Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs: Executive Summary
Abstract
This report summarizes the findings of a study of the motivations and intentions of potential criminal adversaries of U.S. nuclear programs and facilities. The study was based on two premises. The first is that if one understands motivations, one can infer the actions and targets that an adversary is likely to prefer. The second is that given such inferences, and linking them to information about the material and operational capabilities of various types of adversaries, those responsible for nuclear security will be better able to assess the potential threat to nuclear programs and to devise more effective systems for deterring and defending against nuclear crimes. The authors use the term "nuclear programs and facilities" in its broadest sense, to include weapon fabrication facilities, civilian nuclear energy facilities, facilities in the fuel cycle, nuclear research facilities, facilities that fabricate fuel for naval reactors, and all related transport of nuclear material. The term "nuclear crime" refers to a malevolent criminal action against a nuclear target or involving nuclear material or weapons. The authors are most concerned with crimes that may cause significant damage or disruption, and especially with those crimes that may directly or indirectly imperil public safety. They include among these attack, seizure, or sabotage of a nuclear facility; threats against nuclear facility personnel or their kidnapping or assassination; theft or diversion of nuclear material; release of radioactive materials; theft or detonation of a nuclear weapon; construction of an improvised nuclear device; and extortion involving nuclear materials or weapons. The remainder of this section describes the study's approach to the problem and offers a simple typology of motivations. Section II presents a matrix that links specific motivations with the actions they might inspire and flags types of actions that have already occurred. Section III reviews the study's major conclusions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1980
- Accession Number
- ADA483789
Entities
People
- Brian Jenkins
- David Ronfeldt
- Gail Bass
- Geraldine Petty
- Joseph Krofcheck
- Konrad Kellen
- Robert Reinstedt
Organizations
- RAND Corporation