

Terrorism and Beyond

An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict

Brian M. Jenkins, Conference Director



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An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict

Brian M. Jenkins, Conference Director

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PREFACE

As part of its continuing program of research on political violence, terrorism, and other aspects of subnational conflict, The Rand Corporation hosted an International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict in September 1980. The sponsorship of this conference was a joint undertaking by the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and The Rand Corporation itself.

The conference had three objectives: First, it provided an opportunity to examine recent events, identify any new trends in terrorism, and exchange information on countermeasures. Second, it gave participants a chance to review more generally what had been learned about the phenomenon of terrorism in the 1970s and to explore its possible future course in the 1980s. The third objective was to identify the means by which individual research efforts in various countries could be coordinated and the results of this research shared.

Participants at the conference addressed four areas: the terrorist environment, the terrorist mindset, the government response, and the future course of terrorism. This report summarizes the discussions in these four areas. It also includes eleven contributed papers that were used as resource material for the discussions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is more enjoyable to attend conferences than it is to organize and host one. A conference attended by 144 persons from 13 countries is a major undertaking that requires the cooperation and assistance of many.

Special thanks are due to Ambassador Anthony C.E. Quainton, Director of the U.S. Department of State's Office for Combating Terrorism, who at a conference in Tel Aviv a year earlier first suggested the idea of continuing the international exchange with a conference in the United States. Ambassador Quainton mustered the necessary support in government, provided continued encouragement and assistance to the effort, and opened the conference itself with a provocative and challenging address.

The conference was a joint undertaking involving financial support from the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, and The Rand Corporation. A special debt of gratitude is owed for the personal support and assistance given by George Weisz, Director of the Office of Safeguards and Security in the Department of Energy; Perry Rivkind, Assistant Administrator/Operations Support, of the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency in the Department of Justice; and Eric Willenz, Chairman, Europe & Global Research Group, of the Bureau of Intelligence & Research in the Department of State. Their involvement went far beyond merely representing the sponsoring agencies.

Appreciation is also expressed to General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, for his continuing encouragement of research in this area, and for taking time from his busy schedule to participate in the conference.

For his assistance in identifying and inviting key officials from the United States and abroad and for his many helpful suggestions, we are grateful to George Tanham of The Rand Corporation.

The conference benefited greatly from the members of Rand's research staff who assisted in the conference preparations and in the simulations and who participated as hosts, guides, whips, and rapporteurs in the various working groups. Appreciation is expressed to Gail Bass, William Fowler, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Krofcheck, Marvin Lavin, Joyce Peterson, Geri Petty, Susanna Purnell, Robert Reinstedt, David Ronfeldt, William Sater, Peter Tripodes, Eleanor Wainstein, and Sorrel Wildhorn.

At every conference, there are one or two persons whose unstinting efforts behind the scenes make everything run smoothly. In this case, there were four. For the several hundred things they did before the conference (and for handling with diplomacy and good humor the inevitable little crises that arose during the conference), fond appreciation is expressed to the effective backstage team of Claude Culp, Toby O'Brien, Suzy Goulet, and Bernadine Siuda.

It is an unfortunate fact of contemporary life that major conferences must consider the problem of security. This is especially true of a major international conference on terrorism. Security preparations began as the first invitations were sent out. That the conference did not become an event in its own subject area is owed to the sound suggestions and combined efforts of the Santa Monica Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and The Rand Corporation's own security force.

We are indebted to Robert Perry and Arthur Alexander, who made a number of useful suggestions for improving this report, and to Janet DeLand for useful suggestions in organizing the report and for her skillful editing. Joyce Peterson also assisted in the editing, and Alyce Raphael worked flawlessly and fast in the preparation of the voluminous manuscript. The conference was visually enriched by the bold graphics designs of J. Michael Jenkins.

Finally, although mentioned before, a very special thanks is due to my secretary Bernadine Siuda for her enthusiastic hard work in the organization of the conference and in the preparation of this report.

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Part 1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Brian M. Jenkins
The Rand Corporation

Overshadowed by events of grander scale—India's invasion of Pakistan, the October War, the fall of Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq—terrorists waged a hundred little wars during the 1970s on the boulevards and back streets from Beirut to Buenos Aires, from Belfast to Bogotá. International terrorism, a relatively new phenomenon in 1970, captured headlines throughout the succeeding decade.

Growing worldwide terrorism aroused the concern of governments, attracted the attention of scholars, and was the theme of a growing volume of literature. Through their sponsorship of research and conferences, governments supported an increasing body of analysis on the topic.

In March 1976, the U.S. Department of State convened a major international conference on terrorism that brought together, in Washington, D.C., government officials and members of the academic and research communities. It was followed in 1977 by a second conference on terrorism, in Evian, France. Subsequent international conferences were held in Berlin in 1978 and in Tel Aviv in 1979.

These conferences and other, smaller international meetings have been a means of keeping government officials who are responsible for dealing with terrorism abreast of the latest results of research on the topic, for the exchange of information and experiences, and for identifying important issues for future research. They have also helped to create a useful informal network of contacts among government officials and those doing research on terrorism.

As part of its continuing program of research on political violence, terrorism, and other aspects of subnational conflict, The Rand Corporation hosted an International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict in September 1980. The sponsorship of this conference was a joint undertaking by the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and The Rand Corporation itself. It was an ambitious effort. Approximately 140 persons participated in the conference discussions and in a series of simulations conducted at the end of the five-day meeting.

The conference brought together government officials and scholars, as well as representatives of the private sector. Those with operational responsibilities for combatting terrorism predominated. Seventy-

seven of the 140 participants were government officials; 45 came from the U.S. government, 17 represented state and local governments, 15 were officials of foreign governments. Officials from departments or ministries of justice and law-enforcement organizations comprised the largest group, followed by Defense Department officials and military officers, officials of intelligence organizations, officials from the U.S. Department of State and foreign affairs ministries, officials from the Department of Energy, and officials from other government agencies. The remaining participants were mainly scholars or analysts, representing 15 universities and 11 research institutes.

A number of the participants at the conference were senior officials of major corporations. Since business executives and facilities became the favorite targets of terrorists in the 1970s—30 percent of all terrorist attacks were directed against personnel and facilities of private corporations, which present vulnerable and often lucrative targets—it was appropriate to include the corporate perspective in the discussions.

Thirty-one of the participants came from abroad. Thirteen countries were represented: Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, The Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While not all of these countries have suffered high levels of terrorism, many of them have. Collectively, the 13 countries have experienced nearly 60 percent of all reported terrorist incidents since 1968. Whether this unequal distribution is inherent in the way we define terrorism or reflects certain problems or vulnerabilities common to the society of these countries was one of the issues discussed at the conference.

Twenty-six of the attendees at the conference participated in at least one of the earlier conferences on terrorism. This cadre of veterans is extremely important in that it constitutes a kind of informal international network that keeps in touch and identifies new areas of research. Its presence also kept the Rand conference from merely duplicating the debates and conclusions of past meetings. It enabled the participants to focus on the additional insights into the phenomenon that are gained between conferences.

OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE

The conference had several objectives. First, it provided an opportunity to examine recent events, identify any new trends in terrorism, and exchange information on countermeasures. Second, it gave participants a chance to review more generally what had been learned about the phenomenon of terrorism in the 1970s and to ex-

plore its possible future course in the 1980s. A third objective was to identify the means by which individual research efforts in various countries could be coordinated and the results of this research shared.

With regard to recent terrorist events, the participants had ample material to discuss. Since the 1979 conference in Tel Aviv, a number of major terrorist incidents had occurred. One topic on everyone's mind in 1980 was the protection of embassies. The crisis that began November 4, 1979, with the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran continued into its tenth month at the time of the meeting. The episode was unique in the annals of terrorism and was extremely frustrating. Efforts to negotiate the release of the American hostages as of September had produced no result. The rescue attempt had failed.

On January 31, 1980, armed protesters seized the Spanish embassy in Guatemala. The outcome of this episode was tragic. Despite the Spanish ambassador's pleas that force not be used to resolve the incident, Guatemalan police assaulted the building. During the fighting, one of the protesters threw a Molotov cocktail and within minutes the entire building was in flames. Only the Spanish ambassador himself and one of the protesters survived; 39 persons died in the fire. Outraged at the assault, Spain broke diplomatic relations with Guatemala.

On February 4, 1980, another group seized the Spanish embassy in El Salvador, taking 11 persons hostage, including the Spanish ambassador. The episode was resolved when the government of El Salvador agreed to free five prisoners whose release the terrorists had demanded.

Sixteen armed members of M-19, a guerrilla group in Colombia, shot their way into the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogotá on February 27, 1980. Timing their attack to coincide with a diplomatic reception, the guerrillas took 57 persons hostage, including the ambassadors of 11 countries. They demanded the release of 311 prisoners, \$50 million in ransom, and safe passage out of the country. The terrorists finally accepted safe passage to Cuba and \$2 million after a 61-day siege.

On April 30, 1980, five Iranian terrorists seized 26 hostages at the Iranian embassy in London to demand the release of 31 prisoners jailed in Iran. On the fifth day, the terrorists murdered one of the hostages; on the sixth day, British commandos assaulted the building, killing all but one of the terrorists and rescuing the remaining hostages.

In the Republic of Ireland, IRA terrorists assassinated Lord Mountbatten as part of a continuing campaign against high-ranking British officials, a campaign of terrorist spectacles calculated to keep the Irish problem on the front pages.

Although pressed hard by police, left-wing terrorists in Italy continued their campaign of assassinations and kneecappings (the shooting of victims in the knees). The bombing of the Bologna train station in August 1980, presumably by right-wing terrorists, raised the spectre of large-scale, indiscriminate violence, a domain most terrorist groups had not yet entered.

Growing political violence from both the left and the right in Turkey culminated in the assassination of the former prime minister, Nihat Erim, and in the military takeover of the government, which occurred during the conference. (This event made particularly relevant the analysis of the Turkish situation provided by Ihsan Gurkan, a retired Turkish general, which is included in Part 3 of this report.)

State-sponsored terrorism took a new form when Libya launched an openly avowed campaign of assassinations directed against Libyan dissidents living abroad. Libyan exiles were murdered in London, Paris, Milan, Rome, Athens, and Beirut after Colonel Qaddafi called for the killing of opponents of his revolution who lived abroad.

But governments also achieved major successes in their efforts to combat terrorism. Germany continued to track down members of the Red Army Faction, keeping those still at large on the run. Italian authorities launched a major offensive against Italy's terrorists that resulted in over a thousand arrests by the end of 1980. The British Special Air Service's successful assault on the Iranian embassy in London was one of the more spectacular displays of commando skills. A number of participants at the conference were directly involved in the handling of these events.

Although only one of the four discussion groups at the conference was specifically charged with examining the future course of terrorism, all of the groups were asked to look to the future. The group examining the terrorist environment was asked what political, economic, or social environments were most likely to spawn high levels of political violence. The group looking at the terrorist mindset and decisionmaking was asked what terrorists would decide to do next. The group on government response was asked what new terrorism problems governments would face in the 1980s.

In looking to the future, conference participants were asked to look beyond terrorism itself, which might persist in its present form, might change dramatically in its targets or tactics, or might even escalate. A related topic was the broader domain of low-level conflict. Where does terrorism, a specific set of tactics, fit in the broader spectrum of armed conflict? Both Ambassador Quainton, the head of the U.S. State Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, and General Meyer, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, dealt with this question in their opening remarks.

Participants were urged to be bold in their thinking. Had this same conference been held in September 1970 instead of September 1980, it is unlikely that participants would have anticipated the dramatic increase in terrorism throughout the world, particularly in the modern, industrialized democracies of the West, or would have predicted events like the massacre at Lod Airport, the seizure of athletes at the Munich Olympiad, the capture of the OPEC ministers in Vienna, the rescues at Entebbe and Mogadishu, the kidnapping and murder of the premier of Italy, or the assassination of Lord Mountbatten. They would probably not have predicted developments such as airline passenger screening, the use of X-rays and metal detectors at all airports, and the institution of elaborate security measures at embassies.

Yet some of the previous conferences had prophetic aspects. At the March 1976 conference in Washington, D.C., it was suggested that nations faced with a terrorist incident abroad and frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the local government or the inability of international pressure to resolve the crisis might use military force in another country. Three months before Entebbe, the forecast was received with considerable skepticism.

At the same conference, it was suggested that nations unwilling to employ normal diplomacy and unable or unwilling to mount a conventional challenge on the battlefield might adopt terrorist tactics, employ terrorist groups, or exploit terrorist incidents as a mode of surrogate warfare against their foes. In part, this prediction was wrong. It was originally thought that the principal attraction of surrogate warfare would be deniability. It appeared in 1980, however, that deniability was not necessarily sought by offending governments.

Participants at the 1978 conference in Berlin suggested that certain religious cults shared many of the attributes of terrorist groups—a militant ideology, an extremist mindset, a paranoid view of the world, the acquisition of arms, an urge to martyrdom—and might be capable of more extreme acts of destruction, or self-destruction, than those that had been carried out by terrorists. None of us at the conference had then heard of Jim Jones or Jonestown.

And at the Tel Aviv conference in July 1979, participants took part in a simulation that involved American hostages held in Teheran, with the Iranian government being totally uncooperative—in retrospect, an episode that was remarkably similar to the crisis that followed the takeover of the American embassy in November. (The first takeover of the American embassy in Teheran in February 1979 provided a precedent and probably some inspiration for the Tel Aviv game.)

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

When we at Rand planned the present conference, we deliberately avoided prepared papers and formal presentations in favor of a working-group format that would permit greater participation by all those attending the conference. We did not want a hundred persons listening to one speaker. Therefore, the participants were divided into working groups, each focusing on a particular topic: the terrorist environment, the terrorists, the government response, and the future course of terrorism.

The Terrorist Environment. A handful of nations seem to have suffered a disproportionate share of the world's terrorist violence. The question put to this group was, Why? Is this unequal distribution inherent in the way we define terrorism, or is it a result of bias in reporting, or should we seek explanations in the political, social, and economic conditions that prevail in these countries? The group was also asked to examine the role of patron states in instigating or supporting terrorism.

The Terrorists. The second group was asked to review what has been learned about the mindset and behavior of the individual terrorist. Has knowledge in this area progressed very much since an international panel summarized the results of its discussions at the Berlin conference in 1978? What have we learned about the patterns of decisionmaking in terrorist groups?

The Government Response. In what areas of combatting terrorism have governments been most successful? The third group addressed this question. Members were also asked what strategies had been tried, and which had worked; what roles intelligence, research, technology, new laws, and political strategies had played; whether the limits of international cooperation had been reached; and if more international cooperation could be anticipated.

The Future Course of Terrorism. The fourth group was asked whether terrorism has become a permanent feature of modern society. What directions might terrorists take in the future? More of the same? Or would they alter their targets and tactics? With their ability to attract major attention and their coercive power declining, would terrorists threaten indiscriminate violence or mass murder? What effect would changes in the world political environment have on the future course of terrorism? Would terrorism decline with heightened world tensions? With the threat of war?

In addition to addressing its assigned topic, each working group was asked to identify important issues, for future research, and to review the data that had been developed to support this research, as well as their availability.

Although no formal papers were presented, participants were requested to provide a page or two of succinctly stated ideas for use as starting points in the working-group discussions. These included observations about the phenomenon of terrorism, conclusions derived from research a participant might have done on any aspect of political violence, and hypotheses or questions for future inquiry. The papers were compiled at Rand and were used as the agendas for discussions in the working groups. In addition, a number of the conference participants brought papers or provided briefings that were subsequently edited into papers. This supporting material is reproduced in Part 3 of this report.

After an introductory plenary session, participants divided into the four working groups and spent the next two and one-half days in working-group discussions. On the afternoon of the third day, the participants met in another plenary session to listen to a summary of each group's labors. The final two days of the conference were devoted to a simulation in which conference participants played the roles of various governments, private corporations, and terrorists in a series of terrorist-instigated incidents.

THE WORKING GROUPS

The Terrorist Environment

Do we seek the causes of terrorism in the political, economic, or social conditions that prevail in a country, or in the biographies and personalities of the individual terrorists? The working group on The Terrorist Environment tackled the first part of that question: What environmental factors contribute to the precipitation or to the persistence of terrorist violence?

Discussions of the causes of terrorism or the conditions that are propitious to terrorism are invariably frustrating; this one was apparently no exception, despite the vast knowledge and experience of the participants, the diplomatic skills of the chairman in moving the discussion along, and the memories and summarizing skills of the rapporteurs. The fact is, we do not know what causes terrorism to flourish in one society and to be absent in another.

We do know that terrorism, at least as we define it, affects the world unevenly. A few nations suffer high levels of terrorism, while others seem virtually immune to this particular form of violence. Nearly 90 percent of the reported international terrorist incidents involve only 20 countries, nine of which account for better than half of those incidents. One gets a slightly different picture when both local

and international acts of terrorism are considered, but the uneven distribution of terrorism worldwide and the identity of the top ten nations changes little. However, these statistics are not entirely reliable. Chronologies of terrorist actions from which the figures are drawn derive almost entirely from media accounts (which is not as bad as it sounds, since terrorist actions are intended to be public events), with the result that violent actions in the rural backlands of South Asia or Latin America may not be reflected, although many would probably qualify as terrorist incidents. This may explain why modern urbanized nations of the West appear to suffer more terrorism than do the developing countries of the Third World, but it does not explain why Spain, France, and Italy have high levels of terrorist activity, while the Scandinavian countries have little.

Censorship creates still another problem. Censorship may or may not discourage terrorist activity, but it can have an effect on the ability of researchers to accurately chronicle terrorist violence.

Moreover, a counting of terrorist incidents does not necessarily give us an accurate picture of the level of political violence in a country. Terrorism is a peculiar form of violence that is morally, legally, and arbitrarily defined. Italy may be seen to have a more serious terrorist problem than Colombia or El Salvador, although obviously the latter two countries suffer much higher levels of overall political violence. But we must consider the fact that political extremists in Italy express themselves almost exclusively through terrorist actions, while in Colombia and El Salvador, occasional acts of terrorism are merely part of a larger guerrilla contest. Indeed, terrorism may decline as the level of violence goes up. We have seen this pattern repeated several times in Latin America. Acts of terrorism predominate in the early stages of the struggle as antagonists seek publicity and try to finance further operations through kidnappings. Then, as the struggle develops, the anti-government forces adopt a more traditional mode of rural guerrilla warfare. Terrorism declines while the fighting escalates.

Definitions and attitudes also cloud the discussion. The anomalies between the level of terrorist activity and the level of political violence arise only when we try to distinguish between political violence that is not terrorism and a well-defined set of acts that constitute terrorism. While such a distinction may be legally and perhaps morally useful, is it relevant to the question of the causes or conditions that lead to terrorist violence? Are we talking about the causes of political violence, or are we asking why some groups who have already resorted to arms employ terrorist tactics while some others do not?

And finally, the areas in which terrorism occurs are not necessarily the sources of terrorism. A majority of major attacks by Palestinian terrorist groups occur outside of the Middle East and North Africa. Armenian terrorists target Turkey but rarely operate there. In these cases, to which societies do we look for the causes of terrorism?

These problems have not prevented observers from offering explanations for the unequal distribution of terrorism: Some say that terrorism is the by-product of repression; others say it is the by-product of a free society. Some say that terrorism is most virulent in the former Axis powers; others, that it is most virulent in countries where anarchism was rampant in an earlier part of the century. Some say that terrorism is the product of rapid economic growth; others, that it is the product of economic stagnation. Although it is possible to find some evidence to support almost every hypothesis, it is also possible to find contrary examples. No single hypothesis works across the board. However, there is substantiation for several hypotheses in any single country among those where high levels of terrorism have been recorded. Indeed, it is a characteristic of those countries that local conditions tend to support several hypotheses. That brings us to a multiplicity of causal factors.

The working group on The Terrorist Environment concluded that although many factors might be involved—economic, historical, cultural, ethnic, technological, geographical, demographic, psychological, political, and possibly others—no single factor could be identified as a universal cause or even as a universal precipitator of terrorism. Terrorism in various forms flourishes in different countries at different times due to idiosyncratic combinations of factors.

While participants could not precisely describe the conditions under which terrorism may flourish, they did note that totalitarian states provide a "poor environment for terrorism," at least for terrorism that is not under government control. They noted that strict government controls over citizens, over the news media, and over the educational system, combined with a lack of restraints on governmental countermeasures, clearly inhibit terrorism in such states. We may infer, then, that a society that allows the free movement and association of its citizens, that has a comparatively free press, that possesses an educational system unfettered by governmental control, and that places restrictions on its government in dealing with dissidents—in other words, a democratic society—is vulnerable to terrorism. The statistical distribution of terrorist activity in the world partially supports this contention.

Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Colombia, the United States, Turkey (on the basis of figures prior to the 1980 coup), and Spain (before and since the death of Franco) appear high on the list of countries

affected by terrorism. Very little terrorism is reported in the Soviet Union or in the Eastern European nations. Argentina is also high on the list, although its government can be described as authoritarian, except for a brief and tumultuous democratic intermission in the mid-1970s. In the late 1970s, the Argentinian government destroyed the major terrorist groups. (We must note here that the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian governments on other than ideological grounds is not always clear.) Terrorist activity appears to be concentrated in modern, nontotalitarian, and comparatively affluent societies.

The working group did identify the media as a critical factor in the terrorist environment. Terrorist activity is usually calculated to gain publicity, which the news media, by definition, provide. Thus, the publicity aspect generally receives the most attention in discussions of the relationship between terrorism and the media. Participants, however, suggested that in some countries the press has made the environment more hospitable to terrorism by automatically assuming an adversarial role toward the government, sympathizing with terrorists' goals (even while condemning their violent methods), criticizing government efforts to deal with terrorists, and in some cases, even assisting terrorists by printing or broadcasting information on police operations.

The participants identified the presence of sympathizers or a supportive subculture as another crucial aspect of the terrorist environment. A sympathetic constituency makes the environment more hospitable to the terrorists and provides fertile ground for recruiting future terrorists. It would appear, then, that government actions aimed at co-opting or reducing the size of the terrorists' constituency must complement actions aimed at destroying the terrorist groups themselves.

The participants discussed the role of patron states, particularly the Soviet Union, in supporting terrorism. They concluded that while such support may be important to terrorist groups fighting on foreign soil, it rarely extends to the provision of specific operational directions.

The Terrorists

If the working group on The Terrorist Environment could identify no single environmental factor as the cause of terrorism, neither could the working group on The Terrorists identify a single "terrorist type." Terrorists do share some common traits, the group observed, but there is no identifiable psychotic "terrorist personality." There are so many types of terrorists and so many different types at differ-

ent times and places that it is impossible to identify their psychological traits. Indeed, in the final analysis, there may be nothing psychiatrically unexpected about terrorists.

Before reading the summary of the working-group discussion on *The Terrorists*, the reader should review "The Psychology of the Terrorist," by Risto Fried, in Part 3. This paper is the draft report from the 1978 Berlin conference committee that dealt with the psychology of the terrorist. Comparing it with the discussion at the present conference, we see that researchers have made some progress in understanding the mindset of terrorists. The present discussion is richer, but it is still based largely on anecdotal information provided by the handful of participants who have had first-hand experience with terrorists as negotiators, as intelligence or law-enforcement officers, or in one case, as a former member of the Polish resistance movement during the Nazi occupation.¹ There still are no empirical studies of terrorists worldwide. Researchers have not yet systematically mined the growing volume of material written or spoken by terrorists themselves—their manifestos, communiques, strategic directives, underground interviews, depositions, confessions, and memoirs. Moreover, what participants said about terrorists—about the changes in the outlook of a group over time, the decline in intellectual quality, the onset of disillusionment—is based primarily on information about a handful of Italian and German terrorists. How do they compare with Turkish terrorists, Basque or Puerto Rican separatists, or Palestinians who hijack airliners? No comparisons have been made.

Opportunities for research in this direction are growing. An increasing number of terrorists have been incarcerated, and although not all are willing to cooperate with eager interviewers, some have a great deal to say, much of it self-serving, yet all of it revealing. The so-called "repentants" from the Red Brigades and other Italian terrorist organizations have provided a wealth of data about the inner workings of their groups and the kinds of people that belong to them. A forthcoming German study described by Reinhard Rupprecht in "The Causes of Terrorism," in Part 3 of this report, will provide further insights. However, future researchers will still have to base their work on information that may be relevant only to Italian and German terrorists. More investigation must be directed toward ethnically based and right-wing terrorist groups as well.

The discussants agreed that terrorists do not become terrorists overnight. The road to terrorism usually begins with some form of

¹ This individual said that although the Nazi occupiers probably would have labeled members of the resistance "terrorists," the Polish underground would have rejected the tactics of today's terrorists.

alienation, sometimes mixed with boredom. The individual typically drops out of society, spends some time in limbo, moves from there through stages of occasional protest and permanent dissidence, and finally turns to terrorism.

Terrorists have many problems. They suffer depression. They may feel as uncomfortable with their roles in terrorist groups as they did with their roles in society. They have neurotic fears of succeeding. They strive to inflate their own importance by adopting grandiose postures or engaging in histrionic behavior. It is not only the surrounding world that regards terrorism as a mode of theater; the terrorists themselves are fully aware of this aspect. Their desire that an act of terrorism have widespread repercussions affects their selection of targets, timing, and modes of attack.

But staying in the headlines is hard. Terrorists come to believe in their own propaganda, overestimating their own strength, their appeal, the weakness of their enemies, the imminence of victory. At the same time, they are not immune to disillusionment with their group or its cause. Some quit. Others want to. But getting out of a terrorist group is much harder than joining. It requires an admission by the terrorist that he has been wrong. It involves physical risk, in that his former comrades may brand him a traitor and try to kill him. He may have to remain on the run from police.

For those who remain within the terrorist fold, keeping going may become more important than getting somewhere. Violent activity becomes an end in itself, more important than the ideology or the objectives of the group.

Changes in the composition of terrorist groups over time contribute to this evolution, particularly in groups that have survived long enough to recruit new generations of members. The working group noted that "the new generations appear progressively less ideology-minded, less beset by moral scruples, more action-oriented, and more ruthless than their predecessors." In part, this may be due to the brutalizing effects of a long struggle. The shift away from ideology toward anti-intellectual action may also be the result of recruitment of criminals whom the first-generation terrorists naively admired for their technical skills and willingness to act.

The participants agreed with the members of the working group on The Terrorist Environment that a sympathetic constituency is important to terrorists. Terrorists carry out operations they believe are likely to win widespread approval from their perceived constituents. Sometimes they try to ride piggyback on popular causes. But they do not always seem to be able to distinguish between a climate that is favorable to them because of what they did and a climate that just happens to be favorable to them. For example, terrorists who were

active during the height of the protests against the Vietnam War mistook anti-war sentiments for pro-revolutionary sentiments. Terrorists often misjudge their audiences and lose them by carrying out brutal or indiscriminate acts that are viewed with revulsion.

Misjudging the effect that a particular act is likely to have on a target audience is part of a larger problem faced by terrorists, that of evaluating the effectiveness of their tactics. It is something terrorists themselves argue about. If extensive coverage in the news media is a measure of success, why are approximately half of the terrorist incidents that occur unclaimed by any group?

The portrait of terrorists that emerges from these discussions is quite different from the popular image. These are not the highly disciplined gangs of diabolical fanatics and professional assassins one finds in novels. Seen at close range by those who know them well, most terrorists are complicated individuals whose thoughts and actions are filled with contradictions. Any reasonably intelligent person could conjure up more fiendish schemes than any yet attempted by terrorists. But real terrorists must try to make political, psychological, and even moral calculations. Staying in the headlines and trying to coerce governments that are increasingly resistant to threats require terrorists to do more. Technical, political, and moral constraints limit terrorist actions, the broader effects of which are not always predictable. Terrorism appears in the hands of the terrorists to be a crude weapon. Terrorists themselves debate what works on the basis of what criteria, and they often guess wrong.

The Government Response

Before turning to the discussion on The Government Response, let us review how terrorism has affected governments. Terrorists have occasionally won concessions, and some have provoked the overthrow of governments, but terrorist tactics alone have not succeeded in bringing terrorists to power. Terrorism remains an ingredient, not a recipe, for seizing power.

Authoritarian regimes have characteristically reacted to terrorist threats with repressive measures, while nations with strong democratic institutions and traditions have cautiously limited certain liberties as the price of security—making travelers undergo screening procedures at airports, for example. But we cannot say that democracy has been imperiled by terrorism.

Terrorism diverts government attention for brief moments of crisis. When not under the gun, most governments treat terrorism as no more than a nuisance. This makes planning and preparation difficult.

In the United States and in most Western European countries, combatting terrorism has low priority. The anti-terrorist rhetoric almost always exceeds the amount of resources devoted to solving the problem.

But although governments have a clear advantage over the long run, they are almost always at a disadvantage in dealing with individual episodes. Terrorists create dramas in which they and their victims are the central figures. Except for an occasional successful commando rescue, governments seldom get to play the role of the hero. More often, governments are seen as reactive, impotent, incompetent. Intelligence fails, security is breached. The government is unable to satisfy the public's appetite for action against the terrorists. Public perceptions of government standing and competence in dealing with terrorism are based not on the government's overall performance but rather on its performance in a few dramatic hostage incidents in which it is at a disadvantage from the outset. The public sees the government only in crisis, demonstrably unable to provide security for its citizens, sometimes yielding to the terrorists to save lives, often unable to bring its enemies to justice. Such perceptions may corrode the links between the governed and the government and may contribute to public support for drastic counterterrorist measures.

The participants in the working group on The Government Response took a more technical approach than did the working groups on The Terrorist Environment and The Terrorists. This was not surprising, since the group was comprised primarily of government officials, most of whom were law-enforcement officials and military officers. To them, terrorism represented a repertoire of tactics, a set of capabilities, a "weapons system." After noting that the "motivations, perpetrators, and nature vary greatly from country to country," this group concentrated on how to combat them.

On the technical level, governments have made progress in dealing with terrorism during the past decade. Specialized tactics and skills have been developed for use in hostage situations. Negotiators have been trained. This is an area where the behavioral sciences have made a major contribution to understanding and responding to the terrorist problem.

Specially trained military units have demonstrated their ability to rescue hostages held by terrorists, and they have also demonstrated an increased willingness to use force. Participants briefly discussed the idea of a multinational rescue force but considered the concept to be premature.

International cooperation has increased, but there is still no universal agreement on how to define terrorism, let alone how to combat it. However, progress has been made in regional forums, particularly

the Council of Europe, which has established special networks to exchange information on terrorism. But I believe we may have arrived at or come pretty close to the limits of international cooperation in combatting terrorism. Unless terrorism takes new directions, international cooperation will continue to be limited, with emphasis for the foreseeable future on the details of implementation of existing agreements.

The participants concluded that much remains to be done. Governments must be more sensitive in their dealings with ethnic minorities. The problem of overcrowded prisons—which have proven to be fertile grounds for political extremists seeking to proselytize and recruit criminals—must be dealt with. Gathering intelligence about terrorists remains a difficult task, especially under the constraints on such activities that prevail in a democratic society. However, this could be more a matter of priorities than of constraints. Israel, which gives high priority to the gathering of intelligence, claims to have prevented 85 percent of the terrorist acts planned against Israeli targets.

Terrorist incidents apparently raise jurisdictional problems for all governments. The participants, many of whom had dealt directly with terrorist incidents, emphasized the need to exercise the crisis-management machinery.

In the international realm, there are continuing problems concerning extradition, international cooperation on imposing and enforcing sanctions, and coordination in the handling of multinational incidents, such as the aforementioned seizure of the Dominican embassy in Bogotá.

Another concern in the international realm is the increase in state-sponsored terrorism, a trend that has continued since the conference. Terrorist attacks on diplomats and embassies have increased, many of them being undertaken with the apparent connivance and sometimes the assistance of other governments. How to deal with an increasing number of "rogue states" that use terrorist tactics or employ terrorist groups to wage war on foreign or domestic foes abroad poses an international challenge for which the discussants had no ready answer.

New surges of terrorist activity in Western Europe in 1981 convinced the world that terrorism was a long-range, perhaps a chronic problem. It might even be inferred from the discussions that at present, terrorism is at a tolerable level, that more extreme measures to combat terrorism are not warranted by the current threat and would represent an overreaction. Participants were more worried about terrorists escalating their violence to acts that would cause catastrophic consequences or choosing new targets that would cause

widespread disruption or that would be particularly difficult for governments to handle (for example, energy facilities or targets in the maritime environment). Governments have enough power to deal with the terrorist threat as it now exists, argued one participant. "The governments should . . . concentrate on the prevention of two intolerable situations: the escalation of terrorist methods to more destruction and the breakdown of trust between government and the governed as a result of overreaction."

The Future Course of Terrorism

Terrorism will remain a problem. The working group on The Future of Terrorism concluded that there will be no shortage of sources of terrorism—increased poverty and scarcity; inflation and unemployment; increased tension between the have and have-not nations; waves of refugees and immigrants moving from poorer states to wealthier ones, often bringing with them the conflicts of their home country, sometimes causing resentment among native citizens; the disintegration of traditional authority structures; an increase in single-issue groups; contentious issues such as nuclear power; the rise of aggressive fundamentalist religious groups or cults.

Although one cannot easily disagree with these observations, it is important to be cautious about how readily we attribute terrorism to these broader social developments. Thus far, research has not been able to demonstrate a connection between poverty, scarcity, or inflation and terrorism. Indeed, it is not demonstrable that poverty, scarcity, or inflation have actually increased over any defined period. Social observers frequently assert that traditional authority structures are collapsing or have collapsed. But they have said so for decades—during the industrial revolution, after the abolition of slavery, after World War I, after female suffrage, after World War II. Traditional authority structures are collapsing all the time. And are there more aggressive fundamentalist religious groups in the last quarter of the twentieth century than there were in the nineteenth century? I am not sure.

In my own view, equal emphasis should be placed on recent technological developments. Modern air travel provides terrorists with worldwide mobility; communications—radio, television, communication satellites—provide them with almost instantaneous access to a global audience. Modern industrialized society provides vulnerable targets, from airliners to reactors, while the increasing availability of weapons and explosives has expanded the terrorists' arsenal.

Members of the working group agreed that state support of terrorism through the provision of money, weapons, training, and asylum

can be expected to continue, and it may increase. This has been going on for years. What was new at the time of the conference, and has continued since, is the direct use of terrorism by states. An increasing number of governments are providing not only logistical support to terrorist groups but also operational direction. Iran, Libya, and Chile were cited as examples.

In contemplating what actions terrorists might carry out in the future, the participants considered two basic types of groups: (1) terrorists who are extremely conscious of public opinion and who worry about the effects of their acts, and (2) terrorists who are so convinced that their cause is righteous, claiming the sanction of God or subscribing to ideologies that denigrate the importance of favorable public opinion, that they may contemplate actions with no concern for casualties. The distinction seems useful, particularly in identifying groups clearly in the second category. However, recalling the discussions of the working group on *The Terrorists*, even groups that worry about the attitudes of their perceived constituency or about public opinion in general are seldom able to fine-tune their actions, and over time they tend to become more brutal, less mindful of constraints. Terrorist groups of the first type may with time become groups of the second type.

Statistical analysis of terrorism in the 1970s supports this conclusion. There has been an increase in terrorist incidents that result in multiple fatalities, both in actual number and as a percentage of the total number of terrorist incidents. Terrorists appear more willing to kill, and perhaps to be killed.

Terrorists will continue to target those in power—the symbols of political regimes or economic systems they despise. Political leaders, diplomats, and corporate executives will remain high on the target list. Attacks on industrial facilities that are involved in energy, transportation, and communications are to be expected. The participants also noted the increased targeting of religious institutions and leaders. And, in an eerily prophetic observation, it was suggested that even the Pope may not be invulnerable to attack by terrorists.

Evolving Trends in Terrorism

The Long Struggle. The discussions of all four working groups indicate signs of a long struggle. Some terrorist groups, like Italy's Red Brigades, are recruiting their third and fourth generations of members. The quality of recruits, in many cases, is declining. Many terrorists have been arrested, and groups worry about how to keep their struggles going while they are in prison. Staying in the headlines requires increasingly spectacular actions, but too much violence

alienates constituents. Terrorists suffer fatigue and disillusionment after years underground. Some defect. Others probably would do so if getting out were not so hard. Political goals fade as just keeping going becomes the primary objective. Bank robberies become ends in themselves as terrorist groups come to resemble ordinary criminal gangs.

Governments are digging in. They have diverted resources to combat terrorism, and they have developed an array of countermeasures. More and more governments have adopted hard-line policies for dealing with terrorists holding hostages. Governments are increasingly willing to use force to resolve terrorist incidents; some have adopted harsh authoritarian measures. Thousands of terrorists have been jailed, but terrorists in prison recruit ordinary criminals, creating new problems. In some countries, including Italy, a number of convicted terrorists soon will have served their sentences—they cannot be imprisoned forever. Governments now must worry about how they will ultimately handle the reentry of terrorists into society: Do the terrorists remain committed to their cause? Will they revert to terrorist activity? Some have. And governments must worry about terrorists acquiring new technology and selecting new targets. At the same time, they must guard against overreaction.

Escalation. In any war where neither side prevails, the adversaries are tempted to escalate. All of the conference participants worried about this prospect. The working group on The Terrorist Environment noted three conditions that might lead to escalation: terrorists' failure, which may result in desperation; terrorists' success, which may tempt them to try to achieve more by escalation; and rivalry between terrorist groups operating in the same arena.

The working group on The Terrorists touched upon many factors that could lead to escalation: the internal dynamics of a terrorist group; ethnic differences, especially if the enemy is viewed prejudicially as subhuman; the sanction of God, especially when the victims are perceived as heathens or infidels; the numbing effect of a prolonged struggle; desperation that all is lost; the acquisition of new weapons or capabilities that would enable a group to carry out more destructive acts. Some participants in the working group on The Government Response worried that hard-line politics and the very success achieved by governments in containing, if not eliminating terrorism might actually be pushing the terrorists toward more destructive levels of activity.

The working group on The Future Course of Terrorism expressed similar concern that "by refusing to give into terrorist demands, governments may force terrorists . . . to try something more persuasive the next time." They also noted that "as the population becomes more

accustomed to certain levels of terrorism, terrorists may escalate to get the attention of their audiences." Government weakness could also encourage escalation. Physical vulnerabilities invite attack, and ineffective government responses could encourage vigilante terrorism, thus moving a country toward civil war.

The participants identified several kinds of escalation. Individual acts of actual or potential catastrophic destruction—the use by terrorists of chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons—are what most people have in mind when they discuss escalation. But there is also escalation in the choice of targets—for example, targeting energy grids, power stations, communications systems—with terrorists seeking greater disruption, not casualties. Either type of escalation could entail more sophisticated weapons without entering the domain of theoretical mass destruction. The world has perhaps become accustomed to airliners being hijacked. It has not become accustomed to seeing civilian airliners shot down by terrorists using hand-held surface-to-air missiles. Although well short of the mass murder scenarios that are often conjured up, this would clearly represent a third serious kind of escalation. Finally, terrorism might escalate in sheer volume without new weapons or new targets, threatening the fabric of society, or evolving into civil war. But generally, when the participants talked about escalation, they had in mind the first three types—and most often, it seems, the first.

Not all the arguments favor escalation. Even those we call terrorists have imposed moral constraints upon themselves. They must worry about alienating perceived constituents and provoking unprecedented government crackdowns. They may not possess the necessary technical capabilities. They may lack the imagination or the true madness of the mass killer who, fortunately, is found more often in mental institutions than in terrorist groups.

THE RESOURCE PAPERS

Eleven contributed papers that were used as resource material are reproduced in Part 3 of this report. The first of these, "Conflict: A Turkish View," by Ihsan Gurkan, a retired lieutenant general in the Turkish Army, describes the political, economic, and social conditions in Turkey at the time of the conference, an environment of escalating terrorism from both the left and the right. These conditions led the Turkish generals to seize power on September 12, 1980, during the week of the conference itself, heightening interest in Lt. Gen. Gurkan's analysis.

"Description of a Research Project to Study the Causes of Terrorism," by Reinhard Rupprecht, an official of the German Ministry of Interior, describes an ambitious research project sponsored by the West German government. The project examines both the environmental and individual factors that led to the rise of German terrorism in the 1970s.

The next three papers deal with the terrorist mindset and decision-making. "The Psychology of the Terrorist," by Risto Fried, a psychiatrist from Finland, is the report of a discussion group at the 1978 Berlin conference which addressed the psychology of the terrorist.

"Terrorists—What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions," by Konrad Kellen, a senior consultant to The Rand Corporation, provides an overview of terrorist thinking, based on published interviews and books by terrorists themselves.

More primary material is needed if this line of inquiry is to be advanced further. A very useful piece of such material is provided in "Operation Leo: Description and Analysis of a European Terrorist Operation," by Jacob Sundberg, a professor of law at the University of Stockholm. This paper presents a detailed case study of a terrorist incident as seen through the eyes of the terrorists. It describes the planned kidnapping of a Swedish cabinet minister which was foiled when police arrested the principal members of the gang. Much of the paper is based on testimony given at the trial of the terrorists.

The next five papers deal with various aspects of government response. The first, "Proposals for a Liberal-Democratic Government Response to Terrorism and Low-Intensity Violence at Domestic and International Levels," by Paul Wilkinson, a professor at The University of Aberdeen, summarizes ways in which governments can more effectively combat terrorism.

"Terrorism and Countermeasures: Analysis Versus a Participant's Observations," by Lt. Col. Hanan Alon, of the Israeli Defense Forces, presents a novel approach to the problem of government response to terrorism. Using Israel as an example, it examines the allocation of resources to various countermeasures and discovers many surprising discrepancies.

"The Siege at Princess Gate: Attack on the Iranian Embassy," by R. J. Andrew, describes the takeover of the Iranian embassy in London on April 30, 1980, which ended six days later when commandos from the British Special Air Service mounted an assault on the terrorists. The author, a senior official in the British Home Office, was involved in the management of the episode.

"Terrorism: A Summary of Applicable U.S. and International Law," by Louis G. Fields, Jr., Assistant Legal Adviser in the U.S. Department of State, provides an overview of various U.S. laws that apply to terrorism.

Many federal agencies may be involved in dealing with a terrorist episode, including the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which coordinates the government's response to both natural and man-made disasters. David Marvel, a FEMA official, describes the Agency's purpose in "The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Response to the Consequences of Terrorism."

The final paper, "Terrorism in the Marine Environment," by Douglas Macnair, explores an aspect of terrorism that was discussed by the working groups on The Government Response and The Future of Terrorism. It suggests that we are not adequately prepared to deal with such a contingency.

Some of the views expressed in these papers are highly personal and even controversial. It must be emphasized that they do not represent the opinions or policies of The Rand Corporation or any of its research sponsors. No attempt was made to modify or edit the opinions presented in these contributed papers, both out of respect for the personal views of the authors and because they provide valuable insights into the thinking of the people responsible for finding ways to combat international terrorism.

THE SIMULATIONS

The last two days of the conference were devoted to conducting a simulation in which teams representing governments, corporations, and other actors were asked to respond to a series of hypothetical incidents or threats. The Berlin and Tel Aviv conferences included similar exercises, which were found to be useful for developing plausible government responses.

Three One-Move Games

The simulation consisted of three one-move games. All three scenarios dealt with terrorist-initiated attacks on energy facilities or supplies, reflecting concerns that terrorists in the future may target such facilities as, indeed, they have done in the past.

The first scenario, code-named NEPTUNE, combined the problem of Cuban refugees, anti-Castro terrorism, and a terrorist threat against a liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) tanker and facility in the United States. Five teams (in addition to the Control Team) participated in the game, representing the U.S. government, the government of the state in which the LNG facility is located, the corporation owning the threatened tanker and facility, the government of Cuba, and the adversaries.

The second scenario, named JUPITER, focused on the Arab-Israeli problem, Palestinian terrorism, and the prospect of a terrorist campaign against Western Europe's oil supply line. In the early 1970s, Palestinian terrorists attacked tankers, pipelines, terminals, and refineries until the Arab oil embargo of 1973 more effectively threatened Europe's and America's oil supplies. In JUPITER, the terrorists renewed this campaign, threatening to close the port of Rotterdam by setting a hijacked supertanker afire in the harbor's main channel if their demands were not met. The demands called for the removal of Kadum, a tiny Israeli settlement on the West Bank, and the return of the Israeli Prime Minister's office from East to West Jerusalem, a move of perhaps 500 meters in distance but of great symbolic importance.

Again, five teams participated in the game. They represented the U.S. government, the governments of Israel and the Netherlands, a crisis team created by the governments of Europe to coordinate their policies and actions in response to the threat, and the adversaries.

The third scenario, PLUTO, conjured up a threat to energy systems from a neo-Luddite group of bombers calling themselves SCRAMBLE and dedicated to protecting man's identity and independence by attacking the sinews and symbols of modern capitalist society: the electrical energy system, commercial television, and plastic credit cards. Having already demonstrated its knowledge of the electrical power grid and its capacity to blow up power transformers, SCRAMBLE threatened to cause a total blackout in a major California city.

Four teams participated in the game, representing the U.S. government, the government of California, an ad hoc group of corporate executives, and the adversaries.

The Players. Teams were composed of conference participants, whose diverse backgrounds made it possible for each team to have a leader and core staff who were familiar with the machinery of the particular government or corporation involved. For example, one team representing a state government was led by an individual who in real life was serving as a member of a state governor's cabinet. His team included officials from local and state law-enforcement agencies, a state's Attorney General's office, and energy and harbor facilities. Similarly, the teams representing corporations were led and staffed by senior corporation officials.

However, we deliberately avoided having people, especially the team leaders, play their own real-life roles in the games. An official from the Department of Energy led the U.S. team, playing the role of the President's National Security Advisor. The energy company team was led by the senior vice president of a bank, although several senior vice presidents of energy companies were present. Since U.S.

government officials comprised nearly one-third of the total participants, they participated on all of the teams. In addition, scholars and officials from other countries were assigned to the U.S. government and state government teams. Some government officials participated in the games as members of the corporate team, while corporation officials played on the government teams. During the post-game review session, several participants commented that this intermingling of participants allowed team members to gain new insights into the organizational perspectives of agencies other than the ones they actually work for.

The Objectives of the Games. The games had several objectives in addition to focusing attention on the possibility of terrorist attacks directed against energy targets. All three scenarios were intended to move the players beyond terrorism to incidents that entailed not only tactical problems but geopolitical issues as well.

We wanted to examine how governments might react to incidents with large-scale consequences: extensive casualties plus economic disruption; extensive economic disruption; economic and social disruption caused by a major and extended power blackout.

All three threats contained an element of uncertainty. The threat in NEPTUNE could not be verified easily within the time limits set by the adversary. However, the adversary group could conceivably have carried out the action, and therefore the threat could not easily be dismissed. In JUPITER, the adversaries seized control of a ship, and therefore their threat to set it afire had to be taken seriously. But we did not know how long the threatened action would have closed Rotterdam harbor or whether the terrorists could have prevented or disrupted oil deliveries elsewhere. We were especially interested in whether European governments could be induced by terrorist actions and threats to impose an oil embargo on themselves. In PLUTO, the technology used by the adversaries was simple and their knowledge of the electrical grid had been demonstrated. Although the threat was therefore credible, it was not known whether they would be able to carry out the coordinated attacks necessary to black out a major urban area.

The control team tried to preserve the uncertainty in each game by neither absolutely verifying the threat nor providing the teams with information that would permit them to dismiss it. We were interested in how governments would react to such uncertainty. Would they dismiss the threats as hoaxes and call the bluff they perceived? Since the threats had been publicized in all three cases, would the governments be forced by public pressure or local government pressure to deal with them as if they were real even though the government team might doubt their credibility?

The Adversaries' Demands. The adversaries in all three games made demands that might be seen as "reasonable"—i.e., not crazy or purely criminal—or, in the case of PLUTO, popular. The NEPTUNE scenario demanded the admission of Cuban refugees to the United States. Large numbers of Cuban refugees have already been admitted, and to admit more persons seen as desperately fleeing oppression, to reunite families, would have a humanitarian appeal to many. (Others, of course, would oppose it on the grounds that the United States has admitted too many Cuban refugees already.) In JUPITER, the terrorist demands coincided with UN resolutions (on Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the status of Jerusalem) that have received increasing support, or at least less opposition, from Western European countries. In PLUTO, the terrorists called for the canceling of credit card debts, which could have widespread appeal.

Interaction Among Governments and Corporations. In NEPTUNE and PLUTO there was potential interaction between the federal government and local (state) governments. In JUPITER, there was interaction between the Netherlands (the immediate target of the terrorist action) and the other European countries, as well as between the European governments and the United States. NEPTUNE and PLUTO involved interaction between government and the private sector. We were interested in how jurisdictional issues might be dealt with by governments in these complicated episodes, and also in how the federal government might deal with local government and the private corporations involved. Would they coordinate their response or work at cross purposes? How would they try to influence each other?

We were also interested in seeing whether and how unfriendly governments might cooperate in a terrorist incident. In NEPTUNE, for example, the United States might conceivably have approached Cuba to elicit its assistance in restricting the flow of refugees into Guantanamo. (NEPTUNE also raised the issue of the worldwide refugee problem and the political instability in some countries that has resulted from the presence of large refugee populations.)

Format. Each game involved only one move, that is, the teams were provided with a scenario describing the situation and were required to make a response. Play was then suspended, and the teams went on to a new scenario.

A one-move game does not allow for full development of the scenario and therefore imposes a psychological cost on the players. Participants quickly assume their fictional roles in such games, and suspension of the play without denouement causes some frustration. The one-move format was, in fact, criticized during the final review. However, other factors made this format necessary. Less than two days

were available for the simulation, and we wanted to expose the participants to a variety of energy scenarios. Although the scenarios were all different, they shared common attributes: large-scale consequences, uncertainty, "reasonable" demands, a variety of actors. The one-move format provided an opportunity to test reactions to these factors several times. Also, we wanted to maintain the element of uncertainty about the credibility of the threat, and uncertainty is very difficult to preserve in a multiple-move game.

Teams were permitted to communicate with other teams to coordinate their response, but they were not allowed to engage in any dialogue with the adversaries. They could try to communicate with the terrorists through the news media, and information contained in broadcasts was passed on to them. But there were no negotiations.

What then was the role of the adversary team? This team was required first to predict the government's response to its threat and then to formulate its next move on the basis of that prediction. The adversary team revealed this move during the review that followed each game, thus allowing the other teams to see what they would have been confronted with if the game had continued beyond one move. The adversary team was also asked by the control team to make some interim moves which were then communicated to other playing teams.

Scenarios and Supporting Material. Each team was provided with a basic scenario describing the terrorist action or threat, a statement of the terrorists' demands, and a description of the terrorist group involved. In addition, each team was given chronologies of past actions carried out by real-life groups similar to (and, in the game, possibly predecessors of) the hypothetical adversary involved. These chronologies comprised factual, not fictional events. They were intended to lend plausibility to the events postulated in the game and thus to contribute to an atmosphere of realism. The teams were also provided with selected newspaper clippings and copies of official policy statements on various problems addressed in the scenario. Finally, they were given maps and other visual aids, including projections of 35mm slides of the facilities involved in each game.

While we did not want the teams to get bogged down in technical minutiae, it was inevitable that certain technical questions would arise. Therefore, we prerecorded on videotapes a number of interviews with technical experts discussing specific questions that related to each game; for example, experts discussed the vulnerability of a facility to the kind of attack threatened in the scenario, or the likely consequences if such an attack were carried out. The teams were provided with lists of these tapes and were permitted to view them on closed-circuit television. In addition, in most of the games, each team

had at least one member with some expert knowledge of the facility involved. The control team also had experts standing by to answer technical questions not covered by the videotapes.

The control team provided additional unsolicited information during the course of the play, such as public reactions to the event. The teams could also request information from other teams or from the control team representing other entities. Although the teams did not know everything they would have liked to know, which probably would be true in a real-life situation as well, they did have fairly complete supporting information to use in formulating their response.

Each team was given three hours in which to read the scenario, review the supporting material, make specific inquiries about further information, contact other teams (except the adversaries), and formulate a response. At the end of the three hours, the teams assembled in a large conference room, and each of the team leaders, including the leader of the adversaries, presented the decisions and actions determined by his team.

The Control Team. Because these were one-move games with only a short period of play, the control team had a limited role. It monitored the players' deliberations by means of a closed-circuit television, and one control team representative was assigned to stay with each team to assist if necessary and to provide the control team with additional information on the course of the discussions. The control team decided whether to provide additional information requested by the teams, and it informed each team of moves made by other teams when these were known. However, no details regarding any of the teams' internal deliberations were revealed to the other teams. Beyond these functions, the control team did not intervene except in a few cases where one of the playing teams appeared to have misinterpreted its directions.

Participant/Observers. Each team included one participant/observer, a psychiatrist or psychologist who functioned as a regular team member but who also had been requested to observe the dynamics of the team itself. The participant/observers reported separately to the conference after the completion of the final game.

Concluding Comments on the Simulations

Playing the games provided some surprising results. The scale of the terrorists' threats did not appear to greatly affect the teams, nor did the element of uncertainty deliberately incorporated in the scenarios. For the most part, the teams never seriously considered yielding to the demands of the terrorists, despite the "reasonableness" of their demands. There was little conflict among the teams—less than

planners of the games expected, and less, one suspects, than would be the case in real life. Finally, the games demonstrated that in incidents involving high technology—LNG, supertankers, electrical grids—technical assessments are likely to determine responses. Decision-makers turned to the technical experts. The technical assessments may have been in fact “soft” estimates, and opinions varied among the experts, sometimes for reasons that had little to do with technology. However, the decisionmakers appeared to take the assessments as incontestable.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Part 1 of this report presents the opening addresses at the conference. Part 2 contains the agendas and summaries of the discussions of each of the four working groups. The discussion summaries were prepared by the official rapporteurs of the groups, each of whom was assisted by two or more Rand staff members who participated in the working groups. Part 3 presents the contributed resource papers. The Appendix lists the conference participants.

OPENING ADDRESS

Ambassador Anthony Quainton
U.S. Department of State

It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this Conference on International Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict. The conference is a joint effort of The Rand Corporation and the Departments of State and Energy. It is partially funded under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice, within the larger LEAA research effort on the problems of terrorism. These agencies have brought together leading authorities in government, academia, and the private sector to look at and evaluate the phenomenon of political violence as it affects free societies. Tremendous work has gone into the organization of the conference itself and of the games in which we will participate later in the week. I know I speak for all of us in expressing our appreciation to Brian Jenkins and his colleagues at Rand for the splendid preparations that they have made.

The success of our meeting, however, will depend not only on the physical arrangements but on your individual and collective involvement. With so many old friends and familiar faces from the Berlin and Tel Aviv conferences, I have no doubt that we are in for a stimulating and challenging week. I look forward to what I hope will be the innovative and creative analyses and proposals that our discussions will produce.

Although the returns are not all in, historians are certain to regard 1979 and 1980 as vintage years of terrorism. Both the public and private sectors have had to cope with new kinds of terrorist violence and with many of the older forms to which we have become accustomed. On the government side, we have seen a dramatic and disturbing increase in the number of forcible incursions into diplomatic missions—31 since the beginning of 1979, in comparison to a total of 29 in the previous nine years. The Iranian incident has been a particularly flagrant example of that trend. In the same period, two American ambassadors have been taken hostage (in Afghanistan and Colombia); another in Lebanon narrowly escaped assassination two weeks ago. On the private side, the situation has been equally bleak. Let me highlight just a few of the events of the last year: banks bombed in El Salvador, the Philippines, West Germany, Italy, and Turkey; more hijackings than in any year since 1972; businessmen kidnapped in Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador, and Honduras; po-

litical assassinations in France, Turkey, Greece, and Guatemala. Although the statisticians disagree about the absolute number of terrorist acts, there is no question that multiple-casualty incidents have increased. Terrorism, low-level conflict, urban insurgency, guerrilla activity, violent disturbances provoked by social or economic dissatisfaction are on the rise. Our governments as well as our corporations and universities are devoting increasing time and resources to these issues. I hope that our discussions will refine our understanding of this dramatic and dangerous phenomenon.

It seems to me that this conference should try to do three things: (1) seek new directions in which research is needed; (2) clarify our understanding of the nature and dynamics of terrorism; and (3) define practical and effective measures for dealing with it.

Before turning to the four major topics on which the conference will focus, I would like to make a few comments based on my two years' experience as Chairman of the National Security Council's Executive Committee and Working Group on Terrorism. I would also like to pose some "challenges to conventional thinking," in the hope of stimulating our discussions.

The most troublesome issue for government remains that of definition. We do not agree on what is terrorism and what is not. We agree that they are the "bad guys," but we do not agree on who they are. We need above all to ask ourselves whether there are significant differences between international terrorism and other forms of low-level political conflict and violence. What is it that sets terrorism apart and makes it unique? Some would argue that terrorism is but one form of "subnational conflict" to be dealt with by governments in basically the same way as other kinds of violence, using the conventional tools of intelligence, diplomacy, and military force. And yet a nagging doubt remains: Are the similarities and parallels among the IRA, the PLO, the M-19, and the Red Brigades that clear and distinct? Should these groups really be handled as part of a single worldwide phenomenon? Far too often the terms "international terrorism" and "terrorist groups" are used as nothing more than convenient grab bags into which to stuff all forms of violent small-scale political dissent and conflict of which we disapprove.

In fact, because of their inability to define just what "international terrorism" is (and what it isn't), some governments have tried to treat terrorism merely as a kind of international criminal violence deserving swift and effective punishment. Yet we must not lose sight of the normative questions implicit in any definition. *Terrorist* is a pejorative term that is used selectively against one's enemies. We must, therefore, seek a viable definition that will enable us to act against those violations of international law involving "innocent" targets or victims in ways that are both consistent and coherent.

We must also ask ourselves whether and to what extent terrorism is a form of "surrogate warfare" among nations. It is often argued that all international terrorism serves the purposes of the Soviet Union and hence must be directed by it. In my view, that is a dangerous oversimplification and does not help governments to understand and deal with the terrorist phenomenon. It certainly introduces confusing elements into our understanding of the actions and motivations of states such as Syria, Iraq, or Libya, all of whom have repeatedly provided support to groups involved in acts of international terrorism. Are they merely pawns in some elaborate Great Game? Are they conducting "surrogate warfare" against Israel, or against each other? And how do we fit the IRA, whose ideological motivations predate Karl Marx by several centuries, or the various right-wing terrorist groups into this pattern? Some types of terrorism may indeed fall within the rubric of surrogate warfare—but many others do not. It is also important that we not fall into the trap of seeing violent dissent, both foreign and domestic, as terroristic when, in fact, this may not be the case. In our more reflective moments, we would probably all agree that those who demonstrate against nuclear power or who oppose specific government programs are not by that very fact terrorists. Yet in the heat of the moment when government authority is challenged in the streets, we sometimes create terrorists when in fact none are there.

In the 1980s the clearest possible definition of terrorism will be needed as governments attempt to deal with violence in Central America, South Africa, and the Middle East. To have such clarity we will need to answer several questions: Is terrorism a well-defined list of criminal acts that are uniquely heinous because they are against "innocent" targets, or is it but one strategy in a continuum of low-level political violence no more or less reprehensible than insurgency or guerrilla warfare? The United States has adopted the former approach. Consequently, we have focused our efforts on a series of deterrent and preventive measures and on a strengthening of international law to outlaw these acts. However, if governments accept the latter view, they will have to put counterterrorism into a foreign policy context in which their attitude toward violence will be conditioned by their attitude toward the cause on behalf of which violence is being used. The perils of this approach are manifest. Ends and means will be confused. Obviously many governments are torn between these approaches. They wish to have their cake and eat it too. This conference, therefore, should explore the extent to which there is a significant difference between an act of terrorism and an act of war and, if so, what that difference is. It should ask whether political ends justify terrorist means and, if so, when. The answer to these questions will have a direct and critical impact on governmental responses.

Let me turn briefly to the four major topics on which we will concentrate this week. The first is the *terrorist environment*.

As we approach the 21st century, speculation is increasing about changes in the geopolitical and socioeconomic environment over the next 20 years. It is widely assumed that racial tension, inflation, dwindling natural resources, rising population, and widening income disparities between and within countries will lead to higher levels of social frustration and violence. Some of this violence is presumed to be terroristic. Yet evidence of a connection between socioeconomic conditions and terrorism is inconclusive at best. Nevertheless, even if we reject this direct linkage, we should try to develop a matrix within which correlations are valid, in which we try to identify relationships between certain kinds of political institutions and certain kinds of violence. Is terrorism, we must ask, an inverse function of repression? For Communist governments, terrorism appears to be a relatively trivial issue. The Communists seem to have concluded that if governments are prepared to use force or repression in sufficient quantity, they need not fear terrorism. Authoritarian systems, on the other hand, seem to be almost as vulnerable to terrorism as democratic societies. This question needs our urgent attention.

