external powers in the region arises from motivations ranging from commerce and political rivalry to imperial security. Political rivalry emerges from the drive of extra-regional powers for domination of the Gulf, ostensibly to ensure easy access to oil. Countries that have dominated the region since the early fifteenth century include Portugal, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany and the United States.

There is a general consensus that the states of the Persian Gulf region operate in a volatile and changing security environment. Observers believe that there are three poles to the problem.¹¹ Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are on one axis of the pole, Iran on a second axis and Iraq on the third axis. Saudi Arabia and other GCC states prefer to maintain the present political and strategic status quo, but Iran and Iraq reject the American intervention to preserve regional security. With such intervention, Iran feels that its rightful position as leading power in the Gulf has been challenged. Similarly, Iraq appears to have ambitions as a major player in the region and the Arab world. On the whole, there is no symmetry among the three poles.¹² This means that the region has no form of collective maritime security. Consequently, the region remains dangerous to its peoples and to the rest of the world because it is very unstable and a breeding ground for various terrorist organizations.

Furthermore, analysts conversant with the region's politics note that Persian Gulf leaders have not made collective maritime security strategy an important focus of their regional policy. Individual states respond to their vulnerabilities with traditional defensive measures, military modernization, and in some cases with renewed commitments to political and economic reforms.¹³ The formation of the Baghdad Pact in

¹⁰ John E. Peterson, "The Historical Pattern of Gulf Security," in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, eds., *Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles, and the Search for Consensus* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 7-31.

¹¹ Andrew Rathmell et al., "A New Persian Gulf Security System," RAND Issue Paper, Article online, available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP248/IP248.pdf; Internet: accessed 22 January 2008.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ellen Laipson et al., "Security Sector Reform in the Gulf," A Joint Project of the Henry L. Stimson Center and U.S. Army's Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 7.

the 1950s as a kind of protective arc around the vital Gulf oil-producing region has not been effective. The only effective maritime security in the region is the coordinated air and sea power provided by the U.S. to cover choke points at Bal al-Mandab, the Gulf of Suez, and Gibraltar, as well as ports of entry.

The Indian Ocean region is another maritime environment with similarities to the GoG sub-region. Like the GoG with a large number of littoral states (23), the Indian Ocean is fronted by 35 nations.¹⁴ The Indian Ocean has many choke points, including the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Lombok and the Sundae Strait. Like the GoG and the Persian Gulf, the strategic importance of this region lies in its sea lines of communications that encourages sea borne trade and transport of energy products. Any disruption in traffic flow, and particularly the flow of energy products, poses serious security concerns for the littoral states since most of their energy lifelines are sea-based. Furthermore, given India, China and Japan's increasing energy demands, these countries are inevitably sensitive to the security of the region's SLOC and choke points.

Unfortunately, like the Persian Gulf and GoG, the Indian Ocean has been bedeviled with increasing rate of piracy, terrorism, the terror-crime nexus, gunrunning, maritime pollution, and oil-related and environmental disasters. Despite maritime bonding, for decades there has been no vibrant trans-oceanic community in the region.¹⁵ Analysts argue that this is rooted in the countries' dissimilarities and divergent interests, prompting each to pursue economic linkages more with the West than with each other. The situation results in a lack of coherent maritime security strategy that limits the region's ability to counter security threats.

The convergence of interests on security issues cannot be attained because of the states' dissimilarities in military and economic capabilities. The good news, however, is that recently the Indian Ocean states overcame their historical mistrust enough to engage in basic maritime cooperation.¹⁶ The approach is that each littoral state adopts individual

¹⁴ P. K. Ghosh, "Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the India Ocean: Response Strategies," American-Pacific Sea Lanes Security Institute Conference on Maritime Security in Asia, Honolulu, Hawaii. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 18-20 January 2004, 2.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Victor Huang, "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?" *Naval War College Review* Vol. 61, No. 1 (2008):87.

security measures and in most cases cooperates bilaterally. However, despite the need for such responses due to transnational threats, effective multilateral approaches are still limited. Even the charter forming the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) ignores the issue of collective maritime security.¹⁷ Similarly, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed by the U.S. was strongly criticized when the media incorrectly reported that the high-speed vessels would conduct antiterrorist patrols in the Strait of Malacca. In the meantime, the navies of India, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa operate at individual, bilateral, and in some cases multilateral levels to stem the security threats. These efforts are yielding positive results, checking maritime security threats even as the multilateral approach takes root in the region.

6. ECOWAS Past Collective Security Effort

This thesis relies upon analysis of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean security experiences, in addition to those of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) peace support operations (PSO) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau.

The ECOMOG intervention established a precedent as the first sub-regional military force to take such a mission in the third world since the end of the Cold War and as the first sub-regional military force working as a secondary partner with the UN.¹⁸ Thus ECOMOG, despite sub-regional and bilateral differences, succeeded in bringing peace to the aforementioned countries. This was due to political acceptance among the combatants, knowledge of the contested nations' political issues and physical geography, commitment to ending a nearby struggle that could affect neighboring states, appropriate military capabilities and cooperation.¹⁹

Nigeria must again seek the cooperation of GoG member states in implementing the proposed integrated collective maritime security strategy to stem emerging maritime

¹⁷ Joshua Ho, "The Security of Regional Sea Lanes," Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 2005, No. 81: 20.

¹⁸ Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996-1997): 145-176.

¹⁹ Ibid.

security challenges. The strategy will demonstrate to the extra-regional stakeholders the ability of the sub-region to secure the maritime environment, which will in turn reduce the likelihood of external involvement. Like the Indian Ocean strategy, this study considers a layered strategy made up of individual, bilateral, and multilateral approaches to securing GoG maritime environment.

B. CONCEPTS USED IN THE STUDY

Concepts used in the thesis include interest, security, sea power, strategy, defense policy, maritime domain awareness, and navies world wide. Relationships among these variables and gaps in existing literature about them are equally examined.

1. Interest

An interest could be described as likeness, admiration or feeling for something that seems necessary or important to an individual, family, group of people or a nation. This study considers interests that are beneficial, whether internal or external. Internal interests are those which belong to an individual, group or a nation; the party in question has exclusive rights over it. External interests are those for which the interested party does not have exclusive rights over the object. In this thesis, external interests refer to extra-regional powers and oil majors with interests in the GoG sub-regional oil and other natural resources.

The U.S., some European countries, China, India, and Japan are extra-regional nations interested in the GoG sub-region. There is now international competition among these nations for dominance in the GoG sub-region. The primary object of their interest is oil and other natural resources. Their interest is due partly to increasing instability in traditional energy suppliers like the Persian Gulf, the better quality of oil in GoG sub-region, and the GoG's strategic position since it does not have numerous transit choke points.²⁰ The sub-region is considered a vital artery to sub-regional seaborne trade, serving as the main shipping transit route to the Atlantic corridor.²¹ For Nigeria, the GoG constitutes its most strategic environment and security interests.

²⁰ F. Agwu, "Foreign Interest in the Gulf of Guinea: Implications for National Security," unpublished lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos (2004), 13.

²¹ Ibid.

2. Security

Security for a nation is its ability to feel secured against threats that could undermine its stability or threaten its survival.²² It is the basic requirement for survival as an independent nation-state in international politics. During the nuclear age, security policies focused on the physical survival of the state.²³ It was assumed that security policies were anchored in rational assessments by knowledgeable analysts and that clearly defined threats could be identified and appropriate strategies developed to counter them.

In conventional security thinking, a state's military power is measured against the power of other nation-states. The net assessment helps to determine the minimum military power a nation-state needs to deter a hostile attack, or at least to defend itself (second strike capability). Nation-states with enough resources focus on measures to attain a military balance of power with their rivals. Factors like force, cohesive power and inter-state conflicts are cornerstones of security analyses of the superpower nuclear rivalry during the Cold War era.

In contrast, in the Western academic community, the post-Cold War research agenda for regional security in Africa emphasizes multi-dimensional threats, including a broad spectrum of vital interests. These vital interests include the organic survival of the national population, the protection of state sovereignty, the well-being of citizens and political status and prestige. Contrasting the conventional security view, the nature and type of threats in this expanded concept of security are much more complex. The complexities are specifically due to dynamic causal links among four major dimensions of security: military, economic, ecological and ethnic.²⁴

African states need determine how to deal with both internal security threats from political separatists and traditional external security threats. However, political

²² Ciro E. Zoppo, "The Issues of Nordic Security: The Dynamics of East-West Politics in Emerging Technologies, and the Definition of National Defense" in *Nordic Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Center for International and Strategic Affairs (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 29.

²³ Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance," in James F. Rosenau and Ernst Czempedi (eds.) *Government without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 139.

²⁴ Ganiyu T. A. Adekeye, "The Nigerian Navy in National Defense," lecture delivered at the Nigerian National War College, January 2006), 18.

separatism is more of a political and social problem than a military-strategic one. Thus, African security in this thesis refers to the ability of an African state to counter all threats to its survival, ranging from external aggression to threats of economic, political, social and cultural insecurities, while simultaneously grappling with the challenges of nation-building and good governance.

3. Sea Power

Sea power encompasses the control of international maritime trade, the operation of navies in war, and the use of navies to achieve political influence during peacetime.²⁵ Naval strategists like Alfred Mahan identify six principal factors affecting the sea power of nations: geographical position, natural resources and climate, the extent of territory, population, the character of the people, and government policy.²⁶ Julian Corbett updates Mahan's list to include economic strength, technological development, and dependency on maritime trade. He observes that these characteristics determine the ability of nation-states to develop and successfully employ sea power.²⁷ Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond defines sea power as a nation-state's use of naval forces to send armies and commerce to its allies across seas and oceans, and to territories where access is needed for war (sea control) and to prevent enemies from doing the same (sea denial).²⁸

The concept of sea power is applicable to the security concerns of a globalizing world economy. The ultimate goal of sea power is unrestricted access to the world's common transportation routes, as well as access to markets and materials. Ensuring good order (safe and unrestricted access) to the GoG sub-region is the cardinal objective of this thesis. Good order requires a naval presence (see Figure 1). Naval presence encourages stability and security and sets the stage for diplomatic and political cooperation. Achievement of sea control and sea denial requires a well funded, structured and efficient navy.

²⁵ Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1990), 232.

²⁶ James Wirtz, et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 119.

²⁷ Michael McGwire, *Maritime Strategy and the Sea Powers* (London: Adelphi Papers IISS, 1976), 15.

²⁸ O. O. Biobaku, *Maritime Strategy and Strategy*, lecture delivered at the Nigerian National War College, October 2005, 18.




Figure 1. Good Order at Sea.²⁹

4. Navies Worldwide

Navies are policy instruments of statecraft as the maritime component of a nation-state's defense forces. Naval strategists observe that a key reason to establish navies is to protect maritime sea lane of communications.³⁰ Accordingly, navies have been variously classified. For example, A. T. Morris classifies navies in a hierarchy of expansion based upon their initial weaponry, modernity and weapons equipment, supplementary naval power and corroborating national power base. Considering these factors, he classifies navies of the world into nine categories including Major Global Force Projection

²⁹ Alan Lee Boyer, "Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment: Maritime Security in the Mediterranean," *Naval War College Review* Vol. 60 No. 3 (Summer 2007).

