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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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COMMON SECURITY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Professor B.F. Griffard

Operations and Gaming Division, CSL

A major criticism of the Coalition strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq is their heavy dependence on the military element of power; portrayed by many critics as a failure to understand the environment within which these battles are being fought. To emphasize this point, British operations during the Malayan Emergency are presented as a model for successful counter-insurgency efforts. However, placed in perspective, the Coalition has been involved in Afghanistan since 2001, and Iraq since 2003; the Malayan Emergency lasted 12 years.

Without a doubt planning for the post-major combat operations phases lacked prescience; yet, as is being demonstrated in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, there remains a requirement to kill terrorists while attempting the win the hearts and minds of the extremists. More importantly, Coalition military hearts and minds initiatives are short term; long term success requires international political will, and national governments that can govern and provide for the security of their citizens. Many of the symposium speakers reinforced this premise by emphasizing that the affected populations have become inured to the presence of the military and the media, therefore they will begin to believe when other agencies of government become more relevant in the fight.

Addressing the Issue

The global reach of transnational terrorism became apparent after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Protected by the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its international network posed a major threat to the stability and security of many nations of the world. The risk was especially acute within the regions encompassed in the United States Central Command area of responsibility. To counter this threat Coalition Forces initiated Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. In both cases a decisive military victory has been followed by extensive counter terrorist/counter insurgency operations. It is the tactics and techniques employed in these on-going operations that framed the

discussions at the second annual Land Forces Symposium in Islamabad, Pakistan April 10-12, 2007.

As part of an on-going effort to outline a comprehensive and collaborative strategy toward terrorism the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Pakistan, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander, U.S. Army Central co-hosted this year's symposium. Organized around the theme "*Common Security and the Global War on Terror*," it provided a forum for Chiefs of Staff of the Armies from the 22 attending nations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and surrounding region to meet and confer on common threats, and



LTG R. Steven Whitcomb, Commander, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) welcomed symposium participants.

the political, socioeconomic or ideological motivations of terrorists. These discussions led to three strategic conclusions. First, in combating transnational terrorism the use of military force alone has not and will not yield desired results. Second, win the "hearts and minds" of the people. Such a strategy addresses the root causes of terrorism by removing the sense of deprivation that leads a population to support terrorist operations and recruitment. The third inference was that the emphasis on the term "war" detracts from the multi-dimensional nature of the counter terrorism struggle.

Supporting the Commander

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) assisted the U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) command

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staff in identifying subject matter experts and speakers. Professor Bernard F. Griffard, USAWC/CSL, reprised his role from the 2006 Land Forces Symposium (LFS), and served as the symposium's co-moderator. He shared duties with Dr. Pervaiz Cheema, the Director of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). LTG (R) David Barno, Director NESA, served as a principal panelist.

The CSL Issue Paper detailing this event can be accessed at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP03-07.pdf>.

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MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Professor Dennis M. Murphy

Director, Information in Warfare Group

Professor Murphy, participated in a workshop entitled "Bringing the Web to the Streets: New Technologies Leveraging New Behaviors" on 27 April 2007 at the Meridian International Center in Washington, DC. The workshop was sponsored by the Open Source Center, Department of State, and the Global Futures Forum. The seminar focused on "mobile technologies" which, at least currently, is principally focused on cell phone usage and capabilities. Four panels provided insights and then answered questions.

The first panel considered political implications of mobile technologies. There are numerous examples of cell phone SMS (text) messaging shaping political campaigns and mobilizing/revolutionizing politics. It is used both to call people to popular protests as well as used by governments to provide misinformation in order to quell such protests. Text messaging is the medium of choice in overseas countries. It bypasses mass media and mobilizes an already persuaded populace as a means of lightweight engagement. An example includes the popular uprising in Spain after the subway bombings, where text messaging rose 40% above normal within two days of the attacks. Cell phones currently contain the technology to text, provide news, video, sound, voice, radio and internet. Mobile is pervasive in the third world. 97% of Tanzanians have access to mobile phones. Mobile coverage exists throughout Uganda. There are 100 million handsets in sub-Saharan Africa. Radio is the only media device more prevalent than mobile. Small laptops add to the mobile tech phenomena. \$100 laptops currently in development are nearly indestructible.

Panel 2 considered the economic implications of mobile technologies. 59% of mobile phones are in the developing world—over 7 million mobile subscribers in Kenya alone. Efforts are under way to develop African specific mobile applications, e.g. distributing commodity prices (such as vegetable prices) to local village producers. Cell phones are used as

credit cards in Kenya. You can pay for cab fare or for fish with your cell phone. Cell towers are being raised in Lake Victoria to allow fishermen to call to shore with their catch numbers as they set out to market. Mobile phones are ubiquitous in Asia. There are over 400 million users in China. Farmers receive crop market prices from the Chinese government via text messaging in order to allow them to harvest at the best possible time.

