

A RAND NOTE

ON TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM

Konrad Kellen

December 1982

N-1942-RC

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE DEC 1982		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1982 to 00-00-1982	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE On Terrorists and Terrorism				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Rand Corporation,1776 Main Street,PO Box 2138,Santa Monica,CA,90407-2138				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 59	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

This publication was supported by The Rand Corporation as part of its program of public service.

The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

A RAND NOTE

ON TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM

Konrad Kellen

December 1982

N-1942-RC

PREFACE

This Note examines studies of terrorists and terrorism and describes the analytical state of the art at The Rand Corporation and elsewhere. It was sponsored by Rand from its own funds as part of ongoing research and analysis in the Security and Subnational Conflict Program. Emphasis is placed on the "confessions" and self-evaluations of ex-terrorists, which are analyzed for clues to terrorists' aims and psychological characteristics.

SUMMARY

This Note examines a variety of aspects of terrorists and terrorism. It attempts to define the terrorists and to gauge their motivations; it examines their socioeconomic backgrounds and their driving ideologies; and it probes into elements that may aid the cohesion of terrorist groups, as well as at elements that drive toward disintegration.

The purpose of the inquiry is not simply to sum up certain things that have been learned about terrorists and terrorism, but also to investigate what aspects of the problem have been studied in various parts of the world; what methods have been used; who has performed the studies; and what conclusions have been reached. The Note aims to show how Rand's efforts in the domain of terrorism research are to some extent geared to the efforts of others who are also attempting to refine and further develop methodologies for studying this subject.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY TERRORISTS?	1
II. RESEARCH APPROACH: THE STATE OF THE ART	4
III. WHAT IS A TERRORIST? ONE MORE ATTEMPT AT DEFINITION	8
IV. DIFFERENT AIMS OF TERRORISTS	11
V. WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS?	15
Are They Crazies? Psychopaths?	15
Violent Intellectuals	22
Women as Terrorists	24
VI. THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUENCY	29
The SLA: A Prime Example	31
Where Does the Self-Deception Lead?	34
VII. SOCIOECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS	36
VIII. DIVISIVE ISSUES AND VULNERABILITIES	40
Disputes Over Effectiveness of Individual Actions	40
Intragroup Pressures	41
Drug Use and Terrorism	42
IX. CONCLUSIONS	44
Appendix: PRIMARY SOURCES OF TERRORIST DATA	49
REFERENCES	53

I. INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY TERRORISTS?

When "modern" terrorism[1] first made its appearance in the 1960s, not many people were interested in what made the terrorists behave as they did. The questions asked by observers were mostly about material aspects of the phenomenon: Who are the terrorists? How many are there? How are they armed? What will they do next? As for their motivations, the terrorists were generally regarded simply as "crazies" and fanatics.

But interest in what makes terrorists tick has been steadily increasing. Everywhere in the Western world, individual and collective efforts have been made by analysts of widely varying backgrounds to determine what the mindset of terrorists really is, how they think, how they reach their decisions, how they function. Not surprisingly, these efforts have been conducted--and have often yielded results--in conformity with the disciplines of the respective analysts: Economists have seen individual or collective economic causes; psychiatrists and psychologists have sought and found clues in the pasts of terrorist individuals; political and social scientists have examined the personal histories of terrorists as well as the prevailing social and political climate from which the terrorists emerged and in which they operate. As a result, an immense amount of diverse information has been accumulated, and many theories have been established. But most of these theories have remained just that: theories which have never really been proven or disproven. Because there have been so few terrorists available for

[1] As distinguished from, say, the anarchism of a Bakunin, Kropotkin, or Nachayev. Similarities and differences between the early revolutionaries and contemporary terrorists are discussed in Sec. IV.

in-depth study, it has been very difficult to validate or invalidate the theories that have been proposed about them.

Rand, too, has been studying terrorists and terrorism for several years. But from the outset, Rand's studies have focused intensely on what terrorists have said about themselves and about their activities and aims. Fundamentally, there are two types of terrorist utterances that are helpful in efforts to understand these people. The first are statements that terrorists present in the course of their terrorist activities, i.e., propagandistic rhetoric preceding, accompanying, or following an action. The rhetoric may focus on the condition of society, as did that of the so-called Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) during the Patricia Hearst imbroglio; it may be connected with some national or ethnic aims or intended to justify some aggressive act, like the PLFP communiques concerning attacks against Israel; or it may take the form of long and ardent treatises, such as those on Bonn's "imperialism" and "repression" promulgated by West Germany's Red Army Faction. Terrorists, being political activists, have a "line," and that line, though it is propaganda, is always revealing, just as enemy propaganda in war is always revealing. The line may be full of lies and hyperbole and error, but it provides insights into the mindset of those who regard their statements as justification for their actions and an effective instrument in their struggle.

The second important type of communication consists of statements, written or oral, spontaneous or in interviews, made by former terrorists. Such statements may come from terrorists interviewed in prison, where they may or may not have turned into "repentants." They also come from individuals who, for one reason or another, have

voluntarily left the terrorist fold and are now in hiding from both the police and their former comrades. In a few cases, statements have come from terrorists who have been released from prison. The volume of such "confessions" is continuously growing, especially in Italy, where the authorities captured many Red Brigadists in 1982. These "confessions" have been closely examined by Rand in its studies of the mindset of terrorists. (See the Appendix for a list of primary sources of terrorist statements.)

But why study terrorists "from the inside" at all? There are basically three reasons: First, to learn what makes a terrorist tick is simply a challenge--the phenomenon is intriguing because "it is there." The second reason for studying the intellectual and emotional make-up of terrorists is the hope that the results will facilitate prediction: If we know a person or group of persons from the inside out, if we know what drives them, we may be able to predict their actions with some confidence, which in turn should help in prevention of and defense against terrorist violence. Finally, a thorough knowledge of an adversary could reveal certain vulnerabilities to various forms of defense or counterattack. In this connection, it should be noted that not every weakness one finds in one's adversary's armor is exploitable, i.e., a genuine vulnerability. But some weaknesses are, or can be made to be.

This Note looks at terrorists and terrorism in a very select way and makes no attempt to treat any of the aspects raised exhaustively.

II. RESEARCH APPROACH: THE STATE OF THE ART

Less effort has been devoted to understanding and profiling terrorists in the United States than in other countries. Nevertheless, the literature on the general subject of terrorism is impressive. There are perhaps a hundred books in print on terrorism, ranging from works on the notorious Carlos to volumes on the Palestinians and the whole Arab-Israeli conflict. They include such well-known works as Walter Laqueur's Guerilla, Jillian Becker's Hitler's Children, and Claire Sterling's The Terror Network. In most of these books, the approach taken is historical.

The Italian author Alessandro Silj used another method of learning about terrorists. Born in Rome in 1935, Silj, a novelist, journalist, and research associate, among other things, uses an analytical approach to terrorism that is primarily biographical. His studies of the Red Brigades are based on interviews with friends, relatives, teachers, and others who have had meaningful contacts with members of the group. He has also used personal letters written by the terrorists, as well as their ideological articles, manifestos, and depositions. He does not neglect any empirical evidence that could throw light on the psychological, intellectual, social, political, and circumstantial factors contributing to the metamorphosis of these young Italians into terrorists. Silj has also examined the prisons as breeding grounds for terrorism. In his book Never Again Without a Rifle (1979), Silj presents about a dozen detailed portraits of male and female terrorists in Italy who had either been apprehended and sentenced or had died. The

analysis of the voluminous material about his subjects permitted him to draw new conclusions about the nature and origins of their terrorism that appeared more realistic than what had been done before. Both Silj's method and his portraits provide methodological clues that can be helpful in compiling and analyzing the disparate materials on individual terrorists in countries other than Italy.

A recent spate of arrests of Italian terrorists who decided to make detailed jailhouse confessions has further added to the wealth of direct information on how terrorists view the world and how they make decisions, plan operations, evaluate their actions, and cope with their lot, which is by no means always a happy one--in fact, more often than not, it is a very unhappy and insecure one, weighed down by internal strife within the group. Interviews with men like Marco Barbone and Roberto Sandalo, or the notorious Patricio Peci and the less-known Carlo Fioroni of Italy's Prima Linea,[1] afford insights into the terrorist milieu which researchers could only guess at before.

Rand efforts have taken a similar direction. In Note N-1300-SL, Terrorists--What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions, the present author critically examined interviews clandestinely given by defected terrorists and memoirs they had been writing, along with interviews that had been conducted with terrorists who were still in jail. Other Rand studies have utilized interviews with German officials who were in the forefront of the anti-terrorist struggle in that country. Germany has, in fact, been a particularly rich source of basic materials on terrorist ideas and motivations. Much primary material has been provided by Horst Mahler, a former lawyer and

[1] Prima Linea (Front Line) is regarded as Italy's second most dangerous terrorist group, after the Red Brigades. The dividing line between the two is not always clear, however.

a co-founder of Germany's most dangerous terrorist group, The Red Army Faction. Mahler has served a ten-year jail sentence and is now at liberty. He has provided much insight into German terrorism by unveiling his own story and by his discussions with high-ranking officials.

