

A RAND NOTE

PUERTO RICAN TERRORISTS: A POSSIBLE
THREAT TO U.S. ENERGY INSTALLATIONS?

William Sater

October 1981

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Prepared For

The Sandia Laboratories

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PREFACE

This Note is one in a series of publications produced by The Rand Corporation as part of a broad study of potential threats to U.S. nuclear programs. The research is sponsored by Sandia Laboratories.

Previous publications in the series include Konrad Kellen, Terrorists--What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions, N-1300-SL, November 1979, and David Ronfeldt and William Sater, The Mindsets of High-Technology Terrorists: Future Implications from an Historical Analog, N-1610-SL, March 1981.

SUMMARY

The United States has had its fair share of terrorist incidents, but surprisingly few have been grave, compared to incidents in other parts of the world. The exceptions have been attacks by Puerto Rican terrorists who have been active in this country for more than three decades. These terrorists attained nationwide--and worldwide--notoriety in 1950, when they attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman. Four years later, in 1954, they followed with an armed assault in the U.S. House of Representatives, wounding five congressmen. Since then, Puerto Rican terrorists have gone through various phases of activity.

Who are these Puerto Rican terrorists? How numerous are they and what resources do they command? What are their political or other aims? What are their targets? This Note attempts to answer these questions, using information from the available open literature (primarily newspaper and journal articles) and interviews with law-enforcement officials.

By far the best known of the Puerto Rican terrorist groups is the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional). As the name indicates, the overall declared aim of the group is Puerto Rican independence or separate nationhood, an aim that, curiously enough, is shared by less than 10 percent of the Puerto Rican population; that population, according to recent elections, favors either the status quo or the incorporation of their island into the United States as the fifty-first state. The FALN itself is the result of the 1974 merger of two movements, the Comandos Armados de Liberacion (Armed Commandos of Liberation) and the

Movimiento de Independencia Revolucionario en Armas (Armed Independence Revolutionary Movement).

Seven other Puerto Rican terrorist groups have also been identified. These groups and the FALN have carried out attacks in the United States and in Puerto Rico on various targets such as banks, FBI offices, and military installations. Their most deadly attack to date occurred in 1975, when they bombed the Fraunces Tavern in New York, killing four people and injuring sixty-three others. The Fraunces Tavern is located in New York's financial district, and the attack may thus have had additional symbolic significance.

The FALN and other Puerto Rican terrorist organizations are of particular interest, especially to the energy industry, for two reasons: First, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have struck energy facilities on their own island. Second, and more ominously, the FALN made a threat against nuclear targets in the United States during the seizure of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota, Colombia, in March 1980. The FALN and two Latin American terrorist groups issued a joint communique warning the United States that "you must remember ... that you have never experienced war in your vitals and that you have many nuclear reactors." [1]

This particular statement provided the primary impetus for the initiation of the research described in this Note. The major findings are summarized as follows:

- o Attacks in Puerto Rico have generally been directed at U.S. military installations and personnel, whereas most attacks in

[1] Latin, Buenos Aires, March 21, 1980.

the United States have been against office buildings, banks, and other commercial establishments.

- o The number of attacks on the U.S. mainland has been declining, while in Puerto Rico, incidents have increased. It may be that the terrorists consider an attack on U.S. military installations in Puerto Rico to be equivalent to an attack on and in the United States.
- o Puerto Rican terrorists, although verbally committed to Marxist-Leninist lines, seem more devoted to Puerto Rican separatism than to socialism.
- o The political situation in Puerto Rico is such that no democratically determined political solution seems likely to bring about total independence in the foreseeable future, and nothing less will placate the terrorists. Thus, terrorism is likely to continue to be a threat.
- o Although the tactics and weapons of Puerto Rican terrorists have been rather primitive and no evidence exists as yet to indicate that they have the capability of successfully attacking a nuclear installation, their threats against the nuclear industry must be taken seriously.

Puerto Rican terrorists, like other terrorist groups, are bent on attaining publicity. Thus, an attack on a nuclear installation, even if not particularly destructive, would be potentially very profitable for them. The selection of nuclear installations as the target for the threat in their Bogota communique therefore cannot be regarded as accidental.

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I. INTRODUCTION

For over two decades, Puerto Rican terrorists--all of whom are separatists, favoring Puerto Rican independence--have waged a sporadic, but persistent campaign of terror against U.S. domination of their island. They have conducted this war of "national liberation" both on the U.S. mainland and, to a lesser degree, in Puerto Rico itself. The attacks in the continental United States obtained publicity for their cause that they could not have hoped to achieve had they confined their terrorist operations to Puerto Rico. The most notorious attacks were an assassination attempt on President Truman in 1950 and an attack in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1954, in which five congressmen were wounded.

