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# SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AIR SUPPORT IN SEA JUNE 1968 - MAY 1971

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**REPORT**

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS : AIR SUPPORT IN SEA  
JUNE 1968 - MAY 1971**

**1 NOVEMBER 1971**

**HQ PACAF**

**Directorate of Operations Analysis  
CHECO/CORONA HARVEST DIVISION**

Prepared by:

**LT COL ELDON L. STEVENS**

**Project CHECO 7th AF, DOAC**

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
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**APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553**



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The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in the employment of USAF airpower to meet a multitude of requirements. The varied applications of airpower have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, there has been an accumulation of operational data and experiences that, as a priority, must be collected, documented, and analyzed as to current and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity that would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction, and would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA.

Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement. Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7AF/13AF, Project CHECO provides a scholarly, "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination which is being accomplished. It is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must view the study in relation to the events and circumstances at the time of its preparation--recognizing that it was prepared on a contemporary basis which restricted perspective and that the author's research was limited to records available within his local headquarters area.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ernest C. Harvin, Jr.", written in a cursive style.

ERNEST C. HARVIN, JR., Major General, USAF  
Chief of Staff

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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

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MIKE DELEON, Colonel, USAF  
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  - (b) XP. . . . . 1
  - (c) DOCC. . . . . 1
  - (d) DREA. . . . . 1
  - (e) IN. . . . . 1
- (2) AIR FORCES
  - (a) 12AF
    - 1. DOO. . . . . 1
    - 2. IN. . . . . 1
  - (b) 19AF(IN). . . . . 1
  - (c) USAFSOF(DO) . . . . . 1
- (3) WINGS
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  - (b) 23TFW(DOI) . . . . . 1
  - (c) 27TRW(DOI) . . . . . 1
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  - (e) 64TAW(DOI) . . . . . 1
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  - (i) 363TRW(DOI) . . . . . 1
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  - (b) XPX . . . . . 1
  - (c) DM. . . . . 1
  - (d) IN. . . . . 1
  - (e) NR. . . . . 1
  - (f) HO. . . . . 1
- (2) AIR FORCES
  - (a) 2AF(INCS) . . . . . 1
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  - (c) CSEH. . . . . 1
  - (d) MACOA . . . . . 1
- (2) MAC SERVICES
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  - (b) ARRS(XP). . . . . 1
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  - (b) DOT . . . . . 1
  - (c) XPC . . . . . 1
- (2) AIR DIVISIONS
  - (a) 25AD(DOI) . . . . . 1
  - (b) 23AD(DOI) . . . . . 1
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### e. ATC

- (1) DOSPI . . . . . 1

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f. AFLC

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- (a) XOX . . . . . 1

g. AFSC

- (1) HEADQUARTERS
- (a) XRP . . . . . 1
- (b) XRLW. . . . . 1
- (c) SAMSO(XRS). . . . . 1
- (d) SDA . . . . . 1
- (e) CSH . . . . . 1
- (f) ASD(RWST) . . . . . 1
- (g) ESD(XR) . . . . . 1
- (h) RADC(DOTL). . . . . 1
- (i) ADTC(CCN) . . . . . 1
- (j) ADTC(DLOSL) . . . . . 1
- (k) ESD(YW) . . . . . 1
- (l) AFATL(DL) . . . . . 1

h. USAFSS

- (1) HEADQUARTERS
- (a) AFSCC(SUR). . . . . 2
- (2) SUBORDINATE UNITS
- (a) Eur Scty Rgn(OPD-P) . 1

i. USAFSO

- (1) HEADQUARTERS
- (a) CSH . . . . . 1

j. PACAF

- (1) HEADQUARTERS
- (a) DP. . . . . 1
- (b) IN. . . . . 1
- (c) XP. . . . . 2
- (d) CSH . . . . . 1
- (e) DOAD. . . . . 6
- (f) DC. . . . . 1
- (g) DM. . . . . 1

(2) AIR FORCES

- (a) 5AF
- 1. CSH. . . . . 1
- 2. XP . . . . . 1
- 3. DO . . . . . 1
- (b) Det 8, ASD(DOASD) . 1
- (c) 7AF
- 1. DO . . . . . 1
- 2. IN . . . . . 1
- 3. XP . . . . . 1
- 4. DOCT . . . . . 1
- 5. DOAC . . . . . 2
- (d) T3AF
- 1. CSH. . . . . 1
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(3) AIR DIVISIONS

- (a) 313AD(DOI). . . . . 1
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- 1. IN . . . . . 1
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FOREWORD

The CHECO report "Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in SVN," 16 September 1968, traced the early history, evolution, and expansion of psychological operations (PSYOPS) in Southeast Asia (SEA). The report discussed the PSYOPS process required by the war in Vietnam with its peculiar problems and target groups. It explained the role of both the USAF and VNAF in their airborne support of the program. A major portion of the report considered the in-country strategy and campaigns such as Chieu Hoi and Elephant Walk. Discussion of out-country PSYOPS concentrated on PSYOPS programs in support of the interdiction campaign in Laos and PSYOPS missions over North Vietnam. The study included an appraisal of the resource capabilities and effectiveness of the airborne aspects of PSYOPS.

This report is an update and expansion of the subjects discussed in the previous report. The previous report provided necessary background material, history, and a detailed analysis of airborne dissemination techniques not included in this report. This report should be read in conjunction with the previous evaluation because of the difference in focus and emphasis between the two. Little attention has been given to those aspects of airborne PSYOPS which remained essentially as they were in 1968. This report emphasizes the changes which took place between June 1968 and May 1971 and examines facets of airborne support of PSYOPS which were not previously discussed. While the previous report considered

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USAF and VNAF support, this report broadens the scope and considers a variety of different airborne assets in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Recent campaigns and changes in the total SEA picture with redeployment of U.S. forces and increased Vietnamization were also considered because of the impact these events had on airborne psychological operations.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

*Without a doubt psychological warfare has proven its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.*

--Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower

#### Basic Concepts

Psychological operations include both psychological warfare operations and other political, military, economic, and ideological actions which attempt to modify the basic beliefs of a selected target group of people so that they shift their support to a new set of goals. Such operations have been successfully employed by countries engaged in past conflicts and it was natural that the same techniques found fertile application in SEA.

The conflict in SEA which had as its stakes the "hearts and minds" of the people and their commitment to noncommunist governments was characterized by a group of basic definitions which expanded and developed the meaning of psychological operations. Some of these terms which delineated psychological operations had obvious meanings: "rallier" identified that person who had shifted loyalties in the conflict: "airborne support" was the aircraft and crews used to drop leaflets or provide the platform for aerial broadcasts. Other concepts like "propaganda," "psychological warfare," "target," "tactical," and "strategic" need a more exact explanation to separate them from similar terms.

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"Propaganda" is doctrine, information, ideas, or media designed to change the opinions, attitudes, and beliefs of people. Propaganda mainly took the form of words which were manipulated so that the person influenced by the words, if they were effective, altered his beliefs and/or modified his outlook. The places where these individuals who were open to persuasion by psychological operations lived, worked, or fought were called "targets." "Target" was also used to designate the persons who were the subjects of psychological exploitation. If the target was the enemy rather than the neutral or uncommitted, the psychological operation directed against him was called "psychological warfare."<sup>1/</sup> If the operation was in response to a recent event or particular situation which generated a specific psychological message for that situation, then it was a "tactical" psychological operation. But if the psychological appeal was standard and used on a national scale, the operation was called "strategic."

The variety of applications of psychological techniques is infinite, but in SEA airborne support was mainly directed toward leaflet drops and propaganda broadcasts. The variety of methods and application united on the agreed goal of persuasion of the enemy and neutrals, but there was always difficulty establishing the criteria and evaluative factors which would measure the effectiveness of the programs. One measure of the success of psychological operations which could be applied in all of SEA was the number of Communists, Communist sympathizers, and Viet Cong who shifted sides and returned to the support of the noncommunist governments. This program, called "Chieu Hoi" (summons to return), claimed an impressive

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180,000 returnees in South Vietnam by March 1971. Chapter VII of this study examines the attempt to measure the success of psychological operations by counting the numbers of returnees. Perhaps the attention given to this measurement of success was due to the nature of the concrete facts available. Other criteria of measurement--breakdown in enemy morale and weakened support of the communist cause, were difficult to measure because the facts were intangible by nature.

Application to SEA

The situation in SEA, where the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces sought to control the populace by force or persuasion required continued use of psychological operations to counter NVA/VC influence. To meet this challenge, it was necessary to undermine enemy troop morale, counter his propaganda, and bolster support for the non-communist governments and forces. Psychological operations were instituted to achieve these effects, but the NVA/VC were a particularly difficult target audience. They were adequately indoctrinated with a set of beliefs which reinforced their commitment to their cause. Efforts to alter their belief system had to be credible because of the intensive indoctrination and the actual combat environment where the subjects were influenced and controlled by the enemy.

The communist forces, whether in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand, depended on guerrilla tactics and a sympathetic civilian population. Regular NVA troops were difficult to exploit psychologically. On the other hand, Viet Cong sympathizers and the recruited workers who helped the

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communists were vulnerable to techniques of persuasion which might cause them to defect to the Government of Vietnam (GVN), or if not defect, at least cause them to be less willing to continue fighting for the communists. For this reason, psychological operations, especially those which involved leaflet drops and broadcasts made from aircraft, exploited themes which would reach the vulnerable groups. These themes were incorporated into leaflets or broadcasts which questioned the truth of the claims of the NVA leaders, pointed out the dangers of continued fighting, and stressed the good life for the people who cooperated with and supported the noncommunist government. These techniques sought to deepen the people's hatred for the communists and to decrease enemy combat effectiveness by attacking the morale of the NVA/VC units.

The NVA/VC were a difficult subject for psychological manipulation for other reasons. He did not share the aversion to deprivation, hunger, and hardship that most Americans felt. If he was of the NVA, he had strong ties in North Vietnam and extensive indoctrination which tended to prevent him from shifting allegiance or becoming a traitor.<sup>2/</sup>

In spite of these difficulties, psychological operations had a definite advantage when they were used in conjunction with successful military actions. Heavy enemy losses, the loss of supplies, the possibility of death by bombing, could all be effectively exploited by producers of psychological material.

The abstract discussion of psychological operations' concepts, terminology, and situations is necessary background to understanding the

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particular role airborne support played in the total psychological effort. But one must see the terminology and concepts translated into actual leaflets and actual propaganda to acquire a deeper understanding of this role.

#### Operational Concepts

The program of psychological operations in Southeast Asia was an extensive interrelated effort against a common enemy. There were programs for Laos flown from air bases in Vietnam and Thailand. Safe conduct leaflets dropped in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam used different languages to support the same theme. (Figure 1) Themes were remarkably similar and most of the leaflets and handouts, posters, and calendars were printed by the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa using Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) funds. Unity of theme, approach, and technique were brought about by the training in psychological operations provided by advisors from detachments of the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa working within the various countries.

The entire psychological operations program in SEA was the responsibility of the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and its subsidiary, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). Psychological operations, requiring military support approved by JUSPAO, were implemented by the Psychological Operations Division, J3-11, of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Airborne support of psychological operations such as leaflet drops and loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts came from USAF Seventh Air Force (7AF) and South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) squadrons. Most

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programs were directed toward the enemy--the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), Viet Cong (VC), and Pathet Lao (PL)--and the uncommitted indigenous South Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and Thais.

