

# THE COLLINS CENTER UPDATE

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**THE CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP**  
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
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## INSIDE THIS ISSUE

- **The Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium**
- **Linking Strategic Mission Command to Operational Battle Command (Part 2 of 2)**
- **Education for Transatlantic Security**
- **Role of the Armed Forces in the War on Terror**
- **Transformation Efforts of the Moldovan Armed Forces**

## **THE SIXTH ANNUAL RESERVE COMPONENT SYMPOSIUM**

**Professor Bert B. Tussing**  
Director, Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group, CSL

On July 11-12, 2007, the United States Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a symposium, *Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crises*. The forum was directed at determining better means of incorporating all elements of military response—the active component, the Services' Reserves, and the National Guard—in support of Federal, state, and local authorities following catastrophic events. Symposium participants arrived armed with a compelling interest and a wealth of experience in the area of defense support to civil authorities. They represented a host of the leading stakeholders in homeland defense and security affairs, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), The United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve Affairs. Adding their experience to the exchange of concern and understanding on this topic were the Adjutants General from the states of Georgia, Rhode Island and Texas, the Pennsylvania Director of Homeland Security, and representatives of both the public and private sectors.

Symposium participants were divided into four "workshops," each focused on a critical aspect of the evolving response and recovery requirements for the military in support of federal, state and local government:

- The evolving relationship between the USNORTHCOM and the military's reserve component in preparing for and responding to catastrophe
- The potential need to establish an appropriate mechanism for the military to accompany and support civilian components focused on regional response to catastrophe

- The military's role in supporting an evolving National Response Plan
- The development and dissemination of a "common operational picture" in preparation, response and recovery operations between the components of the military and civilian authorities at all levels of government

Each workshop began with a subject matter expert presentation from individuals and organizations intimately involved in the particular focus areas being addressed. Following the presentations, the workshop groups embarked upon a series of questions designed to frame the discussions, observations, and recommendations that were to follow. At the end of the symposium, those observations and recommendations were presented to a "Blue Ribbon Panel," which consisted of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Deputy Commander, USNORTHCOM; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Integration from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs; the Director of Operations, DHS; the Chief of the Army Reserve; the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff for National Guard Affairs; and the Chief of Logistics, NGB. Four papers have been written which reflect the findings of each of the panels. These papers are available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp>.

— CSL —

## **LINKING STRATEGIC MISSION COMMAND TO OPERATIONAL BATTLE COMMAND (Part 2 of 2)**

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Part One of this article discussed the relationship of Mission Command to Battle Command and the use of digital command and control (C2) tools for Mission Command by strategic leaders. It also discussed how battlespace visualization, through the use of network enabled tools, now permits commanders at all levels to

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dynamically affect decision processes to have immediate impact on the battle. Part two focuses on a particular tool now in use from corps level to battalion and special unit levels for Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). This tool is Command Post of the Future, or CPoF.

CPoF was initially brought to Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) in 2004 through the efforts of then MG Chiarelli, the 1st Cavalry Division and MND-B Commander. Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency (DARPA) provided the 1st Cavalry Division with just over 40 terminals in mid-2004. With its initial success DARPA provided another 140 machines to MND-B under the 3rd Infantry Division throughout the 2005 OIF mission. As its potential was fully realized and exploited, CPoF became the battle command tool of choice for the division commander, BCT commanders, and their supporting staffs. CPoF allows commanders, staff members, and action officers to conduct virtual battle update briefs, monitor current and future operations, integrate intelligence, plan operations, conduct virtual mission rehearsals, and make time critical decisions with up to the minute common operational picture (COP) and readily accessible staff estimates. The CPoF System enables this through a suite of collaborative tools including an intuitive graphical user interface; Voice-Over-Internet Protocol (VOIP); real time “Shared Products”; detailed mapping and imagery; and data bridges from the Blue Force Tracker satellite-based asset visibility system. These tools are supported by a central server repository that instantaneously populates data across the system, binding them together to dramatically increase user utility.