Also from Germany, where a considerable percentage of prominent terrorists are women, more and more information detailing the role women play in terrorist groups and in actual episodes has become available. Most of this information is barely more than raw material for the analyst, but it is very rich raw material indeed.[2]

Some individual researchers in Germany have made in-depth studies of terrorists. One of these researchers, Dr. Helm Stierlin, a psychiatrist from Heidelberg who has practiced extensively in the United States and in Germany, has provided valuable personal correspondence to Rand analysts. Drs. Fetcher and Rohrmoser, both of West Germany, have studied the influence of ideology on terrorist action and have concluded that despite the strenuous efforts on the part of terrorists to appear ideologically motivated, most of them are deeply anti-ideological-- a controversial but stimulating thesis on the important subject of motivation for joining and remaining in a terrorist group.

These are only a small sample of the many sources of information available on the terrorists' mindset. In addition, the dozen or so international conferences on terrorism, including the conference held at Rand on September 8-15, 1980, have yielded very valuable insights. At the Rand conference, there was a special working panel on terrorist mindsets. Several panelists had had first-hand experience with

[2] See, for example, "Role and Motivation of Women in the Red Army Faction," Der Spiegel, May 11, 1981.

terrorists; some had even negotiated successfully with terrorists in very critical situations. Much of the material discussed at these conferences also serves as the basis for further studies of the terrorist mindset.

As a result of personal correspondence with various experts on terrorism in France, Rand has received an unpublished two-volume treatise entitled Les Pouvoirs Psychologiques Du Terrorism (The Psychological Powers of Terrorism), by Pierre Mannoni of the University of Nice. This work, comprising than 1500 pages, contains one of the most detailed analyses of terrorism and terrorists ever compiled and should yield a great deal of new insight.

Providing yet a different vantage point and a method that can be profitably applied are books such as Revolutionary in Ireland, by Sean MacStiöfain, himself a revolutionary leader. Until 1975, MacStiofain was chief of staff of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Due to his high rank, he could write with great authority, especially about how terrorists collect the intelligence on the basis of which they act.

Another important contribution to methodologies for studying the phenomenon of terrorism is Rand's growing circle of working relationships with students of terrorism in over a dozen countries, particularly Italy and Germany. Working contacts with German government and police officials who are active in terrorist studies were further consolidated by Rand analysts during a trip to Germany in the summer of 1982.

III. WHAT IS A TERRORIST? ONE MORE ATTEMPT AT DEFINITION

Defining a "terrorist" is either relatively easy or next to impossible, depending on what one expects the definition to encompass and how complete or neat one expects the definition to be. The terrorist can be caught in the net of words, despite semantic snipers who keep finding fault with every analyst's definition and who twist their own minds endlessly trying to find a definition that is airtight, complete, and final. These attempts at totally defining the "terrorist" are condemned to remain exasperating, for just as there is no trait of an alcoholic, no habit, no anything that is not at times shared by other people, there is no trait or characteristic of peaceful citizens that is not also at times to some extent shared by the terrorist.[1] Yet we all can define an alcoholic in an operationally useful manner. The same goes for terrorists. After much study, we have developed the following definition of a terrorist:

A terrorist is a person who, first of all, commits acts that are designed to terrorize, to frighten. On his or her stage, he or she plays to an audience beyond the footlights. The terrorist aims at spreading terror in order to move people to do, or desist from doing, certain things. The terrorist acts in this manner for ends that are, broadly speaking, political. He or she spreads terror by committing and/or threatening acts of violence against human beings or material property as signals that he or she exists and "means business." Thus, a

[1] Pushing this point a bit too far, perhaps, the Swiss dramatist Max Frisch asked the question: "Supposing you have never killed a man, how do you explain that it never came to that?"

terrorist is different from an ordinary criminal whose primary aim is to get money or material goods or to kill or injure a specific victim. The crime of the ordinary criminal is not designed to have consequences beyond the act itself. To facilitate his crime, the ordinary criminal may also use some short-term, targeted terror, as in a hold-up with a gun. But the terror is limited to the immediate victim the criminal wants to cow into surrender, and besides, it has no political purpose. The criminal is not interested in swaying or attracting public opinion. He does not intend to spread the effects of his actions beyond himself and his victim; in fact, he wants to limit his terror as much as possible. But the terrorist (who is also a criminal in that he breaks the law) is different: The terrorist wants to change "the system," while the ordinary criminal does not.

The terrorist is also different from madmen like the "crazy" who shoots a president in order to win the affection of a girl, just as he is different from the "crazy" who spreads terror by brandishing a weapon or a bomb or from an individual who tries to kill people by poisoning the water supply, goods in a market, etc. The actions of such "crazies" terrify people and can affect their behavior, but they have no political content or impact. Of course, the borderline may at times be fuzzy, in that the ostensibly political or social aims espoused by some perpetrators of violence may be so bizarre as to stamp their advocates as "crazies" rather than terrorists. But such cases only show that the definition of a terrorist cannot be airtight--a fact the analyst must resign himself to accepting.

The terrorist is also different from the ordinary criminal in that he is not egocentric but pursues purposes beyond his person that,

generally, he believes to be serving a good cause; the criminal, on the other hand, does not see himself as serving any cause at all. A terrorist without a cause (at least in his own mind) is not a terrorist. The terrorist is also distinguished from "ordinary" political zealots or extremists in that the latter do not use violence. The political extremist may also be a person who breaks the law, for example, by becoming a member of an illegal party or by trespassing upon private property, but he is not a terrorist because he does not use violence in the promotion of his cause.

The terrorist, finally, is a person who does not consider himself a terrorist.[2] He may consider himself an ex-terrorist if he ever leaves the fold, but while he is pursuing his cause he does not consider himself as anything but a fighter for that cause. In other words, he does not see himself as we see him. This distinguishes him from a communist or other revolutionary or even from the professional robber or hit man. Communists and robbers agree with us that they are communists and robbers. Terrorists never agree with the appellation we give them. On the contrary, they say that our society and laws are the "terrorists."

[2] Rand analyst Alex Alexiev, to whom the author owes a debt for his incisive review of this Note, regards this last point as redundant. The author is not so sure about that.

IV. DIFFERENT AIMS OF TERRORISTS

Having defined terrorists as clearly and fully as seems possible, we must add that there are many different types of terrorists, with widely differing aims, even though all share some of the characteristics described in Sec. III. The aims of terrorists appear to cover a spectrum from the desire for simple and clear territorial changes, such as the separation of a finite strip of territory from the political control of a nation, to a self-assumed mission to change all of human society in millennialist ways. For example, the PFLP and the Basque or Breton separatists profess what to outsiders appear to be very clear and limited aims, while the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany aimed at what Nietzsche would have called the "transvaluation of all values." But all these people, including terrorists from the right and the left, from any nation in the world, fit into our definition in that they pursue sociopolitical aims; they break the law; they use violence to terrorize others into doing their bidding; they consider themselves benefactors of a sort; and they have a strong sense of mission, at least initially.

Apparently, some terrorist groups are dedicated primarily to the destruction of the existing order and institutions without having any vision or even a general idea of what would or should replace them. In fact, the wider and more radical the aims of a group, the more indistinct are their ideas of what is to follow, or what a transvaluation of all values would actually entail. The terrorists themselves have addressed this point: "What comes afterwards is not our concern," Gudrun Ennslyn, co-founder of Germany's Red Army Faction, once said. This echoes Michael E. Bakunin's statement:

I frequently told the Germans and Poles when they argued in my presence about future governmental systems: "We are called to destroy, not to build; those who build will be better, wiser and fresher than we are." [1]

Thus, terrorists of the millennialist, nonterritorial type would agree with Bakunin, who fought Marx on the grounds that Marx simply wanted to replace one set of controls and controllers with another set, whereas Bakunin believed that "the urge to destroy is constructive." This view comes much closer to the terrorist mindset than does the Marxist or communist philosophy. In fact, the anarchists who went even further than Bakunin, such as Kropotkin and Nachayev, come still closer to the mindset of the contemporary terrorist.

The aims of the millennialist terrorist were described as follows in an extensive German study: [2]

What do the terrorists want? They want The Revolution, a total transformation of all existing conditions, a new form of human existence and an entirely new relationship of people to each other, and also of people to nature. They want the total and radical breach with all that is, and with all historical continuity. Without a doubt they are utopians. The source of their (self-provided) legitimacy is the utopia which they want to make real, and it is the same utopia that makes them regard all historical and ideological factors as illusions. Inside their world, or outside their world, there is no voice that could call them back to reason. For them, there is no connection between the vision that drives them, and the existing reality that, they feel, keeps them in chains; therefore destruction is the only form of freedom they can accept. In light of their own utopia, the existing system appears to them as hell, as a system that exploits, suppresses and destroys human beings and in which to live means death. In their view, the decision to become revolutionaries is the beginning of becoming human (a form of rebirth); to act in

[1] Eugene Pyzins, The Doctrine of Anarchism, The Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1955, p. 3.