Panel 3 considered the impact of mobile technology on social behavior and the security sphere. As we know, terrorist groups are networked. Sunni extremist groups use multiple websites to solicit donations. Terrorists recruit, conduct knowledge management (e.g. the "Encyclopedia of Jihad"), and conduct perception management and disruptive attacks on the web. There will continue to be increased sophistication of existing uses of information technology (IT) and greater emphasis on IT for both disruptive and destructive attacks. Policy should target IT use by anticipating IT capabilities and targeting information flows. Mobile phones are closed platforms that allow aggregated demand to reduce risk (e.g. I'll go to the protest if 10,000 other people agree to go). However, cell phones are "persistent worlds," i.e. everything is logged and thereby traceable.

The final panel looked at technology "over the horizon." This panel considered the future of technology and looked specifically at "web 3.0", that is virtual worlds like 2nd Life and others. 2nd Life is attractive as an opportunity to socialize where there is no need to compete and can be exploited as a tool for learning. Web 3.0 is generally about being inside a 3D world that is low-cost and emotive. Multinational corporations see a movement (that is here now) where they will plan and execute business plans in the 3D internet world. One presenter cautioned to be attuned to social change which he described as having a low chance of happening but great impact if it did. As of last year over 50% of the world's population lived in cities for the first time in history. The Chinese and Indians are producing decent \$4000 cars. He predicted that mobile phones will soon be supercomputers in people's pockets.

This event had important national security and military implications. Mobile technology can be used as a political and economic enabler to advance democracy in its purest sense by empowering individuals. On the other hand, it can be used to spread disinformation and to incite hatred among the disaffected. While standard cell phone messaging can usually be tracked it can also use prepaid cards to mobilize quickly, conduct an operation and then shut down with little or no traceability. From a national security perspective, the U.S. needs to consider current privacy laws, international treaties and

bureaucratic clearance policies regarding the monitoring of mobile technology. Mobile will continue to grow in significance and the U.S. can either be helped or hurt depending on whether it is prepared to support the good aspects of the technology and/or counter the bad. This will require the international development of acceptable norms, treaties reflective of the ability of nations to exploit the capability and counter the negative aspects of it, and a nimbleness of response that is currently the antithesis of our bureaucratic processes.

The 3D internet (web 3.0) will be the world of our children and grandchildren. It will complete the globalization process by allowing everyone access to (virtually) everyone else on the planet. The implications are huge from a political, economic and social perspective. In this world the power of the nation-state may be usurped by the power of the corporation, the power of the loosely organized franchise and even the power of the individual. By "wiring the world" and providing access to it by all the chances of democratization taking hold are increased since the power of autocrats and dictators is diminished. On the other hand it provides a platform for the disaffected voice. Perhaps the latter is best quelled by ensuring that economic prosperity is achieved through the use of mobile technologies to reduce that angry population. In any case, the U.S. needs to be proactive in managing this information environment to a positive end.

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UNIFIED QUEST 2007 CAPSTONE WARGAME

Mr. John Auger, Booz Allen Hamilton

Professor Jim Kievit, OGD, CSL

The Collins Center hosted the Army's Title 10 Capstone Wargame, Unified Quest 2007 (UQ07), from April 29 through 4 May 2007. As the Army's Executive Agent, the Training and Doctrine Command cosponsored the event with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The UQ07 Capstone Wargame is the premier concept development wargame and also the capstone event to the Army's FY07 Future Warfare Study Plan. Over 350 representatives from the joint and interagency communities participated in UQ07. Using a scenario initiated, seminar panel format (with embedded U.S./Allied, Adversarial, and Coalition/Neutral components), UQ07 participants employed a full-spectrum campaign planning approach to identify and examine both regional and broader strategic issues which influence campaign planning and the framing of necessary actions and objectives essential for the challenges to be addressed.

UQ07 objectives included:

- Promoting a shared understanding of the enemy and the “Long War” with emphasis on employing and sustaining forces capable of conducting “Full-Spectrum Operations.”
- Identifying the governance, demographic, economic, scientific, technological, and military operational factors to consider in framing national security strategy and operational planning for the “Long War.”
- Determining how the above listed factors can be integrated and exploited against a range of possible competitors/opponents.
- Identifying operational challenges, implications, and suggesting possible solutions affecting our capability to conduct Full-Spectrum Operations for a conflict spanning several decades.