The most prominent Puerto Rican terrorist group operating in the United States in recent years is the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, or Armed Forces for National Liberation). The FALN emerged as a distinct entity in 1974, after about twenty years of relative inaction on the part of Puerto Rican separatists, following the 1954 assault on the U.S. Congress. Most FALN actions have consisted of bombings of banks and corporate headquarters in New York and Chicago, but in 1980 the organization threatened to attack a different sort of target: During the seizure of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota, the FALN and two Latin American terrorist groups issued a joint communique warning the United States that "you must remember ... that you have never experienced war in your vitals and that you have many nuclear reactors." [1] This threat against U.S. nuclear reactors attracted the attention of those

[1] Latin, Buenos Aires, March 21, 1980.

charged with the security of U.S. nuclear programs. Earlier, in 1975, a Puerto Rican separatist group--presumed to be the FALN--had threatened to detonate 100 bombs, 25 of which were to have contained radioactive material. This threat was assessed to be a hoax.[2] Four years later, a person or persons claiming to be members of the FALN warned that they would blow up New York's Indian Point nuclear plant. Again, nothing happened.[3]

There is no indication at present that the FALN or any other Puerto Rican terrorists have either the capability to mount a successful attack on a nuclear facility or the knowledge and means to assemble their own nuclear device. But given their demonstrated ability to operate in the United States and their continued striving for publicity, such threats may have to be taken seriously. The terrorists certainly have the conventional weapons to attack a nuclear installation, though they may not be able to actually seize or destroy one.

[2] Information obtained May 18, 1978, from the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security, through the Freedom of Information Act.

[3] "Puerto Rico, The Flame of Resistance," New York Times, September 12, 1979.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Puerto Rico became a U.S. possession in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. The new colony submitted to U.S. rule and accepted a series of governors appointed by Washington. Although some sentiments for independence always existed among a minority of the islanders, there has never been a strong, popular separatist movement in Puerto Rico.

With the founding of the Nationalist Party in the 1920s and the assumption of its leadership by Pedro Albizu Campos, nationalist sentiments began to acquire some focus and direction. Albizu believed that Puerto Rico should not be dominated by the United States or "polluted" by its alien culture. He attacked U.S. imperialism and the "exploitation of the island by U.S. business interests." Even so, in the 1932 general election, his Nationalist Party won only 2 percent of the vote. Its failure to attract widespread support was partly the result of successful efforts by insular officials to curb the separatists, but it also reflected the belief held by influential Puerto Ricans that independence would destroy the island's fragile economy. Various measures which proposed granting the island freedom were introduced in the U.S. Senate both before and during World War II, but they were opposed by these influential Puerto Ricans.

The economic ascent that began during the New Deal and continued throughout World War II further deprived the separatists of popular support. Nevertheless, in 1950 they launched a small uprising. The uprising was quickly suppressed, but separatist sentiment was not

eliminated. Later that same year, two Puerto Rican separatists attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman, and in 1954 four armed Puerto Ricans sprayed the U.S. House of Representatives with gunfire. A plot to murder the governor of Puerto Rico was subsequently uncovered. Albizu was implicated in these plans and was sentenced to prison, leaving the nationalist movement without its charismatic leader. An intensive police crackdown was launched on the independistas, and separatist violence abated.

Meanwhile, Puerto Ricans had voted in 1952 to become a commonwealth. Under this new arrangement, the island retained its ties with the United States, and thereby continued to enjoy the economic benefits produced by the relationship while acquiring increased control over some aspects of its political and economic life. A combination of economic programs, including Operation Bootstrap, and extensive emigration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland helped the island's economy during the 1960s and 1970s, but by the mid-1970s, the economic boom had slowed. Construction started to taper off, tourism decreased, and as the U.S. economy weakened, many Puerto Ricans returned home. The world crisis of 1974 and 1975 further hurt the island's economy, which was heavily dependent on imported oil.

Puerto Rico is beset by high inflation and suffers from the unemployment that began a decade ago. The precarious state of its economy had continued to cloud its political scene. Parties advocating independence habitually receive no more than 6 percent of the total vote cast. The remainder is almost evenly divided between those favoring statehood in the United States and those preferring retention and expansion of

Puerto Rico's commonwealth status. Therefore, many of those who demand independence seem to think that their goal can be obtained only by violence.

III. THE TERRORISTS

The most active Puerto Rican terrorist organization in the United States, the FALN, was formed in 1974 through the merger of the Comandos Armados de Liberacion (Armed Commandos of Liberation) and the Movimiento de Independencia Revolucionario en Armas (Armed Independence Revolutionary Movement). Both of these groups had been active between 1969 and 1971, primarily attacking American businesses based in Puerto Rico. Their members believed that independence was attainable only by armed struggle. Their purpose was to undermine "the imperialist power base on the island [and] to hasten a crisis which would shake the foundation of the Puerto Rican colonial world and enable the struggle to move on to the offensive and toward victory." [1] Concerted police efforts eventually destroyed both groups, but the surviving members formed a successor group called the Fuerza Unida Revolucionaria Pro Independencia Armada (United Force for Armed Independence), which later became the FALN.

The FALN's first operation was the fire-bombing of five New York City banks on October 26, 1974. Subsequent symbolic bombings--operations that caused no loss of life but were designed to cause extensive damage and thus attract attention--were directed against entities that the terrorists perceived as representing U.S. capitalism and imperialism. The violence of the attacks then increased, as a New York City policeman was lured into a booby-trapped apartment in East Harlem and was severely injured by a bomb explosion.