In thinking about the terrorist environment, we should also pose the question of whether terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla war are unique forms of political violence that need an actively sympathetic and supportive population in order to flourish. Must there be "friendly waters" in which the terrorist "fish" can swim? If, as we must assume, there are plenty of people in totalitarian systems who do not agree with government policies, why are the "waters" there not more friendly for terrorist "fish"? Is the answer that these governments have better intelligence available to them than we have? Or are they more prone to use force against terrorists regardless of possible casualties to either victims or innocent bystanders?

As for patron states, I have already touched on one or two of the problems in this area. But beyond these aspects, it would be extremely useful if we could explore this issue in depth. We all know that certain radical rejectionist Arab states finance, train, and otherwise assist the major Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Many of these same states are engaging in violent campaigns of assassination and intimidation in foreign countries. Other states—Iran and Chile, to name but two—have on occasion done the same. Many other states provide training and support to national liberation movements, some of which engage in acts that we readily identify as terroristic. These states, by their willingness to underwrite violence and subnational conflict, in fact create an atmosphere in which terrorism flourishes. Are these states critical elements in the terrorist environment? And, if so, what can we do about it?

As a crisis manager, I am all too often reminded that we must be sensitive not only to the international and domestic environment in which terrorists operate but also to the *terrorist's mindset and his decisionmaking process*. The first question to ask is whether there is such a thing as a "typical terrorist type?" Is it possible to construct a "terrorist profile," as some have suggested? We are using profiles today in our anti-hijacking programs, but the criteria are vague and the categories may be too ill-defined to be useful in other contexts.

Some terrorists, like Carlos, seem to be among the supreme individualists of the world. They work effectively together for only a limited period of time and in a specific operational context. Others seem able to maintain a high degree of long-term cooperation. Some groups collaborate with each other on a basis of equality, but one group may also be serving the interests of another, as in the case of the activities of the Japanese Red Army in support of PLO objectives. We know little about these interrelationships.

Because of these and other differences, the search for the "typical" terrorist may be a fruitless one. Some terrorists' propensity for violence may result from personal psychological needs; other terrorists may be conditioned by the mores of their culture and the political and social environment in which they act. Rather than looking for an archetypical terrorist, we should attempt to understand the terrorist in the framework of his society and history. Typologies can then be drawn on a more limited scale, within which research on terrorist decisionmaking can fruitfully be pursued. We should also attempt to compare terrorist group decisionmaking with that of other groups (such as the Mafia) which rely on secrecy and clandestinity. We need to know more about whether the commitment to violent action transforms decisionmaking and leads to greater equality in the decision-making process among the perpetrators of a particular act or whether strong authoritarian leadership tends to be the rule.

The answers to these questions will help us to grapple with some of the challenges of hostage-barricade situations. We know that in terrorist groups there are leaders and followers, thinkers and actors. What steps can we take during incidents to split followers from leaders by exerting psychological pressure on both? Can we do anything to undermine group confidence and determination? And how far can we go in these directions without posing too great a risk for the hostages? If we can resolve the issues of definition and come to a better understanding of the terrorist and his environment, there will be direct consequences for government action.

It is appropriate, therefore, that we will also be discussing the issue of *government response* and the philosophy on which it is based. There are several strategies open to governments. They can seek to

deal with the underlying causes, or they can focus on certain types of acts—hijackings, bombings, etc.

Governments are likely to seek solutions to the underlying causes of violence if they see terrorism as a threat to their national interests and as a rational strategy of national or subnational policy designed to achieve particular objectives. On the other hand, if governments see terrorism as merely a troublesome political aberration, as a predictable category of specific violent acts, they are more likely to concentrate on specific techniques of intelligence gathering, physical security, or threat credibility assessment. Palliative or preventive measures will then predominate over curative.

Over the last decade, governments have tried to do both. They have used the entire panoply of resources available to them in an effort to thwart the terrorist, limit his success, or manage the consequences of his act. They have also gone after the underlying causes, although with a certain ambiguity in those situations that require some significant modification in the territorial or geopolitical *status quo*.

I am struck by the fact that our efforts to date have concentrated on violence by subnational groups. Yet in the last two years we have witnessed more and more state terrorism—assassinations, bombings, and assaults—directed and carried out by nation states. This phenomenon has posed new challenges and raised for governments the question of how states can be deterred or dissuaded from either directly engaging in terrorism or acting as patrons of various subnational terrorist groups. Are there viable sanctions that the international community might realistically adopt? Past experience suggests that this will be a very difficult task, yet it undoubtedly deserves our attention.

In other aspects of intergovernmental response, we have not been as successful as I would have hoped. We have not achieved agreement on common policies toward those governments that either condone or support terrorist groups. We have not collectively prevented such outrages as the recent assassination of Arab dissidents in several European countries. A small step was made by the seven nations who signed the Bonn Summit Anti-Hijacking Declaration in 1978 and who agreed to impose sanctions against states that fail to prosecute or extradite hijackers. But other kinds of agreed sanctions are more elusive. As was vividly illustrated during the attack on the embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogotá last spring, governments do not yet agree on negotiating tactics, let alone on the basic substantive issues of ransom payments, safe conduct, and prisoner release. This conference provides an ideal vehicle for advancing international discussion of these difficult issues.

The last major area of interest, the *future course of terrorism*, tempts me, as I am sure it does you, to expand the mind in "Dr. Strangelovian" directions. I have not read the latest terrorist thriller, *The Fifth Horseman*, but its plot of a nuclear bomb in New York City, set to explode unless the U.S. government changes its policies toward Israel, represents the type of more serious threat that could confront us in the years ahead. We need, however, to examine carefully the probability of terrorists adopting such vastly more dangerous tactics and targets. In the wake of our improved defenses against terrorism, it is possible that terrorists will have to turn to entirely new forms of violence if they are to succeed. There may be a chain of actions and reactions that lead inexorably toward more and more sophisticated threats. But is this progression or, more accurately, regression, inevitable?

While we are gazing so intently into our crystal balls, as well as expanding our horizons, let me ask you to conjecture with me further about the future. If the world economy worsens significantly over the next 20 years, one consequence of this worldwide recession, or depression, may be increasing political violence. Will violence be terrorism as we have known it in the 1970s, or will it be some other type of subnational conflict? This will be the proverbial sixty-four dollar question.

But even accepting the premise that we will face more turbulent world conditions, one does not have to postulate an enormous escalation in terrorist tactics and targets from the simple weapons and targets with which we are familiar. The assertion that there are thresholds of frustration that, when breached, lead to higher orders of violence is one that should be questioned. What is certain is that as more sophisticated weapons become readily available, terrorists will use them.

In analyzing this issue, we should differentiate carefully between weapons and targets. Without new or more advanced weapons, terrorists can shift their targets from individuals of symbolic importance to facilities of comparable or greater significance. Should we assume that terrorists will try to exploit the vulnerabilities of modern society for their own purposes? If so, we must identify the most likely targets. Energy-related installations appear to be more vulnerable and less protected than many others and hence more likely to be chosen. But they are not the only nodes of vulnerability. If more technologically critical targets are chosen, governments will face formidable tasks of management. The games at the end of this week will provide us with an opportunity to examine some of the problems involved.

I am convinced that even if there is no quantum jump in violence, we must anticipate at a minimum sustained levels of traditional ter-

rorism—particularly assassinations and bombings. Governments will continue to be challenged by low-level conflict. They will be deeply threatened not only by theatrical long-duration hostage incidents but also by other forms of insurgency and violence.

It is therefore critically important that we try to manage future terrorist incidents with the greatest discretion and judgment. We must be as thoughtful, as resourceful, and, above all, as patient as we possibly can be in handling these attacks. In the past, our overriding objective has always been to save and protect the lives of those caught up in these events. But more and more we have come to realize that our concerns about terrorism are not limited to our concerns about the victims. Terrorism takes place in a geopolitical context of great sensitivity in which vital national interests may be at stake. Our ability to manage the interaction, and perhaps even contradiction, between global strategic interests and individual human values may be the true test of our ability to deal with terrorism in the 1980s.

Although I have raised more questions than we will be able to address during the next five days, I have tried to highlight some of our current major concerns as we look at the prospects for international terrorism and low-level conflict in the 1980s.

Your ideas and suggestions on how to manage terrorist incidents, on ways to reduce the threat to the lives and health of those in terrorist hands, and on appropriate national and international strategies will have direct practical relevance for all of us.

LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW

Gen. Edward C. Meyer
United States Army

Ambassador Quainton, ladies and gentlemen, I'm indebted to George Tanham and Brian Jenkins for this opportunity to share some perceptions and ideas with you at this conference.

Perceptions of terrorism and low-level conflict differ considerably. However, I doubt that anyone would disagree that these phenomena have a tremendous impact on us, both nationally and internationally. Having called on many of you over the years to be my sages, guides, and counselors in this field, I am aware of the depth of understanding and the credentials possessed by this audience. The credentials I bring to this forum are the credentials of a soldier. My interests are the practical interests of a soldier—being able to forecast the potential challenges that terrorism and low-level conflict hold for our nation and to design the appropriate military responses, where military response is advisable and affordable.

Among the threats to Western democracy, low-level conflict may seem minor in comparison with thermonuclear and large-scale conventional warfare. But the potential for damage from low-level conflict runs the gamut from kidnappings intended to force a government's hand to physical threats against society itself through acts of insurgency, civil war, and, perhaps, even the lunatic use of biological or radiological weapons. And the effects of low-level conflict are intensified by the unfortunate circumstance that the modern world faces all three levels of threat simultaneously.

Today, there is increasing national awareness of the threat that low-level conflict poses. Certainly, this conference reflects that awareness. The television program that ABC has prepared in cooperation with Robert Kupperman is another reflection of it. Many of the books being published now, such as *The Fifth Horseman*, are indicators of popular flirtation with the subject. I note that there is even a junior college in the Washington area that offers a course in Terrorism.

Despite this growing awareness, I would have to say that we have spent less time focusing on the lower level of warfare than on the other levels. For example, analysts at The Rand Corporation do very well in laying out the geometric diagrams and detailed numerics involved in a strategic nuclear exchange, but we have barely scratched the surface of theoretical strategies and counterstrategies involved in the lower levels of conflict.

If we were to overlay a histogram indicating the nation's intellectual investment on the spectrum of conflict, it would be heavily skewed to show emphasis on careful examination of the highest levels of conflict and diminished commitment against each successive category of lesser violence. In many ways, this is a changing phenomenon: 15 to 20 years ago there was a sizable community focusing on the topics of rural insurgencies, counter guerrilla warfare, and nation-building.

While the histogram of intellectual investment would show investment heavily skewed toward the highest level of conflict, a second histogram showing physical investment would reveal a more balanced picture—although some of the experts in this audience would probably disagree with that. We have made a large physical investment in the center category of conventional warfare, perhaps less in the strategic level, and still less in the lower level. Nevertheless, some of the capabilities that we developed for conventional warfare could be used in counterterrorist and other low-level conflict.

Be that as it may, comparison of these two histograms with a third one reveals a startling paradox. A histogram illustrating the frequency of conflict across the spectrum of violence would clearly indicate that the frequency of occurrences—real and anticipated—is today markedly skewed toward the lower end of the spectrum, toward terrorism and low-level conflict. And I understand that in this forum, yesterday and today, there is a general consensus that such incidents will be on the increase during the decade ahead. That certainly is consistent with my view of the future thrust of terrorism. Thus, the first two histograms show us making our greatest intellectual and physical investment in preparations for the levels of conflict we have least often faced. Taken together, my three hastily sketched histograms imply that we are investing heavily to prevent the unlikely, while essentially ignoring what we must do to cope with the unavoidable.

There is a tinderbox out there in the world that increasingly possesses the attributes necessary for igniting itself, for combusting spontaneously—with or without any direction or assistance from third parties hostile to the democracies. Those of you who are familiar with *The Global 2000 Report to the President* have seen the assessments of where current trends will lead us if they persist into the 21st century. Unless we act to foster responsible change, the future promises a world increasingly vulnerable to natural disaster and to destruction from human actions, including terrorism and low-level conflict.

By every measure of material welfare—per capita GNP, food, energy, minerals—the gap between the richest and the poorest will have

widened. In per capita GNP, for example, the current gap between the less developed and the industrialized countries will widen from about \$4,000 in 1975 to \$7,900 in the year 2000. Urbanization will create other potential hazards. Consider the population increase projected for just a few major cities: Calcutta will increase its population from 8.1 to 19.7 million by the year 2000; Mexico City, from 10.9 million to 31 million; Seoul, from 7.3 to 18.7 million; and Tehran, from 4.4 to 13.8 million. Take into account that most of this urban growth will probably occur in uncontrolled settlements and slums, and you see what fertile ground this will be for the urban guerrilla.

These statistics represent only a few of the challenges we will face in our attempt to orchestrate reform peacefully within existing governmental and intergovernmental frameworks. Frustrations or the expensiveness of conventional forces could lead a state to resort to low-level forms of conflict. Frustrations with an existing government's inability to meet the needs of particular citizens may lead to global fractionation along tribal, ethnic, religious, or cultural lines. By increasing the identifiable elements, this fractionation will further complicate any accommodation we might make to forestall or overcome low-level conflict. Given these circumstances, terrorism, insurgencies, civil wars, and regional conflicts could dot the landscape in the decade ahead.

To prepare for these eventualities, there are certain things we must do: To the degree that the Soviet Union makes use of, fosters, or orchestrates terrorism and low-level conflict within a scheme intended to isolate the free world, the United States must maintain a capability to intervene. To the degree that friendly states request our help and assistance, we must be ready to respond. To the degree that our domestic scene is threatened with violence, we must be prepared to act to meet our obligations to the Constitution and its authorities.

These are not unfamiliar responsibilities for the Army. Looking back at our history, we realize that the Army has often been involved in incidents of low-level conflict similar to those we face today: intervention during domestic strikes, riot control, border control, insurrections, civil wars, counterinsurgency activity, and nation-building. However, in the context of today's threats of conflict, the challenge—strategically, politically, and economically—is continued maintenance of our capability to react across the spectrum of violence. We must be prepared to respond not just to one but to all three levels of challenge.

We do have many of the necessary military capabilities today. Since Vietnam, we have acted in concert with our NATO allies to bolster our conventional forces targeted on Europe. Nevertheless, I believe we have been myopic in structuring the force for a single sce-

nario and not having forces capable of responding to threats throughout the world. I have long contended that we need to pay attention to the "other Army," the Army traditionally ready to respond to the full spectrum of threats against this nation and its friends anywhere, not just in the Fulda Gap.

Fortunately, we have succeeded in convincing the right people that this is essential. We have the mandate to create a technologically sophisticated division of lighter forces. We are balancing our heavy and light forces so that they can respond across the entire spectrum of warfare. Obviously, there are limits on the total resources available. But that means that we have to be canny enough, with your help, with everyone's help, to ensure that the forces we build to respond in one area can respond equally well in others, wherever that is possible. We have to be sensitive enough to design the force structure so that we get the maximum use and flexibility from our fungible forces. In some special instances that is not possible. Unique capabilities, such as those embodied in the Delta Force and in the joint command and control of service counterterrorist capabilities, as recommended in Admiral Holloway's critique, are exceptions that we must protect.

As I indicated earlier, we had for some time been too focused on a single scenario, with the consequence that we prepositioned a lot of equipment in one area. We are changing that. We are looking at other alternatives that will yield greater global mobility and permit us to respond more quickly to challenges elsewhere.

These efforts will not have full utility until we are able to correct some severe limitations. We need a cadre of experts to train U.S. and friendly nations in techniques of insurgency/counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. We need improved HUMINT, human intelligence capabilities. We need materiel and personnel to bolster our support of internal security-assistance programs. We need an enhanced personnel exchange program with the armed forces of friendly nations. We need continued support from multinational schools, such as the School of Americas in Panama. We need a stockpile of low-level conflict weaponry. We need legislation to enhance reasonable external programs that permit the use of all these tools in sustaining nations critical to our own well-being.

But above all these, we need concepts, doctrine, theories for structuring the kinds of forces that can face the challenges of this critical decade ahead. That is why I believe that the activities of this conference are so important. What emerges from them may help provide that kind of conceptual structure.

One author has described our contemporary experience in these words: "Step by step, almost imperceptibly, without anyone being aware that a fatal watershed has been crossed, mankind has descend-

ed into the age of terror." I am not that fatalistic about our situation. I believe that terrorism is going to increase, and I believe that the threat of international anarchy is very real. But I do not believe that reasonable men anywhere, regardless of their political, economic, religious, or ethnic persuasion could see any advantage in having that condition persist.

I am persuaded that the means can be fashioned by which mankind will avoid that kind of degeneration. We are capable of shaping a more promising future, and gatherings such as this will contribute to that shaping. So in the next two days I ask that you focus on these critical issues and take back to your agencies and your governments the resolution to get on with the work of preventing our descent into an age of terror.

Thank you for letting me join you.

Part 2

AGENDA AND SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Session 1

THE TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT

Agenda of Topics

A handful of nations seem to have suffered a disproportionate share of the world's terrorist violence. Is this inherent in the way we define terrorism, a result of biases in reporting, or a product of the political, social, and economic situations that prevail in these countries? What can we say about the role of patron states?

Defining Terrorism

What definitions can distinguish terrorism from other types of low-level conflict, e.g., rural and urban guerrilla insurgencies, in which terrorist tactics such as hostage-taking may be used?

Since terrorism usually threatens neither the stability of regimes nor the "fabric of society," why do experts and governments regard it so seriously? Does it have consequences as yet unidentified?

Dynamics of the Terrorist Environment

Totalitarian political systems do not have the problem of terrorism. Authoritarian systems, on the other hand, are almost as vulnerable as democratic societies. Why?

In democracies, does terrorism result from the ideological fanaticism of minorities not representative enough to achieve political clout by legal means?

Under what conditions do legitimate, peaceful means of political protest substitute for political terrorism, and when do they instigate or catalyze political violence?

Does the publicity that terrorists invariably get invariably help them and harm society?

In a given environment, what role does culture play in the development of the terrorist subculture and in the resolution of conflicts between itself and that culture?

Is there a correlation between the amount of political terrorism and the amount of violent crime, and are these forms of violence influenced by the same factors, e.g., national traditions and "character-

istics," relative strength of law-enforcement agencies, economic situations?

Is there a "pendulum of terror" that produces a special escalation of terrorism in certain countries, i.e., is it true that the more left-wing terrorists strike, the more right-wing terrorists try to surpass them?

Support and the Role of Patron States

How does terrorism figure in Soviet policy? Many analysts would agree that although the Soviets have provided some funds, training, and logistics for terrorist groups, they have not actually deployed individual terrorist operations. Will they, and will terrorism be the bridge to a wider variety of unconventional-warfare operations for the Soviet Union?

Can terrorist groups based outside their target country maintain operations without the support of a state?

How necessary is foreign support to domestic terrorist groups? Are groups like ETA, the Red Brigades, and M-19 purely "domestic"?

How strong, or potentially strong, is universalist terrorism? For example, how involved are the Japanese Red Army—the Red Army Front (RAF)—and others in the activities of the PLO?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS¹

INTRODUCTION

Much of the initial session was spent considering possible typologies of terrorism. Peter Janke suggested a four-way distinction among the following types:

1. Ideological groups (e.g., Tupamaros, German leftists, Red Brigades).
2. Nationalist/separatist groups (e.g., Basques, IRA).
3. Quasi-colonial situations (e.g., South Africa, Rhodesia).
4. Exiles from authoritarian countries opposing the regime in their homeland (e.g., Spaniards during Franco's rule, Turks, Greeks against the Greek junta).

¹ Jacques Léauté, Moderator; Ariel Merari, Rapporteur. This summary was prepared by Gail Bass, Ariel Merari, and William Sater.

There was substantial, but not universal, support for this as a working typology, and it was suggested that a fifth category, state-supported terrorism, be added to the list.

An alternative four-way typology—the first three categories of which seemed to parallel Janke's—was offered by Luigi Bonanate. He distinguished among

1. Revolutionary terrorism.
2. Terrorism for independence.
3. Colonialistic terrorism.
4. Terrorism practiced by the state.

There was some disagreement about whether or not violence committed by a government against its own citizens, so-called "state terror," should be labeled "terrorism" and included in the discussion. No consensus on this point was reached.

Ariel Merari pointed out that both suggested typologies were based on terrorist motivations and therefore were of limited practical utility, because there is little relationship between a terrorist group's motivation or credo and its *modus operandi*. He proposed, instead, distinguishing among terrorist groups along lines that affect their *modus operandi*. For example, terrorists who act against their own countrymen versus terrorists who act against foreigners. The former are likely to be more selective of their targets, while the latter are more prone to indiscriminate killing. Another useful distinction might be made between terrorists based abroad and terrorists based in their own country; those based abroad are more likely to depend upon support from patron states.

Yehezkel Dror argued for a different approach to the entire matter of the terrorist environment. He felt it inappropriate to begin by creating a taxonomy of different types of terrorism. He proposed instead drawing up a list of factors that might predispose a society to terrorism—e.g., accelerated rate of change, destabilization of value system, lack of capacity to govern (either because of self-restraint or inadequate technical efficiency)—and only then examining whether different sets of environmental conditions are correlated with different kinds of terrorism.

There was no clear-cut resolution of the opening debate on whether to taxonomize first or to attempt to generate a set of environmental conditions that contribute to the development or persistence of terrorism of any type. In fact, the group did neither. The next two days' sessions considered a variety of topics related to the theme of the terrorist environment without following a systematic agenda. While no taxonomy was officially adopted to provide structure to the analysis, the distinctions between ideological and nationalistic terrorism, between left-wing and right-wing terrorism, and between domestic terrorism

and terrorism on foreign soil served as leitmotifs throughout the discussions.

The group agreed that no generalizations can be made with regard to the influence of environmental factors on terrorism. Many types of factors which constitute terrorism's environment and therefore affect the phenomenon were mentioned: economical, historical, cultural, ethnic, technological, geographical, demographic, psychological, political, etc. No single factor can be identified as a universal cause of terrorism or even as a universal precipitating factor. Terrorism in various forms flourishes in different countries at different times as a result of idiosyncratic combinations of factors.

A detailed description of terrorism-precipitating conditions in Turkey was given by Ihsan Gurkan as an example of the multiplicity and complexity of factors that encourage or foster political violence.

Specific topics that the working group addressed during its meetings are summarized below.

FACTORS IN THE TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT

Role of the Media

There was agreement that the media represent a critical factor in the terrorist environment. It was noted with consternation that in various countries the press has made the environment more hospitable to terrorism. In addition to providing massive publicity for specific terrorist actions (the aspect that has generally received the most attention in discussions of terrorism), the media have contributed to terrorist activities in several ways; for example:

1. Television stations in Italy have assisted terrorists by giving specific information on police deployment.
2. In Germany, among other countries, some elements of the press have nurtured terrorists by sympathizing with their goals, even while condemning violent methods, and by criticizing government actions for dealing with the terrorists.

There have also been examples of press cooperation with the government, however, e.g., during the Schleyer kidnapping incident in Germany, or among what Peter Janke termed Britain's "responsible press" (as opposed to the so-called alternative press).

It was argued that governments and security forces might be able to use the media more effectively to generate public support; one possible method for doing so would be to provide accurate information to

the media on a regular basis. However, for terrorist groups, even bad publicity is usually better than no publicity at all.

Impact of Ideology

Whereas radical ideology is the main motivation for some terrorist groups, this kind of ideology may also be detrimental to nationalist or separatist groups, in that it limits their appeal to the general public. Cases in point are the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and the Basque separatist group, ETA. This observation seems to be true for the more politically minded regions of the world, such as Europe and the Middle East, but it may not necessarily be true for the less politically developed parts of the globe, such as Africa, where the distinctions between various shades of the left-right political spectrum do not mean much to the people.

Role of Patron States

Patron states are involved in supporting terrorism in many, but not all, cases. It appears that patron states are more important to terrorist groups fighting on foreign soil. They may provide training, weapons, financial backing, false documents, and other logistical support to terrorist groups. Beyond this, patron states may be a source of psychological support and political legitimacy for terrorist groups.

The activities of the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries, as well as of Libya, in support of terrorist groups were discussed. It was suggested that Soviet bloc countries provide open support to groups they characterize as national liberation organizations, because the Soviet constitution provides for this. When the Soviets wish to covertly aid illegal subnational groups not classified by them as national liberation organizations, they may delegate training and support activities to satellite countries or to other terrorist groups, such as the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). The PLO acts, in effect, as a Soviet agent in supporting other terrorist organizations, including the IRA.

It was generally agreed that support of terrorist groups by the Soviet Union or its allies rarely extends to the provision of specific operational directions.

The potential for terrorist acts within or against the Soviet Union was the subject of some speculation. The prospects for terrorism within the Soviet Union were assessed as being unlikely. The Soviet Union, a totalitarian state that strictly controls its news media and educational system and feels no restraints on governmental counter-measures, was deemed to be a poor environment for terrorism. Nor have Soviet personnel and interests frequently been the targets of

terrorist acts on foreign soil. It was suggested that if the Soviet Union were to become the target for any significant terrorist activity, its leaders might be willing to enter into international agreements aimed at curbing the problem.

Escalation

An attempt was made to identify conditions that may lead to an escalation in terrorist methods or targeting. Three such conditions were mentioned:

1. Terrorists' *failures*, which could result in desperation and a willingness to wreak destruction on a larger scale.
2. Terrorists' *successes*, which could tempt them to achieve more by escalation.
3. Rivalry or competition between terrorist groups operating in the same arena—for example, left-wing and right-wing terrorism in Italy.

It was generally agreed that none of these conditions would necessarily lead to an escalation in terrorist actions.

From the terrorists' viewpoint, escalation has several drawbacks: It may alienate major portions of the public, either national or international; it could give governments the legitimacy to take extreme antiterrorist measures in a more favorable atmosphere; and in the case of high-order escalation, e.g., mass destruction, such an escalation could also be a *casus belli*.

It was pointed out, however, that to attract renewed public attention and to boost the morale of their members and "supporters," terrorists may resort to new tactics in a way that does not constitute an escalation, e.g., the poisoning of Israeli oranges in Europe in 1978, presumably by Palestinians, in an avowed effort to "sabotage the Israeli economy."

Thus, the availability of advanced technology, which might significantly enhance the terrorists' power to induce fear or cause destruction, is not in itself sufficient inducement for the terrorists to resort to the use of such technology.

Sympathizers or the Supportive Subculture

The group discussed the existence of *sympathizers* or a *supportive subculture* as a crucial aspect of the terrorist environment. It was suggested that for research purposes it may be as important to understand the motivations of sympathizers as it is to understand those of the terrorists themselves. The presence in a society of a sympathetic

constituency makes the environment more hospitable to terrorists, and this supportive subculture provides fertile ground for the recruiting of future terrorists. It was emphasized that harsh police or governmental measures aimed at members of such a subculture will reinforce it and may have a radicalizing effect on some of its members, making them more likely to become active terrorists.

SUBJECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In general, there was support for a cross-national study of the factors that create and promote terrorism. For this purpose, agreement should be reached on the definition of the phenomenon as well as on the methods of data collection and analysis.

It was also agreed that the following areas deserve further study:

- The differences between left-wing and right-wing terrorists. (It was suggested that the motivations of left-wing terrorists are mainly ideological, while right-wing terrorists tend to be less committed to ideology and more driven by innately aggressive personalities. Italy was given as a prime example of this. There was some disagreement as to the general applicability of this hypothesis, and a feeling that it should be examined carefully in a number of national contexts.)
- Conditions favoring rural versus urban political violence, and the prospects of success for these two forms.
- Ways to facilitate terrorists' reentry into mainstream society.
- Factors that affect the longevity of terrorist groups (e.g., size of group, age of members, homogeneity of membership, nationalistic or ideological orientation).
- The role that culture plays in the development of the terrorist subculture and in the resolution of conflicts between itself and that subculture. (It was suggested that a comparative analysis be made of several countries' experience.)
- The international conditions and possible developments that promote low-level conflict, including terrorism.
- The relationships in a number of countries between ecological and political protest groups on the one hand, and terrorist groups on the other.
- The impact of terrorism on international commerce.
- The economic costs and other consequences of terrorism, including impacts on public attitudes and political systems.
- The impact of immigration policies on terrorism, with possible extension to a study of population movements in general.

Session 2

TERRORIST MINDSETS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Agenda of Topics

Has our knowledge in this area progressed very much since an international panel summarized the results of its discussions at the Berlin conference in 1978? What have we learned about the mindset and behavior of the individual terrorist and of terrorist groups? What have we learned about their decisionmaking patterns?

Mindset

Although there appears to be no identifiable psychotic "terrorist personality," it may be that individuals attracted to terrorists do have common traits. Would it be useful to be able to identify those traits?

Can we exclude criminality and mental pathology from our deliberations about terrorist intentions?

How different are people who commit isolated terrorist acts in moments of crisis from the long-term planners of successive acts?

In studying terrorists, would it be useful to have more data from control groups, i.e., those who use violence or intimidation in social or political contexts other than those in which terrorists operate?

Behavior

To what extent is terrorism imitated behavior? Is there any empirical verification for the so-called "contagion effect"?

What factors determine the type and rate of a terrorist group's operations?

How much of terrorist behavior can be explained by the relationship of the terrorist group to the "sympathizers" who make up the environment in which the group survives and operates?

Do terrorists proceed from common criminality to political terrorism or from political terrorism to common criminality (the Mahler thesis)?

Is there an inner dynamic of terrorist actions that has greater explanatory power than apparent motives, such as reaction to existing state or police measures, or ideological commitment?

Decisionmaking

To what extent do terrorist groups alter their tactics on the basis of experience—their own and others?

How do terrorist groups choose their targets?

In terrorist groups, does the prerequisite of violent action lead to equality in decisionmaking rather than authoritarian leadership?

Should attempts be made to compare terrorist-group decisionmaking with that of other groups who rely on secrecy?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS¹

INTRODUCTION

A principal purpose of the discussion sessions was to share recent experiences and observations from around the world, to advance our meager knowledge about the terrorist mindset. The discussions produced some important insights and showed that our understanding had improved since the conference on international terrorism held in Berlin two years earlier. But they also reminded us that we still have a great deal to learn about the nature of terrorist mindsets, their causes and consequences, and their significance relative to other factors involved in terrorism.

The discussions followed no fixed agenda and covered everything from psychiatric to police concerns, worldwide locations, and various types of groups. Observations about terrorist mindsets considered individuals, groups, and individuals as part of a group. The participants were concerned with the causes and consequences of terrorist mindsets, their significance for recruitment, ideology, leader-follower relations, organization, decisionmaking about targets and tactics, audience appeal, escalation of violence, and the efforts of individual terrorists to exit from terrorism. A principal parameter turned out to be evolution over time: Participants from Germany and Italy pointed out that the terrorists and the organizations (not to mention their targets and environment) change with the years. Thus what may seem true for early members of a terrorist group may not be true for later members, or for successor groups.

¹ Richard Mulder, Moderator; Risto Fried, Rapporteur. This summary was prepared by Konrad Kellen and David Ronfeldt, with the assistance of Robert Reinstedt.

The discussions were so extensive and free-flowing that one participant finally confessed to "methodological discomfort," stating, "We are constantly shifting from one level of analysis to another, from the personality dynamics of a terrorist to 'small group' dynamics. Another reason for my discomfort is that we are dealing with different cultural values that are modifiers of behavior: We're talking Germany, we're talking Algeria, Italy, Poland, . . . although I feel that this produces insights, empirical insights, that are absolutely superb material for our discussions, I feel the generalizations ought to be sensitized to culture differences in each group if we want to get at motivation." Indeed, we did have difficulty producing cogent generalizations about terrorists and terrorism, but in part this reflects the elusive nature of the subject.

The principal points from the discussions are summarized below.

THE ROAD TO TERRORISM: ENTERING AND EXITING FROM THE FOLD

It was generally agreed that terrorists do not become terrorists overnight, and that no individual trait drives them to embrace political violence as an avocation. The road to terrorism usually begins with some form of alienation, sometimes mixed with boredom. The individual typically drops out of society, spends some time in limbo, moves from there through stages of occasional protest and permanent dissidence, and finally turns to terrorism. This process can take a long time. A person does not join a terrorist group the way he might suddenly join a club or a political party.

One facet that distinguishes many terrorists is the rather unusual combination of an intellectual inclination and a proclivity toward the use of violence. The person who becomes a terrorist generally has both intellectualism and idealism present in some form, no matter how misshapen. The idealism of new joiners is not always maintained, however. In the course of a terrorist's career, violent tactics, like robbing banks to acquire operating funds, sometimes become an end in themselves. Terrorist groups also recruit people with special skills, e.g., expertise in explosives; and such people, even though nominally members of the group, cannot be said to have idealism as one of their motivations for joining.

The physical violence of terrorism entered the discussions about why terrorists (somewhat like armed robbers) were usually young and dropped out in later years. This may result from a maturation process and the growing disinclination to use physical violence with age; but it also could be, at least partly, due to the physical demands of active terrorism, which may be too great for anyone not in prime shape.

It was generally agreed that terrorists do not see themselves as terrorists; they never call themselves terrorists, either in their pamphlets or in the works of their theoreticians. And this is not simply a propaganda tactic. They, in fact, see themselves as defending themselves and others against a predatory and aggressive state; they see their acts as legitimate. They may state that their firing squad has executed someone, as though they were presenting an official bulletin issued by a legitimate power. They also talk of "convicting" traitors, "condemning them to death," and so on. To underscore this view of their legitimacy, terrorists also like to stage trials before killing either a victim from the other side or one of their own who is suspected of being a traitor. For example, they actually staged a "trial" in an Italian prison and then "executed" the "convicted" man by strangling him in his cell. This then leads to more rationalizations and excuses. If a terrorist who calls himself a "soldier" kills an innocent person, he thinks of himself as carrying out a legitimate death sentence, even though soldiers generally do not do that. He also thinks of the victim as being guilty, because that person was "condemned" by the group. Still, some discussants felt that all this ambiguity and downright untruth must create confusion and, eventually, dismay in the minds of some terrorists.

Like others motivated by political concerns, terrorists are not immune to disillusionment with their group or its cause. This has moved some to quit and might move others to do likewise if leaving were not so difficult. Conversely, some terrorists are forced by their peers to leave the group against their own intentions. They are "stricken off the list" for unreliability, age, or any of a variety of reasons. At the point of leaving the group, the terrorist truly becomes what, in the view of some discussants, he really had always been: a displaced person.

A good deal of the discussion focused on the process of getting out of terrorist groups. Indeed, society's best defense against the otherwise elusive and hard-to-confront terrorist is his own decision to abstain from terrorism. But it is very hard for a terrorist to "get out," much harder than it is to join. This is so partly for practical reasons, e.g., because both the authorities and the terrorist underground would pursue him, but there are also psychological constraints in that exiting would mean admitting to himself that he had been wrong all along.

Contagion is another factor that may apply not only to terrorist acts but also to defection from a terrorist group. If a terrorist can be persuaded to leave his group, and especially if his action is then publicized and he is able to justify his defection as a political act based on what he sees as the betrayal of the cause by those from whom he has defected, this may trigger widespread defection by others who may have been latently dissatisfied. Again, however, the terrorist group may counter this possibility by staging a very well publicized execution of a defector as a warning to others.

TRAITS OF THE MINDSET

Though numerous points of peripheral importance entered the discussions, primary attention was devoted to examining "what makes the terrorist tick." The participants reviewed common propositions regarding what distinguishes the mentality of a terrorist or a terrorist group, but it was concluded that, at least for now, no truly satisfactory analysis of the subjective factors explaining terrorism can be produced. There are so many types of terrorists and so many different types at different times and places that it is impossible to identify their psychological traits. Moreover, it is not clear whether terrorist mindsets should be treated as a subset of some broader kinds of mindsets or as a set apart with its own dynamics and varieties. Indeed, in the final analysis there may be nothing psychiatrically unexpected about terrorists; instead, it may be the sociopolitical environment that makes them unusual.

It is difficult to tell whether terrorist activity primarily represents an extension of personality or an extension of ideology. An ideology may be a guide to action, and certain kinds of terrorist action may flow logically and consistently from an espousal of ideology, but ideology may also be an *ex post facto* rationalization for some activity that has quite different motivational roots. The inclination to attribute the terrorist mentality to a "depressive" personality component may obscure the fact that the real component may be political, as in Italy, where terrorism is sometimes the result of a perception that the Communist Party is not creating the revolution. The difficulty of separating personality from ideological factors is compounded by the difficulty of separating individual and group dynamics. For many terrorists, activity does become more important than ideology or its ends. This success can breed anxiety and vulnerability, because keeping going becomes more important than getting somewhere.

There was some consensus, albeit no clear agreement, that something was amiss in the terrorists' personality and that concepts like depression, insecurity, and uncertainty were helpful descriptors. Various psychological explanations have been applied to terrorists, e.g.:

- Terrorists are characterized by feelings of profound depression, anxiety, and hopelessness, which they may try to compensate by counterphobic activity.
- Terrorists are characterized by feelings of isolation and of not belonging anywhere, which leads them to drop out of society in the first place and may later help to induce disillusionment with roles in the terrorist group.
- Terrorists have a neurotic fear of succeeding and would rather end up dead than in power.

- Terrorists are characterized by feelings of their own lack of importance and by compensatory tendencies to adopt grandiose postures.

These propositions are significant not only because they are widespread but also because their validity—or lack thereof—may have important implications for terrorist tactics and target selection, as well as for counterterrorist activities.

Depression and Uncertainty

Some of the discussants expressed a belief that terrorists tended to be depressed in the clinical sense, but there was no unanimity on this. The case of the German terrorist-defector Baumann was cited: By his own account, Baumann had been very depressed before turning terrorist, faced as he was with a long and boring life as a construction laborer; but after joining a group, he had a great time, if we can believe him. Some of the psychiatrists present chose not to believe him, stating that depression can be hidden both from the observer and from the victim.

The group thus moved away from the emphasis on depression that dominated the 1980 workshop discussions² and toward a new emphasis on perceptions of the future. Depression is an area where there is much disagreement among experts from different countries, possibly reflecting cultural and national differences. A person may have been depressed some time before become a terrorist, but that is rarely the only explanation; and being a terrorist may not be depressive. Uncertainty about the future and depression are not necessarily associated. A sense of being against what exists at present and a feeling of incertitude about the future characterize both terrorists and their sympathizers.

It was noted that a deeply rooted fear of the future is found at German universities, where students live with stress and pressures and have little to fall back on. The South Moluccan population in Holland, from which many terrorists have come, is characterized by depression and apathy, which are often associated with common criminality and psychoses.

Hope for the future, rather than fear of it, could be the decisive consideration in some cases. In clinical examinations of depression, questions about a patient's past, present, and future have generally shown that what is off-base is the view and explanation of the future. We must be careful not to overemphasize such points, however, be-

² See Risto Fried, "The Psychology of the Terrorist," draft committee report from the 1978 Berlin Conference on International Terrorism.

cause the explanation may lie not in fear or depression but in other factors such as the desire for power resulting from a lack of goals. This has been the case with Italian terrorists, who would not be described as depressive; depression may develop when one of them leaves the movement, but even in prison Italian terrorists are not apathetic, and they never commit suicidal acts.

Feelings of Isolation and Role-Playing

Feelings of isolation and attitudes toward role-playing seem important to the formation and conduct of terrorists. Recruits have dropped out of society in the first place because they resented the roles society assigned them, only to find much later that even outside society, in the terrorist groups, roles were still being assigned to them.

Yet most terrorists have not been "loners," despite their often antisocial posture and acts. On the contrary, many of them have a history of making attempts to find new affiliations by espousing causes and seeking to join groups of co-believers. Progressive disillusionment ultimately brings them into terrorist groups, where they may enjoy the close-knit aspect of their affiliation, no matter how hostile they otherwise are to society in general.

Apart from individual psychological attributes, the key to whether a potential terrorist becomes a real terrorist may be the finding of group support where people talk each other into action. Operating terrorist groups often do not actively recruit (in contrast to religious cults, which typically do so). However, in Italy there has been some contagion effect in recruitment into terrorism (as well as in getting out of it later on). Especially noticeable among youth in universities, this seems to reflect a need to be a part of a homogeneous group. The need to belong is a very powerful determinant. The point was made that German experience has shown that pacifist and civil rights movements may precede terrorist movements. Both represent rejection of society's rules governing violence. Both also emphasize concepts of shame, blame, and guilt and transfer these to society. Conditions are thus created for an easy transition from pacifist to terrorist movements (as from one cult to another). But this pattern may be limited to postwar Germany, where pacifism developed as an over-reaction to militarism.

Overcoming isolation through terrorist role-playing is often not a lasting solution. Some members of terrorist groups eventually find that overly close association with others in highly restricted quarters is quite oppressive and undesirable.

Neurotic Fears of Succeeding

It was opined that terrorists may actually have neurotic fears of succeeding and of the responsibilities they would have to meet if they ever really won a decisive victory. The role of a revolutionary dissident may be more congenial to most terrorists than that of a responsible person in power.

Some discussants went so far as to say that what the terrorist really seeks is not power, but death. But this view was criticized. A death-seeking terrorist may have fantasies of a life after death, rather than expecting a mere cessation of life. A death-seeking motivation among certain terrorists was regarded as unlikely by some discussants who saw *all* terrorists as basically depressed. Depression and death-seeking were, in any case, regarded as more evident in individual terrorists than in the broad membership of groups and organizations.

Terrorists apparently seek to counteract their profound anxiety and insecurity by engaging in counterphobic violence, which is designed to prove to the terrorist himself and to others that he is not afraid or that he is capable of doing the very thing that he fears most. Thus some terrorists may want to work at the edge of death and their own fears—to see how far they can go as a way to break internal tensions. But at least in Germany, many want to come out alive, even though they like to play with risks. Terrorism is used as a kind of romanticism, to escape drab lives. In the United States, groups like the Weather Underground and the Manson Family wanted to remain alive so as to be part of the new order.

Feelings of Power and Importance

Another issue for mindset analysis concerns how the terrorist views his own power and importance. It has been said that terrorists are characterized by a feeling of unimportance and that many overcompensate by adopting grandiose postures, exaggerating the size of their group, the goals it seeks, and the results it produces.

The attempt to inflate one's own importance may help motivate the terrorist to seek links with terrorists from other countries in order to suggest that his cause is international or worldwide. The exaggerated popular fear of a highly organized international terrorist conspiracy—whether or not one actually exists—may gratify the terrorist's wishful fantasies.

Connected with the striving for grandiosity is a histrionic or dramatic quality which characterizes much terrorist behavior. It is not only the surrounding world that regards terrorism as a form of theater; the terrorists themselves are fully aware of this aspect. Their

desires for an act of terrorism to have widespread repercussions affect their selection of targets, timing, and modes of attack. It is important for a terrorist group to create the impression that it is bigger, stronger, better-organized, and better-informed than it really is or ever could be. Finally, it is increasingly in the interest of the terrorists to suggest to the public that intense cooperation and coordination exists among the far-flung groups that operate in the world. One discussant cited the example of Carlos throwing a bomb into the crowds at Le Drug Store in Paris to make it appear as though he (or his group) were closely allied to other terrorists mounting a siege at that time in Holland.

In this connection, it was mentioned that propagandists during World War II issued exaggerated accounts of their own side's strength and corresponding accounts of the enemy's vulnerability. Just as the propagandists eventually came to believe their own propaganda, terrorists too may create a fool's paradise, greatly overestimating their own strength, the cohesion of terrorist groups (which seems far from solid), the vulnerability of their adversaries, and the number and enthusiasm of their sympathizers. Just as he tends to inflate the righteousness of his cause and the nefariousness of his adversaries, the terrorist consciously and unconsciously seems to inflate his own strength.

It was mentioned that German terrorists had threatened major actions, including the downing of three Lufthansa planes, after the death in Stammheim prison of Meinhof, Baader, and Ensslin. In fact, only a few isolated, minor bombings occurred. While this initially baffled German defenders, they soon found a twofold solution to the riddle. On the one hand, they discovered from terrorist literature that the terrorists were beginning to lose active sympathizers, i.e., people willing to lend support by providing cars, safe houses, identification papers, and so on. On the other hand, some groups in Germany representing environmental and similar concerns came to the fore. These groups apparently drained off concerned young citizens—or at least kept them from joining violent groups—by providing a forum in which they could express their feelings through anti-nuclear demonstrations and other legal activities. Thus, in the German case, the self-evaluation of the terrorists proved greatly out of line with reality.

TERRORIST DECISIONMAKING AND TARGET SELECTION

The problem of gaining some predictive insights into terrorist target selection was seen primarily as one of scarcity of data, diffuseness of the considerations (on the part of the terrorists), and variety of purposes.

The discussants noted that in wartime, it is relatively easy to predict targets. One can establish with some ease how lucrative a target (for example, a choke-point in production or transportation) is and, depending on how well-defended that target is and what the enemy's capabilities are, can list strategic assets that are likely to be targeted for attack. Quite simply, the purpose of an attack—any attack—in wartime is to get closer to victory.

In the terrorist context, all this is different. The attractiveness of targets, whether installations or people, could depend on the terrorists' motivation—whether they want to create fear and alarm, alert people to a particular issue, impress sympathizers, or shore up the morale of their own members. Decisions may also be a function of whether the aim is destruction (or death), hostage-taking, extortion, robbery (to finance further operations), propaganda for or against a certain cause, signaling, intimidation, or revenge. Yet another complicating factor is that terrorists themselves often seem to differ on how to evaluate the effects of prior actions and the probable effects of attacks on new targets, so that predictions of what *they* would consider lucrative are made still more difficult.

Discussants pointed out that in certain localities and at certain times some targets that might be expected to be attractive to terrorists have never been attacked. For example, terrorists do not attack the military in Italy, partly to avoid provoking martial law, but also because they identify conscript soldiers with the common people and not as enemies. However, with an increasing proneness to violence on the part of the attackers, and with their decreasing ideological orientation, a shift in targeting could occur even there.

It was agreed that the question of terrorist target selection required considerably more study.

Audience Support and Sympathy

The attitudes of the wider audience from whom terrorists receive support and sympathy can significantly influence the terrorist's mindset and his decisionmaking. Terrorists may try to swim with the outside current by performing activities they believe are likely to win widespread approval from their selected audiences. The discussions here, however, focused on the possibility that terrorists can misjudge their audiences, and even lose them, by performing brutal acts that ultimately cause revulsion. Moreover, terrorists may become too confident of their audience's support and fail to anticipate changes within it.

Terrorists may severely misjudge sympathetic audiences, with regard to both their true nature and their durability. For example, during the Vietnam war, there was a large and ready-made audience for

people who opposed the war and struggled against the police. But many of these sympathizers shared only one aim—that of opposing the war—with the current terrorists. When the war was over, most people withdrew their support from revolutionary groups.

Thus it seems easy for terrorists to fool themselves as to who is a true sympathizer and for what reason. They do not always seem to be able to distinguish between a climate that is favorable to them because of what they did and a climate that just happens to be favorable to them by accident. And they are often not well attuned as to when and why the climate of supporters and sympathizers changes.

There may come a time when a group becomes either less reactive or no longer reactive to influence from the outside and shuts itself off from the rest of society. It does not rely upon outsiders for psychological support or social sanction; it develops ways to be fairly resource-independent from the usual sources of materials and supplies; and its members rely on a strong commitment to fellow members (both living and dead) to pursue a particular course of action on behalf of a rigid set of beliefs. This withdrawal and isolation can have dangerous consequences for a group's psychology and activity.

Last but not least, terrorists themselves are always an audience for their own actions. This is one reason why the leader of a group must take into account how his own people will respond to the hitting of a target: Will it produce further cohesion or will it cause disintegration in the group?

Group Cohesion

A particularly interesting point emerged from a discussion of factors that lead to a terrorist group's decision to make an attack: The maintaining of group cohesion through activity is a key and often the primary determinant of terrorist decisions. Thus, promoting the group as a whole can be a more important concern than hurting the enemy. For example, some Palestinian groups have selected actions that seemed directed more toward competing with other Palestinian groups than toward inflicting damage on Israel.

Tactic and target selection may be affected by the differences between the operational values of the leaders and those of followers. Leaders may think in terms of purposes and goals, while followers on the "front line" with each other may be most strongly motivated by loyalty to their comrades. And the assumption that terrorist groups are quite cohesive is often incorrect; they can be splintered, a possibility that the group and especially the leader must take into account. Leaders may even create threats from the outside in order to promote group cohesion. Moreover, a terrorist group, once in the headlines, often wants to stay there. This creates inner pressures for bigger and

better actions—a dynamic that is independent of government response. Leaders must choose actions that will demonstrate to their followers, and to rival leaders, that they exist and can prevail. In this respect, terrorist mindset and decisionmaking patterns resemble those of any other competent group in a conflict situation. A terrorist leader who launches an attack primarily to increase the cohesiveness of his group is by no means unique; the leaders of legitimate military units may have the same motivation.

Target selection and decisionmaking are further affected by group structure. There are basically two kinds of structures: pyramidal and centrifugal. The structure constrains the flow of information and access to it within the organization. Structures may also be characterized as Marxist cell or traditional charismatic. In the Marxist cell model, the "party" hovers over all; in the charismatic model, the leader hovers over all. The traditional charismatic model is more common in underdeveloped Third World countries and may lead to factionalism (as has happened in the PLO).

This discussion led to the question of whether an increasing volume of actions led to greater pressure for decisionmaking democracy and equality within the terrorist group, causing more participants to get involved.

NEW PATTERNS BEHIND TERRORIST VIOLENCE

The discussants identified two new patterns behind recent violence: (1) evidence of generational change within terrorist groups, and (2) a changing role for women terrorists. Discussions of both topics drew heavily on recent German and Italian experiences.

Generational Change

Generational changes that develop in terrorist movements was one of the most important themes discussed in the workshop. Earlier generations tend to be more ideological and discriminating, later generations more violent and ruthless. Every four years or so a new "generation" takes a dominant role in terrorist activities as older leaders and the "brains" are killed or imprisoned, and their "soldiers" rise to leadership. The newer generations appear progressively less ideology-minded, less beset by moral scruples, more action-oriented, and more ruthless than their predecessors. It was noted, particularly by Italian and German participants, that first-generation terrorists were frequently highly educated and well-versed in questions of ideology, especially Marxism. They were given to philosophical and ethical ar-

guments and would ponder questions such as whether it was morally justifiable to shoot a policeman. The second generation would pretend to know Marxism. But the third and fourth generations of terrorists are not ideologically sophisticated, nor are they interested in ideology. They "don't give a damn" about Marxism; they just "do things." They have contempt and impatience for learning, and they prefer instant action.

The shift away from ideology toward anti-intellectual action was partly the result of recruitment by first-generation terrorists of criminals whom they naively admired for their technical skills and willingness to act. When criminals are recruited into a terrorist group, they often have a destructive effect on the group's discipline and morale. Also, admiration of them may give way to disillusionment and contempt. The fourth generation's contempt for intellect may thus be traced back to steps taken by the first generation.

In the Italian case, the first generation of terrorists consisted of Catholics who were highly committed and who believed God was with them; they were well-educated and had been formed by experiences during turmoil first in the universities and then among the industrial working class. The second generation had less education but still had a strong sense of commitment, including commitment to the first-generation leaders who had recruited them.

The earliest generations showed more sense for step-by-step strategies, but by now the brains are in jail, while the soldiers remain at large. The third generation had a low cultural level and was not able to articulate Marxist-Leninist ideology very well. They emerged from intraterrorist conflicts which split the Red Brigades. The fourth generation is the most dangerous; it includes more workers and fewer students.

This generational change may reflect declining attention and interest within the terrorists' presumed audience of sympathizers, which in turn may signify fewer constraints and may open the way for more dangerous violence by succeeding generations. In February 1980, terrorists killed four judges in Italy in one week, but only the fourth murder got them into the headlines—the first three brought hardly any publicity for them.

In Germany, most of those in the first and second generations of terrorists are dead or have been arrested. The fourth generation is much more ruthless and violent and less concerned about justifying its tactics. It is led by remnants of earlier groups. Such generational change affects methods of recruitment and organization. Fragmentation of the left in Germany and changes in the presumed audience of sympathizers may be important determinants of trends in terrorism. One cannot say that generational change results from tactical fail-

ures by early generations, however, because terrorists *do not necessarily see failures*.

There is still more student involvement in terrorism in Germany than in Italy, but succeeding German generations are also showing less facility with and interest in Marxism-Leninism. The German fourth generation includes terrorists who moonlight at jobs other than their terrorism or, in some cases, who moonlight in terrorism ("leisure-time terrorists"). In general, later generations show less interest in symbolic acts, preferring more deliberately violent actions and having contempt for theory. Some "degeneration" is taking place.

Similarly, Berkeley radicalism shows an evolution from student-based idealism to non-student-led phases dominated by street people. As one discussant pointed out, in the early days of the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley (which, in a way, he regarded as a precursor to later, more violent groups), the leadership was in the hands of excellent students. Then, as things moved from Free Speech to the Vietnam Day Committee and finally to the People's Park, the leadership deteriorated considerably, with groups of protesters increasingly dominated by non-students and with members increasingly coming from other strata.

Women in Terrorism

Discussion of the high percentage of females in terrorism and of their psychological profiles and consequences aroused much interest. In Germany, women terrorists have exhibited great strength and stamina. Despite some efforts to retain an image of femininity, they have often acted more macho than the men and have generally proved more dangerous and ruthless. They have been more tough and cruel from the beginning, and those who have risen to high decision-making levels have shown less concern about sympathetic audience support in their selection of targets and tactics (this has also been true in Italy). Women terrorists to date have not gone in for "a fair fight." They are more likely to attack symbols of male dominance, like police officers and office managers. Females in groups have characteristically indulged in in-fighting and in seeking to turn males against other females. Men in groups dominated by women are more brutal and competitive than men in other groups. As women act more male than males, the men have become brutal to avoid being outdone. Women social deviants are common in terrorism; indeed, women terrorists generally reject any and all standard social roles.

Further observations were obtained from prison experience in Italy. In jail, male terrorists would write home still posturing as terrorists. But women would write home as women, e.g., showing concern

about family matters, thus revealing a split or double life, which may contribute to making them more dangerous than their more single-minded male counterparts. In addition, it was noted that women rarely defect or cooperate with police, whereas men often do.

Police experiences in Los Angeles support these observations. There too, women prisoners write letters like ordinary women, and they have proven more resistant to interrogation. In contrast, it is usually the women members of criminal gangs who turn evidence.

Women terrorists in Germany tend to stay with their cause even when in prison. But long imprisonment often leads to their total psychological disintegration and, ultimately, suicide. This vulnerability may reflect the fact that women, even more than men, seem to burn all their bridges, to cut themselves off from the past so as to make a new life, when they enter terrorist groups. Long imprisonment, without hope of rescue, in addition to aging, often leads to a severe midlife crisis.

Differences Between Right-Wing and Left-Wing Terrorists

A few points were observed about differences between terrorists of radically different persuasions. In Italy, an extreme left-wing terrorist places a high premium on ideological matters, whereas an extreme right-wing terrorist may have only a hazy, mystical, poorly formed ideology and be far more emotional than cerebral in his motivation. Differences in motivation and personality type also go together with differences in the kinds of actions that are carried out and the targets at which they are directed. A left-wing organization's target is likely to be an authority figure, such as a representative of government or industry, while a right-wing terrorist is more likely to express his contempt for people through indiscriminate mass killings. In Italy, only right-wing groups would attack feminist-movement offices, and no women are included in rightist groups. The left-wing would never attack women. In Germany, right-wing terrorist groups may include women, and left-wing groups may endanger women and children.

WHY HAS TERRORISM INCREASED? WHY HAS IT NOT ESCALATED MORE?

One of the principal questions addressed was, Why has terrorism increased? (It was agreed at the outset that there had been such an increase.) One answer to this was generational changes, discussed above, which have put terrorism into the hands of increasingly violent tacticians. An additional explanation was that escalation has

been necessary to obtain the attention of the media, which usually publicize only those terrorist actions that produce heavy casualties. Finally, escalation is inherent in terrorist activity, because to maintain or enhance one's self-image, it is necessary to do something more important and more spectacular than has been done before.

The discussants considered motives that may either push the terrorist toward escalation of activity or place constraints on him. Audience reactions may motivate terrorists to desist from activities that are too brutal or too difficult to justify on ethical grounds, yet the terrorists may also fear that inactivity will cause them to lose credibility, support, or the chance to gain new recruits—and that people within the terrorist organization will become restless or depressed.

The question of the increase in terrorism also led to counterquestions: Why have terrorists not been even more active and destructive than they have? Why have they used only a fraction of their available destructive power? Why have they passed by so many highly vulnerable and visible target sites? Why do they sometimes seem to refrain from doing all they could to increase their power to launch attacks on opponents?

In all cultural groups, ethnic values, religious values, or a strong motive to display one's moral superiority over the enemy appear to place constraints on terrorist acts. For example, during World War II Polish resistance fighters—not only regular units but also dissident units that had become bandits—did not kill German women or children even though Polish civilians, including women and children, were being killed at the rate of 3000 a day by the Nazis. Similarly, the Tupamaros did not kill women or children, and they were severely criticized from within their group for kidnapping and executing the father of a large family. A Palestinian terrorist who had deliberately killed children justified his act by stating that Israeli bombings of villages or refugee camps had inflicted death on children; this justification would not be considered valid by the Polish or Italian groups. In any event, terrorists should not all be considered as being indiscriminately aggressive; there are many things many of them will not do.

The discussants were ultimately concerned with why we have not seen (and whether we will see) terrorist groups with the technical ability and the resolve to bring a major Western power to its knees by actions such as hitting energy and transportation systems. It is surprising that offshore targets have not yet appealed to terrorists' needs for visible drama, even though weak groups often prefer the most dramatic actions. The possibility was raised that in the United States terrorists would come to attack targets at which money, environmental, and governmental-response issues intersect—for example, private

nuclear or petroleum energy systems. The targeting of such interest-intersection points might make terrorist action more effective and more detrimental.

The belief that terrorism becomes self-limiting was expressed several times. German terrorists, for example, seem to prefer not to change tactics and targets, and they continue to use old proven ways. Perhaps because of fear of failure, German terrorists still perceive boundaries in their game, and they fear the risks of crossing the boundaries. In Italy, terrorists have been careful not to attack military targets or to hurt the employment rate. In general, the discussants felt that strong constraints and perceived disadvantages would make "going nuclear" unattractive: Nuclear actions would invite too much security attention and a coordinated search and could provoke rivalry and competition within the terrorist groups themselves.

Several factors were identified as potentially facilitating escalation to superviolence: religious sanctions; ethnic differences, especially if the enemy is viewed prejudicially as subhuman; the numbing effect of prolonged struggle; desperation that all is lost, leading terrorists to decide to take everybody with them; and desperation that all will be lost if terrorists do not escalate.

But escalation does not refer only to bigger targets and tactics; it might also be implicit in improved coordination. One Los Angeles police officer noted that we are now seeing more coordination and synchronization of local and international actions. This indicates the possible emergence of a central multinational body that will select the targets to show that diverse local communities can be hit simultaneously.

Thermonuclear Terrorism

Most of the discussants seemed to be cautiously optimistic about thermonuclear terrorism, thinking it was not likely to occur in the near future for a variety of reasons. First, the terrorists may feel that the use of nuclear devices or a dangerous attack on installations could alienate real and imagined sympathizers. Second, terrorist groups seem determined to remain small, not just for security reasons but for reasons of cohesion, and therefore are not likely to aim for acquisition of supercapabilities. Finally, except for psychotics, most individuals, including terrorists, are not seen as eager to use superviolence against other people. One discussant called this a "corrective mechanism" at work in terrorist groups, keeping them from getting too violent, not only for fear of alienating constituents and bringing down upon themselves the wrath of the state and society, but also to avoid alienating their own members and to remain in a position to recruit new ones.

The Most Dangerous Terrorist Type

The question was raised as to who would be the most dangerous type of terrorist. It was agreed that the most dangerous terrorist would be one who was potentially capable of using nuclear or biological weapons. This would have to be an individual or group with a particularly pronounced tendency to despise human life and to regard opponents as non-people or mere objects. A group with this inclination would be likely to be of the millennialist type—perhaps a fanatical religious cult. Alternatively, it might be a group trying to escalate from mere terrorist activity and low-level or subnational conflict to the starting of war, possibly on behalf of some nation that would give them support. Finally, a group aspiring to superviolence would, of course, have to have a great deal of technical know-how.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The group concluded that while law-enforcement and military agencies must be ready to cope with the emergence of new types of adversaries who might be willing to commit terrorist acts far more dangerous than anything attempted so far, behavioral scientists can give little precise information, at least at this time. Behavioral scientists are obtaining valuable information from in-depth studies of individual terrorists and from multivariate studies using sociological and sociopsychological variables, but even with such information, their role will still be that of advisor on how to negotiate rather than that of threat predictor.

