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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Improving SSTR Operations through a Permanent Joint Advisory Corps

By

**Daniel Aldana
Civilian Student**

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government institution or entity.

Signature: _____

23 April 2008

Abstract

A Joint Advisory Corps (JAdC) that incorporates all service capabilities would bring greater cohesion and unity of effort to future American-led stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) missions. U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, recognizing the need to improve SSTR operations, is advocating for a permanent U.S. Army Advisory Corps (AAC), an entity designed to train foreign security services in national defense and counterinsurgency. Nagl argues that the U.S. military requires a separate force dedicated to SSTR operations because it would facilitate transitions and reconstruction along the lower end of the combat spectrum. The AAC has its merits, but it is Army-centric and a JAdC would spread SSTR burdens across the services and leverage all component capabilities.

The United States military over the past two centuries has fought on foreign soil countless times to protect American interests, and spread and uphold its values. Overwhelming U.S. military victories and technological superiority have underscored many of these conflicts and has emboldened U.S. leaders to embark on increasingly ambitious nation-building projects. Yet despite America's comparative military advantages, U.S. forces struggled to restore security and order in several of the nations they have occupied in the aftermath of war or following a military intervention.

The U.S. military has only recently begun to seriously address the inadequacies inherent to its SSTR capabilities such as restoring security in a country following regime change. A permanent JAdC is required for sustaining and executing successful SSTR operations in the future, and although such a force may not be sufficient, the convergence of multiple service capabilities would likely lead to substantial improvements in U.S. SSTR operational effectiveness.

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INTRODUCTION

A Joint Advisory Corps (JAdC) that incorporates all service capabilities would bring greater cohesion and unity of effort to future American-led stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) missions. U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl,¹ recognizing the need to improve America's ability to carry out SSTR operations, is advocating for a permanent U.S. Army Advisory Corps (AAC), an Army entity whose mission would focus on training foreign security services in the realm of national defense and counterinsurgency.¹ Nagl argues that the U.S. military requires a separate force dedicated to this mission because it empowers a host-nation to stamp out nascent insurgencies before, during, and after conflict and to foster progress.² He also asserts that the U.S. military has not seen its last SSTR mission, a primary reason for making a long-term investment in this area.³ The AAC has its merits, but it is Army-centric. Expanding the AAC concept to include all the services would likely gain wider approval across the U.S. government and bolster SSTR capabilities.

Re-establishing security and maintaining order are essential components of a broad range of military missions geared to bolster what is now commonly referred to as SSTR operations. In general, SSTR is a term referring to a wide-range of U.S. government activities designed to foster stability, sustain peace, and promote U.S. interests overseas, especially in places distressed by chronic and severe domestic unrest.⁴ Because of the numerous types of SSTR operations, this paper will focus on security operations, specifically

¹ U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl commands the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate from Oxford University, taught national security studies at West Point, and served as a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is the author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* and was on the writing team that produced the Army's new *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. He is also working with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and contributing to series of reports that address the future of the U.S. military. The preceding biographical information is found on the Small Wars Journal and CNAS websites.

re-establishing and maintaining security to protect host-nation civilians and civilian property, and to permit a smoother transition along the lower end of the conflict spectrum. A range of lower end activities is shown below and straddles the peace and conflict categories.




Figure 1. A Range of Possible Military Operations.⁵

A permanent JAdC that focuses on SSTR operations may benefit long-range U.S. political and military interests at home and abroad. Abroad, a JAdC would spread SSTR burdens across the services and leverage all component capabilities, which could enhance SSTR performance. It could combine service strengths, improve planning and execution, and diminish the risks associated with having to fill security gaps during SSTR missions. For instance, the Air Force could show foreign helicopter or fighter jet pilots how to provide support for ground forces engaged in combat or other relevant missions while the Navy could enable foreign counterparts to improve riverine and littoral patrols. Furthermore, a JAdC could work directly with the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG), an emerging U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) concept aimed at better coordinating the use of national power between U.S. government civilian agencies and the military.⁶ A JAdC could facilitate smoother transitions along the lower end of the conflict spectrum, particularly when

the collapse of a foreign government and its security apparatus leads to a security gap that threatens to raise the costs of achieving the operational and strategic objectives.