³⁰ Adekeye, 18.

(Complete), Major Global Force Projection (Partial), Medium Global Force Projection, Medium Regional Force Projection, Adjacent Force Projection, Offshore Territorial Defense, Inshore Territorial Defense, Constabulary and Token Navies.³¹

In this categorization scheme, the U.S. Navy is the only complete major force projection navy. The Nigerian Navy is in the sixth category as an offshore territorial defense navy, while the navies of member states of GoG are placed lower, as constabulary and token navies. Booth further classifies navies based on perceived roles and geographical ranging. While the roles of navies consist of policing, diplomatic and military functions, classification is based on geographical ranges (Global, Ocean Going, Contiguous, Seas and Coastal Sea).³² This further categorization groups the NN among the coastal sea navies.

5. Relationships Among the Concepts

International competition for dominance in the GoG maritime domain can be seen as a security threat. Increased activities open the door to both internal and external threats. National security calls for a clear appreciation and use of sea power. Ensuring sea control and sea denial and protecting a nation's vital economic and political interests are core functions of the navy. Consequently, a littoral state must structure and organize its navy to meet its responsibility to contribute to national security and nation-building.

The GoG sub-regional offshore oil and gas resources are vital economic interests. Therefore, events within the GoG are of great concern to all member states of the GoG sub-region and to Nigeria in particular. The NN has a responsibility to ensure that the maritime environment where assets are located is effectively and efficiently monitored and protected.

Most of the GoG navies have limited capacity for force projection, sea control and sea denial outside their nation's territorial waters. However, the NN is a notch above most of the navies of the GoG sub-region. It therefore behooves on the NN to pursue and

³¹ Michael A. Morris, *Expansion of Third World Navies* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 25.

³² Ibid.

implement policies to guarantee collaboration and cooperation to protect maritime environment. Such cooperation requires sub-regional nations to pool their resources to protect the economic resources of the sub-region.

6. Absence of Literature

In the course of this study, it became clear that very little literature is available on the GoG maritime security environment. Similarly, there was very little academic or policy interest in the GoG sub-region until the recent crisis in the Middle East. The recent upsurge of oil exploration activities within the sub-region has resulted in greater awareness and led to the publication of a few scholarly works. However, the few available sources focus more on economic issues, with little or no attention on their protection. The most significant publication is by Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates in 2004; it deals extensively with the economic potential of the sub-region.³³ Unfortunately, their work does not propose strategies for countering emerging security threats.

This study seeks to address the existing gap in knowledge. The result of the thesis's primary and secondary information is an integrated collective maritime security strategy using the framework of ends, ways, and means.³⁴

C. LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS

Reports, seminar papers, treaty documents, executive summaries and memoranda concerning the GoG sub-region and case studies from regions with similar problems are used to develop the proposed strategy. However, there is a dearth of published works on the sub-region's maritime activities, and in addition, there is not adequate current statistical data on some sub-region navies. The thesis research is limited to the development of maritime security strategy.

³³ Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004.

³⁴ Joseph R. Ceremi and James F. Holcomb Jr., "U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy," Article online; available from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/00354.pdf>, Internet: accessed 17 August 2007.

The thesis assumes that oil and natural gas in the GoG sub-region will remain a major source of energy supply to the global energy market in the foreseeable future. If this assumption is true, it will help give stakeholders and external actors the political will and economic means to make the strategy a reality.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis is organized into three chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II examines the security environment of the sub-region. Chapter III develops proposed strategy to counter the emerging security challenges in the GoG sub-region.

II. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE SUB-REGION

A. GEO-STRATEGIC SETTING

For the purposes of this thesis, the GoG sub-region is defined as the thirteen West African nations mostly fronting the Atlantic Ocean from Angola in the Southeast to Cote d'Ivoire in the West. Other countries within this area include Ghana, Togo, the Republic of Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe. Chad is the only landlocked country among the GoG states. These countries have different colonial ties. The languages spoken across the sub-region include English, French, Portuguese and Spanish.³⁵ The sub-region population is estimated at over 200 million. Nigeria alone has about 140 million, with over 250 ethnic groups and a land mass of about 350,000 square miles.³⁶ Nigeria is thus a dominant nation in the sub-region in terms of human and material resources.

The sub-region has a coastline of about 3,400 miles (5,500 km), roughly the size of Mexico (Figure 2).³⁷ With an EEZ of 200 nautical miles, the sub-region has a maritime domain of about 680,000 square nautical miles (nm). Exercising effective and sustained security over this vast maritime domain is a daunting challenge for sub-regional states.

³⁵ Damian Ondo Mane, "Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the Global Economy: Prospects and Challenges," IMF Working Paper, Article online; available from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05235.pdf>, Internet: accessed 27 December 2007.

³⁶ "Nigeria: Facts and Figures," Article online; available from http://encarta.msn.com/fact_631504831/Nigeria_Facts_and_Figures.html, Internet: accessed 27 December 2007.

³⁷ Raymond Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (2007).




Figure 2. Political Map of Africa Showing Gulf of Guinea Sub-Region³⁸

³⁸ Luventicus Modified, Online: <http://www.luventicus.org/maps/africa/gulfofguinea.html>, Internet: Accessed 30 April 2008.

B. NATURAL RESOURCES

The sub-region is endowed with numerous living and nonliving resources including diamonds, gold, huge deposits of hydrocarbon, manganese nodules, nickel and fish. Geologists estimate that the oil, gas and deepwater reserves within the sub-region are about 77.4 million barrels, 11.8 trillion cubic meters and more than 14 billion barrels (Tables 1 and 2). The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates the sub-regional total oil reserves to be in the neighborhood of 80 billion barrels, about eight percent of the world's crude oil reserves.³⁹ Additionally, within the sub-region an estimated one million metric tons of fish are caught annually, of which more than one-third for export.⁴⁰

Country/Region	Onshore Oil (million)	Gas (Trillion Cubic meters)
1. Middle East	685.6	56.0
2. North America	37.3	7.1
3. South & Central America	98.6	7.0
4. Asia-Pacific	38.7	12.6
5. Africa	77.4	11.8
6. Europe	19.7	61.0
7. Former Soviet Union	77.8	

Table 1. Oil and Gas Reserves⁴¹

³⁹ Jean-Christopher Servant, "The New Gulf Oil States," Article online; available from <http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil>, Internet: accessed 1 February 2008.

⁴⁰ *Food and Agricultural Organization Annual Report 2006*, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.

⁴¹ BP 2003 Statistical Review of World Economy in Jean-Christopher Servant, "The New Gulf Oil States," Article online; available from <http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil>, Internet: accessed 1 February 2008.

Country/Region	Deep Water Oil
1. West Africa	14.495
2. Gulf of Mexico	12.393
3. Northwest Europe	3.126
4. Mediterranean Sea	1.868
5. Brazil	8.396
6. Asia-Pacific	2.139

Table 2. Deep Water Reserves 2003⁴²

Analysts and representatives of oil majors agree in their predictions that production will rapidly increase in the coming decades. As noted in Table 3, the oil output figures of the major oil producing countries like Nigeria and Angola are expected to double within the next decades, and thus will likely shape the future world oil trade movement.⁴³

⁴² Douglas-Westwood/Infield Systems' world in Jean-Christopher Servant, "The New Gulf Oil States," Article online; available from <http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil>, Internet: accessed 1 February 2008.

⁴³ Lutz Neumann, "European Policy and Energy Interests: Challenges from the Gulf of Guinea, Oil Policy," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*. International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 59-67.

S/No	2005	2010	2015	2030
1. Nigeria	2,719,000	3,042,000	3,729,000	4,422,000
2. Equatorial Guinea	313,000	466,000	653,000	724,000
3. Angola	1,098,000	2,026,000	2,549,000	3,288,000
4. Congo (Brazzaville)	285,000	300,000	314,000	327,000
5. Gabon	303,000	291,000	279,000	269,000
6. Cote d' Ivoire	43,000	71,000	83,000	94,000
7. Cameroon	84,000	72,000	66,000	61,000
8. DR Congo (Kinshasa)	30,000	33,000	30,000	25,000
9. Ghana	11,000	16,000	20,000	23,000
10. Total	9,936,000	12,059,000	13,975,000	16,242,000

Table 3. Projected Oil Production of Gulf of Guinea in Barrels per Day (2005-2030)⁴⁴

Other natural resources that increase the sub-region's strategic importance include cobalt, copper, uranium, cocoa, coffee, oil palm fruits, and columbite tantalite (a key raw material used in cellular phones, satellites, and telecommunications equipment). The Congo Basin has the world's second largest rain forest and is also home to one of the world's most powerful rivers, the Congo River. The Congo River power plant provides electricity to countries as far away as Egypt and South Africa.⁴⁵ All these resources put the sub-region in a high strategic position among global sub-regions.

C. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SUB-REGION

The global economy is experiencing tremendous changes with significant effects anticipated on the GoG sub-region. The political climate in the Middle East, which has disruptive effects on oil prices and causes shifts in the structure of oil demand, coupled with robust economic growth in China and India, is likely to elevate the sub-region in U.S., European, and Asian energy strategies.

⁴⁴ EIA, U.S. Department of Energy (2004) in Lutz Neumann, "European Policy and Energy Interests: Challenges from the Gulf of Guinea, Oil Policy," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*. International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 59-67.

⁴⁵ Mane, 5.

Other factors fuel interests in the GoG sub-region. Most sub-regional oil is exploited from offshore oil fields, far from ground-based political instability, and can be easily protected from domestic disorder. Problems linked to Caspian Sea oil exploration and exploitation, and especially ecological problems, make the GoG off-shore oil even more appealing. With the exception of Chad, whose oil fields are connected to Cameroon by the 1,000 kilometer long Doba-Kribi pipeline, no oil routes in the sub-region pass through the territories of neighboring countries.⁴⁶ Therefore, oil deals can be made bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Additionally, the sub-region's crude oil is better quality than that from Latin America,⁴⁷ and the oil contains little sulfur, which better suits U.S. oil companies. Finally, the numerous transit chokepoints facing other world oil producing nations adds to the comparative advantage of producers in the sub-region, contributing to ease of shipping, lower transportation costs, and fewer environmental hazards and security problems.

Overall, GoG oil is an attractive source of energy. It leads all other regions in proven deepwater oil reserves (about 14,495 billion barrels), which will create significant savings in security budgetary provisions. This, according to experts, has prompted the U.S. Intelligence Estimate to anticipate an increase in its GoG oil imports from the current 16 percent to 25 percent by the year 2015 (a percentage higher than U.S. imports from the Middle East).⁴⁸ While some analysts believe that the sub-region and even Africa as a whole do not measure up to the Middle East, there is a general consensus within the U.S. energy community that it could be a viable alternative. Within the next decade, oil production in the sub-region could double from its present four to eight million barrels per day (bpd), an amount that corresponds roughly to the anticipated growth in U.S. oil imports within the same period.⁴⁹ The sub-region is the only oil producing regions of the

⁴⁶ Mane.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Rudolf Traub-Merz, "The Geo-Strategic Importance of the Gulf of Guinea," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 9-26.

⁴⁹ Traub-Merz.

world not yet dependent on any single regional client. The competitiveness of other extra-regional powers notwithstanding, the sub-region may become an area that produces oil essentially for American energy consumers.