The view was expressed that we should not expect too much from studying terrorist mindsets alone. Such study can help to identify triggers, targets, and violence levels. But in the end, the mindsets of the sympathizing audience and the government officials who must respond to the terrorist threat may be equally significant for the course and conduct of terrorism.

Session 3

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Agenda of Topics

In what areas of combatting terrorism have governments been most successful? Have governments developed effective policies for dealing with terrorism? What roles have intelligence, research, technology, new laws, and political strategies played? Have we essentially reached the limits of international cooperation, or can we expect more?

Formulating Policy

How can government objectively assess the feasibility and effectiveness of policies for dealing with subnational conflict?

Has "the value of human life" proven useful as a moral or practical anchor in regulating our approach to terrorism?

Should governments develop policies regarding hostage behavior (e.g., how does the code of conduct apply to military personnel seized in noncombatant situations)?

Have governments developed policies of cooperation with the private sector to meet continuing terrorist threats?

Implementing Policy

Does the United States have in place the organizational framework to meet current and future terrorist threats?

How much cooperation is there among agencies (on the national, state, and local levels), and what are the barriers to coordination, especially during a crisis?

What role should the military play in combatting threats to national security posed by revolutionary movements?

Prevention

In dealing with terrorism, should governments treat the causes rather than the symptoms?

Is capital punishment an effective deterrent for terrorists?

Are there effective ways of reducing terrorists' influence on their potential supporters?

After terrorists have been captured and convicted, how should governments handle their prison life and their reentry into society to prevent proselytizing?

What security measures might be taken at facilities such as nuclear plants to prevent attacks rather than containing and detaining attackers after they have breached the facilities?

Counterterrorist Strategies and Tactics

Must counterterrorism be designed differently in democratic and authoritarian societies?

What steps can be taken on the national, state, and local levels to maximize antiterrorist intelligence within the limitations the intelligence community now faces?

Under what circumstances may a declaration of amnesty for terrorists be successful in causing desertion from terrorists' ranks?

Britain, Israel, and the Federal Republic of Germany have had considerable tactical success in countering terrorism. Why do other nations have difficulty in developing similar counterterrorist capabilities?

To what degree might preventive or counterterrorist policies, strategies, or legislation be compatible with individual rights and civil liberties?

International Issues

What can be done to deter or dissuade nations from directly engaging in terrorist acts or from acting as patrons of subnational groups?

Are there viable sanctions that the international community might adopt?

What would be the appropriate body to adopt and monitor such sanctions?

Adoption and enforcement of sanctions will be feasible only if there is a consensus among nations that terrorism is a crime against humanity. Is there such a consensus?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS¹

INTRODUCTION

This working group benefited from its international character. The participation of officials representing several governments enhanced the group's ability to compare experiences and perceptions and assured a wide-ranging discussion on the terrorist threat, policy formulation, implementation of preventive and reactive measures, international cooperation, future problems, and suggested areas of research. This summary reorders the discussions, grouping relevant points under these six topics.

THE TERRORIST THREAT

In discussions of the nature of the terrorist threat to governments, the group appeared to approve of the concept that terrorism is actually a weapons system. While various nations contend with similar terrorist tactics and weapons, the motivations, perpetrators, and nature of that threat vary greatly from country to country. Each government reflects unique societal values, and therefore each perceives the threat differently.

Moreover, as Ambassador Quainton suggested at the outset of the conference, the group saw terrorism as part of a broad spectrum of conflict and low-level violence. That spectrum ranges from episodic criminal acts to state terrorism. While the Spanish government deals with the extremist Basques' domestic terrorism campaign, the U.S. government is more concerned with episodic international incidents in which terrorists target American citizens and property abroad to gain leverage on the local government. An Israeli participant characterized his government's perception of the threat as a state of war.

Determining where in the spectrum a certain act or threat fits can be important, as was demonstrated by the group's discussion of the hostage situation in Iran. Most European participants characterized the seizure and continued confinement of U.S. embassy personnel in Teheran as a violation of international law, while a Mideast participant argued that if the Iranian government had continued to sanction the holding of American diplomats, they would have been committing an

¹ J. R. Armit, Moderator; Paul Wilkinson, Rapporteur. This summary was prepared by Susanna Purnell and Eleanor Wainstein.

act of war. A U.S. official pointed out that because the U.S. initially treated the incident as a "run-of-the-mill" terrorist event, the U.S. response "led us down a certain road." By the time American officials perceived the threat as something much more serious, the United States was locked into a set of responses.

Some discussants reminded the group to "look at the forest instead of the trees" when analyzing the terrorist threat. They argued that governments often contend with a heightened perception of terrorism which is disproportionate to the actual threat. One participant, Hanan Alon, submitted a paper² in which he reviewed the incidence of terrorism in Israel over the past decade, showing that terrorism accounted for only 0.5 percent of the exogenous casualties in Israel over an 11-year period. Yet the Israeli government and people, perceiving terrorism as a major threat, allocate a large proportion of their casualty-preventing expenditures to combatting terrorism. In a discussion of this point, it was pointed out that such heightened perceptions were also evident in Western Europe, where at times opinion polls indicated that Europeans ranked terrorism as one of the major problems to be addressed by their government. A poll taken in the Netherlands indicated that 87 percent of the people were willing to give up certain civil rights in order to allow the government to combat terrorism effectively.

There was general agreement that terrorists try to enhance their own credibility while undermining that of the government. They often deliberately use provocative methods to generate government over-reaction. Democracies were judged particularly vulnerable to this strategy, since a response that is repressive could undermine the perceived legitimacy of such a government.

Several participants pointed out that terrorists often capitalize on a wide base of discontent by utilizing government failure to address basic socioeconomic and political problems as justification for their actions. Governments therefore are vulnerable to terrorism if they fail to make some progress in addressing such fundamental issues. For example, in Colombia's recent incidents of terrorism, particularly the seizing of diplomats at an embassy party in Bogotá, terrorists were exploiting conditions that have existed for decades.

It was also pointed out that governments often inherit the terrorism of other nations. The terrorist takeover of the Iranian embassy in London set the stage for a battle between two Iranian factions on British soil. There are many cities, including London, which play host to a microcosm of international political conflicts and exiled populations in addition to having the symbolic presence of other governments

² See Hanan Alon, "Terrorism and Countermeasures: Analysis Versus a Participant's Observations," in Part 3 of this report.

in the form of embassies. This, coupled with the increase in rogue states that use diplomatic cover to conduct terrorism against fellow diplomats and against foreign groups within a country, means that governments have to deal increasingly with imported terrorist threats, motivated by factors over which they have little or no control.

POLICY FORMULATION

There was a lively discussion about how specific and binding government policy on terrorism should be, including whether it is even desirable or necessary for governments to have a policy. All participants appeared to subscribe to the conventional wisdom that each terrorist situation is unique and therefore authorities must have some flexibility to react as a situation develops. Much of the discussion centered around whether and how government policies on terrorism are compatible with this desired flexibility of response.

Participants addressed the issue from a number of viewpoints. The question was raised, Is the role of policy to project an image or to direct actions? Some suggested that a number of factors push policy into the sphere of concrete actions. Policy development was characterized as a political process. When the public feels threatened by terrorism, it puts pressure on governments to develop policies to cope with the threat. Government leaders who fail to do so are charged with not knowing what they are doing. When a terrorist act takes place, the government leadership runs the risk of further trouble from its constituency if it has previously issued declaratory statements of policy which it then proceeds to ignore in the resolution of the incident.

One member argued that the tendency to push policy into the realm of concrete actions is a major argument for formulating an unstructured policy. A similar viewpoint was expressed by another participant who suggested that government policy should cover only a few aspects and should be primarily formulated in the context of options. It was pointed out that sufficient progress has been made in the development of negotiating skills and tools that such a sophisticated approach is now a viable solution.

Most of the group, however, seemed uncomfortable with this recommendation, and the majority probably agreed with the view that while every incident is unique, there are some common threads that make it possible for governments to prepare a general policy for dealing with terrorist events. Generally the group opted for guidelines rather than ironclad rules as the best policy formulation. The stated policy of the British government, for example, is to (1) retain legitimacy of government, (2) control crisis, (3) deter future incidents, and (4) save lives. It

was agreed that whatever the policy, it should not exclude imaginative initiatives to try to resolve a situation before more violence occurs.

At the core of much of the debate on this topic is the issue of making deterrence a major aim of government policy. Again, there were many shades of opinion. There seemed to be some feeling among all discussants that catastrophic occurrences—such as nuclear and biological terrorist acts—had to be deterred and that governments simply have to do whatever is necessary to insure against such occurrences. This very premise led to one interesting argument against deterrence as a major goal. A minimal response may be better than a hard-nosed one, which could be counterproductive. By successfully deterring low-level conflict, the government might actually be pushing terrorists toward more destructive levels of activity. If an analysis shows that the threat really is at a tolerable level, it might be better to keep it there.

In Israel, the government and populace perceive the threat in terms of a state of war. The major aim of that government's policy is to deter terrorism, a goal evident in their declaratory statements, preventive measures, and the handling of terrorist attacks. This approach appears to have had some impact, since it is known that the Fedayeen have trouble recruiting for operations in Israel. It was also argued that by placing a priority on deterrence, the government has actually saved lives, in terms of both the incidents that have occurred and those that have been deterred.

While most other governments take a hard-line policy stance, few of those represented at the conference automatically made deterrence the first priority in handling an incident. This may be partly the result of a perception of terrorism as a low-level threat; it may also have a basis in what one participant called the traditional judicial model of the governments of Western Europe and the United States, in which each government balances democratic principles against forceful measures for the purpose of deterring future incidents.

The issue of how effectively various policy options contribute to deterrence, however, remained unresolved. It was noted that in the seizure of the Iranian embassy in London, the government resorted to a military solution. While this resulted in the killing of the terrorists, an event which traditionally has been considered a deterrent to future incidents, authorities fear that this action might actually spawn more incidents. The terrorists appeared so fanatical that their cohorts might make them martyrs in whose footsteps others will be encouraged to follow. Another participant—also recalling the idea that response should be tailored to the threat—suggested that deterrence of future acts may not be important in an isolated incident and that adoption of a policy based on deterrence may depend on whether government officials perceive any future consequences.

Several discussants called for more research in this area, particularly on measuring the impact of such deterrence measures as counterforce and retaliatory activity. All seemed to feel that successful government policy and its implementation is something akin to a balancing act.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVENTIVE AND REACTIVE MEASURES

Having formulated a policy or range of options to deal with terrorism or low-level conflict, each state tailors its mechanisms for their execution to the form of government, nature of the threat, and public perception of the threat. Discussion of these mechanisms covered preventive measures, intelligence, apparatus for decisionmaking and crisis management, and the exercising of response procedures.³ Especially informative were remarks by members who had participated in the resolution of terrorist crises at Entebbe, the Dominican embassy in Bogotá, and the Iranian embassy in London.

Prevention

Several participants suggested that imaginative government initiatives can in some cases resolve political conflicts before violence occurs by identifying the syndromes of potential violence and defusing them. For example, in Venezuela, President Betancourt introduced democratic reforms that frustrated Cuban-instigated terrorist activism, and in the United States, civil rights legislation combined with increased minority participation in government at all levels undoubtedly prevented much incipient urban unrest in the 1960s.

Timely measures may also help prevent minority terrorism. Dealing with minorities whose terrorist activities have become catalysts for political change within their countries—for example, the French Canadians and the Basques—requires extreme sensitivity on the part of the authorities. Minority perceptions of government actions as unjust or prejudiced may actually strengthen ethnic identifications. However successful the political solutions to their problems, there may still be a minority of the minority who reject these solutions as betrayal and continue to promote terrorism. In such cases the security response of the government remains a valid option.

³ See Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for a Liberal-Democratic Government Response to Terrorism and Low-Intensity Violence at Domestic and International Levels," in Part 3 of this report.

The Croats and the Catholics of Northern Ireland exemplify permanent disaffected minorities within a state. They feel that their rights are being denied by the majority and that they have no chance of winning political control over the whole territory. In such cases, governments should combine a maximum sensitivity to minority groups' legitimate political and economic needs with equal treatment under the law. In addition, it is important to maintain effective intelligence and security against those hardened to systematic violence and against radical movements that exploit minority grievances for their own ends.

Discussants also suggested that governments, through omissions and misjudgments, can unwittingly create situations of confrontation which might evolve into terrorism. For example, overcrowded prisons in the United States bring trained revolutionaries together with criminals and could provide the mixture of charismatic leader, idealistic loser-type followers, and conventional criminals that can result in the formation of a terrorist group. There was a strong recommendation that authorities should move toward smaller groupings in prisons.

Better training of police may also prevent violence. Police are the cutting edge of the establishment because they are in constant contact with the volatile elements of society. If their response to a troubled situation appears callous or prejudiced, it can actually promote further violence. Police in Great Britain are now trained to strengthen their links with the people as the "friendly bobby" rather than as an alien force. Local U.S. police have found that special training and increased minority recruiting have helped to contain street confrontations.

Intelligence

The discussants agreed that intelligence is a vital prerequisite for combatting terrorism and other forms of low-level violence. It was also stressed that an efficient and professional intelligence agency must function within the accountable institutions of a democratic state.

There was an extended discussion among U.S. participants over whether efforts during the 1970s to increase accountability had resulted in too much restraint on intelligence gathering. There were a number of opinions. One discussant characterized much of the intelligence collected before Executive Order 12036 as excessive, while several others cited recent examples in which federal intelligence agencies were prohibited from pursuing needed investigations. While the group reached no agreement, a number of issues were explored. One

participant argued that the U.S. government assigns such a low priority to the terrorist threat that if intelligence gathering restrictions were relaxed, government agencies would allocate resources to other threats. Since there is no real need for more intelligence collection in this area, increasing the present effort would not be cost effective. Another participant disagreed, stating that in this nuclear age the ultimate terrorist threat could materialize, and that the United States should therefore have the option of gathering more intelligence available at all times.

Israel was cited as a nation that gives a very high priority to gathering intelligence. The success of their preventive measures is reflected in the Israeli claim that they have prevented 85 percent of planned terrorist acts, largely because of their superior intelligence system. While it was agreed that the Israelis have good reason to appreciate the efficiency of their intelligence service, it was also agreed that Western Europe and the United States perceive a different threat and are therefore unlikely to authorize such an extensive intelligence service.

Crisis Management

R. J. Andrews, of the United Kingdom Home Office, provided an account of the attack on the Iranian embassy in London⁴ and then described some of the lessons learned from that event:

- The two levels of control—tactical and strategic—worked; and the SAS attack tactics worked.
- Clear strategic direction by the government is needed beforehand.
- Translating strategic direction into negotiations is difficult, especially when there are language complications; more trained people are required for hostage situations.
- There is a need for accurate intelligence on the intentions and state of mind of the terrorists.
- One cannot rely on achieving rapport between hostages and terrorists when there are fanatics on both sides.
- Physical control of the media (especially television) at the scene can be difficult; in this incident, the military attack was compromised by the television coverage.
- The deterrence effect of an action taken against terrorists depends on their martyrdom posture.

⁴ See R. J. Andrews, "The Siege at Princess Gate: Attack on the Iranian Embassy," in Part 3 of this report.

All participants felt that jurisdictional lines and decisionmaking apparatus should be set up and rehearsed before a crisis occurs. A comparison of various national approaches revealed that the unique nature of the threat, government structure, and even geography can influence the response to a terrorist event.

Israel divides responsibility for terrorist incidents into two jurisdictions: The border and vicinity are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, and the interior areas are the responsibility of the police. In hostage incidents, because of the small land area involved, the government moves the crisis center, including staff, as close to the event as possible within a very short time. If political decisions are involved, they are made by the Prime Minister and a pre-established committee. This may involve a formal meeting or telephone contact with the crisis center.

The British government has a two-tier management system to respond to terrorism. Police at the scene take over tactical control, while the Home Office retains strategic control. Police initially respond to an incident as they would to a crime, and when it becomes clear that there are political aspects to be dealt with, the Home Office steps in. For example, control passed to the Home Office one hour after the seizure of the Iranian embassy at Princess Gate. As a matter of policy, the British use police negotiators at the scene, but the Home Office determines guidelines for the negotiations. Should the use of military force be necessary, the police relinquish tactical control to the military.

In the United States, local police forces handle terrorist incidents. Federal authorities assume responsibility when an incident has a nuclear or interstate involvement, when there is a kidnapping, or when foreign diplomats are involved. They may also monitor local incidents and assist local law-enforcement authorities. Because of the large number of local jurisdictions in the country and the unevenness of capabilities for handling incidents, many problems arise.

On the federal level, there are two tiers of responsibility. The actual incidents are handled by the federal lead agency, but the National Security Council (NSC), through the Working Group on Terrorism, is charged with policy coordination. The lines between the two are not firmly drawn. The Justice Department is the lead agency for domestic incidents, and the State Department is the lead agency for those with international involvement. The system can become what some participants labeled a jurisdictional nightmare, especially when circumstances surrounding an incident evolve so that the responsibility for handling the incident changes. Such was the case during the hijacking of a TWA airliner by Croatian terrorists, which began as a domestic incident and became an international one.

Canada also has jurisdictional problems that its government is attempting to resolve. In 1970, to control the October Crisis brought on by two FLQ kidnappings, Parliament found it necessary to invoke the War Measures Act. In the aftermath, it was evident that for such crises Canada should have available an alternative mechanism short of the War Measures Act. The Canadian government is currently trying to formalize a federal plan for public welfare, which would include responding to terrorist acts. Such an approach would avoid potential conflicts with provincial governments.

For many nations, a terrorist event with international overtones quickly escalates to being under the control of the head of the government, especially if no crisis management structure has been prepared. In the embassy seizure in Bogotá, for example, the President of Colombia took charge of the government response.

The discussants repeatedly emphasized the need to exercise the crisis management machinery at all levels, including the top decision-making levels. Participants who had managed crises reported that simulations, which force decisionmaking under stress, are essential to assure that a smooth-running response system is in place before an incident occurs. The Israelis conduct a number of such exercises at different geographic locations throughout the year. The British had run an exercise with high-level participation just prior to the seizure of the Iranian embassy at Princess Gate, and this proved a great help in dealing with the crisis. In the United States, exercises at the local level vary in frequency and quality, depending on the interest of local law-enforcement agencies. The FBI, State Department, and Department of Defense have held national-level exercises, but there have been no simulations at the NSC level. This is due first to the fact that the NSC has neither a specific institutionalized response nor an established command center, and second, to the low priority many high-level officials assign to terrorism. They are unwilling to spare time from busy schedules for an exercise. Sometimes events reorder these priorities, as happened, for example, when potential threats to the Montreal Olympics catalyzed Canadian leaders into participating in exercises.

Crisis Management Options

There was general agreement that the group could not prescribe hard and fast rules for handling crises but that responsible authorities have an array of options open to them. Each case should be handled on its own merits, and successful handling of one case should not limit options on the handling of similar situations. For example, after the first Dutch train hijacking, South Moluccan terrorists changed

their strategy and thus made previous Dutch government reactions obsolete. Decisionmakers must consider a number of options—on occasion, even those not favored by current government policy—and then transmit clear instructions to the negotiators at the scene. Discussions concerning major crisis options are summarized below:

- *Use of Force.* In recent terrorist incidents, decisionmakers have ordered military contingency planning and exercises at the beginning of the incident, well before the decision to use them. This was the case in the Entebbe hijacking and the Princess Gate embassy seizure. In the Bogotá embassy seizure the Colombian government had no viable force capability available, leading some hostages' governments to encourage Colombia not to use force to resolve the crisis. Ideally, governments should prepare force and non-force options to be employed as each situation develops. Although it was agreed that the use of force is always an option, there was disagreement over when to employ it. For a number of reasons, the Israelis put a premium on concluding an incident as soon as possible. Quick response provides the tactical advantage of hitting the terrorists before they can become familiar with their surroundings. Once force has been used, the aim is to kill the terrorists as quickly as possible, in order to save Israeli lives. Quick response also has the advantage of limiting media coverage. Other governments are less likely to employ force as rapidly, however. The U.S. government considers force a last resort, and the British government prefers not to use force until the terrorists start killing the hostages. The rationale behind this approach is that by stalling for time it is possible to wear the terrorists down, enhance hostage survival, and eventually reach an acceptable outcome.
- *Payment of Ransom.* There was no real consensus on the ransom issue, although all discussants agreed that governments prefer not to pay. The major arguments against payment are (1) that terrorists use the funds to finance their operations and (2) that governments do not want to accede to extortionist demands. The principal argument in favor of payment is that ransom has usually facilitated the hostages' safe release. Governments find it difficult, if not impossible, to control ransom payments. Italy and Argentina have made ransom payments illegal, but their governments cannot enforce the law because private businesses and families surreptitiously pay the ransoms. For the U.S. government, it is a contradictory issue. The FBI allows ransom payment in domestic kidnappings, while the State Department discourages payment in international

kidnapping incidents. Furthermore, although the U.S. government refuses to ransom its own employees overseas, for humanitarian reasons it will not interfere with families and businesses paying ransom. One participant speculated that U.S. tax policy may actually encourage ransom payments by allowing corporations to claim them as tax deductions. Some participants suggested that further study of this issue should be undertaken to determine the direct and indirect price and effects of ransom payments.

- *Release of Prisoners.* There has been a growing trend among governments toward ruling out release of prisoners as a bargaining option. West Germany, for example, released four prisoners as a concession to the terrorists who took over their Stockholm embassy, and they subsequently returned to their terrorist activities. In 1970, the British released hijacker Leila Khaled to Jordan in response to a series of PFLP hijackings, and she remains free and active to this day. In light of these experiences, representatives of both governments indicated that they would not release prisoners in response to terrorist demands again.
- *Safe Passage.* Although governments would prefer not to offer safe passage to terrorists in return for freedom of hostages, this option appears acceptable, depending on the nature of the incident. The British who refused safe passage in the Princess Gate incident have no hard and fast rule beyond their general policy. The option worked well in the case of the Bogotá embassy seizure.

Other Crisis Participants

Members of the private sector also participate in and influence terrorist crises. One major participant requiring sensitive handling by the authorities is the media, which crisis managers find both a help and a hindrance. During the Princess Gate siege, for example, negotiators used media release of terrorist statements as a bargaining lever to gain concessions. On the other hand, television camera coverage on the scene, using "cherry pickers" in order to film all angles, made it very difficult to launch the surprise military attack that resolved the incident.

Private enterprise has become an increasingly important participant in terrorist incidents. Terrorists find that private institutions are lucrative targets, and threats or attacks on facilities such as airlines and power plants have sufficient impact on public welfare to command high exposure. Participants revealed that many govern-

ments have already addressed the problem for selected industries. The British government has developed security requirements and contingency plans for the North Sea oil installations. There has already been an IRA threat against one facility, so exercises have been developed and held. The British have also responded to specific incidents. When Cunard reported a threat against its luxury liner, the Queen Elizabeth II, the government mounted a military operation. In Singapore, the government has identified and established security requirements for all key industrial installations. The government tests the adequacy of these measures by holding operations to try to penetrate a facility's security system. Israel has one of the most comprehensive programs. Under a 1976 directive, the government sets up guidelines for industrial security and actually helps recruit and train the needed personnel. At issue in all these programs is the question of who pays for the security program. Some governments have helped private industries defray the costs of complying with security regulations.

There was a discussion of some aspects of U.S. government activity or lack of activity in the private sector. Private companies tend to inform the government of terrorist threats or incidents only if the company and the government have common interests. One reason for the reluctance to share intelligence is that such sharing may cause insurance rates to rise. However, the two sectors do cooperate on some threats: For instance, the government and the airlines have worked together to develop standard policies and procedures for hijacking incidents.

A participant from the U.S. private sector faulted the U.S. government for not devoting adequate resources and planning to problems that concern the private sector. In particular, his corporation is concerned about threats to the maritime environment. He feels that the government's framework for response results in putting the burden on the private sector. Each terminal facility is responsible for its own security. The FBI has responsibility for the threat but has little specialized maritime knowledge. The Coast Guard has the knowledge but not the adequate resources to respond. As a result, this corporation has developed its own response, including an active intelligence system, threat analysis capability, passive and active defenses, and a crisis management program. The participant fears that if a maritime incident occurs—and such an incident would probably evolve at a fast rate—both the government and the corporation will overreact. He therefore recommended that the two sectors cooperate in contingency plans tailored to the maritime environment and that they provide adequate resources to carry them out.

In the discussion that followed, some government participants asserted that authorities are working on maritime threats but that

there is some disagreement over the level of the threat. Moreover, it was pointed out that most private corporations—including those in the maritime environment—are reluctant to involve the government for fear that government participation will lead to regulation. However, representatives of both sectors agreed that this is an area of growing concern and that they will move forward on the problem when both sectors recognize common interests.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

There was general agreement that improved cooperation among nations would help to deal more effectively with terrorism—with prevention of incidents, and with the capture and punishment of terrorists. Early in the discussions, Raphael Eitan proposed an agenda for improved international cooperation. It included:

- Exchange of basic and current intelligence.
- Cooperation once an incident occurs.
- Cooperation on defensive measures, such as at airports.
- Coordination of political options, such as eliminating sanctuaries.
- Coordination of military options, such as helping set up special force units.
- Cooperation in developing contingency plans.
- Formation of an international group representing interested countries to handle terrorist situations.

The discussants subsequently considered aspects of most of these suggestions and noted recent progress in police and intelligence cooperation, international legal agreements, and coordination of strategies. Particular attention was directed to existing mechanisms and frameworks which promote international cooperation.

One of the most effective vehicles for dealing with international terrorism appears to be the Council of Europe, which has established procedures concerning prevention, capture, and punishment. One of the most important is the TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism and International Violence) network established in 1977. Police forces of the nine European Economic Community (EEC) countries have each set up a coordination office entrusted with following up day-to-day cooperation, while representatives of chiefs and lower levels meet at regular intervals. The network serves not only to promote the exchange of information, but also to cooperate on defense measures and training. While it might be desirable to expand this institutionalized arrangement to other nations such as the United States and Israel, there

seems little possibility of this happening. Outside of the EEC, there are many contacts at high levels, as in NATO, but few at the working level. Most other arrangements are either informal or formal bilateral agreements.

Louis Fields led a discussion on the impact of the political-offense exception on the extradition of terrorists.⁵ This exception, which is fairly standard in extradition agreements, allows a state to refuse to extradite if the alleged offense is considered political in nature. One of the purposes of such an exception is to prevent punishment of a person because of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. However, the interpretation of this exception as it relates to terrorist acts is uncertain, especially since there is no generally accepted definition of "terrorism" or "political offense."

Two recent U.S. court hearings on this issue illustrate this point. In May 1979, a U.S. magistrate refused extradition requested by the United Kingdom by applying the political-offense exception to a former member of the Provisional Wing of the IRA who was charged with the bombing of an army barracks in Great Britain. The judge found that at the time of the crime, an insurrection and political uprising did exist and the act of bombing a military target was part of that uprising. Several months later, at Israel's request, another U.S. magistrate ruled against political exception and ordered the extradition of a Jordanian accused of placing a bomb near a bus stop in Israel, resulting in an explosion which killed civilians. The court argued that this was a random, indiscriminate act, the target of which was not military and not justified by any military considerations.

Discussants noted a trend toward exempting some terrorist acts from the political-offense exception, especially in cases involving innocent persons. This was evident in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism adopted by the Council of Europe in 1977, which attempts to depoliticize terrorist acts by specifying the manifestations of those acts—i.e., the weapons and the means. The convention specifies aircraft hijacking and sabotage and the use of such weapons as letter bombs. This also has the advantage of denying terrorism any special designation as a separate kind of crime. There seemed to be general agreement that such an approach should be applied to other bilateral and multilateral agreements.

It was also pointed out that even when nations make disparate political interpretations of terrorism, they do have common interests in banning certain kinds of terrorist acts and can arrive at conventions based on this common interest. For example, several nations

⁵ See Louis G. Fields, Jr., "Bringing Terrorists to Justice—The Shifting Sands of the Political Offense Exception," in Part 3 of this report.

that are politically antagonistic to Western Europe and the United States, including the Soviet Union and Libya, subscribe to the anti-hijacking convention. Perhaps similar agreements can be worked out concerning protection of diplomats.

Much attention is being given to tightening extradition laws. The European Convention states that if a country refuses to extradite, it has an obligation to try the accused in its own courts. It was strongly recommended that such a clause be included in other extradition agreements. In the United States, there is an effort to remove the determination of political exception from the judicial branch and transfer it to the executive, specifically the State Department, in order to obtain more consistent enforcement.

Despite efforts to promote extradition of terrorists, a government can simply avoid the issue by deporting or expelling a foreign suspect. In Canada, for example, the Minister of Information and the Solicitor General can jointly authorize the exclusion or exportation of a foreigner attempting to enter Canada, without further recourse to the court system. This in effect transfers the problem to another country.

International cooperation on imposing and enforcing sanctions is also a problem. For example, while there is almost universal agreement that Iran violated international law in the seizure and holding of U.S. diplomats in Teheran, other nations could not agree on and enforce sanctions. It was pointed out that a nation's decision to impose sanctions usually depends on their compatibility with national interests. Because the Iranian government could use its powerful economic lever of oil, nations that buy Iranian oil were reluctant to impose effective sanctions. Sanctions that do not have widespread cooperation may actually become counterproductive.

Another international problem is the handling of multinational incidents such as the seizure of the Dominican embassy in Bogotá during a diplomatic reception involving 18 governments. There was little coordination of effort among the hostages' governments even in such simple tasks as establishing communications and exchanging information, not to mention in the harder task of agreeing on objectives and strategies for gaining the release of the hostages. A coordinated response would probably have moved the local government to resolve the situation more expeditiously, but disagreements among the hostages' governments over the acceptability of a number of bargaining concessions precluded any such unified response. While it was suggested that an international organization with representatives of all countries should be formed to develop contingency plans and handle such situations, the consensus was that such an approach was unrealistic for the near future.

Discussion of the Bogotá incident raised another issue, international military cooperation. It became evident as the siege progressed

that since Colombia did not have trained and equipped forces, it could not employ a force option. To resolve the hostage incidents in Entebbe and Mogadishu, outside forces of the hostages' governments traveled to the scene. Such operations require special forces, training, and contingency planning capabilities which few nations possess. It is possible that by international agreement, governments without such capabilities could invite the help of those who do. The group considered the suggestion that international units be established and stationed in various regions of the world to be premature. However, all agreed that there should be more international exchange of technology and contingency planning for such operations.

FUTURE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

In the discussion of current problems, the group identified several trends which might be of major concern for governments in the future.

A number of participants discerned an increase in state-sponsored terrorism. This is evidenced in the illegal seizure of U.S. diplomats in Iran and the use of diplomats and diplomatic pouches to assist in terrorist acts. The Vienna Convention should be reviewed in this regard. One participant suggested that all nations have vested interests in protecting their diplomats and embassies, so it might be possible to enact stronger conventions as has been done with airline hijacking. In particular, a number of discussants urged stronger sanctions against "rogue states" which flagrantly disregard international law. The United States urged the imposition of a number of economic sanctions against Iran, but there was a very limited response, partly due to Iran's leverage as a major oil supplier. In the future, more effective sanctions may have to be developed in order to isolate those nations which have themselves become terrorists.

The question of governmental response to Soviet involvement in and assistance to terrorism was also raised. No policy presently exists on this issue.

It was suggested that the projected energy crisis coupled with the increasing gap between the "have" and "have not" nations may influence future terrorism. Literature has already appeared urging that terrorism be used as one of the few levers left to some Third World countries. One participant even suggested that oil-producing states might use terrorism to prevent energy alternatives from being produced. Energy-related targets—including offshore drilling platforms, oil tankers, and offshore loading and transfer facilities—will be increasingly attractive to terrorists in the future. A corollary of this

trend is that multinational interests will become more frequent targets, and therefore business and government will have to increasingly coordinate efforts to assess vulnerability, to provide protection, and to present a credible response to the terrorist threat.

Finally, participants considered the effects of terrorism on government in the future. Recent events in Central America demonstrate how the mishandling of low-level conflict can lead to the polarization of society into the two political extremes. Terrorists want an overreaction to their provocative methods. In light of this, one participant contended that the Western democracies at present have enough central authority to deal with the terrorist threat. Therefore governments should resist further centralization of power and instead concentrate on the prevention of two intolerable situations: the escalation of terrorist methods to mass destruction and the breakdown of trust between government and the governed as a result of overreaction. Prevention of these two extreme outcomes, it was argued, will be the real challenge to governments in the future.

FUTURE RESEARCH

During the discussions, several issues for future research were identified. Past government experiences provide the data for analyses of

- Common threads in terrorist strategies and behavior.
- Coordination requirements between political decisionmakers and security forces.
- The types of government responses which best impede or prevent future incidents: How effective are counterforce strikes and retaliation in dissuading terrorists?

Experiences in other areas can also be applied to terrorism research, including

- Comparison of national experiences in the handling of minority populations: How can you give minority groups separate cultural identities but still satisfy the majority?
- Identifying the catalysts for violence: Why are there different manifestations of violence? Why do Iranian students demonstrate, while Croatian dissidents hijack airplanes?
- Examination of private sector experience in paying ransom: What have been the short- and long-term costs? Has such a policy been more or less effective than a no-payment policy?

In the area of international law, it was suggested that researchers analyze improvements of existing mechanisms, including

- Sanctions available against rogue states.
- Reappraisal of diplomatic security under the Vienna Convention.
- Application of laws concerning piracy on the high seas to include terrorist acts.

In the area of international and political cooperation, a number of topics should be addressed, including

- The potential for bilateral or multilateral assistance to states with weak security resources.
- How to help other nations combat terrorism without encouraging repressive regimes.

Finally, it was suggested that there should be much more contingency planning in the area of vulnerable energy-related targets.

Session 4

THE FUTURE COURSE OF TERRORISM

Agenda of Topics

Has terrorism become a permanent feature of modern society? Is it escalating, changing? Will terrorists change their tactics and targets? Will they threaten greater violence if they perceive that their ability to attract attention and their coercive power are declining? Will new adversaries emerge?

Escalation

Given the considerable disparity among various statistical sources on terrorism, have international and domestic terrorism really shown an upward trend over recent years?

Do incidents like the bombing of the railway station in Bologna, Italy, indicate that terrorism is bound to escalate in audacity and bloodshed?

Are there factors inherent in the phenomenon of terrorism (e.g., public animosity, harsher government response, greater exposure and potential for capture due to increased activity) that inhibit its growth beyond a certain point?

Targets and Tactics

Is there a trend away from taking people hostage toward taking facilities hostage? If so, what are the most likely targets?

Are energy systems and facilities more vulnerable, less protected, and hence more likely to be attacked than other systems?

As the world is divided into more smaller, poorer, and less-developed nations, will these nations turn increasingly to "cheaper" forms of conflict (sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism), causing governments unprecedented policy and military-management problems?

Under what conditions might terrorist groups use weapons of mass destruction?

New Adversaries

It appears that international cooperation among terrorist groups has increased. Why, and is this trend likely to continue?

What is the potential magnitude of terrorist actions by foreign nations residing in the United States? What kinds of targets are such groups likely to choose?

What are the prospects for a coalition among terrorists and radical environmentalists who would select nuclear facilities as targets for violent actions?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS¹

THE PRESENT STATE OF TERRORISM

Much of the initial discussion was devoted to assessing the state of terrorism in Italy, West Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States.

The Italian participant stated that some success had been achieved by the Italian government against left-wing terrorism. This success could be partly attributed to new government initiatives that enhanced the possibility that terrorists who collaborate with the justice system might get special treatment, such as a reduction of prison sentences. However, it was his observation that when left-wing terrorism in Italy goes down, right-wing terrorism goes up.

In West Germany, the Revolutionary Cells—autonomous groups consisting of three to five persons who know each other only under assumed names—may be more dangerous to public order than the old Baader-Meinhof Gang. The Revolutionary Cells have attacked railway conductors and have blown up automatic ticket-takers, causing disruption in the lives of ordinary citizens.

A government representative from the Netherlands said that the principal problem for that country was the South Moluccan terrorists, who have been quiet for about 18 months. He briefly reviewed the history of South Moluccan attacks on Dutch society and described their perceived grievances; he said that most of the terrorists are youngsters who were born in the Netherlands.

¹ Peter Morre, Moderator; Martha Crenshaw, Rapporteur. This summary was prepared by Martha Crenshaw, with additional comments by Brian Jenkins and Gerladine Petty.

In the year preceding the conference, the United States had very few internal terrorist incidents but had been victimized by acts stemming from problems in other countries—the Iranian hostage crisis and the Cuban refugee influx.

The discussion group's conclusions are summarized below.

THE NEED FOR FORECASTING

It was agreed that there is a critical need for accurate forecasting of terrorist events—that governments on all levels and in all regions need to anticipate terrorism, not merely react to it. The consequences of inadequate foreknowledge can be literally disastrous. However, the discussants disagreed on several methodological questions: How far ahead could credible predictions be made, if such speculation is ever a safe activity? Most agreed that the group must look ahead at least a decade. Speculations about the future—about what terrorists will do, what targets they will choose—are necessarily based on assumptions about what a future world will be like. The task is immensely complicated; there is hardly a social, economic, political, or ideological trend that is not pertinent to the issue of forecasting terrorist activity.

SOURCES OF TERRORISM

The group tried to make some assessment of the future directions of terrorism. It was assumed that there will be no shortage of sources of terrorism—social, economic, and political conflicts and discontents will not go away. A participant suggested the following categories of actual and potential terrorists:

1. Traditional terrorists—those who target government officials in an attempt to change government policy.
2. Dissatisfied individuals—a group that is obviously on the increase.
3. Ethnic minorities seeking independence or self-determination.
4. Economically disadvantaged groups.
5. Anarchists—those who are against all government.

Economic changes within states and among nations have many disturbing implications for the development of terrorism. Increased poverty and scarcity will inevitably breed strife within states. Inflation and unemployment will continue. Scarcity, resource dependency, and tension will increase between have and have-not nations.

Social problems will also arise, partly as a result of these economic factors. Increased immigration from poorer states to wealthier ones will create ethnic communities that may bring with them the conflicts of their home countries. These newcomers may create resentment among native citizens, because of their competition for a shrinking pool of jobs and their alien customs. The influx of Cuban refugees into the United States is an example of the sort of activity that is likely to increase in the future.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

On the political scene, the participants saw a general disintegration of authority structures and an increase in the number of specific protest groups, such as environmentalists, anti-nuclear groups, and other single-issue political pressure groups. These are groups who seek not to overthrow the state but to change its policies in a particular area. In addition, the participants foresaw the rise of aggressive fundamentalist religious groups or cults, both in the United States and abroad, in line with events in Iran and the mass murder-suicide of the Jonestown cult. It is possible that such groups will turn to systematic terrorism of the kind now practiced by self-styled Marxist-Leninist groups, separatist nationalists, and right-wing extremists.

STATE TERRORISM

The group further noted an alarming trend toward the use of terrorism directly by states. This is not entirely new. For years, certain states have encouraged and exploited terrorism by others for their own ends—by providing money, weapons, training, and refuge. There will be no diminution of such logistical support; indeed, if international tensions increase, such support also may increase. But a recent trend has seen the *direct* use of terrorism by states, usually against dissident nationals residing in a host country (e.g., Iran, Libya, Chile), but also in the use of resident minorities to further national interests. Increased immigration may heighten this danger.

POSSIBLE GOALS OF FUTURE TERRORISTS

If we are ever to be able to anticipate terrorism, it will be necessary to know what the goals of future terrorists will be. The discussants noted that terrorist goals tended to fall into two major classes: There

are terrorists who are extremely concerned about public opinion and about the effect of their actions on popular attitudes and who consider themselves representatives of certain constituencies; these terrorists will do nothing to damage the support they have or hope to gain from their often unwitting populace. Then there are terrorists who care nothing about the hostility they may create; gaining popular support is not their aim. These terrorists either have narrowly extortionate aims, or they are so convinced of the rightness of their cause that the sacrifice of good will is irrelevant. The discussants constantly returned to this distinction in their attempts to discuss what sorts of actions terrorists would take. It was felt that we should be on the alert for an increase in groups of the latter sort, as they are the most likely to be extremely destructive and heedless of casualties. A rise in terrorism will indeed include more such groups—most existing right-wing groups fall into this category, as do religious fundamentalists and perhaps some "interest groups." There was particular concern about the rise of groups who feel their motivating cause is so legitimate that it justifies any excess.

TARGETING

The issue of targeting was next addressed. Who will be the targets of terrorism? Who will the terrorists want to influence? The participants concluded that the targets of terrorism will continue to be those in power, and that the critical problem will be to identify those that terrorists will perceive as the powerful, both domestically and internationally. Energy companies, because of their increasing importance in the world economy, are the power-holders of the future, and perhaps of the present as well. Those who control vast economic resources, such as multinational corporations that are also conveniently linked, in the minds of the left, with American "imperialism" and with the traditional dependency of the Third World on the United States, are probably also seen by the terrorists as morally acceptable targets of violence. It would not be surprising to see terrorism directed against international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or other economic, Western-oriented institutions. Religious institutions and personages were also perceived as being increasingly targeted. Reference was made to the assassination of the Archbishop of El Salvador while he was saying mass, and it was suggested that even the Pope may not be invulnerable to attack by terrorists.²

² This speculation was subsequently proven to be accurate when a Turkish national attempted to assassinate the Pope in St. Peter's Square.

The physical targets that terrorists will attack will be logically and symbolically related in some way to these people and institutions and to their policies. Attacks can be expected on industrial targets related to energy, transportation, and communications. Moreover, it will be important to distinguish between hard and soft targets. Terrorists will attack facilities that seem to them to be the most vulnerable (some vulnerabilities may not seem obvious to them); as the easiest targets are protected or hardened, the terrorists will move on to other, perhaps more difficult, targets. Thus increased security in one area may increase the vulnerability of another area. However, there appears to be no significant evidence of a shift from people to things, and the personnel of industry will probably continue to be as vulnerable as facilities.

POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF TERRORIST TACTICS

Many of the discussants were concerned with the tactics of terrorism. What, concretely and practically, can we expect terrorists to do? Will the development of terrorism in the future include vertical as well as horizontal escalation? There has been a broadening trend in the sources of terrorism, in the types of terrorist groups or causes, and in the targets terrorists may attack. Is terrorism likely to escalate in shock value, in destructiveness, and in disruptiveness? As mentioned earlier, there may be an erosion in self-restraint, resulting from such factors as changes in types of groups and in government responses to terrorism. Terrorism can be neither understood nor predicted without reference to the dynamics of the conflict between terrorists and government. No prediction about possible escalation can be isolated from the question of the effectiveness of government responses. There is, paradoxically, a danger that governments may encourage terrorist escalation either by weakness or by strength. By refusing to give in to terrorist demands, governments may force terrorists to up the ante, to play for bigger stakes, to try something more persuasive the next time, even if this involves establishing bases abroad from which to plan operations. As the population becomes accustomed to certain levels of terrorism, terrorists may escalate to get the attention of their audiences. The media may tire of "run-of-the-mill" terrorism, report it less frequently, and thus encourage sensationalism.

On the other hand, physical vulnerability increases the likelihood of any target being attacked. Governments may not be able to prevent acts of terrorism in advance because of the crippling or inadequacy of intelligence functions. At the same time, ineffective government response could lead to an increase in vigilante terrorism by people who feel compelled to take the law into their own hands. This could be

manifested in a backlash against ethnic groups who might be seen to harbor terrorists or in pressure on the government for repressive measures that themselves would be a threat to democracy.

POTENTIAL INCREASES IN TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES

The group expressed concern with the relation between technology and terrorism. What sort of capabilities will future terrorists have, regardless of motivation? A distinction must be made between the sophistication of weapons and the sophistication of targets: Will terrorists opt, for example, for nuclear devices or for chemical and biological warfare techniques? Or will they use simpler measures against critical points in large systems, such as electric power grids, to create enormous disruption with little actual effort or expenditure of force? In the past, terrorists have not been extremely technically oriented. However, any changes in their recruitment patterns to include more scientists and engineers should be closely monitored, even though the failure to escalate may have been the result of a deliberate choice, not a lack of ability. The availability of capabilities and of targets will certainly influence intentions. Yet the consensus of the discussants was that escalation will be gradual rather than abrupt; that we should look at middle-range complexities, not extreme ones.

COSTS OF SECURITY

It seems certain that the cost of security and protection can only go up. As terrorists proliferate in number, as their targets widen, as they become technologically more adept, the difficulty of physically preventing terrorism will intensify.

FUTURE RESEARCH

In conclusion, the discussants identified issues for future research on terrorism. These included legal responses to terrorism, particularly whether or not restrictions on intelligence gathering impair the effectiveness of the government's prevention activities. Research is also needed on popular attitudes toward curtailment of civil liberties in order to combat terrorism: What is the threshold of tolerance in different societies and regimes? Other topics included "fanatic" or more emotional terrorist personalities; the use of terrorism by states as a tool

of warfare; the links between terrorism and the international system (particularly nuclear proliferation); the relationship of terrorism to other forms of low-level conflict; the conditions under which terrorists will cross the threshold of creating mass destruction; the motives, forms, and consequences of terrorist attacks on economic targets; the relationship between ethnicity and terrorism (particularly links between ethnic and leftist causes); and the cost of security measures to government, industry, and the public. Finally, there was a feeling that more should be done on (1) developing consistent and thorough data bases and (2) building theories of terrorism.

Part 3

RESOURCE PAPERS

CONFLICT: A TURKISH VIEW¹

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INTRODUCTION

International terrorism has showed extremely destructive developments during the last two decades, and it is likely to be the main cause of widespread violence in the coming decades. In 1979, such activities doubled, compared to the terror in the preceding year. Since 1970, an increase in terror and anarchy of about 400 percent has been recorded in the world.

In Canada, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany, terrorism was rendered almost ineffective before it developed into a sound offensive strategy. However, it could not be eradicated altogether. In rapidly industrializing countries like Italy, Argentina, and Turkey, on the other hand, urban terrorism, often supported by rural terrorism, continues to cause grave concern and widespread fear.

The violence committed by the otherwise unemployed youth, brainwashed students, and young workers, supported by local and external provocations and assistance, has led not only to the organization of terror into leftist and rightist segments, but also to their operation in a more systematic, more sophisticated, and more widespread manner. Moreover, terrorism in recent years has become so commonplace that the hijacking of an airliner or the bombing of a railroad no longer affects the public as it used to. Consequently, it seems that the escalation in recent years of the severity of terroristic violence also aims at making terror more dramatic to get a stronger response in the media and, in turn, to impress the public imagination more.

Consideration of the geographic locations of Italy, Argentina, and Turkey, and the occurrence of similar terrorist events elsewhere confirms that international terrorism is the instrument of an ominous plot, or else of a terrorist international formed to serve specific geopolitical objectives in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin

¹ This paper is based on reference notes used by the author during the conference; it refers mainly to the conditions present before the military takeover of September 12, 1980. Observations and analyses of terrorism in Turkey are generally based on the findings of a seminar organized to commemorate the late Abdi İmpekci, a leading journalist who was assassinated by terrorists. See Ibrahim Ors (ed.), *Türkiye'de Terör*, Istanbul, Turkey, May 1980.

America. An extensive geographical area is involved, including large sectors from Sweden to Northern Ireland; from France, Spain, and Switzerland to Greece, Turkey, and beyond.

When seen from a wider perspective, the problem facing the free world at the moment is a resource war (economic war) on one side and an ideological war on the other. And this low-level conflict situation may, in conjunction with international terrorism, be driving the world toward a kind of greater conflict, possibly a Third World War, in the last quarter of the century. In the same context, another relevant observation is just as dramatic: The Soviet attainment of strategic parity and U.S. acceptance of the USSR as a superpower having equal military power have resulted in the United States renouncing the policy of acting from a position of strength. Thus, the Soviets may have contended that "intersystemic competition shifted from the military to socioeconomic, political, and ideological planes." (This is analogous to the fact that the Soviets, after stabilization of the Central Front of NATO, turned to the flanks.) It should be noted that the present power projection capability and resources of the Soviet Union enjoy more than enough flexibility in this field.

It is worth recalling at this juncture that the Soviets openly present the challenge that "in the ideological field there is not, and never will be, peaceful coexistence. There cannot be an ideological truce between Capitalism and Socialism (i.e., Communism)." This confirms what J. M. Mackintosh observed earlier, that the first of the two main themes of Soviet foreign policy since the 1917 Revolution was the drive for revolutionary conquest of the world, to be achieved by breaking up by violence the nearest ring of non-Communist states bordering on the Soviet Union. (The second theme suggested was the active defense of the Soviet heartland.)

Normally, terror begins with individual behavior aimed at civil disturbances, whereas international terrorism bids for civil war on a global scale. In the same context, terrorist actions may be considered the truest indicators of popular trends, for the first aim of terror is to prove to the masses that there is an authority gap. The next aim is to frustrate the people over this lack of authority to the extent that, in the end, they conclude in despair, "It is all right whoever comes up next, since none could be worse"; the final aim is then to suggest an authority or to actually try to fill the vacuum which was thus created. Racism/ultranationalism and religious fundamentalism are just as responsible for the present difficulties.

International terrorism is not based solely on a Marxist-Leninist origin. However, the threat looming over the non-Communist countries is very great. For this reason, the problem of international terrorism and the low-level conflict that it is fomenting must be exam-

ined within the larger framework of the present strategic situation, also bearing in mind the geopolitical realities.

According to Soviet doctrine, the best and easiest way to weaken, fragment, and dominate the free West is to achieve control of the raw-material resources in the Third World. The economic calamity thus created would raise conditions of upheaval in the labor ranks, and the Soviets would promptly exploit these conditions to the maximum. In such a situation, the notorious Brezhnev Doctrine might also be implemented.

Second, Soviet encroachments in the Near and Middle East and in Africa—especially the Soviet influence established in areas of global significance, such as the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa—created opportunities for the USSR. The new situation resulting from the following political and economic developments tends to serve the Soviets: the occupation of Afghanistan; the internal situation in Iran and also in Pakistan; the latest developments in the Israeli-Arab conflict and further polarization of the Arab world; the worst possible economic crisis coupled with mounting political violence that threatens Turkey; the stalemate in Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem; and, finally, the strange disarray the West is presently suffering. The Soviet ideology postulates that the changes in the power balance create opportunities for political change, and this situation should be exploited. The present wide disarray of the West and the problems of internal politics, as well as the weight of economic interests, all negatively affect the Western reaction against Soviet initiatives southward from the Soviet heartland to gain control of strategic raw-material sources and of the crucial waterways on which they are moved.

As a third problem, the oil and energy crises that aggravate the economic difficulties of the underdeveloped anti-Communist countries also create conditions that could readily be exploited by the Soviets. Turkey constitutes a typical example. The Turkish economy, which had almost reached the point of takeoff, suffered negative development resulting from the extensive and frequent oil price hikes initiated by the 1973 October war, as well as from inadequate support by Western allies. These and some other internal and external problems thus created an environment suitable for terrorism in Turkey. Inflation and unemployment, coupled with an acute shortage of foreign exchange, have brought the problem up to crisis dimensions, placing the country in a vicious circle; and mounting foreign debt and trade deficits tend to enlarge and intensify the circle. Rapidly increasing prices of consumer goods generate uneasiness and instability among the people.

Although the instrument for terror against the non-Communist

countries constitutes a small minority of the population, this small minority, even in the fully developed Western countries, has infiltrated the political parties, unions, training and educational institutions, and the mass media, succeeding in gaining the appearance of a much larger element. Moreover, the fact that the interested governments so far have not been able to successfully enlighten public opinion in this respect and take preventive and corrective measures, because of political reasons and election considerations, augments the difficulties.

Another cause of the present situation in Turkey is the rapidly increasing population which, *inter alia*, results in (1) the production of a very large number of college candidates, exceeding the capacity of existing facilities; (2) a large number of workers and their dependents going abroad to work in affluent industrial and highly democratic countries; and (3) a comparatively high social level reached by the people, helped by an enlarging economy and extremely independent mass media. All these factors produce a society enjoying a wider world view and social development overtaking economic development. The socioeconomic gap thus created constitutes a great problem and renders the country quite vulnerable.

In brief, one of the basic differences between national (domestic) terrorism and international terrorism is that the main aim of the latter is to accomplish strictly political objectives and to obtain political changes through a certain process.

Another feature of the international terrorism of our day is the existence of an intergroup agreement, or rather an international coalition, among active terrorist groups. This is one of the reasons why international countermeasures and cooperation are required.

A key strategy of international terrorism is to obtain the reflection of their actions in the communication media all over the world. This way, they reason, they may persuade the masses that they act for their good.

The Soviets and their East European allies have contributed very generously to international terrorism—in Europe and elsewhere—mainly by proxy. Soviet arms shipped to the Middle East in large quantities are reshipped westward once a week from Palestinian bases in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, to be stored in strategic locations for later use. To these should be added the arms smuggled across the Black Sea and from Bulgaria, in the case of Turkey. This intrasubsystem support—i.e., mutual support between states other than the Soviet Union directly, for subversion and guerrilla warfare—aside from political convenience for the Soviets also guarantees that when the final takeover occurs, the new regime will be linked to them.

In all these problem areas, Turkey occupies a peculiar place. The

terror in Turkey has lately taken a turn not only against the state but also against the people. In this respect it is very interesting to recall what Stalin used to say about the use of fear of terror to replace respect for authority: "I prefer to base the authority on fear and not on reason. Reason may change, whereas the fear injected into human beings may last 'til the death."

A second problem here is that Marxist-Leninist-sponsored terrorism in Turkey also aims at the destruction of the Atatürkist Program. This program is founded on two tenets, the first being the belief among Turks, as a nation, that they would accomplish and digest the progressive dash. The second is the belief that the evolutionary process is a matter of survival for Turkey and the Turks; that nothing short of it could bring a national, independent, democratic, and civilized life for the Turks.

THE TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT

Local (political, social, and economic) conditions, as well as general or global ones of history and geography, play an important role in the disproportionate concentration of international terrorism in some countries, Turkey included.

First of all, Turkey is a direct neighbor of Russia and of her most faithful ally, Bulgaria, with long land and sea (Black Sea) borders. Turkey contains the strategically important Straits, a traditional Soviet objective. She has a dominating position in the Eastern Mediterranean and forms a ridge within the buffer zone between the Middle East and Europe, shielding large areas of the former, including extensive oil fields, against Soviet Russia. Turkey also delineates a long border between the predominantly Moslem but secular Turkey and revolutionary Iran, Iraq, and Syria, the last two countries being among the most powerful Arab states. But most important of all, Turkey traditionally constitutes one of the initial objectives of Russian imperialism, Tsarist or Communist, with roots of animosity forming a very strong historical and ideological factor in addition to the problems of geography and geopolitics.

Turkey is the remotest NATO member, very difficult to reinforce tactically (from Western Europe) and strategically (from North America), which makes her rather exposed and strategically vulnerable.

The foregoing geographical and historical factors enhance the specific effects of the socioeconomic conditions listed in the opening paragraph of this section. However, it is proper to add that the great potential and the important geopolitical role of Turkey in the Middle East are well known but somehow have been taken for granted dur-

ing quieter periods. The present circumstances do not at all warrant such complaisance. On the other hand, when Turkey manages to solve her problems, the destiny of the Middle East will also be affected positively.

The notion of state authority is uppermost in Turkish society. This is why her opponents are striving systematically to destroy the respect of the people for the state, by weakening its credibility and authority. The same opponents also try to bring into conflict the nationalist movement and externally sponsored and supported Marxism in Turkey. In this respect, the real Marxism has been deviated, under the guise of leftism, into various terrorist activities; on the other hand, the Turanian and Ultranationalist movement came out asserting that it alone defended Turkish nationalism and the values of Turkish society.

As for the environmental details affecting terrorism, the following political and socioeconomic conditions appear to exist, specifically in the case of Turkey:

Political Conditions

1. Divergences of view and, in some cases, a complete lack of conceptual consensus among the political parties on the interpretation of some articles of the Constitution.
2. Lack of understanding between the political parties on the notion and extent of political violence.
3. The difficulty and impossibility, in some cases, of passing greatly needed laws.
4. Inadequacies of election law that produce rather weak coalitions rather than strong one-party governments; and the possibility of untimely and politically motivated replacements among the high-ranking administrators. This situation may result in a polarization among government employees, but also in a lowering of the quality of administrators and even in the possible abuse of authority. The unfortunate result of all these is that they may negatively affect the people's confidence in the Constitution, even in the state.

Socioeconomic Conditions

The following socioeconomic conditions usually outweigh the political ones:

1. A high rate of population increase. (In the same context, we must cite the difficulty of controlling the migration from rural and remote areas to the large cities and the consequent make-

shift and unhealthy housing areas mushrooming around the cities, as well as the impracticability of bringing public services to these areas, causing, *inter alia*, possible erosion of state authority.)

2. Rapid social development and claims of social injustice.
3. Shortages of some raw materials, particularly oil.
4. Foreign debt, shortage of foreign exchange, and international economic dependence.
5. Shortcomings in the economic policy.
6. Inflation, unemployment, and rampant price hikes.
7. Ethnic and religious minorities that are being incited, provoked, and exploited, mainly by external powers and foreign-supported organizations.
8. Ideologically motivated politicization of associations of government employees, teachers, students, even police, deviating from social security and other legitimate purposes.
9. Legal gaps exploited by the trade unions to enable them to evade legitimate state control, in effect making them a state within a state.
10. The abuse by some press organs of the freedoms provided by the Constitution.
11. The quantitative and qualitative shortcomings of the police.

In addition to the listed (classical) conditions, there is also the important fact that in Turkey social development has overtaken economic development, and this factor is also conducive to terror. We will return to this interesting point later.

By far the most convenient condition to promote terrorism is the weakening of the solidarity in a society. The factors that cause breaking up of social values, which are essential for the democratic order, are in turn instrumental in the spreading of terrorism. It follows that the topic of the environment of terrorism should not be taken, in a narrow sense, as a matter of security only; rather, it is a social crisis situation with deep roots in social structure, political culture, and public administration, including specifically the security services, and, last but not least, the economic structure. Hence, to prevent terrorism, all aspects of the problem should be treated.

Anarchy and terror have been rather more active in large cities, first and foremost in Istanbul, since the crowded localities render very soft targets for terrorism.

The peculiarity of the extreme rightist movement in Turkey is that it consists of two main factions, one aiming at fighting against Communism and the establishment of an ultranationalist regime, and the other aiming at a theocratic regime based on one version of Islamic socialism. Its means and resources are known to include also external

ones. In organization, strategy, and action, however, it is considered somewhat less sophisticated than the extreme left, which is known to have about 50 factions, within and without, of six illegal political parties and which enjoys some 80 periodicals of its own. This interesting fragmentation in the Turkish left is thought to result from the infiltration of Communists into various groups and from local conditions, in addition to specific ideological considerations, including trends of conservatism, revisionism, cessationism, etc.

THE TERRORISTS

Terrorism in Turkey is an organized movement consisting of trained and highly conditioned members who, particularly in the case of the extreme left, have already completed the preparatory phase. The movement has managed to infiltrate some public institutions; and it has selected as its objective the destruction of the parliamentary democratic order. It is interesting to note that the forces and organizations that carry out terrorism in Turkey generally employ young individuals, usually suffering from various degrees of perversion resulting from unemployment, lack of the possibility of schooling, separation from family, village, or town, affliction with psychological disorders, and so on. Many of them are known to be former convicts.

The terrorist believes himself dedicated to the achievement of specific political and ideological purposes. He (or she) may have actually been coerced or brainwashed into this identity through thought-control processes (such as injection of extreme fear and terror into the mind of potential terrorists, methods of Pavlovian strategy aimed at making the terrorist a trained animal, dehumanizing processes that make men into robots, and blackmailing) and may consider it a highly valuable virtue. Terrorists insist that they represent the people or the social classes and that they have revolted against the existing order on the latter's behalf. They strive to make the people believe in their cause and their struggle, and they try to earn legality and legitimacy for their acts through integration with the masses. They do not refrain from using any illegal method whatsoever. In the process, they attempt to weaken and erode state authority. They aim at filling the vacuum they have thus created. However, if they cannot win public support, they do not hesitate to turn against the people and society, trying to intimidate them. In the same manner, if they cannot influence and dominate the people, they concentrate all their efforts and means to drive the people and the administrators into fear and panic through violence; and they cherish the hope of accomplish-

ing this aim. However, although indiscriminate killing may be effective in intimidating the masses, in the final analysis it backfires to the *de facto* disadvantage of terrorism.