[1] Juan Angel Silen, "We, the Puerto Rican People," The Monthly Press Review, New York, 1971, p. 127.

The FALN struck next in Puerto Rico, bombing two branches of the Chase Manhattan Bank and a power station transformer.

Back on the U.S. mainland, the FALN mounted an operation in early 1975 that was designed to kill and injure as well as to destroy. On January 25, they bombed the Fraunces Tavern, near Wall Street in downtown Manhattan. The bomb exploded during the lunch hour, killing four persons and injuring sixty-three others. This operation was ostensibly mounted in retaliation for an alleged CIA attack on an independista meeting. However, the quest for publicity was undoubtedly an equally strong motive.

Attacks were subsequently resumed on symbolic targets, but they now spread to Chicago, and the targets included department stores, hotels, government offices, and military installations as well as banks and businesses. In all, 120 bombings have been attributed to the FALN since 1974.[2]

Prior to 1981, the only other Puerto Rican terrorist organization that had attacked targets on the U.S. mainland was CRIA (Comandos Revolucionarios Independientes Armados, or Independent Armed Revolutionary Commandos). CRIA is believed to have been responsible for 20 bombing attacks between 1977 and 1978. Their targets included the FBI's offices in New York City and Newark, New Jersey, and a number of Puerto Rican banks and economic aid offices based in New York. These attacks caused no loss of life but did considerable damage. There is no ready explanation for CRIA's sudden emergence and disappearance; it may simply have been a faction of the FALN operating under an assumed name.

[2] Risks International, Inc., Executive Risk Assessment, February 1981, p. 1.

Several other terrorist groups dedicated to Puerto Rico's independence are presently active on the island. To date, they have not turned their attention to targets on the U.S. mainland. These groups include FARP (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Popular, or Armed Forces of Popular Resistance); CRP (Comando Revolucionario del Pueblo, or People's Revolutionary Commandos); COPAAN (Comite Patriotico Anti-Anexionista, or Patriotic Anti-Annexation Committee); MAP (Movimiento de Accion Revolucionario, or Armed Revolutionary Movement); OVRP (Organizacion de Voluntarios de la Revolucion Puertorriquena, or Organization of Volunteers of the Revolution of Puerto Rico); and the Macheteros.

The Macheteros are the most active and dangerous of these groups. They surfaced in August 1978, claiming responsibility for the shooting of a policeman on an isolated Puerto Rican beach. In October 1979, they joined with several other pro-independence terrorist groups in the bombing of six government office buildings and military installations in Chicago and Puerto Rico. Two months later, the Macheteros combined forces with the OVRP and FARP to ambush a U.S. Navy bus near the Sabana Seca naval base in Puerto Rico, in retaliation for the death of a jailed Puerto Rican terrorist who hanged himself. Two American sailors were killed in the ambush and ten were wounded. In March 1980, the Macheteros again attacked military personnel, attempting to assassinate two American Army officers and an American sergeant attached to the University of Puerto Rico's ROTC program. In January 1981, the Macheteros scored their biggest coup, destroying nine jet fighter planes at Puerto Rico's Muniz Air National Guard Base. Using simple pipe

bombs, the terrorists caused damage estimated at between \$30 million and \$40 million in just 9 minutes. They explained their action as a protest against U.S. military intervention in Latin America and affirmed their solidarity with other revolutionary groups in that region.

MINDSETS AND IDEOLOGY

The Puerto Rican separatist movement is not monolithic but consists of a variety of factions which will, if necessary, cooperate with each other. The only common thread is the demand for independence. In this sense, the terrorists are isolated from the mainstream of Puerto Rican politics, but the lack of popular support does not seem to diminish their zeal.

Clearly, Puerto Rican terrorism attracts attention to the separatist movement. The more the independistas can destroy or disrupt, the more they can demonstrate the power of their cause. Other groups which also began as terrorists and eventually led their nations to independence, such as the FLN in Algeria, have set examples for them to follow. The independistas may believe that prolonged resistance to the status quo will increase the chance of international support for their cause and will convince the United States that granting independence is preferable to continued acts of destruction. The separatists may also believe that violence creates the setting essential to the process of nation-building. The Puerto Rican terrorists are similar to the Palestinians in this regard; they seem convinced that the actual process of the struggle they are waging creates a national identity for them. Thus, they may believe that acts of destruction enhance their movement's

visibility, demonstrate their effectiveness, and create a climate of local and international support for their cause.

MODUS OPERANDI

Puerto Rican terrorists have generally attacked undefended or lightly defended targets. Although fanatical and seemingly unrealistic in their campaign to secure Puerto Rico's independence, the terrorists are not careless about their own safety. They generally prefer stealth and escape to armed confrontation and possible death or capture. Their preferred weapon has been the pipe bomb, which enables them to attack without warning and to use timers so that they can withdraw long before an actual explosion. When surrounded by superior numbers of police, as eleven FALN members were in 1980, they will surrender rather than initiate a gun battle.

Their most sophisticated bombs consist of dynamite packed in an ordinary lead pipe and attached to a fuse and timer, sometimes attached to a tank of propane gas. Such devices are easy to construct, simple to detonate, and very destructive. Thus simplicity by no means inhibits effectiveness.

