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
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Single Manager for Air in SVN

18 MARCH 1969

HQ PACAF

Directorate, Tactical Evaluation
CHECO Division

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Prepared by:

Lt Col Robert M. Burch

Project CHECO 7th AF, DOAC

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PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in the employment of USAF airpower to meet a multitude of requirements. The varied applications of airpower have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, there has been an accumulation of operational data and experiences that, as a priority, must be collected, documented, and analyzed as to current and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity that would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction, and would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA.

Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement. Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7/13AF, Project CHECO provides a scholarly, "on-going" historical evaluation and documentation of USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in Southeast Asia combat operations. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and evaluation which is being accomplished. Along with the other CHECO publications, this is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in SEA.



MILTON B. ADAMS, Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

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WARREN H. PETERSON, Colonel, USAF
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 AFXPD 6 Cys
 AFXPPGS 3 Cys

MAJCOMAAC

ALDOC 2 Cys

ADC

ADLPP 1 Cy
 ADODC 1 Cy
 ADOOP 1 Cy
 ADOTT 1 Cy

AFCS

CSOCH 5 Cys

AFLC

MCFS 1 Cy
 MCKH 1 Cy
 MCOO 1 Cy

AFSC

ADTC/APD 2 Cys
 ASD/ASJP 2 Cys
 ESD/ESWV 2 Cys
 RADC/EMDOL 2 Cys
 SCEH 2 Cys
 SCLA 2 Cys
 SCS-6 1 Cy

SCTPL 1 Cy

ATC

ATXDC 1 Cy

MAC

MAFOI 1 Cy
 MACOA 1 Cy
 MAOCO 1 Cy
 MAOID 1 Cy

SAC

DI 1 Cy
 DM 1 Cy
 DO 1 Cy
 DPL 1 Cy

TAC

DI 1 Cy
 DO-0 1 Cy
 DOTS 1 Cy
 DORQ 1 Cy
 DPL 2 Cys

USAFE

ODC/OA 1 Cy
 ODC/OOT 1 Cy
 ODC/OTA 1 Cy
 XDC 1 Cy

USAFSO

BIOH 1 Cy
 OOP 1 Cy

USAFSS

COI-5 5 Cys
 ODC 1 Cy

PACAF

DE 1 Cy
 DI 1 Cy
 DM 1 Cy
 DO 1 Cy
 DP 1 Cy
 DPL 4 Cys
 DXIH 1 Cy
 DOTEK 6 Cys

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AIR FORCES

1AF
DO 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

2AF 1 Cy
3AF 2 Cys

4AF
DO 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

5AF
DOPP 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

7AF
DI 1 Cy
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DOAC 2 Cys
DPL 1 Cy
TACC 1 Cy

8AF 1 Cy

9AF
DO 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

10AF
DO 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

12AF
DI 1 Cy
DO 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

13AF
DOO 1 Cy
DPL 1 Cy
DXI 1 Cy

7AF//13AF
CHECO 3 Cys

14 AEROSP FORCE . 2 Cys

15AF 1 Cy
16AF 2 Cys
17AF 2 Cys

19AF
DA-C 1 Cy
DO 1 Cy
DP 1 Cy

21AF
OCXI 1 Cy
ODC 1 Cy

22AF
OCXI 1 Cy
ODC 1 Cy

AF ICELAND 2 Cys

USAFSOF
DO 2 Cys

AIR DIVISIONS

3AD 3 Cys
25AD 2 Cys
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313AD
DOP 2 Cys

314AD
DOP 2 Cys

322AD 1 Cy
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832AD 2 Cys
833AD 2 Cys
834AD 2 Cys
835AD 2 Cys
836AD 2 Cys
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839AD 2 Cys
840AD 2 Cys

WINGS

1 SOW 1 Cy
3 TFW 1 Cy
4 TFW 1 Cy
8 TFW 1 Cy
10 TRW 1 Cy
12 TFW 1 Cy
14 SOW 1 Cy
15 TFW 1 Cy
20 TFW 1 Cy
23 TFW 1 Cy
26 TRW 1 Cy
27 TFW 1 Cy
31 TFW 1 Cy
33 TFW 1 Cy
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37 TFW 1 Cy
48 TFW 1 Cy
49 TFW 1 Cy
50 TFW 1 Cy
56 SOW 1 Cy

60 MAW
ODC 1 Cy
OXI 1 Cy

61 MAW
ODC 1 Cy
OIN 1 Cy

62 MAW
ODC 1 Cy
OOPT 1 Cy

63 MAW
ODC 1 Cy
OXI 1 Cy

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WINGS (Cont'd)

64 TFW 1 Cy
66 TRW 1 Cy
67 TRW 1 Cy
75 TRW 1 Cy
78 FW 1 Cy
81 TFW 1 Cy
82 CSPW 1 Cy

89 MAW

ODC 1 Cy

113 TFW 1 Cy
123 TRW 1 Cy
140 TFW 1 Cy
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316 TAW 1 Cy
317 TAW 1 Cy
347 TFW 1 Cy

349 MAW

EDC 1 Cy
OID 1 Cy

355 TFW 1 Cy
363 TRW 1 Cy
366 TFW 1 Cy

375 AAW

ODC 1 Cy

388 TFW 1 Cy
401 TFW 1 Cy
405 TFW 1 Cy
432 TRW 1 Cy

435 MAW

ODC 1 Cy
OTI 1 Cy

436 MAW

ODC 1 Cy
OX 1 Cy

437 MAW

ODC 1 Cy
OXI 1 Cy

438 MAW

ODC 1 Cy
OX 1 Cy

443 MAW

ODC 1 Cy

445 MAW

ODC 1 Cy
WDO-PLI 1 Cy

460 TRW 1 Cy
464 TAW 1 Cy
474 TFW 1 Cy
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553 RW 1 Cy
633 SOW 1 Cy
4410 CCTW 1 Cy
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4453 CCTW 1 Cy
4500 ABW 1 Cy
4510 CCTW 1 Cy
4525 FWW 1 Cy
4531 TFW 1 Cy

6940 SW

OOD 1 Cy

7101 ABW 1 Cy
7149 TFW 1 Cy
7272 FTW 1 Cy

CENTERS

USAFSQC 2 Cys

USAFALC

DA 2 Cys

USAFARC

DI 2 Cys

USAFAWC

DA 2 Cys

USAFTFWC

CRCD 2 Cys

OTHERSAAVS

AVODC 1 Cy

ACGS

ACODC 1 Cy

ARRS

ARODC 1 Cy

AWS

AWODC 1 Cy

AFCSPI 1 Cy

EUR SCTY RGN

OPD 1 Cy

TASK FORCE ALPHA .. 1 Cy

USAFAGOS 2 Cys

504 TASG 1 Cy

601 TCG 1 Cy

6400 TEST SQ 1 Cy

SEPARATE OPERATING
AGENCIESACIC

ACOW 2 Cys

AFAFC

AFDSDC 2 Cys

AFRES

AFROP 2 Cys

ARPC

AU 2 Cys

ACSC

ASI-ASAD 1 Cy

ASI-HA 2 Cys

AUL(SE)-69-108 2 Cys

USAFA

CMT 1 Cy

COC 2 Cys

DFH 1 Cy

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FOREWORD

Implementation of the Single Management concept on 10 March 1968 represented the culmination of a two-year effort to integrate the direction and control of air resources assigned to COMUSMACV under a single agent, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for Air Operations to maintain the flexibility required by the tactical situation. [A special CHECO Report, "Single Manager for Air in SVN", dated 1 July 1968,] covered the developments influencing this command decision, traced implementation of the system, and explained its functional evolution. This volume provides a continuing report on the subject with highlights of the first six months summarized. Events covering the period from May to December 1968 receive major emphasis.

Through many and varied means, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) sought a return to command/control arrangements that existed before implementation of Single Management for Air. Thus, the history of the concept is seen mainly through related proposals and counter-proposals. These are viewed largely in the context of their relevance to the basic issues at stake. While granting the Marines doctrinal concerns, their justifications for release from Single Management were frequently tinged with a predilection for "localism". Of more concern to COMUSMACV and his Deputy for Air was the allocation of limited air resources to the changing tactical situation. Real problems were given more weight than theoretical ones. Yet, higher echelon's approval of the concept in SVN also was predicated on the "existing tactical situation." In short, it was viewed as a temporary measure. Thus, a compromise was

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adopted to resolve the issue, but this also set the stage for events related in this report, most of which affect the prerogatives of ground commanders and air commanders.

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CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT

Dramatic events associated with an enemy offensive buildup in late 1967 triggered the sense of urgency to designate a member of the Air Force to coordinate and direct the entire tactical air effort throughout all of South Vietnam and the extended battle area. Initially, the threat became most pronounced in I Corps; however, integration of the allocation and control of limited air resources was deemed essential to the MACV mission. A command decision by COMUSMACV accomplished this end by placing the burden of responsibility for management of air with his Deputy Commander for Air, and by assigning to the latter operational control of all Marine fixed-wing strike and reconnaissance aircraft, plus their control elements. If implementation of the Single Manager concept needed a catalyst, Khe Sanh provided it.

Initial Consideration

During the last three months of 1967, all signs pointed to the likelihood of an enemy offensive. Truck sightings showed a significant rise, as did activity in all infiltration corridors and tactical zones. In early January, COMUSMACV discerned a shift in enemy strategy from the defensive to the offensive. Enemy troops were everywhere on the move; however, strong indicators cast a spotlight on northern I Corps. The greatest threat appeared to be here, against Marine units generally strung out in fixed positions to create a barrier below the demilitarized zone (DMZ).^{1/} Even though the widespread Tet offensive hit all four tactical zones, the most intense pressure still impacted on friendly forces in I Corps, and reinforcements streamed

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in to bolster the Marine ground capability. Before the siege of Khe Sanh was lifted, Army maneuver battalions in I Corps had increased from 17 in January 1968 to 31 in April, while Marine battalions rose from 21 to 28. This previously lonely outpost became a vortex, drawing to it increased commitment of forces by both sides, until Khe Sanh took on greater significance and importance than any previous battle in South Vietnam.

As events gradually presaged a mammoth confrontation, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, MACV Commander, considered some major changes in deployment to I Corps to improve his ability to cope with the seriousness of the threat and changes in the tactical situation. He was advised on 18 January the air effort was fragmented between 7AF and the Marines, and the flexibility in air resource employment was mandatory. Since time was critical, and control of the air was becoming more complex, he was further advised this flexibility should be achieved through centralization--placing operational control of the First Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) under his Deputy Commander for Air. That same day, a message was prepared for CINCPAC indicating this move was being considered.^{2/}

CINCPAC expressed concern about changes in ground rules that had worked well and which conformed to doctrine and accepted principles of command. Any necessary changes had to be viewed in the broadest context to avoid creating more problems than those to be remedied. Viewpoints on tactical air control were many and varied. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, defined his goal as satisfying operational requirements and minimizing inter-service debate. He concluded:^{3/}

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"Any plan which might divest CG, III MAF of operational control of his own assets will require full consideration of all aspects of the problem. I will make any decision necessary after you have had an opportunity to review the recommendations of Momyer and Cushman, and submit a proposal to me."

For the time being, a change in operational control of the 1st MAW was shelved due to a potential roles and missions argument.