[2] Analysen zum Terrorismus, Vol. 2, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981, p.87.

revolutionary fashion means to them the establishment of their own selves, the step from the realm of disaster and damnation into the realm of freedom and light. They are fascinated by the magic of the extremes, the hard and uncompromising either/or, life or death, salvation or perdition, "pig" or man--with nothing in between. They recognize only one principle; unconditional consistency. Any compromise they do not even regard as weakness, but as treason. They are driven by their pitiless hatred against those they look upon as their enemies, a hatred fed by a disgust with what they regard as a morbid, decadent society of sly and immoral ways and mendacious hypocrisy. When they pretend to serve the people, the people exist only in their imagination. They are interested in Marxist or Leninist theory only to the extent they hope to find there effective methods of revolutionary action.

These German authors believe that the terrorists who pay lip service to leftist ideologies or show an interest in them are really interested only in methods of overthrowing existing societies. This would also explain why their published statements are mainly radical and strategic rather than ideological in nature.

One European expert on terrorists and terrorism, Dr. Hans Josef Horchem, the former chief of the Hamburg branch of the Office for the Protection of (West Germany's) Constitution,[3] summarized the different aims of terrorist groups in this way:

We must distinguish between three groups of terrorism:

1. Terrorism based on Nationalist Motivations. This would include operations in Europe, the Palestinians or the Croats.
2. Terrorism based on Ethnic Minority Interests. Generally, there we see the terrorist wings of irredentist movements ... some of these also have nationalist motivations. Examples are the Basques, Bretons, Corses and some others. The Irish are a separate case--in their case, religious factors, social aspects and the extreme repression of the Irish population in former centuries play a role.

[3] "Problems of Terrorism in Europe," IPZ Information Bulletin, Institut fur politische Zeitfragen, September 1979.

3. Terrorism based on Revolutionary-Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Motivation. Examples of this type are the RAF, the 2nd of June Movement, the "Revolutionary Cells" in Germany, the GRAPO and FRAP in Spain, and the "Red Brigades" in Italy.

Horchem adds:

Actually, terrorists motivated by nationalist or ethnic factors may also use social-revolutionary ideologies, but these are not at the core of their thinking.

As regards the purely social-revolutionary terrorists, they are--especially in the German and Italian case--spin-offs of the student rebellions of the sixties. We see a development here that began with the student protests in Berkeley and the renaissance of Marxism that occurred in the mid-sixties, especially in Western Europe. In Germany, an added reason was that the various political parties joined in a "great Coalition" so that rebels felt they had no road except the "extra-parliamentary" road, which became "armed struggle." It might be added that the fighting modes of the European terrorists are modeled after those of the Palestinians and the Tupamaros.

Horchem does not specifically mention the existence of right-wing terrorists, who had a resurgence in Europe only relatively recently. More will be said about them below.

V. WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS?

ARE THEY CRAZIES? PSYCHOPATHS?

Many observers, especially prominent political figures who are called upon to comment publicly on acts of terrorism, tend to dismiss terrorist acts as "senseless violence" and to regard terrorists as demented. But are they? Franco Ferracuti, a psychiatrist who has spent many years in the Italian government service fighting terrorism in that country and who has had very close contact with many of the Italian terrorists, had this to say:

The analyses of clinical reality, based on the very few available case histories of individual left-wing terrorists, when enriched by psychobiographics, show clearly that left-wing terrorists rarely suffer from serious personality abnormalities. Generally, they demonstrate a good capacity to stand stress, both in clandestinity and in long term imprisonment, and an ability to organize themselves in groups, to sustain each other and to carry out adequate actions aimed at propaganda and dissemination of their principles.[1]

But if the terrorists of the left appear generally to be "normal," how about right-wing terrorists? According to Ferracuti,

Even when they do not suffer from a clear psychopathological condition, their basic psychological traits reflect an authoritarian-extremist personality with the following main distinctive features:

- (a) ambivalence toward authority (submission-aggression, unbalance);
- (b) poor and defective insight;
- (c) adherence to conventional behavioral patterns with poor judgment and a tendency toward emulation and repetition of attitudes and behaviors;
- (d) emotional detachment from the consequences of their actions;

[1] Franco Ferracuti, "Psychiatric Aspect of Terrorism in Italy," edition Forensic Psychiatry, University of Rome, p.3.

- (e) disturbances in sexual identity, with role uncertainties;
- (f) superstition, "magic" and stereotyped thinking;
- (g) destructiveness and self-destructiveness;
- (h) low-level educational reference patterns;
- (i) perception of weapons as fetishes and adherence to violent subcultural values.

The practical implications of this characterological pattern are self-evident: right-wing terrorism can be very dangerous not only mainly because of its ideology, but because of its general unpredictability and because of the destructiveness often resulting from psychopathology.

Ferracuti concludes:

In right-wing terrorism, the individual terrorists are frequently psychopathological and the ideology is empty; in left-wing terrorism, ideology is unrealistic and terrorists are more normal and fanatical.[2]

This distinction between left-wing and right-wing Italian terrorists may or may not apply also for terrorists elsewhere. It is little more than a hypothesis on Ferracuti's part, though one that deserves exploring. Actually, there are better criteria than sanity vs. insanity by which to distinguish right-wing and left-wing terrorists; for example, right-wing terrorists tend to be racists and nationalists, whereas left-wing terrorists tend to be anarchical millenialists. But even such distinctions must be used with caution, if only because some terrorists have stated that they might have gone either way when they began.

Sigmund Freud's findings that motivations are often unconscious and provide actions that are merely symbolic of what a person is really trying to do pertain particularly to acts of violence and murder,

[2] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

especially acts in which the end is not mere material gain. Psychiatrists believe they recognize symbolic patricide in many instances of passionate or ideological murder of important men. A good case in point is that of the German ex-terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein,[3] whose most notorious terrorist act was his participation in the attack on the OPEC ministers conference in 1975. He may well be one of those people for whom political orientation was merely a veneer; it may be that unbeknownst to himself, he was engaging in a struggle with authority because unconsciously he was struggling against his father. Klein quite consciously hated his father (he says, "I would never talk about that man as 'father'"), but he may not have been aware of the fact that his rampage against the established order and those defending it may have been a continuation and extension of that struggle.

One might speculate that Klein's later defection from terrorism is further evidence that in his heart he never really identified with the political aims of any terrorist group. In fact, like some other terrorists, he ultimately quit for the same reasons that led him to join. He joined because he was appalled by what he regarded as the brutality and injustice of the state and the police who represented that state. He says that he observed policemen brutally beating some innocent civilians, including a woman; this perceived brutality and injustice must have reminded him of his father's real brutality and injustice. (His father, who also happened to be a policeman, beat his son mercilessly at the slightest provocation--or no provocation at all.) Then, when he saw that the groups to which he belonged also acted brutally and unjustly, Klein became disillusioned. That is not really

[3] See Kellen, Terrorists--What are They Like?, op. cit.

the way of the true political fanatic, who is expected to regard every nonbeliever as the enemy deserving of punishment, including death. But Klein balked at that, just as he had balked at obeying the legitimate authorities before he became a terrorist. From his autobiography it is clear that he is not profoundly fanatical in a political sense. He seems like a man who acted all along from the unconscious motives of merely inflicting pain and destruction on the hated enemy--in his case, persons of the establishment, i.e., "father figures."

A similar case, though a more complicated one, may be that of the notorious terrorist Carlos. Carlos has given many interviews, the most extensive of which is perhaps the three-part interview given to Arab journalist Asim-al-Jundi between November 20 and December 30, 1979. In these interviews, Carlos emerges as a person not particularly dedicated to political aims. Whether or not he too is driven by unconscious patricidal impulses is not apparent from his words. From various accounts, Carlos does not seem to have been at odds with his father, who sent him to study in the Soviet Union and who shares some of his son's views, to the extent that these views are discernible in either father or son.

But whatever motivates Carlos (or motivated him while he was active, if there is any truth to the rumors that he has "retired"), he does not really seem to be a single-minded political zealot. Rather, from what he says about himself and from the exploits he stresses in his interviews, he seems to be an adventurer, a hedonist, and, at bottom, a real psychopath or sociopath. He told one interviewer, "Yes, I like good food, good drink, good cigars and good shoes. I am an epicure." When reminded by the interviewer that Epicurus was a good man, Carlos

replied, "He liked the good life, but the Greeks interpreted his life in the well-known manner." He added, "I like dancing parties. I also like the theater, and especially the classical theater. I do not like to possess things." (This disinclination to having possessions, one may assume, ties in with his nomadic proclivity.) Then, almost as an afterthought, he said, "I would ... in one moment give up all worldly possessions for the cause and the revolution. As far as I am concerned, the revolution is the strongest of tonics."