Puerto Rican terrorists' assassination operations have been similarly uncomplicated. Although U.S. military personnel have recently become the focus of their attacks, they have traditionally sought unarmed targets who could be ambushed without difficulty and taken with minimal resistance. The combined Macheteros, OVRP, and FARP attack on unarmed sailors in an isolated part of the Sabana Seca naval base is an example, as were the plots to assassinate three ROTC personnel at the

University of Puerto Rico and the attempted assassination of an Army recruiter in Waukegan, Illinois. In none of these incidents did the terrorists use anything more sophisticated than light automatic or semi-automatic weapons. To date, they have not employed RPGs, heat-seeking missiles, or other advanced weaponry.

The simplicity of the terrorists' weapons is undoubtedly one of their greatest strengths. They do not have to rely on external patrons for sophisticated arms and training, and they are able to obtain maximum effect with limited resources because of their mobility and the advantage of surprise.

TARGETING

Puerto Rican terrorists have attacked three types of targets: private property, government facilities, and individuals. While attacks in all three categories have increased since 1974 (see Figs. 1 and 2), violence against persons has almost doubled. Historically, the independistas have tended not to strike at individuals. Indeed, given the number of bombings, very few people have died. The deaths that have occurred have been deliberate, not the accidental consequences of bombings; most have been carried out in retaliation for what the terrorists believe is violence against jailed separatists. As more independistas are incarcerated, there is an increasing risk that they may suffer injuries which, in turn, could precipitate the assassination of government officials or military personnel. This possibility would be particularly strong if jailed FALN members were to initiate hunger strikes like those undertaken by IRA members in Northern Ireland.




Fig. 1 — Attacks on private property




Fig. 2 — Attacks on government property or persons

Puerto Rican independistas have recently attacked energy facilities both in the United States and in Puerto Rico. These facilities have primarily been buildings belonging to large oil companies. While costly and sometimes deadly, the incidents have not been intended to disrupt energy production. A bomb did, however, disrupt the oil refining operations of one facility in Puerto Rico in 1974.

The island's electrical company has suffered extensive damage, particularly in 1977 and 1978, during a labor dispute when transmission lines and the grid system were attacked. Officials also discovered an explosive device at a Consolidated Edison facility in Larchmont, New York, which was apparently placed there as an act of solidarity with the striking electrical workers of Puerto Rico.

Actions against nuclear power or research facilities in the United States would not appear improbable. Such actions might take the form of mere threats, but they would still increase public awareness of the existence of the Puerto Rican separatist cause. The publicity potential of such an operation could be sufficiently tempting to cause Puerto Rican terrorists to launch something like a standoff attack on a nuclear installation in the United States.

TIES WITH CHICANO EXTREMISTS

The Puerto Rican independence movement has tried to establish connections with other dissident groups within the United States. The independistas have courted the Chicano movement, as both share a common culture and language and also a history of "exploitation at the hands of

the American imperialists." Some Puerto Rican activists even favor creating a united front of Chicanos, blacks, and native Americans. Such a movement, they seem to think, would be a powerful economic force which would support the independence movement and could paralyze the American economy.

A limited coalition of Puerto Ricans and Chicanos already exists. In June 1977, Puerto Rican activists and Chicanos combined to create the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN), an umbrella organization stressing the shared interests and shared history and intended to direct revolutionary activities. The MLN compares the American Southwest to Puerto Rico, and both are considered as having been incorporated into the United States not by choice but by imperialism. Speeches by MLN leaders deal with solidarity and honor the heroes of both areas, supporting the goals of both groups.[3]

An example of possible cooperation between Puerto Rican and Chicano extremists was the undercover presence of alleged FALN members in the Episcopal Church's National Commission on Hispanic Affairs. The federal government investigated various individuals belonging to the Commission, claiming that they had ties to the FALN. These investigations did not always result in indictments, partly because some of those subpoenaed preferred to go to jail for contempt rather than respond to the Grand Jury inquiries. Attorneys for two women associated with the Commission who served jail terms for contempt argued that the women were acting as lay ministers and could not violate confidentiality. They were questioned about the bombing of the Fraunces Tavern and the whereabouts of a

[3] MLN, Discussion Documents #3 and #5.

FALN leader sought in the investigation. A judge who released the women after a 10-month silence stated that "all that has been shown is that the [fugitive being sought] was a one-time member of the Commission" and that the two women "may have talked to him and may have had some knowledge of his whereabouts." [4]

However, one fact clearly emerges: The elements favoring a violent road to Puerto Rican independence have expanded beyond the ethnic enclaves of New York and Chicago. Authorities stated that dynamite discovered in the Chicago apartment of a suspected FALN member had been traced to a Colorado construction site. And explosives used in FALN bombings in New York and Chicago appear to have been stolen from a dam site near Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico, a center of Chicano political activity.