Several days after the CINCPAC caution signal, COMUSMACV acted on a suggestion to initiate a SLAM operation at Khe Sanh involving B-52s, tac air, Marine air, diverted sorties from Route Package (RP) VI and carrier air if required--with the Commander, 7AF, as the operational air commander when the plan was executed. While this might not have been considered the best solution to the problem of air support, and since the Commanding General, III MAF, expressed unalterable opposition to Single Management, it was considered realistic under the circumstances. The Comdr, 7AF, clearly believed:^{4/}

"...that Admiral Sharp and the Marines would fight the issue clear up to the JCS. In the meantime, we have a crisis developing at Khe Sanh. If the battle at Khe Sanh develops, it may be the event to get the air responsibilities straightened out like we had them in Korea and WW II."

Operation NIAGARA had been in the planning stage since the first week of January 1968. NIAGARA I called for a B-52 effort against increased enemy logistical movement on pivotal LOCs leading toward Khe Sanh; it was executed in mid-January. NIAGARA II* identified SLAM-type operations around the Khe

* Hereafter, NIAGARA refers to SLAM.

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Sanh area itself; these began on 22 January and lasted until 31 March.^{5/}

NIAGARA and Single Management

The responsibility for coordinating and directing the employment of air resources in Operation NIAGARA rested with the Comdr, 7AF. B-52 operations were also coordinated through him. While strike sorties not required for direct support of Marine units were supposed to be made available to 7AF, III MAF retained control of Marine air supporting its own units. Thus, when NIAGARA began on 22 January 1968, operational control of the 1st MAW did not rest with Deputy COMUSMACV for Air, and the matter of control of its assets remained open to interpretation. Planning and application of tac air during the first few weeks of the operation were not completely centralized.^{6/} As a result, problems soon developed; these were also a product of the sheer magnitude of the air support directed into the Khe Sanh area. Air allocation and cycling, airspace control, targeting, congestion, bombing assessment, overall responsibility--all combined to resurrect the issue of management. By mid-February, the air commander for NIAGARA, believing it to be at an impasse, requested authority to direct and control the air effort in accordance with the Single Manager concept. Most of the problems were attributed to the fragmented control arrangement originally applied. Dissatisfied with control arrangements for ground forces as well, COMUSMACV was ready to initiate major changes for control of air and ground forces in I Corps.^{7/}

Accordingly, the Comdr, 7AF, was given complete responsibility for the entire air effort in the defense of Khe Sanh, while overall operational direction of ground forces in I Corps was given to CG, III MAF. While these moves

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were being contemplated and discussed prior to their going into effect, the concept of Single Manager once again precipitated a spirited response from CG, III MAF, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Their arguments against the concept focused on the following: (1) it was a violation of UNAAF; (2) the reasons for CINCPAC not granting approval in January were still valid; (3) there were no deficiencies in the existing system; and (4) it threatened to dissolve the integrity and dilute the combat power of the Marine air/ground team. In addition, MACV Directive 95-4 provided the emergency options needed, while preserving the tactical integrity of III MAF forces. ^{8/}

Whatever the merits of these arguments, many difficulties were identified during the first three weeks of Operation NIAGARA. The enemy brought the battle together as one continuous action. Units of all services fought together in single or continuous engagements, and geographic limitations were such as to preclude dividing the area into specified portions for each service's aircraft. Air effort was directly proportional to the nature of the threat; an integrated, substantial enemy offensive called for a similar defensive response throughout all of South Vietnam, with sufficient flexibility to counter as the tactical situation required. Khe Sanh was accorded top priority. Yet, during those early weeks of Operation NIAGARA, there was no integrated target base. Inadequate, uneven cycling of aircraft affected sortie flow, led to congestion over target areas, increased the possibility of mid-air collision, caused aircraft to return with ordnance unexpended, and prevented constant pressure from being applied on the enemy. No clear responsibility existed for providing support or escort for airlift or other unusual requirements. The commander had no single source of information for determining where ordnance was expended.

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and with what results.^{9/} Two tactical air control systems added further grounds for confusion.

COMUSMACV did not feel that his proposal "was really understood and... why [it] was made." The situation in I Corps had changed compared "to what it was three years ago or even two months ago." He stated:^{10/}

"Whereas the situation was handled by Marine divisions with organic air a few months ago, this is not true today. I have the equivalent of a field army now deployed to I Corps. To support this magnitude of forces requires a major portion of the air assets of the 7th Air Force plus the air assets of the VNAF, carrier forces, and Thai-based forces. Marine air, therefore, has become a junior partner in the total air effort, but an important one. The problem is one of coordination and directing all of these diversified air elements so that air support can be put where and when needed in the required quantity. I do not see how this can be accomplished without one airman fitting [all air] into schedules that do not conflict with one another."

The magnitude of the effort at Khe Sanh required a single airman to be responsible for the overall planning, scheduling, and mission direction, and this was considered a proper function of his air deputy. CG, III MAF could state what effort he needed, and the Air Deputy would pull together the air resources to meet the requirement and see to it that missions were flown as requested. COMUSMACV did not see "how this method of operation is inconsistent with our previous experience of controlling air operations when the magnitude of ground effort has reached the field army level." His proposal provided the following:

- . Maintains the Marine air/ground team intact, except when the tactical situation dictated otherwise.

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- Establishes a procedure for controlling and directing the air effort available to COMUSMACV in support of field army size forces in I Corps.
- Permits General Cushman to determine where he would like the air effort applied in his area.
- A single airman COMUSMACV can hold responsible for coordinating all the air effort that is made available to him.
- No change in service doctrine or roles and missions.

11/

Previous efforts at coordination were required but, not always successful, they did not compensate for fragmented management of the tactical air effort. To a considerable degree Operation NIAGARA precipitated the establishment of a Single Manager because of the command/control deficiencies encountered. These deficiencies jeopardized the effective application of airpower in the defense of Khe Sanh. Since this defense was only one important part of an effort to parry enemy offensive actions throughout all of SVN and the extended battle area, flexibility in the air support of the total MACV mission became an overriding consideration.

12/

The Issue Resolved

COMUSMACV directed Comdr, 7AF, to draw up plans to integrate the function of control of the 1st MAF fixed wing aviation into the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), but to preserve Marine air/ground team integrity as much as possible. Since the function of control was the issue, the function of command of the 1st MAF was not violated and remained with the CG, III MAF. Between 17 February and 3 March 1968, planning and debate went on simultaneously. In addition, forces in northern I Corps were organized into the Provisional Corps, Vietnam (PCV), whose commander (U.S. Army) became responsible to CG, III MAF, who in turn became the equivalent of a Field Force Commander. The Commander, 7AF, worked to iron out the details of Single Management with CG, III MAF, and on 26 February

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COMUSMACV resubmitted the proposal to CINCPAC. The Director of Operations, 7AF, personally presented the plan to CINCPAC. Once again Marine objections centered on roles and missions. In responding to this issue, it was pointed out that nothing in the roles and missions correspondence provided for: (1) a Marine Amphibious Force to function as a field army in a sustained land campaign; (2) an Army Corps Commander to relinquish control to a Marine Force Commander; and (3) USARV to pass operational control of Mohawks to 7AF. These had all been done. The entire MACV command structure was unorthodox to meet the requirements of the situation--and not consistent with UNAAF.^{13/} CINCPAC approved the recommendation on the basis of the necessity for maximum application of total air assets and the new ground force arrangements.^{14/} Letters to the Deputy Commander for Air and to CG, III MAF, established the Single Management System on 8 March. Between 10 March and 1 April, the system went into effect by stages as first immediates--then preplanned--were fraggged and flown. Needed communications were established and training of personnel was achieved.^{15/}

Integration of Marine strike and reconnaissance aircraft was accomplished, with only minor adjustments in planning. Previously, except for special agreements, Air Force and Marines acted independently. Efforts were now directed at synchronizing their resources, with little major impact on the existing systems.

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CHAPTER II

THE FORMATIVE STAGE

The stated objectives of Single Management were to achieve concentration and exploit flexibility of tactical air to apply air resources toward the total MACV mission and in response to the current tactical situation. COMUSMACV held the Single Manager responsible for coordinating, directing, effectively applying, and equitably distributing all tactical air resources throughout SVN and the extended battle area. CG, III MAF, was directed to make available the following: (1) strike, reconnaissance, and tactical air control system assets; (2) the number of Marine aircraft available for fragging; (3) personnel to augment J-2 and J-3 MACV, TASE, TACC, I DASC (later Horn DASC) and DASC Victor (created to support PCV and later became XXIV DASC); and (4) mission reports as required. Marine strike aircraft were to be used in support of Marine ground forces to the maximum extent possible, and the integrity of the Marine air/ground team was to be preserved.^{1/} The ultimate purpose of these developments was to achieve effectiveness, responsiveness, and flexibility with the limited air resources available in SVN.

Implementation

To further that goal a number of alterations and changes were instituted. The request structure was expanded to improve the capability for allocation throughout SVN; Marines at MACV TASE had a hand in establishing priorities for preplanned sorties and in final approval. Marine sorties were added to the published daily frag, and Marine personnel were added to 7AF TACC, whose function was expanded. Immediate request structure changes involved additional

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Marines at I DASC, which also became the only DASC granted scramble authority for alert aircraft assigned. DASC Victor was created to serve PCV (but remained subordinate to I DASC); it also had divert authority for PCV allocated aircraft. Below I and Victor DASCs, Marine air control system agencies operated as before. Panama CRC became the senior controlling agency for I Corps, with Waterboy (USAF) and Vice Squad (USMC) acting, respectively, as CRPs in northern and southern I Corps. Both MSQ and TPQ sites were fragged for preplanned sorties and received radar hands-off from appropriate agencies; they were also available for immediates. Finally, the Marine TACS was integrated into the 7AF TACS.^{2/} All these preliminary steps had been taken to grapple with the coordination and control problems encountered during Operation NIAGARA through integrated planning and central control.

As stated in CHECO report, "KHE SANH (Operation NIAGARA)", of 13 September 1968: "However, many tributaries of control appeared to remain clogged with functional confusion."^{3/} This resulted from necessary adjustments to Single Management. Resolution of many problems came about as a result of the concept, but since it had not been a feature of NIAGARA, originally, an immediate panacea could not be expected. Throughout April, the Single Management system was subjected to numerous stresses which had a purgative effect. Integrated TACC/ Marine control agencies handled 8,327 sorties. These formed the basis for a 30-day evaluation called for in the MACV directive which implemented Single Management. Additional reports at later times were subsequently directed. The arguments, the different conclusions reached in these reports, are better understood by recognizing that the roles and missions issue remained central

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to subsequent Marine objections, and by recognizing that there were basic differences in tactical air employment philosophies.