The USAF supported some psychological operations in each country. USAF personnel acted as advisors for leaflet drops and broadcast missions in countries like Thailand where the low key U.S. posture reduced overt U.S. support. Aircraft transferred to the various governments for use in psychological operations were normally declared surplus from U.S. military resources. These aircraft were employed by the receiving governments in leaflet drops and broadcast missions.

Massive USAF support was given to psychological operations through C-130, C-123, C-47, U-10, and O-2B aircraft which disseminated approximately 3 billion leaflets during 1970 in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The South Vietnamese Air Force with U-17s and U-6s also made major contributions to the airborne support of psychological operations during the time period covered in this report, June 1968-May 1971. VNAF support was mainly confined to Vietnam, but the VNAF also flew missions in support of psychological operations in Cambodia and Laos.

The USAF supported both tactical and strategic PSYOPS in SEA. Tactical requirements were suggested by indigenous leaders in conjunction with advice from U.S. advisors. In South Vietnam for example, members of the U.S. 4th PSYOP Group operated one PSYOP Battalion in each military region at the Province level. These PSYOP Battalions supported the programs with media

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TƯƠNG LAI CỦA  
VIỆT-NAM,  
SINH MẠNG CỦA  
CÁC CHIẾN-SĨ  
PHẢI ĐƯỢC BẢO TỒN.


Ai là người yêu nước Việt-Nam phải nghĩ đến tương lai của Tổ Quốc mình. Tương lai Việt-Nam lại tùy thuộc vào thể hệ trẻ tuổi không thể bị hy sinh vì họ sẽ là sức mạnh của đất nước khi Hoà Bình được lập lại.

HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED



- Đón tiếp tử tế
- Bảo đảm an ninh
- Đãi ngộ tương xứng


HÔNG HÀNH NÀY CÓ GIÁ TRỊ VỚI TẤT CẢ CƠ - QUAN  
VIỆT - NAM CỘNG - HÒA VÀ LỰC - LƯỢNG ĐỒNG - MINH.



Safe Conduct Passes Used in SEA

FIGURE 1

GIẤY THÔNG-HÀNH



SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정될 것입니다.  
รัฐบาลเวียตนามและหน่วยพันธมิตร ยินดีให้เกียรติแก่ผู้ถือบัตรผ่านปลอดภัยนี้.

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development which included prerecorded broadcast tapes, and the design and printing of leaflets. Illustrating the extent of this capacity, the 4th PSYOP Group printing plant produced 66 million leaflets for psychological operations during January 1971.<sup>3/</sup> Tactical requirements also included Quick Reaction missions which were psychological operations designed to meet purely local situations. "Earlyword" live broadcast transmissions were an example of Quick Reaction missions in broadcast form. Strategic PSYOPS requirements were planned on a national level and required JUSPAO approval and they were normally directed at national objectives such as the Chieu Hoi program. Figure 2 illustrates the different levels of responsibility from JUSPAO to the specific aircraft assigned to fly a psychological operations mission.

#### Vietnamization

Vietnamization of the conflict in Vietnam brought a decline in U.S. support for the total war effort in SEA and resulted in major transfers of psychological operations to control and support by the GVN. There had always been cooperation and combined actions, but by March 1971, with the deactivation of some USAF psychological operations squadrons and the transfer of leaflet printing facilities to the GVN, the advisory role of the U.S. had increased and its air support, though substantive, was being reduced. Even with the additional aircraft and printing presses, the GVN lacked the resources and the priorities to support a comprehensive psychological operations program at the previous level. There was a recognized need for more aggressive psychological efforts if the


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Government of Vietnam was to retain its gains, but the GVN lacked the resources to support such a program.

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Different Levels of Responsibility for a Psychological Operation



Assuming that a C-47 from Flight A, 9th SOS at Da Nang flew a Chieu Hoi leaflet dropping mission, this chart illustrates the chain of instructional command and guidance which preceded that C-47 mission

FIGURE 2

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## CHAPTER II

### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

*Soldiers of the Viet Cong!! We know you are tired of war; you have not enough food; your Viet Cong leaders have not kept their promises to you; your families suffer. There is no victory for you, and death comes closer every day. . .Heed the Call to Open Arms!!*

--Chieu Hoi Loudspeaker Tape Number 29A

#### Scope

Millions of leaflets with different themes such as Chieu Hoi, Anti-VC/NVA, Peoples' Information and Support of the GVN were dropped on hundreds of different targets in Vietnam during any one month from June 1968-March 1971. Many different USAF and VNAF aircraft supported a variety of different psychological campaigns with hundreds of sorties for the period of the report. USAF psychological warfare sorties averaged 1,595 a month during 1969 and remained at close to 1,000 a month during 1970<sup>4/</sup>. The total psychological operation requiring airborne support in Vietnam was massive. In-country printing of leaflets was 206 million a month. Out-country printing accounted for 225 million leaflets a month including 405 million Safe Conduct leaflets every year.<sup>5/</sup>

The major USAF support for psychological activities in SEA was provided by a Seventh Air Force unit, the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Phan Rang Air Base (AB), Republic of Vietnam. This chapter examines its mission, assets, and the specific psychological campaigns supported by the squadron. VNAF support is also considered in the light of the

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phase-down of U.S. efforts and the rise of participation by the VNAF in psychological operations in Vietnam. Figure 3 depicts airborne PSYOPS assets that were available in March 1971 in South Vietnam.

Seventh Air Force support of psychological operations in RVN for the early portion of the time span covered by this report, starting in June 1968, was delegated to two Air Commando Squadrons (ACS), the 5th and the 9th under the 14th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nha Trang AB (Figure 4). Resources of the 5th ACS were six C-47s and 20 U-10s. Resources of the 9th ACS were six C-47s and 18 O-2Bs. Psychological operations support was divided between the four Military Regions (MRs). The 9th ACS supported activities in MRs I and II, and the 5th ACS supported activities in MRs III and IV.<sup>6/</sup> All three types of aircraft were equipped with loudspeaker systems. The O-2Bs used powerful 1,800 watt speaker systems. The C-47s used 1,000 watt Altec speakers and the U-10s used 1,000 watt Ling-Temco-Vought University systems.

USAF support for psychological operations was reduced 50 percent in October 1969 with the deactivation of the 5th ACS. The 9th ACS, renamed the 9th SOS, was the only remaining USAF squadron appropriately configured and dedicated to support psychological operations.<sup>7/</sup>

The 9th SOS was directed against the NVA, VC, supporters of the VC, and the general populace of South Vietnam. The major goal was to win support for the GVN in all Military Regions.<sup>8/</sup> The 9th SOS also, as a minor part of its total effort, broadcast advisories prior to Air Force

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VIETNAM: AIRBORNE PSYOPS ASSETS

MARCH 1971




FIGURE 3

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14th ACW

PSYOP AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT

June 1968




FIGURE 4

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anti-mosquito spray operations and emergency warning messages for a variety of purposes. To carry out its mission, the 9th SOS had an average strength of 60 officers, 125 airmen, 6 C-47s, and 18 O-2Bs. Its total leaflet dropping capability per month was 250 million, and its loudspeaker broadcasting capability was 730 hours per month.<sup>9/</sup> The various aircraft were operated by 9th SOS flights at Phan Rang, Da Nang, and Bien Hoa Air Bases, RVN (Figure 5). Specific programs supported by the 9th SOS included the Chieu Hoi Program, the Rewards Program, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail Program.

The 9th Special Operations Squadron averaged about 56 psychological operations sorties daily during 1970. The six C-47s accumulated 5,972.5 hours of flying with 555 speaker hours and almost 3 billion leaflets dropped during 2,559 sorties. The 21 O-2Bs dropped over 128 million leaflets and logged 7,714 hours of loudspeaker time (Appendix I). They flew 9,753 total sorties during the year.<sup>10/</sup>

Chieu Hoi Program

The Chieu Hoi (open arms) program was the major PSYOPS program in South Vietnam requiring airborne support from 1963-1971. During March of 1971, 85 percent of the 253 million psychological leaflets dispersed by aircraft exploited anti-Viet Cong or anti-NVA Chieu Hoi themes. General Creighton W. Abrams in a message to troops under his command said:<sup>11/</sup>

*The Chieu Hoi Program pays dividends to you, the fighting man. It provides intelligence, and it saves lives. It is my desire that every serviceman in Vietnam assist this program whenever he can. Your support of the program will help materially in the defeat of the enemy on the battlefield.*

Just exactly what was the program and what was the basis for the high priority of support given to the program?

Chieu Hoi means in English "open arms;" in Vietnamese "a call to return home." The program was initiated in February of 1963 to induce enemy personnel to rally to the GVN. It was directed not only at NVA and VC, but at "Any person who has given active support to military, political, or economic activities of the Viet Cong or the NVA and who voluntarily decided to return to the side of the government."<sup>12/</sup>

Typical Chieu Hoi leaflets which could be used as safe-conduct passes stressed reunification with one's family, good treatment, and the opportunity to live safely and build a new life. Chieu Hoi leaflet number 2775 explained how one should rally.

1. Rally to any unit or agency, civilian or military, GVN or Allied.
2. Rally during daylight, not at night.
3. Hide weapon before rallying. Later, show authorities where it is to collect reward.
4. If possible, bring a leaflet. But if you don't have one, please feel bold to rally.
5. If you are unable to get to a government authority or military unit yourself, ask the local people to help you rally.

Figures as of 28 February 1971 showed that a total of 177,000 Hoi Chanh (returnees) had rallied to the side of the GVN since 1963. A total of 3,394 was reported for the first two months of 1971 (Figure 6).<sup>13/</sup>

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Seventh Air Force  
14th ACW  
PSYOP Aircraft Deployment  
April 1971




FIGURE 5

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RETURNED FIGURES BY YEAR  
 \*(18 FEB 1963 - 31 DEC 1970)

CHART 1

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	TOTAL
	11,248	5,417	11,124	20,242	27,178	18,171	47,023	32,671	173,064

\*Program Initiated 18 February 1963

1 JANUARY - 31 DECEMBER 1970

CHART 2

MR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
MR-1	567	335	413	570	384	234	401	303	246	137	414	587	4,601
MR-2	160	250	282	159	113	145	316	251	243	281	114	175	2,489
MR-3	517	498	416	444	1,318	526	587	340	429	269	297	282	5,923
MR-4	1,103	1,308	1,846	1,630	1,610	1,394	1,828	2,161	2,335	1,551	1,361	1,531	19,658
TOTAL	2,347	2,391	2,957	2,803	3,425	2,299	3,132	3,055	3,253	2,238	2,186	2,585	32,671

FIGURE 6

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The 9th SOS directed its major flying effort to the support of the Chieu Hoi program. Roughly 70 percent of the over 3 billion leaflets dropped by the squadron each year supported this theme (Appendix I and II). There was a genuine interest by the squadron in the effectiveness of its leaflet drops; the squadron interpreted the rise in the numbers of ralliers as evidence for the success of its mission.<sup>14/</sup> The validity of this conclusion based on the number of ralliers will be considered in Chapter VI. One evaluation of the psychological activities of the 9th SOS stated that since March 1963, "more than 180,000 enemy have rallied to the Government of Vietnam. The 9th SOS airborne PSYOPS efforts of leaflets and recordings are credited with a significant contribution to the success of this program."<sup>15/</sup>

The Chieu Hoi Program received major support from U.S. aircraft flown in SEA. An average of 230 million leaflets were dropped each month and 730 hours of aerial loudspeaker missions were flown in behalf of Chieu Hoi surrender themes.<sup>16/</sup> The Chieu Hoi Program and the 9th SOS's support of the program are illustrated in Operation Round-Up.