It is generally accepted that the human being tends to behave irrationally more than rationally. However, this is not directly related to terrorism. On the other hand, it is difficult to consider terrorism as normal behavior in terms of mental health. Contemporary psychiatry recognizes some intermediate echelons between health and illness, and it is possible in this respect that a terrorist may be defined as being in one of these intermediate echelons.

As we have noted, one of the factors that can make an individual a potential terrorist is rapid modernization. The rapid passage from the traditional way of life to the modern one is known to cause some mental disorders. The changes that took a couple of hundred years in developed societies were more or less effected in Turkey within two to three decades, leading to a rapid and somewhat unhealthy modernization. Indeed, there would be significant differences of attitude between the members of a traditional society and those of a modern society, particularly in terms of sentiments, thinking, and behavioral patterns, as well as in terms of human relations.

Furthermore, some traditional patterns may still survive in a rapidly modernizing society, and the motivation of evading freedom and taking refuge in authority may very well fuel terrorism. Moreover, when modernization merges with matters such as pollution, nuclear dangers, population explosion, exhausting resources, energy problems, and so on, the resulting feeling of insecurity will undoubtedly be strong. It should not be forgotten that frustration may aggravate aggressiveness.

The Oedipus complex, along with various disorders in family dynamics, is also considered to create anger both against the family and against central authority. In the same context, brother/sister rivalry and the grudge and/or hate that may result from it also may serve to make potential terrorists. The solution here may lie in the democratization of the conservative family, if this is practicable.

The aim of the extreme left in Turkey, consisting of many factions united loosely on a Marxist-Leninist line, is to destroy the existing constitutional order through a people's upheaval and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat. For this purpose a three-phase strategy is adopted: (1) an urban guerrilla phase, (2) a rural guerrilla phase, and (3) a civil war phase aiming at subduing, reducing, and overcoming the armed forces and taking over the government.

International Communism is generally considered to be the main source of terrorism in Turkey. However, despite its agreement to maintain the Marxist-Leninist line as basic philosophy, it is not a

monolithic movement anymore, and its division into various doctrines has resulted, in turn, in the reorganization of the foci of anarchy and terror in Turkey along the same lines.

The extreme right, on the other hand, as mentioned earlier, is a less well-organized movement, consisting of at least two factions with the common goal of fighting Communism. It is interesting to note that the extreme right in Turkey does not seem organized according to a system based on a revolutionary theory having a scientific basis, like the extreme left. This is the general view of the social scientists in Turkey and abroad.

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Violence essentially constitutes a threat to the established order and thus always invites a response from those in authority. On the other hand, despite the worldwide concern over international terrorism, the power of resolutions passed by the United Nations and other international organizations and of related conventions is extremely limited. Some states, as well as some political parties and some political scientists, still recognize terrorism as a means, even a legitimate one, for fighting against oppression. Yet international terrorism is, in actual fact, an act of political violence against a prevailing situation of power and thus requires a political solution and a scientific examination of all factors bearing on the problem.

Of the three menaces threatening the Turkish Republic and the Turkish Democracy, the extreme left is first in order of priority. Russian attempts aimed at dominating Turkey and incorporating her into its domain—which have gone on since the days of the Tsars—are benefiting both from the atmosphere of almost unlimited freedom and from antagonistic interparty relations, coupled with the economic malaise prevailing in the country.

The second threat originates from the extreme right. Yet it is not possible to define the ideological objectives of this movement within well-founded socioeconomic and political structures, as it is with the extreme left. For this reason, the extreme rightist movement in Turkey is sometimes evaluated as a reaction within the society against the extreme left. One observation confirming this opinion is that the starting point of the Turkish extreme right is the notion of eliminating the Communists wherever they are found. Incidentally, the other party also conducts the same practice.

The second source of this rightist thinking is the longing by individuals who do not agree with Atatürkist secularism and who, under the influence of propaganda by some Islamic powers that dream of the

leadership of the Islamic world, bid for the establishment of a theocratic state in Turkey. The events in revolutionary Iran are said to be encouraging this religious segment of the extreme right to indulge in upheavals through anarchy and even assassinations.

On the other hand, the continuation of terrorism, in spite of the alternating of left and right governments through the normal election process, is itself evaluated as an act of incitement aimed at coercing the governments into a process of effect-reaction, or still later to one of effect-overreaction. The purpose may be to compel the governments to curb freedoms and consequently to help bring into power an administration that will retire from democracy. The governments should keep this in mind and make a correct diagnosis of terrorism.

All Turkish governments recognize, in principle, the necessity to consider seriously social and political grievances and events that lead to frustration, along with the necessity for international cooperation. However, in practice, various ruling coalitions have failed to follow these principles. Frequent changes of government and the coming into office of weak coalitions rather than one-party governments with a strong majority in the Parliament hamper the formulation and implementation of long-range solutions.

As to international cooperation, it is a common complaint in Turkey that terrorists who kill Turkish diplomats, rob or demolish banks, or even kill indiscriminately are treated very favorably in leading Western newspapers; these incidents are often reported as ordinary events or sometimes even as signs of Turkey's imminent collapse. Recent editorials in *The New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune*, after reporting that "This year more than 2000 persons were executed by terrorists, whereas no one was executed by the government, condemned to death by the Turkish courts," wondered if those executions would have caused very severe reactions from the international community if they had been carried out by a Turkish government. This is a paradox.

The main feature of the preventive measures is that they have to be patiently implemented for a long period of time to be effective, and it is this feature that raises other difficulties. Economic hardships that actually enhance these difficulties also constitute a problem.

In contrast, the deterrent or persuasive measures tend to be effective within shorter terms. However, they are not as effective as the preventive measures; and perhaps this is why the general tendency is to concentrate on prevention. Martial-law practices are also thought to be more effective on preventive measures, excluding the loopholes in the relevant laws that terrorism exploits. Consequently, they are considered rather ineffective in fighting terrorism. The inadequacy of some public and special laws in this respect is still another important factor bearing on this problem.

The principle of never leaving terrorist acts without prompt and proper punishment, especially when indiscriminate killing and indiscriminate damage to public and private property are involved, does not seem to be uniformly observed, for many reasons. Some governments, deeply concerned with retaliation, either do not bring the offenders into court or set them free secretly, sometimes under a particular pretense. Another practice is to help the defendants escape from prisons through bribes, blackmail, and similar methods. Some loopholes in criminal and procedural laws are also exploited by the defense, and in some cases the presiding judges themselves prolong the court proceedings unnecessarily. Still another difficulty in this context is the deliberate intermingling of petty crimes with terrorist acts to mislead and confuse the authorities. Finally, terrorists expect to survive after carrying out their so-called missions, and in actual practice many manage to do so. (A CIA estimate shows that "62 percent of terrorist missions had elaborate escape plans built into them.")

THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM

International terrorism should not be taken as a passing phenomenon. Trends like the weakening of central authority resulting from unlimited democracy or unconstrained freedom, the rise in ethnic and subnational feelings, and gradual fragmentation of global policy denote that international terrorism will be used in the future not only as an instrument of political protest and deterrence but also increasingly for ideological purposes.

Because of the difficulty of prevention and control of individual and group violence, classical diplomacy of the balance of power is not effective in this field. The impression that international terrorism has achieved much in recent years in obtaining concessions is also becoming widespread. Consequently, based on the foregoing and on other reasons, it may be logical to assume that the future may see many more acts of international terrorism. The increase in acts of indiscriminate killing and indiscriminate damage to property also invites much concern and anxiety. There seems to be the danger of a sharp increase in these acts, parallel to the augmentation and sophistication of countermeasures, until a radical solution is effected.

It should always be borne in mind that party government, with parties alternating in power through the normal process of elections, despite all the advantages inherent in it, also has a basic weakness in foreign policy due to discontinuity. This is particularly true when the new government adopts a new policy, even though the international situation does not require a change.

The asymmetry between open and closed societies, particularly in terms of the decisionmaking process in foreign policy, weakens the position of the democratic countries in a systemic conflict. The contemporary communication facilities and mass media tend to exacerbate this situation. Ideological debate between the two sides is also an asymmetrical one, since on one side the Communist vision prevails, while reality is the basic value on the other. Cultural subversion, which in a way causes another source of asymmetry, is also an inherent problem in many Western countries.

A third problem is the ability of the Soviets to take advantage of and to exploit the domestic policy of pluralistic societies, something the Western democracies never manage to do, and this particularly applies to international terrorism.

Continuation of terrorist violence in Turkey despite the measures taken requires the examination of this problem in that country. On one side, the terrorists are using the methods of guerrilla warfare without any constraint. In other words, they are waging a war, using warlike methods and means at their discretion, whereas security forces have to act within the rules of mission and authority as delineated by law, that is, they have to fight a war with peacetime rules and methods. Intelligence, under the circumstances, is not specifically suitable for this kind of work; and martial-law practices are restricted by a number of public and special laws and regulations.

Istanbul, which is the scene of great terrorist activity, is the largest city that is perfect in terms of urban guerrilla activity. It is the largest industrial and cultural center in the country, with more than 150,000 factories and more than a million workers; it has 32 university branches, 24 other institutions of higher education, and 234 high schools, with approximately 325,000 students, many having economic, social, educational, and specific family problems. Every year a quarter of a million people migrate to this large metropolis from other parts of the country. The majority of immigrants from other countries either settled in Istanbul originally or later moved there. This migration process is creating an unhealthy housing problem around the city, where some 2.5 million people live and the authorities have all the difficulties of bringing in proper public utilities and state authority. It is a fact that the vacuum of central authority creates opportunities for the foci of anarchy and terror and gives terrorists a chance to try to fill this vacuum themselves. Finally, Istanbul is geographically the most suitable place for the support of terrorists and for the smuggling of arms and money.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

First of all, the national and the global environment should be made a politically and economically healthy one to cut to the absolute minimum grievances, social injustice, and other breeding grounds of terrorism; a sound monetary policy should be established; an effective fight should be waged against inflation and unemployment; and other social and economic measures should be taken. In addition to close international cooperation in these fields, including specific research and exchange of information, there are other important measures bearing on the problem—for example, more international agreements and conventions should be promulgated to cover fields of terrorism that are not covered by the existing ones.

Fighting terrorism, at both national and international levels, is not only a problem for government, the police, and the judiciary, but also an ideological and political task for society. It requires close international cooperation. This is extremely important for the struggle against the nonmilitary challenge of the Soviets (as well as the extreme right's threat to secular parliamentary democracy), and it also serves to compensate the military inferiority the West seems to suffer at present vis-à-vis the Soviets and their allies.

Non-Communist countries should devise ways and means to destabilize the Soviets psychologically, as the latter used to do to compensate their own inferiority. Exposing Soviet colonialism and imperialism is a good starting point. NATO might organize the work of coordinating national policies to also fight transnational subversion and terrorism.

Suitable research activity on both systemic and subsystemic levels is still another requirement.

DESCRIPTION OF A RESEARCH PROJECT TO STUDY THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM

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OBJECTIVE

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany has established a scientific project group to study the causes of terrorism. Using the available data and information, the group will study the individual, group-dynamic, social, and ideological conditions that have contributed to the development and spread of terrorist violence in the Federal Republic of Germany, have led to the development of terrorist groups, and have permitted terrorist careers to flourish.

Scientific discussion has clearly shown that the phenomenon of terrorism cannot be explained monocausally: Terrorism arises from a complex network of causes. Interdisciplinary cooperation is therefore a characteristic feature of the research group, which includes experts in criminology, psychology, sociology and political science, law, and philosophy.

The aims of this research into the causes of terrorism are (1) to fill knowledge gaps and (2) to overcome preconceived ideas and make public discussion more objective. The research should contribute to an objective assessment of terrorism and to the development of realistic approaches toward preventing terrorism. For the time being, this government-subsidized project is the only major systematic investigation and evaluation of the causes of terrorism in the Federal Republic. In view of the contradictory hypotheses about the causes of terrorism, the interdisciplinary, empirically oriented approach appears to be of particular importance.

PROJECT STRUCTURE

The research project is divided into four subprojects:

1. Analysis of *curricula vitae*
2. Group formation and group dynamics
3. Social preconditions for terrorism
4. Ideological influences on terrorism

The methodological approaches within the individual subprojects differ. They include case analyses, studies of sources and examination of files, comparative investigations, qualitative opinion polls, and comprehensive surveys. As far as possible, the development of terrorism from 1968 to 1978 will be investigated in terms of all these areas.

Project 1: Analysis of Curricula Vitae

The analysis of curricula vitae will investigate and analyze biographical facts and social data on about 250 persons who have committed or supported violent terrorist acts, including both right-wing and left-wing terrorists. These data, *inter alia*, will include information on origin and family, the role of important background individuals and examples, key experiences, and the individual response to actions taken by the state. Personal failure in social and political activities is a further aspect that will be considered, along with techniques of self-justification and objectification and symptoms suggesting the reduction of inhibitions. The systematic evaluation of biographical material is intended to help identify the turning points that lead to a terrorist career when certain organizational and ideological preconditions exist.

By December 1977, useful preparatory work had been accomplished. The group had evaluated the curricula vitae of about 40 presumed terrorists wanted under warrants of arrest. The evaluation showed, for example, a high percentage of women in terrorist groups, markedly higher than the percentage of women involved in general crime. The majority of presumed terrorists had grown up in large cities; most of them came from families where indications suggest that family life was in some way disturbed. A high percentage came from large families of the so-called upper class and upper middle class and had a distinctly higher level of education than the average population. However, the relatively limited available data make the interpretive value of the results questionable. Nevertheless, the preliminary study has given rise to a number of hypotheses, and the subproject will enlarge the investigation of both qualitative and quantitative biographical aspects.

Project 2: Group Formation and Group Dynamics

The second subproject will analyze the formation of groups and group dynamics. It will consider the development, recruitment, and structures of terrorist organizations, the role of coercion exercised by the group, detachment from social reality, and processes of isolation and escalation. Group phenomena of different terrorist organizations

(e.g., SPK Heidelberg, the June 2 Movement, the RAF) will be analyzed and compared, and available empirical studies will be taken into account.

Subproject 2 focuses on the specific processes and structures of terrorist groups, most of whose members are cut off from social alternatives outside their groups. Irrespective of ideological and strategic conditions, the causes for terrorist activities also appear to be rooted in the "internal" demand for action in terrorist groups. Therefore, the question is raised, Why do these terrorist groups need action? Are terrorist actions used for testing individual members, as opportunities for experimenting and training, or even as an outlet for internal tensions and for remobilizing slackening motivations? In order to judge a group's capability to act, it is necessary to determine whether and how problems of leadership have been solved, how work-sharing and specialization have been enforced, how mutual confidence has been ensured, and how past failures have been assimilated within the group. Extraordinary efforts within a group seem to be necessary to increase members' belief in the "legality and success" of terrorist actions, to cover up and suppress doubts.

A further study within the framework of subproject 2 will examine the social relations among terrorists and those between terrorists and sympathizers and contacts. Clique and cluster analysis will be used to examine whether an assignment of functions has developed within and among different groups, and to describe the group structure in terms of the solidarity and accessibility of group members and the time at which certain groups have come into existence and/or have been dissolved. Finally, the study will consider whether the contact basis and the sympathizer scene are homogeneous or incoherent, and whether there are certain nuclei of crystallization.

Project 3: Social Preconditions for Terrorism

The third subproject will study the social preconditions for terrorism, i.e., questions relating to the loss of legitimacy and authority, the lack of social integration, and the correlations between terrorism and reactions by state and society.

As in Italy and Japan, terrorists in Germany are not primarily intent on putting through manifest social, economic, and political interests that are said to be subdued in the social system of the Federal Republic; their aim is to answer the fundamental question of the legitimacy of the political and social order. This form of terrorism prevails in countries that have experienced major historical interruptions in their national development and that have a relatively young democratic tradition. The years 1918, 1933, and 1945, for instance,

mark such interruptions in the German national development; in addition to this, the existence of a strong tradition of unpolitical thinking can be proved from experience. This is why a connection seems to exist between the legitimacy—or more precisely, the alleged weakness of legitimacy—of the democratic system, on the one hand, and that of terrorism, on the other. Within the framework of a methodologically comprehensive study (a representative survey and analysis of institutions), the project will attempt to clarify what types of events, experience, information, and political action produce legitimacy and the kind of events by which legitimacy can be shattered.

If terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany is considered to be a product of the disintegration of the youth and students' movement of the late 1960s, the question necessarily arises as to why the youth movement in other countries—where it had also been rather vehement—has “collapsed” into other forms. The response by state and society to the protest movements differed in different countries and may possibly have had a decisive influence on the ensuing development and the consequential effects. This subproject therefore will investigate whether certain social and political features are important with regard to the development of terrorism; these features include social and political control procedures of a suppressive and integrating nature, the possibilities of implementing (partial) aims of the movement through institutional political channels as well as on the social level, and the frankness with which these aims can be discussed.

Project 4: Ideological Influences on Terrorism

The fourth subproject will examine the kinds of arguments terrorists use to give legitimacy to their activities—which theories or fragments of theories they use in their ideological “contraptions.” Ideological differences between terrorist groups will be examined by an international comparison (Germany vs. Italy). The subproject will consider the role of ideologies and theories in the actions of terrorist groups, that is to say, whether ideologies constitute an incentive to act or serve as subsequent justification of existing objectives of aggression.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TERRORIST¹

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There is substantial agreement that the psychology of terrorism cannot be considered apart from political, historical, familial, group dynamic, organic, and even purely accidental, coincidental factors. These levels are not contradictory but complementary. The task of psychology is not to ignore some of these factors but to consider how they affect, and are reflected in, the awareness and behavior of the individual.

Politics can be an important factor in the psychology of the terrorist in a variety of ways. But before discussing these, we must caution that there are many kinds of terrorism and many kinds of terrorists. From one perspective, all terrorists have something in common because they are willing to use terror to achieve their ends. But if one wants to be as undifferentiated as this, one could say with Harry Stack Sullivan that all men are more human than otherwise and could thus talk about the psychology of man rather than about that of the terrorist. Or one could choose to emphasize uniqueness and say that one cannot talk about the psychology of the terrorist because there are differences between terrorists in different countries and in different groups; for that matter, one could say that no two individuals are alike. Whether one prefers to emphasize commonalities or differences is a question of choice, which may depend on the particular task one is trying to perform—from diagnosing the motives of an individual's particular act to consulting with government officials on a question of international negotiations concerned with prevention of terrorism.

To return to the question of politics, terrorists can be placed along a continuum ranging from the individual for whom personal motives are paramount and political motives negligible to the one who is caught up in a political situation that dictates his behavior, with purely personal motives playing a minor role. The terrorist is more likely than the non-terrorist to be an individual who sees politics as highly relevant. This relevance may be direct and easily understand-

¹ This paper is a draft report from the 1978 Berlin Conference on International Terrorism. Dr. Fried was the rapporteur of the Committee on the Psychology of the Terrorist at that conference.

able, as in the case of the homeless displaced person whose life was made insecure from infancy by a political situation that he desperately wants to change so as to gain, or regain, a homeland.

The importance of the political motive may be more difficult to understand if the terrorist comes from a peaceful, democratic, neutral country in which the majority of the citizens are satisfied with their way of life. It is remarkable how often, in these cases, the terrorist nevertheless identifies with a small beleaguered country or group of displaced persons, as in cases of Finnish hostage-takers who have wanted to go to Israel or to Cuba. In cases like these, the individual sees parallels between personal experiences of being small, insecure, and ignored by parents in a strife-rent family and the experience of a small nation in a strife-rent world. He feels less alone and less insignificant if he can identify with a whole nation, and his desire to fight back seems more significant and more honorable if it expresses not merely his personal frustration but allegiance to a great cause.

Projection of personal problems into the arena of the outside world may be seen as serving the defensive function of avoiding insight into the origins of the problem, but of course it can also be seen as a desirable shift from egotism to altruism. In fact, whether the individual is classified as a terrorist or as a freedom-fighter, as a criminal madman or as a hero, often depends as much on the motives and values of the classifier as on those of the classified. In scientifically assessing the psychology of the individual, one should try to free oneself of such moral judgments and recognize that even a terrorist whose ultimate aims one approves of is functioning on a psychotic level, as attested by his delusional thinking and cognitive malfunctioning. Even a terrorist whose aims one condemns may be a realistic person with great ability as an organizer and planner, and with political motives that are perfectly understandable from his own frame of reference.

Even in the case of the terrorist who is clearly psychotic and delusional in his thinking, awareness of political realities can play a significant role in determining behavior. American skyjackers who tried to force pilots to fly them to Cuba often had fantastically personalized, unrealistic, and essentially unpolitical motives for wanting to go there. But they were realistic in perceiving that Cuba was a hostile nation that U.S. citizens were not supposed to visit. They did not hijack planes to Canada or Mexico, from which they would have been promptly extradited. When an extradition treaty was signed with Cuba, skyjacking in that direction virtually ceased.

The terrorist act itself typically has a theatrical, highly spectacular character. It is designed to attract attention because the reactions of an audience are essential to the terrorist in the achievement of his aims. For the individual terrorist with highly personal motives, the

audience he is trying to reach may be a particular individual to whom he wants to prove that he is not, after all, a failure, but a real man. For the organized group of political terrorists, the audience may be a government on which the larger audience of national opinion will, it is hoped, put a certain kind of pressure. In the latter case, shrewd political calculations may be involved, and the terrorists may fail to achieve their goal, not because their thinking was delusional but because they made miscalculations of the same order as those of any political leader. Similarly, the realistic terrorist may take great care that there be little actual audience present when he commits his act, so as to avoid recognition, too much bloodshed, or the inconvenience of having to take too many hostages. He will rely on the media to provide him with his audience, and in the manipulation of the media he may exhibit all the skills of a trained PR man.

Examples were given of instances in which the terrorist act was committed in a state of altered consciousness, suggestive in some cases of temporal epilepsy, or at least of high excitement with cognitive disruption. Terrorists of this type, however, would not be likely to pass through the screening and training processes of the better organized groups, whose members are capable of operating with great discipline and self-control even in highly stressful combat situations.

Since the terrorist act involves a high degree of danger for the perpetrator, he must be a person willing to risk his life. Given this basic fact, there is again a continuum along which individuals can be ranged. At one end is the terrorist who takes minimal risks and takes all possible precautions. At the other is the man who virtually ensures that his act will have suicidal consequences. Between these extremes are such psychological types as the man who wants to die but has religious scruples against suicide and feels that it is morally better to have someone else kill him; the man who believes that death is the door to a better life beyond; the man who believes that near-death would give him a new lease on life; and the man who wants to confront death and overcome or transcend it.

Death-seeking or death-confronting behavior suggests a depressive component in the terrorist personality, and this has indeed been noted by many observers. The terrorist often is a person who feels empty, anhedonic (incapable of enjoying anything), and incapable of forming meaningful interpersonal relationships on a reciprocal level. To overcome these deficits, he may dedicate himself to the achievement of an ideal society that will be entirely different from the familiar environment in which he has suffered, may seek thrills or extremely challenging activities to overcome his own apathy and give him a sense of euphoria, and may seek highly idealized human relationships to compensate for the lack of satisfaction in ordinary ones.

The terrorist's interpersonal world (as with borderline and narcissistic personalities who are not terrorists) is likely to consist of three categories of people: the idealized heroes on whom he models himself, including perhaps a small group of comrades who share his ideals; the enemies (a category to which his heroes may be switched if he becomes disillusioned with them); and a large world of shadow figures (people who seem to him to be not quite alive, the population of expendables from whom his hostages may be taken). In these three categories the psychologist may see projections of aspects of the terrorist's own personality: his ego ideal, the despised parts of his self, and the not-quite-alive everyday self of his periods of apathy. The prevalence of two of these—the hated self and the shadow self—helps to explain why the terrorist may be willing to die along with his enemy or his "expendable" hostage. But the better he is integrated into a group that does give him real friendship and support, the less likely will he be to seek death. It would be an unfortunate oversimplification, however, to assume that pathology is found only in the freelance terrorist and that members of larger groups can be considered "normals" with purely political, nonpsychological motives.

A PLO leader has said that Palestinians, in addition to having one of the highest literacy rates and one of the highest percentages of well-educated professionals in the world, also have one of the highest rates of mental illness. Their children often start to scream for no apparent reason—and the child's desperate, rage-filled scream is a symbol that frequently occurs in the memories or fantasies of terrorism-prone (European or American) individuals in the course of their therapy. Considering the high rate of mental illness among Palestinians, it is remarkable that their suicide rate is so low—but perhaps this is after all not so surprising when one considers that there is scarcely a family without at least one member in the fighting forces. In short, these observations of a political leader on the members of his own large group coincide with the observation based on individual studies in other cultures that depression can be rage turned inward, and terrorism can be suicidal rage turned back out against the frustrating world. The Palestinian has been described by Dr. Abdel-Qader Yassine as having a "Samson complex": being willing to die himself if in doing so he can attract attention to the fact that he exists, win admiration, and inflict maximum damage on his enemies. But it is significant that as soon as the PLO achieved a certain measure of recognition and respect—the beginnings of a dialogue—it renounced terrorist activity and denounced terrorist acts by European groups with which it had formerly cooperated.

The "Samson complex" is a concept remarkably similar to that of the "Icarus complex," a psychological construct of Dr. Henry A. Mur-

ray, based in part on the case of the Italian poet Lauro di Bosis, who wrote a play called *Icaro*, made a spectacular flight (in 1933) in which he dropped anti-Fascist leaflets over Mussolini's Rome, then crashed into the sea in a manner that he had predicted in a posthumously published news release. Students of mythology may recall that although Icarus' flight ended only in his own death, another spectacular ascensionist, Phaethon, drove the sun chariot so close to earth that he put the earth in danger of destruction and had to be killed.

If psychologists and political analysts use figures from Hebrew and Greek mythology to describe terrorists, this is because of the close correspondence between the imagery and motivation in the myths and those employed by terrorists in their public and private utterances (dreams, creative writings, test results, therapeutic interviews). Some of these common factors are the ascensionist factor, spectacular exhibitionism and attention-seeking, precipitation (falling, or hurling others down from a height), and fascination with fire. These sometimes find direct behavioral expression, as in skyjacking or in the firesetting that was an important feature of German terrorist activity in its early phase (or in the childhood experiences of some terrorists).

Sometimes the behavioral expression is less directly concrete and more symbolic: One aims at bringing about the "fall" of a political leader or government. In some cases it has been possible to achieve a high degree of accuracy in predicting the existence of specific inner experiences and their childhood antecedents, on the basis of a particular terrorist act; for example, an act of hostage-taking that did not involve skyjacking may reveal recurrent flight and falling dreams, a childhood history involving the "triad" of enuresis-firesetting-cruelty to animals that often is predictive of unusually violent criminal behavior, and/or severe maternal rejection during the first year of life.

Two cautions are, however, in order. One is that some specialists who have had extensive experience with terrorists, including some of the most dangerous terrorists, do not recognize these personality patterns as applicable. They emphasize that the terrorist may be perfectly normal from a clinical point of view, that he may have psychopathology of a different order, or that his personality may be only a minor factor in his becoming a terrorist if he was recruited into a terrorist group rather than having volunteered for one. The second caution is that Samson and Icarus complexes can be found in individuals who are merely potential terrorists rather than actual ones, and even in individuals who have developed such strong inhibitions on their aggressive tendencies that they are even less likely than the average person to commit criminal acts. Such personality types are frequent among actors and people in the arts; among people who participate in sports like automobile racing, parachuting, and mountain

climbing; and among those who participate in politics and in other spheres of activity in which their ambitious and ascensionist fantasies are less obvious. Therefore, one cannot establish a direct line of causation between having a certain type of personality and becoming a terrorist, just as one cannot establish a certain organic deficit, family background, ethnic identity, or political situation as a sufficient explanation of terrorist activity.

To shift from personality to ethnic and family background, for example, it has been suggested that terrorist activity in Ireland could be explained by squalid economic conditions, political oppression, large families that make loving mothering difficult, and so on. But even granting the relevance of these factors, how does one account for the large numbers of Irish policemen who loyally serve their governments, hard-working Irish longshoremen, and brilliant Irish playwrights?

We are left to ponder what events may be the ones that make a potential terrorist cross the line into actual violence, or possibly even lead to terrorist activity on the part of someone whom one would not have described as particularly terrorism-prone. Such factors may include experiences of profound disappointment because of a personal failure or disillusionment with an ideal; the killing or imprisonment of a family member or comrade; being introduced into a setting where terrorism is a long-standing tradition or a response to current political crisis; or contact with a group that influences the way in which one cognitively restructures and reevaluates the political situation, with membership in that group being something that meets personal needs and participation in terrorist activities merely one of the conditions one has to fulfill for membership.

Just as no person is born a terrorist, the fact that a person has engaged in terrorist activity in some phase of his life need not mean that he is a terrorist forever. The mere process of aging may turn him into a law-abiding citizen. Actual changes in the political situation or a willingness on the part of others to respect him in dialogue may be even more efficient factors.

TERRORISTS—WHAT ARE THEY LIKE? HOW SOME TERRORISTS DESCRIBE THEIR WORLD AND ACTIONS¹

Konrad Kellen
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INTRODUCTION: A (CRITICAL) LOOK AT THE LITERATURE

There is a growing literature on terrorists and terrorism, not only in the United States but abroad as well. By far the largest part of that literature is *descriptive*, in that it traces in detail the moves and "actions" of those we have come to call terrorists—"actions" such as the Lod Airport massacre and the kidnappings and assassinations of Hanns Martin Schleyer in Germany and Aldo Moro in Italy. Or it deals with spectacular rescues such as the Entebbe and Mogadishu raids, or striking personalities such as the renowned Carlos about whom two books have so far been written.

A smaller but growing part of the literature on terrorists is *interpretive*. For example, the literature abounds with pieces such as *Who Are the Terrorists and What Do They Want?*² Generalizing on such writings—and also on the congresses, symposia, and the like dealing with terrorism—one can say they all represent efforts to come closer to understanding what motivates terrorists to do what they do, or to learn what types of person become terrorists and how they come to be that way.

Inevitably, the explanations put forth or, perhaps more precisely, the hypotheses established concerning the terrorist phenomenon, tend to mirror the disciplines of those who formulate them. A Freudian psychiatrist, for example,³ has concluded that men or women become terrorists because of unconscious patricidal impulses. Since terrorists do indeed attack persons in or symbols of high authority, and psychoanalysis makes a good case for the unconscious equating official authority with the father, the theory seems cogent. But it is only a theory; as far as we know, no terrorist, male or female, has yet

¹ This paper was originally published as Rand Note N-1300-SL, *Terrorists—What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe their World and Actions*, November 1979.

² Ron Ridenour, in *Skeptic*, January-February 1976.

³ Dr. Jakov Katwan, *Final Report from the Committee at the Berlin Conference*, November 1978.

been placed on the couch and engaged in a psychiatric give-and-take that would confirm or refute it.

Many other psychiatrists and psychologists have searched for, and believe they have found, certain personality traits specific to terrorists: "rigidity," or "inability to form meaningful relationships," or "total rejection of the entire social order as they find it," and so on. Again, these theories may or may not be accurate. But in any case, they lack general applicability. Who is to say that Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof did not have as meaningful a relationship as the average person is able to attain? Or that a member of the Red Brigades is more rigid than some solid member of society? Or that the young men and women of the Japanese Red Army reject the existing social order more totally than a monk or recluse who would never lift a finger against anyone? Moreover, such descriptors beg the question as to what, specifically, makes a terrorist engage in violent actions.

Other psychological observers and analysts believe they have discerned other terrorist traits. One analyst concludes, "Death-seeking or death-confronting behavior suggests a depressive component in [the] terrorist personality The terrorist often is a person who feels empty, anhedonic [incapable of enjoying anything], and . . . as a child he may have suffered from the triad of enuresis-firesetting-cruelty to animals."⁴

This analyst then reasons that the above characterization leads to terrorist actions: "To overcome these deficits [a person] may dedicate himself to the achievement of an ideal society which will be entirely different . . . , may seek thrills or extremely challenging activities to overcome his own apathy and give him a sense of euphoria, and seek highly idealized relationships to compensate for . . . ordinary ones."⁵

Other observers have other explanations. Professor H.H.H. Cooper of the American University writes: "The terrorist must fall back upon some concept of social solidarity or ideology. [This] gives the underpinning of terrorism and is but a pathetic substitute for patriotism, the flag or other appurtenances, from which the legitimate soldier can draw comfort."⁶ Yet it seems more likely that the terrorist is motivated by an ideology to begin with, not that he must "fall back upon" one.

Other, less ambitious observers have groped for certain significant individual emotional mechanisms, rather than trying to present an entire profile of the terrorist. One theory holds that terrorists "deper-

⁴ *Final Report from the Committee at the Berlin Conference*, Committee A: "The Psychology of the Terrorist," November 1978, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶ H.H.H. Cooper, "What Is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective," *Legal/Medical Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1977.

sonalize" their victims. They can kill innocent people, even children, in cold blood or without feelings of guilt, according to this theory, because they see in such victims either the representatives of an evil system, or hapless random victims of their own politically necessary action against such a system. Again, this may well be true. But the phenomenon of depersonalization of victims is also observable in every war, where soldiers depersonalize their enemy and bombardiers depersonalize entire cities. And in view of the fact that most terrorists describe and apparently regard themselves as soldiers, whether in a national war or in a social or political one, the import of the finding, even if it is true, evaporates.


Sociologists, on the other hand, have studied the *environment* from which individual terrorists have sprung. It has been established, for example, that terrorists often come from middle-class or upper-middle-class families. In other words, terrorists do not, as a general rule, come from economically deprived families. Unfortunately, this datum cannot be regarded as having much predictive or other value, because the overwhelming majority of children from similar homes do not turn to terrorism. Although the finding might be "interesting" and might contradict the notions of those who have no knowledge of terrorism at all, it is not very meaningful operationally or taxonomically. Besides, it is not always accurate.

Other sociologically oriented observers and analysts have asked whether terrorists might have been shaped by society as a whole—not by the family environment in which they grew up, but by the society as they found it—and whether they might therefore have some justification for their actions, or whether, at the very least, their actions might be understandable, given current social realities. Such a point of departure for the analysis of terrorism is virtually unknown in the United States, but it is not infrequently employed in Germany. What it amounts to, in brief, is the inquiry as to whether and in what fashion contemporary society may actually cause and even warrant violent attacks on itself, and whether, conversely, some changes in the society might reduce terrorism. The standard American ways of analyzing terrorism generally do not entertain these possibilities; American society regards the terrorist essentially as a complete deviate, a person who is neither shaped by nor in contact with social reality.


German society, on the other hand, in the wake of an aggressive war of its own making and the annihilation of millions by its own hands, seems to feel much less sanguine and righteous about itself and therefore does take the state of society into account as one of the possible precipitating causes of terrorism. To be sure, no serious student of the phenomenon of terrorism in Germany proceeds from the

assumption that the social situation is entirely responsible for what the terrorists do; but some German analysts do allow it to enter into their calculations.

For example, a German naval officer⁷ suggests the following theoretical model of analysis:



He then draws a corresponding scheme for possible countermeasures:



Similarly, a major study undertaken in Germany under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior asks as one of its questions: "What changes would society have to undergo to reduce or obviate terrorism?" In other words, the terrorist is not seen there simply as a deranged individual.

The Ideological Perspective

One of the manifest differences between "common" criminals and terrorists (and presumably the principal reason why the latter have attracted such extraordinary attention) is that the terrorists' objec-

⁷ Lt. Commander Armin Kolb, in *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, July 1978.

tives are not—at least not primarily or initially—financial gain or other personal advantage; their actions are sparked and guided by ideology, i.e., ideas and objectives that go beyond personal interests and have some altruistic or idealistic appearance. Although some “supercriminals” like Bonnie and Clyde occasionally attain hero status in the eyes of some, the ordinary robber, burglar, or killer is neither interesting politically nor a hero personally (despite the great risks he takes). But the terrorist is different. He is invariably concerned with things other than material goods, whether he is a person with primarily national aims, such as a Palestinian commando or Croatian separatist, or one with primarily millennial aims, such as a European or Japanese “urban guerrilla.” His appeal is his seeming altruism and idealism in what to many appears as an overly materialistic and pragmatic age.

Origins of Terrorist Ideas

A question frequently asked is, Where did the terrorists get their ideas? Like all other ideologists—and they are ideologists—terrorists get their ideas from many disparate sources, ranging from early Christian martyrs to Russian anarchists (e.g., Michael A. Bakunin), from Marx to Mao. But on a more immediate plane, many terrorists seem to have received their inspiration primarily from two sources. The first is the guerrilla leaders, such as Castro, Che, Giap, Mao, and Marighella, i.e., men dedicated to violence and the dictum that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The other source, much less well known, is a group of intellectuals, particularly in Europe and especially in Germany, who had no intention or expectation of inspiring terrorism and who were much dismayed when their teachings were translated into such—to them—unexpected actions.

These men were sociologists. The best known among them was Herbert Marcuse, Professor Emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, a man long revered by radicals in the United States.⁸ The group also included Max Horkheimer and W. Adorno, originally German scholars, who lived and taught in the United States during the Hitler years. These two men returned to Germany after the war and founded the Institute for Social Studies at Frankfurt University. Their ideas found wide currency in and beyond postwar Germany at the universities where most of the German terrorists studied—in fact, studied sociology.

These teachers, deeply shaken by the Nazi experience, had not been content to attribute the Nazi calamity to Hitler and German

⁸ Marcuse died August 1, 1979, at the age of 81.

unemployment; they searched for deeper causes. They came to believe that economic progress, although it had brought some freedom to some people, had created a new form of slavery, the "consumption terror" or "consumption slavery" that had turned most people into wage slaves by forcing them to labor incessantly at often meaningless jobs in order to be able to have all the consumer goods they themselves wanted and others expected them to have.

These men also taught that technological progress, based on scientific knowledge, had produced a world administered without respect for human needs; that a straight line led from primitive man to the Auschwitz extermination camps, and from the stone thrower to the nuclear strategist; and that the excessive pressure of modern society on the individual needed to be cast away in exchange for new freedoms. As we shall see later from some terrorists' own statements, this is precisely what some of them think.

But the originators of these ideas were far from being terrorists or even activists. They abhorred violence. As they put it themselves, they dealt exclusively with concepts, social criticism, paradigms. They pointed out what in their view was wrong with society and why it was the way it was, but they did not teach their students how changes were to be accomplished. They were essentially analysts, critics; and they were greatly surprised when some of their teachings, reaching a great many students, were taken up by a handful as the justification and impetus for violent actions. As one of them, W. Adorno, exclaimed in anguish before his death, "I only built models. How could I suspect that people would try to turn them into reality with Molotov cocktails?"⁹

Marcuse, too, frequently expressed his rejection of revolutionary violence. Yet many of those who idolized him favored violence to such an extent that the difference between idol and follower is hard to understand or reconcile.

What Do We Mean by Terrorists and Terrorism?

Many definitions of terrorists and terrorism have been presented, and just as many (usually valid) objections have been raised against these definitions. Like many other phenomena, terrorists, so mercurial and elusive in real life, are not easily bound in words either.

Against definitions that are primarily negative or pejorative, the objection has been raised that the early American revolutionaries would have been regarded as terrorists by contemporary standards. Thomas Jefferson, who said, "The tree of liberty must be fertilized

⁹ *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 7, 1969.

from time to time with the blood of tyrants," might qualify for the label. Similarly, the men who tried to assassinate Hitler or the men who succeeded in killing his chief representative Reinhard Heydrich in subdued and tortured Czechoslovakia would be terrorists to some.

But to put Jefferson or anti-Nazi heroes within the same semantic confines as the perpetrators of the Lod Airport massacre or the murder of the American ambassador in Khartoum would only attest to the uselessness of any definition so wide as to include such disparate elements. It is therefore necessary to introduce some arbitrary criteria for the sake of discussion. The term *terrorism* as used in this paper assumes the following restrictions:

1. Terrorism refers to *contemporary* activity. Historical parallels, even of such recent date as World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, may be illuminating but they are not "the same" as what we understand by terrorism today.
2. Terrorism is distinguished from terror, which is the rule by force and fear "from the top," i.e., by a dictatorial regime.
3. Terrorism is violent action, especially against human beings, or against symbolic targets.
4. Mere threats of violence are not terrorism, *unless* they emanate from a group that has already engaged in terrorist acts.
5. Terrorism is the work of small groups.
6. A terrorist group may or may not have an active working relationship with another terrorist group.
7. A terrorist group must have a political objective, even if it has other objectives as well, e.g., religious objectives.
8. A terrorist act, in contrast to a "common" criminal act, must point beyond itself, i.e., the task is not completed with the execution of the act.
9. A terrorist act must instill fear by being violent, visible, irrational, repeatable, or a combination of these.
10. A terrorist act must be extortionist in nature, even if the extortion is not specifically stated at every turn. The equation of terrorism is:

Violent act committed = More violent acts can be expected,
unless or until certain things are done (or discontinued).

In a word, terrorism is extortion, over time, successful or not, by small groups against large groups.

How Does this Paper Approach its Task?

The literature on terrorists and terrorism is by no means lacking in insights or useful theories and conclusions. Its undeniable short-

coming is, however, that it is almost entirely theoretical, with the authors working backwards from terrorist acts, along the lines of their individual disciplines, rather than reporting from the "inside," i.e., from actual contact with terrorists or former terrorists. This has not been the fault of the observers; rather, it is due to the dearth of available primary sources, i.e., terrorists "in the flesh."

This paper, however, is based almost entirely on what terrorists (mainly ex-terrorists) have said in interviews and have written in autobiographical works. This has had the disadvantage of leading to an "unbalanced" piece, in that the source material stems primarily from two German individuals. But it has the advantage of providing a glimpse into the psyches of true terrorists, and through them, into the terrorist world.

The principal sources for this report are four former terrorists who have given in-depth interviews and one who has given only a very sketchy history of himself. One of the sources has also written a book about himself and his experiences.

Of the sources, two defected from the terrorist world and are now living underground, hiding out both from the authorities and from their former colleagues. The other three were apprehended and tried and are now serving time in prisons.

The five sources are:

1. *Michael Baumann*. Born in 1947. Wrote a book entitled *Wie Es Alles An fing (How It All Began)*, which was translated into English and published with the title *Terror or Love*, by Grove Press, New York, 1979. Gave extensive clandestine interview to the German magazine *Stern*. The interview was published in the June 1, 1978, issue. Defected. In hiding.
2. *Hans-Joachim Klein*. Born in 1947. Granted interview to *Der Spiegel*, which was published August 7, 1978. Also gave interview to the French paper *Liberation*, published on October 5 and 6, 1978. Defected. In hiding.
3. *Zvonko Busic*. Hijacked a TWA airliner to propagate the Croatian cause. Tried and imprisoned. Unpublished in-depth interview by Jeanne N. Knutson of the Wright Institute at Berkeley, California.
4. *Kozo Okamoto*. Participated in the Lod Airport massacre in 1972. Sole survivor of his group. Tried and imprisoned in Israel. In-depth interview by Patricia G. Steinhoff in *Asian Survey*, September 1976.
5. *Horst Mahler*. Founder of the Berlin Socialist Lawyers' Collective and co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang. Went with Meinhof and others to Jordan after Baader had been freed from jail by terrorist action. A participant in bank robberies;

was arrested after his return to Germany and sentenced to 14 years in prison, where he is now serving his sentence. Interview in the *Christian Science Monitor*, August 29, 1978.

Of course, others who have been involved in various forms of terrorist activities have also spoken or written about those activities: Sean McStofain, Susan Stern, Marie Maquire, and several others. Only a few of their statements are included here, partly because this paper cannot be all-inclusive, but mainly because no coherent picture emerges about their motivations and experiences. In the case of McStofain, an additional reason was that this paper is not concerned with the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Susan Stern of the Weather Underground has written a book from which quotes are given later in this paper. Meinhof, Baader, and others, it seems, were never extensively interviewed. Thus they are not primary sources, and what is known about them has not been used here.

How representative is what we learn from the ex-terrorists, even if it is true? Let an ex-terrorist answer that: "I have told my story," says Michael Baumann of his book, "and I would like it to be taken as one contribution among many, as my own contribution . . . based on the experiences I have had and how they have shaped me. Naturally, this has no general validity." We can only agree with Baumann that much of what he says is specifically his own story, and the very fact that he reports considerable disagreement between himself and some of his fellows proves that his opinions, reactions, and experiences are not necessarily representative.

The same, without a doubt, goes for the others quoted here. They are all quite different from each other and, presumably, from other terrorists who are still in the fold. Nevertheless, they have many things in common with each other—and presumably with those who are still active; as young people who have abandoned the path of bourgeois endeavors and, to varying degrees, have embraced a terrorist philosophy and a nonsocial way of life dominated by the use of force, they cannot but be largely similar and therefore at least somewhat representative of others who fall into the same category.

THE TERRORIST INDIVIDUAL

Five Individual Roads to Terrorism

While the literature is replete with theories on why and how people become terrorists, these theories are superimposed by the ob-

servers on the terrorists; they are not based on what terrorists have said about themselves, or even on what they might say under any conceivable circumstance. It is very unlikely that any terrorist has ever said, or would say, "I am anhedonic," or, "I am incapable of forming meaningful reciprocal relationships." On the contrary, Michael Baumann, one of our four principal sources, professes, in the most credible language, that he had an exceptionally good time during most of his stretch as a terrorist, although—and this makes his statements all the more credible—by no means all the time.

Michael Baumann. Beginning his autobiography,¹⁰ Baumann states, "I have no message." Then he continues, "Before the Extraparlimentary Opposition [in Germany the so-called *Ausserparlamentarische Opposition*, i.e., political opposition groups not represented in the German parliament] or anything like that was around, I was a perfectly normal person, a completely well-adjusted construction worker's apprentice. Before that I was a schoolboy."¹¹

Born and raised in East Germany until he was 12 years old, Baumann came with his parents to West Germany and after school was apprenticed to a construction job. He quit that job, because he could not face what he regarded as the monotony of such an existence; then, he says, "I did all sorts of shit jobs until around '65 [when he was 18 years old], when my story began to be not so conformist any more. Actually," he continues, "with me it all began with rock music and long hair." Baumann became very fond of "the Beatles, the Stones, Byrds, and so on . . . I didn't just listen to rock, but blues, too, like John Lee Hooker and guys like that." At the same time, he began to frequent bars where young people of similar tastes were hanging out.

A truly fundamental experience for Baumann was the impact of his decision to let his hair grow long. To the extent that one can generalize, it is probably fair to say that in the mid-sixties a youngster letting his hair grow long probably met with more vocal disdain in Germany than he did in the United States. In any event, the long hair really set Baumann against society and at the same time it became with him an important article of faith: "In my case, in Berlin, it was like this: If you had long hair, things were suddenly for you the way they were for the blacks [in America]. Do you understand? They threw us out of bars, they cursed us and chased after us—all you had was trouble. You got fired from your job or you could not even get one, or you got only the

¹⁰ Michael Baumann, *How It All Began*, Grove Press, New York, 1979, p. 1.

¹¹ Neither Baumann nor the other subjects quoted here provided a sequential, chronological account of how they came to enter the world of terrorism. The author has attempted to provide this from the materials but is aware that the attempt has not been entirely successful.

worst kind. And you had constant hassles with complete strangers in the street."

"But," asserts Baumann, "I was a completely normal person. With me it was like this—I suddenly saw a connection between myself and blues music and the problems that exist in America, like the problems with the blacks. And suddenly (wearing long hair) I, too, was a kind of black or Jew or leper. In any case, with long hair you are in some way pushed into the position of an outcast."

"For me," continues Baumann, "it was clear from the outset: I liked long hair. With long hair you start getting a different relationship to yourself, a new identity, at least that is what happened with me. You develop a really healthy narcissism that you need simply to survive. After some early youthful confusion, you become more conscious and begin to like yourself."

"When we lived in Berlin," related Baumann about his road to becoming, eventually, a terrorist, "I grew up in one of those foul working class suburbs.¹² We were really isolated there, which was hard to stand. You always had trouble there, even with other young people. The conformists broke with you, of course. They did not want to be seen associating with a bum like that (a long-hair), or they were hassled at home about it—you know how it is."

"So you start building contacts with a few people like yourself, other dropouts, or whatever you want to call them. You begin to orient yourself differently. I never looked at books as a boy because nobody encouraged me to do so. At the most I read Karl May or Jerry Cotton or stuff like that."¹³ Then I started to read Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, Sartre, and Jack London, I mean people who had gone through similar things (as I had). These were the kinds of influence you picked up when getting away from home."

Apparently, the strongest incentive for Baumann to give up on ordinary life came when he was apprenticed to a job at a construction site: "The first day on the job, riding on the tram to the construction site, it suddenly hit me—you're gonna be doing this for fifty years, there's no escaping it. The terror of that hit my bones. I had to look for ways to get out." In subsequent jobs he was not any happier, and he later

¹² In the Introduction to Baumann's book, from which these passages are quoted, the German Nobel Laureate Heinrich Böll (often accused by German conservatives of being, or of having been, a "sympathizer" of terrorism) says sarcastically: "We're listening here [in Baumann's book] to one of those rare birds about which the highly abstract and occasionally arrogant intellectual Leftists have so often and eagerly dreamed: an actual *worker*." Böll also says about the book: "I have rarely read anything so revealing from the Underground."

¹³ Well known German writers of trashy imitation Westerns. Karl May in particular was Hitler's favorite author.

complained about the never-ending "Leistungsdruck" (pressure to perform), to which he objected strenuously.¹⁴

"Even in East Berlin I had been an outsider because I wasn't in the Communist Boys' Club [Baumann had lived in East Berlin as a child]. At home I was surrounded by women¹⁵ It was easy for me to drop out, to go along with this thing, it was the first time I wasn't an isolated rebel, I found a certain philosophical direction in it, if you know what I mean." In a sense, this really was "dropping in" rather than "dropping out," i.e., the lone rebel or rejecter of his surroundings was at least joining with other rebels and thereby entering a group or society.

American Weather Underground member Susan Stern reported a similar experience she had for the first time in her life upon joining a group of hippies at an antiwar rally at Golden Gate Park in San Francisco:

I joined the group. They began singing a freedom song and without thinking about it I sang with them Without any effort, and without knowing why I was or wasn't, the casual group of people had made me feel happy. *For the first time in my life I felt I belonged somewhere*¹⁶

For the first time, Baumann, too, found truly congenial company in a group of dropouts who had as yet no particular aims, and, what was even more exciting, he found it in a movement that was growing in size and effectiveness. "The Movement began in '64 or '65, got bigger, became recognized for the first time as a phenomenon, and was taken up by the media as a topic of interest. . . . Maybe our political awareness was a little lower [than that of the founders of the Movement] but . . . along with the music, the clothes, the long hair—all the externals—and the broad framework, my early isolation trip was broken out of and over."

Baumann did not think very highly of the early founders of this amorphous movement, the "Bohemians," who dominated the group until "ordinary people joined." These Bohemians, "pseudo artists," were "elitist." "They felt superior to anyone else," sporting silly symbols like "Ban the Bomb" or demonstrating against the Vietnam War.

Baumann continues, "That's how I came into contact with the political scene, it was a gradual process. It's like this: You constantly draw more opposition against yourself because of your views of the bourgeois world. Then things get political; for example, with attacks (on us) by Springer's tabloids.¹⁷ They were always against us. Nobody could stand

¹⁴ This attitude corresponds exactly to the teachings of the German sociologists cited earlier.

¹⁵ Some sociologists would consider this a significant point.

¹⁶ Susan Stern, *With the Weathermen*, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁷ Axel Springer, West Germany's largest newspaper and magazine publisher, whose publications ran a consistent campaign against the New Left and the counter-culture.

that pig Springer because he always fanned the flames. Like after the Rolling Stones concert, after which there was a riot. That's where it got started and things were made purposely hard for us. The political content (of our nonbourgeois tendencies) came as a result of such confrontations and the Vietnam demonstrations. I was in favor of those, too." This passage may be particularly important in that it shows the beginnings of a mutual posture where both sides believe themselves to be in (justifiable) defensive positions against the depredations of the other. Springer, of course, felt attacked by the New Left, but the New Left felt attacked by Springer. Terrorists apparently have generally come to feel that even their most aggressive acts are defensive in nature, which probably is why they feel, or profess to feel, no guilt for them.

During all that time of inner transformation, Baumann nevertheless continued to consider himself a "worker": "The whole story of some of us joining together (just 'dropouts' then, not terrorists) was purely proletarian." And Baumann liked it that way. "A worker definitely has more of a relation to rock music than an intellectual has. With him, it's more physical, you're only tuned into the body, not into the mind, and dancing and stuff like that is more your thing, because somehow you're closer to the earth. I mean it's more a matter of pure feeling with this kind of music. The whole message of rock is f_____g or whatever you want to call it, . . . make love, not war. It's easier for a worker to grasp and relate to that." It may be significant in this connection that Baumann later talks about the instinctual surefootedness he felt during some terrorist actions. Baumann relates, for example, that when robbing a bank he would operate much more by "feel" and intuition than reason.

From companionship with other dropouts in bars where such youths congregated, Baumann eventually turned "political." He calls it a "jump." "The jump [from the dropout life] into the SDS¹⁸ happened suddenly for me. I thought intellectual potential was not being used, and I wanted to develop it, so I went to an evening course in 1966 . . . I had been more into the music scene and . . . what's called hippie today, or the counterculture . . . The cultural side had interested me more in the beginning . . ."

"In the beginning of '67 I joined the SDS. The people I liked there were from K1 [the first commune in Berlin]. Somehow they were closest to me. The world of the students—those bookworms—I could never really get close to it, it wasn't my world . . . For me, K1 was right . . . the people in it were the only ones who liked music and had long hair,

¹⁸ Socialist German Students' Union.

while those in SDS were all straight . . . K1 represented an alternative to the SDS line that there was going to be a revolution *sometime*."

Baumann was too impatient for that, and K1 had its special appeals: "For me, K1 was the right mix of politics and counterculture. It was political . . . and the people had a life-style, this collective living. Some concepts were totally new to me: the idea of changing yourself, your life-style, and your identity. Such thoughts were not around in Bohemian circles where everyone had his narcissism, or played out his own fantasy."

K1 offered other benefits over SDS: "If you had long hair, there was always an incredible number of chicks hanging onto you, all these factory girls. They thought it was great, a guy like that . . . Straight types were really out of it then. It was a really good time, better than today." One might note in passing that if Baumann's sociosexual observations are correct, at least one appeal to becoming a terrorist has probably faded by now, since relationships are more easily available nowadays to young men, even those who do not carry some sort of a romantic mantle.

It was at K1 that Baumann acquired his taste for terrorist action. "My first book was Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*, and then the biographies of anarchist bombers. Generally, anarchist stuff was what I read first, and also things like the *Communist Manifesto*. Violence seemed a perfectly suitable means, and I've never had any hang-ups about it . . . At any rate it was clear to me that revolution was a matter of violence . . . at some point you have to start, so you prepare yourself for it as soon as possible . . . violence in the political sphere was never a problem for me."

Once active, Baumann benefited from his instinctive resort to physical violence. "The students at that time had a lot of difficulty defending themselves against the pigs, simply because of their upbringing. I didn't have those problems; I always hit back when they tried to grab me. That's why I was never arrested at a demonstration." Three things are interesting in this passage. First, the worker, Baumann, who always lived by his fists, found himself better off than the students who hadn't; second, he again saw himself and the students as on the defensive—being attacked and made to defend themselves as best they could; and, finally, he who "always hit back" was never arrested, for that very reason.

But it was the personal fates of two other students that gave Baumann the principal impetus to become a terrorist and consolidated in his mind what had only been inchoate sympathies and ideas until that time.

When the Shah of Iran visited Berlin in June of 1967 and students and others demonstrated against the visit, a student named Benno

Ohnesorg was shot to death by a policeman. Baumann says, "When a perfectly harmless man like Ohnesorg was shot to death, that is really something . . . I had been with him only two days before it happened, and three days later stood next to his coffin. That gave me a tremendous *flash*, one cannot really describe it, it really shook me to the bones. I simply could not accept or understand that some idiot would kill such a totally unarmed person. When his coffin went by, it left an indelible impression."

The second event was an armed attempt on the student leader Rudi Dutschke, who survived the attack. Baumann says, "The bullet might just as well have been for me . . . I now felt I had been shot at for the first time. So it became clear to me . . . we must now fight without mercy . . ." Here again, we see the defensive posture.¹⁹

Then, during the demonstration for Dutschke which took place in many German cities following the attack, Baumann believed he saw widespread popular sympathies for his new cause and was greatly heartened because—according to him—during the fracas in Berlin even some policemen had given the students to understand that they were not altogether inimical to the students' efforts.

Thus Baumann launched himself on a career in terrorism that he abandoned some six years later when the group he had founded (the 2nd of June Movement) had virtually been forced to suspend operations, and when he also had come to doubt some of his own tenets.

Hans Joachim Klein. Hans Joachim Klein, the other German terrorist who eventually elected to defect and speak about his experiences,²⁰ did not spring from the working class. His father was a police officer of low rank, and while his family was no better off financially than that of a working man, his environment was culturally different. More importantly, Klein as a boy was no tough guy who used his fists on his job or in his hangouts; he was physically a seriously underdeveloped, weakish child. Although from a less affluent home than those terrorists who came from middle- and upper-class families, he apparently suffered no material deprivations as a boy. His emotional and mental suffering, on the other hand, was excruciating and may go a long way toward explaining why he chose to become a terrorist.

The son of a mother he never knew, Klein was endlessly and mercilessly beaten and abused by his psychopathic father, who locked him in his room at the slightest provocation or no provocation at all,

¹⁹ Similarly, Susan Stern states, "And pursuing us all, with dogged determination, was that grim reaper—the System."

²⁰ Klein gave a clandestine interview to the prominent German weekly *Das Spiegel* (August 7, 1978) and a similar interview to the French weekly *Liberation* (published in the 7/8 October 1978 and following issues).

even though—or perhaps because—the boy was so underdeveloped and weak. Klein's physical weakness may, in fact, have aroused the anger of the father who, being a police officer, may have been given to machismo. The father's brutality provided the first set of formative experiences in the boy's life and generated immense hatred and relentless hostility. Klein later stated, "I would never refer to this man as 'father'. The word 'father' will not come across my lips when I talk about him."

If the theory that terrorism is motivated, at least in part, by unconscious patricidal impulses unleashed against symbols of authority is correct, Klein's story would certainly be a case in point.

Klein relates his own road toward adulthood and terrorism as follows: "I was very weak physically and developed very late. At birth, I almost died. My mother, who was Jewish, died at Ravensbrueck concentration camp. But even that I did not learn from my old man [not an endearing term in German translation]. I learned it from a so-called teacher in a reform school, in front of everybody. I ran out crying."

"Even today, I know nothing about my mother. Not even where she was born. I always carry four pictures of her. I took these from an old photo album when I left home for good. The only nice time I ever had in my youth was with my foster parents. But when the old man got married again I had to go back to him. Once, when I was 15 years old, someone risked his life to save me after I had broken through the ice on a lake. Instead of being glad I was alive, the old man beat me half to death. Whatever the occasion, I received beatings or was made to go to bed. I was beaten with rolling pins, wooden ladles, cable."

"I took all this. What was I to do? I simply was afraid of that man. Every few days, especially Sundays, I was locked in my room. Once when I was 17, I was once again locked up in my room and next to me was my old man's parakeet. I felt sorry for the bird in his little cage and let him out and fly away. Only because I felt sorry, not because I wanted to do the old man dirt. But when he saw it, he beat me so badly I thought I was going to die. I soiled my pants and almost passed out." In a way this reveals a curious side of Klein: At the age of 17 he must have known that his act, even if motivated by pity, would bring down terrible punishment from his brutal father. One wonders whether some lack in Klein's sense of reality may have been at work here that later led to his terrorist activities.

Klein continued: "I once went to the authorities and showed them how I had been beaten. But what do such authorities do? I talked to a woman at the Youth Authority. I had confidence in her. Two days later I was sent to a reform school. And, once there for less than an hour, I was beaten up terribly. The 'educator' was a former carpenter.

After a year I escaped. Before I escaped they had placed me in a psychiatric ward, probably because of my slow development. They filled me up with hormones and drugs. Even at 17 I had no pubic hair, nor hair in my armpits. After I escaped from reform school, where could I go? So I went back to the old man. Now he began to lock me out. When I came home after 10 p.m., he did not let me into the house. I had to sleep in the cellar."

Then, at 20, Klein had a decisive experience: "Shortly before I joined the Army I had my first girl friend. She gave me a little neck chain and the old man ripped it off one day. Said it was effeminate. At that moment I hit him for the first time, a good wallop. From that moment on he no longer had the courage to touch me."