The UQ07 Capstone Wargame design included two separate wargame environments. The first wargame environment contained four operational-level, regionally based panels, each working on a separate campaign plan in response to specific operational and strategic factors. The four panels included: Middle East (2008–2016), Latin America (2008–2016), Africa 2008–2016), and Middle East–Future (2016–2020). The second wargame environment was a Global Strategic Panel which examined strategic and operational issues in a global context, beyond the four regional panels, and explored campaign design and campaign planning for this global environment. Each panel contained within it “Blue” (including an imbedded “Red Team”), Adversarial “Red,” and “Green” Team members. These teams worked an action, reaction, and counteraction methodology to frame and reframe as necessary operational issues associated with a campaign design process.

The UQ07 Capstone Wargame insights were presented to a Senior Leader Seminar on 4 May hosted by the Chief of Staff, Army, General Casey; and including the TRADOC Commander, General Wallace; the Deputy Commander of JFCOM, Lieutenant General Wood; the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, Lieutenant General Wagner; and a number of other senior military, interagency, and multi-national officials.

Ongoing and future analytic efforts related to UQ07 will incorporate all the multiple and diverse observations, issues, and insights from the Capstone Wargame as well as from the year-long Future Warfare Study effort in order to provide a more detailed executive summary describing and outlining “this ‘Long War,’” provide information for an operational command white paper, and also provide the foundation for a future edition of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3.

Planning is already underway for Unified Quest 2008, projected to be held at the Collins Center in the Spring of 2008.

JLASS WARGAME UNIQUE TO ALL SENIOR LEVEL WAR COLLEGES

Colonel Michael Gould
Operations and Gaming Division, CSL

The Joint Land, Aerospace, Sea Simulation (JLASS) elective and wargame is a unique opportunity for select senior level college (SLC) students. This elective is the only Joint elective that is offered at each of the SLCs and provides an opportunity for the students to interact over the course duration with fellow students across all SLCs. The wargame, conducted at Maxwell Air Force Base, culminates the learning experience by bringing all of the students together to execute their war plans in a world scenario based in the future, and facing a myriad of global issues and conflicts.

Now in its 24th year, every April the JLASS wargame brings together representation from the Air War College, Army War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Marine Corps War College, College of Naval Warfare, National War College, and Joint Special Operations University for an intense five-day engagement addressing key strategic and operational level issues. Over 100 students, mentored by some 25 faculty and over 85 controllers, descend on the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education’s Air Force Wargaming Institute (AFWI) to tackle issues that simulate issues these strategic leaders will face upon graduation.

Just as their war planning is designed to be realistic, the students will face real world obstacles, such as media and public pressures, during game execution. A fictional news station, the Global News Network, and “Early Worm” fictional news summary provide the informational and public opinion facet of the world that impact student decision making. Approximately 20 Reserve and National Guard public affairs specialists from across the U.S. portray the media and produce these critical venues of information.

The major learning objectives of the JLASS exercise include planning, applying, and adjusting national and theater level strategic plans and policies. This is done through each SLC being designated as either a Combatant Commander and staff, or key Joint Staff and Interagency members. Controllers role play every facet of the government and the interagency process, from the President to the State Department to the Department of Homeland Security. The exercise is a two-sided, computer-supported wargame that takes place 10 years in the future. Issues, ranging from homeland security and natural disaster to reserve mobilization, strategic mobility and global force management are played out through student moves in

response to scripted events.

At the end of each exercise day, a Council of Elders, comprised of faculty from each of the SLCs, the Director of AFWI, and the Exercise Director (provided by the Army War College), gather to adjudicate the decisions made by the student cells, and set the stage for the next day’s injects and learning objectives. Much of the ground work for the game is done over the entire preceding year by the JLASS Steering Group, a composed of faculty and controllers that meet six times a year to resolve issues and plan the way ahead.

Students begin the academic phase of JLASS at their respective SLCs between October and January, varied by school curriculum and electives schedule. During this “distributed” phase, the students interact thru video teleconferencing and other collaborative planning and coordination venues. Late in the planning process, select students from each notional staff gather with the students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, who play the JCS/CJCS/SecDef and other NSC members, to resolve force flow and priority issues. The stage is then set for the trip to Maxwell.

In the end, besides operating in a stress filled environment as key strategic leaders, the students also are given opportunity to interact with students from their sister colleges. This interaction undoubtedly leads to networking that will continue the length of their service, and beyond, as they serve and fight together. Several top ranking officials, to include the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, General Richard Cody, share that their experience in JLASS as a student has better prepared them for the challenges they have faced in the years subsequent to their enrollment. Based on comments like these, and end of course surveys, the JLASS wargame and elective have continued to grow and improve as an opportunity to train and develop strategic leaders for a complex world where an understanding of joint and interagency procedures is paramount to their success.