#### Operation Round-Up

Operation Round-Up "was the most intensely targetted PSYOP campaign ever conducted in one province, in the Vietnam War."<sup>17/</sup> It was a special Chieu Hoi Campaign from 1 October 1970-31 December 1970 directed at VC and VC sympathizers in Kien Hoa province. The province, which was the birthplace of the National Liberation Front (NLF), had been under VC control for years, and it was felt that the enemy and his sympathizers

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were not adequately informed of the Chieu Hoi Program. Intensified psychological exposure of the people in the area to leaflets and broadcast tapes and other psychological media sought to induce them to rally or surrender and to support the Chieu Hoi program. Full exposure to the benefits and advantages of the Chieu Hoi Program, it was believed, would increase the number of ralliers. In addition to these basic goals which sought to commit the people to GVN support, information from ralliers about enemy troop strength, plans, and locations was sought.

The campaign started with extensive exposure to all facets of the program. Explanations of the Chieu Hoi Program, with reasons why and instructions how to rally, were showered on the people. Three million leaflets and 23 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were devoted to the operation during the first week.

During the campaign, the 9th Special Operations Squadron furnished one O-2B daily, used mainly for loudspeaker missions, and two C-47s, one for daylight leaflet missions and one for night loudspeaker missions.

The principles of psychological persuasion were properly applied in the development of both the leaflets and the broadcast tapes. Leaflets were individualistic and contained personal testimonials from Hoi Chanh (returnees) praising the Chieu Hoi Program. Photographs of particular Hoi Chanh were printed on the leaflets along with their personal letters. Leaflets were specifically developed for known enemy units and then dropped over their positions. Appeals were often made to specific persons or

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specific friends of the Hoi Chanh. The broadcast tapes were also highly personal with the Hoi Chanh giving his own testimony about what the Chieu Hoi program meant to him.

The program was rated an eminent success. There were 1,449 Hoi Chanh who rallied in Kien Hoa Province from 1 October through 31 December 1970.<sup>18/</sup> Further evidence of the success of the program came in the form of a captured enemy document which admitted the "damages and difficulties" created by the program.<sup>19/</sup> Figure 7 shows the effort of the 9th SOS in the campaign with regard to leaflets dropped and loudspeaker time used. The figure also contains data on the number of Hoi Chanh who rallied during the campaign. There were other psychological programs conducted on the ground which also contributed to the success of Operation Round-Up.

#### Rewards Program

The Rewards programs were various leaflet campaigns which offered payment to Vietnamese for assistance given to and information regarding the location of downed U.S. flyers or other detained allied personnel. This type of program had begun in June 1968 with a campaign called "Elephant Walk" which advised the indigenous population that they would be paid large sums of money for assistance in the rescue and return of allied personnel or lesser sums for information which would lead to their rescue. Leaflets were dropped in the vicinity of suspected prisoner camps. The 9th SOS supported the program with an approximate monthly leaflet drop of 1.2 million leaflets. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, the results from the program were disappointing. Leaflets had to be precisely placed in areas bordering known prison camps but the camps were constantly being

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moved. Appeals based on cash rewards were unsuccessful with the communist sympathizers living near the camps because they seemed convinced the communist cause was just or they feared reprisal. Prison camps were located in areas of low population density.

#### Trail Program

The Trail Program, an aerial leaflet operation directed at infiltrating NVA soldiers in the eastern Laotian panhandle, required approximately 100 million leaflets monthly. Of this total, the 9th SOS was expected to deliver 6 million leaflets each month.<sup>20/</sup> But 9th SOS support with C-47s continued to decline, and in January and February of 1971, no leaflets were dropped on the trail by the 9th SOS. During March 1971, because of the Lam Son 719 incursion into Laos, C-47 aircraft assigned to the 9th SOS at Da Nang AB dropped 2 million leaflets on the trail.<sup>21/</sup> The Trail Program is discussed further in Chapter III which examines psychological operations in Laos.

#### Pacification and Village Development

The 1969 Pacification and Development Plan for South Vietnam had among its eight specific objectives some which required psychological operations for support. Though the guiding principle of pacification was community development and the program included hamlet security, neutralization of the VC infrastructure, fostering of local government authority in the villages, and encouragement of the annual rice production, there were also aspects of the program such as encouragement of the enemy

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## SUMMARY OF AERIAL LEAFLET AND LOUDSPEAKER MISSIONS "OPERATION ROUND-UP"

### SUMMARY BY MONTH

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>LEAFLETS DROPPED</u>	<u>LOUDSPEAKER TIME (HRS)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TARGETS</u>	<u>HOI CHANHS</u>
October	12,118,000	83.1	130	799
November	7,408,000	63.9	145	318
December	1,035,000	23.6	72	382

### SUMMARY BY PHASE

Phase I 1 Oct-15 Nov	16,712,000	126.3	196	976
Phase II 15-30 Nov	2,812,000	20.7	71	141
Phase III 1-31 Dec	1,035,000	23.6	80	382
Total	<u>20,559,000</u>	<u>170.6</u>	<u>347</u>	<u>1499</u>

FIGURE 7

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to rally which required PSYOPS support.

The JUSPAO Office of Policy Planning and Research issued PSYOPS Policy Number 80 in April 1969 establishing psychological policy and guidance for pacification support to be implemented as pertinent by all U.S. elements in Vietnam. This guidance statement stressed the need to publicize village participation, self-help projects, "GVN officials' efficiency, and quick response to the public's expressed needs."<sup>22/</sup>

Psychological operations were to stress face-to-face persuasion as well as airdrop leaflets and aerial loudspeaker tapes. Themes for these materials were: good treatment of Hoi Chanh ralliers, inevitable victory of the GVN, successful village resettlement, village security, and free elections in the villages.

The Pacification Program was a major group of actions which included comprehensive work on the village level with a wide selection of different efforts in many areas. Airborne support of psychological operations was important, because building a national consciousness and developing support for the GVN by publicizing its goals and achievements over a wide area was most efficiently accomplished by aircraft.

#### PSYOPS Related to Lam Son 719

The Lam Son 719 operation, the RVN incursion into Laos which began on February 8 in response to an order by President Thieu, illustrated the use of PSYOPS methods to support a major effort. The director of

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JUSPAO, on 10 February 1971, sent out Policy Guidance Statement No. 102 which suggested psychological policy to be followed by all U.S. elements in Vietnam. The guidance by JUSPAO discussed the situation, pointing out that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) operation in Laos was limited in time and territory, respecting the sovereignty and neutrality of the Royal Laotian Government, and a legitimate action of self-defense against NVA military and logistic bases in Laos. The policy Guidance Statement directed that the ARVN operations should be exploited "immediately" by stressing that the incursion would cut off food, medicine, and other supplies to the VC/NVA, and it would reveal that the ARVN was growing stronger while the NVA was growing weaker. The JUSPAO statement also suggested that:<sup>23/</sup>

*Focus in all psyop output should be kept on fact these are ARVN operations. PSYOP output to friendly audiences will draw upon materials showing ARVN successes in its current operations. This output can effectively support themes strengthening the image of ARVN and its capabilities for defending South Vietnam.*

Following this guidance, different leaflets were produced which stressed how the attack by ARVN forces undermined the claims of the communist party and how the destruction of trucks (Figure 8) would soon result in lack of supplies. Leaflet Number 4225 illustrated this appeal (Figure 9).

In addition to the development of JUSPAO and MACV propaganda which exploited the Lam Son 719 operation, the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the GVN, which had the responsibility for Vietnamese

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## LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME: Attacks by RVNAF in Laos

LEAFLET NUMBER: 4226

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION DATA:  $V_0 - 2.5$  ;  $R_T/\sqrt{T_0} - 1.11$

SIZE: 3 x 6

### FRONT:

(PHOTO)

This is a picture made from an allied airplane high in the sky after an NVA truck convoy was bombed in Laos. See the bomb craters around the trucks!

### BACK:

Did you hear about the heavy bombing?

The truck in the picture will never carry its supply load to you, the fighting soldier who needs them desperately.

The few other trucks which avoid bombs are being stopped by strong Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces raids into southern Laos, cutting off your supply roads!

You will soon feel the pinch in your own unit, when you use up the few supplies you now have.

You will be no match for the well supplied Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces and FANK forces you will have to face.



Đây là một bức hình do một phi cơ Đồng Minh chụp được sau khi đoàn công xe Bắc Việt bị dội bom tại Lào. Các bạn hãy nhìn những hố bom xung quanh các xe cam nhông !

4226

## BẠN CÓ NGHE NÓI VỀ VỤ DỘI BOM NẶNG NỀ ĐÓ KHÔNG ?

Những xe cam nhông trong hình sẽ không bao giờ mang các đồ tiếp tế đến cho các *bạn*, là những chiến sĩ rất cần đến những thứ đó. Những xe cam nhông khác tránh được bom hiện bị các cuộc tấn công mãnh liệt của Quân lực Việt Nam làm ngưng trệ ở Hạ Lào, cắt đứt các đường tiếp tế của *bạn* !

Bạn sẽ sớm muộn cảm thấy bị ảnh hưởng tại đơn vị của bạn một khi bạn dùng hết số đồ tiếp tế còn lại mà bạn hiện có.

Bạn sẽ không thể chống lại nổi các lực lượng Quân lực Việt Nam và Quân lực Kam-pu-Chia mà bạn sẽ phải đương đầu.

4226

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FIGURE 8

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## LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME: Attacks by RVNAF in Laos

LEAFLET NUMBER: 4225

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION DATA:  $V_0 - 2.5$  ;  $R_T/\sqrt{T_0} - 1.11$

SIZE: 3 x 6

### FRONT:

Since May, 1970, the Communist sanctuaries have been destroyed and the Sihanoukville seaport has ceased to bring you supplies and equipment.

You have been fighting in Cambodia for many months without enough supplies. Because of these shortages, Communist forces have suffered one defeat after another.

Now RVNAF is raiding the Communists last remaining supply route through southern Laos. Your situation will become worse and worse. If you continue to fight, you will die for an increasingly hopeless cause. Therefore, find a way to return to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

### BACK:

Map Cartoon.

Từ tháng 5, 1970 các mặt khu an toàn của Cộng Sản đã bị phá vỡ và hải cảng Sihanoukville không còn được sử dụng để tiếp tế cho các bạn nữa.

Bấy lâu nay các bạn chiến đấu trên đất Miên trong điều kiện tiếp tế hoàn toàn thiếu hụt. Vì sự thiếu hụt đó, Cộng Sản đã thua trận này đến trận khác.

Giờ đây Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa đang tấn công vào đường dây tiếp tế cuối cùng của Cộng sản ở Hạ Lào. Tình hình sẽ trở nên trầm trọng đối với các bạn.