Moreover, the JAdC could score the United States political points with many countries because assistance would be inclusive of all the host-nation's services and avoid an Army-centric label. A permanent and dedicated force that supports SSTR could alleviate the stress on combat troops who during recent times have come under tremendous pressure owing to extended tours resulting from the time required to train Iraqi and Afghani security forces; efforts that are primarily Army-led and not equally distributed among the U.S. military services. Combat troops lack police training and may experience difficulty adjusting to sharp changes in the rules of engagement as they grapple with the transition in operations from "annihilate and destroy" to "apprehend and arrest." The benefits a JAdC offers overseas would complement those at home.

Domestically, a JAdC would likely improve recruitment and retention if fashioned to offer U.S. military personnel new career paths and upward mobility. It would also comply with DoD Directive 3000.05, which stipulates that the military must support SSTR operations.⁷ Importantly, during peacetime a JAdC could help local U.S. governments in times of major national disasters such as Katrina, where lawlessness took place. A JAdC could temporarily fill in for a police department that is unable to secure a security gap and security gaps around the world appear to be rising.

In the geopolitical context, one of the greatest threats America faces in the 21st century is the growing number of vulnerable states, those characterized by weak governments, institutions, and rampant corruption, that are at risk of democratic backsliding and that undermine regional peace and stability. Many of these vulnerable states lack

sufficient capacity to provide its citizens with basic security and as a result terrorist and criminal organizations likely calculate that they can increasingly exploit these states as safe operating environments.⁸ Moreover, states that lack a monopoly on the use of lethal force give rise to illegally armed groups that often challenge the government through violent means and undermine peace and stability, key ingredients to economic progress.

The U.S. military has on numerous occasions had the unenviable task of executing SSTR missions in war-torn societies. Its track record might be better if a JAdC had existed. The Army in particular spearheaded many of these efforts. Indeed the use of Army or other service advisors to assist foreign security forces is not new. For instance, during the Vietnam War the U.S. sent hundreds of advisors to South Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese Army and offer guidance. These advisor relationships, however, were formed on an ad hoc basis and lacked permanency. U.S. Special Forces have also traditionally helped train foreign soldiers, but this mission is widening and Special Forces may not be adequately manned and funded to meet this growing requirement.

This paper uses three brief case studies to illustrate the impact of current U.S. SSTR limitations on its international interests, explains why the U.S. military in recent times has struggled with SSTR, and why establishing a permanent JAdC would boost America's overall SSTR operational capabilities and performance. A counterargument is also included along with conclusions and recommendations.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

The United States military over the past two centuries has fought on foreign soil countless times to protect American interests, and spread and uphold its values.⁹ Overwhelming U.S. military victories and technological superiority underscored many of these conflicts and emboldened U.S. leaders to embark on increasingly ambitious nation-building projects, now more commonly known as SSTR. Yet despite America's comparative military advantages, U.S. forces have struggled to restore security and civil order in several of the nations they occupied in the aftermath of war or following a military intervention. For example, the U.S. military in the past two decades has seen significant spikes in violence and breakdowns in civil order immediately following hostilities in countries suffering from a leadership or security vacuum, in particular where regime change has occurred. Iraq, Haiti, and Panama highlight the importance of establishing and maintaining security in order to prevent lawlessness and a protracted conflict.

Many would further advocate, similar to the Geneva Convention, that when a country invades another, it assumes the responsibility for restoring and maintaining security. International expectations are high from the outset in this regard. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted in late-2004 that "if you break it, you fix it," a notion that many observers coined the "Pottery Barn Rule" and that many world leaders maintain and expect the U.S. to uphold.¹⁰ Indeed the U.S. military's inability, after numerous experiences, to conduct effective security operations aimed at averting the types of breakdowns witnessed in the three aforementioned states is troubling because such mistakes have undermined the operational and national strategic objectives while ramping the costs to the national treasure.