It is hard to overestimate the impact this event must have had on Klein. All his life he had been mistreated and degraded by his brutal, authoritarian father, for tiny infractions or no infractions at all. Suddenly, when Klein turned and attacked him, the father did not escalate the punishment, as one might expect—instead, he simply desisted and in fact seemed too cowed to ever touch the boy again. For Klein, that must have been a revelation, rightly or wrongly.

Klein continues: "I got into a leftist group when the student revolt started in Germany. I was 20 then; it was shortly before I joined the Army. My old man had always talked about the pigs in the most glowing terms. The police, he said, were to protect women, our mothers, and friends. In those days when the student revolt started, I wanted to see that for myself, as I was a curious person. Then, on that occasion, I saw the pigs behave atrociously. I saw how three of them beat up an 18-year-old girl."

This, reports Klein, was the second decisive experience for him, the first having been his successful rebellion against his father's tyranny. "At that moment, a world view of mine was destroyed at a blow. It was that those charged with protecting the weak beat one such feeble creature—all three of them. At that moment something clicked in me. I began to beat the pigs myself and was in turn beaten up by them. At that moment my illusion was gone."

"Thus I came into contact with those [revolutionary] groups. The first three months I didn't understand what on earth they were talking about. Then, I finally got up enough courage to go to a teach-in." The first thing Klein learned there, according to his report, was that the students smoked *Gitanes*, a very rough French cigarette. But he reports also that he gained "tremendous respect for university students," whom his old man, he says, only "regarded as radicals and troublemakers." Incidentally, this distinguishes Klein from Baumann, who had considerable disdain for the "bookworms."

"[Then] I [was drafted]. At first I wanted to refuse to join the Army. Once in it, I often was in the brig. I had put up an antimilitaristic

poster and distributed leaflets against militarism. But it was a long way from there to terrorism. We read a bit of Mao, and everybody interpreted Mao his way. We understood nothing. But at that time I made a lot of friends on the leftist scene."

"Even before the first bomb was thrown in Frankfurt, I had begun to sympathize with the urban guerrillas. I thought it was necessary to sing a different tune [from the rest of the German people]. I then adopted an entire ideology. I never accepted Ulrike Meinhof's statement that 'one can shoot any pig.' I never equated all policemen with my brutal old man. That would have been too cheap."

Klein reports that it also took "some time" for him to acquire his first pistol. After that he joined the "Red Help" in Frankfurt but quit again in mid-1973 because, as he says he told them, "nothing is happening, and you are only making pseudo-leftist politics and that is all."

But after having thus been in a state of suspended animation for a considerable time, Klein was activated by several experiences. The first was the sight of the policeman beating a young girl during a riot, after which he flew into an uncontrollable rage and assaulted the policeman; although he got himself beaten up, he did not suffer much ill effect. The second crucial influence was the fate of the German terrorist, Holger Meins. Meins, a member of the so-called Red Army Faction, had been arrested together with Andreas Baader and others during a shoot-out in Frankfurt on June 1, 1972. In prison since that arrest, Meins had gone on a hunger strike in September 1974 and died in prison on November 9, 1974. "I put that first pistol of mine into my pocket," reports Klein, "the night I heard Holger Meins had died in prison. At that point I got really excited. Comrades who had known me for a long time were barely able to stop me from undertaking some mad action. I had grabbed my pistol from my own weapons storage place—every Revolutionary Cell²¹ has such a storage place and false papers."

Klein's rising wrath over Holger Meins' death is another example of the never-ending chain of provocation and counterprovocation, with the terrorists regarding themselves as wronged and attacked at every turn, and entitled—if not obligated—to "take revenge."

Klein observes somewhat obscurely: "Today I see all this differently. There really was a person at one time who had received orders to croak in prison. It was not Holger Meins, but someone else. However, that person survived, fortunately. That person was told when he went to prison: 'You have to croak. We need a dead body.' Since then I find it really difficult to believe that Meins was simply an unfortunate

²¹ These are offshoots from the Baader-Meinhof gang.

victim of the 'system'." What Klein seems to insinuate here is that Meins may have been forced by his group to commit suicide in prison by going on the hunger strike, so that the group could gain new adherents and fire up old ones with the help of a martyr, a tactic (if indeed it was one) that worked only too well with Klein, who "grabbed his pistol and was barely able to be stopped from taking some mad action" when he heard about it.

Klein's terrorist activities continued. "The road to the OPEC action (1975) was still a long, continuing thing. First, there was my work with the legal Left. Then came the Vietnam movement. Then came the urban guerrilla work in Frankfurt, the occupation of houses. There we really battled the authorities."

Both Klein's and Baumann's stories, and those of others, thus bear out the observation that a person does not generally become a terrorist overnight. There is, rather, a long process of alienation, rebellion, and experimentation with a variety of social settings and political ideas, and only then a commitment to terrorist action and a clandestine life.

Kozo Okamoto. Kozo Okamoto, together with two companions, committed the assault on Lod Airport in Israel on May 30, 1972, in which 26 people died and 80 were wounded. He is the only survivor of that action, his two companions having been killed by police after they had mutilated their own faces so as to avoid identification. Okamoto has since been in an Israeli prison.²²

The youngest of six children, Okamoto was the son of a retired elementary school teacher and social worker. His father remarried after Okamoto's mother died of cancer in 1966. The father has stated that his two youngest boys were "extremely kind and impulsive boys who always rushed to help others in trouble."

Okamoto earned good grades in school but failed to gain entry into Kyoto University. Instead, he attended Kagoshima University near his home town in southwestern Japan, where he was a mediocre student.²³ At the time Okamoto was a student at the university, environmental pollution was the issue of the day. According to Steinhoff, he "viewed the problem as being so extensive, and so little understood, that the efforts of individual scientists dedicating their whole lives to its solution would not have an appreciable effect."

Okamoto belonged to a not-very-radical student movement and a middle-of-the-road peace organization. But he felt they were not accom-

²² Most of the following account is based on Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo Okamoto," *Asian Survey*, September 1976.

²³ Most young terrorists in Japan and elsewhere appear to have been university students, but most of them seem to have been only mediocre achievers.

plishing anything, and he was "looking for a comprehensive ideology that would link all the issues and offer a clear-cut solution."

Early in 1970, his brother Takeshi induced Okamoto to establish contact with the newly formed Red Army Faction. Later in the same year, some Red Army Faction members, including Takeshi, hijacked a plane and forced it to fly to North Korea, which accepted the hijackers. The Red Army Faction itself appears to espouse Trotsky's theory of a simultaneous, worldwide revolution in which the proletariat of the entire world must overthrow the bourgeoisie who rule individual nation states. (Thus the Red Army Faction in Japan, like that in Germany, has much larger aims than the PFLP,²⁴ for whom they carried out the Lod Airport massacre.)

Apparently, Okamoto did not mind the highly authoritarian structure of the Red Army Faction. Nor was he, as he told his interviewer, overly concerned with the finer points of ideology. The precise political rationale was not important to him, as long as it "encompassed his general political frustrations and his concerns about environmental pollution." He apparently also remained on friendly terms with his parents, who stood by him after the Lod attack. In fact, after his brother had hijacked the plane, Okamoto had a talk with his father and promised that he would not follow in his brother's footsteps.

This promise might well have been kept, as the Red Army Faction hardly ever made use of Okamoto's services. But in September 1971, he received a letter from the Red Army telling him that if he wanted to see his brother and get military training at the same time, he was to go to Beirut, Lebanon. Okamoto agreed to go, and his family states that they believe he went primarily to see his brother. As it turned out, the brother was not there. Thus, if he had not been Takeshi's brother, the Red Army might never have known him or called him to Beirut. So his participation in the airport massacre was, to some extent, accidental.

It should be added here that en route to Beirut, Okamoto was given an assignment. He was to fly from New York to Paris on an El Al 747 in order to reconnoiter the plane's interior configuration. But Okamoto failed in his assignment because he took a 707 by mistake. When he aroused suspicion by trying to change to the 747, he decided to go on the 707 instead. (This misadventure and the accidental way in which Okamoto was selected for a major job are indicative of the haphazard planning and execution of some terrorist actions, of which more is said below.)

But in addition to poor preparation, there was also evidence of unnecessary risk-taking in Okamoto's story. The false papers Okamoto

²⁴ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

was carrying on his trip to Lod Airport were made out in the name of Daisuke Namba, the actual name of a young man who had tried to assassinate Emperor Hirohito (then Crown Prince) in 1923. A romantic idea, perhaps, but an unnecessarily risky one.

After seven weeks of military training in Lebanon, Okamoto received the order to participate in the Lod Airport attack, and he accepted the assignment like a soldier. He told his interviewer that if he had been asked instead to assassinate President Nixon or do something for the IRA, he would have agreed just as readily, as these were all acts for the revolution.

After the Lod massacre, when Okamoto was arrested, he showed no regret and did not try to aid his personal cause in the trial that followed. On the contrary, he interfered with his lawyer's efforts to get him a lighter sentence than he eventually received. At first, during the investigation, Okamoto had refused to talk at all. When a high-ranking officer offered to give Okamoto his pistol to commit suicide with in return for first talking freely, Okamoto agreed. But both reneged on the deal: Okamoto never talked freely, and the officer never gave him the pistol.

When confronting the tribunal, Okamoto said that he did not recognize the modern system of justice administered by national states, and that the trial only had meaning for him as a propaganda forum for the proletariat revolution against the bourgeoisie. He concluded his speech with the following passage: "When I was a child, I was told that when people died they became stars . . . We three Red Army soldiers wanted to become Orion when we died. And it calms my heart to think that all the people we killed will also become stars in the same heavens. As the revolution goes on, how the stars will multiply!"

There is a very curious thought in this passage. Whereas most terrorists think of their victims as enemy soldiers about whom they need not feel guilty, Okamoto kept himself from feeling guilt by convincing himself that his victims actually benefited by the act waged against them, that they became stars. In fact, victims and killers both become stars, in Okamoto's view, united and peaceful in the firmament.

Okamoto says that throughout his brief career as a terrorist, he never clearly understood what the "revolution" would or should ultimately produce. He stated that he was not certain what society would be like after the revolution. When questioned about this, he is reported to have smiled and said, "That is the most difficult question for revolutionaries. We really do not know what it will be like."

This, of course, distinguishes him from the more "conventional" Communist revolutionaries, but in fact it also distinguishes him from the radical Trotskyites.

Zvonko Basic. Under the impact of frequent warfare, national boundaries in Europe have shifted back and forth, with the result that there are many ethnic and cultural groups that want to secede from those who rule them and who force them to submit to their language, education, customs, and police. Some of these irredentists have used terror to further their cause in Ireland, France, and Spain. Behind the Iron Curtain, where countries are virtually polka-dotted with ethnic minorities of one kind or another, such separation seems not to have occurred to any large extent; apparently the Soviet government and its local allies have maintained quite an effective lid on such tendencies.

One particularly violent and passionate irredentist group is the Croats who remain fiercely unreconciled to being part of the Communist Yugoslav state that was created after World War II. But the climate for terrorism is so unfavorable in Communist countries, even in Yugoslavia, that those bent on pursuing their nationalist aims by violence have been active mostly in the West, primarily in West Germany, where Croat terrorists and official representatives of Yugoslavia have been killing each other for some time.

Zvonko Basic is such a Croat, and even though he went a somewhat different route than some of the other Croats in his battle against the Yugoslav government, his one big terrorist act—sparked, as he asserts, by the most benign intentions—nevertheless killed one man, blinded another, wounded yet another, and jeopardized the lives of many.

Basic's act was the hijacking in 1976 of a TWA airliner in New York, along with his wife and three other Croats, and the placing of bombs in Grand Central Station in New York, together with a note to the police telling them where the bombs were and how to disarm them. Basic had managed to bring aboard the aircraft 100,000 leaflets demanding Croatia's independence, which he wanted to launch over New York, Montreal, and Croatia itself. His means of coercion aboard the plane were fake bombs, and his means to attain credibility were the real bombs he had planted in New York. The plane was safely returned to New York with none of the passengers harmed, but one of the real bombs Basic had planted in New York exploded upon being found by the police, killing one, blinding one, and wounding another.

Basic grew up in a poor Croatian village in a region where neither Croatian history nor the Croatian language was permitted in the schools.²⁵

²⁵ This account is excerpted from a paper by Jeanne N. Knutson, of the Wright Institute at Berkeley, who interviewed Basic. See "Social and Psychodynamic Pressures Toward a Negative Identity: The Case of an American Revolutionary-Terrorist."

Busic reports that as a boy he became a fervent student of the forbidden science of Croatian history, and that the great Croatian patriot Stephan Radic, murdered by the Serbians, became his hero. Busic's father, whom the son describes as a deeply religious man, was not as avid a patriot; neither was his mother, who had "very little knowledge of Croatian history" and was also very religious and "very narrow." Busic was a good student and was therefore much appreciated by his parents, who were "quite shocked" when Busic committed his act. Busic says: "[They were] not completely surprised [however]; they knew me; they knew I was dedicated. In some strange way they are proud of me."

Busic added that it was the particular nature of his deed that produced this semiapproving response from his parents: "If, for example, I [had done] something for my personal gain, for God's sake, *stole* something . . . my family would reject me completely." If Busic reads his parents correctly, this is another example of the curious phenomenon of the terrorist crime, *per se*, being something honorable, or at least not dishonorable, even in the eyes of those who are "deeply religious" and certainly not terrorists. Even though his crime left one man dead, one blinded, and one wounded, his actions, according to Busic, are regarded by his parents as less evil than a common theft. This indicates that not only do the terrorists not regard their acts as criminal, they feel that others share their view. Busic says: "They [my parents] know that the act itself was [done] out of love and, uh, I believe even they, themselves, in some way . . . feel proud of it." This curious passage is paralleled by the statements of Michael Baumann, who also insists that it was love for mankind that drove him to terrorism.

Busic studied at the university but felt uncomfortable because of anti-Croatian feelings there. He went to Austria, learned German, and enrolled at the University of Vienna (again, he was not a particularly successful student). At that time, Busic wanted to become an "educated man," not a political activist. But in Vienna he had financial problems, so he quit, "forgot my schooling," and came to the United States. He could not resume his studies because he did not know English, so he took a job in a tool factory, trying to save some money to study later. But after 14 months he was laid off, together with others.

After several weeks of collecting unemployment insurance, Busic "got sick of it" and returned to Vienna, trying once again to study at the university. But Busic had been in trouble in Cleveland and had been convicted on a gun charge that grew out of a petty incident and his new habit of carrying a gun for "self defense." He had also become involved in anti-Yugoslav activities, and the incident had earned him

an anti-Yugoslav reputation in various circles, which made him afraid. As a result of his reputation, he says, he was expelled from the university and from Austria, which he felt was a "great injustice." By then (1971) Basic had been living for years with a girl from Oregon whom he had met in Vienna. He continued a nomadic existence with the girl, going first to Berlin, then to Ireland where he met some IRA leaders, then back to Frankfurt. There a Croat friend of his was assassinated and Basic feared a similar attempt on his own life.

In 1972 he returned to Oregon with his girlfriend, where he engaged in menial labors while the girl, the daughter of a professor and a teacher herself, lived in a university atmosphere. At that point, the idea of hijacking an airplane occurred to him: "... hijacking an airplane was some kind of escape for me personally ... from the miserable situation I was living in." Yet he says, "It never occurred to me that I could ... take the life of another person."

The purpose of the hijacking, other than personal escape, was "to brighten [Croat patriotic] ideas, keep hopes alive, calm down people, make them aware ... because these Croatian people in the United States, Canada, and these countries are quite simple and uneducated people They cannot read the newspapers of these countries It's just a pretty desperate life I felt that myself when I came to Germany and when I came to the United States, when I met these difficulties, for example, with the language, the society you came in, to adjust ... it is extremely hard."

The above passage, being almost incoherent, gives the impression that Basic suffers from some enormous confusion in which the fate of Croatia, the fate of Croatians abroad, his own fate, and various other factors are shifting back and forth in kaleidoscopic fashion. Later in the interview, Basic added another factor to the reasons for his terrorist actions: "I feared for my life quite a bit ... I was some kind of paranoid." All these fears centered around retaliation against him for his anti-Yugoslav views, a fear which, in view of Yugoslav activity in Western Europe and perhaps even the United States, cannot be regarded as entirely without foundation.

Basic also stressed that he intended the act of hijacking to be extremely humane. According to the interviewer, he meant the act to be entirely bloodless, without loss of human life, all done with fake bombs only; and he indicated that even the live bombs planted on the ground were made as safe as possible against accidental detonation. The fact that one of them later exploded anyway, causing death and great physical injury, was eventually attributed by Basic to the cunning work of the Yugoslav secret police—a mental tour de force designed to let Basic's conscience off the hook, but which he apparently firmly believes in.

Busic explains his reasons for taking fake bombs on the plane as follows: "... the behavior of various people in different situations is ... very unpredictable, so I couldn't risk at all having real explosives with the people, even with my closest friends who were following my orders ... I wouldn't trust them ... I care so much about human life ... I couldn't put ... human life of these passengers into another person's hands ... it's against my principles." Continuing along these lines, Busic's interview again becomes virtually incoherent: "In this desperate situation ... I took responsibility and blame for myself ... to endanger temporarily the lives ... of people but I believed that after the danger was over, they would discover that there was no real danger ... however they did experience fear and anger, but I thought after I explained to them ... either on the plane or later in court, they would somehow forgive me, at least partially, if not forgive me, then understand me, because I did not demand much patience of people, but I do ask for and expect understanding."

Horst Mahler. In addition to the personal testimonies of the four terrorists discussed above, there is available an interview with Horst Mahler, a co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang. Mahler was sentenced to 14 years in prison in 1972 and thus has by now served over half of his sentence. He told his story in an interview with an American journalist²⁶ and thus the information presented here is, again, his own view, not the description or analysis of an outsider.

Mahler told the interviewer that his road to the rejection of social order in Germany began with his anger over his father's acceptance, or more precisely, his denial of the Nazi crimes committed during World War II. Mahler had then embraced Lenin's thesis that capitalism must in the end turn fascist and imperialist. He saw the Vietnam War as one more proof of this and decided that he and others had to fight against bourgeois materialism, expansionist imperialism, and conformity in West German society. He felt that direct action was all the more important, since he and his peers criticized their own parents' generation for having stood idly by when the Nazis committed their deeds.

At first, said Mahler, the violence he and the Baader-Meinhof gang practiced was directed only at objects. But "we were quite aware of the fact that if we wanted to fight with arms, it would be necessary to kill ... Of course, it was not 'the people,' the little man who is innocent [of] any repression that we would kill. The main point in our struggle was to be some kind of sabotage and punishment of responsible person-ages for cruelties against the people."

²⁶ Elizabeth Pond, *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 29, 1978.

Thus Mahler, like the other terrorists interviewed, assumed a defensive, retaliatory posture—the terrorist seeing himself not as the aggressor, but as the avenger of evil and the liberator of those who have been and are being wronged by society, himself included. Mahler also told the interviewer that “the intention was to provoke the state to blatant counterrepression that would turn the population against it [the state],” thereby articulating a strategy that has been voiced by other (but not all) terrorist groups.

Mahler, who eventually refused to leave prison when given the chance in the course of the kidnapping of conservative West Berlin mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz by the 2nd of June Movement, does not shed much light on his own road to terrorism beyond what is reported here. He is reported to be still wrestling with methods of how to “force a purpose out of an affluent society and a wrong past.” But, like some other ex-terrorists, he has come to believe, according to what he told the interviewer, that “violence is not the way.”

Common Traits

Much has been said and written about the reasons behind the decision to join a terrorist group. Less attention has been paid to a fact that emerges clearly from the five case histories described above: Strictly speaking, there are not one but two decisions involved—to break with bourgeois society, and to join a terrorist group. The two are not synonymous or synchronous. A person can, for any number of reasons, break with bourgeois society without becoming a terrorist; he or she can instead become a monk or a nun, a soldier, a derelict on skid row, a hermit, a political radical, a criminal, a “dropout.” A person can do that because he or she is bored or indignant, lazy, devoted to a religion, or mentally disturbed. Many people “drop out” without becoming terrorists. To become a terrorist, a person has to reject society, but he or she has to be motivated by more than that: The would-be terrorist also needs the desire to actively fight that society with violence, inside a like-minded group.²⁷

Disillusionment with the humdrum nature of ordinary daily work and with law-enforcement individuals was also for some a conscious causative factor for rejecting society. Young people who later turned terrorists have, of course, cited other reasons as well for their disillusionment. Some have pointed to a combination of anger against the excessively materialist orientation of society and against a political system in which economic concerns were paramount. One of Germa-

²⁷ Since the *group* is so essential in our definition of terrorism, it might be said that terrorism is a group—rather than an individual—running amok.

ny's most famous and effective terrorists, Ulrike Meinhof, who later committed suicide in prison at the age of 41, violently denounced the "caviar gorging" in which, she said, her family and other friends engaged, i.e., their excessive materialistic hedonism. (Ex-terrorist Hans Joachim Klein, when asked whether the notorious Carlos had told him anything about his stay in Moscow, replied with heavy sarcasm, "Yes. I am now acquainted with the subtle difference between Beluga and Malossol caviar.")

Finally, even such prosaic elements as special skills may be a factor in the decision to join a group. Klein had been trained in the German army as a specialist in explosives—a rare and, of course, valued skill. This may also have played a role in the decision of Andreas Baader²⁸ to join a terrorist group (and in the decision of others to accept him). Baader was a "weapon nut"; his favorite reading was a weapons journal, and he had, in the words of his colleagues, an "almost sexual relationship" with weapons. He also had other "operational" skills which made him welcome in a group composed largely of intellectuals such as Meinhof. And the fact of being welcome somewhere appears to be as strong a motive for a potential terrorist as his own desire to join.

This points up two facts that may have received insufficient attention: A person does not simply join a terrorist group the way one joins most other kinds of groups. Nor is one routinely *accepted* by a terrorist group. The would-be terrorist must first be acceptable to what, in an inverse way, is a very choosy, elite, and special organization. But the mere possession of one of the skills the group needs may make entry easier, and may therefore also make it more tempting.

This might explain why so few people who "drop out" of society become terrorists. Even those who have the will may not have the skills, the personality, or the opportunity. Conversely, people who "drop out" from society and who do have the skills sought by terrorist groups are much more likely to wind up as terrorists. (This would indicate that it is much less risky for a firm to fire a disgruntled stenographer or statistician than a disgruntled weapons specialist or security expert.)

Thus, terrorists apparently join because:

- After having turned away from society, they decide to combat that society, again for a variety of reasons ranging from simple revenge to millennialist and utopian fantasies.
- They are given a chance to join, i.e., they are wanted and accepted and perhaps recruited for their skills, their intellectual

²⁸ Of the Baader-Meinhof gang.

capacities, or their affinity to the group, or for some other reason.

In other words, there is an intricate mix of motivations for joining.²⁹

The Satisfaction of the Terrorist Life

Although reasons for individual terrorists to stay in a group are varied, two principal motivations emerge from the testimony of former group members: Some like the "cause"; others like the "life"; some, of course, like both. Curiously enough, the life—as distinct from the dangers it involves—seems to be reason enough for some to leave again, when leaving is still possible. According to one ex-terrorist, it is the freedom from all routines and conventions that some new members cannot endure.

Baumann describes a period when his group roamed the city of Berlin, sleeping in a different place every night, having no duties and no possessions, and socializing in certain bars, as a "really happy time." This total renunciation of all bourgeois standards and conventions apparently gives group members (much as it does some habitual criminals) a certain invulnerability to the emotional trauma of arrest and incarceration; being jailed does not matter very much to them, as there is no loss of face or reputation involved, and release often follows quickly. In fact, some group members consider being arrested as a chance to play jokes on the "system." On one occasion, for example, a convicted man walked out of court and an acquitted man stayed behind, which was possible because both were heavily bearded and wore spectacles. It also affords some terrorist group members the important opportunity to become martyrs. Members also take care of each other, not just economically but in other ways: If a member collapses from excessive drug use or is wounded in a shoot-out, there are "safe" houses and even doctors, or at least people with rudimentary medical knowledge, at his disposal.

The nomadic life-style of terrorist groups apparently has a strong appeal for some individuals but not for others. Some of the terrorists interviewed indicated that because of this nomadic existence and because of the nature of the self-imposed task, there was no "progress"

²⁹ Despite fundamental differences between contemporary terrorists and the Viet Cong, there are interesting parallels in the motivations of those who joined what was, if not a terrorist organization, at least a guerrilla force. The decision to join was often accidental, often triggered by events such as government soldiers stealing a man's chickens or ducks. In general, the reasons for joining were a peculiar mixture of four elements: admiration for Ho Chi Minh; rejection of all Westerners after the French experience, and a desire for "national independence"; personal antagonism toward government soldiers; and plain coercion by Viet Cong recruiters.

an individual could make in a group. Living from day to day, whether any action took place or not, the group members had the opposite of the bourgeois life: They did not advance in the ranks, amass property, accumulate learning, or form families.

Aside from the "freedom," life in a terrorist group appears to provide many satisfactions for those electing this existence. First and foremost, the desire for "action" is at least intermittently fulfilled. The desire for effective—or at least noticeable—action appears to be one of the prime motivations of terrorists. And, according to some of those interviewed, one of their major objections to their parents and other members of the older generation is that even when those older persons object to social or political conditions, they do not "act." The terrorists also feel that conventional channels for bringing about change are clogged. This makes *instant action* all the more appealing, and for a terrorist the way to such action is not barred, as it so often is in bourgeois life or in the curriculum of a community revolutionary.³⁰

There are other satisfactions as well for individuals in a terrorist group. According to the sources, one of those satisfactions is money—lots of it. As a group becomes more efficient in financing itself through bank robberies, it thrives financially. Moreover, if it is effective, it may receive support from groups in the Middle East. This increasing affluence appears to have great rewards. Not only does it keep the members from the drudgery of daily jobs, things such as getaway cars or radio receivers that were once necessities can now be acquired in greater numbers and better quality, for their own sake. Members of the Baader-Meinhof gang have described how they engaged in the same *Dolce Vita*, complete with champagne and delicacies, that had disgusted them in bourgeois society;³¹ and Baumann states that once the money came rolling in, some of his terrorist colleagues displayed a penchant for velvet suits and similar luxuries, until they looked "fresh out of *Playboy*." Baumann did not like this, but he reports that many of his former colleagues did.

Xenophilia

One frequent trait of individual terrorists appears to be a strong xenophilia, which may underlie the protest against a traditional society that always tends to be somewhat xenophobic. To some extent, this xenophilia may be the result of the particularly narrow circum-

³⁰ Terrorism is, in a sense, "instant action." In that sense, terrorism can be regarded as a truly "contemporary" phenomenon.

³¹ See I. David Truby, "Women as Terrorists," *Clandestine Tactics and Technology*, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1976, p. 30.

stances in which some terrorists grew up and which they eventually broke out of with explosive force. Not only do most terrorists seem to admire Castro or Mao or Che Guevera, even though they themselves may be German or Italian or otherwise culturally or ethnically far removed from these men, they also believe that they are carrying the banner for the "common" people of every nation. Baumann reports that his group had long given up fighting for the welfare of the German workers who (1) never responded to them but on the whole despised terrorists, and (2) were living in such affluent circumstances, relatively, that they had become members and beneficiaries of the capitalist system. The terrorist struggle, says Baumann, is now for the oppressed people in the Third World.³²

Insensitivity

Like other revolutionaries or utopians, the terrorist seems to be hypersensitive to the sufferings and injustices of the world at large, but totally insensitive to immediate, palpable suffering directly around him, especially if he has produced it himself.

For example, Zvonko Basic, who was so concerned about the suffering of his fellow Croatians, expressed surprise and dismay that the police officers who had been wounded while dismantling the bomb he had planted were intensely hostile to him. Terrorists around the world have inflicted grievous suffering to which they themselves seem impervious.

For some terrorists, this appears to be a natural posture, but for others, at least according to Emile Ajar, a French novelist and close observer of the contemporary scene, it is necessary to undergo some conditioning. Ajar suggests that terrorists have killed for the very purpose of inuring themselves, and he cites the killing of Aldo Moro as such an exercise:³³

I have a friend who says that the members of the Red Brigades have killed Moro in order to desensitize (*desensibiliser*) themselves. You understand?

No.

In order to desensitize themselves. In order to get to a point where one no longer feels anything. To arrive at Stoicism.

So?

It's not for me!

She laughed.

That's because you are not literate enough. You don't have a theory. Or, to talk the way you do, you are not enough of a theorist to get to that

³² Op. cit., p. 94.

³³ Emile Ajar, *L'Angoisse Du Roi Salmon*, Mercure de France, 1979, p. 252.

point. For that, one must have reflected a great deal. For that, one needs a system.

The peculiar insensitivity of some terrorist individuals is perhaps best documented by the assertion of Michael Baumann that for some time he and his colleagues regarded Charles Manson as "a real fun fellow."

Plagued People

While there is a large body of theoretical and analytical writing on how terrorist individuals feel about themselves, there is a paucity of such information from primary sources. From the little that is available, it would appear that self-impressions run the gamut from happy-go-lucky adventurism to black despair.

The seemingly irrepressible Michael Baumann, who attained notoriety as a bomber and founder of the 2nd of June Movement—which was more dedicated to violence than even the Baader-Meinhof gang—had, according to his own testimony, a great time while in the terrorist fold. He reports in his book that he thoroughly enjoyed life on the other side of the fence from bourgeois society. There was money, action, and adventure in eluding or otherwise fooling the authorities, and challenge in the building and planting of bombs. There also was abundant sexual opportunity; having a reputation as tough and daring fellows, Baumann and some of his companions received the loving attentions of "hordes of teenagers in knee stockings from nearby schools."

Baumann states emphatically in his book that this was better than working, any time: "I mean, I always preferred running after a girl than running after some job, naturally; you get more out of it, and so does she!"

Later, Baumann took up with a strikingly beautiful young German girl of Irish descent, a factory worker whom he converted to terrorism. Within a short time this girl excelled in executing arson jobs all by herself, her success undoubtedly enhanced by her engaging and disarming appearance. Baumann was, he states, the "man in her life," even though he was at the same time also the man in another girl's life (also a gang member). Baumann's letters from jail to the first girl, detailing his philosophy of life and his political convictions, reveal a relationship as serious as those found in the letters of other separated lovers. Baumann states, however, that his was not necessarily a typical situation. He tells that other males in the gang had "no women" for very long periods of time and suffered great tension as a result. He does not explain why some of his colleagues had to suffer this frustration. It seems to confirm, however, that individual

terrorists can be quite different from each other in their ability to obtain satisfaction and to have interpersonal relations.

Hans Joachim Klein, clearly an unhappy man, gives only a small glimpse into his personal feelings about himself. He relates in one of the interviews that he spent the eve of the attack on the OPEC ministers' conference—his birthday—all alone and miserable.

Although the extent to which most terrorists are plagued by their own personalities is not known, some clearly are. Susan Stern, who left the Weather Underground after many years in the group and died at an early age, had this to say about her ex-husband and co-Weatherman:

[He] was *obsessed* (emphasis supplied) with aspects of Weathermen politics. Everything was counterrevolutionary, bourgeois, defeatist, individualistic, and uncollective. As violently as he had railed against Weathermen just a few weeks before, that's how . . . he harped away at everyone he met until it was impossible to be near him He muttered constantly about doom and destruction Nervous, paranoid, insecure, yet driven by his despair, he seized on Weathermen as an opiate for his heartbreak. Nothing could kill such a pain; it only drove him deeper into a pit.³⁴

And about herself, she tells of the relentless nymphomania that possessed her:

My sexual desires came from a different part of me than my revolutionary ideals Many times I grimaced the morning after sleeping with some sleazy wreck of a man. But I had long ago given up trying to understand my sexual whimsy. It drove me relentlessly, out of control, sick and insatiable, and all I could do was feed it ³⁵

Whether this affliction was instrumental in her renouncing the bourgeois world with its conventions and taking up the fight against it, we cannot tell.

Why Do They Quit?

Very little is known about why men or women who have joined a terrorist organization leave it again, mainly because there are so few who have done so.

Two of the people treated in this paper left of their own accord and are now living in the twilight zone between their former colleagues who would probably kill them if they could and the authorities who would imprison them if they could, but they did not leave for the same reasons. Klein left because he objected to the use of "unneces-

³⁴ Stern, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-247.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

sary" violence and to the criticism he received for having spared some lives during the OPEC raid. He does not say how much the near-fatal gun wound he received during that raid contributed to his decision.

Baumann left for more pragmatic reasons: His group suffered the same fate as the Baader-Meinhof gang, with the German authorities ultimately getting the better of them, until "there was really little left we could do." This ended whatever cohesion the group had, and it fell apart. This does not mean, however, that Baumann did not also go through some conversion of mind, either before or after he ceased being active. In a turgidly written annex to his book, entitled *Terror or Love*, Baumann presents the view that terror results from people being unable to express their love for their fellow men except in violent, revolutionary endeavors, but that that is not the right way, and that such love can and should be expressed more directly and constructively.

Baumann also relates one curious detail: When he was first on the construction job, he felt nothing but contempt for all his co-workers, including an older man, a highly skilled carpenter who lovingly and expertly worked on wooden roofs. Baumann saw in him just an old fool who was being exploited by the capitalist system and who had no reason to be proud of his work. Baumann later changed his mind and came to believe that this man's work was indeed valuable, satisfying, and worthy of pride. Such a view would of course conflict with what most terrorists probably believe and could contribute to alienation from one's terrorist colleagues or even expulsion from the fold.

In Baumann's case, there was another pragmatic reason for quitting in addition to the "problem" of reduced opportunities and even fewer targets: a definite reduction in the number of sympathizers. Baumann says that the number of sympathizers was diminishing in the seventies, with many of those saying, "All they [the terrorists] are nowadays are criminals who rob banks, live in expensive apartments, and drive around in expensive cars." As a result, says Baumann, "the Red Army Faction started a crazy bombing campaign" in order to recoup their reputation as a serious political group. But by doing that, "they made the same mistake, only on a larger scale, that we had made two years earlier. Instead of throwing bombs against selected targets, they suddenly threw them against God knows whom—the police, the Americans, some judges. As a result, big mistakes occurred . . . workers were killed. All this led to a change of public opinion and then to a really big loss of sympathizers . . . people no longer supported the terrorists."³⁶ This, for Baumann, was the end.

³⁶ Baumann, op. cit., p. 129.

Thus, of the five terrorists examined here, one quit because the job had run its course; one quit because he disagreed on the use of violence and fell into disgrace over it; and three are in prison. Of those in prison, one (Mahler) gives evidence that he would no longer be a terrorist if he were to be freed (he refused to be "pressed free" in the course of a terrorist action), because he has had a change of heart on the use of violence. One (Busic) appears to be enough of a monomaniac to continue, probably, if he had the chance. And one (Okamoto) appears to be the type who would do what he was told in the pursuit of such "good causes" as environmentalism or whatever else was presented.

THE TERRORIST GROUP

Leadership

Hierarchical structures or the division of group members into generals and soldiers appear to be less pronounced among terrorists than in, say, the Mafia. Sometimes there are definite leaders in a group, sometimes not. Any individual action, however, always seems to have a leader.

Only a few glimpses into this aspect of the terrorist group emerge from the interviews. The notorious Carlos, unquestionably one of the leaders (although he is said by Hans Joachim Klein to have retired from terrorism in return for a vast sum of money from an unnamed Arab sponsor), "is a man of tremendous solidarity [with his fellows] but also has a definite 'boss' demeanor. He has a leader mentality." Klein responded to questions about Carlos as follows:

- Q:** Does Carlos have a political concept?
- K:** A political concept? In any event, he knows a lot about politics.
- Q:** What does he think of the Soviet Union? Of Communism?
- K:** In my presence he never talked about it.

But as a leader, Carlos had some special prerogatives. According to Klein, Carlos was the one who shot the two OPEC ministers on the plane ("It is customary that the leader does that"). He also was the one who decided that Klein had to emplane with the rest of them in Vienna after he was so badly wounded, even though a doctor had said he would not live if transported. And it was Carlos who, it had been agreed, "would finish me off if it should turn out that I was paralyzed."

As a leader, Carlos emerges from Klein's description as fearless (at least outwardly), debonair ("he loved Hilton Hotels"), ruthless ("Car-

los took the pistol and shot the man in the shoulder . . . then . . . he finished him off." "With seven more shots?" "Yes, in order to establish an example.") Carlos was, according to Klein, obsessed with personal hygiene and greatly distressed about having a rather prominent bosom formation. (We have no information as to whether he might have had homosexual tendencies.) But there is no question that he was in charge: He personally gave the signal for the OPEC operation to begin, and he took weapons and everything else away from Klein when Klein was wounded.

On a different (and higher level), such as is attributed to an Arab terrorist leader known as Dr. Waddi Haddad,³⁷ leadership apparently works quite differently.

K: He [Haddad] has the ideas and then he charges people with the planning. OPEC and Entebbe are his work.

He "never goes on an operation" himself, but "without Haddad nothing happens." In addition, Haddad is described as the great coordinator among groups and the man who obtained financial contributions (and made disbursements) in the grand style. It thus appears that, as in other organizations, leadership style and leaders are very different on different levels. However, they do not seem to be strictly authoritarian.

Planning of Operations

The planning of even so important and grandiose an undertaking as the attack on the OPEC ministers' conference was surprisingly haphazard, according to Klein's account.

In the first place, the group might have missed out altogether in their attempt had the conference not been extended unexpectedly. "Officially, the conference was to close on Saturday, but then it took another day. That is why we moved everything to Sunday. That was very opportune for us because we were not fully prepared. There was a tremendous problem, as a matter of fact: Our weapons arrived very, very late, only Friday night."

Klein was quite a novice in several ways. "It was the first time I crossed borders with fake papers." Why, then, was he selected?

Q: How can one explain that you, at that time without experience in terrorist activities, were immediately drawn into such a complicated and spectacular affair?

³⁷ Dr. Waddi Haddad, who is reported to have died sometime in 1978 in East Berlin, was one of the founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the more radical wing of the PLO. Haddad allegedly also founded the Special Operations Branch of the PFLP, which is credited with a variety of commando and other actions during the past few years (*Liberation*, October 4, 1978).

- K:** I . . . was the only one who had served in the German army and was able to deal with the whole range of stuff, weapons and explosives. Actually, the people selected for the OPEC operations were meant to be trained first in an Arab country, but there was no longer time for it.

It is really quite astonishing that an operation of such daring and magnitude was undertaken without training or rehearsal.

There were also unresolved language difficulties. "When Carlos arrived, we discussed the whole plan. Boese [another member of the group] translated for me. At that time I did not know English yet." Then, after the attack, "the people were standing with their faces against the wall. All this was very complicated because I did not know any English. I only kept shouting: 'Jacket out! Jacket out!' (which is a poorly Anglicized German way of saying, "Take off your jackets"). Why did Klein not talk German in Vienna, even to the secretary who kept phoning? "I didn't want them to know I was German."

There was disagreement among members on the crucial question of who was to be killed. When asked if it had been agreed before the action when there was to be shooting and in what cases, Klein replied,

Surely, but there we had some disagreements. Carlos [who led this operation] said that anyone trying to get out of the building had to be shot because otherwise the pigs would learn what was going on inside.

To Klein, this reasoning was not compelling:

After all, we sent people out ourselves (during the negotiations), so the pigs could learn it (what went on inside) anyway.

Apparently this conflict was never resolved, and in fact Klein did not shoot a wounded Iraqi guard who tried to leave. Another member of the group shot and killed him.

The march route to the conference, according to Klein, was a "joke." Klein was asked how it was possible to get to the conference building with the heavy load of arms and equipment the team was carrying:

- K:** Yes, that was a problem. Probably the Vienna police are still trying to figure out in what vehicle we went to the OPEC headquarters. Actually, we went on the tram to the very door.
- Q:** The entire commando team went on the tram?
- K:** Yes, it was in one tram. It was a funny picture. We were hardly able to sit down because of all the stuff we were carrying, and the conductor looked at us

Whether this was a stroke of brilliant improvisation or inept planning that turned out, by luck, to have been successful is hard to say. It does, in any event, smack of haphazard preparations.

The way in which the two oil ministers targeted to die were to be killed received only cursory attention:

Q: How were these two ministers to be killed?

K: En route. Not in Vienna *It was discussed only briefly* (emphasis added). Carlos was supposed to do that himself, waste those two. That is customary that the leader does that.

Considering the gravity of the assault, not only was the planning quite haphazard, the whole action appeared to take place in a climate of insouciance.

Q: Did [Carlos] take special precautions [in Vienna] to remain unrecognized?

K: No. He was quite fearless.

Q: How did the discussions go? Were there any worries?

K: No concerns were expressed

Considering that it was awkward for several reasons (language, inexperience) for Germans to participate in this action, why did the Palestinians not attack OPEC by themselves?

K: The Palestinian leader, Haddad . . . wants to get something for his money.

According to Klein, Haddad gave some \$3,000 a month plus weapons to German terrorists, especially the Revolutionary Cells, so he wanted to get a return, even if there was an added risk.

As for the always vexing question of the true purpose of such operations, that, too, seems to have been somewhat vague:

Q: What political purpose did the OPEC action actually have?

K: The purpose was to sharpen the contradictions in the Arab world and to strengthen the Palestinian resistance. Palestinians had been liquidated again in Lebanon and quite a few had also died in Jordan. As far as I was concerned, this was an operation in support of the Palestinian freedom fight.

Q: What did the plan look like?

K: First, we capture the oil ministers. Then we return everyone to his country, but before he is freed he must read a pro-Palestinian declaration. But the Iranian oil minister Amouzegar, and Yamani of Saudi Arabia, were to be killed Money was not an objective The plan was to read this declaration openly in Vienna . . . [then] to leave Vienna quickly. Nobody was supposed to understand what was really happening other than that a few crazy Arabs were running around there. Only after we were in the air was the real political part of the plan going to go into effect.

Target Selection

If the execution and planning of terrorist operations can be quite haphazard, so, apparently, can target selection. Three examples of this target selection process are described below.

Dr. Waddi Haddad, the man who has often been considered the top leader of all terrorist organizations, is reported to have once selected as his target a fabulously rich Arab named El-Tadchir who resided in London (according to Klein, El-Tadchir was worth \$14 billion). The idea, says Klein, who was in London at the time (spring of 1975), was to kidnap the man and "get 40 to 50 million dollars from him." Carlos and others were to be in on it, but the whole thing failed to materialize.

K: The necessary information that we were supposed to get from a diplomat never reached us. In fact, only three weeks later did we see Tadchir for the first time in front of his house in Kensington, with two bodyguards. He was traveling constantly. Carlos then canceled the enterprise.

A still wilder target selection—this one apparently decided on by the middle echelons and without Haddad's knowledge—was the Pope.

K: The "2nd June Movement" wanted to kidnap the Pope. That was April 1976. The "Holy Father" was staked out very carefully for an entire month He was to be kidnapped for the purpose of springing German prisoners from the RAF and the "2nd of June."

But the entire operation was eventually vetoed by Haddad, according to Klein. Haddad is reported to have said that "if you kidnap the Pope, you commit suicide No Arab country can officially tolerate that you run around free after that." This, apparently, is a target constraint.

The third example of target selection reveals the sensitivity of the terrorist to the publicity value of an action, or, perhaps more precisely, to its publicity potential.

K: We convened and asked ourselves . . . what would be an action that no one can disregard, that everyone must talk about [in the media] and report on? We found it: A bomb exploding in the Jewish community house—on the very anniversary of the so-called Kristallnacht [Crystal Night, one of Hitler's most infamous and destructive anti-Jewish raids, in 1938] Even though the bomb did not explode, this story went halfway around the world.

Q: What political considerations played a role there?

K: We looked for a focal point where everything would come together: the Germans still wrestling with their past; the newly arising Palestine problem; a starting gun for an urban guerrilla fight. Such an action could not be disregarded by anyone, from liberals to old Nazis. Simply everyone had to take note, even abroad.

The final example of target selection is not so haphazard, and it is evidence of the feeling of ineffectualness described further below.³⁸

Woe Unto Defectors

Both Klein and Baumann report that all groups regarded it as a matter of course that defectors be done away with.

- Q:** Had the group discussed what was to be done with defectors?
B: Sure. Kill them!
Q: And what if somebody just wanted to quit?
B: The principle . . . is: To join costs nothing, to get out impossible. This was made clear to every new member. "Exit is possible here only via the cemetery."
Q: Are people not scared of a decision that cannot be changed for the rest of their lives?
B: In the beginning the will and the enthusiasm to act are so strong that all other considerations are pushed aside, and one simply says: Yes.
Q: Is it possible at all to maintain such a group and hold it together from within?
B: No. Only from without. One's own will to decide anything is practically eliminated. The only thing that remains is the will of the group. The aim—the action itself—can no longer be questioned. Only the means that are being used. [For example, which car or which weapon.]

Thus, it seems that, like the Mafia, the terrorist group allows no one out except at a heavy price, even death.

The Collective Death Wish

Some analysts are inclined to see in terrorist behavior self-destructive tendencies of such intensity that they may be caused by a conscious or unconscious death wish.

- Q:** After you had joined the army underground, in which situations were you afraid?
B: Anyone who says he is not afraid is lying. But after a while his fears change. The idea of having to sit in the slammer for years causes more fear than death . . . Georg von Rauch said to me on the evening before he was killed: "They will never get me into jail again." This meant: Rather die than be arrested. But this goes still further. One can get onto a "trip" where one simply wants to know what death is all about because it is always so near. Longing for death—there is such a thing.

³⁸ The following exchange is taken from the interview with Michael Baumann (indicated as B).

Social Conscience

There appear to be two ways in which the "social conscience" of a terrorist can manifest itself. One is through overall or individual objectives that may, at least in the terrorist's mind, be political and motivated by social concerns. The other is in the execution of an action, i.e., in deciding who is fair game, and under what circumstances.

In view of the ways in which the various groups are apparently run, there seems to be little leeway for the individual member with regard to overall objectives: The individual does not get to select the overall course or the individual target. And apparently he generally has no quarrel with this. But there appear to be differences with regard to whom is to be killed and when.

For example, Klein balked at killing the secretary at OPEC headquarters even though she interfered with the operation; he did not finish off the wounded security man; he opposed the killing of "anybody who tried to leave"; and he was so severely reprimanded for all this that there must be a connection between the disillusionment of which he speaks elsewhere and his fateful step of defecting.

As we have seen, Klein was not averse to killing *per se*: He would have felt perfectly comfortable about killing the "bastard" who, according to him, headed up the Iranian Secret Service, and he also stated that he would have killed a security guard in the OPEC operation if that man had "attacked" him (as we see again, "attack" and "defense" look different from different vantage points).

But Klein feels—at least now, after his defection—that it would definitely be wrong to bring down a Lufthansa plane, as the German terrorists have threatened to do, in retaliation for the death in Stammheim prison of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and others:

- K:** My position is, what do these people who go somewhere on a plane trip have to do with those who died at Stammheim, or with the madness at Mogadishu? Who are the people who fly to Mallorca? Some little people, not rich guys.
- Q:** You think it is permissible to liquidate a Buback, a Drenkmann, or a Schleyer,³⁹ is that your moral view, but the little fellow must be spared? Was that your idea of the guerrilla war at the time?
- K:** What was being done in Frankfurt in 1972 or in Heidelberg against the war in Vietnam—those were for me at the time the only true political actions. The rest was self-promotion.

Peculiarly enough, the German workers are not included in the "social conscience" of some German terrorists:

- K:** We regarded ourselves as the fifth column of the Third World, and the German workers we really cared very little about. In fact, for us, the

³⁹ Three prominent Germans who were victims of terrorism.

German workers were part and parcel of the capitalist system. People who by now already get a share of the loot. The workers can only be well off in our country because the masses in the Third World are so badly off.

And on the subject of killing "innocent people":

- K:** Mogadishu You cannot take your life and place it above that of children and vacationers and say, "My life is more valuable." That gets close to elitist madness, close to fascism.
- Q:** But where is the borderline? Is that not also true for Schleyer's and Moro's bodyguards who were shot?
- K:** From the perspective of the guerrilla, this is a military operation that cannot be conducted differently. We wanted Schleyer, and these people [the bodyguards] protected him. It is not possible to say to them, "Hold still until we are gone." We know that they have weapons and that they will shoot.

Finally, the "social conscience" of those interviewed here does not extend to former colleagues who have gone over to the other side and informed on their fellows.

- Q:** What did you think at the time of Schmuecker's⁴⁰ murder?
- K:** When that happened, I was excited. I thought it was right . . . to kill Schmuecker. He really worked together with the authorities. In that case, only one thing can be done . . . waste him.

Remorse

How do terrorists feel after they quit? We have the testimony of only one who turned away from the fold.

- K:** I am not going to play the contrite fellow here but I am disgusted that on that occasion [the OPEC raid] three people were killed, because they were killed for nothing. For me, that is murder. [The interviewee did not personally kill anybody.] There was no reason for that at all. But if I were to stand here now and say that I deeply regret this, it would sound very self-serving. Yet, when I think about how I felt when I saw that Iraqi lying there
- Q:** Then you feel guilty?
- K:** No. Not really guilty. I feel to some extent cheated out of my future life. Of course I cheated myself out of my future because I believed in all this blindly. The OPEC operation was the first in which I participated. It was my baptism of fire and I was incredibly disappointed. I felt betrayed in my political expectations.

One can only imagine how great the tension must be in the mind of a man who has broken with society, gone on his first major mission,

⁴⁰ Ulrich Schmuecker was a German terrorist who was liquidated by his group when they suspected that he had been recruited by the police as an informer while in jail.

been "incredibly disappointed," and at the same time is trapped in a group that he cannot leave without putting his life on the line, both with the group *and* with the authorities. And one cannot even guess how many people with such deadly conflict in their minds are still in terrorist groups today.

The Frustrations

From what has been said above, it must not be assumed that the average terrorist—if indeed there is such a thing—sails along happily forever once he or she has made the big decision and traveled the long road to joining a group.

From what some of our sources relate, many people who join a terrorist movement feel trapped sooner or later. In the beginning, at the time of joining, they do not seem to realize how truly fateful and irreversible a step they are taking; but once they are inside a group and have participated in an action in which some felony has been committed, those who might like to quit are confronted by highly unpalatable choices on all sides. If one tries to leave and resume a regular existence, he will be caught and prosecuted for what he has done. Moreover, once back in the real world, he will have to earn money to support himself; yet in looking for a job he will almost surely fall into the hands of the police. And his "high living" will almost always be curtailed.

On the other side, his former terrorist colleagues will look upon him with hatred and will not hesitate to kill him if they suspect that he has been "singing," which they will almost automatically suspect if he defects. Such suspicions are not without justification, as a defector's only conceivable passport back to normal society—if he can make the step at all—may be to become an informer. A case in point is that of Ulrich Schmuecker, a former member of the 2nd of June Movement in Germany, who was assassinated by a female member of the group because he had turned police informant.

In many ways, the life of a terrorist is no bed of roses. Although the actions, which are often few and far between, are reported to be exciting and exhilarating despite, or perhaps because of, the danger involved, the in-between periods of underground living in "safe" houses or apartments are said to be very trying. Tempers flare, occasionally to the point of physical violence, and Baumann reports that on one occasion two members of his group even drew weapons on each other.

Periods of inactivity also lead to intensified discussions about the means and ends of terrorism. There is disagreement about aims and tactics, the use of force, and the meaning of press responses to past

actions. There is disagreement over social habits and sexual mores of group members. Perhaps worst of all, some entrants who have joined because of their complete rejection of hierarchically structured society, with its ever-present bosses and underlings, find that some terrorist cells or groups are similarly organized, so that having escaped one job they find themselves with another "job."

Such disagreements and frustrations emerge perhaps most strikingly from Susan Stern's autobiographical account of her years with the Weather Underground.⁴¹ One cannot be sure, of course, that other groups in other countries are plagued by the same problems with equal intensity, or that other members experience the same emotions. But if Stern is any example, the life of a terrorist is indeed an arduous and vexing one, and it may be that only the extreme difficulties of exiting from that life prevent more members from giving up.

Stern's responses ranged all the way from "being happy for the first time in my life," after she had first dedicated herself wholeheartedly to the "revolution," to intense suffering during self-criticism sessions and many exasperating experiences, not the least of which was being in prison. After several years of underground existence, Susan Stern expressed these unhappy feelings:

I recoiled at the idea of shutting myself up in a forsaken room in some raunchy city and making bombs for years; never being free to get drunk or stoned, to f---k just anybody for fear that they might be a pig, that I might talk in my sleep, too relaxed and stoned, I might give a clue.⁴²

Her group was especially vulnerable, it seems, to FBI and other "pig" infiltrators, not so much because these infiltrators were so clever, but because their very existence destroyed once and for all the free and easy relationship of members with each other, especially when meeting with members of other groups who were not personally known to them. No longer was it possible to offer another person who appeared at one of the houses a "joint" as a matter of course; there was always the risk that one was offering it to a "narc" and would be "busted." The informality of relationships was destroyed. Instead, some "security-obsessed" types began to play a bigger role, not necessarily to the liking of the other members.

Disharmony Within the Group

It has already been mentioned that disagreements inside the group lead to problems for members. Such disharmony occurs not only over general questions and conditions, but also over specific situations.

⁴¹ Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Klein, for example, encountered this problem after the OPEC raid, when he was severely criticized for not having shot the female telephone operator who, braving various threats, called the Vienna police, informing them of the attack; and for not having killed the wounded Iraqi security man who was later killed by Gabrielle Tiedemann, the woman participant in the attack. Klein, who saw nothing wrong with the operation as such, reports in his *Der Spiegel* interview that he felt he was right in not killing these two people:

Q: You were shooting. Why and at whom?

K: The first time I shot was at the telephone. The secretary kept telephoning. I wanted to stop that. I kept shouting at her, "Finish!" . . . however, that secretary kept phoning and so I fired at the telephone.

Q: The telephone that the secretary was sitting next to?

K: Yes, I didn't know what else to do. I shot out one phone and she takes the next one, so I pushed her aside and fired into the whole installation.

Q: Did you consider killing the secretary?

K: No. That would be nonsense. After all, I'm not going to kill a secretary just because she telephones.

But this led to big repercussions.

K: Afterwards, there were big discussions about why I didn't do it [kill the girl]. I also was reprimanded for not having killed the Iraqi security man. I said I wouldn't kill that fellow. All he wanted was to get out. He walked out backwards with his hands over his head.

Klein's unwillingness to shoot the secretary or the security man is significant, as he was by no means opposed to *all* killing, nor was he doubtful about the terrorists' right to liquidate some people. When asked about the two OPEC ministers who had originally been selected for death, Yamani of Saudi Arabia and Amouzegar of Iran, Klein said, "As far as Yamani is concerned, I had some question, he didn't mean a thing to me. But Amouzegar didn't cause me any problem. As far as I am concerned, he is a real bastard because among other things he is head of the Savak [Iranian Secret Service]."

Later in the interview, Klein said, "The fact that they reprimanded me so heavily for having let the Iraqi pig go was a central experience for me." He began to think about getting out, but "it wasn't all that simple to get out." On the one hand, Klein knew too much; on the other hand, "without help I could not get out." The difficulty was that Klein, like Baumann, needed to have people who would shelter and feed him and neither turn him over to the authorities nor betray him to the group. Clearly such people must be difficult to find, and one wonders how many members of terrorist groups would like to quit but cannot.

The Descending Curve of Terrorist Effectiveness

Aside from some mild moral scruples with regard to the killing involved in terrorist acts, some doubts about the *effectiveness* of the acts committed also plague the participants. They perceive, according to one respondent, a definite hardening of the attitude of the state in the face of their efforts. This is discussed in the following interview with Baumann:

- Q:** You have written in your book [that] the "armed struggle" was "useful and right" even when it failed. How do you see this after the Schleyer and Moro cases?
- B:** Even if it was a mistake, it was nevertheless useful and right to make this attempt at urban guerrilla warfare. For without error there is no way of understanding anything or gaining insights. But the form in which they are now fighting is madness, in my opinion.
- Q:** Do you think this kind of thing [the Schleyer assassination] leads to political progress?
- B:** Rather the opposite. It leads backwards. The people who have come that far are caught in a spiral. They act in accordance with laws over which they no longer have moral control. They have completely deviated from their original cause.
- Q:** What was the original cause of the 2nd of June Movement?
- B:** From our perspective, fascism had not been overcome in the Federal Republic It was coming back around the sixties. We did not want to face this development without doing anything, as the people had done in 1933.
- Q:** Now, we are asking you ten years later, was your analysis correct?
- B:** It was not, at least as far as the timing was concerned The urban guerrilla now is finished in the entire world as a form of struggle. This concept works only as long as the state that is under attack holds to democratic law. When that state turns to military force and torture [as the respondent apparently feels the German state and other states have now done], every urban guerrilla [movement] must break down. It is militarily hopelessly inferior.
- Q:** Would you say that a state that thinks in military terms has better chances in the struggle against the urban guerrilla when it reacts in "hard" fashion?
- B:** Experience shows that to be true, from the Tupamaros in Uruguay to Schleyer . . . this fact was not taken into account by Schleyer's abductors.

In other words, Baumann feels that once the state responds in "hard" fashion, both in its treatment of the terrorist and, as in the Schleyer case, in its resistance to terrorist demands, the urban guerrilla as a form of terrorism is "finished."

The Nuclear Option

But if urban guerrilla fighting and similar "conventional" types of terrorism begin to lose their effectiveness because of a hardened atti-

tude on the part of governments, what is the next step? How can the terrorist make up for the loss of effectiveness?

- Q:** What else do you think the RAF (Red Army Faction) may be up to? What do you consider them capable of?
- B:** A great deal. Terrible things may yet happen.
- Q:** What, for instance?
- B:** After all, we live in the age of the nuclear bomb and power stations.
- Q:** In other words, nuclear extortion. What do you consider possible there?
- B:** I do not want to suggest that some group, at this time, has concrete plans or even definite ideas of this kind. But nevertheless, this is the spirit of the times. This is also in the spirit of the group. The three deaths in Stammheim [the announced suicide of the remaining three leaders of the Baader-Meinhof gang] were regarded as confirmation by these groups that fascism has now broken out openly. Now there are no limits any longer for Klein.
- Q:** Have there already been at an earlier stage discussions about the possibility of nuclear extortion?
- B:** Yes, of course. But now this matter gains much more reality. During their attack on the Stockholm Embassy, the RAF people noticed that the government no longer gives in. Therefore, I do not understand why they still did that thing with Schleyer at all. But they did it and again nothing was accomplished. Now they have to do something that will work for sure, and what else can that be except the ultimate thing?
- Q:** Could that also mean that they might occupy a nuclear power station?
- B:** Sure. These are intelligent people, and they have vast amounts of money. They also can build a primitive nuclear bomb. But an attack on a storage depot is more likely. After the killings in Lebach, the Americans noted that in a barracks 16 half-forgotten nuclear warheads were stored. Only a few German guards were there with their police dogs.
- Q:** And how would the RAF terrorists proceed in the course of a nuclear action?
- B:** That is, initially, completely without importance. Anyone who has something like that [nuclear weapons] in hand has enough power to make the Prime Minister dance on a table in front of a TV camera. And a few other statesmen alongside with him. That is an I.O.U. of ultimate power.

This part of the exchange contradicts what some observers have considered probable in recent years. Until the effectiveness of "conventional" terrorist activity began to decline (at least as perceived by Baumann), it seemed that, on balance, terrorists were probably disinclined to "go nuclear," partly because they did not want to alienate their real or imagined constituents and partly because resorting to nuclear options would have been overkill, considering how effective the terrorists were without them.

However, in any war that has not been terminated, reducing an enemy's effectiveness can always lead him either to reducing his effort or to escalating it.

CONCLUSION

What, on the basis of the foregoing, are terrorists like? And, perhaps more importantly, what are the chinks in their armor?

Personal Characteristics

The perhaps disconcerting, perhaps reassuring conclusion is that, first of all, there are many different types of terrorists. This is known from other evidence as well, but it is reconfirmed by the sample of actual cases examined here—by what these terrorists relate about themselves and about others with whom they have “worked.”

1. *Are they fanatics?*⁴³ Not necessarily, although some clearly are. Zvonko Busic, who says that he would not desist from his self-imposed task of freeing Croatia even if God himself were to point to its futility, is certainly a fanatic. Okamoto, who participated in the Lod Airport massacre almost by accident, would not really appear to be, but two of his companions who mutilated their faces before committing suicide to prevent their identities from becoming known probably rank high on the scale of fanatics.

Baumann and Klein cannot be regarded as fanatics. But both are men of profound political and other convictions, and although both have changed their minds about the utility of terrorism and the permissibility of some of its tools, neither has “repented.” They make that quite clear.