Nếu các bạn còn chiến đấu thì sẽ bị chết oan trong một cuộc chiến ngày càng tuyệt vọng. Vậy hãy tìm đường trở về với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa.

4225




FIGURE 9

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psychological operations, formulated its own program. The Political Warfare Department (PWD) under GPWD prepared 500,000 leaflets and 5,000 folders which stressed "the glorious victory of operation Lam Son 719"<sup>24/</sup> and the efforts to "slice up supply lines" in Laos. Victory ceremonies were planned, songs written extolling the victory won, victory banners constructed for Saigon streets, and interviews with ralliers were printed. There was a concerted effort to disseminate to NVA/VC, communist sympathizers, the Vietnamese military forces, and the Vietnamese people, propaganda favorable to the GVN. Victory information was supplied to "the foreign papers and press correspondents who had made mistaken appraisals of the military drive into lower Laos."<sup>25/</sup>

Although many of the leaflets produced using Lam Son themes were dropped in the incursion area in Laos, they were also used in Cambodia and Vietnam. NVA defectors during the Lam Son operation reported that they were influenced by the leaflets, and the 7AF Lam Son Intelligence Report for 13 March 1971 reported "receiving reports of enemy morale and command and control problems. Recent Hoi Chanhs and PWs have disclosed that enemy forces are prohibited from reading allied leaflets."<sup>26/</sup>

Enemy reactions which occurred during Lam Son 719 illustrated the enemy's commitment to psychological operations. "During the contacts along the Tchepone River, the 4th Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), reported that the NVA used loudspeakers in an attempt to persuade the ARVN to surrender."<sup>27/</sup> Allied intelligence

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sources noted that the enemy also attached notes to U.S. and ARVN bodies saying "that the NVA had forward units surrounded and they were given a chance to surrender or be killed."<sup>28/</sup>

Allied psychological exploitation of an immediate situation was illustrated by the preparation of a leaflet based on the defection of MSgt. Nguyen Trong Quyen, Assistant Platoon Leader of the C25 Transportation Company. Sergeant Quyen rallied to the GVN on February 18, 1971, and his picture with a persuasive poem he had written to the men of the 24th Regt. was prepared stressing the lies of the party, the possibility of death fighting for the communist, and in contrast, the good treatment of defectors by the GVN. (Figures 10 and 11.) Revealing that both sides played the same game, the NVA distributed leaflets signed by Col. Nguyen Van Tho, Commander, 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade, who was "captured" when the enemy overran Hill 31 in Laos. Leaflets signed by Colonel Van Tho urged the ARVN troops in the area to surrender. Some of these leaflets were also picked up in Northern Quang Tri province.<sup>29/</sup>

Enemy broadcast activity during the last two weeks of March 1971 also exploited the themes of Lam Son 719, claiming victories by the NVA, and low morale within the ARVN ranks. "Reports of desertion, confusion, and bewilderment of ARVN" were used to prove the failure of Vietnamization.<sup>30/</sup> Broadcasts during the period also suggested that ARVN difficulties in Lam Son 719 were caused "by lack of U.S. support."<sup>31/</sup> Enemy documents revealed that the enemy propagandists, like the GVN, were also claiming victory.

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*The Decisive Hour (poem)*

*to men of the 24th NVA Regt.*

*Friends, the decisive hour has come,  
Do not delay. Doubt means death!  
Hurry up, the Spring is yours,  
The way of life is the way to Chieu Hoi.  
Where is the truth, and where is the power?  
It is no doubt, the Party has lied to us,  
Do you know that these four years,  
Our comrades' blood was wasted so much,  
Oh! What a pitiful death!  
Our family benefit nothing from it.  
Our mothers and brothers eat only soup in the morning and vegetable in the evening,  
Their clothes are dirty rags. What can we expect from the party?  
I have responded to the Chieu Hoi appeal,  
It is not like the party's propaganda,  
Ear cutting, torture, killing do not happen to ralliers.  
All of these are mere lies.  
I am now living in comfort,  
The ARVN treat me with love,  
They consider me as their best friend.  
I am frank, listen to me,  
Hurry up, do not delay  
Respond to the Chieu Hoi appeal.  
Friends, the decisive hour has come.*


Dong Ha, Feb 21, 71

MSgt Nguyen Trong Quyen  
Alias Le Toan  
Assistant Platoon Leader of the 025 Company  
Transportation. Rallied on Feb 18, 1971

FIGURE 10

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## GIỜ QUYẾT ĐỊNH

Mến tặng  
anh em binh sĩ  
Trung-Đoàn 24

Đã đến lúc, bạn ơi giờ quyết định  
Đứng chân chữ, nghi ngại chết uống thân !  
Hãy nhanh lên tự giành lấy mùa xuân  
Con đường sống là con đường Hồi Chánh !  
Đâu chân lý và đâu là sức mạnh ?  
Còn lạ gì, đảng đã dối chúng ta  
Bạn thấy không ? trên suốt bốn năm qua  
Máu đồng đội đã chan hòa đổ xuống  
Ôi ! đau xót bao cuộc đời chết uống  
Gia đình ta được hưởng chút gì đâu !

Mẹ em ta vẫn sớm cháo chiều rau  
Vẫn rách rưới, trông chờ gì chế độ ?  
Sang Chiêu Hồi, tôi đã về rồi đi  
Có giống đâu như cán bộ tuyên truyền . . .  
Nào sẻo tai, nào chém giết huyền thuyên  
Họ nói bậy ! đều là sai sự thật  
Tôi về đây sống trong tình thân mật  
Quân Đội Cộng Hòa đối đãi yêu thương  
Như anh em như người bạn chung đường  
Lời chân thật, lời nhắc cùng bạn hồi  
Hãy nhanh lên, đứng chân chữ trong đời  
Trở về đi với Chính Sách Chiêu Hồi  
Anh em ơi, giờ quyết định đến rồi

Đông Hà 21-2-1971

Thượng-Sĩ NGUYỄN-TRỌNG-QUYỂN  
Bí danh LÊ TOÀN

Trung đội Phó Vận tải thuộc Đại Đội C25  
Hồi Chánh ngày 18-2-1971

C0371006

FIGURE 11

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One captured document from the VC 4th Main Force Regiment, VC Military Region VII claimed in 43 days of fighting the Pathet Lao/NVA units "wiped out 15,400 enemy troops; captured 1,000 others. . . destroyed 496 helicopters, 586 military vehicles, and 144 artillery pieces."<sup>32/</sup> This document called Lam Son 719 a defeat for the U.S. and GVN forces. GVN figures set their losses at 1,531 troops, only 10 percent of the figure claimed by the communists.<sup>33/</sup>

It is difficult to assess the attitude of the Vietnamese people toward the claims of their government. Studies have suggested that the people of Vietnam did not think of their government as objective nor of its claims as plausible.<sup>34/</sup> Vice President Ky of the GVN, perhaps for political reasons, disagreed with his own government's claims of victory and suggested rather that the Lam Son 719 operation was not a victory. Psychological persuasion which is not plausible to the target group is unproductive and may, in fact, further undermine the confidence of the people in their government and its attempts to explain its program and goals.

The Lam Son 719 operation involved extensive use of USAF and VNAF aircraft to support the PSYOPS effort. During the first week of Lam Son 719, the VNAF reported six sorties into Laos which dispensed a total of 700,000 leaflets, including a personally prepared message by Lt. Gen. Lam. VNAF U-17 aircraft distributed another 1.3 million leaflets in Laos between 26 and 28 February and on 10 March, a VNAF C-47 dropped 3 million leaflets. During February, VNAF aircraft also flew loudspeaker missions in the Lam

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Son 719 area. USAF C-130 aircraft dropped 88 million leaflets in the Lam Son area between 8 February and 22 March 1971.

Another example of how PSYOPS activities were supported by USAF aircraft during Lam Son 719 was the C-123 Candlestick Flare missions flown by the 606th SOS of the 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. The 606th SOS normally supported psychological operations by dropping 20 boxes of leaflets, about 20,000, as a secondary mission during their primary missions of forward air control and flare drops in their area of operation in Steel Tiger. During Lam Son 719, all 606th SOS missions were flown in direct support of Lam Son 719, and the C-123s dropped their leaflets directly in the area of major military activity. Though it is always difficult to assess the actual influence of a propaganda leaflet on a man's decision to rally, it is not unreasonable to assume that a PSYOPS message in conjunction with military activity in the area could combine to cause him to rally. The extensive use of PSYOPS by both the enemy and allied forces showed an appreciation for the significance of such efforts in an extremely active military environment.

#### VNAF Support of Psychological Programs

The CHECO report Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in SVN provided a comprehensive account of how the Vietnamese Air Force became involved in psychological operations through the General Political Warfare Department established in 1964. It explained the scope of Political Warfare (POLWAR) activities and how U.S. advisors in psychological warfare assisted the VNAF. The procedures for fragging missions have not changed since 1968, so this

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report provides only the additional background needed for a broader understanding of the VNAF airborne psychological posture of March 1971.

Transfer of U.S. psychological operations facilities meant that the Vietnamese had additional assets with which to develop and expand their own capabilities.<sup>35/</sup> On the most basic level, they were developing and printing their own leaflets. Previous U.S. support for these activities had been supplied by the 4th PSYOP Group. In 1968, it was situated in Saigon with the 6th PSYOP Battalion at Bien Hoa, the 7th at Da Nang, the 8th at Nha Trang and Pleiku, and the 10th at Can Tho. The battalions had the responsibility for providing tactical PSYOPS support in the different Military Regions of RVN. The 4th PSYOP Group was drastically reduced in strength from an authorized level of 941 to 761 and then to 431. Its capabilities for printing 206 million leaflets a month were rapidly being transferred to the Vietnamese. In April of 1971, the 6th PSYOP Battalion was already at zero strength. The 10th Battalion in Can Tho was standing down and transferring its equipment to the ARVN 40th POLWAR Battalion, and the 8th Battalion in Military Region II was scheduled to stand down in June 1971.<sup>36/</sup>

The shift in leaflet printing facilities to Vietnamese military control was accompanied by a rise in VNAF capability to support airborne PSYOPS. Three additional squadrons with facilities to support leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions had been activated, one each at Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, and Binh Thuy Air Bases (Figure 12). The number of U-17s

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and U-6s in the VNAF had also increased, and of the 46 U-17 aircraft which the VNAF had in March 1971, there were 13 equipped with 1,800 watt speakers and leaflet chutes. Only 15 U-17s had no psychological media dispensing capabilities; the other 18 U-17s had leaflet chutes but no loudspeaker capability. This combined capability resulted in a capacity in March 1971 to produce roughly 260 speaker hours per month and to deliver approximately 127 million leaflets a month. The output in 1971 was double the 1968 capacity.