Having said this, Carlos immediately turned to other concerns: "I like women. I mean I like the good life and not only sex. Finally, I am very fond of friendship." He then went on at great length about personal exploits such as shooting a treasonous companion directly between the eyes on a Paris street, and taking part in other killings and bloody adventures. Considering the length of the interview, his few words on the subject of the revolution seem very perfunctory, and his comment that the revolution is like a first-rate tonic seems extremely egocentric, not at all the expression of a truly concerned political radical.

Carlos is apparently not even interested in the Soviet Union. When Hans Klein once was asked whether he had learned much from Carlos about the Soviet Union, he replied that all he had ever heard Carlos say on the subject was a description of the different kinds of caviar that one could enjoy there.

Certainly, Carlos sounds quite different from "General Fieldmarshall Cinque" of the SLA (see Sec. VI), who "loves the people." Carlos is an adventurer par excellence, the scion of a most unusual upper-class Venezuelan family. "My father," Carlos said, "was very

tender at home, but outside he was cruel and powerful." Is Carlos trying to emulate him, or even go him one (or several) better? Is Carlos, too, engaging in a form of symbolic patricide by trying to outdistance his father? Carlos may also be full of admiration for his grandfather, a romantic figure who belonged to a ruling junta in Caracas after a coup in 1899, but went to jail for seven years after its overthrow, emerging bent and ill from torture but having never betrayed a single secret. This grandfather seems to have been one of Carlos' role models in his defiance of men and fate and in his voiced conviction that he will be killed while still young.

However, not all terrorists are like Cinque, the ideologist, or Carlos, the terrorist/adventurer/killer; nor are they all like the millennialists of the Baader-Meinhof gang. Even though terrorists encompass a wide range of types, many are people with a limited objective, such as the destruction of Fidel Castro and his regime in Cuba. The limited-objective terrorists also have a sense of mission. One of them, Orlando Bosch, the former leader of a right-wing Cuban organization responsible for planting a bomb on a Cuban airliner in 1976 that killed 73 people, is described as follows by journalist Blake Fleetwood:[4]

He had once been a practicing pediatrician, first in Cuba, then in Miami, but for more than 20 years now, the tools of his real trade have been instruments of death--plastic explosives, rifles and bazookas. He led a group of Cuban exiles implicated in some 150 bombings and some 50 murders in the last two years. His group has been linked to the car-bomb assassination of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C., and now he was under arrest in Caracas, Venezuela, charged with ordering the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner last October 6 which killed 73 people. He is one of the most famous terrorists in the world.

[4] Interview with Orlando Bosch, "I'm Going to Declare War," New Times, May 13, 1977.

A man like Bosch may or may not also be emotionally deranged, as Cinque and Carlos clearly are, but nefarious though his actions may be, he operates on the grounds of reality, and he is definitely a dedicated political radical of violent anti-communist orientation. He thus seems similar to Armando Santana, reputed chief of Omega 7, a militant anti-Castro Cuban group. This group knows exactly what it is doing, and also which side its bread is buttered on.[5]

Yet another type of terrorist is "Rafael," a killer for the anti-Castro forces in Miami. According to FBI sources, Rafael is a CIA-trained man who lives on a luxurious cabin cruiser and accepts hit jobs for \$20,000 apiece.[6] He says,

Don't make me out to be a monster. The people I kill are bad people, criminals, politicians who subvert government and justice for their own benefit. I do not harm women and children, I commit my murders out of the sight of loved-ones, and no one, except the people who hire me and myself, know anything about the crime. In this dishonorable business I try to conduct myself honorably.

Rafael adds:

In the United States, I kill criminals for other criminals. In South America, I kill political figures for other political figures. I work only for the conservative elements of society in South America. I kill only communists and communist sympathizers.

Actually, one can hardly call Rafael a terrorist. He is surely a psychopathic personality, yet he is more like a weapon used by terrorists than a person. It follows that his actions are not

[5] Jeff Stein, "Inside Omega 7," Village Voice, March 10, 1980.

[6] M. P. Fleischer, "Conversations of a Cuban Hit Man," Tropic Magazine, December 2, 1973.

predictable; he is merely the instrument of other men--terrorists like Bosch or Santana.

VIOLENT INTELLECTUALS

The actions of the terrorist, as has been pointed out, always have a purpose other than gain; even when a terrorist robs a bank, his goal is to finance another "action." Moreover, in the pursuit of his cause, which by definition has some political or social content, the terrorist is always a radical, an extremist. He is using extreme means in the pursuit of extreme ends. This dual form of extremism does not exist in "ordinary" extremists. Many people hold extreme views, from favoring the overthrow of the government to the extermination of races, yet they would never lift a finger in the pursuit of such aims and, in fact, shrink from the prospect of violence.[7]

Thus a terrorist has a rather rare combination of traits. Unlike most radical intellectuals, who promote their cause verbally by polemics of one kind or another, the terrorist is a violent intellectual. Although his intellectual side may not be strongly developed, it is nevertheless one of his characteristic traits.

Seen from a slightly different angle, one may describe a terrorist as a person characterized by "dual nonacceptance." That is, in order to be a terrorist, a person has to reject, or not accept, two things: (1)

[7] This type of person was exemplified by the ordinary German burgher during the Nazi era, who was bitterly criticized by the Chief Exterminator of the Jews, Heinrich Himmler, with these words: "Such people hang around bars and agree over a beer that the Jews should be killed, but that's all they do." These individuals can be called extremists, but they surely are not terrorists. Similarly, there are many people who sympathize with "the Revolution." Again, they are extremists or radicals, but not terrorists. To be a terrorist, a person must use extreme means, i.e., physical force, for the attainment of radical ends.

the established order or parts of that order, and (2) the rule of not using violence against the order of which one disapproves. This might also explain why becoming a terrorist generally requires some time. First, the would-be terrorist has to come to reject the existing social order or parts of it. This requires that he or she be mature enough intellectually to perceive and judge that order. Before that, the individual is a child and accepts what he or she is told about the existing order--usually an affirmative view. Next, the developing terrorist takes the law into his or her own hands--a step very different from the ideological rejection of one's surroundings.

A person may then transcend with physical violence the bounds set by law and custom, in a fit of rage or in cold calculation. He may even feel sorry afterwards. (Strangely enough, observers never postulate that terrorists feel sorry for what they do. But some terrorists do experience remorse, and we have proof of it.) Or the terrorist may act with deliberation, as when he "executes" a "traitor" or an "enemy," primarily for the purpose of influencing, i.e., terrorizing, others.

One might be tempted to conclude that the cold-blooded terrorist, like the Mafia hit man, is not a "killer" but rather is a pragmatist who pursues his aims with unconventional means. This is probably unrealistic, however. One must suspect that any person who kills is primarily a "killer," whatever his motive, and this is the key to his character. After all, to join a terrorist group anywhere, a person must at least be ready to kill. This would present an insuperable obstacle to someone who is not really a "killer," even if the goals of the group were very appealing to him. Thus the terrorist differs from others who do not accept the existing order in that he also does not accept the

legitimate rules of the game for changing that order. He is prepared to kill. And the intellectual who is ready to kill is very rare indeed.

WOMEN AS TERRORISTS

German Terrorists

According to a recent study,[8] about one-third of the German terrorists are women. What is striking is that these women attained positions of leadership in terrorist groups as frequently, on a percentage basis, as men. Of the 227 terrorists studied, 36 percent of the women were in leadership roles, as compared to 32 percent of the men. At the time of the study, there were warrants out for 15 terrorists; 10 of the 15 were females, and five of those were clearly of leadership caliber. One reason for the high proportion of female leaders may be the personal characteristics of female terrorists, who are described as active, dominant, and "cool" in stressful situations. Another factor appears to be the elevated social background of these women, combined with a high rate of striving for personal success. Also, more of the male terrorists had suffered personality damage in early youth and/or had served time: 42 percent of the males had served time in prison before becoming terrorists, as compared to 21 percent of the females. Prison life does not seem to prepare people for leadership roles, even in illegal groups.

There is a higher percentage of lesbians among the female terrorists studied (7 percent) than is estimated to prevail in the population at large (1 to 2 percent). Individual cases show that the lesbian tendency often emerges coincidentally with the exit from the bourgeois fold.

[8] This section is adapted in part from Lives of Terrorists, Analyses on the Subject of Terrorism, West German Publishing House, 1981.

Most of the female terrorists did not complete their studies but pursued them somewhat longer than did their male counterparts. Like the males, the females gave evidence of unrealistically high professional goals, which they failed to attain.