Oil and natural gas exploitation normally go together. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is the preferred fuel in most developed countries because it burns cleaner than oil and is relatively cheap. Consumption of LNG has increased to 25 percent from just 19 percent a few years ago.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, within the sub-region gas is still treated as a by-product of oil exploitation and is generally flared and burned off. However, the government has directed oil companies operating in Nigeria to end gas flaring and convert it for commercial use by 2010.

Africa and the Asia Pacific each account for eight percent of the world's proven reserves of natural gas. (Figure 3) Up to one quarter of Africa's gas reserves is located in the GoG sub-region. Nigeria is the leading gas producer and holds the largest gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also an important exporter of liquefied natural gas.⁵¹ Other countries in the sub-region with gas reserves include Cameroon, the DR Congo, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. The strategic importance of the sub-region has made it the toast of many stakeholders and the international competition for these resources has made the issue of collective security an imperative.

⁵⁰ Johannes Dieterich, "The Gulf of Guinea and the Global Oil Market: Supply and Demand," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 28-37.

⁵¹ Mane, 6.




Figure 3. Share of World's Proven Gas Reserve (2002)⁵²

D. STAKEHOLDERS

1. States of the Sub-Region

The strategic importance of the GoG sub-region in terms of its resource endowment and as a shipping route and hub has drawn both domestic and international attention to the area. The number of oil exporting countries in the sub-region will likely increase in the near future, from the present six to ten or eleven. Presently, there are more well-endowed countries (like Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Angola, and DR Congo) and the less well-endowed (like Togo). Among the well-endowed states shown in Table 4, Equatorial Guinea generated 86 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) from 90 percent of its oil exports in 2002, while Gabon within the same period generated 73 percent of its GDP from 81 percent of its oil exports. Nigeria, Angola, and DR Congo within the same period had government revenues of 83 percent, 90 percent, and 80 percent, generated 95 percent, 90 percent, and 94 percent from their oil exports.

⁵² Oil & Gas Journal, December 23, 2002 in Johannes Dieterich, "The Gulf of Guinea and the Global Oil Market: Supply and Demand," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 28-37.

S/No	Country	GDP	Revenue	Exports
1.	Equatorial Guinea	86%	61%	90%
2.	Gabon	73%	60%	81%
3.	Angola	45%	90%	90%
4.	Congo	67%	80%	94%
5.	Nigeria	40%	83%	95%
6.	Cameroon	4.9%	20%	60%

Table 4. Measures of Oil Dependency, National Income, Government Revenue and Export⁵³

The international competition for dominance in the GoG maritime domain can be seen as a security threat. Attempts by extra-regional powers to influence their former colonies for access to oil now pit member states against each other. A typical example is the maritime boundary dispute, exacerbated by former colonial administrations, between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Increased activities within the GoG sub-region have opened the door for both internal and external threats. Maritime boundary disputes, piracy, illegal oil bunkering, disruption of oil terminal and flow stations operations, poaching, terrorism and environmental degradation are now common problems.

This thesis argues that member states of the sub-region need to set aside their differences and articulate a sub-regional oil policy as well as a common security strategy. A sub-regional oil policy would include the possibility of collective bargaining with extra-regional stakeholders, and would require absence of major conflict among the sub-region states.⁵⁴ Arguments against such a sub-regional policy include the chronic weakness of the sub-regional state institutions, under-developed economies, heavy foreign debts, poor social conditions and widespread poverty. Experts have expressed

⁵³ Commission Économique pour l'Afrique Centrale, les Économies de l'Afrique central 2003 in Manuel Correia de Barros, "Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 68-71.

⁵⁴ Manuel Correia de Barros, "Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 68-71.

concern that these problems will undermine member nations' ability to negotiate better bargains with their resources. Also, the projected emergence of new, cheaper, cleaner, and more accessible sources of energy may put an end to the monopoly currently enjoyed by oil as the world's premier energy source. Arguments against a sub-regional oil policy notwithstanding, most of these countries depend heavily on oil and other resources for their GDP, revenue and exports. Member states of the sub-region cannot continue to pay only lip service to cooperating with a collective maritime strategy. They need to nurture a stable polity and make the GoG maritime domain an investor-friendly environment.

2. Competition for Gulf of Guinea Oil

Historically, the British firms Shell and British Petroleum (BP) dominated the development of oil in Nigeria. Their initial monopolistic position was lost with the entrance of other multinational corporations like Mobil Exploration Nigeria, Gulf Oil Nigeria, the Italian State firm ENI (AGIP), Total Elf, ChevronTexaco and the French subsidiary SAFRAP. French Equatorial Africa had French firms (SPAEF). In Portuguese Angola and Belgian Congo, the dominant oil firm was the American Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. Angola today is dominated by oil majors like ChevronTexaco, Total, and ExxonMobil. American oil companies ExxonMobil, Ocean, Marathon, and Amerada Hess dominated Spanish Guinea.⁵⁵

Today, the scramble for African oil, including GoG oil, has changed from a political contest among European national oil companies monopolizing their neo-colonial spheres of influence to an economic contest among multinational and national oil companies. All are bidding for oil concessions across old imperial boundaries. The changed economic contest caused by oil majors trying to break the monopolies held by the dominant firms opens the door to maritime security threats in the sub-region. For example, environmental degradation from oil exploration and exploitation has not been given adequate attention. The communities whose livelihood is touched by environmental degradation persistently cry foul without favorable response. The failure of both the

⁵⁵ Douglas A. Yates, "Changing Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in Oil-Economies of the Gulf of Guinea," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*, International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 38-50.

government and the oil majors to respond has provided the expanded political opportunities for militant youth to emerge in the Niger Delta; today these militant youth are causing havoc in the oil rich Niger Delta area.⁵⁶

The shift from political to economic contests reflects three major transformations in the international system: the change from a multi-polar to a uni-polar order, the privatization and multinational mergers of former national oil companies, and the failure of African states to successfully nationalize their petroleum industries.⁵⁷ The gradual decline of British, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Belgian spheres of influence over the course of the 20th century was paralleled by the rise of American capitalism to global hegemony.

a. European Union (EU)

It has been argued that energy is crucial for the economic welfare, social stability and geographical security of every nation-state. This effect is amplified with growing competition for access to limited energy resources. The EU countries are no exception.

For the past several decades, energy policy in the EU was regarded as an affair of economic state administration and private companies. This perception changed with the oil crises of 1973-74, when international demand started to exceed supply and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed a fourfold increase of crude oil prices to almost \$12 per barrel.⁵⁸ The cost increases contributed to severe economic crisis in Europe, with high inflation and high unemployment. The Arab oil embargo of the 1970s further made clear the need for more collaboration on energy policies among the nations of Europe and between Europe and energy producers of the world. Unfortunately, every country adopted a separate strategy to cope with the crisis,

⁵⁶ Chuks Iheme, "Ijaw Youths Militant Collective Action: How Rational," *Unpublished Defense Analysis Course 3721 Paper*, (NPS Monterey: Winter 2008), 1-20.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Aglika Ganova, "European Union Energy Supply Policy: Diversified in Unity," Article online; available from <http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/memoires/MemoireGANOVA.pdf>, Internet: accessed 5 February 2008.

ranging from boosting domestic oil and gas production to building nuclear plants. Each nation's strategy depended on its geographic interests, domestic resources and production, specific needs and diplomatic relations with suppliers and transit countries.

Satisfying oil security drove most nations of the EU back to their former colonies. As there are no political restrictions, European countries can buy oil from former colonies or elsewhere. In 2000, the EU Commission observed in a published Green Paper that Europe's oil dependency is high and will continue to rise in conjunction with declining North Sea supplies. The paper observed that if this trend continues, in the next two decades oil exports to Europe from the GoG sub-region will rise from 50 percent to about 70 percent.⁵⁹

Today, the largest EU-based oil companies operating in the GoG are Shell, BP, Total and Agip. In Nigeria, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) accounts for roughly half of Nigeria's oil production.⁶⁰ Shell is the major stakeholder in the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) joint venture and other Shell subsidiaries such as Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG) and the Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Limited (SNEPCO); together these made Shell the largest oil and gas company in Nigeria.

European Union relations with the GoG sub-region are focused mainly on development cooperation with ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Such relationships focus on peace, security and good governance, with a strong emphasis on economic and trade integration.⁶¹ The ECCAS is much less developed than the ECOWAS, but the EU is bolstering its capacity to perform a role similar to that of ECOWAS, in line with the African Union (AU) economic, political, and security programs.

⁵⁹ Neumann, 59-67.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Aglika Ganova, 70.

b. The United States

There has been an increased global strategic interest in the GoG since the end of the 1990s and especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Central to global interest in the region is the rising profile of the GoG in the West's energy security calculations, as a source of both oil and profit for western oil majors.⁶² Furthermore, interest in the GoG is shaped by turbulent relations between the U.S. and President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela that have affected the oil supply from Venezuela. The continued instability in the Persian Gulf region, which is among the major crude oil suppliers to the U.S., has a similar result. These factors greatly influence U.S. policy towards Africa and the GoG sub-region. Since diversification of energy supplies is now the cornerstone of U.S. energy security policy, Washington sees GoG oil as a crucial opportunity to further diversify its oil supply, thus facilitating the inclusion of GoG in the strategic energy calculations of U.S. policymakers.⁶³

The new focus on the GoG is welcome, particularly among leading American policymakers and oil company executives who see prospects for maximizing gains while competing with Britain, France and China for oil in the GoG. For example, Walter Kansteiner, former U.S. Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, notes that African oil has become a U.S. national strategic interest. Ed Royce, a Republican Congressman from California and former Chairman of the African Congressional Subcommittee, advised after the tragic events of September 11 that African oil should become a priority for U.S. national security.⁶⁴ The National Intelligence Council forecasts that the U.S. could be importing as much as 25 percent of its oil from West Africa by 2015, compared with present imports of only 16 percent.⁶⁵ The U.S. now

⁶² Cyril Obi, "Conflict and Peace in West Africa," *News from the Nordic Africa Institute*, No. 1 (January 2005).

⁶³ Dieterich, 28.

⁶⁴ Jean-Christopher Servant, "The New Gulf Oil States," Article online; available from <http://mondediplo.com/2003/01/08oil>, Internet: accessed 1 February 2008.