Further expansion of facilities was proposed by the Joint General Staff (JGS) of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). They expressed the desire in February 1971 that the VNAF capability be raised an additional 200 flights a month with double the speaker hours and increased leaflet drops.<sup>37/</sup> They also sought a night operation capability for the U-17 aircraft. This hope did not match reality, for the U-17s did not have the necessary navigational equipment for night missions and there were very few VNAF U-17 pilots who had night flying experience.<sup>38/</sup> Nevertheless, VNAF PSYOPS capability had grown rapidly. In 1968, the VNAF share of the total airborne PSYOPS enterprise was less than 10 percent, by March 1971 the VNAF was carrying 30 percent of the total in-country load.<sup>39/</sup>

Vietnamization of PSYOPS is illustrated by the number of VNAF sorties flown in Vietnam and Cambodia during January, February, and March 1971. In January, for example, 114 psychological operations sorties were flown in MR IV.<sup>40/</sup> The U-17s dropped over 7 million leaflets and accumulated 76 hours of speaker time.<sup>41/</sup> The month by month total of leaflets dropped

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varied considerably in 1971 with 12 million in January, 7 million in February, and 9 million in March. Over one-third of the total number of leaflets dropped during February were leaflets supporting GVN activities against the NVA and Viet Cong in Cambodia.<sup>42/</sup> The VNAF was extremely active in supporting psychological operations in Cambodia, flying 26 sorties and dropping over a million leaflets during March 1971. Their broadcast hours over Cambodia in March reached a high of 27 for the three month period.<sup>43/</sup>

All of this psychological warfare activity, judged solely in terms of leaflets dropped, did not appear significant when compared to the 12 million leaflets dropped on each sortie by C-130 aircraft. The VNAF did not have any aircraft capable of large volume delivery of leaflets. But the real importance of the figures which showed increased VNAF airborne support of PSYOPS in 1971 appeared in the many sorties which were flown and the number of leaflet targets the U-17 aircraft covered. For example, during January 1971 the VNAF had over 477 different leaflet targets.

In the last half of 1970 the VNAF more than doubled its performance.<sup>44/</sup> Vietnamization of psychological operations was very obvious by early 1971. The Vietnamese were assuming "more and more of the responsibility for identifying target audiences, developing objectives, themes, and specific media."<sup>45/</sup> They had increased their capacity for delivery and increased their use of the U-17s and U-6 aircraft. They had achieved a substantial independence from U.S. control and support in the psychological battle with the NVA and VC forces.

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VNAF  
PSYOP AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT  
APRIL 1971




FIGURE 12

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### CHAPTER III

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN LAOS

*The Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, is trying in every way for peace and neutrality for our country. He has requested countless times for the North Vietnamese to withdraw from our land. The Prime Minister wishes all of the Lao people to unite in developing the country of Laos.*

--Message on Lao Leaflet Number 101

#### Scope

Psychological operations in Laos were both strategic and tactical. They stressed a variety of themes and were directed to many different target audiences. In addition to leaflet and loudspeaker operations supported by USAF aircraft, the total program involved extensive U.S. support for printing propaganda posters, booklets, newsheets, and leaflets. There were motion picture projects and mobile information teams with ground audio-visual equipment which, in conjunction with village literacy assistance programs and education programs, all sought to strengthen attitudes in support of the Royal Lao Government. Psychological operations were also designed to undermine Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army Forces' morale and encourage villagers and enemy military to move from enemy controlled areas to areas controlled by the Royal Lao Government. Without minimizing the significance of other aspects of psychological operations in Laos, this section will concentrate on USAF support of PSYOPS. Figure 13 shows the various airborne assets used in Laos and the different psychological operations they supported.

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Strategic psychological leaflet programs within Laos were directed primarily against enemy controlled or contested areas where enemy troop concentrations were the greatest. Such psychological operations were concerned with the internal situation of Laos and the government aims. They related appropriate themes to the Pathet Lao Communists' and North Vietnam's interference in Laos. These strategic leaflet programs were controlled from within Laos and approval of the message content of specific leaflets came from the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, Laos.<sup>46/</sup> For example, the Embassy prepared the Fountain Pen OPLAN, stressing that the program was an extension of the JUSPAO/MACV Trail program to areas in Laos other than the Trail.<sup>47/</sup> The Fountain Pen Program was considered an expansion of Lao leaflet programs in force in June of 1969. This expansion was justified because of the "limited access to noncommunist information and news media" by the Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese Army, and the Laotian population in PL controlled and contested areas.<sup>48/</sup>

The MACV Psychological Operations Division J3-11 determined mission requirements, selecting the mix of leaflets approved by JUSPAO and Vientiane. The 7th Air Force Special Operations Division (DOPS) published fragmentary orders weekly and exercised operational control of the missions. During the first year of Fountain Pen, high altitude leaflet drops were accomplished by C-130s of the 35th Tactical Airlift Squadron, 374th Tactical Airlift Wing, based at Naha AFB, Okinawa, with a forward operating base at Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. The forward operating location for 374th C-130s was changed from Ubon RTAFB to Cam Ranh AB, RVN, on 31 July 1970.<sup>49/</sup> In

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## LAOS: AIRBORNE PSYOPS ASSETS




Figure 13

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January 1971, the mission was turned over to the 90th SOS of the 14th Special Operations Wing (SOW) at Nha Trang AB, though aircraft continued to be flown from Cam Ranh AB because the leaflets were stored there. The 90th SOS was supporting Fountain Pen missions with one mission a week in May of 1971.

The operation began in May 1969 with a high altitude program which called for one mission of 10 million leaflets dropped weekly by C-130 aircraft and a low-altitude program that would use any available aircraft to drop 5 million leaflets monthly. This combined program proposed to drop a total of approximately 45 million leaflets each month.<sup>50/</sup> A quantitative analysis of Operation Fountain Pen submitted to the American Embassy in Vientiane showed that the actual number of leaflets dropped during the first six months of the operation was 25 million a month, but an average of 40 million a month were dropped from January to June 1970.<sup>51/</sup>

The C-130 aircraft flew both day and night missions with a flight altitude of between 15,000 and 25,000 feet. Their standard load was 12 million leaflets weighing 21,000 pounds which they dropped using upper-level winds to disperse and drift leaflets into desired areas. It was assumed that "a single C-130 load evenly distributed over 15,000 square miles resulted in a leaflet density of slightly more than one leaflet for every acre of land."<sup>52/</sup> A normal mission contained from 10 to 20 different leaflets contained in the leaflet mix dropped by the C-130s.<sup>53/</sup>

The best way to understand a strategic psychological operation directed against enemy controlled or contested areas in Laos is to examine the

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Fountain Pen operation and the particular psychological themes actually emphasized in approximately 500 million leaflets dropped during the first 13 months of the program. There were six main themes in the 106 different leaflets written in both Lao and the Vietnamese language. <sup>54/</sup>

- |                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| Theme 1          | Create a favorable image of the government in the eyes of the enemy and the people. (37.9%)  |
| Themes 2 & 3     | Lower the morale of the Pathet Lao and NVA forces and induce them to surrender or defect. (41%)                                    |
| Themes 4, 5, & 6 | References to the Geneva accords, social advances of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), and rebuttal of enemy propaganda. (14.6%) |

There were hundreds of different leaflets used in psychological operations in SEA. Most of the Laotian leaflets conformed to the themes suggested above, but there was an unusual example of a Laotian leaflet which illustrated an important PSYOPS theme often neglected. This leaflet illustrated how a Laotian citizen gave offerings to the Buddhist monks. The picture and Laotian message explained that "everyone living under the Government of His Majesty the King has freedom to make merits as those shown in this photograph. This man is making his offering to the monk. This is our traditional way." The reverse side of the leaflet pointed out that the Pathet Lao "prohibit the people in their area to make merits (by making offerings to the monks)." This was one of the few leaflets which was based on a religious theme.

The total number of leaflets dropped between 10 May 1969 through 30 June 1970, the first year of the Fountain Pen program, was 482,082,405

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with a cost for line negatives, inks, and paper of \$249,138.<sup>55/</sup> Personnel costs and costs associated with aircraft delivery and maintenance are not included in the latter figure.

### Trail Campaign

The Trail Campaign was an aerial leaflet operation directed at infiltrating NVA soldiers in the eastern Laotian panhandle. The targets for these missions were in an area in Laos called "Steel Tiger" which was approximately 150 miles long from north to south with 40 miles of this distance bordering on North Vietnam. It was an area of extensive road systems, truck traffic, and anti-aircraft defenses. This Campaign dropped approximately 100 million leaflets on the trail per month, using four C-130s from the 90th SOS at Nha Trang AB, RVN; 11 C-123s and 13 U-10s assigned to the 606th Special Operations Squadron of the 56th Special Operations Wing stationed at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand; and one C-47 aircraft assigned to A Flight of the 9th Special Operations Squadron at Da Nang AB, RVN.<sup>56/</sup>

Support for the Trail Campaign psychological operation in Laos by U-10s and C-123s of the 606th Special Operations Squadron dates back to 1968. The primary mission of the squadron was interdiction of NVA truck traffic on the Trail, but the squadron had a secondary mission to provide airborne support for psychological operations in Laos. There were 10 C-123s and 13 U-10 aircraft assigned to the squadron in 1968. Both types of aircraft supported leaflet drops over the Trail. The C-123s flew psychological leaflet drops as an add-on to their Candlestick flare missions

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and the U-10s flew both broadcast and leaflet drops ("Loudmouth" and "Litterbug").<sup>57/</sup> The Trail Campaign leaflet drops began on 25 November 1968<sup>58/</sup> and by December the Trail Campaign was in full swing with the 606th SOS supporting six psychological missions each day. The U-10 Loudmouth/Litterbugs flew 472 sorties with 769 hours of combat flying time during the last three months of 1968.<sup>59/</sup>

The claim that U-10 aircraft carried the major psychological operations burden in the 606th squadron in 1968 and 1969 was substantiated by the fact that during the last quarter of 1968, the U-10s dropped over 20 million leaflets on 508 different targets in Laos as compared with only 714,000 leaflets dropped by the C-123s.<sup>60/</sup>

The year 1969 was an active year for the U-10s of the 606th SOS. They flew six sorties every day dropping approximately 600,000 leaflets a day on the Trail.<sup>61/</sup> During 1969, they dropped approximately 155 million leaflets on the Trail. Unfortunately, this capability for extensive leaflet drops was terminated on 10 November 1969 when the 606th lost its U-10s.<sup>62/</sup> The C-123s had been supporting psychological operations during the first half of 1969 with a minimal capacity of just over one million leaflets for the entire six months, but from July to 19 December 1969 the C-123s did not drop leaflets. Without C-123s dropping leaflets and with the loss of the U-10s, the squadron discontinued its entire leaflet dropping capability and the Steel Tiger area in Laos was without exposure to psychological leaflets for over a month. The squadron commander's remarks in the October-December history revealed his attitude toward the loss of the U-10s.<sup>63/</sup>

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*The removal of the U-10 aircraft from the 606 U.E. deleted the psychological warfare mission which had been successfully conducted by the U-10 section. The Northern Steel Tiger area is now without psy warfare coverage of any kind. Projected meeting with the 7th AF Psychological Warfare Personnel is expected to bring forth proposals to dispense leaflets from our C-123s if that mission can be accomplished in conjunction with C-123 FAC missions.*

A new program of increased dissemination of leaflets by Candlestick C-123s began in December 1969 and ended in April 1971. During this period, the number of leaflets dropped from month to month varied from a low of 600,000 in February 1970 to a high of 31 million in January 1971, but the monthly average during 1970 was approximately 17 million leaflets. From January 1970 through March 1971 the squadron dropped a total of 240,750,600 Trail leaflets.<sup>64/</sup>

The target area for the leaflets changed slightly during the period of this report. From December 1969 through October 1970, the Candlestick leaflet drops were permitted in all of Steel Tiger, but from November 1970 to February 1971 the leaflet missions were restricted to northern Steel Tiger. During February 1971, the C-123s supported Lam Son 719 in central Steel Tiger and dropped leaflets in the Lam Son area of operations.<sup>65/</sup>

The leaflets were shipped by boat from the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa and transported by flatbed trailer roughly 400 miles to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand.<sup>66/</sup> The leaflets stored in the Conex containers were boxed according to the proper mix of leaflets selected to support the Trail mission. For example, a standard mix in a box of Trail leaflets would

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be eight different leaflets.<sup>67/</sup> The Conex containers provided ideal storage because they were metal and waterproof.<sup>68/</sup>

The 606th SOS normally flew four C-123 Candlestick sorties per night over the Steel Tiger area. Three of these sorties usually carried leaflets,<sup>69/</sup> although the primary role of the aircraft was forward air control. The normal crew for each mission consisted of an aircraft commander, copilot, table navigator, starlight scope operator (navigator), flight engineer, and two loadmasters. The crew met at the Tactical Unit Operations Center (TUOC) 1-1/2 hours before scheduled takeoff time. Four hours before takeoff time, each of the aircraft scheduled to drop leaflets was loaded with 20 boxes, each containing 20,000 leaflets.