The Iraq, Haiti, and Panama cases reveal that post-conflict lawlessness hurt America's credibility and legitimacy with the host nation populace and the international community. The initial loss of credibility and legitimacy complicated efforts to re-stabilize and rebuild these states. These cases suggest that security is the foundation upon which stability, transition, and reconstruction can be sustained and achieved; that failure to establish security or restore order raises the cost of achieving the objective. The fallout from such failure can prolong a conflict, disrupt and delay stability, transition, and reconstruction. Iraq, Haiti, and Panama underscore the importance of security in countries following regime change and provide justification for a JAdC.

Iraq 2003. The United States in March 2003 invaded Iraq and was unprepared to deal with the extent of the security gap that ensued following the end of hostilities. Consequently this undercut the mission's legitimacy and became a public relations disaster captured vividly in the "The Descent Into Abuse" chapter of Thomas Rick's *Fiasco*.¹¹ Saddam's totalitarian grip had held the culturally and religiously fragmented country together. Most Iraqis had never known a form of government other than Saddam's brutal dictatorship. There were no vestiges of the pluralistic institutions established by the British after World War I.¹² This meant the U.S. would be required to build institutions such as a legitimate police force to maintain civil order, in addition to a reliable judicial system to prosecute criminals. Unfortunately, U.S. leaders failed to account for the time and manpower needed to establish such institutions, and consequently widespread looting and destruction of Iraqi government and civilian property occurred. One online press report detailed how

"Thousands took part in the looting in Baghdad which began April 9, the day the Hussein government ceased to function in the capital city. Not only were government ministries targeted, and the homes of the Ba'athist elite, but public institutions vital to Iraqi society, including hospitals, schools and food distribution centers. Equipment and parts were stripped from power plants, thus delaying the restoration of electricity to the city of 5 million people."¹³

U.S. military forces did little to intervene.¹⁴⁻¹⁵ They were ill-prepared for this contingency which exacted an enormous financial and psychological cost on the Iraqi population. For example, a RAND report critical of the U.S. military's post-war planning efforts indicated that the lack of security Iraqis experienced was increasingly associated with the U.S. presence.¹⁶ The wide-spread destruction of Iraqi infrastructure damaged U.S. credibility because the Iraqis began to perceive that either the U.S. did not care about lawlessness or worse, was unable to restore order.¹⁷ These tragic events also constituted operational setbacks that cost the U.S. extra time and money needed to restore damaged infrastructure that was key to running the country. For instance, the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was established to manage SSTR missions in Iraq, had to occupy Iraqi government buildings that lacked critical services such as telephones. Looters gutted over a dozen Iraqi government ministry offices that ORHA had planned on using.¹⁸ These security lapses eroded Iraqi trust in America's ability to quickly restore security and governance, and subsequently led many Iraqis to take up arms and swell the ranks of established or newly created local militias.¹⁹

Thus links were formed between an unraveling public security situation and the rise of loosely organized and illegally armed groups in Iraq. The larger armed groups include the Sadr Mahdi Army, the Kurdish Peshmerga Militia, and Badr Organization.²⁰ Various Shiite militias in southern Iraq emerged as powerful and dangerous forces that have frequently impeded reconstruction efforts. Revenge killing and general criminal misconduct spiked soon after the Saddam's government collapsed, especially as Shiite groups long brutally oppressed by the ruling Sunnis vented their rage and sought back-alley justice.²¹ Religious fault lines accentuated the chaos. A JAdC may have curtailed the surge of illegally armed

groups in Iraq. A JAdC, for instance, could have worked with the State Department and CIA field officers to quickly identify, retain, and train some of the Iraqi Police force to protect government buildings and civilian property such as small shops and businesses; a step that may have served to prevent some Iraqis from joining armed groups. A JAdC could have contributed to planning the security portion of Phase IV operations, clarifying the objectives, coordinating, and monitoring for signs of progress. Joint Publication 5-0 describes six operational phases as depicted below, and which also track along the conflict spectrum:²²