⁶⁵ Dieterich, 30.

invests more than \$10 billion in African oil industry annually. It is estimated that three-quarters of U.S. foreign direct investment in Africa in the next decade will be in the energy sector.⁶⁶

United States' policy and energy interests in the GoG sub-region involves partnering with member states to create an investor friendly environment. These partnerships require political stability, rule of law and property rights. The U.S. sees accountability in managing oil revenues as an important step in promoting the socio-political environment. With increased focus on the GoG comes with increased security threats and risks stemming from corruption and bad governance, piracy, terrorism, militant activities, oil flow station and terminal operation disruptions, maritime boundary disputes and oil majors' competition for dominance. These new threats to oil supply security require new U.S. policy approaches to energy security, so U.S. energy policy endorses stronger global alliances, such as bilateral relationships with key countries and regions.⁶⁷

The U.S. has expanded military aid programs in Africa, including the provision of arms, military equipment and technical assistance. Expanded aid programs are intended to enhance friendly African states' internal security so they can better control ethnic, religious, and factional divisions, support peacekeeping operations, and improve anti-terrorism measures.⁶⁸ Other measures that the U.S. is using to complement maritime security include military training, U.S. Navy exercises, the acquisition of basing rights in strategic African countries and the establishment of U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) as a new geographic combatant command responsible for the African region.

c. China

China's recent emergence as a major player in the oil market has created shockwaves in international markets for oil and other raw materials. Its sudden rise to become the world's second largest oil consumer and third largest oil importer should

⁶⁶ Richard Cheney, "African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development," (Washington, DC: National Energy Policy Report, May 2001), 6.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China and the Scramble for Africa's Oil," *Review of African Political Economy* No. 108 (2006): 299.

come as no surprise, given its economic growth rate. China's rapid rise as a consumer in the global oil market is a concern because its difficulties in breaking into already established markets to source these products. Added to this problem is the associated regionalization of the market and investments in oilfield development.

Four factors lie behind the regionalization of the oil market: the length of transport routes, existing transport infrastructure, the market coordinates of the companies involved in exploitation, and traditional business relationships.⁶⁹ It is not easy for newcomers like China to break into established market structures. For China, the available options are paying more than market price for oil, overbidding for exploration rights, and political maneuvering. Of course, China makes more extensive use of these options than any other country, and they are not welcomed with open arms by the established players.

As part of the political maneuvering, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing spent a week in January 2006 visiting four African states, including Nigeria.⁷⁰ The trip involved a series of diplomatic exchanges and more than one hundred meetings between high-ranking Chinese government officials and African politicians and business executives. It culminated in an invitation to 48 African heads of governments to visit China in November 2006 for a summit.⁷¹

Chinese interests in the sub-region fall into three categories: diplomacy and foreign policy, economic and trade policy, and development policy and debt relief. China defends its economic interests anywhere in the world and particularly in the sub-region. Its economy is characterized by a strong orientation towards foreign trade focused on continued increase in exports of goods and, in return, immense demand for raw materials. Chinese imports from the sub-region are mainly raw materials, particularly oil. With a share of about 30 percent, the sub-region already makes a considerable contribution to Chinese oil imports.⁷² In return, Chinese oil corporations (China National

⁶⁹ Gudrun Wacker, *China's Rise: The Return of Geopolitics* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2006), 12.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Claire Woodside, "West Africa: America's Foreign Policy Post 9/11 and the 'Resource Curse': A Head on Collision," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* Vol. 9, Issue 4 (2007).

⁷² Ibid.

Petroleum Corporations) have made extensive investments in Angola and Nigeria. Investments in Nigeria include the rehabilitation and expansion of Nigeria's light weapons industry, oil refinery construction, power plants, and the possible rehabilitation of Nigeria's rail system.⁷³ China maintains a hands-off policy in the sub-region whereby all Chinese aid comes free of economic and political conditions.⁷⁴

In terms of security, China has a long history in Africa, having provided weapons to African groups pursuing independence since the 1950s. China's recent arms and equipment sales to the government in Khartoum and its refusal to press Khartoum to accept a U.N. peacekeeping mission led to accusations that China is fueling the current conflict in Sudan.⁷⁵ Actions by Chinese policymakers such as the rehabilitation and expansion of Nigeria's light weapons industry will undoubtedly pose serious challenges to other extra-regional powers' interests in the GoG sub-region.

E. THREAT ANALYSIS

There is growing concern that the vast resources and potential in the GoG sub-region are undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. It appears that rather than contributing to member states' stability and economic prosperity, the resources are almost a curse.⁷⁶ Resource abundant economies have not had appreciable growth rate, but rather the reverse. None of the sub-region countries has experienced rapid economic growth since oil and other resources were discovered. Analysts attribute this to political and socioeconomic problems including bad governance, corruption, lack of economic diversity, militants youth activities, piracy, poaching and terrorism. The pervasive insecurity tends to make the sub-region look like an investor unfriendly environment, which in turn leads to huge financial losses. Experts believe this contributes significantly to the sub-region's constrained investment and economic prospects.⁷⁷

⁷³ Cheney, 16.

⁷⁴ Woodside, 2.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Gilpin, 1.

1. Domestic and Sub-regional Security Challenges

Poor governance is a common problem across the resource-laden sub-region. Although states of the sub-region differ in many ways, they share several characteristics. All are post-colonial states with weak governments, underdeveloped economies and inadequate qualified human capital. Citizens suffer from poverty, hunger, illiteracy, unemployment and low life expectancy.⁷⁸ Very few of the states achieve significant growth, and none can boast an equitable income distribution. A related vulnerability stems from most member states' weak internal security forces—forces that are under-trained, poorly equipped and incapable of effectively policing their internal waters and maritime boundaries.

These negative influences lead to increases in maritime boundary disputes, piracy, illegal bunkering, disruption of oil terminals and flow stations operations, destruction of oil pipelines, poaching, terrorism, gun-running, and environmental degradation. Associated vulnerabilities include limited maritime domain awareness, weak infrastructure, and poor legislative and judicial arrangements. All these threats and vulnerabilities contribute to huge economic losses, the inability of member states to achieve millennium development goals, and shipping and trade losses.

The inability of member states to mount collective, sustained and effective security control over the maritime domain makes it difficult for GoG states to enjoy the full benefits of the sub-regional EEZ's significant fishery resources. Recent studies suggest that poaching by vessels from Asia, Europe and other parts of Africa costs the sub-region some \$370 million annually.⁷⁹ In addition to the financial losses, poaching has human security costs. Households and individuals are affected directly by the reduced availability of seafood in local markets. Poaching also has a number of indirect effects, including drastic reduction of incomes and loss of livelihood in fishing communities.

The rates of piracy and sea robbery have been increasing since the 1990s, occasioned by increasing shipping activities. The sub-region is ranked by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as one of the most troubled global waterways.

⁷⁸ Manuel Correia de Barros, 68.

⁷⁹ Gilpin.

Despite debate about definitional issues and data reliability, there is broad consensus that criminal activity in this part of the continent is worrisome. An analysis of piracy attacks between 2002 and 2004 indicates that unlike most parts of the world, including elsewhere in Africa, the vast majority of attacks in the GoG resulted in an actual boarding.⁸⁰ This reflects a heightened level of maritime insecurity. (See Figure 4.)




Figure 4. Piracy Attacks in Africa 2002-2004⁸¹

Activities of the Niger Delta militant youths further complicate the tenuous security climate. The activities of militants include disruption of oil terminals and flow stations operations, hostage taking of expatriate and national oil workers, illegal bunkering, terrorism, piracy and the destruction of oil installations. Experts say these highly organized criminal activities cost the sub-region around \$1.2 billion annually in lost revenue.⁸² In addition, militants' attempts to force the government to change its political, economic and social policies towards the Niger Delta area and criminal gangs' illegal bunkering add to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Recent evidence suggests that the weaponry is becoming more sophisticated and lethal as youth and criminal gangs try to evade national law enforcement agencies.

It is often argued that enduring disagreements over maritime boundaries can escalate into armed conflict, particularly when the disputed areas have significant economic potential or are strategic transportation hubs. These disputes make it much

⁸⁰ Gilpin.

⁸¹ International Maritime Bureau Statistics in Gilpin, Raymond. "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," *Strategic Insights*, VI no. 1 (2007).

⁸² Gilpin.

more difficult for sub-region countries to address shared security challenges in a collaborative manner. Examples of maritime disputes in the sub-region include those between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River, and between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon over the Mbane Island and Corisco Bay boundaries.

Oil spills, pollution and environmental degradation are among the environmental hazards currently unchecked within the sub-region. In 2005, the Abuja Declaration reiterated issues highlighted in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) analysis, which indicated that fisheries mismanagement has led to stock depletion, ecological imbalance and environmental degradation. Unfortunately, less than 25 percent of the countries in this sub-region have ratified the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation.⁸³ Although the petroleum industry is singled out as a major polluter in a lot of literature, improper domestic and industrial waste disposal also poses a significant threat.

The traditional land-centric approach to security in the sub-region contributes to the neglect of maritime forces in both absolute and relative terms. It is not surprising that most countries cannot effectively monitor shipping traffic and activities within sub-regional waters. There are no collective coastal radar stations for surveillance. According to data published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), patrol boats are grossly inadequate in the sub-region, with most listed assets categorized as non-operational in Angola, Benin, and the DR Congo.⁸⁴ In addition, most member states cannot police beyond their territorial waters. Poor maritime domain awareness undermines safety and security by allowing criminals to operate with impunity.

Most countries in the sub-region are signatories to relevant international conventions. However, very few have taken concrete steps to ratify and institutionalize these protocols. Creating and enforcing the necessary provisions requires sustained political will and the enactment of enabling legislation. It further requires the strengthening of relevant institutions, the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, and

⁸³ Gilpin.

⁸⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005-2006), 365.

the allocation of adequate financial and human resources to maritime security and safety.⁸⁵ It has been noted that even with appropriate laws in place; the ability to effectively enforce these laws depends on the strength and independence of the judiciary. Investigations reveal that corruption, inefficiency and capacity constraints compromise the effectiveness of the judicial system. Hence, offenders are often seen walking away.

Most of the ports and infrastructure surveillance facilities in the sub-region are in dire need of repair, upgrades or replacement. Countries' failure to pay adequate attention to this crucial aspect of maritime security and safety over the years is partly responsible for the situation in which the area now finds itself. Most countries in the sub-region have yet to fully comply with standards for port safety and security outlined in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, to which all maritime nations are signatories.⁸⁶ In addition, an estimated 85 percent of vessels registered in GoG states are more than 20 years old, making them more susceptible to accidents.⁸⁷

F. CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY

As noted above, the traditional land-centric approach to security contributes to the neglect of maritime forces. Added to this is the inability of sub-regional leaders to make collective maritime security strategy an important sub-regional policy focus. The situation contributes immensely to most GoG sub-region navies' inability to project forces and enforce sea control and denial outside their territorial waters. The individualistic approach against emerging security threats has not proved effective. A brief review of some of the sub-region's navies offers a clear view of the maritime security situation.

⁸⁵ Kamal-Deen Ali, "Legal and Policy Dimensions of Coastal Zone Monitoring and Control: The Case in Ghana," *35 Ocean Development and International Law* (Oregon: Library Press, 2004), 179-194.

⁸⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Review of Regional Developments: Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Review of Maritime Transport* (Geneva: UNCTAD Press, 2003).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

1. Nigeria

Nigeria is the only country in the sub-region with a navy that can boast of frigates, fast-attack crafts, landing ship tanks, air arm, river town class boats, in-shore patrol crafts, and tug boats in its inventory. Added to these are dockyard and shipyards facilities meant for second and third line maintenance of boats and ships.

Nigeria articulates its Navy's roles as the Trident Strategic concept. The NN Trident Strategic Concept includes three levels contributing towards national military strategy (see Figure 5). The first level, coastal defense, protects the coastal approaches, territorial waters, and the EEZ. The second level is sub-regional sea control to defend Nigeria's maritime interests and support the national shipping policy by protecting sea-lanes of communications (SLOC). The third level requires that the NN provide adequate sealift and fire support to the army in amphibious operations. This strategic concept is indeed ambitious.