Entry into the terrorist world under the influence of a partner of the opposite sex was more frequent among females than among males. The following three cases appear typical:

1. "A" was seven years old when her father died. Her mother remarried, but the new marriage was full of conflicts and "A" left home early. Marriage at 18 brought her in contact with student circles that fascinated her. Her marriage soon disintegrated, and at 19 she met a terrorist with whom she joined a group.
2. "B," whose father was a professional intellectual, had difficulty graduating from college. She finally managed to graduate but failed to take up an orderly profession. Instead, she joined a terrorist group with her boy friend.
3. "C" grew up without much parental supervision. She failed in her effort to graduate from college, changed jobs and boyfriends many times, and was finally recruited into a group by a young man.

In general, there is a high correlation between high levels of aggression and frequently incurred hurts in early life. The external conditions of life and the psychological factors that lead women into terrorism are very similar to those of men.

Women who are imprisoned tend to stick more rigidly to their views than do men, which has led to their domination of other terrorists in the prison environment. Letters from men in prison are more personal and contain more open expression of distress, whereas women's letters reflect more depersonalization. Women tend to withdraw into constant self-examination of their political beliefs. They react harshly to signs of weakness in other females and show no pity or moderation toward possible victims of future terrorist acts on the outside, or toward fellow prisoners. Women in the extreme conditions of imprisonment "seem, more than the men, deprived of their humanity, domineering and intemperate, engaged in constant introspection and thinking about revolutionary doctrines, seem eager to expunge the last remnants of their individualities." [9] But they do not seem self-sacrificing or "bent on martyrdom; rather they seem to aspire to cold perfectionism. This 'favorite pupil' behavior is the opposite of the 'excess of self-liberation' that is so often attributed to female terrorists; it is, in fact, the complete denial thereof." [10]

It is our impression that the statements quoted here about German women terrorists also apply to Italian and U.S. women in such groups.

Two American Terrorists

More is known about foreign women terrorists than about American women terrorists, partly because there are few American terrorists, and only a very few have been available for study. But the information that is available is significant.

[9] Bundesministerium des Inneren, Lebenslaufanalysen, Bonn, West Germany, 1981, p. 172.

[10] Ibid.

Lucinda Franks, an American journalist who at one time was close to the Weathermen, drew a character sketch of two girls in the group. One, Kathy Boudin, had been caught in connection with the robbery of a Brinks truck in Nyack, N.Y., on October 20, 1981, in which two policemen were killed. The other, Diana Oughton, was a bombmaker who had been killed ten years earlier when a townhouse in Greenwich Village that had served as a bomb factory exploded. (The sketch of Oughton was drawn from personal memory).[11] Franks's writings, which go back to the 1960s, present some of the essential elements that make some people terrorists and show how a terrorist may undergo personality changes while in the fold. She says:

All her life, Kathy Boudin, like Diana Oughton, had been an unbending person, determined to finish what she started. During the last two years, while the radical underground was dwindling into irrelevancy, Kathy and other white members of the May 19th Coalition reportedly became more and more rigid, refusing to shake hands with anyone, for example, until they knew the person's politics. They lived in a constant state of deprivation and existed in a vacuum; unable to mix freely in society, their measure of the world might have been taken in large part from doomsday headlines in the tabloids. From such isolation comes a kind of paranoia. Although most of the charges against them had been dropped (much of the evidence against them had been gathered illegally, it turned out), they felt hunted, and like wounded bears, they eventually turned to attack those they saw as their hunters. When the public and even the F.B.I. cared nothing about them, it was the Black Liberation Army with its automatic weapons and reckless abandon that gave them a purpose: a way to make good on years of rhetoric, once and for all to prove that they were not just rich kids playing at revolution.

Franks describes the perplexity of Diana Oughton's parents with their terrorist daughter:

[11] Lucinda Franks, "The Seeds of Terror," New York Times Magazine, Vol. 131, November 22, 1981, p. 34.

Jim Oughton, a liberal Republican and a former Illinois legislator, wanders from room to room looking for clues to the mystery of who his oldest daughter really was, who she had really been. His wife keeps seeing Diana stalking the halls, waving her hands and saying, "It's the only way, Mummy; we've got to bring the war home."

Diana, home from Guatemala, where she slept on a dirt floor, worked with peasants and finally came to believe that American aid was going into the pockets of the rich, who kept the poor poorer. "When she came back, she gave away her fancy clothes and took some old ones from the attic. The fun was gone out of her," says her mother. Diana came home for her final Christmas, her toothbrush in a paper bag. "Her arms were no thicker than her wrists and she didn't have presents for anyone." says her mother. Diana, in her last picture, a mugshot, hair shorn, a black look in her eyes. Fingerprints taken at the same time at a Chicago police station were the only thing that could identify her remains in the Greenwich Village townhouse.

One month before Diana's death, a visitor had paid a visit to Jane Oughton. "We have lost our daughter," Jane said, sitting ramrod straight. The visitor volunteered to invite Diana over for a talk, if Jane thought it might help. "Sure, she'll come over to your house," Jane said, "to blow it up."

Franks concludes:

Kathy Boudin and the other white radicals involved in the Nyack massacre traveled down a long spiral: from idealistic students to peaceful protesters to rioters trashing the streets to revolutionary cadres bent on shedding their "white-skin privilege" to fugitives planting bombs in empty buildings to women and men accused of assassinating the very "people" they said they were fighting for.

The portraits of these two young women resemble Ulrike Meinhof, who came from similar upper-class social surroundings and was, it appears, consumed by feelings of guilt over her privileges as compared to the poor and "oppressed" in the world. This feeling appears to lead to the conviction that equalization in society can be attained, but only by violence.

VI. THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUENCY

Terrorists, of whatever stripe, firmly believe that they are fighting not only for themselves, but for something that will benefit and liberate the "oppressed people" of their nation, the third world, or the entire world, eventually. This fanatically held belief in a cause is subjectively a source of strength, but objectively, it is also a source of great weakness. The terrorists feel justified in what they see as their self-sacrificing struggle against the "oppressors," and the notion of widespread secret or inchoate support by people who do not yet dare to express their sympathies gives them the feeling that they are strong and will win. It also gives them a feeling of being an elite that will lead the common and (they believe) grateful people--once their eyes are fully opened and the revolutionary situation is ripe--to victory and the good life on earth.

At the same time, this belief in the existence of widespread support among the masses must also be a source of weakness, for the masses, in reality, either hate the terrorists or have no interest in them. They certainly do not identify with them, except perhaps in clearly atypical and strictly nationalist terrorist activities, such as those of the Palestinian terrorist groups. (Even there, it is not clear how many Palestinians or Arabs approve of or identify with the PLO and related organizations.)

The many statements (and intramural arguments) of German terrorists reveal one fact that conceivably also pertains to other terrorists who cannot be regarded as millennialists: Their errors and rationalizations

are just as enormous as their deeds are violent; they bend logic and evidence with the same fervor with which they attack people and things, at least in their view of the "masses" and of the overt or covert feelings of sympathy they think these "masses" have toward them. For example, defectors from the Red Army Faction have told us the terrorists all seem convinced that a revolutionary spirit pervades the working masses in all capitalist countries, and consequently, there is a ready or gradually awakening sympathy among these masses for the terrorist cause. And the terrorists seem to hold a conviction that these masses are really ready to take them for their avant garde in the struggle against the oppressors.

But what about the provable fact that the "working masses" in no way sympathize with the terrorists, neither in Germany nor in any other western democracy? On the contrary, whereas intellectuals, students, and other privileged groups have evidenced sympathy for terrorist causes in the form of radical chic or just for reasons of plain political convictions, the working masses everywhere not only seem disinclined to follow the terrorists in any way, but seem to be their harshest critics. In fact, it is the working class that seems inclined to hand out the death penalty to terrorists. The terrorists appear to disregard all of this evidence and stick to their conviction that they fight for the masses, and that the masses love them for it--if not overtly, then covertly, and if not now, then very soon. The terrorists see in the masses of all capitalist democratic countries what they call a "revolutionary readiness," which--unless all available indicators are totally deceiving--simply does not exist. And based on this enormous misconception, the terrorists think that when they act in what should

appear to be a revolutionary direction, all this "revolutionary readiness" will be ignited.

The obviously psychotic man who shot President Reagan believed that the girl he had been unsuccessfully courting from a distance would be his if he demonstrated to her the act of assassinating the president. In his case, the madness of his basic assumption--that love and sympathy would be the reward for the assassination of a president--is not in dispute and is clearly demonstrable. No one agrees with the would-be assassin that killing the president is likely to attract the love of a woman who has spurned him before and whom he does not even know. And the situation is really not much different in the case of millennialist terrorists. A closer look at the political situation in various countries convinces us (and should convince them) that no bombing or political assassination or public massacre or hijacking or hostage-taking is going to arouse the sympathy and comradeship of the "working masses." The terrorists' assumption, really, is as mad as that of President Reagan's assailant and has been proven so time and again in political reality.