PHASING MODEL					
SHAPE	DETER	SEIZE INITIATIVE	DOMINATE	STABILIZE	ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY
Phase 0	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V
PREVENT PREPARE	CRISIS DEFINED	ASSURE FRIENDLY FREEDOM OF ACTION ACCESS THEATER INFRASTRUCTURE	ESTABLISH DOMINANT FORCE CAPABILITIES ACHIEVE FULL- SPECTRUM SUPERIORITY	ESTABLISH SECURITY RESTORE SERVICESITY	TRANSFER TO CIVIL AUTHORITY REDEPLOY

Figure 2. Phasing Model - Joint Pub 5-0

In Iraq, the U.S. military struggled with the transition between Phase III and Phase IV operations, parallels observed in the Haitian and Panamanian cases as well.

Haiti. In Haiti from 1994 to the present, the lack of a strong interim international security force coupled with poorly trained Haitian security forces proved that any semblance of peace would be short lived. President Clinton in late-1994 ordered the deployment of 1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy, and U.S. troop levels eventually reached 20,000. However, by 1995 U.S. military forces in Haiti were drawn down to about 2,500 personnel who remained in Haiti to participate in a U.N. Multinational Force totaling 5,300; too few to promote meaningful and sustainable reform.²³ Despite the absence of forced intervention in

Haiti, U.S. and multinational forces have failed to close the security gaps that followed the transfer of power from General Raul Cedras to President Aristide and onward.²⁴

While U.S. forces worked hard to keep the peace in Haiti, U.S. reluctance to undertake any extensive law enforcement responsibilities early on hampered efforts to restore order. For example, corrupt elements of the Haitian Army and police intimidated the locals and engaged in widespread criminal activity.²⁵⁻²⁶ The Haitian National Police (HNP) notoriously violated human rights such as beating prisoners.²⁷ Some of this was due to inconsistent training, vetting, and accountability shortcomings which diminished the quality of personnel within the HNP and with it the trust it had worked hard to rebuild with the populace. International criticism of U.S. failure to control Haitian security force transgressions against unarmed civilians rose and especially troubling was the attack on civilians who had gathered to welcome arriving U.S. forces.²⁸ If a JAdC unit would have deployed, it may have given U.S. troops clearer direction regarding law enforcement responsibilities. Also, advisors or trainers embedded in the HNP may have given them better guidance and training, leading to uniformed approaches and rules across policing activities, and developing an environment conducive to SSTR. A JAdC could have been introduced early on in Haiti to boost police reform and help mitigate a deteriorating security situation.

Panama 1989. U.S. SSTR operations in Panama were virtually non-existent. Washington instructed U.S. forces in Panama to leave too early following Operation Just Cause, the invasion designed to remove and capture General Manuel Noriega and dismantle his military regime. Looting and general lawlessness spread throughout Panama City and in other parts of the country²⁹ after Noriega's fall and when U.S. forces destroyed the Panamanian Defense Force. There was no other viable security mechanism to maintain law

and order in the country. According to the Washington Times “old Panama hands [were] not surprised that the Panamanian people surged out of the slums to clean out everything in the stores that was not tied down or protected by armed and resolute owners.”³⁰ Panamanians viewed the security gap as a sign that there was no plan in place to restore public security.³¹ Consequently, the looters and other criminals damaged infrastructure, made it difficult to re-stabilize the country, and hurt U.S. international standing.

These relatively recent struggles with SSTR have prompted frustrated U.S. government leaders to seek and debate new approaches to boosting America’s ability to undertake SSTR. Few would doubt that U.S. leaders likely seek to replicate the ingredients that led to the hallmark SSTR successes of post-World War II Germany and Japan, and avoid repeating the mistakes of the referenced less-than-stellar performances.