During the flight planning phase, the navigators determined the coordinates of the leaflet drop on the basis of winds, enemy activity in the form of troop concentrations and traffic along given lines of communication and the basic route followed in the normal Forward Air Controller (FAC) mission.<sup>70/</sup>

The formal briefing included weather, intelligence, escape and evasion, and target information. The intelligence briefing also included information on the leaflet drop areas.<sup>71/</sup> Procedures which followed the briefing were the typical USAF aircraft procedures prior to takeoff.

Once airborne enroute to Steel Tiger, departure control was contacted and radar following was provided to the Candlestick during the departure.

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At the 20 nautical mile point, radar control was passed to a Control and Reporting Post which provided flight following and traffic advisory services enroute to the assigned mission sector. Prior to crossing the bomb line (western border of Steel Tiger), VHF radio contact was established with Moonbeam Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) to obtain clearance, enroute traffic, and to secure the working sector. In the event another FAC was working a sector between the bomb line and the Candlestick's area, coordination with that FAC was accomplished prior to proceeding through.<sup>72/</sup>

The table navigator gave a two minute to bomb line warning, at which time the engineer turned out all aircraft lights and the Candlestick went "blackout." At the same time, the aircraft commander instructed the starlight scope operator/navigator to coordinate and have the loadmasters open the rear ramp door in preparation for the leaflet drop.

The table navigator instructed the loadmaster when they should drop the leaflets. It took two minutes to kick out the 20 boxes of leaflets which were precut so as to disperse over a 2-1/2 mile area from flight altitude of 9,500 feet.<sup>73/</sup> Time elapsed from takeoff to leaflet drop was between 40 and 60 minutes.<sup>74/</sup> Timing was crucial because there was an important safety factor. The flare mission carried 114 highly inflammable flares which were secured behind the boxes of leaflets. If the flares should accidentally start to burn, the leaflets had to be unloaded before the flares could be removed.<sup>75/</sup>

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### Miscellaneous Psychological Operations in Laos

Second in importance to the Trail Campaign was the campaign called "Frantic Goat." Prior to the period of this report, out-country PSYOPS were explained in terms of the two major out-country campaigns, Frantic Goat and Trail. Either fighter aircraft or C-130s, which dropped leaflets from high altitude, were used for leaflet distribution in North Vietnam.<sup>76/</sup> The label "Frantic Goat" continued to be used after flying over North Vietnam was discontinued but it described a different PSYOPS program. The label was retained primarily because the same assets, C-130s, continued to fly the missions, but Frantic Goat aircraft were now flown over three different countries: Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.<sup>77/</sup>

Frantic Goat missions in Laos were high-altitude missions over the Laotian panhandle covering throughput roads and the Trail. During 1969 and 1970, Frantic Goat missions were flown by C-130 aircraft and aircrews, as was noted in the discussion of Fountain Pen operations. By January of 1970, these missions had become the responsibility of the 90th SOS stationed at Nha Trang AB, RVN. The 90th SOS devoted four of its C-130 missions a week to Frantic Goat though only a portion of these were flown over Laos. Aircraft selected to support the Frantic Goat mission were C-130s because they possessed "both the capabilities for carrying heavy loads (normally 20,000 to 24,000 pounds of leaflets) and the capability of high altitude operation."<sup>78/</sup>

In addition to the major campaigns like Frantic Goat and Trail, there was a variety of other psychological activities in Laos which required

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airborne support. This airborne support might be major like that provided by B-52 Arc Light missions which sought psychological exploitation of the effect of their strikes in Laos; leaflets were dropped simultaneously with the strike stressing the dangers of B-52 strikes and encouraging the enemy to surrender or rally. B-52s dropped approximately 10 million leaflets in Laos during any one month.<sup>79/</sup> Other airborne support involved immediate reaction PSYOPS to current situations and encouraged members of the PL/NVA to rally to the RLG, presenting the Lao Safe Conduct Pass which had been dropped from an aircraft or other leaflets with messages which stressed the hardship of jungle warfare for the PL/NVA and the failure of the communists to succeed in battle.

The Village of Attopeu, Laos, was surrounded by enemy forces in September 1970. The food supply was exhausted in the village, and a psychological operation was started which used aircraft to drop over a thousand small bags of rice to the villagers with a PSYOPS message supporting the Royal Lao Government. The operation was terminated after three days until there was feedback from the village which indicated that the communists had claimed the rice was poisoned, but they were discredited when the villagers, out of desperation, ate the rice. They requested additional drops of rice, with salt. These additional drops were made with an accompanying PSYOPS leaflet enclosed in the bags of rice.<sup>80/</sup>

One excellent illustration of a particular psychological effort in Laos was the operation in the Ban Talat area where the U.S. Embassy requested

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the use of one U-10 Psywar aircraft for leaflet and loudspeaker operations for 30 days.<sup>81/</sup> The area was bordered on the north by the Nam Lik-Nam Ngum Rivers and the area contained over 60 villages accessible by road-trail-stream and other villages accessible only by air. The psychological operation was initiated against the Pathet Lao (PL) 500th Battalion and Dac Cong companies. Its objective was to undermine PL/NVA morale through increased military actions supported by tactical leaflet and loudspeaker operations.<sup>82/</sup> Leaflets were also used to encourage villagers to move from enemy to RLG controlled areas. Those in charge of the operation insisted that "psychological operations cannot be effective unless supported by aggressive offensive combat operations."<sup>83/</sup> The United States Information Service (USIS) in Laos prepared the leaflets and recordings which emphasized recent ralliers' testimonies of good treatment by the RLG and the hardships of battle under the communist leaders. This psychological operation in the Ban Talat area illustrated the type of operation in Laos which, though not a part of any organized campaign, was designed to meet a particular situation that required PSYOPS.

Another operation in Laos which points out how psychological operations could be effectively used in conjunction with different military situations was the use of O-2B speaker aircraft (TDY from the 9th SOS) which used both leaflets and broadcast tapes to exploit an unusual breakdown in relations between the Pathet Lao and the NVA. During April 1971, this situation was exploited by PSYOPS to influence 150 Pathet Lao troops

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to rally to the RLG. The O-2B flew 64.5 hours and 24 missions during the month in the support of this effort.<sup>84/</sup>

Other missions in Laos were directed and supported by the Controlled American Source (CAS). These missions dispersed one million leaflets a month using many types of aircraft from U.S. sources and RLG sources. The Royal Lao Air Force had C-47s and UH-34s with PSYOPS capabilities for leaflet drops and tape broadcasts.<sup>85/</sup> All of these many aircraft, from a variety of different sources, contributed to a widespread and effective use of aircraft to support psychological operations in Laos.

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## CHAPTER IV

### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

*Communist Cadre and Soldiers: For many years you have been hiding in Cambodian jungles, where there were training facilities, arms and food storages to supply the Viet Cong in their harassments against the Republic of Vietnam. But now everything has been destroyed. . . Surrender to the Republic of Vietnam forces.*

--Cambodian Leaflet Number 3789

#### Scope

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in conjunction with Khmer Communists operated throughout Cambodia against the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) seeking to reestablish base areas from which they could attack the Republic of Vietnam. Camps for allied prisoners were located in Cambodia. USAF was engaged in air activity over Cambodia in 1970 and 1971. All of these situations were subject to psychological exploitation, and there were psychological operations requiring USAF support as early as 1967 that did exploit the opportunities. But by 1971 the effort had greatly increased and there were at least four major psychological programs in being, with additional programs in the planning stage, which required the support of USAF and VNAF aircraft. Figure 14 shows the major organizations and their assets for supporting psychological operations in Cambodia.

JUSPAO approved all tape and leaflet content after coordination with the American Embassy (AMEMB) at Phnom Penh. <sup>86/</sup> As in Laos, the AMEMB in Phnom Penh coordinated its programs with local psychological targets

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within the context of the particular situation in Cambodia. This coordination between the GKR, AMEMB, and JUSPAO resulted in specific psychological campaigns which were implemented by MACV using 7AF aircraft.

#### Miscellaneous Psychological Operations in Cambodia

As in most other countries in SEA, there was a variety of different psychological operations being carried out simultaneously in Cambodia. Some of these were public safety operations, the Rice River Campaign, and the Frantic Goat missions.

Public safety operations dropped leaflets directed at the indigenous Cambodians warning them of impending air strikes by USAF aircraft. These public safety messages which were dropped by the 9th SOS 12-24 hours prior to air attacks were strongly supported by 7AF and developed jointly by 7AF and the 4th PSYOP Group. In addition to the leaflets, there were also loudspeaker operations which supported the safety program. The monthly level of support as illustrated by the figures for October 1970, was 10 million public safety leaflets and up to 30 loudspeaker sorties.<sup>87/</sup> Both C-47s and O-2Bs supported the public safety missions and in April of 1971 there were three separate 23-second broadcast tapes based on safety themes in use.<sup>88/</sup> Leaflets which supported the safety theme urged the Cambodian civilian population to find safe areas and stay off roads, bridges, trails, and waterways which were combat areas. They were instructed that for their safety they must stay in their homes and away from enemy troops which

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## CAMBODIA: AIRBORNE PSYOPS ASSETS

9th SOS	90th SOS	VNAF	FANK
O-2Bs C-47s	C-130s	U-17s U-6s	C-47s Helicopters
Speakers & Leaflets	Leaflets only	Speakers & Leaflets	Speaker & Leaflets
<u>Campaigns</u>	<u>Campaigns</u>	<u>Campaigns</u>	<u>Campaigns</u>
Buffalo- Track Public- Safety Rice River	Frantic- Goat Trail Anti NVA	Full- Victory Chieu Hoi Immediate- Reaction	Big Boy Immediate- Reaction

FIGURE 14

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were subject to allied bombing. The following leaflet message was on the other side of the safety instructions and it explained why the roads were being bombed:

*The NVA/VC have been moving supplies and personnel into your country and using Cambodian sanctuaries from which to launch attacks against Cambodian and Vietnamese people. They have invaded the neutral country of Cambodia. To oppose this aggression and destroy our common enemy, it is necessary to bomb enemy base camps, supply routes, convoys, and depots.*

The use and development of psychological leaflets and broadcast tapes which explained the reasons for military airborne attacks on certain areas of Cambodia and warned the civilians of these attacks so that they could move to safe areas outside the area of the airborne strike proved to be an effective use of psychological operations in conjunction with military activities.