Marine versus Air Force Concept

The Marine air/ground team principle is designed to provide a single tactical command with the capability for infantry maneuver, helicopter mobility, and control and coordination of organic attack aircraft and artillery. A Marine Infantry commander considers the terrain across which he maneuvers his forces and the airspace above it as inseparable, and he weaves and blends naval gunfire, artillery, helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, and close air support into his pattern of maneuver. ^{4/}

Marine fixed-wing aircraft substitute to a large degree for the lack of organic artillery and helicopter gunships in a Marine Division. Air support, generally speaking, is considered as an unlimited commodity, which is generated and committed at full throttle when requested by the ground commander. Sorties are provided by TOT, ordnance load, and area; final target determination is postponed as late as possible. Priorities, validated targets, allocated flying hours, and munitions inventory are not overriding considerations. The concept assumes short term, all-out surges, and was designed for support of relatively small ground forces during an amphibious assault and securing of a beachhead. For this purpose, and with fixed-wing aircraft employed in a pure air support role, it may very well be the best system devised. However, it is not designed for the long-haul, for continuous support of ground forces up through Field Army level in a protracted conflict or sustained land war. ^{5/}

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An air component commander has the full spectrum of air operations to be concerned about--air superiority, air defense, and deep interdiction, as well as close air support. In a protracted conflict involving large ground forces, and with a limited amount of air resources available, the USAF/Army concept for joint air-ground operations seeks whenever possible to achieve a stable sortie rate--without surging, although with the ability to surge in an emergency. Air support is viewed as only one part of the spectrum of air operations, a limited resource to be applied judiciously against specific and the most rewarding targets. Preplanned sorties are fraggged against predetermined, validated targets and assigned a priority. Successive echelons of ground commanders rate the targets. TASE performs the Army portion of air planning, and is designed to allow the ground commander to decide where and in what priority his allocated air support is to be employed.^{6/}

Additional Comparisons

A Marine defense of its own system pointed out that in a JCS study of 19 February 1966, "A comparative Analysis of Marine Corps and Air Force Close Air Support Performance in South Vietnam," this conclusion was reached:^{7/}

"...both systems are configured appropriately to perform their assigned missions, and the close air support provided by each system in South Vietnam has been highly satisfactory in respect to quantity, quality, timeliness, and results achieved."

Having failed to prevent implementation of Single Management with doctrinal rebuttals, objections subsequently focused on relative merits of the two systems. With certain terminology common to elements of each system, they

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provided two types of air support, preplanned and immediate, responding to immediates with scrambles and diverts. But, to a degree, similarities ended here because of differing viewpoints and emphasis. (These will be elaborated subsequently at appropriate points.) Marines argued that Single Management was producer-oriented. Advocates of the Single Manager concept countered that it was oriented to the total MACV mission, across a wider spectrum of air operations.

The Air Staff considered Single Management a marked improvement, which would permit greater flexibility in applying airpower where needed. A CSAF message to CINCPACAF stated: ^{8/}

"Further, it will establish a precedent for future operations where Marine air is employed in static land warfare. We are in full accord with the proposed concept in the context of the specific situation in RVN."

Two possible disadvantages were envisioned because the concept was related specifically to the position of Deputy for Air Operations: ^{9/}

"A situation wherein the joint or combined commander may designate someone other than his air force component commander to fill the role of air deputy or he may employ an air deputy in a manner which usurps the role and functions of the Air Force or air component commander."

"Common usage of the term 'Joint DASC' could lead to changes in the control or character of the DASC or constitute a stepping stone towards conversion of the TACS into a structure belonging to the Joint Commander and exercised by him through his Air Deputy, as opposed to his Air Force Component Commander."

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It was recognized that in SVN there may have been no feasible alternative and that the arrangement achieved with MACV was valuable; however, it was deemed desirable to extend the authority and responsibility of the Air Force Component Commander "as feasible within that arrangement."

The Comdr, 7AF, did not feel that these concerns reflected an understanding of the situation. More important was that it had taken two years to achieve arrangements concerning Marine air in-country which paralleled those established in the Korean War, in the face of an adamant Marine position "that they would never come under the operational control of the Air Force again." The doctrinal point was not significant when compared to the achievement. Arguing the case at the air component commander level would not have succeeded. It had to be argued at theater level, because that was the only recognized level of authority by the Marines, and this approach set no precedent for the future in a Joint Force.^{10/} In a message of 27 March 1968, 7AF stated to CSAF:^{11/}

"Tedder was Air Deputy for Eisenhower without his presuming to operate the components. Furthermore, if we organize a theater properly, there should not be an Air Deputy in the first place. It is a superfluous position. For the theater, the position should be a full deputy. You know this position here was a compromise. Even if we should have Air Deputies in a theater of operation for the future, it is almost inconceivable to me it would be other than an Air Force officer if there are major ground and air units. Even in this theater, it would be a far stretch of logic to even argue that a Navy or Marine airman be Deputy for Air."

In addressing the second possible disadvantage, the Comdr, 7AF, pointed out that I DASC came under TACC which belonged to 7AF. "Hence the only thing

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joint about it is...that it has Air Force, Marine, and VNAF people in it. The Air Deputy has nothing to do with it since it is a part of the air component, command structure." It was farfetched to argue that this might lead to the TACS "becoming a tool of the joint commander."^{12/}

Discussion on Single Management also continued at the JCS level. On 26 March, a representative briefed the JCS on Marine objections. These boiled down to two basic issues: (1) losing operational control over their own tactical air; and (2) degraded responsiveness of Marine tactical air to Marine operational needs. The latter appeared to relate specifically to preplanned missions "where responsiveness is normally less at issue." While the Army strongly supported the COMUSMACV arrangement, the Navy agreed with the Marine position but generally remained silent in the discussions.^{13/}

First Evaluation

With discussion of the Single Management decision thus continuing apace at numerous places simultaneously, the concept came up for review in SVN at the end of April. III MAF submitted two evaluations; the first covered the period of 22 March to 21 April. Generally, Single Management was considered less effective and efficient than the preceding Marine system, and a number of specific objections were elaborated:^{14/}

"The system lacked responsiveness. It required too much leadtime for preplanned requests and was thus producer oriented. New procedures were time consuming and unwieldy. Immediates went through additional agencies and response took longer.

"Single Management lacked the ability to blend fire support and ground maneuver provided by a Marine DASC.

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"Longer frags, lengthy request forms, and the time required to hand-carry and encrypt them increased administrative burdens.

"Single Management was not compatible with the functioning of the Marine air/ground team principle. The system was not flexible. (Surging of the Marine sortie rate was equated to flexibility.)"

On 4 May, III MAF submitted a second evaluation which covered the period 1 to 30 April. Objections included in the previous report were amplified, and some of the previous criticisms were toned down. Two new comments were added:

(1) response times for immediates had improved but by diverting preplans without consulting the ground commander; and (2) more Marine sorties were being fragged to support Army units, while the Air Force did not provide the level of five sorties per day per Army maneuver battalion. CG, III MAF, again indicated his dissatisfaction with the system. ^{15/}

A comprehensive study on Single Management by 7AF was completed on 7 May. In responding to specific Marine dissatisfactions, the report differentiated between those items related to Single Management and others not attributable to the system. Also, two significant shortcomings were admitted; they were the result of a fragging procedure that was burdensome and time consuming. Battalion requests were required 36 to 50 hours prior to TOT, and the frag itself contained excessive detail and required each user to extract his own portion from the entire list of in-country sorties. Contemplated improvements in developing and disseminating the frag were provided. ^{16/}

With regard to increased burdens, the study pointed out that part of the 36 to 50 hours leadtime was imposed by ground echelons, and that administrative

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corrections were forthcoming. Actually, harassment and interdiction missions constituted many preplans and presented no leadtime problems. Preplans in support of ground maneuvers required only general descriptions of targets. Both these responses suggested that ground echelons could adopt refinements to reduce the time factor. In addition, 7AF had devised a modified preplan frag which was already being tested in the field. The modification also reduced the volume and other elements in the daily frag, while automated data transmission speeded delivery, reduced errors, and provided unit breakout. A ^{17/} 60 - 80 percent reduction in workload was anticipated.

With regard to effort and responsiveness, the study pointed out Marines provided a high percentage of effort in I Corps only, where there were fewer USAF sorties because of the demands in other zones. This was exactly the kind of flexibility which the Single Management concept sought to achieve. Statistics were provided to show that the system became particularly responsive to immediates through diverts, and that the air effort became more equitably distributed throughout SVN as well as in I Corps. Admittedly, Army forces received only 70 percent of the sorties programmed by the DOD-approved SEA program, but this was a product of the absence of enough tac air in SVN to attain the desired rate. The study suggested that the main reason for Single Management was to insure equitable and judicious distribution of a commodity in short supply. Finally, Marines claimed that less than 10 percent of the ordnance delivered was the type requested. A check of 7,000 sorties revealed only four major discrepancies of this type. ^{18/}

Several Marine complaints were identified as having nothing to do with Single Management. Responding to the claim that the system was not compatible

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with Marine equipment, force structure, and air/ground coordination, the 7AF study indicated that no changes occurred where Marines worked with Marines at division level or lower, and that nothing altered the Marine Air/DASC or Army/TACP arrangement. When it came to precise aircraft control, by airborne or ground FACs, 7AF did not specify the type of direction to be used for strikes supporting Marines. Although integrated artillery warning and control was a problem, Marines retained their own system. Single Management only highlighted the need for a better and more comprehensive system when aircraft of several services were integrated.^{19/}

Although Marines thought of Single Management as an "imposed" system, and while they "directed their energies toward making the newly established Air Force control system perform," the following objections were summarized:^{20/}

"It is producer oriented, rather than consumer oriented.

"It is, inherently, more complex and hence, less responsive to the ground commander's requirements.

"It places primary reliance for fulfillment of immediate air support requests on aircraft diversions.

"And, as a consequence, and based on very brief experience, it was clear...that even if the Single Manager system performs perfectly, it has to remain less effective, for Marine purposes than the system it replaced."

The 7AF study observed that CG, III MAF, was using the Single Manager system to concentrate air assets in I Corps, according to the enemy threat and his units' operational needs. Accordingly, the entire air effort was capable of being shifted in response to the tactical situation, and a single airman was responsible to COMUSMACV for the management and direction of air

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resources--and reporting of results. Quantitative data, for the first time, provided COMUSMACV with information on many facets of the air war in SVN, which in turn permitted analysis and resolution of problems associated with application of airpower. Problems were to be expected. Abrupt addition of Marine assets, conceptual and procedural differences, failures in communications and control equipment--all these subjected the Joint Air-Ground Operations System (JAGOS) to some severe strains. During the "shake-down" period, the system undoubtedly seemed more complex and less responsive than the one to which the Marines were accustomed. While Marines felt it was "less effective for Marine purposes," these were not the only purposes to be considered--nor were they overriding. Single Manager sought the "betterment of the overall air effort in SVN and the extended battle area." The system was devised toward that end in support of the total MACV mission.^{21/}

Criticisms leveled at the development and dissemination of the daily frag were considered valid. A modification had been proposed to MACV's TASE even before the "current arrangements", in anticipation of time delays imposed through the ground request structure. The new method of handling preplanned requests was already being explained by teams in the field with favorable results. The Comdr, 7AF, considered the method acceptable "for this type of war," but not for "a more sophisticated ground war where there were set engagements." In the latter case, "we couldn't do this sort of thing because it is very expensive in effort. We would be confronted with severe shortages of air which would demand better planning of ground operations."^{22/} A COMUSMACV message of 21 May directed implementation of a modified preplanned system commencing on 30 May.^{23/}

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Modified Preplanned System

The modified preplanned system sought to combine the virtues of both the previous Marine and Air Force systems. Strike sorties available for use on a preplanned basis were divided for allocation into two groups--70 percent on a weekly basis through the Weekly Planned Frag, and the remaining 30 percent on a daily basis through the Daily Planned Frag. The two frag orders were alike in format, greatly simplified, and more convenient for users.