America is finally taking steps in the right direction. Two significant shifts, for instance, have been the reversal of severe cuts made to national defense in the 90s following the end of the Cold War, and the decision to expand security partnerships. Contemporary domestic political considerations have in many ways dictated that military activities overseas go quicker and be accomplished cheaper. However, SSTR operations take a long time. Some may last decades, requiring vast amounts of national patience and resources. Iraq, Haiti, and Panama stand out as three cases where the U.S. failed to put forth the necessary military, economic, and political commitment to meet the requirements of conducting successful SSTR missions.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

The U.S. military is wrestling with its evolving role in the security dimension of SSTR operations because of a blend of national political attitudes and institutional barriers which have complicated its ability to adapt and plan for today's threat environment. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government's foreign policy has transformed from one that primarily sought the status quo to one that has increasingly embraced ambitious endeavors to fundamentally alter foreign political and socioeconomic landscapes. Take for instance, the U.S. National Security Strategy which is imbued with extraordinary idealism, and whether right or wrong, strongly extols the virtues of democracy. It also asserts that the global community stands to progress if only it adopt dogma that includes establishing a representative government, rule of law, and free market system.³² These ideals are seeping into the national security establishment and are combining with Washington's corporate mindset or bid to do more with less. Hence the U.S. military has to accomplish more without commensurate increases in resources.

America's Cold War mentality and corporate mindset has hampered the U.S. military's ability to adapt quicker. Washington's Cold War mentality, for example, has prevented it from taking the necessary steps to develop the capabilities required to undertake effective SSTR operations. This mentality was the result of politically and ideologically charged decisions that focused the U.S. military on preparing solely for a large-scale conventional conflict against Soviet forces on the European plains. These policies gave little impetus to bolstering SSTR capabilities and failed to push for greater interagency involvement in military operations. Instead of permitting an interagency coordinated approach to handling the Panamanian crisis, for example, Washington sent the military in

without properly accounting for or preparing it for the potential contingencies that arose.³³

A former U.S. soldier who participated in the invasion of Panama commented that “U.S. troopers had their orders and these orders did not include restoring order. We have seen ample photographic evidence of the massive looting while American soldiers stood by, intent on their mission of eliminating the combat elements of the PDF.”³⁴

Likewise, a corporate political mindset impacted how the U.S. military operated in Iraq following Baghdad’s fall. The corporate political mindset is a term referring to official conviction that technology would solve all problems, and reduce the costs associated with maintaining a breadth of conventional military capabilities as well as a large-standing ground force. The rise of corporate politics that impacted national defense strategies and culture emerged in the early nineties and prevailed until 9/11. Washington has withheld the resources and guidance the military needs to realize its idealistic vision; a vision which requires enhancing the training and equipping of the military to handle a widening mandate. Policymakers are just now formally calling upon the U.S. military to support SSTR operations, which may include policing and training foreign security services. The military, also affected by the Cold War mentality, has long viewed these missions as falling beyond the scope of its greater national security mandate, and missions that Special Forces historically have tackled. Note the remark by General John Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which demonstrates the prevalent attitude in the 90s:

“The task of keeping law and order in Haiti is the responsibility of the Haitian police force and the Haitian military. We are not in a business of doing day-to-day law and order.”³⁵

The U.S. military has only marginally transformed to undertake lengthy and larger-scale SSTR operations. The U.S. military over the past two decades focused on capabilities designed to destroy U.S. adversaries on the battlefield with unprecedented

power and precision. The Cold War contributed to this institutional inclination and it was precisely because of this reason that the bulk of U.S. military training has emphasized kinetic power vice activities that fall at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Absent the Soviet Union, and with the rise of global ethnic and separatist movements, the U.S. has been dramatically challenged to maintain global stability; a challenge that increasingly calls for capabilities other than combat prowess.