Another major psychological operation in Cambodia was the program called "Rice River." It was a strategic leaflet and broadcast campaign supported solely by 7AF assets directed against VC/NVA forces located in Cambodia. The same program had been called "Camel Path" in 1967, but later in 1970, it was called operation "Switchblade" with a 1970 monthly level of dissemination of 60 million anti-NVA/VC leaflets.<sup>89/</sup> The campaign continued to expand until it included all of Cambodia except Khmer cultural and historical centers and it was then called "Rice River."

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The GKR with AMEMB support sought early in 1971 to extend the program with Cambodian controlled assets. This proposal was modified with the introduction on 3 May 1971 of a new operation called "Big Show."<sup>90/</sup> It was a campaign similar to the Rice River campaign, but no U.S. airborne assets were involved, and it was supported solely by Cambodian-controlled airborne assets. These assets included two U-6A aircraft on load to the GKR from the GVN. The main target of the Big Show campaign was the 10,000 Khmer Communists operating in Cambodia and thus the leaflets emphasized surrender/rally themes.<sup>91/</sup>

Frantic Goat missions, as mentioned in the discussion of Frantic Goat efforts in Laos, were missions supporting a variety of different programs and called "Frantic Goat" only because of the type of aircraft that flew the mission. Cambodia was one of the three countries in which Frantic Goat missions were flown. The C-130 aircraft flew out of Nha Trang AB, RVN, with loads of 12 million leaflets per sortie into various parts of Cambodia. For example, they dropped leaflets during April 1971 in the northeast corner of Cambodia supporting the anti-NVA/VC theme. They also dropped leaflets in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia along the border Cambodia shares with Vietnam. Frantic Goat missions in Cambodia averaged about 46 million leaflets per month.<sup>92/</sup>

Like the Rewards Program which was used in Vietnam, this leaflet campaign was directed toward Cambodians, offering payment for information and assistance leading to the release or rescue of downed U.S. flyers or

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other detained allied personnel. The only difference between the two rewards programs was that one dropped leaflets written in Cambodian over Cambodian territory near suspected detention camps, while the other dropped leaflets written in Vietnamese in those areas in Vietnam where prisoners might be detained.<sup>93/</sup>

### The Cambodian Invasion

During May 1970 at the height of the military activity in Cambodia, USAF aircraft, mainly from the 9th SOS, were flying psychological operations missions in all regions of the Cambodia-Vietnam border. The magnitude of this effort was reflected in the 209 sorties flown during May and 186 during June.<sup>94/</sup> On 1 June 1970, the 14th Special Operations Wing was tasked to provide PSYOPS support in northern and central Cambodia. This requirement was filled by the 23 O-2B aircraft and six C-47s available for PSYOPS use. The O-2Bs were equipped with 1800 watt university speaker systems, and they flew two broadcast missions every day from 5-26 June 1970.<sup>95/</sup> A request was made on 26 June 1970 to provide aerial loudspeaker broadcasts in the Siem Reap area of Cambodia. In order to support this request, the 14th SOW and 9th SOS sent two O-2B aircraft, three pilots, and three maintenance men TDY from Tuy Hoa AB, RVN, to Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base on 27 June 1970. These aircraft flew seven speaker missions in the Siem Reap area. These missions informed the local populace of the current situation in Cambodia.<sup>96/</sup> The 9th SOS was also given two additional missions in the north and central portions of Cambodia which required it to fly five missions per day in Cambodia, two from Ubon and three from Bien Hoa.

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Cambodian missions in O-2B aircraft could best be supported from Thailand so again, between 1 July-30 September 1970, two O-2B aircraft were TDY from the 9th SOS to Ubon, Thailand, for psychological operations.<sup>97/</sup>

While at Ubon, these aircraft were supported by the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron. Additional support for psychological operations in Cambodia came from C-123s (converted UC-123s, formerly herbicide configured) assigned to the 12th SOS at Bien Hoa AB. These C-123s supported the 9th SOS between 11 May and 30 June 1970 and dropped 150 million leaflets in Cambodia and adjacent areas in Vietnam. Since this was short-term additional support, the 12th SOS is not included in Figure 11 which reflects major support.

The U.S. and Vietnamese military incursion in Cambodia on 1 May 1970 greatly increased the potential for psychological operations there. After United States ground forces were withdrawn from Cambodia by 30 June 1970, JUSPAO issued Policy Guidance Statement No. 96 on the use of PSYOPS material in Cambodia. This guidance specified "all Psyops directed at VC/NVA forces in Cambodia will be approved by JUSPAO, Saigon, and be carried out by assets controlled by MACV utilizing Frantic Goat and 9th SOS aircraft only." The following themes were exploited:<sup>98/</sup>

1. Encourage VC/NVA personnel in Cambodia to surrender, desert, return North, or rally to GVN forces, either in Cambodia or by crossing over into SVN.
2. Emphasize illegality of VC/NVA operations in Cambodia.
3. Loss of former sanctuaries.
4. Exploit evidence indicating a break in NVA morale.

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Since May 1970, many of the psychological messages prepared for NVA/VC and Cambodian Khmer Communists were produced and delivered by the VNAF. There existed a high degree of PSYOP cooperation between the Cambodian Air Force and the VNAF.<sup>99/</sup> The VNAF flew sorties in the southern border region and illustrating the level of their support, they flew 47 sorties in May 1970 and 85 sorties in June 1970.<sup>100/</sup> The major program supported entirely by VNAF aircraft was called "Full Victory." Leaflets were written in Vietnamese and supported the anti-NVA/VC and Chieu Hoi rally themes. VNAF U-17s flew as many as 15 sorties a month in Cambodia supporting this campaign. In addition, the VNAF concentrated on quick reaction tactical leaflet drops targeted against the NVA/VC units located in Cambodia adjacent to Kontum and Pleiku Provinces.<sup>101/</sup> As many as 120 targets a month were exploited by these missions. The VNAF supported psychological operations in Cambodia mainly against the Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia with the exception of some broadcast missions to Cambodian nationals which explained the presence of GVN forces in Cambodia.

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## CHAPTER V

### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THAILAND

*General Samran (Royal Thai Army) feels that the most effective method of countering the insurgent threat at this stage of its development is to emphasize the use of psychological operations and civic action programs with suppression by force as the last resort.*

--Developments in Thailand  
15 Dec 1968-15 Mar 1969

#### Early Developments

Thailand recognized as early as 1951 that psychological operations should be used to offset a growing Communist insurgency. In 1951, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) recommended that the Thai government set up a psychological operations section in its different branches.<sup>102/</sup> Very little was done with the plan until 1965, though in 1964 the Thai army was sending selected personnel to Fort Bragg, North Carolina for training in psychological operations. In March 1965, the Royal Thai government (RLG) proposed to Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) that a PSYOPS company be included in the Military Assistance Program.

Prior to this proposal, there had been some actual use of PSYOPS. An example is the way it was used in the field training exercise Kitti 08 between 13 February and 30 March 1965. One stated objective of the exercise was "to increase proficiency in planning and conducting civic actions and psychological operations as a coordinated part of the overall counterinsurgency effort."<sup>103/</sup> Interest in PSYOPS continued to grow,

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and later in December of 1965, the RTG issued an order establishing the Communist Suppression Headquarters.<sup>104/</sup> The U.S. Army was to assist this communist suppression organization with a PSYOPS company with an authorized strength of 238 personnel.<sup>105/</sup> This company was authorized in the fall of 1966 and activated as the 93rd PSYOP Company in June 1967. Its primary mission was to assist the Thai communist suppression organization by preparing psychological material and training Thai personnel in the fundamentals of PSYOPS.<sup>106/</sup> A temporary duty unit from the 7th PSYOP Group based in Okinawa arrived on 14 December 1966 to provide transitional psychological instruction until the permanent element arrived in June of 1967.<sup>107/</sup> The Company prepared leaflets, posters, broadcast tapes, and film presentations. Platoons were assigned to the Special Warfare Center and stationed at Lopburi and Bangkok. The Company trained and advised counterparts in all branches of the Thai military forces and the company commander, as a member of the Allied Coordinating Committee's Working Group on Public Relations, assisted in developing several programs designed to improve Thai-U.S. relations.<sup>108/</sup>

Difficulties in the Program

The 93rd PSYOP Company was extremely active in training Thais in psychological techniques, but its proposals were sometimes neglected until the right time for psychological operations had passed. For example, between August 1968 and March 1969, the communists were attempting to drive a wedge between the Meo Villagers and the Royal Thai Government, and the situation required psychological as well as military actions.

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Previous mistakes of harsh military reaction and too little use of psychological persuasion in dealing with the hill tribes were repeated in this operation. "Government Counterinsurgency efforts had been impeded by reliance on conventional military techniques, overreaction and a general lack of empathy for the hill tribes."<sup>109/</sup> Apparently psychological operations were neglected and force was often unwisely applied. "In some instances, if a village was suspected of harboring a few insurgents, the entire village was leveled."<sup>110/</sup> The hill tribes reacted unfavorably to this treatment and only then did the RTG district army commander and some members of his staff begin to acquire "an appreciation for the necessity of prosecuting the counterinsurgency campaign on other than just a military basis."<sup>111/</sup> The author of the study who examined this particular counterinsurgency action said "some signs of an enlightened approach to the problem of the insurgency do seep through the ponderous Thai bureaucracy." General Yurob has placed emphasis on the employment of psychological warfare directed at the hill tribesmen.<sup>112/</sup>

There was a variety of different PSYOPS employed during this operation. They included a rally program which tried to induce the armed insurgent to defect or surrender. There were 100,000 surrender and defector leaflets produced for ground and air dissemination.<sup>113/</sup> Loudspeaker equipped aircraft were employed to support RTG efforts to persuade the hill tribe villagers to move to government-sponsored resettlement camps. One hundred and fifty people moved. Psychological themes were developed which encouraged the uncommitted or friendly hill tribesmen to remain loyal and cooperative

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with the RTG. The local Thai population was encouraged to have a compassionate attitude towards the hill tribe group. <sup>114/</sup> Royal Thai Army Modular Audio Visual Units with leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker capabilities were also dispatched to the Lomsak command post for psychological use during the campaign. Most of these actions were carried out with little support from the underdeveloped, newly organized National PSYOP Structure which the RTG had set up with Cabinet approval on 17 September 1968.