THE SLA: A PRIME EXAMPLE

A careful reading of Every Secret Thing, [1] by Patricia Campbell Hearst, leaves no doubt that Donald Freeze ("General Fieldmarshall Cinque" of the SLA), who harangued his little band of followers in their ramshackle "safe" apartment about the large number of groups affiliated with the SLA and their many sympathizers, convinced himself of this support and succeeded in convincing the others. He believed in the

[1] Patricia Hearst, with Alvin Moscow, Every Secret Thing, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1982.

power the SLA was falsely projecting, and Patricia Hearst, who was initially merely an opportunist follower who sought to save her life by agreeing with what was said, eventually came to believe it all herself. "As strange as it seems to me now," she writes, "at the time, although my will to survive was as strong as ever, I accepted the SLA philosophy [dying for the cause] too." [2]

Patricia Hearst describes a highly significant scene which strikes the reader as something suitable for the Theatre of the Absurd, but which was clearly played out in deadly earnest by the five or six people of which the entire SLA consisted:

In preparation for the outbreak of the revolution, Cinque announced at a meeting one night that he had decided upon a new second-in-command. Fahizah [a young woman], who had held that position since the formation of the SLA, did not have the necessary military skills to provide the leadership we would need in the guerilla warfare which would soon be upon us, he said. "Our sister was fine for the position--dedicated, hardworking and capable--when our intelligence operations were so important, writing our Codes of War, getting the message across to the people," Cinque said. "But now everybody knows us. We are now entering a new phase, a military phase. So we need a second-in-command whose strengths are in knowing military action. Therefore, I have decided to promote Teko [a young man] to the position of General and second-in-command."

This, reports Hearst, precipitated a violent discussion in the group that lasted for several hours; no one was struck by the utter absurdity of it all. It may be noteworthy, in this connection, that everything Cinque thought and said was clearly proof that he lived in a world of fantasy, except for his claim that "everybody knows us by now." The tiny group had indeed become a household word in the United States, thanks to media exposure. Perhaps better than any other, this case shows the vital though reluctant role played by the media in terrorism. Cinque

[2] Ibid., p. 84.

could indeed read about his SLA in all the papers and see news about it on TV. But that was, of course, because he had selected Patricia Hearst as his kidnap victim, not because the SLA was so significant. Without so prominent a hostage, his group would not have received one-tenth the publicity. More important, this notoriety did not equate with public sympathy, overt or covert, as Cinque obviously assumed.

Hearst provides additional insights into the thinking of the SLA people--a type of thinking shared by other millennialist terrorists:

My studying the history of art was, in the view of the SLA people, an example of conspicuous consumption and a waste of my life when I should have been spending that time helping "the people." They "loved" what they called "the people." They had forsaken their past bourgeois lives to pick up guns and fight for "the people" to show their love.[3]

She continues:

They all spoke with such sincerity. Fahizah told me that all comrades in the SLA had once lived as I had. "All of us had the weaknesses of our upbringing and we constantly have to struggle even now against the putrid disease of bourgeois mentality." Each of them, as time went on, explained to me how he or she became conscious, that is, aware of the need for taking up weapons to overthrow fascist America and its materialistic society. The concept of Third World leadership was very important to them. They believed that only the black and other oppressed people could lead the struggle for freedom.... Moreover, whites could not be trusted in a leadership position because, historically, they had proven themselves traitors to the cause of the oppressed peoples.... Above all else, they were most proud to be "soldiers of the Symbionese Liberation Army." They were "urban guerillas" at war with the United States government and all its agencies. They had forsaken drugs and liquor and all materialistic pleasures in order to maintain their discipline and military training.

When a new recruit, a black Muslim girl, asked Cinque, "But where are all the blacks? I don't see any blacks except you," Cinque explained,

[3] Ibid., p. 70.

"Oh, this is a white unit. I'm just here--to help them get organized and trained 'cause these brothers and sisters are going to lead the other white units who have joined the struggle...."

Was he consciously lying? Imagining things? It really doesn't matter. He somehow apparently believed what he said, and he made others believe it too. These passages, like the writings of such ex-terrorists as "Bommi" Baumann in Germany, reiterate the two principal fuels driving almost all terrorist groups: the conviction of the validity of their struggle, and the equally firm conviction that "the people" for whom they are fighting will reciprocate their "love" and secretly support them. Considering the provable falseness of this assumption, it is remarkable that they can operate at all; and it seems doubtful that they can operate for very long.

WHERE DOES THE SELF-DECEPTION LEAD?

Why do terrorists cling to these convictions, then? How can they? How long will they? These are questions of central importance for the future of terrorism, for the assumption of actual or potential mass support is really the mainspring of the terrorist elan. Thus their entire rationale is built on quicksand, and the terrorist effort is perhaps constantly on the verge of collapse.

It has been noted that the number of terrorist incidents has declined in the West to some extent (although serious assaults resulting in deaths have increased slightly). Many observers have attributed this to the tougher stand of governments in refusing to accede to the

terrorists' demands.[4] The no-concessions stance has undoubtedly been an important factor, but the absence of popular support or even sympathy from the "masses" has been so overwhelmingly evident that some of the terrorist impetus may have been impeded and corroded over the years. If terrorists are basically rational--and eminent experts on terrorism, including Franco Ferracuti, have said that they are[5]--they cannot close their minds entirely and forever to the fact that the only feeling they have ever aroused in the masses is hostility. This realization should depress and eventually disillusion them, and may provide grounds for cautious optimism among those who are attempting to combat them.

[4] As for example in the kidnappings and murders of Aldo Moro and Hanns Martin Schleyer.

[5] Ferracuti, op. cit.

VII. SOCIOECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS

When modern terrorism first made its appearance in the 1960s, most European terrorists--i.e., those of the millennialist type, such as Ulrike Meinhof--were young people with a certain amount of university education, although none had either a completed education or a brilliant intellectual record. (Though many terrorists are of course old enough to have done so, Horst Mahler is the only one, to our knowledge, who has earned a Ph.D.)

It is not surprising, of course, that most terrorists have had some education, especially in the social sciences: Most of them, especially the early ones, have been ideologists of sorts; and no matter how muddled the thinking of some of these ideologists may be, a certain amount of education is required to form any ideology at all. Concomitantly, most terrorists have come from homes that were at least of the middle-class social level. European students are generally supported by their families, and the families generally have a certain financial and educational standing. The same holds true, of course, in the United States, although more American students work their way through college. Political activist extremists in the United States, most of whom have stopped short of actual terror, are generally also from middle-class backgrounds.

At one time there was a common impression that terrorists were all highly educated people from superior backgrounds, i.e., brilliant and flaming idealists who fought for a better world. Tied in with that impression was the assumption that terrorists were not criminals and had

in fact never been in trouble with the law. But by now, extensive studies on the background of terrorists show considerable deviations from the popular picture. A study made by the German Ministry of Justice (which describes the study as "not 100 percent scientific")[1] presents the following data, based on the trial records of 209 terrorists who were convicted between January 1971 and November 1980:

1. Only one-quarter of the offenders were convicted of attacks on people or property. The others were convicted of theft or robbery to obtain funds for the group, illegal acquisition or ownership of weapons, forging of papers, or simply of membership in illegal organizations. Ten percent were convicted of murder or manslaughter. Fourteen percent had committed acts endangering public safety, such as arson or bombings, or had committed extortion or taken hostages. Fifteen percent were convicted of robbery. The remainder were convicted of less serious or violent crimes, such as forging papers, etc.
2. Contrary to public opinion, women are by no means in the majority.
3. Not only persons from the middle classes are represented, but also persons from the poorer strata of society. Of those on whom statistical information was available, 36 percent came from families with higher socioeconomic status, 23 percent from families with lower socioeconomic status.

[1] German Ministry of Justice, "Social-Biographical Characteristics of Left-Wing Terrorists," Bulletin of Information, August 10, 1981.

4. Not all the terrorists had a university education or attended a university. Some had attended but dropped out. But several had relatively high education levels compared with the population as a whole. At least 36 percent were students or graduates; 28 percent had gone to college at some point and dropped out. Twenty-four percent had only a grade school education.
5. At the time of their terrorist activities, 20 percent had a profession, 10 percent were self-employed, and 26 percent held minor jobs.
6. Twenty percent were married, 13 percent were divorced or separated, and the rest were single.
7. Twenty-six percent (a substantial number) had prior convictions, of which only 11 percent were for political crimes.
8. Sixty-one percent were between the ages of 21 and 30; 18 percent were below 21; the rest were over 30.

There are no comparable statistics available from other countries, but our impression is that these figures are fairly representative of terrorists worldwide.