Radical groups that are not tied to one specific ethnic or radical element are also supporting the cause of the independistas. The Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, a Marxist-Leninist group affiliated with the Weather Underground, for example, recently stated its support of eleven FALN members arrested in Evanston, Illinois, in April 1980 and "the strategy of the people's war they represent." [5]

Thus, the Puerto Rican movement may now be able to draw upon the resources and skills of other elements. The independistas have a

[4] "Three Year Inquiry Threads Together Evidence of F.A.L.N. Terror," New York Times, April 17, 1977; "Dud Bombs Discovered in Midtown in Building Targeted by F.A.L.N.," New York Times, August 9, 1977; "Release of 2 Women Held in F.A.L.N. Inquiry Urged," New York Times, December 6, 1977; "2 Women Freed After 10-Month Silence in Bomb Case," New York Times, January 25, 1978.

[5] "Solidarity with the Eleven Puerto Rican Prisoners of War," Breakthrough, The Political Journal of the Prairie Organizing Committee, Vol. V, No.1, Spring 1981.

nationwide network which should permit them to follow their plans more easily, particularly in the Southwest, where their targets could include nuclear facilities.

IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY

During the past decade, Puerto Rican terrorists have demonstrated the ability to bring their "war of national liberation" to the continental United States. Since nearly 40 percent of all Puerto Ricans live on the U.S. mainland, the terrorists have ample means of concealment, support, and escape. Moreover, the connections established between the Puerto Rican extremists and various Chicano and radical left groups have further extended the terrorists' operational capacity. Therefore, we must expect continued attacks on U.S. commercial businesses, banks, department stores, hotels, government buildings, military installations, business and political elites, military personnel, and perhaps even nuclear installations. Campaigns may be waged to apply greater pressure on the United States to accord imprisoned Puerto Rican terrorists prisoner-of-war status. In addition, hunger strikes like those staged by IRA prisoners in Northern Ireland might be initiated. Apparently, the FALN has also contemplated kidnapping President Reagan's son Ronald or some high-ranking government official, intending to use a hostage as a bargaining chip for the release of the eleven jailed FALN members. Kidnapping and hostage-bartering may emerge as a mode of operation in the future.

Puerto Rican terrorists have recently begun to attack U.S. military personnel and installations in both the continental United States and Puerto Rico. The military has become a favorite symbolic target of the terrorists because it is the most obvious manifestation of the U.S. occupation of the island. As Juan Antonio Corretjer, a socialist and

advocate of independence, explained to the New York Times:

People call them terrorists But terrorists want to terrify a society. These groups have not directed themselves to terrifying the people, but to striking blows against the armed forces of the U.S.

There is an evident intensification to show the international community that Puerto Rico is a country occupied militarily by the U.S.[1]

The February 1981 issue of Executive Risk Assessment reported that "the U.S. Army is gravely concerned about increasing FALN threats against Puerto Rican members of the armed forces." During that month, a series of bomb threats were telephoned to Army recruiting stations in New York, New Haven, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Canton, Ohio, by a group purporting to be the FALN. A number of death threats were also made against Army recruiters. One recruiter, a Puerto Rican, barely escaped assassination in Waukegan, Illinois, by persons presumed to belong to the FALN.[2]

The FALN has recently begun to issue threats against business and political leaders. On April 8, 1980, police discovered a list of the names of some 100 American business executives in a vacant Jersey City apartment believed to have been a safehouse for one of the FALN members arrested in Evanston, Illinois, on April 4, 1980. Kidnappings of such men may well be planned for the future. Indeed, terrorist assaults in the United States are likely to continue, and they may increase, as a response to perceived American intervention in Central America, the

[1] "Armed Puerto Rican Groups Focus Attacks on Military," New York Times, January 15, 1981.

[2] Risks International, Inc., Executive Risk Assessment, February 1981, p. 2.

continued military presence in Puerto Rico, and the unfulfilled demand for prisoner-of-war status for jailed Puerto Rican terrorists.

Violence has increased dramatically since 1974 and has shifted increasingly from the U.S. mainland to the island (see Apps. A through D). But the decline in activity in the United States appears to be a temporary phenomenon due, perhaps, to the capture of the eleven FALN members in April 1980. As new cadres appear, we should see a resurgence of FALN terrorism in the United States. The first wave of these new cadres may already be active. In May 1981, a group calling itself the Puerto Rican Armed Resistance claimed credit for placing five bombs at various locations in New York City during a four-day period. One of these bombs killed a man at Kennedy Airport. Some officials believe that the group is an offshoot of the FALN.[3]

[3] These New York bombings are not included in the statistics presented in the appendixes.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Puerto Rican terrorists have been active in the United States and Puerto Rico for more than two decades. Because of the island's political status, it is likely that separatist violence will continue. The only solution that would satisfy the terrorists is independence, a condition that is not likely to be attained, if only because less than 10 percent of Puerto Ricans seem to favor it. Despite the lack of popular support, the terrorists apparently remain committed to their campaign. As their frustration grows, their determination to secure independence by violent means, or at least to gain publicity, may well increase--and be translated into more frequent operations against more spectacular targets.

The Puerto Rican terrorists' techniques and methods of assault thus far are not particularly sophisticated, but they are effective and sometimes deadly. If the terrorists were to turn to attacks on nuclear facilities, their determination and modus operandi could make them a serious threat.