The Weekly Frag provided a specific, and relatively constant, number of sorties to major ground commanders (Field Force and ARVN Corps) in accordance with weekly priorities established by COMUSMACV. It was published by 7AF's TACC prior to 1800 hours each Tuesday, and listed strike sorties to be available daily to meet requirements of major commanders from 0600 hours on Thursday to 0600 hours, the following Thursday. Flights were listed by tactical air unit and call sign; information on each flight included number and type of aircraft, ordnance loads (H-hard, S-soft, or M-mixed) and scheduled time and night TOTs. It was up to the ground commander how he used these sorties; he could suballocate all, part, or none, and use them in any manner to support his tactical plans most effectively.^{24/}

The method of computing the actual number of sorties allocated on a weekly and daily basis was based on several computations. (See Appendix I.) First, the total available sorties per day were computed. Subtracting immediate and special category sorties from this figure then provided the sorties available for preplans. Seventy percent of these were fragged for each day on the Weekly Preplanned Frag. When this figure was subtracted, the remainder

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provided a base for arriving at the Daily Preplanned Frag. From this remainder, interdiction sorties were subtracted; the result provided the daily sorties available for preplanned. To these were added the sorties available from out-country inputs, and this sum constituted the net daily sorties available for the Daily Planned Frag.^{25/} For example: assume 700 total available minus 200 immediates and special category equals 500 sorties available for preplanned. Seventy percent (350) were fragged each day on the Weekly Preplanned Frag, leaving 150 as a base for the Daily Preplanned Frag. Subtract interdiction (50) and you have 100 sorties available for daily preplanned. Add to this 50 for out-country inputs, and the net daily preplanned figure comes to 150 sorties a day for the Daily Planned Frag.

The daily frag was transmitted to all agencies by 2000 hours of the day preceding the operation, and was effective at 0600 hours the following day. It provided the additional sorties allocated in accordance with COMUSMACV's daily priorities, those justified requests for added support, or to meet increased threats when they occurred. Sorties allocated to III MAF were all fragged to I DASC, none to DASC Victor; thus, CG, III MAF, had authority to allocate all sorties in I Corps.^{26/}

The new plan was directed to improve the existing utilization of air resources and to correct valid criticisms of Single Management. Changes were based on experience with preplanned target requests, which generally fell into two groups, relatively stationary targets and support of well-prepared maneuvers and operations planned far in advance. The Weekly Planned Frag provided for these. It also considered unknown requirements that were inevitable, by

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allocating weekly sorties to the major ground commander into designated general areas, as a form of advance airborne alert. The Daily Planned Frag was designed for massing a sizable air effort against lucrative targets without adversely affecting ongoing operations or necessitating use of ARC LIGHT strikes.^{27/}

By committing 70 percent of the sorties to the weekly frag, a number of benefits materialized. Deadlines, leadtimes, administrative burdens, numbers of requests, handling and transmission time, and errors--all were reduced or brought within reason. The daily frag was reduced in size, became more valid, and was easier to handle. Major ground commanders received a larger commitment of air support to use as the situation required. In effect, they had an airborne alert capability, which did not require targeting prior to arrival. This constituted a more responsive measure of support. COMUSMACV could mass and shift his air resources through adjustments in the daily or weekly frag. Thus, responsiveness was enhanced, while at the same time preserving the capability to balance preplanned target requests emanating from all of SVN.^{28/} The modified preplanned system represented a culmination of the first phase of operations under Single Management. At this point, the formative stage was completed, and COMUSMACV used the system to apply air resources in a flexible manner, responsive to the conflict throughout his area of responsibility.

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CHAPTER III

MONTHLY REPORTS AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

While the Modified Preplanned System was introduced, explained, and implemented, Single Management received a continuous, thorough review in Washington, D.C. by the JCS. The issue was finally resolved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's decision, which was expressed in terms that were quite significant for the present and future:^{1/}

"I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff...that the Unified Combat Commander on the scene should be presumed to be the best judge of how the combat forces assigned to him are to be organized, commanded, and deployed to meet the threat facing him (just as the Unified Commander is presumed to be sensitive to the need of his subordinate commanders and responsive to guidance from higher echelons). Furthermore, I do not believe that the assignment of Marine Air Units under the Single Management of the Deputy COMUSMACV for Air should constitute a precedent for centralized control of air operations under other combat conditions, or need pose a threat to the integrity of the Marine air/ground team. I note...the assurance made by COMUSMACV to the Chairman...that the Single Manager arrangement over tactical air operations in South Vietnam will not be continued beyond that necessary to meet the specific combat situation for which it was devised. Accordingly, COMUSMACV should revert to normal command arrangements for the III MAF when the tactical situation permits."

A more classic compromise could hardly be imagined. All parties were placated to a certain degree; none was entirely satisfied; the concessions and reservations provided ample opportunity and potential for continued agitation of the issue. Essentially, the system was recognized and accepted for SVN--but only as a tentative expedient related to an existing tactical situation. Specific ground rules or instructions on the tactical situation

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that should call for a return to "normal arrangements" were conspicuous by their absence. Yet, the implication was clear that this decision rested with COMUSMACV--subject always to higher echelon "guidance." From a practical standpoint, several factors always influenced any interpretation of the tactical situation in this context: (1) a significant mix of Army and Marine Divisions in I Corps (This situation prevailed even though the First Air Cavalry Division was deployed to III Corps in October 1968.); (2) the continued existence of a significant enemy threat in I Corps, coupled with his capability for offensive action in all tactical zones; and (3) limited tactical air resources, which must be applied across the spectrum of air operations and equitably distributed in support of the total mission.

The approving memorandum expressed confidence that Marine complaints would be satisfied, and that higher echelons desired to be kept informed of significant developments. A requirement was also levied for continued evaluation. CJCS specified that COMUSMACV, CG, III MAF, and 7AF would prepare monthly reports, and inform CINCPAC and CJCS on system effectiveness and any modifications.^{2/}

June Report

Pursuant to this end, COMUSMACV requested these continued evaluations, constructive comments, and appropriate recommendations. He also established an evaluation group within his Headquarters to correlate the III MAF and 7AF assessments and to make recommendations. This group (commencing on 17 June 1968) eventually visited 11 headquarters to personally evaluate the working of the system.^{3/}

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Prior to the suspense on the June report, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) took advantage of the "loop holes" inherent in the Deputy Secretary of Defense's approval message for Single Management. Ostensibly based on a search for changes to rectify deficiencies, and an interpretation which equated the recent, modified preplanned system to decentralization of preplanned air operations, CMC offered a modification. Indicating that "there are, in fact, two air control systems now functioning in I Corps" and once again resorting to the producer-versus-consumer oriented argument, he strongly favored an "interim solution" to final return of control of Marine Air to CG, III MAF. Furthermore, he saw no more of a requirement for a single air support request procedure than for a single request procedure for naval gunfire, artillery, or tanks. The proposal called for the return to CG, III MAF, of operational control of 70 percent of his sorties available for preplans, to be used in direct support of Marine ground forces in I Corps. ^{4/}

A response was made by 7AF to the CMC contentions. Even with bombing curtailed north of 19°, the need for Single Management was "as pronounced as at any time in the history of the war." The tactical situation in I Corps and around the demilitarized zone (DMZ) had intensified. Equating the modified frag system with de facto decentralization indicated a critical misunderstanding of it and actually impeded flexibility. If the suballocation process by III MAF became nothing more than a standard parceling of a fixed number of sorties, or the same specific number regardless of the level of operations, the rationale of the preplanned system was inevitably degraded and the intention thwarted. To claim that the 70 percent weekly allocation was tantamount to

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decentralization without considering the manner in which that 70 percent was apportioned throughout SVN was omitting a vital point. A message of 7AF to CINCPACAF dated 27 June 1968 stated: "Air dedicated to specific ground units can be costly in terms of lost opportunities. Air must be available to ground forces by need and by requirement established on a priority basis, not by a unit whose need may or may not be greater than other forces in a given area."^{5/} The proposal was considered "particularly unique" because it raised a crucial question "which is wholly unanswered" due to CG, III MAF, serving in a dual capacity. To return operational control of 70 percent of his available pre-plans for direct support of Marines was inappropriate for a Field Army Commander, responsible for the total support of three U.S. Army Divisions under his control. Giving CG, III MAF, in his role as Field Army Commander, direct control of Marine Air, as well as authority to allocate USAF sorties, created a double standard. Giving him the same prerogatives, strictly as a Marine Commander, ignored the responsibilities incumbent on CG, III MAF, as a Field Army Commander.^{6/}

This exchange served as the background for June 1968 evaluations. After identifying several minor problems, some admittedly self-imposed, three agencies indicated satisfaction with Single Management. II DASC at Pleiku believed the basic objectives were met. The evaluation from IV Corps asked that Single Management be continued on a permanent basis. II FFV considered the new system "superior." Requests from OpCon units were being met on a more timely and adequate basis. "Under the new system, air assets are more easily managed and may be employed in the priorities established by the CG, II FFV.

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Additionally, greater responsiveness is possible in coping with [the] fluid tactical situation throughout the III Corps area."^{7/} The III MAF report introduced yet another new twist, CG, III MAF, was to frag Marine aircraft in support of ground units of all services (using the present "joint air control system"), and 7AF was to frag Marine aircraft required outside of I Corps, plus USAF aircraft responding to I Corps requirements beyond III MAF capabilities.^{8/} Responsiveness had improved, and administrative burdens were reduced; however, fully adequate artillery warning and coordination procedures were lacking. Since the daily frag seemed essentially unvarying, it was considered unnecessary. Finally, the report argued that the 1st MAW was "forced" into scrambles and add-on sorties to meet ground commanders' requirements, thus exceeding planned sortie levels.

Allegations of complexity and lack of responsiveness were rebutted by 7AF, whose report contained considerable quantitative data which indicated much improved responsiveness with respect to TOTs and ordnance loads. The system could be only as strong as the users at all levels.^{9/}

"Any time the inherent flexibility and strengths... are misunderstood by the ground commanders, the immense versatility and responsiveness for which it was designed cannot be realized. Seventh Air Force analysis of the past four weeks creates very serious doubt that CG III MAF and his staff, serving in the capacity of a Field Army Commander and staff for FWF in I CTZ, understood the system completely or intend to use the beneficial characteristics of the system."

The COMUSMACV Evaluation Group correlated all inputs with its own personal observations and forwarded the results to the commander. Members of the

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group visited III MAF Headquarters, 1st MAW, 1st Marine Division, I DASC, PCV, DASC Victor, and 101st Airborne Division--in I Corps alone. Personnel from brigade and battalion staffs, as well as ALOs and FACs, were included in discussions, and this same pattern was followed in all tactical zones. Some very pertinent conclusions were summarized. Focusing on the III MAF/7AF "situation" vis-a-vis Single Management, the group pointed out "several basic truisms which must be recognized": ^{10/}

"...the USMC is fighting a land-locked, relatively static type of war in I Corps, intermingled with U.S. Army divisions within a common command structure - I Corps, and particularly Northern I Corps, can no longer be accurately described as 'Marineland.'"

