Does Service Interdependence Take Jointness Too Far?
Abstract
Over the course of the last two decades, the Department of Defense has made tremendous progress in its abilities to defend and advance the national security interests of the United States in peace and war. Much of this success can be attributed to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the continued emphasis of the department to achieve increased levels of Service integration to support and improve the warfighting effectiveness of joint force commanders. The ability to effectively employ joint forces has increased the lethality, agility, and operational precision of the United States military. Combat operations in the contemporary operational environment underscore the necessity to effectively organize the collective capabilities of the respective Services constituting the military, our traditional allies, ever-changing coalition partners, and the interagency to advance American security interests across the globe. There are, however, limits to the benefits of jointness. The U.S. military risks crossing a point of diminishing returns where the doctrine of Service integration that was wisely mandated through the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is interpolated forward to achieve Service interdependence. Ever-increasing levels of Service interdependence can reduce the cumulative and qualitative benefits realized through the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Service interdependence can adversely affect the abilities of the respective Services to execute tasks and functions within their core competencies and unnecessarily increases the complexity of force employment and sustainment at the operational level of war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 27, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA484346
Entities
People
- Christopher G. Downs
Organizations
- Naval War College