Appendix A

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY
BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	9 Feb. 1970	NY	MIRA	Attempted bombing of GE Building
2.	16 Mar. 1970	PR	UK	Bomb explosion outside of Kresge Store
3.	20 Mar. 1971	NY	MIRA (?)	Bomb Altman's Dept. Store
4.	20 May 1972	PR	CAL	Bombing of a hotel housing a political delegation
5.	26 Dec. 1972	NY	UK	Bombing of Bonwit Tellers
6.	26 Dec. 1972	NY	UK	Bombing of Gimbel's
7.	26 Dec. 1972	NY	UK	Bombing of Bergdorf Goodman
8.	16 Feb. 1973	NY	MIRA (?)	Discovery of an incendiary device at Alexander's Department Store
9.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Bombs explode at: Marine Midland Bank
10.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Offices of Exxon and Chemical Bank
11.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Rockefeller Plaza, home of Banco de Ponce
12.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Lever Brothers House
13.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Union Carbide
14.	11 Dec. 1974	NY	FALN	Bombing of an apartment house
15.	1 Dec. 1974	PR		Bombing of Burger King (may be strike involved)
16.	1 Dec. 1974	PR		Bombing of ITT Building
17.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bombing of Chase Manhattan Bank Branch
18.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bombing of Chase Manhattan Bank Branch
19.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bomb Power Transformer
20.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bomb found unexploded
21.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bomb found unexploded

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
22.	24 Jan. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of Fraunces Tavern four killed
				Bombing of:
23.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	N.Y. Life Insurance Bldg.
24.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Metropolitan Life Insurance Building
25.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Bankers Trust
26.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	American Bank and Trust
27.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Blimpies Sandwich Shop
28.	23 May 1975	PR		Bombing of bank
29.	23 May 1975	PR		Bombing of bank
30.	23 May 1975	PR		Bombing of McDonald's Hamburger Stand
				Bombing of:
31.	14 Jun. 1975	CHI	FALN	United American Bank
32.	14 Jun. 1975	CHI	FALN	First National Bank
33.	16 Jun. 1975	PR		Bomb 4 trucks belonging to PR Tel. Co. (may be strike related)
34.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of National West- minister Bank
35.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of First National City Bank
36.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of First National ? Bank
37.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of Chase Manhattan Bank
38.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Continental National Bank
39.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of IBM Plaza
40.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Sears Tower
41.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Standard Oil Bldg. (attempted bombings)
42.	9 Nov. 1975	NY	FALN ?	Bomb First National City Bank
43.	7 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bombing of John Hancock Bldg.
44.	7 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Bank Leumi Le Israel
45.	7 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bombing of First National City Bank Plaza
46.	19 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN ?	Bomb Marshall Fields
47.	21 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN ?	Bomb Marshall Fields
48.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Pan Am Building
49.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb 1st National City Bank
50.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Chase Manhattan Bank
51.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Macy's
52.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Gimbel's
53.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Lord & Taylor
54.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Lord & Taylor
55.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Altman's

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
56.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Altman's
57.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Korvettes
58.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Ohrbachs
59.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Ohrbachs
60.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Macy's
61.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Korvettes
62.	10 Sep. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bomb Holiday Inn (DND)
63.	19 Sep. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bomb Marshall Fields
64.	21 Sep. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Hilton Hotel (DND)
65.	18 Feb. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Merchandise Mart
66.	18 Feb. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bombing of U.S. Gypsum Building
67.	18 Feb. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of Chrysler Bldg.,-- Texaco Touring Center
68.	18 Feb. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of Gulf and Western Building
69.	24 Feb. 1977	NY	UK	Letter bombs mailed to Puerto Rican banks operating in New York City
70.	20 Mar. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of Whelan Drug Store
71.	20 Mar. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of American Bank Note Company
				Bombings of:
72.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Macy's
73.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Macy's
74.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
75.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
76.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
77.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
78.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Gimbels
79.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Gimbels
80.	3 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Mobil Oil Building
81.	4 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	N.Y. Commodity Exchange
82.	8 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of American Metal Climax Building
83.	14 Aug. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of PR Bank
84.	10 Oct. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of Pan Am Building
85.	11 Oct. 1977	NY	UK	Attempted bombing of Bank of Iran
				Bombings of:
86.	11 Oct. 1977	PR	CRP	Esso Caribbean Offices
87.	11 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb Gimbels
88.	11 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb Macy's
89.	11 Oct. 1977	PR	CRP	Mobil Oil Offices
90.	11 Nov. 1977	PR	UK	Electrical substation
91.	11 Nov. 1977	PR	UK	Bank
92.	15 Nov. 1977	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Iran Air Office
93.	23 Dec. 1977	PR	UK	Destroy Electrical Transmission Tower
94.	11 Jan. 1978	NY	UK	Bombing near a Chase Manhattan Bank
95.	14 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb Electrical Transmission Tower