CPoF proponents do not pretend that it will replace the commander’s forward presence. It does, however, significantly complement it by giving commanders near instantaneous collaborative visualization capability. This capability, coupled with its embedded planning, knowledge sharing, and information access tools significantly reduces the time required to make decisions. This enhances a commander’s forward presence through near instantaneous understanding of his intent across the entire command.

Since the 3rd Infantry Division validated CPoF, the program has grown exponentially. Throughout 2006 it became the primary battalion and above battle command platform in the Multi-National

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) theater of operations, with approximately 1,000 systems on the ground, and in use by Army, Marine Corps headquarters and Air Force liaison elements. It became an Army program in January 2006 under Project Manager-Battle Command. The system also taught as part of the intermediate level education course at the Command and General Staff College. This is not a system that has been force-fed by any means. Its growth has been caused by “boots on the ground” demand by senior commanders and primary staff officers who absolutely rely on CPoF’s capabilities. This demand is not restricted to in-theater use. When the 82nd Airborne Division deployed and formed the Joint Task Force headquarters for the Hurricane Katrina relief effort they used CPoF as their Battle Command system. Its flexibility allowed the staff to maintain a COP that displayed not only military units, but law enforcement, disaster relief, and emergency services elements as well.

Contact CSLs Strategic Experiential Education Group for demonstrations of CPoF’s capabilities as well as those of other strategic and theater level visualization and experiential education tools.

## CSL

### EDUCATION FOR TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

**Professor Bert B. Tussing**  
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If there is one truth surrounding the complexity of homeland security and homeland defense it is that our concerns neither begin nor end at our shoreline. The transnational nature of the threat requires a transnational solution—one developed and shared in cooperation with our friends and allies.

That fundamental truth was the foundation of a recent initiative sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, conducted at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Building upon similar educational initiatives in the United States, the Marshall Center brought together over 60 practitioners, stakeholders, and academics to produce a professional development program curriculum for Civil Security professionals in Europe.

The choice of the term “Civil Security” was both unique and deliberate. The conference organizer, Dr. Jack Clarke, suggested that civil security could serve

as a comprehensive term to encompass a number of domestic security issues, including civil defense, homeland security, homeland defense, public security, civil emergency planning, and crisis and consequence management. The term was deliberately designed to connote an “all-hazard” expanse of domestic issues, not solely terrorism. At the same time, the term was specifically not designed to take in the preponderance of domestic law enforcement issues.

In developing a curriculum for the range of domestic security professionals envisioned in this program, the intent was to prepare the current generation of mid-career “operators” to assume the reins of strategic leadership in these evolving disciplines. Planning, policy, management, and other oversight functions would have to be facilitated by a syllabus which would also incorporate studies:

- To promote cultural awareness
- To understand the dangers and complexities of the modern terrorist threat
- To appreciate the national, regional, and international mechanisms that can be applied in times of crisis to save lives and begin recovery operations following a disaster or catastrophic incident

In framing the issues, three moderators (Dr. Stan Supinski of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security; Dr. Graeme Herd of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; and Prof. Bert Tussing of the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership) divided the workshop’s participants into three teams. The teams were charged with addressing educational requirements surrounding “Threats and Hazards”; measures regarding “Preparation and Protection” against the same; and measures designed to “Respond and Recover” from incidents that may still occur, whether natural or manmade. After the initial session, the moderators took the recommendations and observations of their primary workshop element and presented them to the other groups. The challenges, validations, and further recommendations taken from these presentations armed the moderators with a preliminary depiction of ‘what’ should be taught in the course. Returning to their original groups, the moderators facilitated a final set of discussions devoted to ‘how’ the course should be constructed.

This design produced clear direction for the development of the proposed curriculum. Discussions designed around the “Threats

and Hazards” rubric resulted in a requirement for education in both CBRN threats and natural disasters of concern to a given region. A background in risk management theory and an appreciation of risk identification tools was considered necessary. Likewise, instruction in future trends and trajectories in domestic concerns, and the means to address them, were deemed vital to the development of strategic leadership.