Figure 5. Nigeria Navy Trident Strategic Concept

Like the Trident Strategic concept, the NN evolved its maritime mission in the form of defense-in-depth conceptualized as three concentric circles (see Figure 6). The inner and highest priority circle is coastal defense and inshore operations that include surveillance, early warning, anti-smuggling and piracy operations; protecting offshore oil installations; search and rescue (SAR); and policing seaward up to 100 nautical miles. The intermediate circle entails maintaining a naval presence in the EEZ for monitoring, policing, and sea control and to coordinate efforts against poaching, dumping of

hazardous materials and toxic waste, and in support of marine research. Finally, the outer ring involves surveillance, intelligence-gathering, training and flag-showing cruises, independent and joint exercises/operations, and allied or combined operations.⁸⁸




Figure 6. Nigeria Navy Defense-in-Depth Concept

Both concepts can guarantee adequate policing of the Nigerian maritime domain given the political will to fund the NN adequately. Adapting the same concepts within the sub-region will undoubtedly provide much-needed security.

2. Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire has a brown-water navy known as Marine Côte d'Ivoire. Its mission is essentially coastal surveillance and security for the nation's 281-mile coastline.⁸⁹ It has two fast-attack craft, two patrol craft, and one light transport ship, as well as numerous smaller vessels used primarily for traffic, immigration, and contraband control.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

⁸⁹ Stephen Saunders, "Côte d'Ivoire," in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 165.

⁹⁰ "Ivory Coast Navy," Article online; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Ivory_Coast#Navy, Internet: accessed 15 February 2008.

3. Ghana Navy

The Ghana Navy was initially intended for coastal defense, fishery protection and internal security predominantly on Lake Volta. In 1994, the navy was reorganized into two commands, with the Eastern command headquartered at Tema, and the Western command at Sekondi. In 2007, the Ghana Navy included about 1214 personnel with four fast attack patrol boats as its capital ships.⁹¹

Recently, the service hosted the USS Fort McHenry, USS Doyle, the South African frigate SAS Mendi, and USS Emory with its four patrol crafts in a maritime interdiction sea exercise off the coast of Takoradi as part of the African Partnership Station initiative aimed at helping African nations increase maritime security.⁹² The USS Doyle and other vessels from the U.S. European Command were deployed to Ghana to improve maritime security and safety in West and Central Africa and to help strengthen regional partnerships.

4. Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)

The DR Congo Navy is organized into four commands: Matadi (coastal), Kinshasa (riverine), Kalemie (Lake Tanganyika), and Goma (Lake Kivu).⁹³ The navy has personnel strength of about 1,000 as of 2007, with eight patrol crafts. It also operates barges and small patrol crafts armed with machine guns. Experts describe the DR Congo marine forces as "in a state of near total disarray" and state that it neither conducts training nor has established standard operating procedures.⁹⁴

⁹¹ "Military of Ghana," Article online; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Ghana, Internet: accessed 15 February 2008.

⁹² "Two U.S. Navy Sailors Found Dead in Ghana," *CNN*, Article online; available from http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/01/01/ghana.sailors.dead/index.html?eref=rss_topstories, Internet: accessed 20 February 2008.

⁹³ Stephen Saunders, "DR Congo" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 162.

⁹⁴ "Military of Congo DR," Article online; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Congo_DR/Navy, Internet: accessed 15 February 2008.

5. Cameroonian Military

Cameroon has marine forces known as gendarmerie. They have bases in Yaoundé, Douala, Limbe, and Kribi with gunboats designed for internal water, territorial and up to EEZ operations.⁹⁵ Traditionally, Cameroon's military depend heavily on French defense capabilities to protect its major maritime security concerns.

6. Military of Equatorial Guinea

The Equatorial Guinea military was reorganized in 1979 giving birth to naval and gendarmerie forces to take care of the country's brown and internal waters security needs. The naval forces have about 200 service members; the strength of the gendarmerie is unknown.⁹⁶

In 1988, the United States donated a 68-foot patrol boat to the Navy for EEZ patrol. The U.S. military-to-military cooperation with the Equatorial naval forces has been dormant since 1997, the year of the last Joint Combined Exchange Training Exercise.⁹⁷ The government recently acquired some Ukrainian patrol boats and helicopter gun ships. The Equatoguineans rely on foreigners to operate and maintain their equipment as they are not sufficiently trained.⁹⁸

7. Gulf of Guinea Commission

The GoG Commission, a brainchild of Nigeria, was established to ensure peaceful exploration and exploitation of sub-regional resources among member states. The Commission, established by treaty, includes coastal states bordering the GoG from Nigeria to Angola including the island of Sao Tome and Principe. Its mandate is to promote peace and security as well as the economic, social, and environmental well-being of its members.

⁹⁵ Stephen Saunders, "Cameroonian Military" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 86.

⁹⁶ "Equatorial Guinea Military," Article online; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Equatorial_Guinea/Military, Internet: accessed 15 February 2008.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

The Commission is a major effort towards collective security which will reduce the likelihood of conflicts if concerted efforts are made to implement its mandate. Unfortunately, as of 2002, only Nigeria has ratified the Treaty. Similarly, it is on record that the technical sub-committee of the Commission has had several meetings resulting in the preparation of an action plan; however, neither the decisions of the sub-committee nor details of the plan are available for implementation.⁹⁹

8. Extra-Regional Powers

Given the large expanse of water to be secured and the inability of most member states to police beyond their territorial waters, the U.S. and other extra-regional powers are making concerted efforts to protect the maritime domain. The U.S. is working through its European Command (USEUCOM), whose area of responsibility includes all American forces operating in Europe, Africa, and parts of Central Asia. The Command observes that its greatest challenge is the cooperation and willingness of member states to see maritime security as a sub-regional problem that needs a collective approach.¹⁰⁰

The Command strategy is based on higher guidance that recognizes the need to protect international maritime commerce that provides conveyance for over 80 percent of the world's imports and exports. According to the strategy, the U.S., in cooperation with its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforcement capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels.¹⁰¹ The former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs, Charles Snyder, notes that improving Africa's capacity to monitor its maritime domain is part of U.S. strategy. He calls for a revival of the old African coastal security program which once helped African security forces protect their shores and marine resources. The

⁹⁹ Osita C. Eze and Rudolf Traub-Merz, "Interstate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Gulf of Guinea," in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*. International Conference Proceedings, Nigerian National War College, 2004, 73-86.

¹⁰⁰ Stanley A. Weiss, "Protecting the World's Economic Arteries," *International Herald Tribune*, (24 November 2005), 5.

¹⁰¹ The White House, "The National Strategy for Maritime Security," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2005).

program was revived by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs Division in 1985, but the program was discontinued for lack of funds in 1995.¹⁰² The program was of immense help while it lasted.

Similar to the old African coastal security program, the 1000-ship Navy concept developed by Vice Admiral John Morgan (USN) and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio (USN) in 2005 seek cooperation of sub-regional naval forces to relieve pressure on U.S. military operations overextended by deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Partnership with the sub-regional forces would help member states combat a myriad of maritime security challenges. This concept ideally suits the asset limited sub-regional naval forces.

As part of the partnership, U.S. naval forces visit sub-regional ports to discharge their peacetime diplomatic role. For example, in April 2006, the USS EMORY S. LAND visited Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Congo, and Angola. The visit included leadership development, natural disaster response, small boats drills, live fire exercises, amphibious raids, medical awareness and disease prevention. Similarly, USS GUNSTON HALL and USS SWIFT conducted sea exercises with some naval forces of the sub-region in 2005.¹⁰³

In addition to maintaining limited presence in the GoG sub-region, the U.S. supports a number of initiatives to enhance internal security capabilities. The programs are designed to improve antiterrorism efforts, counterinsurgency, small unit maneuver, and light infantry operations easily deployed to suppress religious, ethnic and sectarian strife. Other measures to improve security include sale and transfer of arms, military training, and the acquisition of basing rights.¹⁰⁴ Analysts argue that the sub-region's inability to safeguard the GoG sub-region led to American resolve to expand naval operations in Africa, resulting in the establishment of the African Regional Combatant Command (AFRICOM) in 2007.

¹⁰² Charles Snyder, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 13 April 2004.

¹⁰³ Rebekah Blowers, "Seabees Rebuild School, Makes Friends in Sao Tome," Article online; available from http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23186, Internet: accessed 13 April 2008.

¹⁰⁴ Klare, 299.

Just as the U.S. contributes to safeguarding the GoG maritime domain, so do France, UK (members of EU), and China. As noted above, the EU members support their former colonies with aid, military training, arms sales and transfer. China first became a major actor in the sub-region in the 1960s and 1970s when, in its ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union, it supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement, providing arms and military equipment to support the movement and after Angolan independence.¹⁰⁵

Finally, a number of conferences have been held to sensitize stakeholders to emerging security threats and the need for collective strategy. Spearheading these efforts is EUCOM, with conferences like the GoG Guard (GoG Maritime Security Conference) in October 2004. In July 2005, a conference on Gulf of Guinea Security was held in Washington, D.C., followed by another, in November 2006, on Maritime Safety and Security in Cotonou, Republic of Benin. The GoG Guard conference explored ways to assist member states in protecting natural resources and achieving long-term security and stability. The focus of such international conferences is to prevent sub-regional political, economic, and social issues from becoming regional stability problems that require international involvement.

9. ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

When the Liberian crisis erupted in the late 1980s, the Economic Community for West African States, under Nigerian leadership, established the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as an interventionist group. Its intervention in the crisis on 25 August 1990 marked an important turning point in the practice of peacekeeping by regional and sub-regional organizations.¹⁰⁶ Its importance lies in the fact that it reignited an old debate within Africa about continental capacity to respond to challenges to peace and stability.

The intervention was almost marred by the lack of clear cut guidelines, principles or rules of engagement for managing internal conflicts from the West African Heads of Government. The absence of guidelines affected both operational and tactical levels.

¹⁰⁵ Klare, 299.

¹⁰⁶ Comfort Ero, "ECOMOG: A Model for Africa?" in *Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium* (London: Center for Defense Studies, 2000), Monograph 46.

Among the reasons for the lack of clear cut guidelines were the differences in the interests of the contributing nations and disagreements on how the interventionist force should operate.

These problems notwithstanding, ECOMOG provided an answer to those who wanted Africans to find solutions to their own problems. The UN, U.S., Britain, and France saw ECOMOG as a model to be replicated throughout Africa and other troubled regions of the world.¹⁰⁷ This thesis believes that the spirit of ECOMOG can be reignited to create collective maritime security for the sub-region. With attention to lessons learned from the ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, collective maritime security in the GoG sub-region can be achieved.

G. SUMMARY

Most of the sub-regional countries cannot adequately secure their own brown and territorial waters. Securing their respective EEZ and beyond is another challenge entirely. Except for Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ghana, none have an articulated maritime defense strategy extending beyond territorial waters. Although Nigeria has a workable strategy, it also does not have the right mix of platforms to secure its roughly 84,000 square nautical miles of maritime domain. But increasing security threats to the huge investments made by oil prospecting companies within the GoG sub-region are real. The time for the sub-region to change its land-centric approach to security to accommodate collective maritime security is now.

