Ideas in Arms: The Relationship of Kinetic and Ideological Means in America's Global War on Terror
Abstract
Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT's placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models. First, the paper presents a kinetic model founded in America's historical implementation of its military arm that emphasizes physical effects. Second, it constructs a nonkinetic model comprised of the primarily psychological components of the nation's informational capabilities. Examining actions in OEF through these two lenses reveals the institutional tension the US military experienced as it sought to leverage the relevant COG.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA484456
Entities
People
- Thomas D. Torkelson
Organizations
- Air University Press