The group primarily focused on “Preparation and Protection” re-endorsed the requirement for risk management education, but also insisted that strategic leaders in these disciplines would have to be well acquainted with international laws and agreements affecting these ends. Other areas requiring educational development would include an understanding of the place for domestic security concerns within national strategies; the role of the military in support of civil authorities in these matters; and the quintessential importance of information and intelligence exchange on a national, regional, and international scale. Similarly, the forum held that critical infrastructure protection, border and transportation issues, and emerging trends in challenges and the technologies to meet them were all areas that should be addressed in a curriculum like the one envisioned for the Marshall Center program.

The final group, focused on “Response and Recovery,” began with a foundational position that the curriculum would have to have both a national focus, to address the particular needs of the European nation-states; and an international focus, to concentrate on the advantages and synergies to be accrued through regional and transatlantic cooperation. Education in the importance of deliberate, crisis, and adaptive emergency planning mechanisms was considered vital in this group’s discussion, addressing not necessarily ‘what’ to plan, but *how* to plan for a range of crises. Crisis Communications, Media Management, and Public Education were all identified as important “core competencies” for the strategic leader that would have to be nurtured through study in an environment like the one envisioned here. Crisis Management, familiarity and appreciation of extant “response models,” and particular concerns surrounding Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of Operations (COOP) in both the public and private sectors were also deemed essential. Having therefore described the “things” that needed to be taught in the syllabus, the

working group went on to describe how the things should be taught.

Following the model of the Marshall Center, participants held that a series of lectures followed by practiced seminar discussions would be key components of the syllabus. But in addition to these, the players held that inserting case studies throughout the curriculum would both introduce and validate the lessons the Center would promote.

Finally, the participants suggested that a capstone exercise, involving some of the current top level domestic security officials in the countries represented at the school, would provide an opportunity to showcase the curriculum and validate it. At the same time, it would provide for immediate application of the lessons of the course to those currently responsible for these crucial concerns.

Significant progress in a short period of time is a rare find, but the participants in the workshop were genuinely impressed with the findings and recommendations that came out of three days of concentrated effort. Based on those results, and with the continued support of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Marshall Center hopes to apply the workshop’s findings in the first session of a Transatlantic Civil Security Course in July of 2008.

## — CSL —

### ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE WAR ON TERROR

**Professor B.F. Griffard**  
Operations and Gaming Division, CSL

The time period from 1463 to 1991 is significant to what is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) today. When the Ottoman Empire absorbed Bosnia in 1463, it would have been hard to predict that over 500 years would elapse before it would again emerge as an independent national entity. During this interval, under the tutelage of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarians, the Nazis and the Communists, three distinct ethnic-religious factions evolved: Croat-Roman Catholic; Serbs-Orthodox; and Bosniaks-Muslim. Depending on the overlord of the moment each group enjoyed periods of privilege, repression, and, under Tito, enforced co-existence. With the removal of Tito’s personal leadership, and the pursuant breakup of Yugoslavia, the nascent ethnic-

religious rivalries came to the fore. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia in December of 1991, and, following a referendum boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs in March of 1992, declared itself an independent state. This triggered the 1992-1995 war that ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords by the Presidents of BiH, Croatia and Serbia.

One of the requirements laid out under the Dayton Accords was the deployment in December 1995 of the Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR). In December 1996 IFOR was replaced with the NATO–led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) whose mission was to provide a safe and secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. In December 2005 SFOR was replaced by the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) which by its presence is a deterrent and monitors compliance with the Dayton Accords. It continues the SFOR mission of strengthening the safe and secure environment that allows BiH to grow as a nation. Today, EUFOR has approximately 2500 troops stationed throughout BiH.