"Although the principle of Single Management of strike and recce air within such an integrated command structure is obviously necessary, the USMC will never embrace the Single Management concept, because of the implicit threat it poses to the Marine air/ground team principle."

"...because of the above, the Marine Corps will pursue a month by month strategy of erosion, in an effort to return full management of Marine air assets to CG III MAF. Continual modification of the system will not make Single Management any more palatable to them; rather, constant changes in the system can in a sense provide them with more ammunition to prove the system is not workable. Historically, concessions do not solve basic differences in ideology."

Next, the group admitted to "a certain degree of truth" in the producer versus consumer oriented charge made by Marines. While 7AF had been expanding, no attempt was made to decentralize management or control, but rather the opposite--"resulting in a gargantuan network of communications, layering of control echelons, increased mission standardization, increased administrative

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burden, etc." AFM 66-1 "invites and demands day to day and sortie to sortie standardization to produce a constant flow of combat sorties within a framework of preplanned management of personnel, supplies, and maintenance", which in turn "creates inflexibility in TOTs, ordnance loads, changes, surges, etc." Such a system tended to discourage change or was not receptive to same, because it was designed as a balanced system.^{11/}

At times, fighter presence in the combat area was extremely limited regardless of the existing tactical situation, due to sensitivity of the base to target factors which limited effectiveness.^{12/} Supposedly, Army units learned to live with this because they had never known anything different. The same was not true for the Marines in I Corps under their own system. A comparison of the two systems "is exposing in a harsh light the restrictions and limitations inherent in the 7AF capability."^{13/}

After reviewing the full spectrum of Marine criticisms and recommendations to date, the group concluded that Single Management as a way of life, or even for an indefinite period, would always be unacceptable to III MAF and the USMC, unless reoriented to mean in name only, while actual control of air was returned. Single Management had put a floodlight on the entire 7AF system of management with constructive changes resulting in more effective air support throughout SVN, along with more efficient procedures. III MAF agreed that the Modified Preplanned System corrected many deficiencies, but that these also made a basically bad system more workable. Responding also to the CMC proposal of 14 June, the report recognized this, in essence, as nothing more than "double management" at all levels, treating Marine Air as a separate

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entity at all levels, and negating the very integration and control of air effort in I Corps that was the prime objective of Single Management. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul H. Nitze, approved the concept for the purpose intended, and CG, III MAF (as Field Force Commander), had to consider air support as a total requirement in his Area of Responsibility (AOR), rather than as two separate functions. Throughout the entire period of controversy, Marine Divisions were shown (quantitatively) to have received substantial, concentrated air support. It was thus difficult "to understand the claim that Marine units are not being provided sufficient air support."^{14/}

Next, the frag itself received comment. Specifically, the weekly frag was completely flexible and adaptable to change. Mission changes could be incorporated into the weekly frag at will, right up until TOT; changes in TOT and ordnance were also possible. CG, III MAF, completely sub-allocated the weekly frag; he could have withheld a percentage for contingencies. In other words, he had complete control of sortie utilization in the weekly frag, and the daily frag was designed to give him added flexibility. Finally, MACV intended:^{15/}

"...to put the relative weight of tactical air power where the ground situation dictates, in an integrated, coordinated system. To do this within I Corps requires centralized management controls available at the highest level to assure the availability of assets and procedures to accomplish this objective. Until the ground situation and organization is such that the Marines can operate in an insular environment as an independent force, the tactical situation and deployment of forces will demand a significant degree of control at this level."

All three reports were consolidated, and COMUSMACV addressed every

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recommendation or objection in his report to CINCPAC. His conclusion stated the system improved markedly, since implementation of the Modified Preplanned System on 30 May. With planning and mechanics becoming more capable, Single Management was responsive to his requirements and tactical air support improved throughout SVN. Recognition was accorded the differing III MAF and 7AF points of view. The MACV evaluation indicated that present procedures offered "the most effective system to satisfy MACV, CG, III MAF, and 7AF objectives."^{16/}

Several areas of concern were identified and comments were solicited from III MAF and 7AF. Some of the discrepancies were not related to Single Management, per se; others were corrected before the month was over; the rest were addressed in the July report. CINCPAC believed the report did not contain sufficient information to support statements on effectiveness of the system and requested additional data. When these data were provided by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC indicated if the system allowed timely adjustment of pre-scheduled TOTs in the weekly frag, there should be no problem in "the ground commanders' utilization of available assets and should largely preclude the use of add-on sorties and scrambles for other than added weight of effort and emergency situations."^{17/}

July Report

The four areas of continued concern were artillery warning, flexibility of TOTs, availability of air munitions, and the need for rapid response photo reconnaissance. "The artillery warning problem predated Single Management by at least two wars, but III MAF became more aware of it as Marine aircraft

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began to support Army Units."^{18/} Marines came closer to solving the problem by attempting to control all supporting fires through division Fire Support Control Centers (FSCCs) and DASCs, while Army Artillery control was less centralized. Neither seemed to be able to guarantee complete warning of all fires within an area. "The problem is still the subject of constant study and procedural change in SVN, primarily under the auspices of the Artillery Warning Working Group [at USARV]. However, the Marines have recently intermingled artillery warning and fire support control requirements to justify proposals whereby the Ground Commander would completely control the airspace over the battlefield out to the range of his artillery."^{19/}

Flexibility of TOTs remained an issue partially because III MAF and 7AF came up with different data through the review system involved. Two sets of statistics resulted at two levels of control. When CG, III MAF, denied requests for change at his level, a lesser number reached 7AF TACC. Response times frequently cited by III MAF reflected times of requests in advance of TOTs rather than a measure of minimum response times in which changes might be effected.^{20/} This concern, as well as availability of air munitions, persisted, and both were continually addressed.

Single Management did not create the problem associated with rapid response photo reconnaissance. Under the system, however, III MAF in Da Nang passed Marine and Army requests to the TASE for eventual submission to 7AF for fragging. No special effort was made to frag Marine aircraft for Marine requests. Instead, the frag capitalized on Marine RF-4Cs at Da Nang for improved scheduling, and all Marine flights remained in I Corps. Both

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procedures, in effect, actually allocated Marine aircraft to Marine requests. "To give III MAF a procedure for advance notice analagous to the pickup system of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), 7AF authorized III MAF to designate missions it wished flown by Marine Air and to pass the target data directly to their Wing. This was done often. Since 7AF had never disapproved these requests, the Marines sometimes flew the mission before receiving the formal frag." III MAF thus had a more responsive reconnaissance capability, while Single Management was retained in I Corps for MACV and 7AF. Also on real "hot" items, reconnaissance aircraft from Tan Son Nhut were diverted into Da Nang after their mission to deliver high priority film.^{21/} One other matter was cleared up. Prior to Single Management, Marine DASCs had authority for reconnaissance diverts. MACV, III MAF, and 7AF representatives agreed to permit Horn DASC to exercise this same authority through the immediate request net. This procedure was not extensively used because of the other options; however, it was available along with the others to permit prompt fulfillment of urgent reconnaissance requests. All procedures received continued evaluation.^{22/}

The III MAF report for July conceded improvement, and increased familiarity with the system resulted in more efficient operations. Acknowledgment indicated the weekly frag was being used in accordance with the system, and sub-allocation did not include all sorties. Some were retained to shift effort to other tasks and between divisions when required, although allocating a fixed number was in accord with the principle of guaranteeing a basic level of support. The report concluded with another "pitch" to "return to this Headquarters authority for in-country 1st MAW sorties to be used as required in

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support of all units in I CTZ."^{23/}

Seventh Air Force provided its own evaluation, which also contained detailed responses to the areas of concern identified by the MACV Evaluation Group and to the III MAF report. Pertinent statistical data on air activity in I Corps were compiled on allocation of sorties, sorties flown versus scheduled, service-executed versus service-supported sorties, radar missions, and type of targets being struck. Items directly related to Single Management were addressed, and appropriate or feasible modifications were identified as accomplished or to be resolved shortly. Items not germane to Single Management were treated separately with analysis and comment. Generally, while several problem areas were accepted as valid, recognition amounted to the first step toward a solution. On the whole, the report indicated that the system was working well, and that items of interest or at issue were of two types--efforts to develop improved methods or old problems not created by Single Management.^{24/} In his report to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV quoted liberally from evaluations supplied him and emphasized the progress being made, with improvements exceeding areas for continued attention and action by two to one.^{25/}

"Since the establishment of Single Management, there has been more interest, analysis, judgment, and decision action in the allocation and utilization of TACAIR resources than ever before, at all action levels, within ground elements and within air echelons as well. Despite the differences of opinion, and temporary misunderstandings which have existed, the overall result has been better TACAIR support when and where it is needed throughout MACV areas of responsibility (including Route Package I and Laos)."

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Significant Developments

The JCS had requested that significant developments and modifications be identified in the monthly reports. Several of these fit that category. Relocation of I DASC was initially requested by CG, III MAF; he considered the move vitally important to proper and effective management in I Corps under the current system. The Commander, 7AF, concurred. Placing the DASC at Marine headquarters was considered a valuable move toward assuring maximum coordination and understanding between control and support agencies--and the field force being supported. ^{26/} On 17 March, COMUSMACV discussed moving I DASC to the III MAF compound with the CG, III MAF. No details were firmed at this point; however, construction was begun on a building to house the DASC and plans were set in motion. Movement of the VNAF was left undecided until 19 July, at which time representatives of all agencies concerned met and approved the formation of two separate DASCs. I DASC, manned by USAF and VNAF, and the USAF/ARVN ALO system were to remain intact at the I Corps compound and provide advisory services and air support to ARVN in I Corps. (It became virtually a VNAF facility.) The new DASC was named Horn DASC, to be located at III MAF headquarters, and to become the senior DASC for supporting US/FWF in I Corps. The target date was set for 1 August. The relationship between Horn DASC and I DASC was identical to that between II DASC and DASC Alpha--one of coordination. On 10 August, this projected arrangement went into effect. ^{27/}

At the Current Intelligence Indications Branch (CIIB) meeting held on 22 June 1968, COMUSMACV and his Deputy for Air agreed to meet weekly each

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Saturday and determine a percentage division of air effort for in-country and out-country operations, as well as a breakout of the preplanned air effort in each of the four Corps (See Appendix II). On Fridays preceding the CIIB meeting, the 7AF air staff consolidated intelligence information with previous air activity and aircraft availability to brief the Commander, who then arrived at a recommended distribution of air effort. This was presented to COMUSMACV on Saturday morning for approval or change, and the final percentage for the weekly frag was published Sunday evening to become effective from 0600 hours on Tuesday to 0600 hours the following Tuesday. The allocation of daily frag sorties continued to be accomplished as previously. ^{28/}

The III MAF and 1st MAW jointly agreed on 18 July 1968 to hold a weekly planning conference consisting of representation from Horn DASC, DASC Victor, 1st MAW, major ground commanders, and III MAF. The objectives of the conference were to: (1) enable ground commanders to identify their requirements and air commanders to identify their assets; (2) resolve problems; (3) assess response of air support to ground requirements; and (4) increase appreciation for the overall operation. ^{29/}

August Report

Ostensibly because "critical changes sought and recommended by the CG, III MAF, continue to be analyzed as invalid or contrary to stated COMUSMACV objectives," the III MAF August report basically turned out to be a repeat of all previous objections. Justified as a "recap of recommendations", the report appeared to be a "rehash of all the complaints that had been alleged since the beginning of Single Management." This renewed, sharp criticism was

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viewed as an attempt to reopen the whole issue for the suspected reason that the new CINCPAC, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. might be willing to carry the Single Management question once again to the JCS.^{30/} Prior to the 7AF response, a feeling prevailed that objections to the concept were becoming nothing more than ritualistic criticisms and that future reporting and evaluation should be confined to significant modifications, developments, or problems on a case-by-case basis.^{31/} Thus, rather than attempt a point-by-point rebuttal of the latest Marine position, the 7AF report noted that many of the items had been answered adequately in previous reports but that further point-by-point responses would be prepared if necessary.^{32/} Since they were becoming repetitive, 7AF recommended that the mandatory report be terminated.