It is instructive to note that the Indian Ocean Region recently overcame their historical mistrust enough to engage in basic collective maritime security cooperation and collaborations. By strengthening the GGC, making the details of its technical sub-committee action plan known, integrating it with the maritime security strategy, and drawing lessons from ECOMOG experiences, the sub-region will be better positioned to handle emerging security threats.

¹⁰⁷ Ero.

III. PROPOSED STRATEGY TO COUNTER EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Military strategy is the “art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure national policy objectives by the application or threats of force.”¹⁰⁸ The emerging security threats in the GoG sub-region are significant and the time to address the problems by formulating a collective maritime strategy is now. Led by Nigeria, member states of this sub-region need to muster the political will to properly fund their naval forces and to cooperate with each other and with other stakeholders to secure the sea areas critical to their economic future.

This chapter considers the formulation of a common collective maritime security strategy under the framework of ends, ways, means, and acceptable risk as the first and most important step towards the establishment of an effective strategy to deal with the emerging security threats (see Figure 7). This strategy spells out strategic objectives (ends), how they are to be achieved (ways), what resources are required to achieve them (means), and associated risk arising from mismatch of these variables. The effectiveness of this strategy will depend on the political will of the governments of the member states and the strengths of existing sub-regional institutions like the GGC. Therefore, the chapter considers the lessons of previous collective security efforts: the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau in the 1990s, and experiences of the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Northeast and Southeast Asia with similar security problems.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Towards an Understanding of Military Strategy, in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, edited by Joseph R. Ceremi and James F. Holcomb Jr. Article online; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub362.pdf>, Internet: accessed 2 January 2008.

¹⁰⁹ Duk-Ki Kim, “Cooperative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia,” *Naval War College Review* Vol. 52, 1 (Winter 1999): 57.




Figure 7. Strategic Framework

A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (ENDS)

In formulating this collective maritime security strategy, the interests of the member states of the sub-region are considered. In addition to understanding the security environment, efforts are made to identify strategic objectives and their requirements. The overarching strategic objective is to make the sub-regional maritime domain safe and investor friendly. The requirements to fulfill this objective are derived from emerging security threats. Strategic and operational challenges are considered and operational concepts developed with due regard to the resources available (means) to sub-regional naval forces. The sources of the strategic guidance are the Nigeria Navy Trident Strategic and defense-in-dept concepts (see Figure 8).




Figure 8. Collective Maritime Security Operational Concepts¹¹⁰

The strategic requirements are 1) preventing the maritime environment from being used by militants, criminals, terrorists, or hostile states to commit criminal acts, terror, or hostile acts against the people, economy, or property of member states, 2) developing the capabilities of member states to deal with emerging security threats by themselves, and 3) cooperating and collaborating with extra-regional powers and oil majors to transform the existing naval capabilities and improve their interoperability to meet the challenges of the changing maritime security environment.¹¹¹ The attainment of these strategic requirements is a function of the resources available to the naval forces.

B. NAVAL FORCES OF GULF OF GUINEA SUB-REGION (MEANS)

Securing the GoG maritime environment requires naval forces with the capacity to enforce sea control and sea denial using a balanced fleet, dockyards, merchant shipping and a well-articulated strategy. A cursory look at most member states' naval forces reveals a near absence of the minimum requirements to project sea power. Except for Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ghana, member states lack the appropriate mix of

¹¹⁰ Alan Lee Boyer, "Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment: Maritime Security in the Mediterranean," *Naval War College Review* Vol. 60 No. 3 (Summer 2007).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 73.

platforms, cannot police beyond their territorial or brown waters, and have no defined maritime or naval strategy. Since Nigeria currently has the most capable naval force in the sub-region, analysis of how the Nigerian Navy is organized to enforce its defense-in-depth and Trident Strategic concepts serves as a framework for considering the needs and resources of the sub-region as a whole.

1. Nigerian Navy

By virtue of its geographical endowments, large population, economic potential and military capabilities, Nigeria is perceived as a hegemon in the GoG sub-region. Huge economic investments, including the vast majority of foreign investments in the sub-region, require that Nigeria provide a leadership role in defending the maritime domain. Furthermore, by constitutional mandate, the NN must enforce the nation's strategy to protect Nigeria's national interests within its EEZ and beyond.

The NN command structure consists of the Naval Headquarters in Abuja, two operational commands with headquarters in Lagos and Calabar, one training command with headquarters in Lagos and training facilities located in most parts of Nigeria, and one logistic command with headquarters in Sapele. At the operational level, the NN has four operational bases (located in Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Calabar), one naval air wing located in Lagos, five Forward Operational Bases (FOBs) with two more to be brought online soon, two repair facilities located in Lagos and Port Harcourt, and two fleets based in Lagos and Calabar.¹¹²

Attempts were made by naval authorities to ensure that NN operational commands have a good mix of ships. The ships in the NN inventory include one MEKO 360 class frigate (NNS *ARADU*), two Vosper Mk 9 corvettes (NNS *ERINOMI* and *ENYIMIRI*), two modified Italian Lerici class coastal minesweepers (NNS *OHUE* and *BARAMA*), three French Combattante IIIB fast attack missile craft (NNS *SIRI*, *AYAM*, and *EKUN*), and three German Lurssen 57 Class fast attack missile craft (NNS *EKPE*, *AGU*, and *DAMISA*).¹¹³

¹¹² "Nigerian Navy," Article online; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Navy#Navy, Internet: accessed 24 March 2008.

¹¹³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005-2006), 393.

Other NN platforms include four River Town class vessels (NNS *HADEIJA*, *MAKURDI*, *BRASS*, and *YOLA*), and four Balsam ocean patrol craft (NNS *NWAMBA*, *OBULA*, *KYANWA*, and *OLOGBO*), 15 defender patrol boats, two landing ship tanks (NNS *AMBE* and *OFIOM*), one survey vessel (NNS *LANA*), four tugs boats (RIMA, MIRA, RUDOLF, and COMMANDER APAYI-JOE); two training ships (NNS *OBUMA* and *RUWAN YARO*); and several inshore patrol boats (IPCs) as well as JEDI Boats. The NN air wing has in its inventory two Westland Lynx Mk 89 Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopters and four *AGUSTA* A109E power utility helicopters.¹¹⁴

However, an in-depth analysis of NN combat assets indicates that these platforms are inadequate for effective and sustained maritime security surveillance of Nigeria's 84,000 square nautical mile (nm) EEZ, much less the entire sub-region. The platforms are ageing, with most of them in the services of member states navies for an average of 25 years. Furthermore, because these platforms were poorly maintained partly due to dwindling defense budgetary provisions thereby degrading platforms efficiency and performance. Under the present leadership, the Nigerian Navy has returned most of these vessels to sea despite reduced defense funding. These monumental efforts led to the Nigerian Navy's successful participation in 2005 *TRAFALGA* Centennial celebrations in the U.K. Similarly, most of the vessels participated in 2006 naval sea exercises involving most naval ships from across the African region. Unfortunately, these efforts will not be enough if the politicians, oil majors, and extra regional powers cannot muster the political will to adequately fund sub-region naval forces.

Because Nigeria's economic center of gravity lies within its EEZ, where most untapped offshore oil blocks are located, the EEZ and larger GoG sub-region require effective patrolling with more platforms than are currently available in the NN inventory. At this time, it is still less costly for Nigeria to refit NN platforms through aggressive alterations and additions rather than acquiring new ones. However, new acquisitions will further increase NN capabilities to mount a sustained presence at sea to provide strategic deterrence against emerging threats. Expanding NN capabilities would require the acquisition of dedicated platforms such as submarines, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs),

¹¹⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies.

additional frigates, underway replenishment ships (URS), more helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, adequate logistics support vessels, coastal radar stations and highly trained and motivated manpower. These additional platforms will form part of the critical components for the attainment of this study's strategic requirements.

2. Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin Republic

Côte d'Ivoire has a coastline of about 281 nm, territorial sea of 12 nm, and an EEZ of 200 nm.¹¹⁵ The country has a sea area of about 56,200 square nm to secure. To secure its maritime domain, the country's naval forces, the Marine Côte d'Ivoire, have four operating bases located in Abidjan, Sassandra, Tabou, and San-Pedro, with principal base and repair facilities in Abidjan. Its personnel strength is about 950 from all ranks, with 75 officers. Its platform inventory shows one Patra Class boat, 2 LCMs, 2 Rodman 890, and one tug boat.¹¹⁶

Ghana has a coastline of about 292 nm, territorial sea of 12 nm, and an EEZ of 200 nm.¹¹⁷ With coastline of about 292 nm and EEZ of 200 nm, Ghana has a sea area of about 58,400 square nm to secure. The Ghanaian navy is organized into two operational commands for policing their maritime environment. The commands are the Eastern Naval Command with headquarters in Tema, and the Western Naval Command headquartered in Sekondi. The naval force has personnel strength of about 1,214 from all ranks including 132 officers. There are four maritime patrol aircraft, four Lurssen class 57 and 45 FPBs as well as two Balsam Class patrol boats.¹¹⁸ Mounting sustained maritime security in this vast maritime domain is a daunting task for Ghanaian political and naval authorities.

Togo is one of the few countries where hydrocarbon deposits have not been found in large quantities. The country has a coastline of about 30 nm, territorial sea of 30 nm,

¹¹⁵ Stephen Saunders, "Côte d'Ivoire," in *Jane's Fighting Ships*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 165.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Stephen Saunders, "Ghanaian Navy," in *Jane's Fighting Ships*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 287.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

and an EEZ of 200 nm.¹¹⁹ With its EEZ of 200 nm, the country has a 6,000 square nm sea area to secure. It has one naval base, in Lome, and two coastal patrol craft. With only one naval base and two patrol craft, Togo cannot secure its 200 nm EEZ. Therefore, Togo is almost completely dependent upon cooperation with other member states for maritime security.

The Republic of Benin has a coastline of about 65 nm. It has claimed sea territory of 200 nm but has yet to claim an EEZ. Therefore, it has a 13,000 square nautical mile maritime environment to protect. The country has marine forces, known as Forces Navales with personnel strength of 220 from all ranks, including 30 officers.¹²⁰ The marine forces have two-Chinese 27-Meter Class (patrol craft) and one DO 128 reconnaissance aircraft.

3. Cameroon, DR Congo, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon

Cameroon has a coastline of about 217 nm and claims territorial seas of 50 nm. With the coastline of 217 nm, the country has to secure a sea area of about 10,850 square nm. Their marine forces have personnel strength of 1250 and their operating bases are located in Douala, Limbe, and Kribi.¹²¹ Platforms include one Bizerte Type PR 48, one coastal, one offshore patrol craft, two swift PBR Class (River patrol craft, two Rodman 101 (coastal patrol craft), four Rodman 46 Class, and two Yunnan Class Landing Craft Utility (LCU).

The DR Congo has a coastline of about 22 nm and territorial seas of 12 nm and therefore a sea area of about 264 square nautical miles to secure. Marine forces are organized into four commands: Matadi (coastal), Kinshasa (riverine), Kalemie (Lake Tanganyika), and Goma (Lake Kivu). Their navy has personnel strength of about 1,000 and a total of eight patrol crafts including one Shanghai II class (FAC).¹²²

¹¹⁹ Stephen Saunders, "Togolese Patrol Forces" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 791.

