Effect of Pre-Aiming APS Launcher on Minimum Engagement Range and Multi-Vehicle Protection

Abstract

In traditional Active Protection System (APS) modeling the countermeasure launcher is assumed to either be stowed under armor or at some fixed axis on the vehicle. The time required to detect the threat launch, raise and/or rotate the launcher, track the threat, and the fly-out of the countermeasure determines the minimum engagement range (shooter to victim). When operating in a cluttered battlefield, this may allow some threats to be inside this minimum range. However, by pre-aiming the launcher at the most likely, or most dangerous, location for an enemy to shoot from, a reduction in the minimum engagement range will be achieved. The risk in pre-aiming an APS launcher is twofold: You chose wrong and are shot from the blind side or you are attacked simultaneously, or nearly, from the (dangerous) side and the (safe) side. This can possibly be mitigated by one APS equipped vehicle concentrating on the high threat area while a second APS equipped vehicle protects both vehicles on the lower threat side. This paper will examine the minimum engagement range reduction achieved by a pre-aimed APS launcher and the feasibility of mutual protection.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 08, 2003
Accession Number
ADA483882

Entities

People

  • Daniel Hicks
  • Jack Reed
  • W. Andrew Jackson

Organizations

  • United States Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Availability
  • Battlefields
  • Classification
  • Contracts
  • Countermeasures
  • Information Operations
  • Instructions
  • Launchers
  • Monitoring
  • Security

Readers

  • Materials Science
  • Missile Defense Systems.
  • Radar Systems Engineering.