COMUSMACV consolidated the two inputs, provided specific comments on all III MAF "recommendations," and supported the 7AF position that the system worked and was an improvement over previous command arrangements. He accepted the 7AF explanation on two remaining areas of concern--the degree to which valid requests for TOT changes were met, and availability of munitions by types and quantity sufficient to meet the user's requirements. The 7AF report detailed how TOT changes could be met, if only the system were used properly, and pointed out the difficulties associated with munitions which precluded full stockpiles of all desired types. COMUSMACV also concurred that monthly reports should be terminated.^{33/}

Airborne Alert

Another new development occurred on 5 August, when the 1st MAF began an experimental airborne alert posture in I Corps. A fighter scheduled for "Air

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Cap" remained on the alert pad for 30 minutes. If not scrambled in that time, he took off and maintained CAP over the TACAN facility at Phu Bai for approximately 45 minutes, or until diverted to a target. In the event no immediate request materialized, he refueled and was directed to a less lucrative or lower priority target as an add-on. With some modification, this practice has continued ever since. Reaction time for fighters diverted from the CAP averaged 14.9 minutes, an excellent response. This provided support of immediates in half the time generally taken by scrambles. It also became another way to generate add-ons but tended to "dry-up" the alert pads. During the August reporting period, the "Marine pads went dry twice."^{34/}

Air Force experience considered airborne alert expensive in terms of maintenance hours and unproductive missions, a waste of flying/man hours, and to be used only when quick response was paramount. But as long as fraggged Marine sorties were met and alert aircraft were available, TACC did not restrict the practice. During that first month, there was an increase in mission cancellations due to lack of aircraft, as well as occasional alert pad exhaustion.^{35/}

Demise of Reports

Any hope that Single Management might be undermined as a result of the August report collapsed. After reviewing the report, CINCPAC stated the system had improved considerably since it was implemented and provided COMUSMACV the kind of control necessary to allocate air assets and carry out his mission. He granted that Single Management did not provide the Marines with the responsiveness they were accustomed to under their own system, but it did enable

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COMUSMACV to make the best overall use of tactical aircraft. CINCPAC also agreed that the mandatory monthly report be terminated and recommended this to the CJCS. The latter concurred, and monthly evaluations ended with the August report. ^{36/}

From April through August 1968, the monthly reports provided III MAF with the necessary means to take advantage of the compromise explicit in the important memorandum of Secretary Nitze, dated 30 May 1968. The period was characterized by resolute Marine steadfastness in never losing sight of the central issue and sticking to their "doctrinal guns." They attempted in myriad ways to reduce Single Management to a concept in name only, but at the same time fulfilled all responsibilities to COMUSMACV and the Comdr, 7AF, under the system. The monthly report was no longer available to provide opportunities for presenting their case; however, Marine dexterity still prevailed.

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CHAPTER IV

POLEMICS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT

By August 1968, three important command changes occurred: Adm. John S. McCain, Jr. became the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command; General Creighton Abrams was the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Seventh Air Force Commander, General George S. Brown, completed the third change in command personalities. The position taken by Admiral McCain and General Abrams vis-a-vis Single Management had a decisive influence throughout the remainder of 1968. When asked his opinion about Single Management, Gen. Abrams indicated the system was working well and should be continued. The impression was that he would under "many circumstances make concessions to keep people happy," but "was damned if he would give an inch on this issue." He further indicated this same view had been conveyed to Admiral McCain. General Abrams felt he should not be told how to use his forces. Admiral McCain was said to have responded, "That's good enough for me."^{1/}

Procedural Changes

Two recommendations of a procedural nature, one by 7AF and another by CG, III MAF, were made to COMUSMACV between 27 August and 9 September 1968. Both were disapproved. The Comdr, 7AF, notified COMUSMACV of his concern that alert scrambles in response to immediates had increased; they also had a tendency to reduce the daily frag to a point resulting in loss of flexibility. The Comdr, 7AF, also cautioned against surging, when the ground battle might not have reached a point to require it. To cope with this, he proposed substituting parameters for use of strike assets rather than numerical allocations. The

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70/30 split in the weekly frag was not considered inviolable, and a proposal was submitted which would take the alert force from the weekly frag (from the 70 percent) to insure surge capability above the program, if and when required.^{2/} According to solicited views of major subordinate ground commanders on this proposal, they preferred the current arrangement. COMUSMACV retained the 70/30 split and suggested other ways of increasing immediate sorties. He did not consider his decision irrevocable, but considered the matter closed for the time being.^{3/}

After conceding its value for control throughout SVN, CG, III MAF, proposed to improve responsiveness of the system in I Corps, if III MAF were authorized mission direction and control of in-country Marine strike sorties. He offered to publish a daily frag for Marine sorties in I Corps, and suggested that 7AF publish a weekly and daily frag, to include its support for III MAF. Then the two frags would be exchanged. A 30-day test was requested. COMUSMACV contemplated effects going far beyond the modification itself. In fact, he believed it would deprive him of a Single Manager and instead establish two--the same complicated arrangement that existed before Single Management. He still wanted to regulate the total air effort through one individual. The proposal was disapproved;^{4/} it represented the last stratagem of this type, the desire to escape operational restrictions directly. Most subsequent means to erode Single Management were more subtle, and generally were characterized by attempts to subordinate battle decisions/tac air employment to ground commanders. Operation THOR provided an opportunity to pursue this course.

THOR and THOR-Type Operations

THOR was a seven-day SLAM operation in the DMZ and lower Route Package I.

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Between 1-7 July 1968 a "ton a minute" was delivered by joint-service arms into a small geographic area, in a relatively short time period. The operation was a saturation effort, using artillery, naval gunfire, and tac air, against enemy artillery, troop concentrations, and AAA sites in an area immune from friendly ground attack. Ground commanders wanted the enemy threat reduced. Prior to THOR, most 7AF sorties in the DMZ were part of an interdiction effort against NVN lines of communication, and any CAS sorties were usually immediates. The last five days of the seven-day operation were under control of the ground commander. He also requested, but was denied, authority for a post-THOR period of indefinite duration, during which he could initiate similar operations under his own control.^{5/}

THOR was considered an unqualified operational success by the XXIV Corps and Marine commanders, largely based upon "inferred BDA" and reduction of enemy artillery, AAA, and shore battery fires. Some duplication of effort occurred, and some targets were probably over-killed. However, ground commanders applauded the effort and emphasized the reduced artillery fire against friendly northern outposts, and the ability of light reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the area at will and spot for artillery and naval gunfire. Seventh Air Force and III MAF submitted separate intelligence reports on THOR, each reaching different conclusions. Air Force estimates suggested that an inordinate amount of sorties may have been employed to achieve unknown results. Reviews of aerial photographs did not substantiate the BDA claimed by III MAF, and raised the question whether the effort was really worthwhile. The 7AF report indicated few targets and very little BDA. This raised the further

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question, whether the sorties could have been used to better advantage elsewhere.^{6/}

The III MAF report indicated a large number of identified targets and considerable BDA. THOR was praised as an outstanding example of the integrated application of firepower that "hurt the enemy."^{7/} The disparity between the two estimates became significant when III MAF and XXIV Corps requested another THOR-type operation in September 1968. Again the threat was identified as increased enemy artillery fire on friendly northern outposts and AAA directed against observation aircraft, and THOR was said to have been the previous answer. The disparate intelligence analyses presented for THOR naturally created widely separate views on the necessity and value of more THOR-type operations. Seventh Air Force did not believe there were sufficient targets to justify the operation; CG, III MAF, stated that he could not continue to tolerate the incoming artillery and restrictions to observation capability. COMUSMACV had previously directed the two parties to confer on the course of action. He heard both sides and decided against it.^{8/} However, this did not end the issue. Renewed proposals were presented to achieve some kind of major effort against the enemy buildup in the DMZ.

On 21 October 1968, CG, III MAF, countered with a rebuttal to the 7AF intelligence conclusions on Operation THOR. He also requested authority to plan and conduct future operations of this type, under the ground commanders control and, if necessary, using only his available resources--when he thought they were required.^{9/} If approved, he could have committed on his own, any air support fraggged to him, or provided on scrambles, in out-country operations without authority from the Single Manager for Air or COMUSMACV. Seventh Air

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Force objections rested on the obvious invasion this entailed into its area of responsibility, because III MAF at his discretion could have committed fraggd in-country sorties to strikes out-country. COMUSMACV proposed an affirmative response to the III MAF request, but 7AF did not concur with the first and subsequent proposed messages to this effect. As of March 1969, no response had been forwarded to III MAF on this issue, and a related proposal to move the Forward Bomb Line (FBL).^{10/}

Moving the FBL

The current FBL, at the time of the proposal, roughly coincided with the northern edge of the DMZ on the east and the Provisional Military Demarcation Line on the west. On 20 October, CG, III MAF, proposed a change to MACV Directive 95-1, which would have moved the FBL ten miles north to coincide with the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).^{11/} The change would have altered the procedures for fire support coordination and control in the TALLY HO area. (See Fig. 1.) Two reasons were given for the change: (1) an interpretation of JCS Pub 1; and (2) recent developments which indicated the logic of such a change. According to the III MAF rationale, the MACV directive gave control of the area around the DMZ from the FBL to the FSCL to his air commander, while JCS Pub 1 defined the terms in such a way as to give control to the ground commander. This, coupled with the indicated enemy threat, buttressed the logic for the move.^{12/} The CG, III MAF, also proposed giving the ground commander control of the airspace between the DMZ and the new FBL. The various ramifications of approval presaged consequences of immediate importance:^{13/}

- Reduced 7AF control in TALLY HO by one third in a specific area which contained 63.17% of the 1,440

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
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**AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AND CONTROL**



Procedures for FSCC
The DMZ AREA JOG
SHEET # NE 48-12 & 48-16
Scale 1/250,000 : Dec 67

FIGURE 1

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total active targets in TALLY HO.

- Limitations on the larger interdiction campaign against a broader spectrum of fleeting, mobile targets that were the objects of vigorous armed reconnaissance.
- Interference with the capability to apply airstrikes against targets of opportunity in a timely manner and the timely acquisition of intelligence.
- Reduced tac air effectiveness in an area demanding unencumbered mobility and responsiveness.

Other possible consequences were more subtle but of major importance.