¹²⁰ Stephen Saunders, "Benin Forces Navales" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 59.

¹²¹ Stephen Saunders "Cameroon Marine Nationale Republique" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 86.

¹²² Stephen Saunders, "DR Congo Patrol Forces" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 162.

Angola has the longest stretch of coastline in the sub-region. Its coastline is about 864 nm and the country claims a territorial sea of 12 nm and an EEZ of 200 nm.¹²³ The country has a massive 172,800 square nautical mile maritime environment to secure. To defend this vast area, Angola has marine forces with personnel strength of about 890 whose operating bases are located in Luanda, Lobito and Namibe.¹²⁴ The platforms in their inventory are two Namacurra class inshore patrol craft. This country is one of the top oil exporting countries of the sub-region and has by far the largest maritime domain, yet it pays the least attention to the security of its maritime environment as evidenced by the miniscule resources allocated for maritime security. It is vital that Angola take the issue of its maritime domain security seriously. While trying to recover from two decades of civil war, Angola cannot afford to ignore emerging threats to its national security with oil prices at an all time high and rising. It is clearly in Angola's national interests to join with other member states to secure the sub-regional maritime domain.

Equatorial Guinea has coastline of about 160 nm, territorial seas of 12 nm, and claims an EEZ of 200 nm.¹²⁵ The country has a 32,000 square nautical mile sea area to secure. Marine forces have personnel strength of 120 of all ranks who operate from Malabo and Bata bases. The forces have three platforms: one Daphne class patrol boat, two ZHUK (GRIF) class, and two Kalkan M class patrol boats. The personnel and minimal platform inventory are grossly inadequate to secure 32,000 square nautical miles of sea area.

Finally, Gabon has a coastline of 292 nm, territorial seas of 12 nm, and an EEZ of 200 nm.¹²⁶ The country has a total of a 58,400 square nm sea area to secure and approximately 600 marine forces of all ranks, including 65 officers, who operate from Ports Gentil and Mayumba. The marine forces' platform inventory includes two P400

¹²³ Stephen Saunders, "Angola Marinha DE Guerra" in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 8.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Stephen Saunders, "Equatorial Guinea Patrol Forces," in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 263.

¹²⁶ Stephen Saunders, "Gabon Patrol Forces," in *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2008), 263.

patrol boats, one PATRA class FAC missile craft, two sea trucks (LCVP), one EMBRAER EMB III land based maritime aircraft, one Champlain class troop transport (LPA), and one landing craft utility (LCU).¹²⁷

C. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS (WAYS)

In assessing these countries based on their naval forces Order of Battle (ORBAT), it is obvious that most of the naval forces cannot mount effective and sustained policing within their respective territorial waters. The sub-region's long history of using a land-centric security approach with less emphasis on maritime security tends to compound this problem. By implication, if nothing is done to address the problem, these nations will all continue to lose major sources of revenue to criminals, terrorists and militants, thereby driving away genuine investors. To secure the future of the GoG sub-region an integrated operational concept to resolve these security challenges is needed.

1. Assessment

Separately, most of these nations have failed to demonstrate sufficient capacity to secure their respective maritime domains and create an investor friendly environment within which oil majors and extra-regional powers can operate and invest. Since the threats are real, the first priority is to put aside the issues that have divided them and cooperate. It is abundantly clear that no one country can go it alone. Since the maritime environment holds the key to the sub-regional economic survival, member states must not allow the political issues that have attempted to undermine ECOMOG operations in 1990s to impede their ability to address the security problems collectively. Following the example of cooperation in the Persian Gulf, South- and Northeast Asia, member states need to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements to pool their resources and strengths to shore up their respective deficiencies. They need to cooperate and collaborate with each other and also with oil majors and extra-regional powers currently investing huge sums of money in sub-regional oil exploration and exploitation.

¹²⁷ Saunders, "Gabon Patrol Forces."

In the Cold War era, cooperative security emerged from European principles of common security: to reduce the risk of war and pool resources to attack a common enemy. The concept was based on the assumption that unilateral security was not "fashionable" or effective because states were fast becoming economically, politically and militarily interdependent.¹²⁸

This recognized trend underscores the need for member states to consider cooperative security in the sub-regional maritime environment. The key advantage of common maritime security strategy, it has been argued, is that it will afford sub-region heads of government the commitment to muster the political will to fund their naval forces. With adequate funding, the navies will develop the capacity to check emerging security threats and demonstrate to extra-regional powers and oil majors the commitment of the sub-region to make the sea area investor friendly. In addition, it will lessen the need for extra-regional powers' involvement in sub-regional security.

2. The Gulf of Guinea Commission

The integrated collective maritime security strategy calls for strengthening the GoG Commission initiated by Nigeria and drawing lessons from past ECOMOG operations. The strategy would accommodate the sub-region's short, medium and long term maritime security needs. In addition to its mandate as spelled out in Article V, the Commission need to expand the section dealing with security to cover: 1) the prevention of the maritime environment from being used by militants, criminals, terrorists, or hostile states to commit criminal acts, terror, or hostile acts against member states, its people, economy, and property, 2) the development of sub-regional naval capabilities to deal with emerging security threats by themselves, 3) collaboration and cooperation with the extra-regional powers and oil majors to transform existing naval capabilities and improve their interoperability to meet the challenges of the changing maritime security domain, 4) the installation of coastal radars and surveillance systems across the entire sub-regional coastline and 5) collaborative funding as well as contributions of platforms and equipment.

¹²⁸ Kim, 55.

The installation of coastal radars and surveillance systems along the coastline would compliment the equipment inventory of the sub-regional naval forces in early detection and monitoring of the maritime domain. Nigeria has already established five FOBs at Ibaka, Bonny, Nguama, Ogindegbe and Igbokoda to enhance quick, flexible response and to improve reaction time of NN to illegal activities. The GGC need to further champion the development of FOBs across the sub-regional coastlines and encourage member states like Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, and Gabon to contribute platforms and equipment in order to cover the EEZ of less equipped member states.

Similarly, for short and medium term purposes, it is necessary for the Commission to embark on aggressive, comprehensive refitting of the equipment inventory. For long term purposes, new acquisitions are necessary. Such acquisitions need to include more FPBs, in- and off-shore PBs, MPAs, helicopters, auxiliary boats, and the development of more repair facilities. With good cooperation and collaboration, the Commission could seek the assistance of oil majors and extra-regional powers, as they do in the Persian Gulf, Southeast and Northeast Asia Region.

To facilitate the operations of the Commission and sub-region naval forces, the need to strengthen and adequately fund the GGC cannot be overemphasized. A situation like the present ECOWAS setup in which few member states honor their annual obligations will not help the Commission. Member states and all stakeholders in sub-regional natural resources exploration and exploitation will need to show commitment on issues affecting maritime security and dedicate a certain percentage of their annual net profits for that purpose. The financial contributions of stakeholders should be used by the Commission for comprehensive refitting of the sub-regional naval forces platform inventory and for new acquisitions. In addition, the Commission will be required to involve all private, public, government, oil majors and extra-regional powers in the interagency (IA) process. Carried out conscientiously, these actions will advance the sub-region's commitment to implementing the operational concepts.

3. The Way Ahead

The ability of the GGC to demonstrate to the extra-regional powers its capacity to secure the GoG maritime domain depends on its ability to fund and implement the operational concepts developed in this strategy. Once again, the threats are largely domestic and transnational in nature and can be effectively contained through the cooperation and collaboration of member states, other stakeholders, extra-regional actors, and the GGC. The challenge, therefore, is not just detecting and defeating terrorists, criminals and militants; but in maintaining good order within GoG maritime domain. In other words, the essential tasks for this strategy are to ensure free access to the maritime environment by all lawful actors and to prevent the illegal activities of militants, criminals and terrorists.

This operational concept recognizes the geo-strategic setting of the GoG sub-region. Strategic objectives and requirements are derived based on the security challenges posed by emerging threats within the GoG maritime domain. It focuses on the sub-regional naval forces having a visible presence in the maritime domain in order to detect and deter criminal activities and terrorism in the sea lanes and at the same time respond to a wide range of contingencies, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and search and rescue (SAR).¹²⁹ The concept intends to generate and facilitate cooperation, information sharing, capacity building and interoperability of the sub-regional naval forces.

The strategic concept employs a hybrid approach to the NN defense-in-depth and Trident Strategic concepts (see Figure 9). This concept consists of three levels or layers. Level one involves IA cooperation, collaboration, and integration; intelligence gathering and sharing; and creation of strong Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Level 2 involves the defense of territorial waters, including surveillance, early warning, anti-smuggling, anti-piracy operations, and anti-militant activities; the protection of oil installations; SAR; independent and joint exercises and operations; and policing up to 100 nautical miles seaward. Level 3 involves coordinated efforts aimed at defending the entire sub-regional maritime interests and protecting sea lanes of communications. This

¹²⁹ Boyer, 83.

level requires maintaining naval presence within the EEZ for monitoring, enforcing sea control and denial, and coordinating allied and combined exercises and operations; and also to support marine research and to prevent poaching, hazardous and toxic materials dumping, and terrorism.

Levels one and two are mandatory to all nations of the sub-region, and level three would be implemented by oil producing member states, oil majors and extra-regional powers. The GGC would set requirements for each level and enforce them accordingly. At each level, the forces would be required to preempt, detect, deter, and respond rapidly against all forms of criminal activities through visible presence and surveillance operations. They would be mandated to carry out vessel queries and compliant boarding. Vessel queries would be conducted by Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPAs), and reports of such queries would be forwarded to surface forces for necessary actions. In the same manner, during compliant boarding, if irregularities relating to illegal activities or terrorist acts are discovered, such information would be passed to law enforcement agents for further action at the vessel's next port of call.¹³⁰ Conducting these operations collectively will no doubt build solid cooperation and capacity among member states.



Figure 9. Integrated Collective Maritime Security Strategy

For information gathering and processing, the GGC would create central and sub-central information centers. Similarly, it would integrate all sources of information gathering, including locals and fishermen, fishing trawlers, merchant vessels, servicing boats, oil company information sources, MPAs and naval forces. Furthermore, the GGC

¹³⁰ Boyer, 83.

would create a sub-regional interagency network that links all elements, from sensors to operational forces, and to policymakers. Central to this process would be the establishment of a headquarters and joint information analysis center in Abuja. Intelligence derived from such information processing would be used to deploy naval forces as reaction units to check, take necessary actions, and provide real-time intelligence that could help maintain a proactive security posture.

As part of information gathering, the Commission needs to embrace the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Automatic Identification System (AIS), which the IMO requires ships to carry since 2000. The AIS is a shipboard broadcast system and a continuous autonomous transponder in the VHF band that allows ships to track, identify and exchange pertinent navigational information with each other and shore stations.¹³¹ This information can be graphically displayed on a computer or overlaid onto a radar or electronic chart display and information system; it would complement the efforts of coastal radar stations to monitor shipping traffic.