U.S. actions and statements in the mid-90s suggest that its political and military leaders had limited interest in pouring robust manpower and resources into Haiti to bolster SSTR operations. Despite the valiant effort that U.S. Army Special Forces made to restore civilian institutions in Haiti, America's lack of staying power and commitment to resolving Haiti's seemingly intractable problems constrained SSTR operations.³⁶

Consequently, U.S. forces never secured Iraq after defeating the Iraqi military and toppling Saddam. Some observers claim that this was partly the result of the limited number of personnel that the civilian leadership allocated to the war in Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, for example, significantly limited the force package that was assembled for Operation Iraqi Freedom, largely because he and others in the administration calculated that a smaller yet deadlier force could accomplish the task with a correspondingly lower risk of casualties.³⁷ Retrospectively, these calculations exemplify how the corporate political mindset hindered the military's ability to deal with the emerging threats and challenges. The RAND Corporation aptly points out that such goals and endeavors call for ever-greater levels of commitment in money, time, and manpower.³⁸

CONCLUSIONS

A permanent and separate force that focuses on the security component of SSTR operations, such as a JAdC, is required for sustaining and executing successful SSTR operations in the future, although such a force may not be sufficient. A JAdC could synchronize multi-service and interagency capabilities that are necessary to substantially improve U.S. SSTR operational capacity. For instance, a JAdC could work to train and equip host-nation security forces at the same time U.S. diplomats strive to maintain the support of neighboring states or at the very least their neutrality.

U.S. leaders cannot expect the Army or other services to adopt new mission sets without the proper tools and funding, and cannot leave SSTR to one single service or government department. Moreover, U.S. leaders cannot expect combat troops to transform into policemen in the heat of battle precisely during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV operations, and especially where a high operational tempo requires cooling off and a dramatic shift in the rules of engagement.

The rise of fledgling, vulnerable states and those on the brink of collapse warrant investing and trying a permanent JAdC because there is a high degree of likelihood it may help secure America's interests. The Failed States Index provides ample warning that there are "few encouraging signs...to suggest the world is on a path to greater peace and stability."³⁹ The number of vulnerable states in Africa, the Pacific Rim, and Middle East are all too apparent. Remnants of the communist legacy, such as North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam could also pose serious challenges to U.S. interests. The collapse of any of these governments would most likely require significant U.S. SSTR involvement.

A JAdC could function as the entity that facilitates the cooling off in operational tempo and helps manage the transition along the lower end of the conflict spectrum. A JAdC could make smaller force packages possible in the future because the U.S. military will have already worked with host-nation forces to meet security needs. Having a JAdC to take pressure off combat personnel could reduce the risks that other states may pose to the U.S. should they attempt take advantage of U.S. involvement in a protracted conflict. A JAdC could also improve America's credibility as a nation willing to help other nations or fix what it breaks as JAdC personnel endeavor to enable fledgling states provide security for its citizens, much as Special Forces have through Foreign Internal Defense training projects.

Contrary to the advocates of the AAC or the idea of a separate military force dedicated to handling the military's SSTR mandate, there are those who argue that creating a separate force will only dilute the military's fundamental warfighting capabilities; and that taking on SSTR missions will limit the U.S. military's ability to fight simultaneous wars or defend against formidable or up-and-coming conventional opponents. For example, there is ongoing debate at the Pentagon over whether to augment the number of ground forces to help fight future insurgencies at the expense of new weapons systems that may be needed to fight a conventional threat.⁴⁰ Underlying this claim is a powerful argument that posits China will eventually challenge U.S. military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region. Some observers indicate that such a confrontation may result from a China-Taiwan crisis while others point to potential Chinese clashes with other regional powers over access to vital resources or territorial disputes. Nevertheless, while America waits for the coming of the great conventional opponent or battle, vulnerable states will persistently pose a threat to U.S. interests; hence investing in a force that can aid these vulnerable states would likely pay

handsome peace dividends, especially if one implodes at a time U.S. forces are already committed elsewhere. Then there are those who posit the U.S. is unlikely to undertake another SSTR mission on the Iraqi scale in the foreseeable future and should leave Special Forces as the focal point for foreign security force training.