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LINKING STRATEGIC MISSION COMMAND TO OPERATIONAL BATTLE COMMAND (Part 1 of 2)

MAJ Kyle Burley
Strategic Experiential Education Group

The Strategic Experiential Education Group (SEEG) supports senior leader education by providing practical, experiential, and immersive learning environments. These environments can create learning opportunities beyond those encountered in the seminar room. They can amplify specific teaching

points through experiences such as: constraining time resources, compelling the use of intuitive skills, and altering surrounding physical conditions.

Over the past few months the SEEG has begun laying the groundwork for linking strategic level Mission Command to operational and tactical level Battle Command. Mission Command is “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding” (FM 6-0). Battle Command is “the exercise of commanding operations against a hostile, thinking enemy” (FM 3-0). It is important to differentiate Battle Command, or at the Strategic level, Mission Command, from the term “Command and Control.” Mission Command and Battle Command are related to Command and Control (C2) but the terms are not synonymous. Mission Command and Battle Command elements are focused on the effects of command on the enemy. In contrast, C2 is the “exercise of authority and direction...over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system” (FM 6-0). C2 is the backbone of functions and systems on which commanders exercise Battle Command.

Since many of the simulation tools used to create immersive learning environments are inherently based on digital technology, these environments can simultaneously expose our strategic leaders to C2 and Battle Command decision-making support tools. This secondary effect of experience with technology tools within a simulated environment is additive to the education being received. Today's fight and tomorrow's planning environment requires senior leaders to be “Power Users” who are just as familiar with technology-en-

abled command tools as they are with their favorite cellular phone or personal data assistant. This is a paradigm shift for senior leaders previously accustomed to text and verbal-based procedures; to become leaders who can rapidly attain situational understanding through battlespace visualization made possible by a network-enhanced digital command environment. A specific example of this paradigm shift which has great potential at the operational level is Command Post of the Future (CPoF).

CPoF is a Battle Command System which operational commanders and headquarters staffs in both Iraq and Afghanistan absolutely rely on for timely situational awareness. It has truly made battlefield visualization a reality.

A more detailed discussion of CPoF will follow in the next Collins Center Update as Part 2 of this article.

Now that systems like CPoF are being used by senior commanders and their staffs from Battalion to Multi-National Force level in Iraq, in Afghanistan, as well as in support of Joint and Interagency Missions, it is obviously prudent that USAWC provide learning experiences which will allow our leaders to be adept and conversant with CPoF and supporting Battle Command tools. One of the Exercise Objectives for the 2008 Strategic Decision Making Exercise is to “...apply competencies required by strategic leaders in a complex, fast-moving environment.” Today DoD staffers may spend most of their time using e-mail, cell-phone, or video-teleconference. However, those in contact with operational headquarters will need to understand the user interface of the information they are receiving from subordinate commands in order to translate it to the Strategic Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational environment for national policy and military campaign planning.

At the tactical and operational levels,

Battle Command is now one of the Battlefield Functional Areas, along with maneuver and effects. Army Battle Command Systems like Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), an on-board maneuver based system, are dynamically increasing our combat capabilities, through the planning and mission preparation and spatial awareness capabilities they provide to the soldier. “Battle Command as a Weapons System” or BCAWS, a force modernization concept integrated into emerging Army doctrine, was discussed in detail at the recent Battle Command User's Conference in May 2007. Battle Command Systems are the tools with which the Army prepares for combat, plans operations, passes orders, and reports situations at the tactical level. Their use provides a network-enabled capability that gives the U.S. Army and sister services superiority in the digital battlespace.

SEEG personnel have attended several conferences over the past quarter, with the focus on providing tools to enable strategic Mission Command just as Battle Command has been enabled at the tactical level. SEEG has attended the Battle Command Training Capability Users Conference and Joint Land Aerospace and Sea Simulation Exercise in April, the DoD Modeling and Simulation and Battle Command User's Conferences in May, and the National Simulation Center Gaming Seminar in June. SEEG researchers attended each of these with the purpose of obtaining and modifying existing tools that will provide USAWC students with “Senior Leader Knowledge, Skills, and Attributes” that directly affect “Deciding” by creating a senior leader environment that replicates not only the “Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity” of that environment, but also provides the command tools to operate effectively within it.

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This publication and other CSL publications can be found online at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp>.

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