2. *Are they rational?* Busic and Okamoto give strong evidence of being irrational—or even “crazy,” in the conventional sense of the term. Okamoto believes that the victims of his gun will become beautiful stars in the firmament. Busic conducts a one-man, quixotic war against history, making a restless and aimless hegira from country to country. Horst Mahler, like many others in formerly authoritarian countries, feels that action against what the terrorists perceive as evil is all the more necessary because their parents failed to take action in a similar situation. This may be compulsive, but it does not appear irrational.

Baumann and Klein seem quite rational except for certain blind spots. On the whole, they talk coherently and intelligently, but Klein’s willingness to have himself used, as in the OPEC raid, and Baumann’s being amused by that “fun fellow” Charles Manson give the observer pause.

3. *Are they “happy” in their “calling”?* Here we see fundamental differences. Klein had a bad time of it from the beginning. Of course

⁴³ By fanatics, we mean people who will not change their minds under any circumstances and who pursue their aims without restraint.

he was gravely wounded early in the game, but he never was really comfortable or happy in the fold. Baumann was. He had a great time, even at the end, when he quit more for lack of further opportunities than for any other reason. Susan Stern was happy at the very beginning when, for the first time in her life, she felt a commonality with others and their acceptance. But it did not last long, and her husband's extreme distress in the organization apparently added to hers. Neither Okamoto nor Busic can be regarded as either personally comfortable or uncomfortable with his activities. From the interviews, they appear to be much too rigid to permit themselves the luxury of being either.

Vulnerabilities

From the operational point of view, the principal questions, of course, are, Do these terrorists have vulnerabilities? If so, are these vulnerabilities exploitable? And, if not, are the terrorists perhaps self-liquidating, i.e., destined to ultimately give up the game?

The study clearly shows that terrorists, individually and as groups, have at least as many vulnerabilities as other people and groups.

1. Most terrorists, according to statements cited in this paper, join a group without fully considering how fateful a step they are really taking. As Klein put it: "There is no exit except via the cemetery." New joiners, says Klein, disregard this in their eagerness to join; but when the trap door has closed, anxiety sets in, particularly when disillusionment of one kind or another is experienced.
2. Because they impose such an extreme penalty for defection, terrorists cannot really trust one another. Klein reports that for purely practical reasons it took him a long time to defect. In other words, he was a hostile element in their midst.
3. The tensions to which a terrorist is exposed in a group are many and are extremely severe. "Actions" are exciting, but they are few and far between. The intervening long periods of inactivity, when group members are cooped up somewhere underground, lead to great tensions and violent quarrels.
4. There are big differences of opinion among terrorists on almost all subjects—tactical; ethical; the use of force; strategy and tactics; the proper assessment of past actions; and so on.
5. Leadership, discipline, and planning and execution of actions are often quite lax.
6. Terrorists do not know what to do about declining readiness on the part of governments to be intimidated by abductions, such

as Schleyer's, or to give in to barricade-and-hostage situations, as in the case of Germany's Stockholm embassy.

7. Terrorists are sensitive to the perceived loss of sympathizers—at least in Germany—and to a general decline in public attention.

It is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether or how these weaknesses can be exploited, i.e., to what extent they are true vulnerabilities, or to attempt to predict whether terrorist groups might be self-liquidating. All that can be said here is that small terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the 2nd of June Movement, and the Revolutionary Cells—i.e., groups that do not have extensive popular support, such as that enjoyed by the Palestinian organizations—will have a very hard time continuing operations, because of the many internal and external difficulties and frictions to which they are subject. Whether they will then spawn "new generations" of terrorist groups, as some have done in the past, is another question.

As for probable future target selections, strategies, and other factors, no predictions can be made on the basis of the small sample represented in this study. It appears likely, however, that a continuing effort to learn more about the terrorists from primary sources will provide a basis on which some reasonably confident predictions can be made about preferred terrorist strategies and targets; it should also provide further and more concise insights into adversary decision-making processes.

OPERATION LEO: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF A EUROPEAN TERRORIST OPERATION

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PROLOGUE

In August 1977, a trial was begun in Stockholm. It concerned the planners of *Operation Leo*. The way the prosecutor stated his case, Operation Leo was a plan to kidnap former Minister of the Interior Mrs. Anna-Greta Leijon (*leijon* means lion, which is rendered *leo* in Latin) and to trade her for the release of Andreas Baader and other prisoners in the Stammheim prison in Stuttgart, Germany. The mastermind behind the plan was a German, Norbert Kroeher. Assigned to carry out the plan were a number of Swedes and foreigners, all residing in Stockholm. This was an international group, typical of modern Europe in many respects. It has been considered a matter of some interest to look more closely into the recruiting and the working of this group.

The base materials were within easy access. When the plan was aborted and Kroeher was arrested and expelled, a sequence of procedural and executive steps followed, all meticulously recorded, and a number of trials were held before the District Court in Stockholm. The following account is based on these materials. Although they certainly are beset with adulterations due to self-interest on the part of those heard and a certain provincialism on the part of the hearing judge, the general picture that emerges would seem to be quite reliable in what it conveys as to the recruitment and the working of this group. The case was taken on appeal, but the appellate proceedings added little to what was disclosed before the District Court.

INTRODUCTION

Operation Leo

Operation Leo was planned to take place either on the second anniversary of the assault on the West German embassy in Stockholm, i.e., April 24, 1977, or during the OPEC meeting in Saltsjobaden on July 12-14, 1977. The operation was to involve five to six people. Their

role names were Otto, Katarina, Frank, Sally, and Carol. Each of the participants was to be armed with a gun, one or two hand grenades, and a gas mask. Possibly they were to wear masks.

The former Swedish Minister of the Interior, Mrs. Anna-Greta Leijon, was to be captured somewhere close to her home in Jakobsberg, a Stockholm suburb. It was presumed that she would be moving by car; the plan was to set up a roadblock with two cars, or possibly to have somebody dressed as a policeman stop her. When captured, she was to be put to sleep with drugs.

Once Mrs. Leijon had been captured, she was to be transported by land and sea. A sketch found and decoded showed the place, *ue* (*Ueberfall* or capture), with an arrow to *Autowechsel* (exchange of cars), one more arrow to the letter B (for *boot* or boat), again one arrow to the letter L (for *landung* or disembarkment) with the word *Auto* (for car) above, and finally a last arrow to the letters VG (for *Volksgefaengnis* or people's jail). If you put this sketch on top of the map of Stockholm in the telephone directory and put the *ue* over Mrs. Leijon's residence, the map conveys that an attack was planned in Jakobsberg, close to the motorway, and, after an exchange of cars, an escape route parallel to the motorway was to be taken to Haesselby and through Haesselby and Villastad (two Stockholm suburbs) to a jetty at Bergshamn (at Lake Maelaren). A trip by boat from Bergshamn was to follow to a yacht club south of the Eriksberg swimming pool, after which disembarkment was to take place under the new Skanstull Bridge; thereafter, a short car trip was to be made during which the sleeping victim would be transported in a wooden box to Katarina Bangata, a midtown street.

This was a first-class plan. It was next to impossible to penetrate, and police roadblocks at the entrances to Stockholm would have been of no effect.

During the car trip, a pursuit was expected to take place. In preparation, the planners had assembled Chilean "miguelitos," so-called "crows' feet" or spiked devices to be thrown out of the escape car to puncture the tires of any following vehicle.

Once Mrs. Leijon was safely placed in a cellar apartment at Katarina Bangata—the so-called people's jail—she was to be kept prisoner there during the negotiations. The locality had been specially prepared for this purpose by putting in an extra floor and having holes drilled into the walls and hooks put into the ceiling. By such means and a pair of canvas sheets, a tent was to be built in which to keep Mrs. Leijon.

A complete battle plan had been made, for a seven-day operation with code name "action B.2.6". On day two, an ultimatum was to be given. It called for the release of eight prisoners within four days, one

Hercules aircraft to be placed at the planners' disposal, and a television program including songs with translations, program-reading in German and Swedish, and a showing of the films "Katharina Blum" and "State of Siege" to be broadcast the following day on both Swedish channels.

The prisoners whose release was to be demanded in exchange for Mrs. Leijon were all Germans from the Bundesrepublik, including the four Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK) members who survived an assault on the West German embassy in Stockholm, plus Peter Paul Zahl, Lothar Gend, and Fritz Teufel.

The German Background: Baader-Meinhof

The origins of the Baader-Meinhof group go back to the student unrest of the mid-1960s. Most of the groups formed at this time shared a more-or-less Marxist view of society. The vast majority of students and radical sympathizers may have favored peaceful methods—sit-ins, demonstrations, strikes—but many protesters began to advocate open and violent defiance of the law.

In April 1967, there were huge demonstrations in West Berlin to protest the visit of U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey. These were followed by more violence in June, when thousands of students turned out to protest the visit of the Shah and Empress of Iran. Police reacted nervously, and in the turmoil a student, Benno Ohnesorg, was killed on June 2, 1967.

Gudrun Ensslin, who was at this time an evangelical pacifist, used the occasion to speak of the emergence of a "fascist" state in the Bundesrepublik. Rudi Dutschke, a student and a contributor to *Konkret*, a Marxist paper funded from East Germany, declared that the West German state was "tending toward fascism." One of his colleagues on *Konkret*, Ulrike Meinhof, like Gudrun Ensslin a declared pacifist, said that Ohnesorg was a "victim of S.S. mentality and practice."

Out of such dissent grew the first fruits of revolutionary fervor. On an intellectual, middle-class foundation, the members of the Baader-Meinhof group that was formed in May 1970, with Ensslin's boyfriend Andreas Baader as the leading figure, built a message of destruction. They said (in a simile to the Weathermen¹) that they wanted to drive the German democratic state—forced to adopt an increasingly authoritarian position in answer to the terrorist attacks—further and

¹ The American Weathermen "who first surfaced in June 1969, described themselves as revolutionists whose aim was to bring down capitalist U.S. society by provoking the government to institute harsh oppressive measures." (*International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 1980, p. 3.)

further towards fascism. Only then, so the argument went, would the conditions be ripe for the socialist revolution.²

From the start, the Baader-Meinhof group was committed to violence. As early as 1968, Baader and Ensslin demonstrated their solidarity with other terrorist groups by planting an incendiary bomb in a department store in Frankfurt. The police successfully apprehended the culprits.

One of the first to interview the arsonists in prison was Ulrike Meinhof. She concretized her attitude toward economic advance by writing at the time, "It is better to burn a department store than to run one."

On June 13, 1969, the four arsonists were released from jail pending an appeal. They were greeted by many radicals as heroes. When their appeal was rejected, Baader and Ensslin went underground, where an extensive network of friends and sympathizers helped them to escape to France and thence to Switzerland. However, Baader was later arrested. On May 14, 1970, Ulrike Meinhof led a successful attempt to help him escape, at the cost of a severely injured librarian. From then on, the group was known as the Baader-Meinhof group.

After Baader's daring escape, he and Meinhof, together with others who were wanted in connection with the escape, fled to the PFLP which provided them with a course of training in how to become urban guerrillas. In August, the group returned to West Germany to set up a "People's Army." The charisma of Baader and Meinhof awoke a surprising response among radical young Germans. Between 1,200 and 6,000 active sympathizers were enlisted to help with the supply of funds, cars, accommodations, and papers.

There followed a series of violent bank raids for which the Baader-Meinhof group claimed responsibility. Over the next seven years more than 20 people were to die as a result of Baader-Meinhof activities; scores were to be injured.

In October 1970, Baader having become the leader, a new strategy was devised: the kidnapping of prominent people, who were to be held hostage against the release of imprisoned members of the group.

The German Background: The Socialist Patients' Collective

The SPK was founded by Dr. Wolfgang Huber, a scientific assistant at the Psychiatric Neurological Clinic of Heidelberg University, who believed that an act of violence directed against the state could

² "The Red Army Faction, together with its Japanese allies or the Argentinian Montoneros, for example, are what is sometimes called 'millenarians,' meaning nihilists who wish to bring down all society and replace it with an uncharted millenium." (Sulzberger, *International Herald Tribune*, October 22-23, 1977.)

be instrumental in curing mental illness. His thesis was that the patient was healthy and the system was sick. In December 1969, he started organizing his patients in group therapy sessions. He propagated to his patients the view that "the late capitalist performance society of the Federal Republic" was sick and was therefore continually producing physically and psychologically sick people, and that this could only be altered by a violent revolutionary change of society. When dismissed on February 21, 1970, Dr. Huber effected a coup and managed, by having his patients force their way into the offices of the administration director and occupy them, to force the administration to continue to pay him and to provide him with four rooms in the university building. Secure with money and headquarters, the mental patients and their doctor constituted themselves an organization that they named the Socialist Patients' Collective.³

The SPK put out mimeographed pamphlets (*Patient Infos.*) that they distributed to the general public. *Patient Info. No. 1* proclaimed, "There must be no therapeutic act that has not previously been clearly and uniquely shown to be a revolutionary act. . . . The system has 'made us sick.' Let us strike the deathblow at the sick system." The SPK also set up working circles. Their task was, according to a manifesto called *Scientific Representation*, "the strengthening of the theoretical foundations for the aims of SPK." Among the working circles were "Working Circle Explosives," "Working Circle Radio Transmission," "Working Circle Photography," and "Working Circle Judo/Karate." The job of the radio circle was to construct receivers and listen in to the police radio; the job of the photography circle was to photograph all the buildings, vehicles, and personnel of the Heidelberg police.

The explosives working circle was led by Dr. Huber's wife, Ursula Huber. One of the Heidelberg students who joined the SPK—in which there was no differentiation between individual illnesses and no hierarchy among doctors, nurses, and patients—was Siegfried Hausner. He joined Mrs. Huber's outfit, and in February 1971 he set out on his first mission: making a bomb to blow up the President of the Bundesrepublik as he passed Heidelberg by train. When the police raided the SPK facilities on July 21, 1971, the 19-year-old Hausner was among those arrested.

Patient Info. No. 51, dated July 12, 1971, had announced the merger of the SPK with the Baader-Meinhof group, inasmuch as at every place on the document, SPK was crossed out and replaced with RAF.

³ Detailed accounts of the SPK will be found in Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children*, London, 1977, pp. 227ff, and Leo Sievers, "Der Sturm auf die Botschaft," *Stern*, No. 12, 1976, pp. 136-142.

Hausner was among those brought by the SPK into the Baader-Meinhof group.⁴

Norbert Kroecker in Germany

Norbert Kroecker ("Knofo") was born in Falkensee in East Berlin in 1950 to a mother with a Communist background. In 1967, he became an apprentice at the German Post and Telegraph Office. Having difficulty adapting himself to civilized behavior, he refused to sign the articles which stated rules of conduct requiring apprentices to be polite, say good-day, and have their hair cut, and ordered such things as keeping their hands out of their pockets. This was too much for Kroecker; he not only refused to sign the rules but also had his parents join him in the refusal and finally even published antirules of his own. In short, he developed into a socialist and anarchist. He organized the *Rote Celle Post*—a "red cell in the Post Office"—and tried to cooperate with those in his profession who were of similar inclination and were high school or university students. Later, he also organized Black Cells. Having this as his background, he enthusiastically joined the riots that were organized on the occasion of the Shah's visit to West Berlin in 1967.

By the age of 20, although a skilled telephone worker, Kroecker had succeeded in getting himself blacklisted on the labor market and had to survive on temporary jobs, joining a politicizing student collective.⁵ There, the *Manifesto* for urban guerrillas, published by the Baader-Meinhof group in the spring of 1971, was greeted with enthusiasm. Kroecker himself claimed to have been involved in the creation of the Second June Movement,⁶ a second-generation outfit in the Baader-Meinhof tradition; he certainly was said to be "a close friend of Ralf Reinders, the founder of the Second of June Movement."⁷ He then met Gabrielle Tiedemann, a 20-year-old sociology student. Jillian Becker claims that Gabrielle was a member of the Second June Movement⁸ and also that she "had been a member of a weird group called the Socialist Patients' Collective of Heidelberg."⁹

⁴ Jillian Becker, op. cit., p. 267, writes, "It was Croissant who brought Siegfried Hausner into the [Baader-Meinhof] group and frightened him off again (but not for long) when Ensslin thought him unreliable and decided that he should be liquidated."

⁵ Later, in Stockholm, Kroecker claimed to have lived in fighting collectives in Germany for five years (testimony of Pia Laskar, Judgment, p. 204), but this story seems to have been contradicted by Manfred Adomeit, according to whom Kroecker had joined one collective only and had been expelled from it after a month (Ibid.).

⁶ Testimony of Anna-Karin Lindgren, Judgment, p. 92.

⁷ Colin Smith, *Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist*, London, 1976, p. 192.

⁸ Becker, op. cit., p. 299.

⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

They fell in love and were married in West Berlin, encouraged to do so financially by a city policy to retain the young in the city. But they worked for an anarchist paper.

In Bochum in December 1971, a physician was deprived of his car by armed robbery; the police suspected Kroeher. In February 1972, a bank in Berlin was robbed; the police again suspected Kroeher and his wife and a friend of theirs, Peter Paul Zahl. Kroeher started looking for a safer refuge than Cologne; Sweden seemed to offer the best. Indeed, Sweden offered great opportunities for building up a terrorist infrastructure unnoticed, due to the great numbers of foreigners employed there. The vast area of Sweden, extremely sparsely populated, made the country an ideal place for terrorist operations. Furthermore, the Swedish understanding of order was very humanitarian in approach; and in terroristic matters Sweden had developed a tradition of talking rather than shooting, which was most encouraging to German pistoleros.¹⁰ Consequently, Kroeher went to Sweden.¹¹

The Swedish Background: Kroeher's Arrival

In the 1970s, Sweden became an increasingly fertile breeding ground for terrorist sympathizers. One of the major factors was the ever-increasing use of leftist slogans in Swedish mass media. As the young people filled the universities, they increasingly seemed to accept slogans about the illegitimacy of the state, the illegitimacy of the law, and the horrible suffering of the individual.

On September 28, 1975, the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Olof Palme, screamed from the rostrum, "Damn murderer," at the chief of state of Spain, when Palme was addressing the Party Congress of the ruling Social Democrats. It would be naive to believe that such a message was lost on the young people. However, the negative impact was a lot greater than any positive idea that might have been conveyed. Such language from the highest positions in society undermined the legitimacy of every chief of state and indeed of every state itself. The young and the innocent felt free to reconstruct the principle of legitimacy to their own liking. The victims of the destructive message turned out to include the Swedish socialist rule itself.

Another major factor was the expansion of collectivism and the dissolution of family ties. The socialist idea that property was bad

¹⁰ *Der Spiegel*, No. 18, 1975, p. 28.

¹¹ It is useful to recall in this context the following passage from Judge Cars' judgment in the Operation Leo trial: "The materials before the Court, however, do not allow any definite conclusions as to whether Kroeher adhered to some foreign terrorist organization, or as to the reason for his departure from Germany and his taking residence in Sweden." (Judgment, January 31, 1978, p. 401.)

brought with it, curiously enough, a culture of general promiscuity. To own somebody's love was considered no less reprehensible than to own property: Collective community was the answer to the world's problems. Thus, the collectives came largely to substitute for the family when the latter was blown to pieces by the welfare system in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the participants around Kroeher, and indeed Kroeher himself, had a history with the collectives.

The third major factor was the policy of international aggressiveness that had gradually succeeded the neutral and more prudent Swedish foreign policy of the 1950s. The Greek coup of April 21, 1967, particularly incensed leading socialist circles and released a wave of confrontation. The Swedish attitude toward political refugees developed parallel to this evolution. The new confrontation policy made the Swedish government abandon its previous demands that refugees who had been given asylum in Sweden should refrain from political activity in Sweden. Instead, it was insisted that foreigners should enjoy the same freedom as the Swedes to engage in political activities in Sweden. Since foreigners were not allowed to participate in the Swedish elections, the formula mainly operated to allow the Papandreou type of political activity, i.e., organizing resistance and terrorist activities in their home countries from Sweden. Such confrontation policies gave Sweden the reputation of being a haven for elements of political disloyalty. The illegal leaving of a country under a dictatorship but without totalitarian features was previously not, as such, a political act, and people who left their country under these conditions were not considered as political refugees entitled to asylum. Among the repercussions of the new Swedish confrontation policies, however, was the likelihood that such people, when sent back from Sweden, would now attract a more severe sentence in their home country, if prosecuted there after expulsion. But this hypothetical treatment of refugees, if they should be sent back, indeed made them political refugees. Consequently, Sweden turned into a haven for an ever-increasing flow of people who, by pursuing various socialist policies, had attracted the repression of some of the local dictatorships.

Part of the new Swedish confrontation policy was intense support for the socialist regime that took over in Chile in 1970 under President Allende. After the Pinochet coup of September 11, 1973, a Swedish propaganda offensive was mounted against the new regime, and the Swedish government allowed the wholesale importation to Sweden of Chilean refugees and other Latin American revolutionaries stranded by the Pinochet coup. The license to practice foreign politics, inherent in the Papandreou line, came to confer upon Sweden the character of something of a base area for staging a countercoup in Chile. The increasingly hostile Swedish attitude toward Chile was accompanied by an increasingly friendly attitude toward Cuba.

On December 14, 1972, a member of Kroeher's group (the *Rote Ruhr Armee*), Peter Paul Zahl, was arrested by the German police. Kroeher decided to go into hiding in Sweden. Together with his wife Gabrielle and another terrorist, Cornelia Ebbefeld, he stole a car and drove to Stockholm. There they were provided with lodgings and entertainment by one of Ebbefeld's Swedish acquaintances. The entertainment included a New Year's Eve party at which Kroeher met a Swedish girl, Anna-Karin Lindgren, who was four years his senior. Deserting Gabrielle, he moved into Anna-Karin's flat by the end of February.

Gabrielle went back to Germany and in March or April 1973, Kroeher returned to Cologne to arrange for a divorce. Anna-Karin was invited to join him, and the couple stayed with other members of the terrorist group. In July 1973, Gabrielle was arrested in Bochum. Colin Smith gives the following account:

Tiedemann had been cornered in a car park in Bochum, where she was rather clumsily trying to steal number plates. She was arrested and according to the rules of her movement was expected to use her gun to resist arrest. During the gunfight that followed, a policeman was wounded before Tiedemann surrendered. She was sentenced [in December 1973] to eight years' imprisonment, but at the time of the Lorenz kidnapping would shortly have been eligible for parole.¹²

Kroeher's marriage to Gabrielle seems to have been dissolved in the spring of 1976.

The Lorenz Affair

The terrorist groups scored a notable success in February 1975 when Peter Lorenz, Chairman of the West Berlin Christian Democrats, was kidnapped by the Second June Movement. A letter setting out the kidnappers' demands was published in all the major national newspapers. "If all demands are precisely met," the letter stated, "the safety of the prisoner Lorenz is guaranteed. Otherwise a consequence as in the case of Chief Justice Gunter von Drenkmann is unavoidable." Six days after Lorenz' capture, five terrorists were flown—in accordance with the kidnappers' instructions—from West Berlin to Frankfurt, where a Boeing 707 was waiting to take them to Aden. Only then was Lorenz freed.

Gabrielle Kroeher Tiedemann was one of the five sentenced anarchists traded for the politician and flown to South Yemen from Frankfurt. Since she shortly would have been eligible for parole, she hesitated to join the operation. Colin Smith writes:

¹² Smith, *Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist*, op. cit., p. 192.

Her mother begged her to stay and stressed that her refusal to go would be viewed favorably by the police board. Pohle [another of the sentenced anarchists] countered by praising her bearing at her trial and also by hinting that husband Norbert might be at their journey's end. She decided on a compromise, and in a tearful call to her mother said that she would leave with the other terrorists and then break off relations with them: "I'm going to take up my studies again abroad. You must come and visit me."¹³

Once on board the aircraft, however, she changed her mind. In her Aden hotel she was heard complaining about her food. She was believed to be responsible for the "execution" of Austrian police official Anton Tichler during the December 1975 attack on the OPEC oil ministers' meeting in Vienna.

The Socialist Patients' Collective Takeover of the Stockholm Embassy

On April 24, 1975, a group of six terrorists succeeded in entering the West German embassy in Stockholm, displayed their arms, and occupied the building, taking 13 embassy employees hostage. The terrorists, identifying themselves as "Commando Holger Meins," said that they were occupying the embassy in an attempt to force the Bonn government to release 26 members of the Baader-Meinhof group then in a West German prison. In a surprise move, however, the Bonn government refused to meet that condition. The terrorists killed two of the diplomats; then, while negotiations with the Swedish government, acting as the go-between, were going on, an explosion ended the siege.

"Commando Holger Meins" was made up mainly of people from the SPK. The explosives expert who inadvertently blew the whole thing up was Siegfried Hausner, who had been taken care of by Mrs. Huber in the psychiatric clinic. He had been sentenced in 1972 to three years in prison and had obtained a conditional release in 1974. Expelled by the Swedish Minister of the Interior, Mrs. Anna-Greta Leijon, to West Germany, he died of burns on May 4, 1975, after remaining unconscious for 90 hours. Two other members of the group, Hanna Elise Krabbe and Lutz Taufer, were also connected with the SPK inasmuch as they had met in one of its successor organizations.¹⁴ Even Bernhard Maria Rossner was, according to police information, connected with the SPK.¹⁵ Consequently, it is with some justification that Jillian Becker calls the group the "crazy brigade."

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Leo Sievers, *Stern*, No. 13, 1976, p. 138.

¹⁵ *Der Spiegel*, No. 18, 1975, p. 32.

The SPK later made its impact felt once more when a group of terrorists calling themselves Commando Siegfried Hausner kidnapped German industrialist leader Hans Martin Schleyer in September 1977 and demanded the release of 11 terrorists held in jails in four different states in West Germany. The demands were not met, and instead the hijacked Lufthansa aircraft was successfully retaken by special commando troops at Mogadishu, leading Andreas Baader, Jan Carl Raspe, Gudrun Ensslin, and Irmgaard Moller to commit suicide in October and November 1977. Commando Siegfried Hausner killed their hostage.

The impression that the Lorenz affair and the SPK assault on the embassy made on Norbert Kroeher was described at the trial by Anna-Karin Lindgren in the following terms:

At the turn of the month February-March 1975, the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz took place. Kroeher held the action to be good in some way. He was later once more placed on the list of those wanted in connection with the kidnapping, and he seemed to be proud of being connected with a so-to-say successful operation. Contrariwise, he reacted negatively to the attack on the German embassy in Stockholm. He thought that it was a very violent and completely senseless operation. If such an action had any purpose, it must be to make the general public sympathize, and in his view you could not expect that from this operation. He also thought that he should have been contacted by the perpetrators, and he was slightly disappointed that they had not found out that he was in Sweden.¹⁶ Apparently, however, he felt forced to sympathize with the operation in some way since it was a kind of release operation. To summarize, he was negative to the way the operation had been carried out but was positive as to its purpose.¹⁷ He was very upset that Hausner had been expelled, because of Hausner's severe burns and the Special Clinic at the Karolinska Sjukhuset in Stockholm being the foremost in Europe. It was expected that Hausner would not receive any special care in Germany but be confined to a prison hospital, and this also happened. Subsequently, Hausner died on May 4. It was in particular the expulsion of Hausner and his death that made Kroeher so negatively inclined towards Anna-Greta Leijon, as being the one immediately responsible for the decision to expel.¹⁸

THE BUILDUP OF THE KROECHER GROUP

The Couple

The Kroeher group originated with Norbert Kroeher and Anna-

¹⁶ Smith maintains that "Carlos and Moukarbal flew to Stockholm from Brussels on April 20, 1975, and returned to Paris two days later." (*Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist*, p. 194.)

¹⁷ Judgment, p. 95.

¹⁸ Judgment, p. 96.

Karin Lindgren, his Swedish mistress. Anna-Karin was the product of modern Swedish conditions:

She has been raised in materially good conditions and she has received a good formation [Student Exam and a university degree in French, Art History, and Cinema Sciences]. However, in a way, she has been trapped in a liberation process vis-à-vis her parents, not feeling able to live up to their demands. As a result, she has developed a certain inclination for revolt. At the same time, she bears the imprint of a certain disorientation and an absence of identity that results in her seeking confirmation primarily by means of other people. This has made her prone to seek contact, and she is inclined to identify with people whom she experiences as remarkable and by means of whom she has the possibility of staying in the center of things. Her relationship to Kroecker consequently became very intense and was characterized by a strong reciprocal dependency.¹⁹

How did she meet Norbert Kroecker? Her testimony is telling:

The first time she met Norbert Kroecker was at a party on New Year's Eve 1972. At that time, Kroecker was in the company of two girls whom she did not meet. He said that he came from Berlin. When meeting her later, he told Anna-Karin that he was a photographer. He used the name Eberhard Sabel and called himself Hardy. After a while, she invited him to her birthday party on February 22, 1973. Some time later, he asked her permission to stay with her for a few weeks since he did not have any place of his own. When he moved in, he only brought a bag and a tape recorder with lots of taped music. He was rather gay, spirited, and straightforward, and did not seem to think of violence. She fell in love with him and their relationship developed. As a result, he stayed for more than two weeks; he had lots of money and contributed to the household.²⁰

A year later, however, the picture was less rosy. Anna-Karin Lindgren testified:

When they returned to Stockholm, they had neither money nor jobs. They pawned the cameras, and Anna-Karin took employment as a teacher. She was still in love with Kroecker, although the situation was very taxing since she was forced to help and maintain him. During the spring or summer of 1974, she substituted for teachers, and then she took full employment with *Dagens Nyheter* [a daily]. . . . It was Anna-Karin who paid for his up-keep. He had no money himself until in the end he made some money by his robberies; nor did he receive any money from the outside.²¹

Anna-Karin's more militant girl friend, Pia Laskar, was upset. She testified:

¹⁹ Judgment, p. 533.

²⁰ Judgment, pp. 45-46.

²¹ Judgment, p. 91.

Kroecker was a genuine male chauvinist who did not do anything in the home but only exercised Anna-Karin. Pia never saw him, e.g., clean up or do the dishes. Often he lay sleeping until late in the afternoon. He had a room of his own at his disposal in Anna-Karin's apartment at Agnegatan.²²

Anna-Karin Lindgren detailed the relationship further:

Most of the time, thus, Kroecker sat in Anna-Karin's apartment and read. . . . He easily grew angry and he often grew angry at her. Probably he found her irritating. One reason for that was certainly that he was very dependent on her. He tried to carry on political discussions with her, but she was no exciting interlocutrix. However, they were emotionally engaged in one another.²³ Anna-Karin herself was not politically attached to any particular movement, and her relationship with Kroecker was not marked by any political will or idea, but was exclusively of an emotional character.²⁴ Their differences of opinion covered everything—their way of life. What was important to him was to do big things, while she was only interested in the household: in cleaning and cooking. She was not carried away by revolutionary ideas. His ideas of what kind of society was to be achieved were very unclear. There were no clearly hammered-out plans as to how the system of power was to be. Mostly it was no more than questions of living collectively and things like that.²⁵

Another defendant, Karin Lingtorp, testified similarly:

Kroecker's political idea was to try to change the view that people took of each other and to make them live in a more humanitarian way.²⁶

Kroecker tried Horst Mahler's advice²⁷ on this simple-minded loving nonintellectual by making her commit a petty crime. Anna-Karin Lindgren testified:

²² Judgment, p. 188.

²³ Judgment, p. 93.

²⁴ Judgment, p. 46.

²⁵ Judgment, p. 94.

²⁶ Judgment, p. 252.

²⁷ Already in 1971, Horst Mahler was renowned for his stressing of the *Primat der Praxis*, i.e., the primary importance of practical action. Mahler's main problem was how to make the masses revolutionary-minded—their *Revolutionierung*. He argued forcefully that this should be done by means of law-breaking. "To make people feel less and less used to obedience to the civil legal order is an essential prerequisite for making the masses revolution-minded. This is not a question of theoretical insight." People were held back by their inhibitions that favored law and order. In order to get rid of those inhibitions, what was needed first and foremost was "the repeated, deliberate and practical violation of the law. Much less than the intellectual is the worker able to conquer by theoretical reflection his own inhibitions. Only in practical action that conveys the feeling of immediate experience is it possible to break up this fateful structure of man's consciousness. . . . Once they have conquered their fear of the State apparatus, they will open up the road even to the yelling literary revolutionaries and the braggarts. . . . The practical revolutionary example is the one only way to make the masses

Kroeher was to divorce his wife, Gabrielle Kroeher Tiedemann. Afterward, Anna-Karin and Kroeher were to prepare for moving to Berlin and a vacation trip.²⁸ She had already made her preparations for moving with him to Berlin, renounced her employment, and found out about schools in Berlin that she wanted to attend. Then the plans were born to rob a bank. It was Kroeher who came up with the idea.²⁹ The robbery was planned for Monday morning since they reckoned that there would be no clients in the bank at that time. . . . They went by subway out to Bandhagen. In the vicinity of the bank they pulled stockings over their heads and put on red hats that they had brought. Anna-Karin entered the bank first, and Kroeher, who was armed with a pistol, followed. . . . When they entered the bank, Kroeher called out in Swedish, 'This is a robbery and lie down.' At his asking, Anna-Karin had taught him these words that were the only ones he could say in Swedish. . . . She jumped the counter and first took money from an unmanned cashier's desk; then she proceeded to the next one.³⁰

The Quartet

The next stage in the building of the group was the adding of two more to the couple—Lennart Warring and Pia Laskar—thus making it a quartet. What kind of people were the new recruits? Lennart Warring himself testified:

He had been a pacifist since he was 13. In the beginning, he had maintained a radical-pacifist attitude, which meant that he considered that violence in any form and any connection was wrong. When 18 years old, he refused military service because he did not want to carry arms. At that time, a political awakening also took place in him; he was primarily terrified by the American bombings in Vietnam, the bloody coup-d'état against Allende in Chile, and the increasing terror of the Franco regime in the early 1970s. His attitude changed. He was still a pacifist but he now considered that people who live under a bloodstained oppression are entitled to resort to violence in order to achieve freedom. His view is, however, still that violence is the worst way to solve conflicts, and personally he finds it very difficult to use violence.³¹

This story should undoubtedly be supplemented by excerpts from the personality report that was presented to the Court. It said,

The present condition of Mr. Warring may probably be a direct derivation from the bad asthma, etc., that he has suffered since he was a baby. As a result of this illness, Warring came to be forcefully overprotected;

revolutionary-minded that has a historical chance to make eventually socialism come true." See the text (generally ascribed to Horst Mahler) in *Wagenbach Rotbuch*, No. 29, Berlin, 1971, pp. 43, 45ff., cf. p. 57.

²⁸ Judgment, p. 46.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Judgment, pp. 46-47.

³¹ Judgment, p. 138.

he was never confronted with any difficulties during his early years, and, above all, he could never engage in such physical activities as are normal for boys. As a compensation, Warring read much. At an early stage, he became interested in societal problems and strange religions; and during his school years he is described as a 'humanitarian idealist, something of a peaceful dreamer. . . .' As time went by, Warring developed into a semi-anarchist of peaceful inclination, nurturing, together with his fellows, visions—believed to be innocent—of radical changes of society. Later, however, Warring came into contact with reformers of society of a much tougher variety, and, as a result of his great immaturity, credulity, and failing life experience, etc., he was made to undertake acts likely to make him morally lost and, as a result, even more easy to manipulate. . . .

As a result of Warring's pacifist conviction, it was at first difficult for him to do this, but after extensive discussions about 'the nature of imperialism,' certain events in Vietnam, Chile and Spain and the situation in the Third World in general, Warring's attitude changed, and he saw violence as legitimate in certain situations. Since 'the heart of imperialism' was to be found in West Europe, it became legitimate to strike there, too.³²

It is not without interest that Warring, during the autumn of 1975, was working in a kindergarten.³³

As to Pia Laskar, we know less. The findings in her personality report convey the following:

Pia considers as satisfactory the conditions prevailing in her home and during her childhood. The family's material and other conditions were reasonable, and the emotional relationships between the members were well developed. . . . When in the *gymnasium*, she became a school dropout in the spring of 1973. It is relevant that in fact she had wished to get a professional formation in something more practical: the wood technical line in the gymnasial school; but these ambitions were repressed by the teachers and in particular by her parents who wanted her 'to become something' (by which is meant to become professional in something intellectual). After her dropout, she spent the following year taking miscellaneous jobs and repeatedly traveled abroad. In January 1974, she returned to Sweden and then left the family home and moved in with a [female] companion.³⁴

Pia Laskar herself testified:

Pia and Kroeher were of different political opinions, i.e., Kroeher did not have any specific political opinion at all, while she herself considers society as a form of organization. Thus, she considers that one should organize a society by means of workers' councils and other representative bodies carrying on a continuous dialogue with those represented. The representatives should be liable to be deposed as soon as they did

³² Judgment, p. 536.

³³ Judgment, p. 143.

³⁴ Judgment, p. 540.

not speak for their group. At a later stage of the development, when only a few people are in possession of the means of production, and do not want to give them up, it may be considered that a certain amount of violence should be resorted to, but in order to arrive at this stage, one should first propagate and win adherents by peaceful means.³⁵

These people—the overprotected sickly pacifist and the school dropout—met Kroeher and Anna-Karin Lindgren by accident, after a party, waiting for a bus. The conversation touched on pirate broadcasting. Warring said that he had experience with Radio 88—a leftist pirate outfit that castigated commercialized music and the like—and Kroeher hinted that he knew much about pirate broadcasting in Germany. They decided to meet again. Warring was indeed involved in Radio 88, and here he cooperated with Pia Laskar. As it happened, they monitored together the Television Melody Festival on Anna-Karin's television set, and from then on they used to meet.

At that time, Pia Laskar held stray jobs and studied Spanish and photography. Warring was also interested in photography. Together with Kroeher and Anna-Karin, who held a degree in cinema sciences, they decided to get themselves a photo laboratory. This was the place at Katarina Bangata that was turned into the hoped-for "people's jail." Warring rented it; it was adapted and furnished for its new purpose at his expense, the money being taken from his Swedish government study grant.

Kroeher pulled the newcomers tightly into his net by the classical device: the petty crime that afterwards prevents the return to legality. This is the testimony of Pia Laskar:

During May [1976], Kroeher said much about the need to get money. As far as Pia understood, it was to be used to buy equipment for the photo apartment. A few days before Ascension Day, Kroeher suggested that Pia, Hesch [a German friend of Kroeher], and Warring were to steal money. Probably it was Kroeher who came up with the idea that the money should be taken from Minilivs' bank messenger. Kroeher, Hesch, and Pia discussed the plan while they were smoking hash together. She does not really know how Warring came into the picture.³⁶

Robbing the bank messenger being accomplished, the loot was given to Anna-Karin. She counted the money—it turned out to amount to 13,000 crowns—and put it into a box. The money was never shared among the participants.

The Killer and the Contact Man: Completing the Group

The Swedish-Cuban connection made Sweden a haven for Latin American/Marxist revolutionaries. One of them was Armando Caril-

³⁵ Judgment, p. 193.

³⁶ Ibid.

lo, who came from Mexico. There he had belonged to a revolutionary organization called M.A.R., and he had succeeded in getting theoretical and practical guerrilla training in North Korea. It was testified at the trial that he was a Marxist-Leninist and that he had been assigned to do political groundwork among the Mexican farmers.³⁷ Hederberg claims that Carillo had been active during 9 months with M.A.R.—from May 1970 to February 1971. During the period 1971-1973, he served a jail sentence for robbery, insurrection, and the like.³⁸ Thereafter, a sympathetic revolutionary organization called F.R.A.P. set up a kidnapping operation, in the course of which the release of Carillo was traded for the kidnap victims. Carillo was then flown to Cuba. There he joined Maria Carillo, a Chilean Communist and opera singer, apparently stranded in Cuba after the Pinochet coup. She was his wife, a woman 9 years his senior.

Between Mexican President Echeverria and Cuba's Fidel Castro an arrangement was being worked out at that time that meant that a number of Mexican refugees in Cuba were to be given one-way visas to certain European countries. Maria Carillo was forwarded from Cuba to Portugal (at that time in revolutionary fervor), to continue from there to Sweden. Armando Carillo obtained a one-way visa on his Mexican passport valid for Sweden only.

He arrived in Sweden on December 4, 1975. The Swedish immigration authorities refused to admit him. He was returned to Cuba several times, via Prague and via Madrid, but Cuba refused to take him back. Then the Swedish authorities wanted to send him back to Mexico. This offered Carillo the opportunity to request asylum on the ground that he would suffer "political persecution" in Mexico.

On December 22, 1975, Maria Carillo arrived in Sweden,³⁹ having been informed that her husband might arrive there.⁴⁰ In January 1976, she visited the Stockholm Refugee Council (*Stockholm flyktingrad*), a breakaway organization from *Svenska flyktingradet*. "She said that she recently had arrived in Sweden from Cuba via Portugal and that she had been informed by a social welfare agency in Stockholm that her husband, Armando Gonzales Carillo, was being deprived of his liberty in Stockholm since more than one and a half months."⁴¹ At the intervention of *Stockholm flyktingrad*, Carillo was now released but put under a travel ban which obliged him to report daily to the police.⁴²

³⁷ Judgment, p. 227.

³⁸ Armando Carillo is given a full chapter in Hederberg, *Operation Leo*, Stockholm, 1978, p. 35ff. That is the main source of the material presented here.

³⁹ Hederberg, *Operation Leo*, p. 36.

⁴⁰ Judgment, p. 361.

⁴¹ Judgment, p. 360.

⁴² Ibid.

The Swedish Foreign Office wanted to get rid of Carillo and negotiated the matter with the Cuban ambassador in Stockholm. The Cubans were uncooperative.

Kroeher met Armando Carillo in February 1976.⁴³

Being a haven for Marxist revolutionaries, Sweden attracted another type of operator: contact men. One of them was Alan Hunter, a British citizen, born October 4, 1953, and a resident of Stockholm. Hederberg writes:

Alan himself had a past within the English anarchist movement—but he had also worked on a kibbutz in Israel and had been a civilian employee of the British military in Berlin. In Stockholm he had studied Arabic at the university, played classical guitar before an audience in the Cultural House [a leftist stronghold], and shown that he could speak Spanish fluently.⁴⁴

It was testified at the trial:

In early 1976, Hunter had been to Geneva and raised half a million crowns that officially should have been used for medical equipment but in fact was intended for purchases of arms for the liberation movement in Eritrea.⁴⁵ Tungstedt knew that Hunter was deeply involved with the Eritrean liberation movement and thought that he had certain contacts also with Polisario.⁴⁶

Hederberg elaborates, by insinuation:

What does he really want, that young man, who is so enormously knowledgeable in refugee matters and international politics, but simultaneously very deliberately fans opposition and internal strife? At the Swedish Refugee Council he has participated in organizing sit-ins . . . to prevent certain meetings. Finally, in the autumn of 1975, he and his fellows were more or less expelled from the Swedish Refugee Council at Tunnelgatan. The three leading figures in *Svenska flyktingradet*—with the president Hans-Goran Franck in the lead—considered themselves forced to raid the localities and change the lock in the outer door. Alan and his fellows took some of their refugee cases with them—considering them to be personal trust cases—to new localities at Appelbergsgatan, using a new name, *Stockholm flyktingrad*. Both refugee councils claim to have no political ties and to be independent. But many in the splinter group belong to small political groups to the left of the Left Party of the Communists.⁴⁷

Armando Carillo organized Hunter's meeting with Kroeher. Hederberg writes:

⁴³ Judgment, p. 101f.

⁴⁴ Hederberg, *Operation Leo*, p. 50.

⁴⁵ Judgment, p. 364.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Hederberg, loc. cit.

Towards the end of May [1976]—after some ten discussions and meetings—it is completely clear for Armando and Maria that Norbert is planning to kidnap some highly placed Swedish official. In exchange for the hostage, the authorities are to deliver—apart from imprisoned comrades—a big sum of money. Norbert mentions a sum of some millions. Armando and Maria are excited by the plan. . . . Armando and Maria ask Norbert to come to Blakulla in Hagalund [a Swedish suburb outside Stockholm] the next time. Then Norbert will meet an interesting person—a good friend of Armando and Maria who is working at the Stockholm Refugee Council and who is staying with the vice president of the council out in Blakulla. . . . This is the Englishman Alan Hunter, 23 years of age, whom Norbert and [Anna-Karin] get to meet this way for the first time.⁴⁸

These foreigners were crucial to Kroecker's plans. This can be concluded from the testimony given at the trial about Kroecker's relationships to Swedes and foreigners:

Kroecker had, generally speaking, no views on Swedish society at all.⁴⁹ Kroecker spoke all the time about his unease in Sweden and that he did not like the Swedish mentality, but dreamed about the days back in Germany and preferably Berlin, and even Paris. He thought that the Swedes were unfriendly, taciturn and reserved, and that Sweden was one of the most capitalistic countries in the world.⁵⁰

Contrariwise, Kroecker was happy with Armando Carillo, Alan Hunter, and a mysterious German, Manfred Adomeit, who joined the group. He "looked to Carillo for guidance. Kroecker met Hunter a lot and used to go to the pubs and drink beer with him."⁵¹ The observer "had the feeling that Kroecker liked to be with Hunter because Hunter did not criticize him. They were good friends, and at least Kroecker respected Hunter. He was—besides Frank [i.e., Armando Carillo]—one of the few people that Kroecker did not slander."⁵²

Warring testified at the trial:

When Armando Carillo and Hunter had joined, Kroecker became much more insistent. He became more 'pushing' and also received some support from them. However, their reaction to Kroecker's plans for an operation in Sweden in order to obtain the release of political prisoners in West Germany was a bit wait-and-see in some way.⁵³

As to Manfred Adomeit, much less is known. He was immediately expelled by the Swedish government when Kroecker was arrested.

⁴⁸ Hederberg, p. 49.

⁴⁹ Judgment, p. 147.

⁵⁰ Judgment, p. 251.

⁵¹ Judgment, p. 165.

⁵² Judgment, p. 295.

⁵³ Judgment, p. 159.

Hederberg identifies him as Manfred Adomeit, born September 18, 1949, a German citizen, having arrived in Sweden in 1976 as a tourist. It was testified at the trial that "Adomeit was one of the few people whom Kroeher respected, listened to, and liked well."⁵⁴

Hederberg insinuates why this was so by writing:

Manfred says nothing to the Swedes about the case of Ulrich Schmucker—the 22-year-old who was executed as a traitor by his fellow comrades in a wood in the neighborhood of Berlin.⁵⁵ Schmucker had confessed before a kind of kangaroo court set up by the Second June Movement⁵⁶ that he had said too much to the police about some comrades—one of them being Manfred Adomeit. Schmucker's defense—that he only said such things as he thought the police already knew, and that he later warned Manfred Adomeit and one more comrade for the police, knowing their preoccupation with arms—did not help. Schmucker was executed in June 1974 by an action group in Second June Movement. The West German police had been clearly interested in Manfred. But there is no arrest warrant on him, and he is not wanted. The West German police only note briefly that Manfred since 1975 probably resides abroad.⁵⁷

At the trial, this was reflected only in the testimony of Manfred's girlfriend by the following passage:

In Berlin he lived in some kind of collective and worked among other things in a kindergarten. He and the rest in the collective, furthermore, were engaged in contact activity among the detainees in prisons. . . . When relations within the collective deteriorated, he decided to leave for a while.⁵⁸

While Hunter and Carillo were the two most important members of his team, Kroeher used the period between the SPK attack on the German embassy and late 1976 to reinforce his group with extra people. Two Marxist organizations were involved in these efforts. One was the Stockholm Refugee Council, where Marxist revolutionaries of all sorts could be found and recruited and contacts could be established for the procurement of arms and explosives. The other one was KRUM (*Riksfuerbundet fuer kriminalvarens humanisering*), a

⁵⁴ Judgment, p. 303.

⁵⁵ Further details of this affair are given in Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children*, pp. 259-260.

⁵⁶ Becker refers to an investigation into the Schmucker affair that was made by Stefan Aust for the North German Television program *Panorama*. She quotes Aust as saying that "although the judges and condemners of Schmucker called themselves Second June Movement, they were not necessarily the same people who committed any of the other acts claimed by a movement of that name, and . . . there were several separate groups as well as a shifting membership." (p. 293).

⁵⁷ Hederberg, op. cit., p. 77.

⁵⁸ Judgment, p. 327.

Marxist-dominated organization founded in 1966 as a windfall of the Swedish Vietnam effort and ostensibly concerned with bettering the conditions of prisoners, but which in reality—true to the Marxist policy of delegitimizing the “Capitalist State”—concentrated on humiliating the state’s prison institutions and raising the status of the state’s prisoners, not the least by procuring for them a sounding board in the mass media (a service that, of course, was readily provided by the Marxist-dominated Swedish television, where Dr. Elwin was an important figure, and by some important dailies of the same inclination, including *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet*.) This was a service indeed parallel to the Baader-Meinhof defense strategy of claiming prisoner-of-war status, because that tended to legitimize the armed operations and give the RAF a kind of international recognition.⁵⁹ KRUM used to organize—on behalf of or for the benefit of the German terrorists—demonstrations and press conferences replete with attacks on the *Bundesrepublik* and its system of justice. One such occasion occurred early in 1975. The following picture emerges.

On December 6, 1974, Andreas Baader’s defense counsel, Siegfried Haag,⁶⁰ invited the Swedish and international press in Stockholm to a press conference on conditions in the prison in which the Baader-Meinhof people were being held. A group of clandestinely working Germans came to Stockholm for the occasion and approached various well-known leftist people and organizations. Officially, they were turned down. On December 12, 1974, however, a demonstration against the German embassy took place, headed by Dr. Goran Elwin and Tobias Berggren, both of the Marxist persuasion.⁶¹ In early 1975, there followed a press conference at which the rostrum included Dr. Elwin. Now *Rechtsanwalt* Siegfried Haag appeared, having flown in from Germany. The whole party of Germans afterwards found lodgings in the apartment of a Swedish girlfriend.

Haag returned to Germany and disappeared underground after the SPK had blown up the Stockholm embassy. The Haag Gruppe was indeed the illegal outfit cooperating with Klaus Croissant’s law firm

⁵⁹ On the policy of delegitimizing the “Capitalist State,” see Horst Mahler in *Wagenbach Rotbuch*, No. 29, Berlin, 1971, pp.45ff, and “Die Entwöhnung von Gehorsams gegenüber der bürgerlichen Rechtsordnung ist eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Revolutionierung der Massen” (p. 46). On the Baader-Meinhof defense strategy, see Volker Speitel’s testimony, published in *Der Spiegel*, No. 31, 1980, p. 32.

⁶⁰ Haag was also the defense counsel of Holger Meins, who starved himself to death on November 11, 1974. Haag profited by this occasion to recruit Volker Speitel into the SPK, which later undertook the assault on the Stockholm embassy. See Speitel’s testimony in *Der Spiegel*, No. 31, 1980, p. 41. Haag was indeed rumored to have masterminded the attack.

⁶¹ See Leo Sievers, *Stern*, No. 6, 1976, p. 68, for the interviews with Elwin and Berggren, published in *Aftonbladet*, June 17, 1977, p. 8.

in Stuttgart and taking its orders from the Baader-Meinhof prisoners in Stammheim prison—*Fuhrerfunktion Stammheim*, as the matter was known to insiders such as Volker Speitel. The law firm operated in several sections, one for legal defense matters, another for the courier service to the Haag Gruppe and the rest of the underground, and a third for the propaganda apparatus and the coordination of the international effort that was based on fellow travelers and mass media.⁶²

On May 9, 1975, Haag was arrested at the Swiss frontier on charges of having transported arms for the Baader-Meinhof group. He was later released on bail and thereafter disappeared underground. His arrest, taking place without a shootout, brought bitter condemnation from *Fuhrerfunktion Stammheim*, which castigated him as a "supercop" (*Oberbulle*).⁶³

In May 1975, a new conference took place, organized by KRUM. At the trial, Karl Gratzner testified:

In May 1975, Gratzner and Karin participated in a meeting organized by KRUM at Aso gymnasium concerning the legal aspects of the embassy drama that had taken place previously during the spring. Gratzner got the impression that the meeting supported the action that had been launched against the embassy.⁶⁴ After the meeting Gratzner and Karin talked to some Germans participating—two men and two women—who accompanied them back to Osterlanggatan together with some others. The Germans said that they belonged to a committee against the torture of prisoners.⁶⁵

These committees—*Komitees gegen die Isolationsfolter*—were outfits set up to house the fellow-travelers and coordinate them into the propaganda effort. *Fuhrerfunktion Stammheim* was less than happy about them. Andreas Baader is reported to have rejected them because the talk was too soft: "Torture does not belong among the concepts of the revolutionary struggle" ("Folter ist kein revolutionärer Kampfbegriff").⁶⁶ However, one of these committees is said to have employed Karl-OHeinz Dellwo, the youngest of the terrorists who attacked the German embassy in Stockholm.⁶⁷

⁶² See the disclosures of Speitel in *Der Spiegel*, No. 31, 1980, and No. 32, 1980, p. 33.

⁶³ See Speitel testimony in *Der Spiegel*, No. 32, 1980, p. 33.

⁶⁴ Hederberg (who is active in Swedish television) here adds a footnote by writing that the meeting was deserted by the Swedish organizers "because they felt that it had turned into pure propaganda for terrorism." (p. 64.)

⁶⁵ Judgment, p. 221. Claimed to be among the Germans participating was Suzanne Albrecht (wanted for the murder of Jürgen Ponto). See *Svenska Dagbladet*, August 2, 1977, p. 4 (Sune Olsson).

⁶⁶ See Speitel's testimony in *Der Spiegel*, No. 31, 1980, p. 38.

⁶⁷ Leo Sievers, *Stern*, No. 13, 1976, p. 136.

Finally, there was the nest in the Old City, a spacious apartment at Osterlanggatan, rented by a leftist actress and her German boyfriend, that housed a continuously changing group of people. Having broken with Anna-Karin Lindgren, Kroecker moved into this apartment during the summer of 1976. He stayed until November 1976, when he moved to a borrowed apartment with his new girlfriend, Motzi Eklof.

DISINTEGRATION OF THE KROECKER GROUP

The Purge of Anna-Karin

When the group had been formed by Kroecker, it went through certain convulsions. All in all, they may be said to have doomed the plan. At the bottom of the strife lay the opposition between locals and foreigners.

The first event was the purging of Anna-Karin Lindgren by the non-Swedes. It happened at a meeting in December 1976. Anna-Karin herself testified:

Since Kroecker had moved from Anna-Karin, their relationship had worsened progressively. . . . The last meeting in which Anna-Karin participated was held in early December—at the time when Gratzner was to go to Austria—in an apartment at Hornsgatan where they had not been before. Kroecker, Warring, and Motzi Eklof fetched Anna-Karin from her home by car. Kroecker had told her in advance that people would come and fetch her. . . . Present at the meeting at Hornsgatan were Kroecker, Motzi Eklof, Hunter, the spouses Carillo, Warring, and Gratzner. Hunter was chairman. It was said that Anna-Karin was unreliable and unpolitical and that consequently one did not want to have anything to do with her. Then there was some kind of voting. Nobody was against the decision. Anna-Karin wondered what they were doing, but she did not ask since she felt that there was no interest in asking. She did not react in any particular way; she only thought that it was absurd their suddenly excluding her from something when she did not understand what it was they were excluding her from.⁶⁸

Karl Gratzner, an Austrian by origin but a naturalized Swedish citizen with an almost complete Swedish university degree, including studies in sociology, belonged to the group but did not get along too well with Kroecker, who had difficulty mastering him in intellectual discussions.

Gratzner testified:

⁶⁸ Judgment, p. 122.

When he came to the place, an apartment in a backyard where he had not been before, Kroeher was there, and Anna-Karin Lindgren, Warring, the spouses Carillo, Hunter, Adomeit, and Motzi Eklof. Kroeher was not satisfied with Anna-Karin who had not met his expectations but had shown passive resistance to his plans. He thought perhaps that she had not done enough, and after voting, she was simply excluded.⁶⁹

It is worthy of note that the group active here included three Swedes (or four if Gratzner, an Austrian, is counted as Swedish due to his citizenship) and five non-Swedes.

Bloody Sunday: The Democratic Swedes Rebel

The second event was a rebellion among the Swedes. It exploded on January 30, 1977, and was later referred to by Kroeher as "Bloody Sunday." On January 14, 1977, Warring held a birthday party. The guests included Anna-Karin Lindgren, Pia Laskar, Karin Lingtorp, and Viveka Monti, all Swedish girls, and two men, Gratzner, who was half Swedish, and Adomeit who was all German. Gratzner testified:

During the party, Gratzner spoke to Adomeit about Kroeher and his kidnapping plans. They were of the opinion that all of Kroeher's acquaintances should meet and discuss Kroeher and possibly also invite him.⁷⁰

The meeting thus planned became Kroeher's Bloody Sunday. The following testimonies convey what happened:

The meeting, which lasted several hours, grew rather turbulent and those present told Kroeher straight in the face what they had accumulated during a long time. Kroeher reacted by growing rigid as a stick and saying nothing.⁷¹ Motzi rather soon got the feeling that these people had pulled themselves together in order to jointly—in a slightly more organized way—criticize Kroeher. It was very difficult to criticize him alone. It was easier to do it with the support of other people. Maybe that added more stress to the criticism, and it was not equally easy for him to find subterfuges; rather, he was forced to listen to what people wanted to say. Somebody said that they now wanted to take him down to earth. Pia, who sat beside Kroeher at one end of the room, started. . . . Everybody listened to Pia quietly, and then Warring continued. Kroeher and Motzi were a bit taken by surprise that there were so many people assembled and that the criticism advanced was so organized. Kroeher mostly sat silent and listened. Those times when he said something he tried to repudiate the criticism by saying that it

⁶⁹ Judgment, p. 239ff.

⁷⁰ Judgment, p. 241.

⁷¹ Judgment, p. 331.

was not only his fault but also theirs. Mostly, however, he sat in his corner, ate his nails, and listened.⁷²

.....

Karin [Lingtorn] and the others had been sitting talking for one or two hours before Kroeher and Motzi Eklof finally arrived. Everybody then started to criticize him enormously and put forward their personal opinions about him. He was told that he must behave differently or he would not have a single comrade left. Pia thought that he was a genuine male chauvinist and that he had a fixation to violence, and that he was bossy toward his surroundings. Karin criticized him for giving orders, e.g., to buy beer even when they were short of money. She told him to go back to Germany. Even Motzi delivered forceful criticism against him.⁷³

.....

When Kroeher arrived, everybody went after him, even Motzi. They criticized his person and his political opinion. The criticism lasted several hours, but Kroeher looked outwardly rather unaffected. He only sat and listened. Then he turned the criticism around and said that in fact the others were the ones oppressing him by not accepting his political goals, that is to say, his actions for kidnapping and release. Finally, he asked what would happen to action Leo. After the meeting, he was completely alone. Not even Armando Carillo was interested in any political activity in Europe but only wanted to go back to Mexico. The meeting lasted probably three hours. People went in and out. Karin [Lingtorn] was out in the kitchen making food.⁷⁴

.....

There was no direct answer given to Kroeher's question—what would happen to Operation Leo? No direct decision was taken, but it seemed that Kroeher was rather depressed when he left Osterlanggatan (the actress' nest).⁷⁵

The impression that is conveyed by these accounts is that Bloody Sunday was the fiesta of the Swedish females. The role of the foreigners seems to have been very limited. Gratzner, the half-Swedish sociology student, only takes professional note of how Kroeher treats the criticism. Nothing is said about any criticism against Kroeher from his side or from Adomeit's, although these two may well have masterminded the session.

⁷² Judgment, p. 293.

⁷³ Judgment, p. 265.

⁷⁴ Judgment, p. 241.

⁷⁵ Judgment, p. 266.

DECISIONMAKING IN THE KROECHER GROUP

Language and Democracy

Let us now look at how decisions were made in the Kroecher group. Their primary problem was language. This was a pluralistic European group. There prevailed a "Babylonian confusion of tongues."⁷⁶ Originally, Kroecher knew no Swedish, but by 1976 he had learned to speak Swedish rather well.⁷⁷ Anna-Karin and Kroecher spoke German together.⁷⁸ Neither Warring nor Pia Laskar understood German, so they spoke English with Kroecher. Indeed, Warring testified that Kroecher spoke rather good English.⁷⁹ Kroecher did not speak Spanish; consequently, when he had been introduced to the spouses Carillo, he recruited a girl student from the Spanish Institute at the University of Stockholm to serve as an interpreter.⁸⁰ Maria Carillo, however, spoke English.⁸¹ Anna Maroufidou—a recruit from the Stockholm Refugee Council—spoke English very badly, so badly in fact that it was hard to communicate with her.⁸² As a result, their parties proceeded with a mixture of languages: "some Spanish, some French, some English, and some Swedish."⁸³

Kroecher was the man of action and organization. "Kroecher wanted to form a group in order to carry out his plans. Therefore, he did not bother very much about political philosophies but rather checked to see if the person in question could be of any use. Consequently, it was not a political view that united the people in this group and they did not share the same political platform."⁸⁴ "Kroecher worked in conspiratorial ways inasmuch as he did not disclose all the details in a plan at once, but served the pieces of information in portions in order thereby to get a hook into the people in question. Thus, it took quite a long time before [Warring] understood that the plan looked the way he now has described it."⁸⁵

The major organizational work took place when Armando Carillo and Alan Hunter had been recruited:

⁷⁶ The expression is used by Gratzner, *Judgment*, p. 232.