To the extent that there is a trend, that trend would appear to be "downward," i.e., fewer terrorist group members (particularly in Italy and Germany) have a high educational level, fewer members have no prior criminal record, and more members commit violent offenses.

What do these and other figures mean? According to Dr. Horchem, an expert on terrorism and also a great skeptic,[2]

[2] "Problems of Terrorism in Europe," op. cit., p. 4.

The search for causes [of terrorists becoming terrorists] has produced results that are no doubt interesting, but have no definitive scientific value because the data are insufficient. As far as the curricula of terrorists are concerned, we can say that a considerable percentage have come from bourgeois families of the upper classes, with ten of those being sons or daughters of Christian ministers. What does that mean? Should we now look at all sons and daughters of Christian ministers to see whether they might become terrorists? ... As to family background, the findings have also been very diverse: for example, some terrorists have come from families that were very generous and gave their children a great deal of freedom; others came from families that were very authoritarian; some graduated from high school and others did not; some went about their studies diligently and systematically and others just existed from day to day. All "objective" factors that apply to terrorists also apply to the majority of other young people who do not become terrorists.

This passage shows that unlike military intelligence, which often provides a means of fighting an enemy, information about terrorists--in this case, their social and educational background--does not provide a means of fighting them. But the data do contribute to the picture we have of the terrorists and can perhaps be of some use in anticipating some of their actions.

VIII. DIVISIVE ISSUES AND VULNERABILITIES

Many divisive issues interfere with the cohesion of terrorist groups. Attitudes toward the use of violence, views as to who may or may not be killed in an action, different sexual mores, and just plain stress of the idle and hunted life between actions are, it seems, corrosive agents to morale and sources of friction among members. But there are other divisive factors as well.

DISPUTES OVER EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS

Primary sources such as depositions by ex-terrorists (including Baumann and Klein) indicate considerable differences of opinion among terrorists over how to evaluate the effects of their actions. This clearly is significant for those trying to predict the targets terrorists may strike in the future.

In past wars, soldiers would expect an enemy to strike "lucrative targets," if possible. Such targets were relatively easily determined; both combatants generally agreed on what constituted lucrative targets. But it is very difficult to determine what is considered by a terrorist group to be lucrative, and terrorists themselves argue about this. Some feel that an action is a success if it gets into the headlines; others think that is not enough, or that mere publicity can fail to serve their purposes altogether. For example, terrorists have taken hostages in some aircraft hijackings in order to make demands for public release of certain political statements. A Croatian terrorist who hijacked a TWA plane demanded--and obtained--the printing of a call for Croatian independence in important newspapers in several countries. However, it

was the hijacking itself, the route of the plane, and the identities and fates of the captives that made news; it can safely be assumed that very few people read the long and involved plea for Croatian independence, and that even fewer understood it or were swayed by it.

Thus, like the use of deadly force, which has led to bitter disagreements among terrorists, action evaluation is a great problem and disputes over it are often divisive.

INTRAGROUP PRESSURES

Disputes about what represents success are only one of many problems jeopardizing group cohesion. According to those who have been part of the terrorist scene, almost anything terrorists do produces great pressures on them, be it risky actions or nerve-racking nonaction; constant hiding out in "safe" houses; ideological controversies; disputes over the use of force and killing; disagreements over tactics and strategies; or any kind of group interaction. No doubt, these represent internal weaknesses of groups, but they are not necessarily exploitable weaknesses.

Vulnerabilities can be either physical or psychological. Demonstrably, terrorists everywhere have been vulnerable to police surveillance and to arrest and imprisonment. Nevertheless, they have continued to operate, on the whole. Therefore, it is particularly important to determine whether there may be weaknesses affecting some terrorists, individually or as groups, that could be exploited by psychological warfare. A detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the following can be said: Psychological warfare generally aims not at making the adversary lay down his arms, but at aggravating problems with which he is faced, to

make him lose fervor and, ideally, to tempt him to defect. From what has been learned so far in terrorist studies, the corrosive temptation to defect is apparently present in many terrorists. Perhaps the two greatest impediments to defection are the absence of amnesty for terrorists in most Western countries, and the fear of retaliation by former comrades. There are other impediments, too, of course, such as the fear of being regarded by former comrades as a coward and the fear of feeling like a coward oneself.

Some observers of the terrorist scene believe that some terrorists at least can be "co-opted"; other observers do not share this view. It will take active attempts on terrorist morale to show whether their weaknesses are genuine vulnerabilities.

DRUG USE AND TERRORISM

Not very much is known about drug use by terrorists, but there does not seem to be the connection between drug use and crime that is found in robbery, for example, or in theft. In fact, the road to drugs for young people seems to be the opposite of the road toward terrorism. Up to a point, the drug user and the terrorist travel along the same path: They drop out of society and end their early life careers as a protest against existing values and customs. However, those who are prone to violence tend to select terrorism as their outlet, while the more passive types go into drugs. Drug use is also in conflict with left-wing ideology. Studies made in Italy show that prospective candidates for terrorist organizations who are found to be drug users are screened out. Drug use, to the extent that it occurs, appears to be more frequent among right-wing than left-wing terrorists in Italy.

German studies on the same topic have yielded the same results: On the whole, terrorists, even those who may have been drug users before, cannot reconcile the arduous life they must lead with the time-consuming chase for drugs, not to mention the risks of incapacitation in action and the problems created by withdrawal.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

The question concerning terrorism that is uppermost in people's minds is, What is the future of terrorism? Will it grow? Will it abate? This study has yielded certain indications, and while they are not provable, they nevertheless have logic on their side. We have said that one of the greatest and most obvious misconceptions on the part of terrorists is that they consider themselves to be supported, at least silently, by a large constituency of sympathizers, ready to join them in battle at the decisive moment. Most terrorists are sufficiently devoted to the fantasy of fighting for "the people" that they are not likely to engage in mass killings; for this reason also, they are not likely to consider using the ultimate terror weapon, a nuclear device, or even the release of radioactivity that would poison the atmosphere.

But this constituency does not really exist, and any movement whose central platform rests on a radically erroneous assumption cannot be assumed to be viable in the long run. If the terrorists were activated only by an ideology that condemns the capitalist system, propelled by hatred of the social evils they perceive, and determined to fight against prevailing defense concepts that in their estimation must lead to war, they could go on forever. In fact, all societies have groups with such views who spring up and fight for their cause. But the terrorists' views are based not on theories of war, peace, prosperity, and social justice, but on an analysis of the distribution of political forces, and that analysis is in error. This must inevitably adversely affect terrorist individuals and groups, and it must also be a

vulnerability that can be exploited. All this does not mean, of course, that terrorism is not effective. It may not attain its ultimate aims, but it does stir up great operational problems for governments and industries; it costs those who try to defend against it billions of dollars; and it can strongly affect the political atmosphere wherever it appears. Terrorism seems to have had a particularly strong effect on the political climate in Germany and Italy--two countries that were fascist before World War II, belonged to the Axis, and lost the war. People in both countries seem to some extent to have lost the feeling for what is right and wrong; crushing defeats like those suffered by these two countries often lead to such diminished capacity. As a result, these societies seem to be more easily and widely influenced by terrorists (who are often guilt-ridden from belonging to such societies) than are other nations. Especially in Germany, it is felt in some quarters that society itself has spawned the terrorists, that their actions are therefore even justified to some extent, and that societal changes in accordance with what the terrorists have said are in order. But if the terrorists gain any succor from this, they are likely to be disappointed in the long run, as most Germans do not seem to share this self-inculcating view.

Despite the considerable and increasingly sophisticated research that has been done on terrorism, more can and needs to be done. Earlier researchers were severely handicapped by a paucity of primary data. There were few terrorists to talk to and few self-revelatory "confessions" in print. Moreover, the authorities in countries that held captured terrorists in prison showed little inclination to permit researchers to interview them.

Although the number of terrorist incidents has not risen significantly over time, each year there are new actions, new prisoners, new victims, and new attacks producing new sources and new data for analysis. Also, more people are concerned with studying terrorism in depth, so there are increasing opportunities to "compare notes," especially where close international working relationships have been established.

What will all this research yield? The principal purpose of studying terrorists is to find ways to predict, with some confidence, what they will do next, where they will do it, how they will do it, and why they might be tempted to do it. This is particularly important because it is impossible to defend against them statically. With their mobility and therefore their de facto ubiquity, terrorists can strike anywhere at any time. To thwart them, the whole world would have to transform itself into an armed camp. Thus, predictability, which can only come from in-depth knowledge, is essential.

Continuing research on terrorism may also reveal certain weaknesses on the part of terrorist groups that can be exploited. We know that the life of a terrorist is not usually a happy one. Being once a dropout, which is likely to be more his own than society's "fault," he may well be a chronic dropout, i.e., a person who sooner or later might want to drop out of the terrorist group as well. Some persons who cannot endure the constraints imposed on them by society cannot endure the constraints imposed on them by terrorist groups either. If we add to that the internecine struggles, the disillusionment with terrorist aims and purposes, the disillusionment with apparent lack of popular support, the

disappointment over the effects of dangerous and strenuous actions, the arduous nature of terrorist existence, and the effects on terrorists of growing older and therefore conceivably wiser on the one hand and physically weaker on the other, we have a large number of powerful disincentives against almost anyone staying in the terrorist fold.