CG, III MAF, would have been "released from the restraints of Single Management in the area in question," and could then use all or part of his fraggied sorties (both preplans and immediates) to strike north of the DMZ, "in fact, conduct his own private war there and no other forces could participate without his permission."^{14/} The precedent this might establish was very significant--a ground commander would have control of the air space over a portion of the battle field where no ground forces existed or were maneuvering. This issue has yet to be resolved by the JCS, and 7AF could not abide a proposal with such precedent--establishing potential and which abrogated control in a 7AF area of responsibility.^{15/}

In reply to a MACV request for comments, several reasons were given for 7AF disapproval of the move. Formidable problems were envisioned if the FSOC at division level had authority to select weapons to be used against a target, to veto entry of aircraft, and to subordinate all missions to its control. While the ground commander had no forces in the area, the air commander had a considerable array of aircraft there. The ground commander was interested

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in specific targets, primarily those harassing him--the air commander was interested in all targets--not just the former. Finally, the rebuttal pointed out that the FSCC was neither in the best position to control and to target in the area nor to assess BDA; furthermore, it was not equipped or manned to manage the FACs.^{16/}

Another reason 7AF disapproved the proposal hinged on disagreement with the Marine interpretation of terms in JCS Pub. 1. Seventh Air Force felt that it did not specify who was to coordinate and control fires between the FSCL and the FBL. JCS Pub. 1 defined the FSCL as "a line established by the appropriate ground commander to insure coordination of fire not under his control but which may affect current tactical operations," and defined FBLs as "lines (land) prescribed by a troop commander beyond which he considers that bombing need not be coordinated with his own force." The purpose of the FBL was to protect an area within which friendly troops might be maneuvering, and to require positive air control when this was the case.

In summary, the basic objection was that the proposal placed serious constraints on application of air in the air commander's area of responsibility and impeded his ability to support the ground commander, while also fulfilling other responsibilities, particularly the out-country interdiction program and targeting associated with it.^{17/} Resolution of this issue is also still in abeyance. In retrospect, the real issue in the proposal to relocate the FBL seems not to have been the movement of the line, but rather the interpretation involved, which then was used as partial justification for the ground commander being given control of the ground and the airspace above it. And had this

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materialized, III MAF would have won, in the area under consideration, the prerogatives which a Marine commander enjoyed under his own system prior to Single Management. Presumably with this point established, or reestablished, in miniature, the way would be clear to win back control of its own air on the doctrinal point which formed the basis for Marine resentment of Single Management in the first place. This point regarding the ground commander was also seen as pertinent in another issue.

Artillery Warning and Coordination

Since Single Management was first implemented, III MAF continually objected to USAF/Army fire support coordination procedures, initially through the monthly reports and even after they were terminated. The solution generally provided was to make Marine techniques standard throughout SVN, to change the artillery warning system into a FSCC system--along Marine lines. The Marine system provided "excellent artillery warning for aircraft as a by-product of a system designed to centrally control all supporting agencies... The Army opposes this degree of centralization and does not desire to commit men and equipment to a warning agency which has no combat pay off." Seventh Air Force felt that "danger to aircraft from artillery fire is relatively slight and that few missions are avoidably lost to artillery fire...."^{18/} When continued Marine dissatisfaction was expressed, COMUSMACV suggested that constructive criticism be provided through proposed changes to MACV directives.^{19/} III MAF replied with a proposal which would have subordinated airstrikes to the local ground commanders' FSCCs.^{20/} This also, if approved, would have affected the ground commander/air commander issue, and tac air would have been

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placed under the control of Division Artillery Centers. When requested to comment, 7AF objected to "fragmenting the control of airpower in SVN."

COMUSMACV eventually rejected the proposal and recommended that CG, III MAF, use his authority as a Field Army Commander to standardize artillery warning procedures in I Corps. ^{21/}

The Common Denominator

It has been suggested that the Marine proposals to gain authority for THOR-type operations, to move the FBL to coincide with the FSCL, and to make Marine fire support coordination techniques standard throughout SVN--all had one thing in common. "They were attempts to mitigate or terminate the restraints of Single Management on Marine forces in SVN." ^{22/} All proposals at least carried implications related to the degree of control exercised by a ground commander or an air commander in the ostensible issues in question. Approval of any one of the three could have altered the prerogatives exercised by the 7AF Commander, acting as the Single Manager for Air and upset the ground commander/air commander control arrangement inherent in the Single Management concept.

During Operation THOR, out-country air support was under the ground commander's control for five days, although originally indefinite control of future operations by the ground commander was requested. Since then the term, THOR-type, was used for additional requests for similar operations and for blanket authority to conduct them when deemed necessary, using only allocated resources. These proposals were suspected as intending to gain ground control of air assets outside of SVN proper. Later, a new term, "coordinated fire

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support operation," was adopted.

The proposed change to MACV artillery directives was argued on the basis of a need for improved artillery warning procedures for aircraft; the solution was suspected as another attempt to escape Single Management by subordinating all air support to Division Artillery Centers. Efforts to have the FBL moved to coincide with the FSCL were related to the same issue, in that III MAF requested authority for the ground commander to control the air space from the DMZ to the new FBL. Thus, since Single Management was implemented, various attempts have persisted to return to previous arrangements. Whether through evaluations, recommendations, or proposals--whether seeking return of operational control directly or indirectly, in whole or in part--the integrity of the Marine air/ground team remained the central point at issue. Marines believed they lost this integrity and were forced to operate in a different way than they were used to under a system they considered inferior to their own.

Comparison of 7AF and III MAF Positions

While Marines at all levels have diligently fulfilled their responsibilities under the system, they did not like it, and when possible, by-passed the system to generate additional sorties for their own ground forces. The operational key to the Marine system was the ground commander, and his request/need for air support was not to be questioned. No allocated preplanned air support could be diverted without his prior approval. Scrambles rather than diverts were the preferred response to immediates. Tac air was treated as another weapon in his fire support arsenal; it was controlled by the ground

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commander through a fire support coordinating center. Through the center, the commander exercised control on the ground and in the airspace above the battlefield. Marines pointed out that their system was consumer oriented. Schedules and allocations were not considered inviolable, and air support was to go to the ground commander at the rate he called for it, even at the risk of breaking down the system. ^{23/}

Seventh AF operations were predicated on the position that air resources were limited and had to be judiciously applied by massing and shifting in accordance with the tactical situation in support of the total MACV mission throughout SVN. Centralized airspace control was necessary for safety and efficiency. Surges were to be avoided except in an emergency; otherwise, a sustained, relatively stable sortie rate was preferred. The most rapid and best response to an immediate was to divert a preplanned from a lower priority target through the TACS, and this did not require approval of a ground commander. A single target list was considered necessary for operations in a given area to prevent duplication of effort (over-kill) or omission of targets. ^{24/}

Marine air was applied consistent with the principle of air/ground team integrity, because by design it was one element in the organic firepower of the amphibious force. Any contributions to the total air effort prior to Single Management were made on a cooperative basis to the degree that assets could be spared after the ground commanders' requests for close air support were satisfied. Marine antipathy to Single Management in a larger context probably rests on potential loss of organic air if Single Management was not challenged, particularly when Marine forces participate in a sustained land

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campaign divorced from the conditions associated with an amphibious assault. ^{25/}

Seventh Air Force viewed the airspace over SVN and the extended battle area as a continuum, and believed the air commander should control the arena over the battlefield. Single Management reflected the concept of centralized control to maximize the efficiency with which limited and versatile air resources might be applied across the spectrum of air operations in support of the total MACV mission, as well as CINCPACAF delegated responsibilities throughout SEA. Daily operational decisions were influenced by many factors associated with incursions of Army aviation into the close air support role-- and the implications of these for the future. ^{26/}

Conclusions

Since Marines considered Single Management a "radical disruption to III MAF's organization for combat," they fought it at every opportunity in an effort to revert to their own system for reasons previously summarized. An extraordinary variety of stratagems were played, both direct and indirect. These focused on several basic arguments. Attempts to promote the prerogatives of the ground commander were parried with equally legitimate rebuttals on behalf of those belonging to the air commander. When Marines argued their own system was consumer rather than producer oriented, COMUSMACV replied that Single Management was oriented to the total mission. If there were any wasted effort in the new system, it was largely administrative rather than operational. The inevitable complaints resulted in consistent reduction of these burdens. When Marines criticized the responsiveness of the system, they had two things in mind: (1) responsiveness in terms of a reduction in the number

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of sorties a Marine ground commander routinely preplanned to complement his ground maneuver for the ensuing day; and (2) responsiveness in terms of actual time required for aircraft to fulfill an immediate request for air support. The Modified Preplanned System was designed to cope with the first objections, and through the 70 percent weekly frag gave Field Army Commanders considerable latitude in the application of their allocated air resources. The 30 percent daily frag retained additional flexibility for COMUSMACV. Integration of the Marine control assets into JAGOS increased the time required for response to immediates by only two minutes, and diverts from lower priority targets were considered the best and the quickest means to support troops in contact.

Gradually, it appeared that all parties faced up more often to real problems and less frequently to theoretical problems--although the latter never disappeared. Single Management, as modified, permitted a measure of decentralization in certain management areas after the 70/30 split, and technically this split was not considered inviolable. The constant dialogue since the March implementation sharpened the system, and it was modified to incorporate and take advantage of some of the best elements in the Marine system. Eventually, Single Management operated procedurally somewhere between the previous USAF/Army and Marine system. Few would deny that close air support throughout SVN did not improve considerably as a result.^{27/}

Epilogue

For several months, a proposed revision to MACV Directive 95-4 was being coordinated by the major agencies concerned. Finally the proposed draft of

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the revision was submitted to CG, III MAF, in December 1968 for final approval. Single Management was defined as a system whereby COMUSMACV charged one agent with the "direction of employment of tactical air resources." It was a system intended "to retain at a central point the control of tactical air resources in order to maintain the flexibility to employ the tactical air effort as dictated by the tactical situation." Such control of tactical air assets by the Single Manager consisted "primarily of directing the employment of air assets through a centrally controlled tasking agency and a coordinated and integrated Tactical Air Control System."^{28/} The Deputy COMUSMACV for Air was charged with the responsibility for coordinating and directing the entire U.S. air effort, and coordinating the FWMAF and VNAF air activities, in the MACV area of responsibility. While III MAF exercised command and control over all organic Marine Corps aviation, III MAF strike and reconnaissance aircraft were to be tasked by the Deputy COMUSMACV for Air Operations and (were) under his "operational direction."^{29/}

CG, III MAF, did not concur in the proposed revision. He indicated that the revised draft contravened a basic provision of United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), the principle of "preserving the uni-service integrity of forces." Approval would have endorsed permanent operational control of organic air. He thought the current directive provided suitable options for an emergency, while the proposed revision would have formalized operational control, which he could not differentiate from "operational direction." Finally, he submitted the thesis that "the specific combat situation which prompted the temporary centralizing control over air assets no longer exists." Even granting that it

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did exist to some extent, it seemed apparent to him that the situation would change at some point and permit orderly reversion to normal command arrangements. He wanted to preserve that option. In summary: ^{30/}

"Since the revised draft of 95-4 would constitute a precedent for centralized control of air resources under any and all combat conditions, and since it would make permanent that which was recognized by SECDEF as temporary, I cannot concur in the revised draft of 95-4, as written...Any revision should be in accordance with established doctrine and reflect the guidance provided by DEPSECDEF."