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
				Bombings of:
96.	19 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	AFF Tower
97.	19 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	AFF Power Lines
98.	20 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb AFF Tower
99.	31 Jan. 1978	NY	FALN	Bomb Con Edison Building
100.	8 Feb. 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb bank
101.	8 Feb. 1978	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of power transmitter
102.	16 Feb. 1978	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Manufacturer's Bank
				Bombings of:
103.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Department Store
104.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Woolworth's
105.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	National City Bank
106.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Chase Manhattan Bank
107.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Chase Manhattan Bank
108.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Law Offices
109.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	AFF Tower
110.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing of First Federal Savings and Loan
111.	5 May 1978	PR	COPAAN	Bomb Democratic Party Headquarters
112.	24 Jun. 1978	Schaumburg Illinois	FALN	Bomb J. C. Penney
113.	24 Jun. 1978	Schaumburg Illinois	FALN	Bomb Marshall Fields
114.	24 Jun. 1978	Schaumburg Illinois	FALN	Bomb Sears
115.	7 Jul. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb Central Federal Savings Bank
116.	12 Jul. 1978	NYC	FALN	Bomb Macy's
117.	12 Jul. 1978	NYC	FALN	Bomb Korvettes
118.	25 Jul. 1978	PR	MIRA	Bomb Communications Tower
119.	29 Aug. 1978	NY	FALN	Bomb Macy's
120.	13 Oct. 1978	PR	MIRA	Bomb First Federal Savings Bank
				Bombings of:
121.	17 Oct. 1978	CHI	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	Republican Headquarters
122.	17 Oct. 1978	NY	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	Republican Headquarters
123.	17 Oct. 1978	NY	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	Democratic Headquarters
124.	17 Oct. 1978	PR	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	RCA's Isabella Tower
125.	14 Mar. 1980	CHI	FALN	Vandalizing of political headquarters of various candidates

Appendix B

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PROPERTY
BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	5 Mar. 1970	PR	MIRA	Assassination of 2 U.S. Sailors
2.	17 Mar. 1970	NY	CAL	Attack on Armed Forces Recruiting Center
3.	17 May 1970	NY	MIRA (?)	Attempted Bombing of a Recruiting Station
4.	18 Mar. 1971	PR	Individual	Assassination of a Riot Unit Policeman
5.	14 Mar. 1973	PR	Unknown	Bomb offices of University of Puerto Rico
6.	31 Aug. 1974	NY	FALN	Bomb Damrosch Park
7.	28 Sep. 1974	Newark	Unknown group claimed credit	Newark City Hall Police Bldg. bombed; 2 wounded
8.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Bomb Federal Reserve Bank?
9.	1 Dec. 1974	PR	Unknown	Destroy U.S. Army Reserve vehicles, Gov't owned Water connected
10.	11 Dec. 1974	NY	FALN	Policeman injured by bomb
11.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Government Electrical Agency's Transformer destroyed-- current is cut
12.	15 Jun. 1975	CHI	FALN	Federal Building bombed (Did Not Detonate)
13.	17 Jun. 1975	PR	Unknown	Puerto Rican Co. bombed-- may be strike connected
14.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	U.S. Mission to UN bombed
15.	27 Oct. 1975	WASH	FALN	State Department bombed
16.	27 Oct. 1975	WASH	FALN	Bureau of Indian Affairs bombed
17.	6 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bomb Police building
18.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Police building
19.	10 Sep. 1976	CHI	UK	Bomb PR Dept. of Labor
20.	21 Sep. 1976	NY	FALN	Hilton Hotel bombed-- protesting presence of Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon
21.	1 Dec. 1976	NY	Indep. Armed Rev. Command	Letter bombs in U.S. mail-- 14 mailed; 1 postman injured

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
22.	3 Jan. 1977	PR	CLPR	Bomb ROTC Bldgs. at U. of Puerto Rico
23.	14 Jan. 1977	NY	Young Lords Party	Bomb Algerian Mission to UN
24.	21 Jan. 1977	UK	UK	Mailbombs addressed to various public officials including the President & Government agencies
25.	12 Mar. 1977	NY	Indep. Armed Rev. Command	Mailbombs in Post Office
26.	21 Mar. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb FBI Office
27.	4 Jun. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bomb county building
28.	3 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb Dept. of Defense Bldg.
29.	3 Aug. 1977	NYC	FALN	Bomb Dept. of Defense Office
30.	10 Oct. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb Reserve Officers Beach Club
31.	11 Oct. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bomb in Post Office
32.	12 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb outside of NY Public Library
33.	12 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb under police car
34.	15 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb in National Guard Armory
35.	7 Oct. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb at statue commemorating U.S. landing in Puerto Rico
36.	25 Jan. 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb at Banco Gubernamental de Fomento
37.	31 Jan. 1978	NY	FALN	Explosion near police car
38.	8 Feb. 1978	PR	People's Rev. Armed Commando	Bomb FBI building in San Juan
39.	7 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attack on Chilean Consulate in San Juan
40.	11 Apr. 1978	PR	CRP	U.S. Coast Guard Club
41.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing U.S. Army Recruiting Agency
42.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing Coast Guard Housing Project
43.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	U.S. Corps of Engineers bombed
44.	19 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
45.	20 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
46.	9 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
47.	9 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
48.	9 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
49.	10 May 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb U.S. Army-Navy Recruiting Station
50.	10 May 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb a military vehicle
51.	18 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb government owned vehicle
52.	22 May 1978	NY	FALN	Bombs explode in Kennedy Airport
53.	22 May 1978	Newark	FALN	Bombs explode in Newark Airport

