A Comparison of Operation Iraqi Freedom and The Algerian War
Abstract
Both the Algerian War and the war in Iraq offer numerous lessons for conducting Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, the United States found itself embroiled in a bitter insurgency. Since then, the U.S. military skillfully adapted to the rigors of combating the insurgency. As a result, a solid foundation has been laid for the fulfillment of long-term strategic success. History is replete with examples of failed attempts at combating insurgencies. For instance, in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, the French did not link their impressive tactical accomplishments on the battlefield to strategic success against a nationalist insurgency. Conversely, the U.S. military in Iraq has demonstrated a more thorough grasp of the operational art. This paper focuses on how the United States, in Iraq, more effectively applied certain principles of war to COIN operations at the operational level than the French were able to in Algeria. Specifically, the paper compares the principles of security, restraint, perseverance and finally legitimacy. Examples are given, drawn from numerous sources on both case studies, which paint a detailed picture of how both sides either successfully or unsuccessfully applied those principles at the operational level of war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 23, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA484357
Entities
People
- Robert C. Hawkins
Organizations
- Naval War College