The GGC would be required to create strong and effective MDA within the sub-region as the fulcrum for success of this collective strategy. Maritime domain awareness is the thorough understanding of all entities associated with the maritime environment that could impact sub-regional security, safety, economy or environment.¹³² MDA creates an environment conducive for naval forces to take proactive actions against criminals and would guarantee an investor friendly maritime environment.

Finally, policymakers need to put the requisite legal authorities and instruments in place at national, sub-regional, and international levels to support this strategy. The immense opportunities offered by MDA will come to nothing if the strategy lacks legal authority or organizational structures needed to operate. Specifically, these legal instruments would enable naval forces to freely operate across jurisdictional boundaries without constant and continuous requests for permission.

¹³¹ Boyer, 87.

¹³² Ibid.

D. ACCEPTABLE RISK ASSESSMENT

In an integrated collective maritime security strategy, an acceptable risk assessment is necessary to determine the second and third order effects of partial or complete implementation of the strategy. To facilitate understanding of consequences of partial implementation of this security strategy, the probability of maritime security and the severity of such incidents must be analyzed. The consequences associated with such maritime security incidences can be determined based on an understanding of the maritime domain environment and its relationship to the sub-regional economy.

For instance, during the last quarter of 2006, the militant attack on Shell's 477,000 barrels per day oil terminal left the facility closed for more than two months.¹³³ Similarly, the effects of maritime boundary disputes, terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and environmental degradation on the sub-regional economy are enormous. The risk associated with the sub-region's present inability to effectively secure the maritime domain can be assessed as high, since the effects arising from current threats have significant security and economic consequences. This is because member states have been dealing with these problems unilaterally without adequate resources and in some cases without well-articulated strategy. In effect, there has been a mismatch in the individual countries' strategic objectives, concepts and resources. Since individual countries have been dealing with problems unilaterally, there are no common strategic objectives, concepts and resources to check the threats.

Although the intentions of potential threats are difficult to predict accurately, effective intelligence gathering and information sharing is important in assessing emerging maritime threats and could go a long way towards reducing the associated risks.¹³⁴ Continuous reassessment of the effectiveness of strategic actions with every practical means will help achieve a secured sub-regional maritime environment. Therefore, the need for all concerned to ensure full implementation of this strategy cannot be overemphasized.

¹³³ Ike Okonta, "MEND: Anatomy of a Peoples' Militia," *Pambazuka News*, 2 November 2006.

¹³⁴ Peter J. Winter, "The Role of the U.S. Navy in Support of the National Strategy for Maritime Security," *USAWC Strategy Research Project*, Article online; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil546.pdf>, Internet: accessed 25 April 2008, 7.

E. POLITICAL ISSUES

This study recognizes the growing concern regarding Nigeria's perceived hegemony among GoG member states. More so are political issues like the Francophone/Anglophone divide and different former colonial administrations that have over time tended to undermine previous collective security efforts ... specifically ECOMOG operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. Investigations revealed that these problems are not peculiar to the sub-region alone. Similar issues persisted in Europe during the Cold War era before policymakers realized that unilateral security was no longer fashionable as states were fast becoming economically, politically and militarily interdependent. This was also the situation in Northeast and Southeast Asia regions before they came together and developed bilateral and multilateral agreements that are today helping them to pool their resources together to shore up their deficiencies. Therefore, political leaders of member states need to come together, set aside their differences and make the issue of mutual security a common focus of their respective administrations. They need to cooperate and collaborate with each other and also with oil majors and extra-regional powers currently investing heavily in oil exploration and exploitation in the region.

To ameliorate the concerns of the smaller states regarding Nigeria's perceived hegemony in the GoG and to overcome political, cultural, and historical suspicions and misgivings across the sub-region, policymakers need to invest in building long term political, economic, and military relationships with one another. They need to leverage common security interests to lay the groundwork for negotiating mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral agreements. Furthermore, the level of military cooperation required to implement this proposed integrated maritime security strategy will require additional mutual military-to-military investments in communications, exchange programs, and combined doctrine, training, education, and exercises.

In addition, policymakers need to employ the political tools of process transparency and political oversight to nurture cooperation and collaboration while simultaneously protecting the minority rights and interests of the smaller member states in order to reduce the potential for larger members to take advantage of or abuse the

weaker states. In this context, international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission will play a vital role in nurturing cooperation and collaboration by providing a common framework from which member nations can fairly participate.

Finally, policymakers need to acknowledge the need to build the partnership capacity of many weaker member states by training, advising, and assisting their respective security forces to participate in this proposed integrated maritime security strategy. In this regard, the better resourced and more capable states will not only need to cooperate and collaborate regarding real-time maritime security operations but will also need to provide additional doctrine, training, personnel, and subject matter expertise resources to help build the capacity of the weaker states to secure their own territorial waters.

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V. CONCLUSION

The GoG sub-region has been in the news lately due to its large deposits of hydrocarbons, other mineral resources, fisheries and agricultural products. Interest in the sub-region is intensified by the ongoing Middle East crisis, instability in the Persian Gulf region and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Oil from the sub-region yields higher profits, does not have numerous transit chokepoints, offers ease of shipping and lower transportation costs, is mostly exploited from offshore locations, yields higher quality oil with low sulfur content and API gravity often close to 40°, and often comes with fewer environmental risks to stakeholders.

A. GOG SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY

Chapter II describes the geo-strategic and security environment of the GoG sub-region in detail, identifying its key strategic natural resources, important regional and extra-regional stakeholders, emerging maritime threats (piracy, boundary disputes, domestic poverty and unrest, poor governance), and limited or nonexistent maritime strategies to address these challenges in a volatile maritime environment. The strategic attributes of GoG sub-regional oil make it an important part of western energy calculations. The area hosts stiff international competition among industrialized nations seeking new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy. Extra-regional powers currently scrambling for oil from the GoG sub-region, including the U.S., some European countries, China, Japan, and India are making huge investments. At the same time, shipping activities have increased tremendously.

These huge investments and increased shipping activities have boosted the revenue profile of member states while simultaneously exposing the sub-region to security risks. There is growing concern that the vast resources and potential in the GoG sub-region are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and international threats and vulnerabilities that stem from political and socioeconomic problems including bad governance, corruption, lack of economic diversity, militant

youth activities, oil pipeline destructions, the illegal bunkering of petroleum products, oil terminals and flow stations disruptions, piracy, poaching, terrorism and environmental degradation.

B. GOG MARITIME STRATEGIES SUMMARY

To address these threats, Chapter III developed this proposed strategy to counter the emerging security challenges in the GoG sub-region under a framework of strategic analysis of ends (strategic objectives), means (available maritime security resources), and ways (maritime operational concepts). These threats challenge all sub-region member states' limited capacity for effective and sustained maritime security. The sub-region has a long history of land-centric security arrangements. In assessing sub-regional naval forces based on their ORBAT in relation to their vast maritime territories, the picture emerges of mostly relatively low capacity naval forces that can barely police their territorial waters, much less police beyond them. The inability of most of these forces to mount effective and sustained policing exposes the vulnerable sub-regional sea areas to criminal activities and exploitations. If nothing is done to resolve these issues, these nations will continue to lose their major source of revenue to criminals, terrorists and militants, driving away genuine investors because they cannot create an investor friendly environment for the oil majors and extra-regional powers. Since these threats are real, member states need to overcome divisive political issues, cooperate and collaborate, and make the sub-regional maritime domain safe by collectively implementing this proposed integrated maritime security strategy. They should also cooperate and collaborate with oil majors, other stakeholders and extra-regional powers investing heavily in sub-regional oil.

C. NEW STRATEGY JUSTIFICATION

Based upon the analysis in Chapter III, it is obvious that most member states lack resources and manpower to deal with emerging security threats within their respective brown and territorial waters. Member states continue to confront emerging threats unilaterally rather than bilaterally or multilaterally. Because none of the sub-region states have sufficient means to achieve maritime domain security, sub-regional political leaders

should make collective maritime security a central policy focus. Furthermore, political leaders should take a cue from the IOR leaders who recently overcame their historical mistrust enough to engage in basic collective maritime security cooperation and collaboration. By overcoming their differences, mustering enough political will, and pooling resources together, GoG leaders will convince extra-regional stakeholders to contribute to the implementation of this collective maritime security strategy. In the meantime, the efforts of the extra-regional powers to provide limited security, aid, training, and arms sales to deal with the myriad of security problems is highly commendable.

Nigeria must encourage member states to articulate maritime defense strategies extending beyond their own territorial waters and must work to strengthen the GGC, revealing details of its technical subcommittee action plan and integrating it with this proposal. In so doing, and in light of lessons learned from ECOMOG experience, the sub-region will be better positioned to handle emerging security threats.

D. PROPOSED INTEGRATED MARITIME COLLECTIVE STRATEGY

The proposed integrated maritime collective strategy aims to make the maritime domain safe and investor friendly under the framework of ends, means, ways, and acceptable risk. The strategic objectives are 1) to prevent the maritime environment from being used by militants, criminals, terrorists, or hostile states to commit criminal acts, terror, or hostile acts against other member states, its people, economy, and property; 2) to develop member states' capabilities to deal with emerging security threats by themselves; and 3) to collaborate with extra-regional powers and oil majors to transform existing naval capabilities and improve interoperability. Attainment of these objectives is a function of the political will of the member states' governments, the strength of the GGC, lessons drawn from ECOMOG operations, and cooperation, collaboration and commitment of oil majors and extra-regional powers.

The sources of strategic guidance are the NN Trident Strategic and defense-in-depth concepts. A hybrid approach to the strategic guidance is adopted, using three levels. Level one involves IA cooperation, collaboration, and integration; intelligence gathering and sharing; and strong MDA. Level two involves surveillance, early warning,

anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, and anti-militant activities; the protection of oil installations; SAR; independent and joint exercises and operations; and policing up to 100 nautical miles seaward. Level three involves coordinated efforts to defend the entire sub-region's maritime interests and protect sea lanes of communication, along with maintenance of naval presence within and beyond the EEZ.

Levels one and two is mandatory to all nations of the sub-region; level three would be left to the better resourced member states, oil majors and extra-regional powers to implement. The GGC would set and enforce requirements for each level. In each level, maritime forces would be required to preempt, detect, deter, and respond rapidly against all criminal activities through visible presence and surveillance operations. They would be mandated to conduct vessel queries and compliant boarding. Collective operations will build solid cooperation, capacity, and trust among member states.

E. POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH

As indicated in Chapter I, very little literature is available on GoG maritime security. Although this thesis fills part of the gap in the literature, the arena of GoG maritime security and protection is still a virgin territory and deserves more research. One purpose of this thesis is to explore how GoG member states should develop their maritime defense capability. However, the more important purpose is to provide a methodology to identify and ask the right questions about military strategy and to glean the answers from the limited experience of successful maritime strategies in this particular sub-region. This thesis assesses maritime strategy through the lens of ends, ways, and means, using lessons learned from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions to tease out some doctrinal truths. Future research on similar maritime security challenges and strategies in other resource-rich regions, such as Central and South America, may provide useful insights for developing options and refining GoG maritime security strategies. Future research is also necessary to examine the extent to which ineffective government policies, bad governance, and political corruption have provided the expanded political opportunities for security threats to emerge.

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