⁷⁷ *Judgment*, pp. 188, 139.

⁷⁸ *Judgment*, p. 192.

⁷⁹ *Judgment*, p. 139.

⁸⁰ This was Viveka Monti. *Judgment*, p. 146.

⁸¹ *Judgment*, p. 151.

⁸² *Judgment*, p. 232.

⁸³ *Judgment*, p. 188.

⁸⁴ *Judgment*, p. 159.

⁸⁵ *Judgment*, p. 158.

No regular meetings were being held, but Kroecker presented his plans when people met. Sometimes, however, this happened in connection with his calling a meeting. Most matters were touched on when Hunter and Armando Carillo had joined. Then there developed great political discussions since the political differences were very big between these people. Kroecker described himself as a kind of anarchist, while Armando Carillo was a Marxist. Warring himself had a kind of liberal Communist view and supports a trade union movement of the type that was built up in Spain during their Civil War. As to Hunter's ideas, Warring did not have much grasp. It was Kroecker who presented plans, but there were never any formal decisions taken. Mostly no plans were discussed at all because there was an enormous confusion of tongues.⁸⁶ On the whole it was a very heterogeneous collection of people and political views. Furthermore, the confusion of tongues was Babylonian. At the suggestion of Kroecker, a chairman was elected so that there should be at least some order. It was decided that the chairmanship should circulate, and the first time Kroecker was the chairman he spoke so long that nobody had a chance to speak.⁸⁷ People met in Anna-Karin's apartment at Agnegatan, sipped coffee or ate food, listened to music, and discussed all sorts of things, e.g., politics, group work and group dynamics. Hashish was almost always smoked during the meetings, which were more or less spontaneous gatherings. It was usually Kroecker who spoke about conspiratorial actions of various kinds, but he too spoke about a lot of other things. There was no list of attendance, no table to sit around, no chairman's mallet, and no record of any kind. At a couple of meetings during the autumn, however, one person was elected chairman. It was Kroecker's idea that somebody should formally be chairman during the discussions, but, nevertheless, it was he himself who functioned as chairman. At one meeting Gratzner was made chairman and at another Adomeit. It is possible that Warring served as chairman. Hunter was the chairman at the last meeting in December. However, Armando Carillo never was chairman. Anna-Karin has no recollection of any rule that what was revealed at the meetings should be kept secret. Indeed, that matter was not discussed at all. Consequently, nobody was made to give any promise of secrecy.⁸⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Sweden—A Socialist Patients' Collective

The story of the Kroecker plan is exciting. After all, it is a remarkable feat for a German worker, barely knowing a word of Swedish, to succeed in staying underground in Germanophobic Sweden for five years at the expense of a university-educated, loving Swedish girl, occasionally supplementing her earnings with the proceeds from his

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Judgment.

⁸⁸ Judgment.

bank robberies. It is even more remarkable that in peaceful Sweden this man succeeded in setting up very advanced plans for one of the most dangerous operations that has threatened the Swedish government in modern times.

This German refugee was on the wanted list of the German police. Indeed, he even carried around the German police poster showing his face and stating the arrest warrant and displayed it to his Swedish recruits. And this very fact was no deterrent to his Swedish friends; on the contrary, it was an attraction. How come?

It appears that by insistently throwing out criticism of foreign laws and foreign governments, based on leftist slogans, the Swedish government of the 1960s and 1970s created such a climate of disaffection with law and state and such general leftist sympathies that this German exile had no difficulty at all in recruiting the lesser members of his team among the Swedish middle-class intellectuals, and in particular among the girls who populated Stockholm. Neither did he have any difficulty in recruiting his top people among the Marxist foreigners who had been lured to Stockholm by the new Swedish refugee policy (the Papandreou line).

The extent of nondetection is stupefying. Evidently it has to do with the destruction of the infrastructure that was one of the hallmarks of Sweden's socialist culture. Spurred on by the socialist family law reforms of the early 1970s, Swedish promiscuity dispensed with all need to submit to control. Even Schmucker's murderer could survive in Sweden for any amount of time in the apartment of a local girlfriend. The existence of collectives, finally, provided a perfect underground network, almost undetectable by the police.

It thus appears that the combination of an aggressive foreign policy with a lax societal discipline had turned the whole of Sweden into a giant Socialist Patients' Collective, served on a platter to German terrorists. On the other hand, it is also noteworthy that the spirit of participative democracy that had been a dominating fad in Sweden by the 1970s seems to have turned the promising breeding ground for Marxist terrorists into a society with two left feet. The very German efficiency—hard working, good planning—suddenly backfires. Here it is hard to know from the accounts of Bloody Sunday whether the Swedish group members only reacted emotionally to bossism and male chauvinism or if they also were the slow thinkers who finally realized what was taking place. The latter alternative would credit them with some rationality.

Let us return to the destruction of the infrastructure. This theme is crucial. Terrorism is not an acceptable societal development; it has to be combatted. In the socialist camp it is combatted by replacing the benevolent family control that once formed the infrastructure with a

political control, not benevolent at all. In the West, the family infrastructure has progressively been phased out in recent years. So far it has not been replaced by other means of control. This has provided the terrorists with their opportunity. High-tax society offers considerable means of control, but while there is much fuss about them, they have so far not been used for antiterrorist purposes. Consequently, one may conclude that Western society right now is in a vacuum, and on this vacuum, it seems, the terrorists are feeding.

Better To Burn a Department Store Than To Run One

The Swedish "Socialist Patients' Collective" has another moral as well. Leftist millenarianism had no difficulty in surviving in this society with slogans such as "It is better to burn a department store than to run one." It is well to recall that the whole Western notion of détente is endangered by this remarkable survival.

The intellectual rationale for the policy of détente outside of the socialist camp was the belief that the Soviet Union is being changed by commercial and technological exchanges with the West. The men of the West behind this are economic in their thinking—technocratic, pragmatic, unideological. They believe that commercial and technical exchanges with the socialist camp encourage the growth and influence of a modernizing and liberalizing element in socialist society, which is destined eventually to take over control of the government. They believe that these emerging socialist liberals are practical people who see the world in much the same way as their Western counterparts. They argue that the national interests of the countries in the socialist camp coincide with the interests of the Western industrial countries, and they find the really serious division in the world not between East and West, but between North and South.

People holding this view might be called economic determinists. They have something in common with the Marxists, also determinists, although their view of how it will all end is the opposite of what the Marxists believe.

The success of the Norbert Kroeher plan, limited though it was, calls for an awakening. If slogans such as "It is better to burn a department store than to run one" can survive and flourish in very advanced Western industrialized states, why should the evolution among the socialists themselves—in the socialist camp where they are at home—be determined by economic interest and technological development, by the demands of those who have acquired the taste for consumer goods? Isn't it more likely that there are also in the camp men of principle in the leadership, determined to sacrifice the department store to the flames of political belief, to see the department stores burn rather than run them?

**PROPOSALS FOR A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
AND LOW-INTENSITY VIOLENCE
AT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LEVELS**

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RESPONSE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The liberal state tough-line approach means combining harsh and effective temporary measures to isolate and eliminate terrorist cells, their leaders, and their logistic support, with the maintenance of liberal democracy, and with a vigorous political life of participation, debate, and reform within the framework of the law. The keynote of this approach is not panic repression and overreaction, which actually plays into the hands of terrorists, but a consistent policy of *minimizing* their potential rewards. There are some historical examples of the effectiveness of this approach.

After France had suffered what is dubbed the Dynamic Decade of bomb outrages in the 1890s, the government used the weapon of *les lois scelerates*. These laws were deliberately aimed at suppressing anarchist movements and journals and even made it an offense to apologize for anarchist acts of violence. Despite the predictable outcry these measures caused in anarchist circles, there can be no doubt that they effectively snuffed out the anarchist terrorism that had mushroomed. And although the punishments meted out to convicted anarchists were harsh, it is also clear that the democratic institutions and processes of the French Third Republic managed to survive intact.

Again, there is the case of the newly independent Irish Free State confronted by the rebellion of the Irregulars who opposed the treaty with Britain. The Free State government adopted emergency powers to deal with the terrorist and guerrilla campaign of the Irregulars between November 1922 and May 1923, setting up special military courts with the power to inflict the death penalty. In six months of the civil war, the number of Irregular prisoners executed by the British was almost twice the number of other prisoners executed in the years between 1916 and 1921. These draconian measures certainly

assisted the Free State government to restore order: By May 24, 1923, the leaders of the Irregulars had conceded military defeat.

However, even when the tough-line approach eliminates a specific threat to the security of a state or to law and order by destroying active terrorist cells, passive sympathizers often remain. Indeed, part of the price we pay for the survival of democracy is allowing freedom of ideas. Hence, in a working liberal democracy it is both dangerous and naive to hope "to destroy a subversive movement utterly."¹

To counter terrorism effectively, the tough-line approach involves waging two kinds of war: a military-security war to contain and reduce terrorist violence, and a political and psychological war to secure the popular consent and support that must be the basis of any effective modern democratic government. It is fallacious to assume that terrorists need mass support before they can perpetrate murder and destruction. As we have already observed, many contemporary terrorist groups are very small. Yet it is important for the success of antiterrorist operations that popular support for the terrorists remain limited to a minority—indeed that the terrorists be as isolated as possible from the general population.

To be successful, this strategy demands a unified control of all counterinsurgency operations, an intelligence service of the highest quality, adequate security forces possessing the full range of counterinsurgency skills and complete loyalty to the government, and last but not least, enormous reserves of patience and determination.²

There are rarely any easy victories over terrorism. The characteristic features of political terrorism, its undeclared and clandestine nature and its employment by desperate, often fugitive, fanatics, imply a struggle of attrition constantly erupting into murder and disruption. Moreover, the terrorists know that security forces in a liberal state are forced to operate at dangerous mid-levels of coerciveness. Judicial restraints and civil control prevent the security forces from deploying their full strength and firepower. No doubt this is inevitable and desirable in a liberal democracy, but it does mean that the tasks of countering terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare in a democracy are enormously complex and demanding. We must now consider them in more detail.

¹ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p. 50.

² Police used these qualities with notable success at the end of 1975 in their handling of the kidnapping of Dr. Tiede Herrema, a Dutch industrialist, in Eire, and of the Balcombe Street siege in London that ended in the surrender of four IRA suspects. Many of the techniques of siege-management used by British police were pioneered by the New York Police Hostage Department.

Some Ground Rules

It is possible to draw from the recent experience of low-intensity and counterinsurgency operations certain basic ground rules that should be followed by liberal democracies taking a tough line against terrorism:

1. The democratically elected government must proclaim a determination to uphold law and constitutional authority, and must demonstrate this will in its actions.
2. There must be no resort to general indiscriminate repression. The government must show that its measures against terrorism are directed solely at quelling the terrorists and their active collaborators and at defending society against the terrorists. A slide into general repression would destroy individual liberties and political democracy and may indeed bring about a ruthless dictatorship even more unpalatable than the terrorism the repression was supposed to destroy. Moreover, repressive overreaction plays into the hands of terrorists by giving credence to their claim that liberal democracy is a sham or a chimera, and it enables them to pose as defenders of the people.
3. The government must be seen to be doing all in its power to defend the lives of citizens. This is a vital prerequisite for public confidence and cooperation. If it is lacking, private armies and vigilante groups will tend to proliferate and will exacerbate civil violence.
4. There must be a clear-cut and consistent policy of refusing to make any concessions to terrorist blackmail. If the terrorist weapon can be shown to pay off against a particular government, then that government and its political moderates will find their power and authority undermined. There is abundant evidence that weakness and concession provoke a rapid emulation of terrorism by other groups and a dramatic escalation in the price of blackmail demands.
5. All aspects of the antiterrorist policy and operations should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and hence democratically accountable.
6. Special powers, which may become necessary to deal with a terrorist emergency, should be approved by the legislature only for a fixed and limited period. The maximum should be six months, subject to the legislature's right to revoke or renew the special powers, should circumstances require. Emergency measures should be clearly and simply drafted, published as widely as possible, and administered impartially.

7. Sudden vacillations in security policy should be avoided: They tend to undermine public confidence and encourage the terrorists to exploit rifts in the government and its security forces.
8. Loyal community leaders, officials, personnel at all levels of government, and security forces must be accorded full backing by the civil authorities.
9. No deals should be made with terrorist organizations behind the backs of elected politicians.
10. The government should not engage in dialogue and negotiation with groups that are actively engaged in promoting, committing, or supporting terrorism. To do so only lends the terrorists publicity, status, and, worst of all, a spurious respectability.
11. Terrorist propaganda and defamation should be countered by full and clear official statements of the government's objectives, policies, and problems.
12. The government and security forces must conduct all antiterrorist operations within the law. They should do all in their power to ensure that the normal legal processes are maintained and that those charged with terrorist offenses are brought to trial.
13. Terrorists imprisoned for crimes committed for professedly political motives should be treated in the same manner as ordinary criminals. Concessions of special status and other privileges tend to erode respect for the impartiality of the law, arouse false hopes of an amnesty, and impose extra strains on the penal system.
14. It is a vital principle that liberal-democratic governments should not allow their concern with countering terrorism, even in a serious emergency, to deflect them from their responsibilities for the social and economic welfare of the community. Liberal-democratic governments must, by definition, be grounded upon the broad consent of the governed. They are inherently reformist and ameliorative. It is their citizens' natural and legitimate expectation that their representatives and ministers will respond constructively to the expressed needs and grievances of the people. The business of attending to the public welfare must go on. It is, of course, true that this is one of the great inner strengths of a liberal democracy and, incidentally, one reason why its citizens constitute such a hostile "sea" for the terrorist to swim in.

It would be the height of folly for a liberal democracy faced with a terrorist emergency to halt its work of amelioration and reform. On the contrary, everything possible should be done to prevent the serious disruption and paralysis of social and economic life so ardently

sought by the terrorists. Yet the liberal-democratic government should not, on any account, concede a reform or change of policy under terrorist duress. Such grave acts of weakness would only breed contempt for the normal political processes and for the law.

I must emphasize that the above general principles are not meant to be comprehensive. Much qualification and elaboration is needed to relate these ground rules to the actual problems of conducting anti-terrorist operations. Nevertheless, I do believe that these broad principles embody some of the major lessons that have been learned from antiterrorist campaigns of the past. It is now necessary to survey the strategy, tactics, measures, and resources of antiterrorist operations and to identify some of the more valuable forms of international response.

The Two-War Strategy

The so-called "two-war" or "two-front" strategy was developed primarily by counterinsurgency specialists engaged in countering the "people's wars" of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. It is true that these conflicts involved a mixture of high and low intensity, and conventional and unconventional warfare. Terrorism, both rural and urban, was only part of the tactics of revolutionary warfare experienced in Malaya and Indochina. Nevertheless, despite the enormous differences between these conflicts and contemporary terrorism within liberal democracies, the "two-war" strategic doctrine is still broadly applicable to low-intensity operations in heavily industrialized and urbanized societies.

The doctrine prescribes the harmonization of the two distinctive kinds of campaign by the counterinsurgency forces:

1. The military and security war to identify, isolate, and destroy the revolutionary forces, their leaders, logistic support, and lines of communication.
2. The political, ideological, and psychological war to sustain and strengthen the base of popular support behind the government and hence to render the terrorists politically isolated and vulnerable.

Terrorists are always ready to exploit genuine grievances and profound social problems for their own revolutionary purposes. Naturally, governments are in a much stronger position if they can show some bona fide successes in tackling these socioeconomic problems. And terrorists invest considerable effort in the propaganda work of their political wings. Where the terrorist organization proper is proscribed, front organizations are used for this work. Governments

must effectively counter the barrage of terrorist propaganda and defamiation if the counterinsurgency campaign is to have any hope of success.

We need to identify and destroy the terrorist propaganda bases that are active in our communities, although this would be just a start. The Soviet apparatus would still remain intact, and so would the East European proxies. But there are groups busily engaged in propaganda and recruitment in most Western capitals. They are very important to the terrorists, because an ethnic separatist or class-revolutionary movement cannot be mobilized without including some of the constituents the terrorists are claiming to represent, at least in their leadership committees, where they actually run the cells. They cannot run a movement that claims to be "liberating Italy" or "conquering Japanese imperialism" if they do not even have some platform in the country they claim to be liberating. In other words, it is very important that the propaganda and recruitment setups of terrorist organizations within democratic societies be put out of business.

Where do we look for these propaganda bases? Publishing organizations and journals often serve as a cover for this kind of activity. There are also certain danger spots within the university systems. I am not suggesting for a moment that we close down certain universities. What I *am* suggesting is that we should know, and most of us can find out very easily if we do not know already, those university departments and those *individuals* in departments who are carrying out tasks for terrorist organizations as propagandists, as agents, and as recruiters. They are the *key* initial point of entry for most active terrorists. Ruthless people, determined to keep up the numbers of their terrorist organization, mobilize impressionable young people who have political malleability and utopian enthusiasm. Remember, they are losing members all the time—some are put in jail, others defect or just run away. Thus they need to have this constant flow of recruits.

Stopping the flow of recruits into the terrorist organizations would do much to prevent the violence and damage done to society later on and would save many young people from the fate of becoming pawns of terrorist organizations, from becoming exploited by them. Indeed, many are exploited. Many do not want to stay in the movement; some are trying to get out. It is hard for them because once the terrorists have them, they use terror to keep them, and the threat against one's family or against one's own life is enough to keep the average man or woman in the organization.

Therefore, it is important to try to do two things:

1. Locate those centers of recruitment and cut off the flow of recruits before the damage is done.

2. Find ways of helping terrorists leave their movements and become rehabilitated as constructive members of society.

Democratic governments and their intelligence agencies should give priority to examining the development of university bases of recruitment by terrorist organizations operating in their region. And they should have close liaison with academic authorities who are sympathetic to the task of protecting free societies, who can cooperate by hiring only staff people who are unlikely to act as terrorist agents and propagandists. It is an ongoing business. As one person is not given tenure, another comes along who seems fitting, who seems to have all the appropriate qualifications, but who really is primarily working for a terrorist organization. Part of the war against terrorism has to be fought in the seminar and lecture rooms of the universities of the Western world. The Italian police have discovered this reality—rather late in the day. We need to apply the lessons about our moral and spiritual defenses against terrorism in all the Western democracies.

Of course, political will and propaganda alone cannot win the whole war against terrorism. The military, security, and political fronts all need to be won. But there are two key points I think we can make. You cannot win against terror by military methods alone, except perhaps in a totalitarian state that none of us would want to live in. You cannot win *solely* by better propaganda. Charles Roetter, in *Psychological Warfare*, wrote,

Propaganda is no substitute for victory. It cannot unmake defeats. It can help prepare the way for the former and speed its coming; and it can mitigate the impact of the latter. It cannot act in isolation. To be effective, it must be closely related to events.

That is a rather wise comment and it does apply very much to the terrorist situation. The gravest danger of all, in situations of severe and protracted challenge by terrorists, is that the moral integrity, will, and loyalty of a democracy may become eroded under the impact of general cynicism or the blind pursuit of self-interest by powerful groups (such as the oil companies being unprepared to take any strong measures against terrorism for fear of upsetting the Arabs). Or the media may allow the public's voracious appetite for sensationalism to influence them, causing the forces of law and order to suffer consequences of media irresponsibility.

Any liberal state heavily demoralized and under strain from inflation and recession could be pushed into destroying itself without a shot being fired. (I leave you to guess which countries I have in mind as being the most likely to come to such an end.) If one injects the element of terrorism and the probable disorganization that could be

provoked by simultaneous terrorist attacks in many parts of a democratic state, it does not take a great effort of imagination to envisage a scenario of political collapse. It is essential for us to see terrorism in the context of a worsening climate of conflict. It may be only one element, but in certain key crises it may be the decisive catalyst for the destruction of democracy. A democratic system that is undefeated at the ballot box can still be destroyed by its failure to defend itself against determined attack by the enemy within the gate. Terrorism may well be the Trojan Horse.

Police as Intelligence Agents

An intelligence service of the highest quality is clearly a vital prerequisite for any effective counterinsurgency campaign. It is absolutely crucial for combatting terrorist bombings and assassinations, which present difficulties of a rather different order from the problems of full-scale guerrilla war. The archetypal terrorist organization is numerically tiny and based on a structure of cells or firing groups, each consisting of three or four individuals. These generally exercise a fair degree of operational independence and initiative and are obsessively concerned with the security of their organization and lines of communication. Usually only one member of each cell is fully acquainted with the group's links with other echelons and with the terrorist directorate.

Experienced terrorists develop sophisticated "covers" to protect them against detection and infiltration. They are adept at disappearing into the shadows of the urban and suburban environment and at acquiring the funds and resources necessary to shift their bases between cities and across frontiers. Modern internationally based terrorist organizations take full advantage of the mobility afforded by air travel and are adroit at shifting their bases of operations when things become too hot for them.

For all these reasons the police are the most appropriate intelligence agency for combatting terrorism. I do not share General Kitson's view³ that intelligence gathering should be primarily an Army responsibility. It is true that in the special circumstances of the troubles in Ulster, police effectiveness has been somewhat vitiated by the sectarian conflict. But in most Western states the police Special Branch or its equivalent has enormous advantages over the military in the investigation and prevention of terrorist crimes. The police have firm roots in the local communities and possess an invaluable "bank" of data on both extremist and criminal groups. Moreover, the

³ Kitson, *op. cit.*, Chap. 4, "The Army's Contribution," pp. 67ff.

Army does not possess the manpower, time, or police training to duplicate the work of the police forces. Defense chiefs have to make their primary concern the meeting of external defense obligations, and they generally prefer to husband their intelligence services for use in operations in which the Army is militarily involved.

Police in Western democracies have learned many valuable lessons from their recent experiences with terrorism. There have been three main trends in this development:

1. Improvements in techniques of intelligence gathering, infiltration and surveillance, and data computerization. By these means, background information can be more readily developed into contact information.
2. Improvements in the machinery for coordination of antiterrorist operations at the national level.
3. Greater international cooperation and exchange of data on international terrorism on a regular basis.

The Army's Role

What should be the role of the Army in countering terrorism? Even in the initial phases of a terrorist campaign, the Army can provide invaluable aid to the civil power. Bomb disposal, sharpshooting, and training and testing in new techniques and weaponry are some obvious roles in which military expertise may be invaluable. But I believe that the Army should be handed the overall task of maintaining internal security and order only as a last resort; troops should be brought in when it is obvious that the civil power is unable to cope and there is a very real risk of civil war. If they are given this task, they should be given a clear remit and briefing on their role by the civil authorities, and they should be withdrawn as soon as the level of violence has dropped to a point at which the police can act effectively.

There are a number of dangers involved in deploying the Army in a major internal terrorist emergency role that need be constantly borne in mind:

1. An unnecessarily high military profile may serve to escalate the level of violence by polarizing pro- and anti-government elements in the community.
2. There is a constant risk that a repressive overreaction or a minor error of judgment by the military may trigger further civil violence. Internal security duties inevitably impose considerable strains on the soldiers who are made well aware of the hostility of certain sections of the community toward them.

3. Antiterrorist and internal security duties absorb considerable manpower and involve diverting highly trained military technicians from their primary NATO and external defense roles.
4. There is a risk that the civil power may become overdependent upon the Army's presence, and there may be a consequent lack of urgency in preparing the civil police for gradually reshouldering the internal security responsibility.

Britain is fortunate in having an Army steeped in democratic ethos. They have shown enormous skill, courage, and patience in carrying out a number of extraordinarily difficult counterinsurgency tasks around the world since 1945. Their loyalty in carrying out their instructions from the civil government has never been put in question. It is doubtful whether any other army could have performed the internal security role in Northern Ireland with such humanity, restraint, and effectiveness.

It would be naive to assume that all liberal democracies are as fortunate. It is notorious that many armies, particularly conscript armies, have been infiltrated and subverted by extremist organizations of both the left and the right. Both the Italian and French armies have had to weed out left-wing activists who were undermining military discipline.

The recent history of Greece affords a vivid demonstration of the consequences of widespread disaffection and political subversion within the armed forces. It is a warning that no liberal democracy can afford to ignore, for loyal and disciplined armed forces are the last line of defense for democracies in crisis.

Mobilizing the Public

Yet there are many other valuable lines of defense open to liberal democracies before the Army is put to the ultimate test of preserving the state. The ordinary, loyal, and decent citizens are themselves a priceless asset in combatting terrorism if only they can be mobilized to help the government and security forces. One way of doing this is to enroll large numbers of able-bodied men into the police reserve. It is unfortunately true that these auxiliaries are treated with some disdain by the professionals, and that there is considerable resistance in some quarters to extending the police reserve. Nevertheless, when so many of our major city police forces are below efficient strength, a large injection of police reserve manpower could considerably ease the situation.

Police reserves would have an obvious benefit for the effective conduct of antiterrorist operations. Full-time and specialist-trained officers would be freed from more routine duties, and more time and man-

power could be devoted to combatting terrorist crime. Moreover, there is no reason why police reserves could not adequately perform many of the extra duties of patrols, searches, and vehicle checks that may be necessitated by a terrorist emergency. I strongly recommend that measures to increase police reserves be given urgent consideration.

Another valuable way of mobilizing public assistance against terrorism is through a concerted program of public information and education about how to recognize bombs and terrorist weapons, the procedure to be adopted when a suspicious object is sighted, the kind of information that might be valuable to the police, the speediest method of communication with the antiterrorist squad, and so forth. There should also be much more use of television, radio, and public advertisement to convey this essential information. There is a rich fund of experience from Ulster and elsewhere concerning the most effective methods of mobilizing the public behind an antiterrorist campaign.

The security authorities should also take care to brief special groups such as property owners in areas under attack and businessmen concerning the particular terrorist hazards that they are most likely to confront, and to give special advice on appropriate counter-measures. It is to be hoped that the police in British cities have already held such consultations with owners of premises and places of entertainment. The police should also make a regular practice of informing regional hospital authorities of the kind of emergency situations that are likely to arise through terrorist attacks. This task of public education and mobilization is just as vital to the task of saving lives as the formulation of contingency plans for military and police action.

One general aim of such measures should be to make the public far more security conscious. Members of the public must be constantly vigilant for suspicious objects or activities in the environs of buildings, for signs of tampering with vehicles, and for unattended bags and parcels. Gunsmiths and commercial suppliers of chemicals and explosives should, as a matter of routine, check that their customers are bona fide. Any irregular transactions or unaccountable losses should be immediately reported to the police. The eyes and ears of the security forces must be the citizens.

Indeed, without the fullest public cooperation, special preventive measures against terrorism are bound to fail. Take, for example, the matter of storage of detonators and explosive substances for industrial purposes. It would be no earthly good for the government to bring in a new Act imposing severe penalties for failing to keep explosive stores fully secure if the actual workers and managers involved in their industrial use still failed to observe the minimal rules of security. Police are generally called in only when there is an explosives or

weapons theft, i.e., when it is probably too late. Truly preventive action against terrorism demands the fullest cooperation of every member of the public.

Special Powers: Detention

What should be the role of special powers in a terrorist emergency? And which have been shown to be the most effective? Much nonsense is talked about equating the use of special powers with the abandonment of political democracy. Of course the terrorists' political propaganda eagerly seizes on any crude and confused emotionalism about basic rights being "trampled on," and uses it to foster the myth of repression. Special powers do represent a partial curtailment or restriction of the normal freedoms of a peaceful democracy, but in a liberal state they are, by definition, a temporary expedient to be used only as an ultimate weapon to help save democracy from its enemies within.

Proscription of terrorist organizations, making membership in such groups illegal, normally results in driving the groups underground, making police surveillance more difficult. However, this disadvantage may be considerably outweighed by the gain in public morale and support for the government. It is widely felt to be intolerable that a terrorist organization should flaunt itself publicly while the tally of victims of its atrocities rises. Moreover, proscription does curtail open recruitment and fund-raising. Temporary bans on marches and demonstrations may assist considerably in reducing the level of violence and tension and can free security forces from the thankless task of riot control.

The most controversial special powers are those that extend police powers of detention without trial. This is clearly a suspension of habeas corpus, yet it must be recognized that in a serious emergency the normal judicial processes may be simply unable to function. They can break down because of terrorization and intimidation of witnesses, juries, and lawyers. The police may be totally hamstrung in their attempts to get a person known to be guilty actually convicted and sentenced by a court of law. Are they then to return the terrorist to society to continue his systematic murders? The historical evidence in Ulster shows clearly that the level of violence actually increases with each wave of detainee releases. Detention without trial is a security source that governments cannot afford to discard lightly in a severe emergency situation involving terrorists. However, if detention without trial is used, it must be subject to automatic periodic review by an impartial judicial tribunal.

Less controversial, but also of proven value to the security forces, is the power to exclude and deport aliens suspected of terrorist activi-

ties. In certain states (for example, Eire), use has also been made of powers to ban terrorist organizations and their propaganda from the media. This denial of a public platform certainly hits the terrorists hard: They delude themselves if they believe that their "underground" and informal propaganda is just as effective as the established media. In October 1970 the FLQ in Quebec were so desperate for publicity that they actually made the broadcasting of their manifesto a condition for negotiating the release of their kidnap victim, James Cross.

RESPONSE AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Substantial progress has been made in international cooperation in Western Europe, but it has not sufficed to prevent this region from experiencing a higher proportion of terrorist attacks than any other. The EEC Ministers of the Interior and the police forces and intelligence services of the member states have since 1976 developed regular machinery for discussion and practical multilateral cooperation.

But the most ambitious attempt at European cooperation at the judicial level is the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism that 17 out of 19 Council of Europe member states signed in January 1977, when the Convention was opened for signature.⁴

The Political-Offenses Loophole

The Convention provides, in effect, that all ratifying states will exclude the whole range of major terrorist offenses, such as assassinations, hostage-taking, bomb attacks, and hijacking, from the political-offense exception clauses that had previously been used to justify refusal of extradition—in other words, to ensure that all contracting states would treat such offenses as common crimes. In cases where, because of some technical or constitutional difficulty, a contracting state is unable to carry out extradition, the Convention obliges the authorities to bring the suspect to trial before their own courts. Mutual assistance in criminal investigation of such offenses is also made mandatory.

However, the admirable intentions of this Convention have been seriously obstructed by two major shortcomings. First, a possible escape clause was inserted into the Convention permitting a contract-

⁴ The only member states that refused to sign were Ireland and Malta.

ing state to reserve the right to regard particular offenses as political and hence to withhold extradition.

Second, the process of ratification has been disgracefully slow despite the speedy signature of the Convention in January 1977. France and Belgium, for example, have been reluctant to ratify on the grounds that they are constitutionally committed to guarantee the right of political asylum. (It seems odd that despite all the careful safeguards in the Convention, these countries are still unprepared to exclude from this right all those charged with serious crimes of terrorism.) By late 1978, only five member states had completed ratification (Sweden, Austria, West Germany, Denmark, and Great Britain). In these circumstances, French President Giscard d'Estaing's much publicized idea, voiced in 1978, of an *espace judiciaire européenne* (a European judicial zone) seemed, to say the least, premature.

Two other recent moves to improve international cooperation against terrorism are worth mentioning. At the Bonn summit meeting of July 1978, the heads of government of Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany came out with a firm collective statement promising sanctions against states aiding and abetting aircraft hijacking. Their communiqué states:

In cases where a country refuses the extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft, or refuses to return it, the Heads of State or government are additionally resolved that they will take immediate action to cease all flights to that country. At the same time their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned.

Experts met in August 1978 to discuss the practicalities of implementing this agreement. There is every reason to welcome this firm stand in favor of sanctions by the major Western states, for it may exert a continuing deterrent effect against rogue states that have, in the past, helped to encourage hijacking. However, a cynic might note that by July 1978 aircraft hijacking was no longer the major terrorist threat; action had really been needed in 1969-1973 when the menace was at its peak.

Finally, there was an encouragingly positive meeting of the EEC Ministers of Justice in early October 1978 that proposed a Convention similar to the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism for use between all nine EEC states, again based on the principle of *aut dedere aut punire* (extradite or prosecute). This has now been introduced. It enables states (such as Ireland) that claim to have constitutional difficulties over extradition to at least guarantee that terrorist suspects will be brought to trial in their country of origin or residence.

Intelligence and Police Cooperation

One of the most important aspects of Western cooperation is the strengthening of the machinery for multilateral police and intelligence cooperation, and this has generally progressed far more rapidly than political and judicial cooperation. It takes place at five different levels:

1. Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) is, under its constitution, strictly confined to dealing with ordinary law crimes, but, as these include many terrorist acts, the organization has had some value in acting as a clearinghouse for information. For instance, in July 1976, Athens police were able to identify a West German terrorist, Rolf Pohle, with the aid of Interpol photographs, and could then detain him.
2. NATO has developed a valuable system for exchange of intelligence concerning terrorist weapons, personnel, and techniques that has been of great assistance to member states.
3. Joint training visits and exchanges of security personnel are now well established among the EEC and NATO countries.
4. Bilateral cooperation has been provided on an ad hoc basis at the request of governments. Thus, British SAS personnel, techniques, and weapons have been made available to support Dutch and West German counterterrorist operations. And the West German computer bank of data on terrorists has been used in the fight against terrorism in Italy and elsewhere.
5. There is a permanent structure of police cooperation between EEC member states of particular value in combatting cross-border terrorism.

Bilateral Cooperation

It is not generally realized that one of the most effective methods of cooperation against terrorism takes the form of bilateral agreements between neighboring states. A notable instance of this occurred in the U.S.-Cuba Hijack Pact of February 1973, in which both governments agreed to return hijacked aircraft, crews, passengers, and hijackers. It is true that Cuba insisted on a caveat enabling it to refuse to return terrorists affiliated with a national liberation movement recognized by Cuba. But as most hijackers who sought sanctuary in Cuba from the United States were criminals or psychopaths, this clause did not undermine the effectiveness of the agreement. Moreover, even though Cuba refused formally to renew the agreement, following the blowing up of a Cuban airliner by anti-Castro exiles in October 1976, it has in fact continued to operate in the spirit of the Pact, and that has

undoubtedly contributed to the defeat of the hijacking plague that afflicted the United States between 1970 and 1972.

An even more unlikely example of partnership was the cooperation between Somalia and West Germany in the GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppen 9, the German antiterrorist unit) operation at Mogadishu to rescue hostages held in the hijacking of a Lufthansa airplane. After all, Somalia was a Marxist regime that had previously been used as a base by terrorists who organized the Air France hijacking to Entebbe. Yet, encouraged by the prospect of economic assistance, the new state rendered valuable service by allowing the German rescue squad to come in.

If such diverse political systems can cooperate profitably, surely it should not be beyond the power of the West European states to improve their own bilateral security cooperation. There is some recent encouraging evidence that this is being developed in two areas particularly hard-hit by terrorist violence over the past decade: the Basque region and Northern Ireland. In January 1979, France abolished refugee status for Spanish nationals in France, on the sensible ground that Spain, as a democracy, no longer had political refugees. Almost simultaneously, 13 Spanish Basques living near the Spanish border were banished to the remote Hautes-Alpes in eastern France. This was France's very positive response to Spanish government demands for more vigorous cooperation to stamp out terrorism.

French border country has long been regarded as a valuable sanctuary and launching point for ETA terrorists, and the new measures will do much to assist the Spanish authorities' counterterrorist drive. France itself has a strong interest in helping to combat ETA terrorism, for the recent assassinations in France of two Basque leaders in revenge attacks were an unpleasant warning of the way in which ETA terrorism could spill over the frontier.

In the wake of the Provisional IRA massacres at Warrenpoint and Mullaghmore in August 1979,⁵ the governments of the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom held a series of meetings to discuss closer security cooperation. The measures agreed to in the talks held in September and October 1979 are an excellent practical illustration of cooperation between two parliamentary democracies to curb a terrorist campaign of murder that threatens them both. The new measures, including improved border cooperation, are a bold and imaginative effort to curb terrorism, which is now the major obstacle to a lasting peace and reconciliation in Ireland.

⁵ Eighteen British soldiers were murdered in the Warrenpoint ambush on the same day that the Mountbatten boat was blown up at Mullaghmore.

Extradition Problems

If the international community is to minimize the rewards of terrorism and maximize its risks and costs, it must be seen to be possible to bring terrorist suspects to justice even when they slip across frontiers. But extradition is a highly complex and unpredictable process. Many states do not have extradition agreements, and where these do exist they frequently exclude political offenses—and the term “political” is often very liberally construed. Differences in criminal codes, procedures, and judicial traditions also have to be taken into account. Often the extradition procedures become highly protracted, owing to difficulties of obtaining evidence and witnesses from abroad. In the British extradition hearings in the case of Astrid Proll in 1978-1979, there was a further complication—a dispute over nationality. (Despite delays and difficulties, however, Astrid Proll was eventually extradited to West Germany where she was charged with attempted murder of two policemen and other crimes; she was later released.)

Extradition proceedings succeed in the cases of only a small minority of terrorist suspects. Between January 1960 and June 1976, 20 states requested extradition of 78 hijackers, but the requests were granted in only five cases, although 42 of the offenders were prosecuted by the recipient state. Small wonder that in many cases states use deportation as a form of “disguised extradition,” and, as this is a civil (as opposed to criminal) proceeding, it does not afford the individual the same opportunities to present his or her own case. However, deportation merely shifts the problem to another state and does not ensure that a suspected terrorist is brought to justice. On all these grounds this method ought not to be encouraged. A far more desirable course is for states to attempt to standardize their criminal codes and procedures to facilitate the application of the “extradite or prosecute” principle.

Nor is it the case that states can always be depended upon to honor the letter or spirit of their extradition agreements. A government that fears a retaliatory attack by terrorists or that is subject to blackmail by, say, the Arab oil weapon, may well decide that “national interest” demands that they let a suspect go free. A notorious case occurred in January 1977 when Abu Daoud, suspected of involvement in the planning of the Munich massacre, was arrested in Paris on an Interpol warrant issued by the West German police. Israel immediately announced that it would request Daoud’s extradition on the ground that he was to be charged with the murder of Israeli citizens. A Paris court rejected attempts to extradite him, and he was allowed to travel to Algeria. The West German authorities expressed surprise and regret at this decision, and the international community drew

the conclusion that the French government had put its desire for remunerative new commercial agreements with Arab states before its obligations to combat international terrorism.

Problems of Establishing a European Judicial Area

The first problem to consider is what is meant by a "European judicial area"? President Giscard and spokesmen of the French government have been extremely vague. The concept of an *espace judiciaire européenne*, first floated in 1978, has an impressive resonance, with its overtones of comprehensiveness and enforceability. But what precisely is the intention? Is it the establishment of a common jurisdiction, legal code, and legal process for crimes of terrorism throughout the European democracies? Is it the setting up of a European Court for all cases of terrorist crimes? Or is it merely the ratification and implementation of extradition treaties and European conventions on the suppression of terrorism?

Nation-states have traditionally held on very tightly to their monopoly of internal legal sovereignty. There are certainly no current indications that they are now more willing even to consider relaxing this hold. It seems extremely unlikely that the European Community states would be ready to pool their sovereignty in sensitive matters crucially affecting national security, the suppression of crime, and maintenance of law and order. Thus the pooling of sovereignty and the establishment of some common legal code and judicial process to deal with terrorist crimes throughout democratic Europe can be ruled out as an impracticable option. Such developments would appear feasible only if at some future date, European countries were to unite under a federal government. While our countries remain independent nation-states, governments will continue to regard these matters as the exclusive responsibility of national governments.

This state of affairs does not, of course, preclude improvements in international judicial police and intelligence cooperation. Yet, if we examine progress to date in the most ambitious attempt at international cooperation, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, for which the Council of Europe must take full credit, it is all too evident that there are severe obstacles.

On the face of it, this may seem hard to understand. After all, the European democracies are geographically concentrated, many with common frontiers and long histories of bilateral contact and cooperation. Their legal, political, and economic systems have much in common. And, of course, the establishment of the EEC might well encourage one to believe that some degree of legal and political integration may, after all, be possible. More to the point, all our countries have a

common problem in curbing the high incidence of domestic and international terrorism.

No one should doubt the urgency of the problem for European countries. Over 50 percent of the world's internationally linked terrorist incidents in 1979 occurred in NATO Europe, i.e., 783 out of a total of 1550 incidents. This was *over double* the figure for NATO European incidents in the previous year (357).

Moreover, the very nature of modern international terrorism demands effective international response. Terrorists shift their bases and their operations rapidly from capital to capital. They criss-cross frontiers to evade detection. They collaborate with fraternal groups and sympathizers abroad, and they often rely on foreign states and movements for weapons, cash, training, and other valuable forms of support.

Given the urgent need for international cooperation, how does one explain the snail's pace of the ratification process of the European Convention? Why is it that even the modest approach of applying the principle of *aut dedere aut punire* has been more honored in the breach?

The major difficulty is that each state is proud of its own national laws and traditions. National publics may often criticize aspects of their own systems and demand reforms in the law, but they are not sympathetic to the idea that their own system should have to change in order to accommodate to some supranational or intergovernmental design.

In addition to national differences and national chauvinism, there is a considerable residue of popular mistrust and suspicion concerning the quality of their neighbors' political and legal systems. Sometimes this is rooted in an earlier history of conflict and the feeling that you can never really rely on professions of good faith and good will by the government of a former enemy. Often it is grounded on sheer xenophobia. A particularly glaring example of this type of prejudice emerged in a recent European Parliament debate on antiterrorism legislation.

A more intractable problem arises when one European government comes to the conclusion that the government of a neighboring state is actually shielding terrorists they wish to have extradited, or that neighboring states are delaying or obstructing the process of rendering *mutual assistance* as required under Article 8 of the European Convention.

In really serious cases of interstate disagreements—as, for instance, in the dealings between the Northern Ireland and Irish Republic judiciaries over the questioning of suspects and witnesses—the whole process of judicial and police cooperation can become jeopardized.

It was partly because of recognition of these profound problems that the drafters of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism wisely allowed enormous flexibility. They were particularly concerned not to exclude from the Convention states that had a deep attachment to constitutional traditions or guarantees of political asylum. This is, of course, the rationale behind Article 13 of the Convention that permits any state

... at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, to declare that it reserves the right to refuse extradition in respect of any offense mentioned in Article 1 which it considers to be a political offense, an offense connected with a political offense or an offense inspired by political motives.

At first sight, this Article of Reservation appears to negate the whole value of the Convention and its important core proposition that crimes of terrorism should be treated as serious common crimes.

There is no doubt that Article 13 does in a very fundamental sense contradict the basic philosophy of the Convention. It is a powerful testimony to the deep differences in constitutional and legal traditions to which I have already referred.

It became obvious, however, that there would be no chance of achieving a general European Convention on Terrorism without the inclusion of such a reservation clause. I was only one of many who argued strongly that the Convention was gravely weakened by this inherent contradiction.

However, it is also important to recognize that the Article of Reservation does not, in effect, totally undermine the Convention's efficacy. There is a crucial rider to the effect that when a state invokes Article 13, it has an obligation

to take into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offense, any particularly serious aspects of the offense, including

- a) that it created a collective danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons; or
- b) that it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it; or
- c) that cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of the offense.

On signature of the Convention, France, Italy, and Norway all declared their intention to invoke the Article of Reservation (although in the case of France, the declaration is couched in such cloudy and ambiguous terms that it implies that additional Reservations will be entered). Sweden invoked Article 13 when it deposited its ratification.

As I understand it, if and when all those states that entered the Reservation Article on signature do eventually ratify the Convention, they must honor their commitment under Article 13 and not allow

the excuse of political motivation to exempt persons accused of what is clearly a terroristic crime from the obligation to extradite. Indeed it is the rider to Article 13 of the Convention that comes closest to defining the characteristics of a terroristic act of violence. Thus all is not lost.

In view of the fact that such grave difficulties were encountered in drawing up a convention on terrorism that would be generally acceptable to the European democracies, and in the light of the painfully slow process of ratification and *implementation*, what possible hope is there for a more ambitious and all-embracing harmonization?

I have reluctantly concluded that the European Convention represents the *optimal mechanism* for European cooperation in the fight against terrorism, given the present condition of international relations. Rather than spending more time and effort in discussing fresh institutions or mechanisms, we should pursue the more modest aim of making the existing machinery work effectively. Moreover, there is no doubt that recent efforts by the Council of Europe and the European Community towards a greater degree of convergence in the jurisdictional legal codes and judicial procedures of the European states could immeasurably assist in smoothing the path for closer judicial cooperation and effective implementation of the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

So far this paper has argued that President Giscard's concept of an *espace judiciaire européenne*, however laudable its motivation, is neither clearly defined nor feasible, and that our energies would be better spent on making the more modest, although still painfully difficult, Convention machinery work.

But in my view there is another fundamental reason why it would be a mistake for Europe to set off in search of the chimerical "European judicial zone." Even if we were able to achieve such an agreement, and as I have said, I think this is extremely doubtful, it would not really tackle the major and growing problem of the overspill into Europe's capitals of international terrorism, much of it launched as a form of proxy war by regimes from the Middle East and other non-European areas. Cities such as Paris, London, Vienna, Athens, and Rome have in recent years become the favorite killing-grounds of terrorist groups and the hired assassins of dictatorial regimes. European governments are rightly worried about the growing toll of diplomats, émigrés, and ex-political leaders who have become victims of such attacks; they are naturally even more concerned about the growing number of their own citizens—policemen and members of the general public—whose lives are being put at risk in these incidents.

The action urgently required to counter this "overspill" of terrorism from beyond Europe's borders has little or nothing to do with the

debate on the European judicial area. What is called for is a determined and united stand by all democratic governments against the abuses of diplomatic privileges and the flagrant sponsorship of the staging of terrorism by states such as Iran, Libya, and Syria, wherever and whenever they occur and against whomsoever they are directed.

It is primarily the responsibility of each individual Western government to clean out the Augean stable of modern "diplomatic terrorism" and to ensure that grave breaches of the Vienna Convention (1961) on diplomatic relations are not tolerated. It is their prerogative to, when necessary, expel diplomats, declare individuals *persona non grata*, and, in extreme circumstances, sever diplomatic relations. In my view, the European governments, both individually and collectively, have been appallingly weak and irresponsible in failing to use these powers. They have allowed international law to be contemptuously defied by foreign states and nationals. They have all too often backed down or turned a blind eye rather than put at risk some tempting export contract or access to oil or other valuable commodities. Such pathetic weakness inevitably invites further humiliations and further undermining of already fragile international laws and conventions.

A shameful recent example of weakness of this kind was the British Parliament's sabotaging of the trade sanctions arrangements against Iran, previously agreed to by the EEC foreign ministers. Iran has been guilty of the most outrageous violation of the international law of diplomacy in modern history. Its "regime" of religious fanatics colluded with a group of "students" in abducting the entire U.S. diplomatic mission and incarcerating them for over a year.

The Americans are the West Europeans' tried and trusted allies; they have saved Western Europe from tyranny twice in this century. They still provide the crucial military power to protect Western Europe from being overrun a third time. Yet there are powerful voices not only in the British Parliament but in all the West European states who were unwilling to give the Americans even the basic diplomatic and economic backing they deserve against this barbaric tinpot regime of mad mullahs, wading in the blood of their executions. Thus the West European "allies" have not been prepared to sever diplomatic relations with Tehran. Iranian diplomats walk the streets of Western cities enjoying full immunity, protection, and privilege. (As supreme irony, in London the magnificent British SAS and police actually demonstrated the quality of this protection by rescuing their embassy hostages!) How extraordinary that despite all that the Iranians have done to Americans, not a single European ally has had the courage to sever diplomatic relations with Tehran. How

disgraceful that they have been too frightened of losing Iranian markets and oil supplies to freeze Iranian financial assets in European banks or to introduce a total ban on trade.

When acts of terrorism promoted by oil states provoke such a febrile response from European democracies, and international law and morality are trampled under foot, rhetoric about a European judicial zone against terrorism is bound to sound like a sick joke.

If the European states wish to do something more constructive about international cooperation against terrorism, they could make a useful start by demanding an international conference to review the workings of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, and by proposing new clauses to strengthen it and tighten its enforcement. But I suspect that they would rather muddle along, trying to make the best of the present system, and trying hard not to give too much offense to the susceptibilities of those pro-terrorist states possessing the potent blackmail weapons of oil and oil surpluses.

A Coordinating Group?

There is also a real need to create a small international commission or specialist department, preferably under the aegis of the EEC, to coordinate Western cooperation against international terrorism. There is already a framework of regular meetings of European Ministers of the Interior and a basis for police coordination and intelligence sharing. Bilateral cooperation between police forces, intelligence services, and specialist antiterrorist units is far more advanced than collaboration at the judicial and political levels, but it is at present conducted piecemeal.

A central coordinating antiterrorist cell of, say, a half-dozen top security and intelligence experts, with adequate research and administrative support and access to all meetings of Community Ministers of the Interior and Justice and the intelligence and police chiefs of member states, could add immeasurably to the precision and quality of the international response. The new unit could provide expert analysis of intelligence data; assessment of responsibilities and threats; a continuing research and development backup, including work on the pooling of counterterrorist weaponry and technology; training and briefing services; and advice to ministers, police, and security services.

One of its most urgently needed contributions would be to provide coordinated contingency plans and crisis-management machinery when two or more member states are involved in an incident. Just imagine, for example, the confusion and panic that would have set in if, as so easily might have happened, diplomats of a number of differ-

ent Western states had been abducted together with the Americans in Iran. There is at present absolutely no proper coordinating mechanism to deal with such an eventuality. Yet with the growing number of seizures of diplomatic premises and the offices of international organizations and companies around the world, such "multinational" mass hostage-takings are increasingly likely. Indeed, early this year diplomatic representatives of a dozen different countries were seized in a terrorist attack in Bogotá.

A central coordinating group could also help to organize joint exercises in hostage rescue and other counterterrorist operations and could supervise training of personnel of member states in how to conduct hostage negotiations. This coordinating commission could also serve as a means to improve antiterrorist intelligence links between the EEC states and other democracies such as the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia. It could promote research in improved technologies of prevention and encourage higher standards of security education in government and industry.

It is no good looking to national officials, police, and intelligence services to take the initiative in establishing an international coordinating unit of this kind. They tend to be instinctively conservative and suspicious and jealous of their own monopolies of access to ministers and intelligence sources. The fact remains that more sophisticated international coordination, especially for contingencies of the kind mentioned, is urgently required.

It is up to the leading politicians with vision and a sense of the international realities to exert the necessary pressure to secure police and security coordination that matches the needs of the 1980s and 1990s.

Hostage-Rescue Flying Squads

Finally, and once more taking into account the global context of modern international terrorism, I advocate the formation of special hostage-rescue commando units for every major region of the world. These might most usefully be established under the aegis of the regional organization (such as OAU, OAS, ASEAN, EEC) or, if this proves impossible, under the UN on a basis similar to that of peace-keeping contingents. Such specialized units would be provided at the request of a government experiencing grave problems in coping with an international terrorist incident. They would be able to bring to bear on the situation all the latest techniques and technologies of siege management, hostage negotiation, and hostage rescue.

It would be a valuable and positive step if the Council of Europe could make a start in proposing a stand-by unit of this kind for

Europe. If it proved successful, it could then provide a model for other regions of the world.

Guidelines for the Democracies' Response

If, as has been argued, effective action through world bodies is currently impracticable, what should the Western democracies do to counter the threat of international terrorism? As has already been made clear, this threat is largely directed toward the democratic societies of Western Europe and North America. What can we usefully do?

First and foremost, we should keep our democratic systems in good political and economic repair. In particular, we should try to respond positively to the changing needs and demands of the populace, including protecting the rights of minorities. This requires balanced and effective structures of representative democracy at both local and national levels, with ultimate control by the elected bodies over the bureaucracy, armed forces, police, and security services, ensuring their full accountability. A sure sign of danger is the accretion of overweening power by officials or by specific agencies of the state.

An independent judiciary is a prerequisite for the maintenance of the rule of law and the constitution and a vital ally of the elected government and legislature in ensuring democratic control and accountability. In a terrorist situation it is essential that the authorities and security forces act entirely within the law. Extralegal actions will only tend to undermine democratic legitimacy and destroy public confidence. Any breach of legality will be exploited by terrorist propagandists to show the hypocrisy of government and security forces' claims that they are acting in the name of the law and to persuade waverers that the government is not worth supporting.

Operating outside the strict rule of law is thus not only morally wrong, it is likely to be counterproductive. In observing legal constraints, democratic governments must constantly make it clear that when terrorists are convicted and punished, it is not because of their professed political beliefs but because they have committed serious criminal offenses; and because the punishment is for criminal deeds and not for political motives or cause, it would be totally wrong to accord jailed terrorists some special status as "political prisoners." Refusal to grant such status is entirely consistent with the philosophy of judicial control common to all the Western democracies and is implicit in the terms of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism that seeks to define certain terroristic offenses as common crimes.⁶

⁶ This principle was strongly reiterated by the European Union of Police Federations at its conference in Cologne on September 19, 1979. The conference recommended

It is also vital for democratic governments to strive for a sound and healthy economy, and it is in all their interests to cooperate more effectively in creating the right policies to deal with those now universal twin evils of Western economies—runaway inflation and high unemployment. In a climate of massive recession and industrial collapse, it is inevitable that the fear and frustration generated among the working population will give rise to militant and violent confrontations. Economic chaos and collapse create a far greater danger of destabilization of democracy than the actions of a handful of terrorists are likely to cause. For it is in the conditions of major economic breakdown that the real threat of a wider escalation into internal war (in which terrorism would play merely a minor or catalyzing role) really lies.

Avoiding Overreaction

Hence, the best advice one can tender to democratic governments on international terrorism is not to overreact against this particular menace⁷ and to attend to the vital strategic tasks of ensuring economic and political survival. There are, of course, some useful practical steps that can be taken, for example, to improve the machinery of international police and security cooperation among the EEC members. Some of the more cost-effective of these possible measures are suggested below, and in my view they would be worth adopting because they would help to save innocent lives and would substantially increase the rate of apprehension and conviction of terrorists. It would, moreover, be a great advantage if other states whose measures for international cooperation are less advanced than those of Western Europe and the United States could be encouraged to follow the West's example and to implement the basic international conventions and agreements designed to curb terrorism.

What is needed is a cool appraisal of the longer-term threat posed to liberal democratic society by terrorism, and of the kinds of measures that will effectively help to protect innocent life without sacrificing the rights of the individual. More radical responses involving sweeping emergency legislation and modification of normal judicial procedures and processes are not normally justified in the democratic

the acceptance of a European police charter that includes the removal of political status from terrorist groups such as the IRA. It is noteworthy that this move was welcomed by the delegate from the Garda Police Association who stated, "The view of my association is that people who contravene the criminal code are only criminals and no cause can justify them being other than that."

⁷ One of the terrorists' major stratagems is to provoke the authorities into a repressive overreaction that will alienate the people and drive them into the arms of the terrorist movement. See Carlos Marighela, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*.

West. The only exceptions are perhaps Northern Ireland and the Basque region in Spain where emergency powers have become necessary as a result of the worst protracted terrorist campaigns experienced in Western Europe in this century.

In the West, such emergency or special powers would normally not only be unjustified and unnecessary, they would be totally counter-productive. For the real danger of resorting to sledge-hammer methods to cope with the relatively low intensities of political violence experienced in most Western countries is that they would extinguish democracy in the name of security. If we were to do this, we would effectively be doing the terrorists' work for them and, moreover, with a speed and certainty that they themselves are incapable of achieving.

Some Practical Steps

There are some additional general measures, both national and international, that should be taken by the Western democracies. The steps suggested below would not be expensive to implement, and none of them would court the dangers of unbalanced response or overreaction that have already been emphasized.

1. The Western democracies should patiently continue their efforts to alter the climate of international opinion in order to improve the long-term chances of creating a more effective framework of international law to deal with terrorism. Thus, despite the difficulties and obstacles discussed earlier, all Western states should lend their diplomatic support, votes, and influence in international organizations and conferences:

- To persuade nonratifying states to accede to existing useful multilateral agreements, such as the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal conventions to curb hijacking.
- To press for strengthening existing conventions, particularly in regard to enforcement provisions and sanctions.
- To lend their full weight to useful fresh initiatives for international conventions. Even when it seems unlikely that a new initiative will surmount all the hurdles of international opposition, or when it is clear that only a handful of states will accord such measures immediate ratification, support is still worthwhile—if nothing else, it serves to educate the international community about the danger of terrorism and the vital need for international cooperation to counter it. By exposing the opposition and obstruction of other states, such exercises help to identify the cryptoterrorist regimes. There is, furthermore, always the chance that the sheer weight of international pressure may

cause a government to reconsider its earlier support for terrorism, or to move from neutrality or ambivalence to positive support for humanitarian international measures designed to protect the innocent.

2. A second useful step would be to press for speedy ratification and implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and the parallel European Community agreement.

3. There is also a real need to create a small international commission or specialist department, preferably under the aegis of the EEC, to coordinate Western cooperation against international terrorism. There is already a framework of regular meetings of European Ministers of the Interior and a basis for police coordination and intelligence sharing. Bilateral cooperation between police forces, intelligence services, and specialist antiterrorist units is far more advanced than collaboration at the judicial and political levels, but it is at present conducted on a piecemeal basis.

A central coordinating antiterrorist cell of, say, a half-dozen top security and intelligence experts with adequate research and administrative support and access to all meetings of Community Ministers of the Interior and Justice and the intelligence and police chiefs of member states could add immeasurably to the precision and quality of the international response. The new unit should provide expert analysis of intelligence data; assessment of capabilities and threats; a continuing research and development backup, including work on the pooling of counterterrorist weaponry and technology; training and briefing services; and advice to ministers, police, and security services.

One of the most urgently needed contributions would be the provision of coordinated contingency plans and crisis management machinery when two or more member states are involved in an incident. A coordinating agency could also help to organize joint exercises in hostage rescue and other counterterrorist operations and could supervise training of personnel of member states in techniques of hostage negotiation. This coordinating agency could also serve as a means to improve antiterrorist intelligence links between the EEC states and other democracies such as the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia. It could promote research in improved technologies of prevention and encourage higher standards of security education in government and industry.

4. All democratic governments must hold firm to a strict policy of "no deals with terrorists" and no submission to blackmail. Consistent national policies of minimizing terrorists' chances of rewards and

maximizing the probability of punishment are most likely to stem the flow of terrorist killings in the longer term.

5. The democracies must also learn to defeat the terrorists' sustained propaganda war. Efforts by terrorists to disguise themselves as legitimate "freedom-fighters" must be exposed. The free media in particular owe a responsibility to the democratic societies that enable them to exist.⁸ It is their job to expose the savage barbarism of the crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists. It is not their job to condone such acts or to lend murderers the freedom of the air to preach and promote more deaths. But, of course, in the last resort it is not a democracy's government or its security forces, or even its media, that will determine the outcome of the long, long war against international terrorism—it is the degree of public support for democracy.

6. There is, furthermore, a real need for a voluntary and totally independent international organization to minister to the special needs of victims of international terrorism. Some governments, such as the Dutch in the wake of the South Moluccan attacks, have shown considerable imagination and insight in ministering to the needs of the survivors of terrorist incidents and the families of the bereaved. The United Kingdom has taken steps to provide for compensatory payments to victims of terrorism and for damage to property and business premises. By comparison with some of the awards, the pensions and other benefits for members of the security forces seem pitifully inadequate, and this is something the British government should attend to as a matter of urgency.

However, one must remember that in most countries, victims of terrorism receive no assistance whatever from the state. And even where some provision exists, there is often a vital need for medical and specialist services that only a voluntary organization could provide. Over most of the world, the victims are forgotten people. Yet they often have the most desperate needs for specialist medical care, psychiatric help, and family and financial support. The proposed organization might perhaps be best established under the aegis of the International Red Cross. And, of course, even if it proves necessary to set up a separate body, the advice and expertise of that body of mercy should be sought.

7. Finally, and once more taking into account the global context of modern international terrorism, I advocate the formation of special hostage-rescue commando units for every major region of the world. These might most usefully be established under the aegis of the regional organization (such as OAU, OAS, ASEAN, EEC) or, if this proves impossible, under the UN on a basis similar to that of peace-

⁸ See *Television and Conflict*, ISC Special Report, May 1979.

keeping contingents. Such specialized units would be provided at the request of a government experiencing grave problems in coping with an international terrorist incident. They would be able to bring to bear on the situation all the latest techniques and technologies of siege management, hostage negotiation, and hostage rescue.

