Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. The Defense of Saigon
Abstract
This report traces the 1968 Communist Winter-Spring campaign in the Saigon area. The three distinct phases of enemy attacks -- the Tet Offensive, the rocket assaults beginning on 18 February, and the May Offensive -- are examined in light of air response. Particular emphasis is placed on examining the resultant damage in the urban area plus the requirement for and the effectiveness of fixed wing aircraft in urban guerrilla warfare. During the series of offensives on Saigon, command of U.S., FWMAF, and RVNAF forces was maintained by National Commanders. Combined operations involving the above forces were founded upon the principle of cooperation, coordination, mutual support, and close partnership at all echelons. The defense and security of Saigon were delegated by the Commanding General, III Corps, to the Commanding Officer of the Capital Military District (CMD), the area encompassing Saigon and its environs. To accomplish his assigned missions, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the CMD had operational control of all RVNAF units except designated General Reserve units stationed or deployed into the CMD. At the onset of the enemy Spring Offensive, command relationships in the CMD were not designed to facilitate conducting a major combined defensive campaign in Gia Dinh and Saigon. The subsequent CMD reorganization and birth of the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) will be discussed in a separate report.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 14, 1968
- Accession Number
- ADA485057
Entities
People
- A. W. Thompson
Organizations
- Pacific Air Forces