But how to get out? As in organized crime, there is no easy or safe exit, nor is there at this point any reentry into society except via long prison terms, which are not only very unattractive but do not even constitute a way to enter society as a full-fledged member. It has therefore been proposed that some form of personal amnesty might be offered as a way to lure disaffected terrorist members away from their groups. Some experts on terrorism believe terrorists can be "co-opted"; others are more skeptical. As efforts at "co-opting" could require bending the law and probably enraging large numbers of good citizens, no such efforts have yet been tried. Continuing in-depth study of terrorism may reveal better ways to lure members away from the group and to conduct effective psychological warfare against those who cannot be lured away.

Toward these twin ends of predicting terrorist decisionmaking and exploiting physical and psychological vulnerabilities, continued effective research into the growing body of primary data promises to make the most significant contribution.

Appendix

PRIMARY SOURCES OF TERRORIST DATA

BOOKS

Baumann, Michael (Bommi), Terror or Love? Bommi Baumann's Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerilla, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1978; published in German as Wie Alles Anfing, Tri-Kont-Verlag, Munich, West Germany, 1977.

Hearst, Patricia, with Alvin Moscow, Every Secret Thing, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1982.

Iyad, Abu, with Eric Rouleau, translated by Linda Butler Koseoglu, My Home, My Land, A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle, Times Books, New York, 1981.

Jager, Herbert, Gerhard Schmidtchen, and Liesolotte Sullwold, Analysis in the Area of Terrorism - Analysis of Lives (Lebenslaufanalysen), West German Ministry of the Interior, Westdeutscher Verlag, Bonn, West Germany, 1981.

Klein, Hans-Joachim, La Mort Mercenaire: Temoignage d'un Ancien Terroriste Ouest-Allemand, presente par Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1980.

MacStiofain, Sean, Revolutionary in Ireland, Gordon Cremonesi, United Kingdom, 1975.

McGuire, Maria, To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA, Macmillan, London, 1973.

Silj, Alessandro, Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism, translated from the Italian by S. Atanasio, Karz Publishers, New York, 1979.

Stern, Susan, With the Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1975.

REPORTS, JOURNALS, AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Headquarters, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Special Report: Terrorists on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., August 1978.

Fleetwood, Blake, "I'm Going to Declare War," New Times, May 13, 1977.

Stein, Jeff, "Inside Omega 7," Village Voice, March 10, 1980.

INTERVIEWS

German Terrorists

Baader, Andreas, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe, "Wir werden in den Durststreik treten (We will begin a 'thirst strike')," Der Spiegel, No. 4, 1975.

Baumann, Michael "The Mind of a German Terrorist," Encounter, Vol. LI, No. 3, September 1978, pp. 81-88.

Boock, Peter Juergen, "Im Schutzengraben fur die falsche Sache (In the Foxhole for the Wrong Cause)," interview in Hamburg Remand prison about experience with the Red Army Faction, Der Spiegel, February 23, 1981, pp. 110-125.

Fleischer, M. P., "Conversations of a Cuban Hit Man," Tropic Magazine, December 2, 1973.

Ganier-Raymond, Philippe, "L'autocritique d'un terroriste allemande," (Horst Mahler, German lawyer, one of the founders and the theoretician of the Baader-Meinhof gang), Le Monde, September 7, 1980.

Klein, Hans-Joachim, "Ich habe genug angestellt (I Have Done Enough Bad Things)," Der Spiegel, No. 20, 1977, pp. 33-34.

-----, "Den Papst einen Monat lang ausspioniert (We Spied on the Pope for a Month)," interview on the OPEC attack, terrorism, Der Spiegel, August 7, 1978, pp. 70-82.

-----, "Die Waffe niedergelegt und ab in die Busche (Down with the Weapon and Quit the Job)," Der Spiegel, November 3, 1980, pp. 135-138.

-----, "Les Memoires d'un Terroriste International," Enquete, October 3, 1978.

Horst Mahler, Per la Critica del Terrorismo, published in Italy by De Donato (first world edition), 1980; available also in German.

-----, interview in Der Spiegel, December 31, 1979.

J. David Truby, "Women as Terrorists," Clandestine Tactics and Technology, IACP, CTT, 1976.

"Wir brauchen mehr Gelassenheit (We need more equanimity)," interview with Minister of the Interior Baum, Der Spiegel, No. 53, December 31, 1979.

Italian Terrorists

"Terrorist Carlo Fioroni Talks to Police," Il Mattino, Naples, January 8, 1980, pp. 1-12.

"Former Prima Linea Terrorist Sandalo Explains Defection," Panorama, Milan, June 30, 1980, p. 60.

"Des deserteurs du terrorisme temignent," interview with two ex-members of Prima Linea, Liberation, No. 2072, Paris, in three parts, October 13-30, 1980.

"Revelations by Leading 'Repentant' Terrorists," (Peci, Fioroni, Casirati, Borromeo, Sandalo, Zedda, Giaai, Viscardi), L'Espresso, Rome, December 21, 1980, pp. 24-31.

"Interview with Repentant Terrorist Sandalo," L'Europea, Milan, January 19, 1981, pp. 84-89.

"Revelations by 'Repentant' Terrorist Libardi," L'Europea, Milan, March 9, 1981, pp. 24-25.

The Faranda-Morucci Debate

"Dissenting Brigadists," unsigned article by Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda, Lotta continua, July 26, 1979, pp. 9-14.

Communique 21, signed by prisoners of Lamarmora (Torino), July 12, 1979,

"You Were All Paid by the Psychological Counter-Guerrilla, so: 'Back to School, Little Boys.'" Red Brigades "leaders" reply to dissidents, Renato Curcio and 16 others sign, Lotta continua, July 31, 1979.

"How We Were Born, Why We Have Come Along with You, Why We Have Left," Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda, response to Encyclical of Renato Curcio, Lotta continua, October 28, 1979.

Other Terrorists

Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo Okamoto" (one of the attackers at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, 1972), Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 9, September 1976.

"IRA Leader Discusses Attacks in FRG, 'Hit List' Targets," described as "first authorized interview with member of the new leadership staff of the IRA, "Patrick," Der Spiegel, April 8, 1980, pp. 145-151.

"Interview with Carlos, International Terrorist," Near East/North Africa Report, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 29, 1980.

Frederick Hacker, "The Mind of the Terrorist" (Leila Khaled), The Listener, Vol. 93, No. 2409, June 5, 1975.

REFERENCES

- Analyzen zum Terrorismus, No. 2, Westdeutscher Verlag, Bonn, West Germany, 1981.
- Asim-al-Jundi, "Interview with Carlos, International Terrorist," Near East/North Africa Report, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 29, 1980,
- Becker, Jillian, Hitler's Children, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1977.
- Ferracuti, Franco, "Psychiatric Aspect of Terrorism in Italy," edition Forensic Psychiatry, University of Rome, n.d.
- Fleetwood, Blake, "I'm Going to Declare War," New Times, May 13, 1977.
- Fleischer, M. P., "Conversations of a Cuban Hit Man," Tropic Magazine, December 2, 1973.
- Franks, Lucinda, "The Seeds of Terror," New York Times Magazine, Vol. 131, November 22, 1981.
- German Ministry of Justice, "Social-Biological Characteristics of Left-Wing Terrorists," Bulletin of Information, August 10, 1981.
- Hearst, Patricia, with Alvin Moscow, Every Secret Thing, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1982.
- Institut fur politische Zeitfragen, "Problems of Terrorism in Europe," Information Bulletin, September 1979.
- Jager, Herbert, Gerhard Schmidtchen, and Liesolotte Sullwold, Analysis in the Area of Terrorism - Analysis of Lives (Lebenslaufanalysen), West German Ministry of the Interior, Westdeutscher Verlag, Bonn, West Germany, 1981.
- Kellen, Konrad, Terrorists--What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions, The Rand Corporation, N-1300-SL, November 1979.
- Laqueur, Walter, Guerilla: A Historical and Critical Study, Little, Brown, Boston, 1976.
- MacStiofain, Sean, Revolutionary in Ireland, Gordon Cremonesi, United Kingdom, 1975.
- Pyzins, Eugene, The Doctrine of Anarchism, The Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1955.

Silj, Alessandro, Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism, translated from the Italian by S. Atanasio, Karz Publishers, New York, 1979.

Stein, Jeff, "Inside Omega 7," Village Voice, March 10, 1980.

Sterling, Claire, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism, Holt, Rinehart and Winson, New York, 1981.