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
54.	22 May 1978	WASH	FALN	Bombs explode outside Justice Department
55.	6 Jun. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb Post Office
56.	6 Jun. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb government vehicle
57.	19 Jul. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing of Post
58.	31 Jul. 1978	PR	CRP	Bombing of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture vehicles
59.	24 Aug. 1978	PR	Macheteros	Kill policeman in theft
60.	4 Oct. 1978	PR	MAR	Bomb Federal Office Bldg.
61.	18 Sep. 1979	PR	UK	Bomb attack on National Guard Armory
62.	17 Oct. 1979	CHI	FALN, Mach-	Bombing of Great Lakes
63.	17 Oct. 1979	PR	eteros, FRAP,	Naval Station, various
64.	17 Oct. 1979		Org. of Volun-	Federal as well as local
65.	17 Oct. 1979		teers for PR	offices and the political
66.	17 Oct. 1979		Rev., MAR	headquarters of both Rep.
67.	17 Oct. 1979			and Kennedy Hq.; gov't owned statue--6 attacks
68.	27 Oct. 1979	Conn.	FALN	Threat to bomb Amtrack Train
69.	23 Nov. 1979	CHI	FALN	Bomb Recruiting office
70.	24 Nov. 1979	CHI	FALN	Bomb naval militia building
71.	24 Nov. 1979	CHI	FALN	Bomb recruiting office
72.	3 Dec. 1979	PR	Macheteros	Murder of 2 members of Navy to retaliate for death of Angel Rodriguez Cristobal who, it is claimed, was murdered in his jail cell. Gov't claimed suicide. He had been jailed for trespassing on U.S. Naval property
73.	12 Mar. 1980	PR	Macheteros	Attempted assassination of three members of ROTC faculty at U. of Puerto Rico
74.	14 Jul. 1980	PR	UK	Destruction of four navigational beams used by FAA and Coast Guard to guide international air traffic
75.	21 Jul. 1980	PR	Rev. Commando	Bomb post offices
76.	19 Aug. 1980	PR	UK	Attempted bombing of post office
77.	8 Jan. 1981	PR	Rev. Commando del Pueblo	Bomb three post offices
78.	12 Jan. 1981	PR	Macheteros	Destruction of numerous airplanes of PR Air National Guard

Appendix C

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST PERSONS
BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	5 Mar. 1970	PR	MIRA	Assassination to two U.S. Naval personnel
2.	18 Mar. 1971	PR	Ind. w/o known affil.	Murder of riot policeman during disturbances at Univ. of Puerto Rico
3.	28 Sep. 1974	Newark	UK	People injured in attack on police
4.	12 Dec. 1975	NY	FALN	Maiming of a policeman with a booby trap
5.	24 Jan. 1975	NY	FALN	Kill 4 in bombing of Fraunces Tavern
6.	4 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Injure 4 in the bombing of commercial buildings
7.	8 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Injure 5 in the bombing of commercial building
8.	2 Dec. 1976	NY	Indep. Armed Rev. Commando	Mailman injured with a letter bomb
9.	4 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Kill a man in bombing of Mobil Oil Bldg.
10.	23 Sep. 1977	PR	Comandos Obreros	Murder of Allan Randall
11.	4 Jul. 1978	PR	UNK	Occupation and holding of people in Chilean Consulate in San Juan
12.	2 Aug. 1978	PR	CRP	Bombing of Federal Building in San Juan in hopes of killing FBI agent
13.	24 Aug. 1978	PR	Macheteros	Murder of policeman
14.	16 Aug. 1979	NY	Private ind. wanted gov. to sup. FALN	Bomb threat against airliner by passenger
15.	27 Oct. 1979	CONN	FALN	Threat to bomb an Amtrak train
16.	29 Oct. 1979	PR	Comandos Obreros	Threat to kill various members of Teamsters. May be strike related
17.	3 Dec. 1979	PR	Macheteros FARP	Murder of 2 U.S. sailors

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
18.	12 Mar. 1980	PR	Macheteros	Attempted murder of 3 members of ROTC staff at Univ. of Puerto Rico
19.	15 Mar. 1980	NY CHI	FALN	Seizure and holding of people in political hqs. of George Bush and Carter-Mondale
20.	21 Dec. 1980	NY	Resistencia Armada Puerto- Riguena	Bombing of Pennsylvania Railroad Station

Appendix D

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ENERGY TARGETS
BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	2 Dec. 1974	PR	Unk.	Cut water supply to Union Carbide's Caribe Oil Refining & Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.
2.	13 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Power Transformer
3.	11 Nov. 1977	PR	UK	Electrical substation
4.	23 Dec. 1977	PR	UK	Destroy Electrical Transmission Tower
5.	14 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb Electrical Transmission Tower
6.	19 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of APF Tower
7.	19 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of APF Power Lines
8.	20 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb APF Tower
9.	8 Feb. 1977	NY	FALN (?)	Attempted bombings of power transmitter
10.	16 Feb. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb APF Tower