Indeed the U.S. military already has the Special Forces spearheading many training missions abroad, albeit they are a smaller service with an ever-growing mandate. Former Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel asserts that under Title X, USSOCOM is positioned to “raise, train, and equip [an] advisory corps,” and that it has the clout to run such a mission.⁴¹ However, the Long War has placed great stress on U.S. Special Forces and to expect USSOCOM alone to establish an advisory corps may be a stretch. Rather, Special Forces provide a model from which to begin building a JAdC SSTR force. If a JAdC is approved, funded, and realized, Special Forces could take part in training this force. Special Forces could specifically offer insight into how to build up cultural expertise.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. military should push for a permanent JAdC because it may significantly boost the U.S. military's ability to undertake SSTR operations. A JAdC would account for phase four security requirements, and bolster Washington's ability to deliver on humanitarian, and reconstruction assistance, in addition to prompting economic recovery. A JAdC could lighten the load on the conventional warriors, simplify command and control, improve interagency cooperation, and act as a force multiplier as it works to build the cultural expertise the U.S. military requires to help train foreign forces or to restore security. Force and equipment contributions from each of the services to form a joint group would also spread the effort and cost among the military components and reduce the likelihood that any one service sacrifices a core competency as it incorporates SSTR doctrine.

Currently, the concept underlying the AAC revolves around embedding professional U.S. soldiers within host nation security forces as part of broader training programs. The overarching program calls "for the Arm to institutionalize and professionalize the manning and training of combat advisors in permanent Army force structure. This corps would develop doctrine and oversee the training and deployment of 750 advisory teams of 25 soldiers each, organized into three 250-team divisions."⁴² Nagl's proposal is a good starting point, and these personnel numbers should be considered. Moreover, this corps should eventually be comprised of a blend of trainers, infantry, engineers, and military police, in addition to deriving personnel from all the services and the interagency.

A multi-service approach would enhance law enforcement responsibilities by assisting with air support or riverine transport or patrols. This calls for a JAdC to have units that police and enforce until such a time when indigenous forces are reconstituted. These

units could perform constabulary duties. The JAdC could work with interagency partners such as the Department of Justice, and State's International Narcotics and Law center to coordinate the following: Making the best use of indigenous police forces; employing constabulary forces, perhaps a combination of contractors, indigenous forces, and U.S. personnel; and training some military units to police with non-lethal weapons.

During peacetime, a JAdC could play a vital role at home in helping the country cope with major national disasters and emergencies, and bolster recruitment. The aftermath of Katrina demonstrated that American cities and urban centers can easily descend into disorder. A JAdC could work to bridge planning and execution between local police and National Guard forces, for example. It could also use its own forces, provided they exist, to fill the security vacuum should a police department be unable to fulfill its mission.

National recruitment and retention would be an added benefit because the new path and skill-sets could be parlayed into the civilian job market once the enlisted separate from service. Former JAdC personnel could compete for jobs in the U.S. criminal justice system, police departments, or private security firms. This job may lure people into the military who are interested in missions other than full-blown combat.

The U.S. military is only now beginning to address the inadequacies inherent to its SSTR capabilities especially restoring security in a country following regime change. For its part the U.S. Army, the largest service, has bore the brunt of SSTR missions and is taking the lead in crafting new concepts such as the AAC. Nevertheless, the U.S. Army's initiative faces institutional and cultural barriers that are impeding its ability to transform and adopt SSTR operations as a permanent mission. The mission in Iraq has exacted a toll on the military, particularly the Army. The U.S. military mindset has been jarred, however, and

U.S. leaders must capitalize on this changing mindset to move toward meeting the requirements of today's and future SSTR operations.⁴³

ENDNOTES

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