On 7 February 1969, the MACV Chief of Staff directed the proposed revision remain unpublished, and that the existing publication stay in effect. ^{31/} This decision retained the status quo, with Single Management adhering to its original charter. This was based on the "existing tactical situation." It is upon that foundation the future of Single Management in SVN will be determined.

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FOOTNOTES*

CHAPTER I

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2. (S) Memorandum for Record, Gen William W. Momyer, Comdr, 7AF, "Ops Control of 1st MAW," 18 Jan 68.
3. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, subj: Conduct and Control of Close Air Support, 18/2213Z Jan 68.
4. (S) Memo for Record, Gen William W. Momyer, Comdr 7AF, "Air Support in I Corps," 21 Jan 68;
(S) Msg, CG to COMUSMACV, subj: Single Management in I CTZ, 18/1352Z Jan 68.
5. (S) "Khe Sanh (Operation NIAGARA)", pp 1, 4.
6. Ibid, pp 78-79.
7. Ibid, pp 79-86;
(TS) Memo for Record, Gen William W. Momyer, Comdr 7AF, "Control of Air," 17 Feb 68.
8. (TS) Memo, Gen L. F. Chapman, Jr., to CJCS, "Single Management of Fighter/Bomber Recon Assets, 21 Feb 68;
(TS) Msg, CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, subj: Control of Acft in I CTZ, 24/1256 Feb 68.
9. (S) Study, 7AF, 7 May 68.
10. (TS) Memo, Gen W. C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV to CJCS, "Single Mgmt of Fighter/Bomber Recon Assets," 24 Feb 68.
11. Ibid.
12. (S) CHECO Rprt, Hq PACAF, DOTEK, "Single Manager for Air in SVN," 1 Jul 68, pg 20. (Hereafter cited: "Single Manager for Air in SVN.")
13. (S) Msg, 7AF to CINCPACAF, subj: Single Management, 29/1330Z Feb 68.)

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15. (S) "Single Manager for Air in SVN".

CHAPTER II

1. (SNF) Study, TACD, Lt Col John Stoer, "Single Management," 8 Jan 69. (Hereafter cited: Lt Col Stoer Study.)
2. Ibid.
3. (S) "Khe Sanh (Operation NIAGARA)," pg 86.
4. (S) Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Mar 68, pg 59.
5. Ibid;
(SNF) Lt Col Stoer Study.
6. Ibid.
7. (S) Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Mar 68, pg 60.
8. (TS/AFE0) Msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF, 25/1538Z Mar 68.
9. Ibid.
10. (TS/AFE0) Msg, 7AF to CSAF, 27/1900Z Mar 68.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. (S/AFE0) Msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF, 27/1734Z Mar 68.
14. (S) Msg CG, III MAF, to COMUSMACV, 22/1340Z Apr 68.
15. (S) Msg, CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 04/0902 May 68.
16. (S) Study, 7AF, 7 May 68.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

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20. (S) Operation of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Mar 68.
21. (S) Study, 7AF, 7 May 68.
22. (S) Msg, 7AF to CINCPACAF, 08/1300Z May 68.
23. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV to 7AF, subj: Modified Preplanned Air Support System, 21/1145Z May 68.
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25. (S) Monthly Report, 7AF, 1 Jul 68.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. (SNF) Lt Col Stoer Study.

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3. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV, subj: Evaluation of Single Management/Strike Support Procedures, 07/1135Z Jun 68.
4. (S) Msg, CJCS to CINCPAC, with Memo for JCS, 14 Jun 68, quoted, 19/1952Z Jun 68.
5. (S) Msg, 7AF to CINCPACAF, subj: OpCon of III MAF Aviation, 27/0015Z Jun 68.
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7. (C) Msg, CG, II FFV to COMUSMACV, 30/1438Z Jun 68;
(C) Msg, II DASC to COMUSMACV, 30/0600Z Jun 68;
(C) Msg, SA IV Corps to COMUSMACV, 30/0630Z Jun 68.
8. (S) Msg, CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, subj: III MAF Evaluation of Single Management/Strike Support Procedures, 30/0636Z Jun 68.
9. (S) Rprt, 7AF, "Single Management of Strike and Recon Assets", 1 Jul 68.
10. (S) Rprt, Summary to COMUSMACV, Evaluation of Single Management, 30 May-27 Jun 68, undated.

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16. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, subj: Evaluation of Single Management, 06/1130Z Jul 68.
17. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 10/2340Z Jul 68;
(S) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 13/0637Z Jul 68;
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23. (S) Msg, CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, subj: Evolution of Single Management, 29/1442Z Jul 68.
24. (S) Report for July, 7AF, "Evolution of Single Management," 29 Jul 68.
25. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, subj: Single Management, 07/1218Z Aug 68.
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27. (S) Report for July, 7AF, "Evaluation of Single Management," 29 Jul 68.
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(SNF) Lt Col Stoer Study.
31. (S) Commentary, TACD/DOC, MACV Single Management Report for July, undated.
32. (S) Form 4, Single Management - 7AF Report for August, Lt Col John Stoer, undated.
33. (S) Rprt, 7AF, "Single Management....28 July - 28 August 68," undated;
(S) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, subj: Single Management, 13/0350Z Sep 68.
34. (S) Rprt, Horn DASC, Single Mgmt, 20 Aug 68.
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36. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, subj: Single Management, 04/0118Z Sep 68;
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2. (S) Msg, 7AF to COMUSMACV, 27/0230Z Aug 68;
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3. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV to 7AF, subj: Method of Computing Sortie Allocation, 08/1145Z Sep 68.
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(S) Msg, CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, subj: Preliminary Rprt--

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- (S) Operation THOR," 14/1538Z Jul 68;
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8. (SNF) Lt Col Stoer Study;
(S) Msg, COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, subj: Proposed THOR-type Operation, 13/1048Z Oct 68.
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15. Ibid.
16. (S) Msg, 7AF to COMUSMACV, subj: Relocation of...FBL, 31/0550Z Oct 68.
17. Ibid.
18. (S) Form 4, Lt Col J. S. Stoer, Artillery Coordination and Warning, 28 Oct 68.
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28. (C) Proposed Revision to Directive 95-4, MACV, Dec 68.
29. Ibid.
30. (S) Msg, CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, subj: Proposed MACV Directive 95-4, 12/0608Z Jan 69.
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APPENDIX I

MODIFIED PREPLANNED SYSTEM FRAGGING

a. Total available sorties: USAF average possessed F-100 and F-4 aircraft x 1.2 sortie rate; A-37 aircraft x 2.0 sortie rate.

Total F-100s and F-4s = 334 x 1.2 = 400	400
Total A-37s = 20 x 2.0 = 40	40
RAAF (Canberras) = 8	8
A-1s = 8	8
	456

Average Possessed Marine Aircraft

190 - 2 (Air Defense) = 188 x 1.2 = 225	225
Total Sorties:	681

b. Immediate were computed on the following basis:

40 USAF A/C on alert x 3 assumed sorties/aircraft/day = 120	
1 RAAF sortie on alert	= 1
16 USMC A/C x 3 sorties/aircraft/day	= 48
Total Immediate Sorties:	169

c. Special Categories. USAF average/month indicated 26 specials/day. USMC helicopter escort was designated as 10% of total sorties, available less immediates, thus $225 - 48 = 177 \times 10\% = 18$ Marine specials specifically allocated to helicopter escort. (III MAF and I MAF have been questioned as to the validity of this requirement in terms of numbers, but as of the date of this report no comment has been forthcoming, indicating no dissatisfaction on their part.)

d. Interdiction. Interdiction sorties were initially set at 40 USAF/Day and 16 USMC/Day.

e. Given these planning factors as outlined above, the weekly/daily allocations for the first four weeks of the modified preplanned air support system were as follows:

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TABLE 2

All Forces
Except VNAF

Marine

30 May- 6 Jun	6-13 Jun	13-26 Jun	20-26 Jun		
681	681	707 ²	725 ⁵	Total Available Sorties	225
-169	-128 ¹	-128	-128	Less Immediate	- 48
512	553	579	597	Available Sorties	177
- 44	- 44	- 38 ³	- 38	Less Sp Categories	- 18
468	509	541	559	Avail for Preplanned	159
-327	-356	-378	-391	Weekly Preplanned (70%)	-111
141	153	163	168	Remainder	48
- 56	- 56	- 36 ³	- 36	Less AF Interdiction	
85	97	127	132	Marine Out-Country	- 16
+ 56	+ 56	+ 36 ⁴	+ 32 ⁶	Daily Preplanned	32
141	153	163	164	Plus Out-Country Inputs	
				Net Daily Preplanned	32

FOOTNOTES

1. During 2d week of modified preplanned air support system, the assumption of 3 USAF alert sorties/day/aircraft was lowered to 2. Thus USAF alert sorties were programmed at 80 per day. The 1 Canberra on alert was dropped.
2. During the 3d week (13-20 June), one additional ANG F-100 aircraft arriving in SEA increased the sortie base by 26 to 707.
3. For the week 13-20 June, 6 sorties were dropped from the "Special Allocation" and the USAF interdiction allocation was reduced by 20.
4. For the week 13-20 June, out-country inputs were reduced by 20.
5. For the 4th week, the sortie base again increased, this time by 18 with the addition of another F-100 ANG squadron and 8 B-57 sorties/day.
6. For the 4th week, out-country inputs were reduced to 32.

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APPENDIX II

ALLOCATION OF AIR RESOURCES

TOTAL SORTIE ALLOCATION

Total Available In-Country
Total Available Out-Country
Total Gross Sorties Available
Minus Specials (SAR, SOG, CAS, IGLOO WHITE)
Total Net Available for Allocation
% Available for Out-Country of Net
% Available for In-Country of Net

IN-COUNTRY ALLOCATION

% Available for In-Country of Net
Minus - Specials (In-Country interdiction, herbicide and airlift
escort, special operations)

and

Minus - Immediate (7AF and I MAW)
Equals - Net Available for Preplans In-Country
(70% weekly frag and 30% daily frag)

DATA FOR COMMANDER FOR CIIB MEETING

In-Country _____%	I Corps _____%	III Corps _____%
Out-Country _____%	II Corps _____%	IV Corps _____%

Correlation of Flown vs Guidance

I Corps _____%/_____%	III Corps _____%/_____%
II Corps _____%/_____%	IV Corps _____%/_____%

Recommended Distribution

In-Country _____%	I Corps _____%	III Corps _____%
Out-Country _____%	II Corps _____%	IV Corps _____%

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GLOSSARY

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CG	Commanding General
CIIB	Current Intelligence Indications Branch
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC	Commandant, Marine Corps
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CRC	Combat Reporting Center; Control and Reporting Center
CRP	Control and Reporting Post
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FBL	Forward Bomb Line
FFV	Field Force, Vietnam
FSCC	Fire Support Control Center
FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
JAGOS	Joint Air-Ground Operations System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LOC	Line of Communication
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAW	Marine Air Wing
OpCon	Operations Control
PCV	Provisional Corps, Vietnam
Recon	Reconnaissance
RP	Route Package
RW	Reconnaissance Wing
SEA	Southeast Asia
SVN	South Vietnam

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TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element
TOT	Time Over Target
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
UNAAF	United Action Armed Forces
USMC	United States Marine Corps
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force

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