It would be a valuable and positive step if the Council of Europe could make a start in proposing a standby unit of this kind for Europe. If such a unit proved successful, it could then provide a model for other regions of the world.

But the most important consideration in arriving at an appropriate response to terrorist violence must be the strengthening of democracy and human rights. It is by these means above all that we can be sure of denying victory to those who have been corrupted by hatred and violence.

CONCLUSIONS

It is, of course, obvious that the judicial control of international response I have advocated is extremely difficult to apply rigorously, even in the confines of Western Europe. Special problems arise when the lives of Western citizens are threatened by acts of terrorism undertaken with the full connivance and support of fanatical anti-Western regimes, e.g., Tehran. In such circumstances, international law certainly permits a state to use limited force to rescue its endangered citizens. But it must be remembered that such action may well threaten the lives not only of the hostages in the hands of the terrorists but also of large numbers of other innocent citizens. The chances of a successful Entebbe-style rescue operation must be weighed against the potentially wider dangers of armed intervention, and all possible diplomatic, moral, political, and economic pressures must be tried before resorting to force.

TERRORISM AND COUNTERMEASURES: ANALYSIS VERSUS A PARTICIPANT'S OBSERVATIONS¹

Lt. Col. Hanan Alon
Israeli Defense Force


The study summarized in this paper addresses the policy question, *What and how much* should be done in order to counter terrorism in Israel? I shall present to you today surprises that I encountered during my research, the questions that these surprises stimulated, the methodology I used to address these questions, and, finally, findings and policy conclusions.

You may wonder why I was surprised at all. Indeed, I was surprised about being surprised, since for eight years, from 1969 to 1977, I was a close observer of terrorism in Israel. From 1969 to 1973, I served as a personal aide to two chiefs of the general staff of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). During the three years before I came to the Rand Graduate Institute, I headed the National Security Department in the General Staff Planning Branch. Yet, soon after I started my research, one surprise followed another.

My first surprise was the magnitude of terrorism. May I at this point ask each of you to try to guess the number of Israeli civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) inflicted by Palestinian terrorists over 12 years, from 1967 to 1978.

Perhaps I am not the only one to have been surprised. What I guess is our common surprise is the low number of casualties inflicted by terrorism over that period—a total of 1,856 (1,584 injuries and 272 fatalities). This number represents about 0.5 percent of the total number of casualties, that is, exogenous deaths and injuries.

¹ This paper is a summary of Rand Note N-1567-FF, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures*, August 1980, prepared by the author while he attended the Rand Graduate Institute.




Casualties from different causes: 1967-1978

My second discovery, which also surprised me, was the large discrepancy in resource allocation among various casualty-preventing programs:


- Countering terrorism consumed about 61.9 percent of the total casualty-preventing expenditures.
- Road and car safety measures received only 2.9 percent.
- The police budget (gross) represents 33.2 percent.
- Labor safety expenditures represent about 2 percent.

Inside the domain of terrorism, I suffered a third surprise looking at the various modes of operation of the Palestinian terrorists and at the proportion of casualties inflicted by these strikes:




Allocation of resources among casualty-preventing programs in Israel, 1967-1978 (gross estimates in 1980 billion shekels)

Although I guessed that explosives account for a large number of strikes, I did not realize that they inflict the highest numbers of casualties. My impression was that small-arms assaults (e.g., the Lod Airport Massacre in May 1972), hostage/bargain strikes (e.g., the Maa'lot School strike, which inflicted 86 casualties), or the shelling of border settlements inflicted most of the casualties. Although this conviction should have prevented my overestimation of the total number of casualties, because I know that these were few and far between, this is not the case, as demonstrated by the figure below.




Proportion of civilian casualties according to type
of strike: total for 1967-1978

I was surprised also to see the geographical distribution of strikes and casualties:



Geographic distribution of terrorist strikes involving civilian casualties, 1967–1978

The fifth surprise is another large discrepancy in resource allocation among countermeasures within the domain of terrorism:



Allocation of resources among countermeasures, 1967-1978
(gross estimate in 1980 billion shekels)

Only about 3 percent of the total resources were allocated for bomb-disposal. About 50 percent of the budget was consumed by participational countermeasures:

- Mandatory school guarding.
- Citizens' guard patrols.
- Guarding public entertainment facilities.

The remaining 47 percent was allocated to passive defense measures: the border security system, sheltering, and paving border roads. These figures exclude the cost estimates for military operations, counterforce strikes, and retaliations.

When I looked into single countermeasures, I was surprised for the sixth time. Despite the fact that most of the explosives are planted in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the same number of bomb squads are allocated to Ber Sheba, Haifa, and so on.

I then asked myself why I was surprised. The answer lies partly in the way terrorism is perceived in Israel (and, of course, not only there)—namely, as a major threat, as demonstrated by a recent survey. I suggest some tentative explanations as to why terrorism is perceived in this manner:



- Terrorism as theater
- What counts is the number of casualties per incident and not aggregate casualty statistics
- The distinction between statistical and particular victims
- Changes in society's sensitivities toward the use of violence for political purposes
- Insult against the state
- The personal threat leaders face
- The boomerang effect of countermeasures

I looked into the way resources are allocated among casualty-preventing programs, and after an intensive literature review that covered the last 200 years, I was surprised for the seventh time. In the few cases where analysis has preceded resource allocation to casualty-preventing programs, e.g., programs for prevention of cancer and heart attacks, cost-benefit analysis was used. Benefits are measured in money. Four different approaches are used to estimate the monetary aspects of life, all having the same drawback: Money does not capture the many other aspects of life and death, known by economists as externalities. In addition, cost-benefit analysis has until now focused on single programs and has not been used for resource allocation among programs.


Given these surprises, I concluded that a new countermeasure has to be added, namely, downgrading the impact of terrorism—not reacting as expected by the terrorists. For this purpose, I argue, the current policy objectives of reducing casualties incurred in a particular manner should be replaced, ideally by a single policy objective: *minimizing the casualty total*.

I would advocate the adoption of a preference that might be stated as, "A life equals a life." Under this preference, the loss to both individuals and society of a casualty is independent of the cause that generated it, i.e., the same weight is assigned to a casualty caused, say, by a car accident as to a casualty inflicted by terrorism. Of course, if that preference were rejected in an explicit fashion, as it now is implicitly, the objective just stated—*minimizing the casualty total*—could and should still be pursued, while assigning different weights to different types of casualties.

Instead of using cost-benefit analysis, I suggest cost-effectiveness analysis. The measure of effectiveness is the number of casualties prevented. One would strive for equating the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel among programs (extraterror) and among countermeasures (intraterror).



Hypothetical production functions for two
casualty-preventing programs



Production possibility frontiers for two
casualty-preventing programs

I have considered marginal adjustments in the prevailing set of countermeasures in all the domains under consideration (i.e., terrorism, car accidents, etc.). No *tabula rasa* assumption is made. The relevant question in my analysis is, Assuming we have extra money, say, 10 million shekels, to be allocated during next year, what will be the most effective allocation serving the policy objective stated? Similarly, if we have to cut our present budget by 10 million shekels, what will be the cut that would have the least effect on the overall number of casualties prevented?

First, do not allocate any additional money in Israel to countering terrorism; give it all to road and car safety programs. Again surprisingly, this recommendation is still valid even if we relax my "life equals life" preference by a multiple of, say, as much as ten—weighting one terrorist casualty the same as ten car accident casualties.

Second, abolish participational countermeasures (such as mandatory school guarding) to avoid the boomerang effect of countermeasures. Not only is their current marginal product with regard to casualty prevention lower than that of other countermeasures, they also have a specific boomerang effect—they enhance the public's belief in the seriousness of the terrorists' menace, regardless of the actual impact

of terrorism. Had I been a PLO agent, I would have recommended that the government of Israel implement exactly these participational countermeasures.

Third, the Israeli efforts should focus both on impeding the terrorists' use of explosives and on passive defense against explosions.

Fourth, an effort should be made to educate the public in order to adjust society's perception of terrorism to its objective threat.

This study provides a framework for analysis and applies it to a limited extent, falling short of a detailed working-out of the many elements of this complex policy issue. I do hope that this work will contribute to a better understanding of Palestinian terrorism in its *actual* magnitude, the countermeasures taken by Israel to curb it, the way Israelis perceive terrorism, and the interrelationship among the three. I hope that the discussion presented here will lead to a more sober approach to countering terrorism by Israeli decisionmakers. The suggested methodology can, of course, also be applied in other countries that face terrorism.

THE SIEGE AT PRINCESS GATE: ATTACK ON THE IRANIAN EMBASSY

R. J. Andrew
Home Office, London

The attack began when a group of gunmen rushed into the Iranian embassy around 11:30 a.m. on Wednesday, April 30, 1980. The armed policeman who was posted outside the embassy struggled with the gunmen but was overpowered and taken captive. A total of 26 people were held hostage by six terrorists. The hostages consisted mainly of Iranian embassy officials but included two employees of the BBC who had come to the embassy to apply for visas, a British caretaker, and the police officer.

The gunmen identified themselves as members of an Iranian dissident group, wanting independence for the region of Khuzestan (which they called "Arabistan"). It was clear from an early stage that this was a highly political incident that could not be left entirely to the police. The involvement of a foreign government and the possibility that it might be necessary to resolve the incident by force led the British government to draw on the contingency plans that had been practiced for a number of years. A crisis centre was set up under the leadership of the Home Secretary, where overall strategy was decided, while the police exercised tactical control on the spot and organized negotiations with the terrorists. It was hoped to obtain the release of the hostages and resolve the incident peacefully, but a team from the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment was called up in case of need.

Five days of negotiations followed, during which five hostages were released. Negotiations finally broke down on May 5, when the terrorists killed a hostage and placed his body outside the embassy. The Home Secretary authorized an assault by the SAS, which took place at about 7:25 p.m. In the moments before the SAS went in, the terrorists killed another hostage. The remaining 19 hostages were rescued alive. Five of the six terrorists died and one was captured. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on January 22, 1981.

THE TERRORIST DEMANDS

Initially, the terrorists' demands, handed to the police and also passed by telephone and Telex to the BBC by the terrorists, were for

1. The freeing of 91 prisoners held in jails in Khuzestan, a Western province of Iran.
2. Iran's recognition of the "legitimate national rights of the Iranian peoples."
3. The provision of a plane to take the gunmen and the hostages outside the United Kingdom once the 91 prisoners had been released.

In negotiations, it was pointed out to the terrorists that the first two of these demands were outside the ability of the British government to meet. Around 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 1, the terrorists gave the police a second set of demands:

1. An aircraft to fly the terrorists and the Iranian hostages to the Middle East—the British hostages to be released at the airport.
2. The ambassadors of Iraq, Algeria, and Jordan and a representative of the Red Cross to be waiting at the airport.

The terrorists set further deadlines for the meeting of these demands. The negotiators talked through these deadlines, playing very much on the terrorists' apparent interest in worldwide publicity for their cause. As part of the attempt to force concessions from the terrorists, the police produced—at the request of the terrorists—an employee of the BBC who was known to one of the hostages. It was agreed on the evening of Saturday, May 3, that a statement given by the terrorists to the BBC man would be broadcast in return for the release of two hostages. This statement demanded the presence of the Algerian, Jordanian, and Iraqi ambassadors and a representative of the Red Cross at the scene to start negotiations between the terrorists and the British government.

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLICE RESPONSE

Government policy not to give in to the primary demands of terrorists, buttressed by international agreements, led to the decision that no plane or safe conduct would be provided for the terrorists to leave the country, but the energies of the police and government were devoted to negotiating a peaceful solution, i.e., the surrender of the terrorists and the release of all the hostages alive. Efforts were first directed at securing the release of the hostages by giving minor concessions, such as the publication of the terrorists' statements on Saturday, May 3, and by encouraging the terrorists to release those hostages who were sick. This was successful, up to a point. The terrorists continued to reiterate their demands that the Arab ambassadors

named by them should be brought to the scene to negotiate. Given the government's decision that under no circumstances should the terrorists be allowed safe conduct, it was clearly impossible to allow the ambassadors to negotiate for that. However, discussions were held with the ambassadors to try to get them to talk to the terrorists to persuade them out.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE ASSAULT

The day prior to the assault (Sunday, May 4) was devoted to discussion with Arab ambassadors and to attempts to find other suitable persons to appear at the scene. These efforts were unsuccessful. On Monday, May 5, the terrorists reiterated their insistence on seeing some of the Arab ambassadors for whom they had asked. Further approaches to some Arab ambassadors were made by the government. The terrorists set a deadline of 12:00 noon for the production of the ambassadors and threatened to kill a hostage if their demands were not met. Shots were heard at around 1:00 p.m. It was clear that tension was rising. Arab ambassadors in London decided to meet at 5:00 p.m. to consider further how to respond to the British government's request. At about 2:00 p.m., the terrorists set a new deadline of 5:00 p.m. for the ambassadors they had requested to arrive at the scene. It was unclear at this point whether any hostage had in fact been killed. A letter guaranteeing the personal safety of the terrorists if they surrendered without harming the hostages was delivered to them from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The 5:00 p.m. deadline passed without any apparent sign that a hostage had been killed. At 5:50 p.m., the terrorists said that if they had not heard from the Arab ambassadors by 6:25 p.m., they would kill another hostage, and then one every half hour. A further attempt was then made to persuade the terrorists to surrender: An Imam from the London mosque was brought to the scene to talk to the terrorists. They insisted on seeing an Arab ambassador. At around 6:50 p.m., while the Imam was trying to make contact with the ambassadors who were still meeting, a body was pushed out of the embassy. Further death threats were made. The decision was then taken to commit the SAS to an assault on the embassy.

POINTS OF INTEREST

A number of points of interest emerged:

1. The system of two-level control (government strategy and police tactics) worked well, as did the SAS assault techniques

when used for the first time to resolve a terrorist incident in Great Britain.

2. The incident demonstrated the need for clear strategic direction and for clear decisions to be taken at an early stage on the attitude to be taken to the terrorists' main demands (e.g., refusing safe conduct).
3. The need to translate complex diplomatic moves into simple terms that could be understood by terrorists with a limited command of English and under considerable stress demonstrated the vital importance of the role played by the police negotiators.
4. The role of a psychiatrist who attended the scene proved of value in determining the day-to-day conduct of negotiations. Sharp differences of political opinion between terrorists and hostages undermined the process of negotiation and made it very difficult to take the edge off the fanaticism of the terrorists and the fatalism of some hostages. On this occasion, the "Stockholm syndrome" did not operate.

TERRORISM: A SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Louis G. Fields, Jr.
Department of State

While there are no U.S. statutes or international conventions having general application to the broad spectrum of terrorism, there are laws and conventions that proscribe certain specific criminal manifestations of terrorist activity, e.g., crimes against civil aviation, or crimes against diplomatic personnel and institutions. This paper summarizes the current status of U.S. statutes and international law pertaining to terrorism.

U.S. LAW

The U.S. Criminal Code (Title 18, U.S.C.) covers traditional crimes utilized by terrorists in their efforts to influence governmental policy or action, i.e., murder, kidnapping, assault, arson, etc. Recently, however, Congress has taken account of particular manifestations of terrorism and has enacted or modified laws to deal with this specialized criminal behavior. These laws are described below.

Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons

Public Law 92-539, October 24, 1972, amended the Criminal Code (Title 18, U.S.C.) by adding crimes directed against "foreign officials and official guests of the United States."¹ These crimes include (1) murder or manslaughter [S1116]; (2) conspiracy to murder [S1117]; (3) kidnapping [S1201]; (4) assaults, including harassment (treated as a misdemeanor) [S112]; and (5) injury, damage, or destruction of real or personal property owned or utilized by a foreign government, international organization, or foreign official or official guest [S970]. This law antedated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention),² adopted by the United

¹ The Secretary of State has authority to designate citizens or nationals of foreign countries as "official guests of the United States" (18 U.S.C. S1116(b) (6)).

² 23 UST 3227; TIAS 7502; 500 UNTS 95.

Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1973. Public Law 94-467, October 8, 1976, implementing the New York and OAS³ Conventions, further amended those sections of Title 18 that were changed by Public Law 92-539 by adding "internationally protected persons" as a third category of individuals entitled to the special protection of the law. The new law adds Section 878 to Title 18, a section that provides felony punishment for (a) willfully threatening to kill, kidnap, or assault a foreign official, official guest, or internationally protected persons, and (b) making any extortionate demand in connection with any violation of S878(a) or actual violation of SS112, 1116, or 1201. It also confers jurisdiction upon U.S. federal courts to try alleged offenders present within the United States for offenses under SS1116, 1201, 112(a), and 878 that were committed outside the territory of the United States. In addition, the new law authorizes the Attorney General, in his enforcement of SS1116, 1201, 112(a), or any conspiracy or attempt to violate these sections, to request assistance from "any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force," thus providing an exception to the prohibition against the use of military forces as *Passe Comitatus* (18 U.S.C. 1385).

Crimes Against Aviation

The Antihijacking Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-366, August 5, 1974) was enacted in implementation of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking) (the Hague Convention)⁴ adopted at The Hague on December 16, 1970. This law amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301 *et seq.*) to redefine the "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" and to modify the offense of aircraft piracy to conform to the requirements of The Hague Convention. It also conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction upon U.S. federal courts to try alleged offenders under this statute and provided for the death penalty when the death of another person results from the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

Aside from the criminal provisions of the Act, it gives the President authority to suspend "(1) the right of any air carrier or foreign air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation, and the right of any person to operate in foreign air commerce, to and from [any] foreign nation (which he determines permits the use of its territory as 'a base of operations or training or sanctuary for, or in any way arms,

³ Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance (OAS Convention), adopted by the Organization of American States on February 22, 1971 (TIAS 8413).

⁴ 22 UST 1641; TIAS 7192.

aids, or abets any terrorist organization that knowingly uses the illegal seizure of aircraft or the threat thereof as an instrument of policy') and (2) the right of any foreign air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation, and the right of any foreign person to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce, between the United States and any foreign nation that maintains air service between itself and a nation subjected to the determination referred to in (1) above." Thus the President has, under specified circumstances, authority to suspend air service rights, both primary and secondary, and the Act makes it unlawful (civil penalty) for any air carrier to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce in violation of the suspension order. It should also be noted that a "notwithstanding clause" relieves the Secretary of Transportation and the Civil Aeronautics Board of any statutory obligation to exercise their powers and duties (to grant certificates of public convenience and operation) pursuant to any treaty obligation of the United States and to take into consideration applicable laws of foreign countries.

The Act provides for the maintenance of minimum security measures in foreign air transportation and grants to the Secretary of Transportation, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, authority to "withhold, revoke, or impose conditions on the operating authority of the airlines of [any nation he finds 'does not effectively maintain and administer security measures . . . equal to or above the minimum standards established pursuant to the Convention on International Aviation']."

Part II of the Act (known as the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974) provides for the establishment of screening procedures and the promulgation of rules and regulations for aircraft security.

Part II confers upon the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) *exclusive* responsibility for the direction of any law-enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft involved in the commission or attempted commission of aircraft piracy and prohibits, except as otherwise provided by law, the transfer or assignment of those responsibilities. Other federal departments and agencies are required, upon FAA request, to "provide such assistance as may be necessary to carry out the purposes [of the law-enforcement activity]."

It should be noted that the United States is a party to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) (the Montreal Convention)⁵; however, implementing legislation is needed to enable full discharge of obligations under this Convention. The U.S. Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. ch. 2) establishes felony offenses involving the destruction of aircraft and

⁵ 24 UTS 564; TIAS 7570.

aircraft facilities; however, these offenses do not conform completely to the offenses described in the Convention, nor is there extraterritorial jurisdiction in federal courts to try such offenses. Legislation has been submitted, but Congress has not acted upon it to date.

Sanctions Against Countries That Aid or Abet Terrorists

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329, June 30, 1976) contains a prohibition of assistance to countries granting sanctuary to international terrorists. Section 303 of the Act (known as the Wolff Amendment) adds a new section (620A) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, requiring, except where national security dictates otherwise, the President to terminate for one year "all assistance under this Act" to a government that he finds "aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism." Assistance affected by this section includes economic, military (including training), and security supporting assistance, all granted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. It would not affect foreign military cash or credit sales, disaster relief assistance, international narcotic control assistance, any economic preferences or loans not under the Act, or commercial sales.

The 94th Congress adopted Senate Resolution 524 (the Javits Resolution) that urged the President to (1) direct U.S. ambassadors to encourage host governments to suspend air service to countries aiding or abetting terrorism, (2) undertake international negotiations to strengthen and improve aircraft and airport security, and (3) exercise his present authority to suspend aviation rights as conferred under the Antihijacking Act of 1974. Moreover, it urged the President "to conduct a comprehensive review of all United States trade and diplomatic relations to determine that further appropriate actions including specific sanctions may be taken to discourage any further support of international terrorism." The Javits Resolution is advisory in nature and does not have any mandatory effect upon the Executive Branch. It does, however, convey strong Congressional interest in an effective policy for dealing with governments that encourage and support terrorists.

The International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-92, August 4, 1977) amended Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act to require the President, unless he "finds that the national security requires otherwise," to "terminate all sales, credits, and guarantees" under the Act to "any government that aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution, to any individual or group that has

committed an act of international terrorism." It establishes a one-year "embargo" under the Act from the date of initial Presidential action to terminate such assistance and provides for an additional one-year extension of the "embargo" for any intervening grant of sanctuary by the offending government.

Section 509 (the Heinz Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-148, October 31, 1977) provides that

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act to the Export-Import Bank and funds appropriated by this Act for direct foreign assistance may be obligated for any government that aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism, unless the President of the United States finds that the national security requires otherwise.

On October 25, 1977, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) introduced a bill entitled the Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1977 (S. 2236). He characterized the legislation as an effort to combine "diplomatic initiatives with a strong unilateral U.S. Policy to combat terrorism."⁶ Major features of the bill included (1) reorganization of Executive Branch responsibilities and capabilities to combat terrorism; (2) reporting requirements regarding terrorist incidents; (3) a List of Countries Aiding Terrorist Enterprises (LOCATE), together with a range of sanctions against such countries, unless the President waives application on national security grounds; (4) a List of Dangerous Foreign Airports, with sanctions against foreign governments whose airports are so listed; and (5) implementing legislation for the Montreal Convention. The bill was considered and reported by the Governmental Affairs, Foreign Relations, and Select Intelligence Committees of the Senate. The Committee process made several changes to the bill, i.e., it (1) eliminated reorganization provisions; (2) modified the listing of countries supporting international terrorism (the LOCATE acronym was dropped); (3) reduced the range of sanctions applicable to listed countries; and (4) dropped the Dangerous Airport provisions. Although cleared for floor action in the Senate, the bill was not acted upon before the expiration of the 95th Congress. Companion legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 13387); however, it also failed to be enacted before adjournment.

The 95th Congress did, however, pass two bills that are designed to assert U.S. influence within international financial institutions against loans or other assistance provided by those institutions to any

⁶ Hearings, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, January 23, 1978, p. 4.

country that (1) provide(s) refuge to individuals committing acts of international terrorism by hijacking aircraft,⁷ or (2) permits terrorists to enter its territory, supports, encourages, or harbors them, or fails to take "appropriate measures to prevent [them] from committing [acts of international terrorism] outside the territory of such country."⁸ Specifically, this legislation requires U.S. Executive Directors of international financial institutions to oppose loans to countries that give refuge to hijackers, unless the loan serves "basic human needs" (Section 701(a)(2) and (f)) and instructs the U.S. Executive Director to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) "to work in opposition to any extension of financial or technical assistance" to countries aiding and abetting terrorists (Section 6).

The 96th Congress reflected an early interest in antiterrorism legislation. Senator Ribicoff introduced a bill entitled *The Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1979* (S. 333). It is essentially the same version of his earlier bill (S. 2236) that had cleared the Committee process but expired with the 95th Congress. It includes (1) reincorporation of the reorganization features of S. 2236 (which initially contained reorganization provisions affecting the Office of the President [NSC] and the Departments of State and Justice), with the addition of the Department of Transportation; (2) elimination of most of the reporting amendments added to S. 2236 by the Senate Intelligence Committee; (3) omission of the nuclear material security information provisions; and (4) resurrection of the recommendatory priorities for negotiation of international agreements. The act has been referred to the Governmental Affairs, Commerce, Science and Transportation, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Judiciary Committees.

Congressman Glenn Anderson (D-Cal.) introduced two bills (H.R. 1834 and 2441), each designated as an Act to Combat International Terrorism. H.R. 1834 is almost identical to H.R. 13387, whereas, H.R. 2441 reflects changes to H.R. 13387 made during hearings in the 95th Congress. Major changes include (1) a reordered definition with a more precise military exception clause; (2) an added sanction to require validated licensing for "articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data or other information that have a potential military application or that would otherwise enable a state to support acts of international terrorism"; (3) a requirement for consultation with Congress prior to waiving sanctions for reasons of national security; and (4) an added section on discretionary priorities for concluding international agreements to combat terrorism. Both bills have been jointly

⁷ Section 701, P.L. 95-118, October 3, 1977.

⁸ Section 6, P.L. 95-435, October 10, 1978.

referred to the Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Public Works and Transportation Committees.

Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) introduced a bill (S. 355) to amend the Criminal Code (Title 18) to provide for additional sentences to those already prescribed for designated offenses when perpetrated in conjunction with terrorist activities (as defined in S. 355) and to establish sentencing criteria for the imposition of these additional sentences. The bill has been referred to the Judiciary Committee.

Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.), by a floor amendment, added an antiterrorism provision to the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-72, September 29, 1979). Section 6(i) (the Fenwick Amendment) requires the Secretary of State to notify Congress before any license is approved for the export of goods or technology valued at more than \$7 million to any country that he has determined to have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism," when such exports would make a significant contribution to its military potential, including its logistical capability, or would enhance its ability to support acts of international terrorism. This amendment provides for an informal reporting requirement prior to approval of subjected export licenses. It does not inhibit the granting of licenses but would afford Congress the opportunity to register its protest concerning such exports. It would be likely to be a precursor to a general licensing prohibition (subject to a waiver), should Congress become concerned over exports to such countries, notwithstanding its objections. It does reflect strong Congressional interest in exports to countries that support terrorism.

CODIFIED INTERNATIONAL LAW⁹

Civil Aviation

Three international conventions and the Bonn Declaration address the question of offenses against civil aviation. These conventions, prompted by terroristic attacks against aircraft engaged in civil air commerce, were adopted under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). They are summarized below.

1. *Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) of September 14, 1963.*¹⁰ This con-

⁹ This section utilizes material contained in *Multilateral Conventions and Agreements Relating to the Punishment of Terrorist Acts*, a report prepared for the Department of State by the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, September 1976.

¹⁰ 20 UST 2941; TIAS 6768; 704 UNTS 219.

vention applies to offenses against penal laws and to acts, whether or not they are offenses, that may or do jeopardize the safety of an aircraft or of persons or property therein or that jeopardize good order and discipline on board, while the aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any area outside the territory of any state (Article 1).

The convention is concerned with ensuring that at least one state has jurisdiction over the alleged offender but contains only limited provisions for the trial of persons accused of offenses under it. Article 3 provides that the state of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offenders and, further, that each contracting state is obliged to take necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction as the state of registration. Even though a contracting state is required to adopt the laws necessary to give its courts jurisdiction, it is not obliged to ensure that all alleged offenders will be prosecuted (Article 13).

The convention provides for a contracting state to take delivery of a suspected offender, but it places no obligation on the receiving state to extradite a suspected offender to a state that has jurisdiction to try him. Article 16 merely provides that offenses committed on aircraft registered in a contracting state are to be treated, for the purposes of extradition, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they had occurred but also in the territory of the state of registration of the aircraft. Without prejudice to that provision, it is declared that "nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition."

2. *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention) of December 16, 1970.*¹¹ This convention obliges contracting states to make the offense of unlawful seizure of aircraft punishable by severe penalties (Article 2). The definition provided in Article 1 states that any person commits an offense who on board an aircraft in flight

(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act; or

(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act.

The convention limits itself to cases where an international element is involved, i.e., where the place of takeoff or the place of actual landing of the hijacked aircraft is outside the territory of the state of

¹¹ See footnote 4, *supra*. There were 106 contracting parties to the Hague Convention as of January 1, 1980.

registration of that aircraft. The convention does not apply to aircraft used in military, customs, or police services (Article 3).

The convention requires the following states to establish their jurisdiction: (1) the state of registration, (2) the state of first landing, and (3) the state in which the lessee has its principal place of business or permanent residence (Article 4). Further, in an attempt to prevent the establishment of havens for hijackers, the convention provides that each contracting state is to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over an offense in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and is not extradited.

Article 7 embodies the principle *aut dedere aut judicare*, i.e., a contracting state, if it does not extradite an alleged offender, is obligated to submit his case "without exception whatsoever to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."

Although the convention does not contain an obligation to extradite, it does facilitate the extradition of an alleged offender by providing that the offense referred to in the convention is deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing between contracting states and is to be included in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between contracting states (Article 8). Further, it is provided that contracting states may consider the convention as the legal basis for extradition. Article 8, however, makes it clear that extradition is to be subject to the laws of the requested state, which may preclude extradition of nations or political offenders.

3. *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention) of September 23, 1971.*¹² While the Hague Convention is concerned essentially with aircraft hijacking, the Montreal Convention covers a range of offenses affecting aircraft and air navigation. These offenses, requiring "severe penalties," are

Any acts of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight; destruction of, or damage to, an aircraft in service; sabotage of an aircraft in service; destruction of or damage to air navigation facilities or interference with their operation; communication of false information which is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.

Attempts or participation in these acts also constitute offenses under the convention. The convention applies only if

- (a) the place of takeoff or landing, actual or intended, of the aircraft is situated outside the territory of the state of registration of that aircraft; or

¹² See footnote 5, *supra*. There were 101 contracting parties to the Montreal Convention as of January 1, 1980.

(b) the offense is committed in the territory of a state other than the state of registration of the aircraft. (Article 4(2))

Further, notwithstanding the above provisions, the convention applies if the alleged offender is found in the territory of a state other than the state of registration of the aircraft (Article 4(3) and (4)). The convention does not apply to aircraft used in military, customs, or police services (Article 4(1)).

The convention seeks to establish a form of universal jurisdiction. It recognizes, in addition to the traditional territorial jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of (1) the state of registration, (2) the state of first landing, (3) the state in which the lessee has its principal place of business or permanent residence, in the case of an aircraft leased without crew, and (4) the state where the alleged offender is present and is not extradited (Article 5).

Like the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention contains the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare* by which the contracting states have an obligation either to extradite the alleged offender found in their territory or to submit his case, without exception whatsoever, to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7).

The convention contains provisions (similar to the Hague Convention) for the facilitation of extradition but does not create an obligation to extradite (Article 8).

Aside from whatever stigma is attached to breaching one's international treaty obligations, there is little to compel a contracting state to honor its commitments under these conventions. There are no sanctions or enforcement measures, and efforts to achieve an independent enforcement convention during the Rome Air Security Conference and the ICAO Extraordinary Assembly (September 1973) ended in failure.

4. *The Bonn Declaration.* The heads of state and government of the seven summit countries¹³ meeting in July 1978 in Bonn to discuss international economic issues made a dramatic announcement at the conclusion of their conference. The following joint statement was read by Chancellor Schmidt at the Summit Press Conference on July 17th:

The heads of state and government, concerned about terrorism and the taking of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism.

To this end, in cases where a country refused extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such air-

¹³ Canada (Prime Minister Trudeau); Federal Republic of Germany (Chancellor Schmidt); France (President Giscard); Italy (Prime Minister Andreotti); Japan (Prime Minister Fukuda); United Kingdom (Prime Minister Callaghan); and the United States (President Carter).

craft, the heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their governments should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.

At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. The heads of state and government urge other governments to join them in this commitment.

The summit leaders represent the major aviation powers whose airlines carry two-thirds of the air passenger traffic in the free world. Thus, their statement of intent (referred to as the Bonn Declaration) could have a profound influence upon countries that depend on international air commerce to augment their economies and facilitate movement of goods and persons beyond their own borders. While the Bonn Declaration has yet to be fully tested through implementation, it represents the first multilateral effort to develop enforcement measures for use against countries that refuse to extradite or prosecute hijackers and/or do not return hijacked aircraft.

Internationally Protected Persons

Responding to increasing incidents of terrorism directed against diplomats and public officials, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3166 on December 14, 1973. The resolution adopted the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents* (New York Convention).¹⁴

This convention obliges contracting states to make punishable by appropriate penalties the following acts against internationally protected persons:

- (a) murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person;
 - (b) a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally protected person or liberty;
 - (c) a threat to commit any such attack;
 - (d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and
 - (e) an act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such act.
- (Article 2)

Each contracting state is to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes" referred to in the convention when

¹⁴ See footnote 2, *supra*. There were 43 contracting parties as of January 1, 1980.

- (a) the crime is committed in the territory of that state or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state;
- (b) the alleged offender is a national of that state;
- (c) the crime is committed against an internationally protected person who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions that he exercises on behalf of that state. (Article 3)

Article 7 embodies the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare*:

The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present, is obliged, if it does not extradite him, to submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.

For purposes of extradition, the crimes referred to in the convention are deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between contracting states and are to be included in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between contracting states (Article 8). States that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty are obliged to recognize these crimes as extraditable offenses between themselves subject to the procedural provisions and the other conditions of the law of the requested state. Further, it is provided that contracting states may consider the convention as the legal basis for extradition.

States that are parties to the convention are obliged to "afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect to the crimes set forth [in the convention], including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings" (Article 10).

The provisions of the convention do not affect the application of the treaties on asylum in force at the date of its adoption (Article 12).

In 1977, the United States tabled a *Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism*¹⁵ in the Sixth Committee. The U.S. draft was aimed at the "export of terrorism" and sought to establish as offenses murder, kidnapping, and bodily harm when the offense has an effect outside of the state of nationality of the alleged offender, the state against which the act is directed, or within a targeted state if the alleged offender knew that the victim was not a national of that state. Acts of or against armed forces were exempted. The *modus vivendi* of the offense must be to damage the interests of or obtain concessions from a state or international organization. The draft convention employed the *aut dedere aut judicare* technique to bring alleged offenders to justice. Although this

¹⁵ United Nations document A/C.6/L.850, September 25, 1972.

convention was not adopted, it led to the adoption of the New York Convention in 1973.

The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted on February 2, 1971, a *Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance (OAS Convention)*.¹⁶ The focus of this convention is on terrorist acts, characterized in Article 2 as common crimes of international significance, namely kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the life or personal integrity of those persons whom the state has the duty to give special protection according to international law, as well as extortion in connection with those crimes. The extortion provision is the principal substantive difference between this convention and the New York Convention.

The OAS Convention obliges states to include in their penal laws the above prohibited acts (Article 8). Article 5 embodies the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare*, i.e., a state is obliged either to extradite an accused offender or submit his case to its competent authorities for prosecution. Extradition is to be granted pursuant to extradition treaties in force between the contracting states or, in the case of states that do not make extradition dependent upon the existence of a treaty, in accordance with the conditions established by the laws of the requested state (Articles 3 and 7).

Hostages

On December 10, 1976, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations recommended to the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly that it consider a resolution to conclude an international convention against the taking of hostages.¹⁷ The 31st Session of the General Assembly adopted the resolution and established "an *ad hoc* committee to draft the requested Convention." On February 16, 1979, the *ad hoc* committee completed its work and forwarded a draft convention to the General Assembly, where it was referred to the Sixth Committee. The Sixth Committee resolved several ambiguities in the draft and adopted it on December 7, 1979. The General Assembly adopted the *Convention Against the Taking of Hostages* by consensus on December 17, 1979, and it was opened for signature on December 18, 1979.

The convention defines an offender as:

¹⁶ See footnote 3, *supra*. There are six parties to the convention: the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.

¹⁷ An initiative proposed by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany (Ambassador von Weichmar) in a statement to the Security Council on July 12, 1976.

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the 'hostage') in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or a juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage, commits the offense of hostage-taking within the meaning of this Convention. (Article 1)

Attempts and participation in these acts also are designated as offenses.

State parties are required to make Article 1 offenses punishable under their domestic law by "appropriate penalties that take into account the grave nature of these offenses (sic)" (Article 2).

As in the New York Convention, state parties are obligated to cooperate in the prevention of the offenses by taking measures to prohibit the use of their territories for preparation for the commission of these offenses and by exchanging information with other state parties (Article 4). There is also a requirement to ease the plight of the hostage, secure his release, facilitate his return, and return "any object gained as a result of the offense to the hostage or any third party (including states or international organizations) against whom a demand was made and concession given" (Article 3). It also contains an obligation to assist other state parties in criminal proceedings brought in respect to offenses under the convention; not, however, to the exclusion of mutual judicial assistance embodied in other treaties (Article 11).

To enable state parties to prosecute offenders if extradition is not elected, the convention requires the establishment of jurisdiction by the state over offenses committed

- (a) in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state;
- (b) by any of its nationals or, if that state considers it appropriate, by those stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its territory;
- (c) in order to compel that state to do or abstain from doing any act; or
- (d) with respect to a hostage who is a national of that state, if that State considers it appropriate. (Article 5)

The convention obligates a state party to take an alleged offender into custody when found in its territory and to notify directly (or through the Secretary General) the state where the offense was committed, the state that was the object of a demand, the state of nationality of the hostage and the offender, and all other states or international organizations concerned or affected (Article 6).

Article 8 of the convention incorporates the *aut dedere aut judicare* principle by requiring a state party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite him, "to submit the case to

its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State."

The convention contains provisions for extradition if no extradition treaty exists between state parties (when permitted by applicable domestic law) for incorporation of the offenses of the convention in existing extradition treaties between state parties.

The somewhat controversial Article 9 permits a state party that has received an extradition request to deny extradition if it has "substantial grounds for believing" that (a) the request has been made "for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion" or (b) the person's position may be prejudiced for those reasons or because of lack of rights of protection in the requesting state. This provision would apply to existing extradition treaties amended by this convention to include its designated offenses to the extent of its application to these offenses.

The convention does "not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto" if a state party is bound under these conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker (Article 12). Nor does it operate in instances of purely domestic hostage-taking incidents (Article 13). Moreover, the convention is not to be construed to justify "violations of the territorial integrity of political independence of a state in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations" (Article 14). The application of the Treaties on Asylum in force at the date of adoption are not affected; however, they cannot be invoked by a state party to this convention against another state party that is not party to these treaties (Article 15).

Common Devices or Weaponry Used by Terrorists

Among the destructive devices used by terrorists, perhaps the most invidious is the letter or parcel bomb, due to its maiming potential. The *Universal Postal Convention* (November 14, 1969) requires states parties to adopt measures necessary to prevent and punish the insertion, in postal items, of "explosive or easily inflammable substances, where their insertion has not been expressly authorized by the Convention and the Agreements" (Article 11(e)). Article 29(e) prohibits the insertion of explosive, inflammable, or other dangerous substances in letter-post items. There are no penalties or sanctions prescribed in the convention for violations, nor is there an extradition or prosecution requirement; thus, it will be of little effect as either a

deterrent or an international basis for acquiring jurisdiction over terrorists who send letter or parcel bombs.¹⁸

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

On November 10, 1976, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the *European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (European Convention)*. It was opened for signature and ratification to the 19 members of the Council of Europe on January 17, 1977, and to date, 17 states have signed, five of which have ratified it. It is in force.

The preamble to the European Convention states that its purpose is to "take effective measures to ensure that the perpetrators of [acts of terrorism] do not escape prosecution and punishment." Extradition is the essential *modus operandi* of the convention, and its purpose is to remove offenses under the Hague, Montreal, and U.N. Internationally Protected Persons Conventions, as well as the offenses of kidnapping, hostage-taking, and use of certain lethal weapons¹⁹ from any political consideration or exception in the extradition process between contracting states (Article 1). It has the effect of amending existing bilateral extradition agreements between contracting states to remove any incompatibility between them and the convention (Article 3) and including offenses specified in the convention, if not otherwise included (Article 4).

The convention also requires each contracting state to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over an offense mentioned in Article 1" and to prosecute an alleged offender found in its territory if it does not extradite him (Article 7). There are requirements to provide "the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters (relating to the convention)" (Article 8), to put disputes to the Committee on Crime Problems for Coordination and Settlement of Disputes (Article 9), and to resort to binding arbitration as a final means of dispute settlement (Article 10).

It is interesting to note that the convention avoids the persistent problem of defining "terrorism" by merely listing offenses. These offenses, then, for the purpose of this convention, embody terrorism *ad referendum*. The problem is that it makes all forms of kidnapping, the bulk of which is extortionate kidnapping, terrorist crimes.

¹⁸ See the discussion of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism below.

¹⁹ Article 1e incorporates "an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm, or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons" under the coverage of the convention.

The most serious problem with the convention, however, rests with Article 5. That article appears to contradict the intent of Article 1 to declare the offenses under that article not to be political offenses. Article 5 allows a contracting state to which an extradition request is directed to deny that request if it "has substantial grounds for believing that the [extradition request] has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on grounds of his race, religion, nationality, or *political opinion*, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons." The normal interpretation of such a provision would have the effect of negating the intent of Article 1. Since there is no generally accepted definition of the term "political offense," each state is free to interpret it as it will. This then creates a serious lacuna in existing international agreements with respect to the extradition of persons accused or convicted of acts of terrorism. This point was raised in a paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (FCO) in December 1977. The paper comments as follows:

The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism aims at filling this lacuna by eliminating or restricting the possibility for the requested State of invoking the political nature of an offense in order to oppose an extradition request. This aim is achieved by providing that, for extradition purposes, certain specified offenses *shall never* be regarded as "political" (Article 1) and other specified offenses may not be (Article 2), notwithstanding their political content or motivation.

The system established by Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention reflects the consensus that reconciles the arguments put forward in favor of an obligation, on the one hand, and an option, on the other hand, not to consider, for the purposes of the application of the Convention, certain offenses as political.

In favor of an obligation, it was pointed out that it alone would give States new and really effective possibilities for extradition, by eliminating explicitly the plea of "political offense," a solution that was perfectly feasible in the climate of mutual confidence that reigned among the member States of the Council of Europe having similar democratic institutions. It would ensure that terrorists were extradited for trial to the State that had jurisdiction to prosecute. A mere option would never provide a guarantee that extradition would take place and, moreover, the criteria concerning the seriousness of the offense would not be precise.

In favor of an option, reference was made to the difficulty in accepting a rigid solution that would amount to obligatory extradition for political offenses. Each case should be examined on its merits.²⁰

²⁰ Miscellaneous No. 28 (1977): European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (with Explanatory Report), Cmnd. 7031, p. 13.

Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden have taken reservations to Article 1 as permitted under Article 13.²¹

On December 4, 1979, the Justice Ministers of the European Communities signed in Dublin the *Agreement on the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism*. Irish Justice Minister Gerry Collins said at the signing ceremony at Dublin Castle that once the agreement is ratified "there would be no safe haven for terrorists anywhere in the [European Community]."

This agreement strengthens the application of Article 7 of the European Convention by providing that member states may regard offenses in that convention as political offenses "on condition that it undertakes to submit the case without exception whatsoever and without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution" (Article 3.3). The intent of the Ministers of Justice is to make prosecution the automatic alternative to extradition. The agreement applies "in relations between two member states of which one at least is not a party to the European Convention or is a party to that convention, but with a reservation" (Article 1).

The problem confronting member states in the application of Articles 5 and 13 of the European Convention is described in the December 1977 FCO report to Parliament on the convention as follows:

Although the Convention is clearly aimed at not taking into consideration the political character of the offense for the purposes of extradition, it does recognize that a Contracting State might be impeded, e.g., for legal or constitutional reasons, from fully accepting the obligations arising from Article 1. For this reason Article 13 expressly allows Contracting States to make certain reservations.

It should be noted that there is no obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been inspired by the considerations mentioned in Article 5, or that the position of the person whose extradition is requested may be prejudiced by these considerations.

In the case of an offense mentioned in Article 1, a State refusing extradition would have to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, after having taken the measures necessary to establish its jurisdiction in these circumstances (Articles 6 and 7).

These provisions reflect the maxim *aut dedere aut judicare*. It is to be noted, however, that the Convention does not grant Contracting States a general choice either to extradite or to prosecute. The obligation to

²¹ Article 13 permits a state to declare its reservation of the right to refuse extradition in respect of any Article 1 offense that it considers to be a political offense. It is obliged, however, to take into consideration, when evaluating the character of the offense, any particularly serious aspects of the offense, such as danger to life, cruel or vicious aspects, or remoteness of victims to the political motives.

submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution is subsidiary in that it is conditional on the preceding refusal of extradition in a given case, which is possible only under the conditions laid down by the Convention or by other relevant threat or legal provisions.

In fact, the Convention is not an extradition treaty as such. Whilst the character of an offense may be modified by virtue of Articles 1 and 2, the legal basis for extradition remains the extradition treaty or other law concerned. It follows that a State which has been asked to extradite a terrorist may, notwithstanding the provisions of the Convention, still not do so if the other conditions for extradition are not fulfilled; for example, the offender may be a national of the requested State, or there may be [a] time limitation.

On the other hand, the Convention is not exhaustive in the sense that it does not prevent States, if their law allows, extraditing in cases other than those provided for by the Convention, or to take other measures such as expelling the offender or sending him back, if in a specific case the State concerned is not in possession of an extradition request made in accordance with the Convention, or if it considers that a measure other than extradition is warranted under another international agreement or particular agreement.²²

The Agreement purports to create obligation under the maxim *aut dedere aut judicare*, thus removing any ambiguity in this regard under the convention.

The Agreement will enter into force three months after the ratification, acceptance, or approval of "all States which are Members of the European Communities [on December 4, 1979]" (Article 6.2).

²² Ibid., pp. 13-14.

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY IN RESPONSE TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

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INTRODUCTION

Acts of terrorism have occurred in the United States and are expected to continue. In the past, terrorist incidents have been symbolic in nature and have been directed at individuals and property. There have been isolated events limited to local impact, including bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, arson, murder, and extortion. State and local governments, supported by federal law-enforcement agencies, have been able to cope effectively with these symbolic incidents.

However, there remains the potential for change in the character of domestic terrorism. Expanded objectives and activities of extremist groups could become regional or national in scope. Activities could involve a different class of targets with more widespread impact. Terrorism could change from isolated events to coordinated attacks causing major property damage, extensive loss of life, severe disruption to essential services or resources, disruption to the continuity of government, or situations of unique political significance. If these more serious and nationally significant incidents occur, they could cause economic, social, political, and national security effects that would require a coordinated federal response.

The probability of terrorist groups successfully combining the material resources, skills, and motivations necessary to initiate such acts is not high. The potential consequences, however, are serious enough to warrant assurance that our current response capabilities at the federal level are adequate. Federal agencies must be prepared to cope with the broadest range of possible effects. Their preparedness must include provisions to deal with a terrorist incident as a criminal act, provide assistance to alleviate personal suffering, and restore disrupted services and damaged property to normal levels.

The first of these requirements involves effective management of the law-enforcement response to the incident. It encompasses such activities as intelligence gathering, hostage negotiation, and prosecution of the terrorists. The second and third requirements relate to the consequences of terrorist acts.

FEDERAL RESPONSE

Incident Management

Responsibility for the management of the federal response to terrorist acts depends upon the location and nature of the incidents. The crisis management responsibility for a specific terrorist incident is exercised by that agency that has the primary responsibility by virtue of constitutional or statutory authority or Executive Branch directive or understanding.

The Department of State is the lead agency for response to international terrorist incidents that take place outside the United States (foreign incidents). Those acts that take place within the United States (domestic incidents) are usually managed by the Department of Justice.

Within the Department of Justice, the Deputy Attorney General and his immediate staff are responsible for overall coordination of the federal government response, including policy decisions and legal judgments relating to such incidents. The lead agency for the actual management of most terrorist incidents, however, is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Consequence Management

Under the authority of Executive Order 12148, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been delegated the responsibility to plan and coordinate the federal response to the consequences of terrorist incidents, a new emergency function which, prior to the President's Reorganization Plan, was not assigned to any specific federal agency.

The FEMA now has the mandate to provide a single source for the President to which he can turn for reports of damage incurred, the resources available to respond, and the relief actions under way following a major terrorist incident. To fulfill this responsibility, the FEMA must monitor terrorist incidents in progress and, as required, report the status of consequence management to the President. According to the President's Message of June 19, 1978, concerning Reorganization Plan No. 3, the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents "would not alter the present responsibilities of the Executive Branch for reacting to the incidents themselves."

Vulnerabilities

There appears to be a likelihood that the nature of terrorism will broaden to include activities that could be disruptive to our society.

Certainly, technology and capabilities are now available that would permit terrorists to interrupt or curtail critical services and the flow of resources. Many such threats and consequences can be countered or handled at the local level. Some services and resources that are vulnerable and critical come under federal regulation. Also, some of the possible targets could have serious national security implications. Therefore, the federal government should undertake to identify critical services, resources, and activities that may be vulnerable to terrorist attack, and to take prudent measures concerning mitigation, protection preparedness, and response planning to cope with such threats. Capabilities of terrorist groups are important in the context of vulnerabilities of the American society.

To date, U.S. systems have not been seriously disrupted by terrorism. However, U.S. society offers terrorists a variety of targets for destruction. The highly interrelated functions necessary to keep a modern city alive offer countless opportunities to extremists.

Experience in the past decade has demonstrated the extent to which breakdowns in one area of society can have significant impacts in other areas. Past accidental occurrences that have seriously reduced the performance of essential services or the availability of essential resources underscore system weaknesses. Many natural disasters, including severe weather, have provided evidence of the vulnerability of a complex society to unanticipated events.

The emergency preparedness requirements for disruptive terrorism rest heavily on the assumption that the United States is vulnerable to disruptions resulting from actions of extremist groups. Modern complex systems possess choke points upon which essential activities depend. Destruction of these choke points can leave vital industries without energy, transportation, raw materials, food, and other support requirements. Many of them are susceptible to damage or destruction by motivated terrorists possessing the necessary capabilities.

Any planning to reduce the consequences of major disruptive terrorism must be based on information that would be provided by vulnerability analyses of resource systems under the jurisdiction of other federal agencies. Therefore, an essential activity of the FEMA, in its role of coordinating planning and preparedness to reduce the consequences of terrorist incidents, will be the coordination of vulnerability analyses. This activity should be directed toward identification of physical actions that might be taken to reduce damage against specific kinds of targets, and identification of areas and types of scenarios that require consequence management. The specific areas of resource systems that are vulnerable to acts of terrorism have not been identified.

Objectives, Policies, and Assumptions

The following objectives, policies, and planning assumptions will govern the development of the federal preparedness capability to cope with disruptive terrorism. As the capability is developed, coordination with the FEMA should assure a uniform and integrated national response.

Objectives:

1. *Complete the pre-incident actions that will minimize the consequences of disruptive terrorism.* These actions include operational response planning, stockpiling of critical components, mutual protection of interagency choke points, reduction of interdependencies, and the preparation of standby authorities and capabilities to reduce the impact of disruptions. This objective focuses on activities that might not be possible during an emergency because they would be too complex to initiate, would be too time-consuming to develop, or would require action by non-target groups that are too diverse to provide rapid response. Actions related to this objective must be cost effective in relation to the probability of disruptive terrorism.

2. *Attain a state of readiness to perform essential relief operations in response to disruptive terrorism.* This objective includes preparedness in the target systems that are regarded as the most critical and the most vulnerable. Preparedness will enable the federal government to minimize the scope, severity, and duration of disruptions to these essential systems. Disruptions are minimized if conditions are less severe, of shorter duration, and less varied than they would be if no preparedness measures had been taken. The reductions in severity, duration, and variety should be as great as can be expected, given the constraints of time, societal complexity, limited governmental authority, and available resources that may be operative under emergency conditions.

3. *Attain a state of readiness to restore disrupted national systems.* This objective includes the restoration of the disrupted target systems as part of the long-term recovery of the United States. A disrupted system should be restored to as much of its preattack capability as is feasible, within the shortest possible time frame, given the resource constraints applicable during that period.

Policy:

1. Federal agencies, as designated in Executive Order 11490, will participate in an effort to develop a federal preparedness program to meet all of the conditions of national emergency that may be produced by disruptive terrorism.

2. Emergency planners should concentrate on eight critical target systems: electric power, petroleum and gas, transportation, telecommunications, finance, industrial production, water, and government. These are the systems that appear to be the most vulnerable and most critical to the national well-being. In addition, users of chemical, biological, and/or radiological agents that could affect large numbers of people should be given special attention.

3. In meeting the preparedness objectives, agencies should consider the full range of emergency measures that might be applicable. These include voluntary measures, rationing, stockpiling, dispersion of resources, conservation, establishing priorities, determining allocations, and obtaining standby authority.

Planning Assumptions:

1. State and local governments will, under their legal powers, respond to the immediate needs of their citizens.

2. When the consequences of disruptive terrorism exceed the response capabilities of an affected state, the governor may call upon the President for federal assistance. Depending on the nature of the request, the President may respond under any number of emergency powers or may request specific federal agencies to respond under their own authorities. In some instances, a direct request from a state to a federal agency may suffice to obtain the needed assistance.

3. The governor may seek extraordinary support from the President or the Congress for any consequences that cannot be dealt with under existing law.

4. Disruptive terrorism may extend beyond the boundaries of a single state to the extent that an entire region of the nation may be adversely affected. In regional crises, the federal government will work closely with the states and will respond in a manner that will meet the needs of both the individual states and the region as a whole.

5. Disruptive terrorism may impact directly upon national conditions and adversely affect the security and economic prosperity of the nation. In such instances, conditions of national emergency may be created and vigorously sustained, and coherent federal response may be required. The federal government will be the primary actor and will direct operations as required. States will be expected to conform to federal guidelines and to operate in a manner consistent with the federal response.

6. Under Public Law 94-412 of 1976, the National Emergency Act, the President can declare a state of national emergency. He may do so under extreme situations such as major disruptions threatening the national security or the national economy. In such cases, nearly 500

emergency powers are available to the President and, through him, to federal agencies. In less extreme cases, the President can direct federal agencies to respond to the problems of disruptive terrorism without invoking such extraordinary powers. Federal agencies should plan to operate under either condition.

CONCLUSION

As previously stated, the probability of any group successfully perpetrating terrorist acts that would produce national consequences is not high. However, it must be recognized that if such actions are initiated, the results could seriously disrupt essential social, economic, and political functions. Casualties and damage could be several orders of magnitude greater than those produced by any terrorist attack of the past. Modern terrorists have already demonstrated that small groups, even those with a limited capacity for violence, can achieve disproportionately large effects elsewhere in the world. They could accomplish the same in the United States.

The exploitation of vulnerable choke points would affect the functioning of numerous systems in the United States. The disruption of essential services or resources could cause serious economic, social, and political consequences for a region or for the nation as a whole. Some disruptions could have serious consequences for the functioning of the federal government and for the national security.

Significant disruptions for a sustained period of time could produce situations such as unemployment, crippled production, shortages of important goods, reduction of personal income, decreased GNP, or extreme hardship for the public.

For these compelling reasons, examination of existing arrangements for decisionmaking, coordination, allocation of resources, and multilevel government interaction must be undertaken by the agencies responsible for preparedness measures.

The antiterrorism program of the FEMA will be given high priority, and the necessary planning and preparation required for effectively responding to the consequences of major terrorist incidents will proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Analyses of intelligence sources and discussions with knowledgeable individuals involved in antiterrorism programs have made it readily apparent that the United States is vulnerable to the type of terrorist acts that have plagued other areas of the world. A recent survey that illustrated the concern of the American public revealed that "terrorism is viewed as a very serious world problem by 90 percent of the American people, a very serious domestic problem by 60 percent" (Harris Survey, December 5, 1978).

Acts of terrorism against the United States in Iran and other areas of the Mideast, as well as in Latin America, have caused great concern within our nation, and many agencies of the federal government are aware of the increased threat of terrorist acts being perpetrated within the United States. These agencies are also developing a greater realization of the necessity to provide for the protection of their resources as well as to plan and prepare for the effective response to the consequences of terrorist acts, should they occur.

It is an auspicious time for the FEMA to ensure that vulnerability studies of all major resource areas are conducted expeditiously as a basis for writing a National Emergency Plan for the Federal Response to the Consequences of Major Terrorism. The plan will be coordinated and published by the FEMA to provide a uniform federal effort for responding to the consequences of major disruptive acts of terrorism within all areas of our nation.

TERRORISM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

Douglas G. Macnair

DEFINITION

Unfortunately, terrorism has no precise and completely accepted definition. Yet the meaning of the term raises little doubt in the mind of the average citizen. Banner headlines have for years described the "terribleness" of the criminal acts involved. While governments may be concerned with the motives of the individual terrorist or terrorist group, it is the *act* that is of paramount concern to the victim.

The mystique surrounding terrorism needs to be cleared away. The somewhat mystical aura may well have been propagated by the myriad of endeavors to sort, count, classify, define, analyze, measure, profile, and name terrorists. Putting terrorism into neat pigeonholes hardly seems a way to solve or otherwise cope with the problem; yet the proliferation of these activities seems to continue, as evidenced by the current differentiation among international terrorism, transnational terrorism, transregional terrorism, domestic terrorism, symbolic terrorism, disruptive terrorism, etc.

Perhaps the mystique will begin to fade when we "own up" to what terrorism certainly is—deviant human behavior marked by unmitigated violence. As such, it most properly falls on the continuum of man's activities having at the one extreme tranquility, and at the other, war. We have the choice of either rejecting terrorism as a form of intolerable and inexcusable behavior and subsequently providing juries with the elements of proof, or continuing the practice of treating terrorism in isolation with sympathy, understanding, and patience. Fortunately, many of us *already* fail to see terrorism as a justifiable abhorrent act governed by the call to a higher order.

PREDICTING TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST MARITIME TARGETS

Corporations concerned with the security of maritime assets seem anxious about the possibility of terrorists moving in their direction, and well they should, given the popularity of such recent works as *Shipkiller* and *The Devil's Alternative*.

Yet U.S. government officials have indicated that little effort in the intelligence community is oriented toward the marine environment other than the rather obvious effort to gauge Soviet naval intentions.

A detailed analysis by an individual skilled in the targeting process would lead to the inevitable conclusion that few "softer" potential victims exist than energy-related marine assets. In view of the fact that vulnerability to terrorist acts is absolute in the marine environment, the risk of "doing nothing" is obviously unacceptable. And while it is true that the threat cannot be precisely measured or quantified, it certainly can be qualified.

SUGGESTED COUNTERMEASURES

As an initial step, the federal government should consider convening a seminar on terrorism in the marine environment. From this beginning, a complete plan of action might be formulated having the following goals:

1. The establishment of a federal mechanism through which intelligence information germane to the maritime threat can be *routinely* exchanged between industry and agencies of government.
2. The development of voluntary marine security guidelines for terminal facilities, ports, offshore assets, and vessels.
3. The development of a national contingency plan that provides the agency/industry interface and coordinated response necessary to react effectively and efficiently. Such a plan could be modeled after the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.

This effort would implement three of the four key words used by the government to describe the federal antiterrorism program: predict, deter, and react. More importantly, it is a *proactive* approach to the problem, marked by overt action rather than words. At issue is whether we manage change or allow change to manage us.

There is some confusion as to which federal agency has been designated as the marine security/counterterrorism coordinator. Is it the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI, the Department of State, the Maritime Administration under the Department of Commerce, or some other agency that would provide *immediate* assistance and is trained, prepared, and equipped to respond? Recent experiences with bomb threats to vessels engaged in commerce while in U.S. waters suggest that a viable planned and coordinated response does not exist.

FORCES AVAILABLE FOR COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS

Counterterrorist field operations at sea constitute a radical departure from the training orientation currently in vogue for most law-enforcement or military personnel that might be made available. Certainly, an appropriate response is beyond the means of the majority of state or local municipal law-enforcement agencies and is limited within the U.S. Coast Guard. Tactics and techniques do not readily transfer from one environment to another, especially to a crude or product-carrying vessel. Most evidently, aside from a handful of Navy SEALs, no suitably trained force currently exists in the United States, and the employment of the SEALs, in any event, is subject to the approval of the President. In the marine environment, the decision to use force must be made early in the crisis or the initiative will be lost—and it is not likely to be regained as in the notional concept of "incidents of duration." Orthodox procedures governing the intervention of federal military forces, such as those relating to civil disturbances, do not foretell success.

Marine terrorism in U.S. waters offers the potential for impeding, disrupting, and/or limiting an already austere capability to project U.S. power abroad with the support required. A limited series of strikes against key port/terminal facilities could prove too costly when success is measured in days and not years.

The need to reverse the reactive trend of counterterrorist activities and to confront the crime of terrorism with a proactive program is a *sine qua non*.

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