A major objective of U.S. European Command’s (USEUCOM) Cooperative Military Event (CME) initiatives in BiH is to support infrastructure, interoperability, and training activities that ensure safe and secure conditions post-EUFOR. In support of this effort, a four-member U.S. Army War College (USAWC) team traveled to Sarajevo to conduct a seminar on “Role of the Armed Forces in the War on Terror.” During the period 7-10 August 2007, Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier and Professor B.F. Griffard, and Professor Bert B. Tussing from the Center for Strategic Leadership, and Colonel William R. Applegate from the Department of National Security and Strategy, familiarized representatives of the Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defense and members of the BiH Armed Forces Joint Staff and Operational Commands with how the U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff and the U.S. military conduct the war on terrorism inside and outside the U.S. borders, and specifically how they coordinate their efforts to avoid duplication and conflict with other U.S. civilian organizations.

Using information briefings and discussion workgroups, the USAWC team communicated the criticality of interagency participation in successfully waging the War on Terrorism. Specifically they addressed the synchronization, connectivity, and

coordination at the operational and national levels. Also stressed was that the transnational nature of major terrorist incidents and natural disasters requires the development of processes for regional cooperation along shared borders.

Both the Republic of Serbia and BiH armed forces are operating under relatively new structures, so their roles in the national interagency procedures are evolving, and will continue to evolve for a number of years. The information received during this seminar supported their efforts to visualize an endstate where the military's role in the national and regional processes supports the national policies of their respective nations.

— CSL —

**TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS  
OF THE MOLDOVAN ARMED  
FORCES**

**Professor B.F. Griffard**

Operations and Gaming Division, CSL

In 1991 the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence from the rapidly dissolving Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), becoming the Republic of Moldova. A landlocked country, considered the poorest in Europe, present day Moldova traces its existence as an independent Principality back to the 14<sup>th</sup> Century. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Principality of Moldavia became part of Romania which was then under control of the Ottoman Turks. The Turks later ceded Moldova to Russia in 1812. With the Bolshevik victory, and the addition of the province of Bessarabia, the Soviets defined the boundaries of today's Moldova.

Upon declaring independence, the nation immediately faced a fight for its survival. Ethnic Russian-Ukrainians populating the Trans-Dniester region between the Dniester River and Ukraine rose up demanding separation from Moldova proper. After an inconclusive but relatively short and violent military conflict the Trans-Dniester issue remains a source of national instability. The issue is further complicated by the existence of 2500 Russian soldiers stationed in the region purportedly to provide security for a Russian Army arsenal, a remnant of Soviet times.

The active Moldovan Armed Forces number approximately 6500 personnel, outfitted with the obsolete Soviet equipment that remained after independence. Although there is a very active initiative to educate mid-level officers at western military staff colleges, it will take another generation before such training can impact the Moldovan military. Unit training and manning is negatively affected by a lack of resources and modern equipment. Currently a great percentage of the defense budget goes to salary and entitlements, leaving very little discretionary resources for maintenance and modernization efforts.

Within this background, Professor B.F. Griffard and Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, from the U.S Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), conducted a Military Forces Transformation seminar for the Moldovan Armed Forces in Chisinau, Moldova, 24-27 September 2007. This seminar supported a U.S. European Command bilateral affairs initiative to familiarize members of the Moldovan Armed Forces Joint Staff with the U.S. Military Forces Transformation Process. During the four-day

event the CSL team employed information presentations and seminar discussion to address:

- Purpose, scope and definition of Transformation
- Operational goals of Transformation
- Developing the Transformation concept
- Force structure planning
- Implementing transformation
- Deterrents to change and overcoming them
- Measuring successful transformation
- Relationship with Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution

Although there is open debate within the Moldovan Parliament as to the relevance of a National Army, the officers stressed that the greatest obstacle to the development of a credible transformation concept was the absence of a national-level security document providing the necessary guidance for defense planning. They expressed a desire for assistance in the development of a transformation concept once a national security document is published. Working on a transformational concept before a Security White Paper is developed or approved may actually prove to be an exercise in futility. This is the horse; anything else is a cart before it.

As an audience the participants were all knowledgeable of transformation concepts and the processes involved, and were candid as to the difficulties faced by the Moldovan Armed Forces in executing a national transformation plan. This seminar was a small step forward, but during extensive discussions the attendees demonstrated a solid grasp of the subtleties of a transformation effort that must overcome institutional inertia.

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This publication and other CSL publications can be found online at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp>.

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