#### Consolidation and Development

Consolidation and development of psychological efforts in Thailand continued as the insurgency grew. The Communist Party of Thailand announced on 1 January 1969 the creation of the Thai Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces with a Supreme Command. <sup>115/</sup> In response to this action by the communists, the Commanding General of the 1st RTA operating in Central Thailand announced that the primary emphasis of the counterinsurgency efforts in Central Thailand would be directed toward PSYOPS and civic action projects rather than suppression by force. Suppression by force was to be used only as the last resort according to General Samran. <sup>116/</sup>

At this time, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) became active in psychological operations. The RTAF acquired five U-10D speaker aircraft delivered in October 1969 from excess resources in Vietnam and the first references to psychological missions appeared in the historical accounts of Thailand's development. Five PSYOPS loudspeaker missions were flown

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during the Third Quarter of Fiscal Year 1969 using U-10 aircraft. Various leaflet drops were made with surrender-type leaflets, safe conduct passes, and specific leaflets targeted at the hill tribe dissidents.<sup>117/</sup> The historical record of developments in Thailand explained the use of psychological operations in conjunction with military actions.<sup>118/</sup>

*Loudspeaker operations using U-10 aircraft were often in conjunction with military operations. Prior to major troop movements into villages areas aerial broadcasts informed the villages of these movements.*

Additional developments revealed a growing interest in psychological operations. The RTAF produced a "PSYOP" booklet and made it mandatory reading for all personnel attending formal career schools. USAF personnel trained members of two RTAF units with PSYOPS capability in the flight techniques to be used in aerial loudspeaker operations.<sup>119/</sup> The RTAF 71st Tactical Air Support Squadron by the fall of 1969 had U-10 aircraft for leaflet drops and a U-10B aircraft equipped with a 1000 watt loudspeaker system. The unit also had a 250 watt loudspeaker system which could be quickly installed in any U-10.<sup>120/</sup> The only other RTAF unit with PSYOPS capability was the 62nd Transport Squadron which had equipped two of its C-47s with 1000 watt loudspeaker systems for supporting PSYOPS. The unit also had three more 1000 watt loudspeaker systems that were installed in other C-47s as needed. There were 18 C-47s with leaflet-drop capability on call for psychological operations assigned to the unit.<sup>121/</sup> As an example of a growing interest in PSYOPS, the RTAF flew 27 loudspeaker and leaflet missions during the last three months of 1969.<sup>122/</sup>

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There was continued emphasis on the use of psychological operations to combat the growing insurgency in Thailand during this period. The Thai Special Warfare School opened its PSYOP Department in April 1969 and started teaching PSYOPS courses for unit officers in all branches of the Thai Armed Forces.<sup>123/</sup> Self-training programs were inaugurated in each service. A 10-day General PSYOP course for the RTAF was prepared and taught in July 1969.<sup>124/</sup> Thirty RTAF officers attended the course and returned to their respective bases to advise and assist their base commanders in the conduct of effective PSYOPS programs.<sup>125/</sup>

The national government redesignated the PSYOP Division of Communist Suppression Operations Command as a Directorate in May 1969. This organization formulated and prepared PSYOPS policies, plans, and guidance consistent with RTG objectives and policies. It administered the Open Arms and Rehabilitation Program for the RTG.<sup>126/</sup> National distribution of strategic printed materials using out-of-country printing support through CINCPAC resources was given to the National Info-PSYOP Center (NIPSO),<sup>127/</sup> Out-of-country printing support was partly oriented toward the hill tribes of Northern Thailand, including leaflets and a map of the hill tribe group of Thailand. Other leaflets produced included two million copies of a composite picture of the King and Queen for rural dissemination.<sup>128/</sup> Over four million posters of the King and Queen, 200,000 copies of a RTG-approved calendar, and 100,000 copies of a map of Thailand depicting major government development projects were produced in support of psychological operations.<sup>129/</sup>

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The 93rd PSYOP Company also produced 1,000 copies of a PSYOP Support Handbook.<sup>130/</sup>

### Psychological Operations in 1970-71

Although there was an increased interest during 1970 in psychological operations in Thailand, there were practical difficulties which needed to be overcome. The RTAF 71st Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) located at Sattahip RTAFB had six U-10 aircraft equipped for loudspeaker and leaflet drop operations. These aircraft were able to meet psychological situations demanding immediate action.<sup>131/</sup> Consequently, USAF advisory emphasis during 1970 was directed at increased utilization of these aircraft. In response to this need the RTAF deployed two U-10s for PSYOPS in the areas around Lomsak RTAFB and Song Khla RTAFB.<sup>132/</sup> Between 1 April and 30 June 1970, the RTAF had deployed four of its six U-10 aircraft: one each to Chiang Klang, Lomsak, Nakhon Phanom, and Song Khla.<sup>133/</sup>

Early in 1970, a full-time U.S. PSYOPS advisor was assigned to the PSYOP Division, RTAF Directorate of Operations. This trained psychological operations officer worked directly with a Special Colonel (Brigadier General equivalent) in the RTAF assigned to PSYOPS.<sup>134/</sup> More sophisticated psychological operations with better coordination and increased emphasis began to take place during this period. The U.S. PSYOPS advisor to the RTAF was able to coordinate psychological operations with the U.S. PSYOPS advisor to the Royal Thai Army, thus in part overcoming interservice problems that prevented smooth psychological operations in the Thai military.

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Instruction in psychological operations was further upgraded during 1970. A nine-hour block of instruction was revised and added to the curriculum of the major RTAF schools and a 60-hour two-week course was taught to 29 RTAF civic action and information personnel from each of the air bases. <sup>135/</sup> The RTA Special Warfare Center also offered instruction in psychological operations during its 10-day Instructor's Course presented to RTAF officers.

Psychological themes exploited during this period illustrated the growing sophistication of the program. Muslim calendars were printed for distribution during a major Islamic religious observance, showing that the RTG sought to win the support of its Islamic minority from lower Thailand. Several leaflets stressed new year's wishes and greetings. U.S. supported out-of-country printing produced a variety of leaflets and other psychological material including 225,000 copies of six leaflets which stressed Royal Thai Government Nationalism and Anti-Communism themes. <sup>136/</sup> These psychological materials were used by the RTG in its various psychological operations.

Greater emphasis was also given to the effectiveness of psychological operations. In addition to the Thailand PSYOP Handbook, a pretest and post-test system for leaflets was developed for use by Thailand National Info-PSYOP Center. <sup>137/</sup> These tests evaluated the effectiveness of leaflets by an analysis of the responses of sample audiences. Thailand's efforts toward self-reliance were recognized by a decline in the number of U.S.

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PSYOPS specialists serving there. This was a shift in posture implementing President Nixon's policy of decreased U.S. domination in Thailand with a greater degree of action and control by Thais of their own programs.

The shift to increase Thai participation and withdraw U.S. assets continued during 1971. The 93rd PSYOP Company was gradually phased out. From 1967 until late in 1968 its mission had been primarily training. The mission changed in January 1969 to advisory <sup>138/</sup> and liaison with Thai units. There were 48 members in the original company; this number was reduced to 18 before 1968 and to 10 by 1971. <sup>139/</sup> CINCPAC funding which had supported psychological operations in Thailand with \$125,000-\$250,000 each year were scheduled in 1971 to be withdrawn because CINCPAC funds were to be used for U.S. PSYOPS. <sup>140/</sup> RTAF C-47s which had been used for leaflet missions ceased to be used for such missions by 1971 on the grounds that there was no need for high-altitude leaflet drops which required C-47 aircraft. The U-10s could make more accurate low-altitude drops. <sup>141/</sup> Low drops also allowed the Thais to vary their leaflet size and develop odd-size leaflets including many five by five leaflets rather than the more standard three by six which dispersed better in high-altitude drops. Using the two printing presses U.S. funds had supplied Thailand, the Thais were able to prepare a great deal of their own PSYOPS material. <sup>142/</sup> Time was saved using Thai resources, because leaflets ordered from the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa took as long as three months to arrive in Thailand.

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The thematic content of leaflets produced for Thailand's 1971 psychological operations included safe conduct/rally, anticommunist, warnings of RTG military actions, and leaflets stressing loyalty to the King and Queen. The King and Queen leaflets represented the most effective use of a theme, <sup>143/</sup> and the least effective theme was general anticommunist propaganda. One U.S. PSYOPS advisor argued that a more effective use of psychological techniques should stress positive government projects which would show how the RTG had contributed to a better life for the Thai people. Better use of these techniques would hopefully result when RTAF officers programmed for psychological training at Fort Bragg returned to RTAF units. A total of seven RTAF officers were scheduled to attend this course between 1971-1975. <sup>144/</sup>

U.S. support and control of psychological operations in Thailand had been reduced to a very low level by April 1971. PSYOPS aircraft had been turned over to the RTAF, and leaflet printing presses had been turned over to Thailand. Thais had been painstakingly instructed in the complicated techniques of psychological operations and they were preparing and disseminating their own leaflets. They had reached a final level of independence from U.S. support when the substantial budget for printing Thailand's psychological material had been abolished. The same independence was sought for Vietnam.

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CHAPTER VI  
OBSERVATIONS

Extent of Program

There emerges from the study of the entire airborne support of psychological operations in SEA a nebulous picture of a protracted program which almost defies measurement, involving substantial expenditures in dollars and effort. The program disseminated five billion leaflets a year from approximately 15 different types of aircraft. The total flight hours per month averaged between 7,000 and 9,000 in over 2,000 psychological sorties each month. Leaflets were dispensed by day and night, thrown out by the handful in O-2Bs or dumped wholesale in loads of 12 million from C-130s properly characterized as "B.S. Bombers."

No one person seemed knowledgeable of the total cost of the program. There was a reluctance to venture a guess at the total cost but the cost of offshore printing alone was \$3.5 million for FY 71, which did not include \$250,000 spent for Thailand's psychological materials or the in-country printing expenses for roughly 25 percent of the total leaflets produced. Other expenses for the shipping, aircrews, ground personnel, advisors, aircraft, maintenance, planning, supervising, and evaluating of psychological operations have apparently never been recorded. It is doubtful that anyone knew the cost and extent of the total psychological operations effort in SEA. The total program was widespread and complex, and it involved many different agencies and fund sources.

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Problem Areas - Theory

The central problem in the area of theory was the content of the psychological message. The leaflets and tapes often transgressed elementary rules of persuasion and therefore lacked credibility. One critic points out that psychological appeals in Vietnam violated a basic rule of good persuasion that "allegations about oneself or the enemy should not diverge widely from the facts as the target population sees them."<sup>145/</sup> Apparently, the propagandists in South Vietnam did not recognize that words can in fact persuade, but that exaggerated claims which have little basis in fact were counterproductive. Also, there was the strong possibility that the whole western approach to psychological operations grounded on successful efforts in Europe during World War II was inappropriate as a technique of modifying the oriental's basic life view and therefore ineffective in shifting his loyalties.

One American idea which dominated the whole situation was the faith in numbers. If one leaflet yielded change, 100,000 would obviously generate a proportionately greater change. The quantitative approach in psychological operations too often overshadowed the qualitative approach of credible, imaginative, selective, programs of persuasion. Experienced psychological operations personnel recognized this difficulty especially in Laos, but also in every other country in SEA.<sup>146/</sup>

Another weakness in the theoretical program was ineffective leaflets. They were ineffective because they pictured dead soldiers, encouraged the individual to violate his own standards of loyalty and honor, or because

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they were merely negative. An example of the negative was the typical anticommunist leaflets. These ineffective leaflets did not modify beliefs or motivate individuals. Individuals working in the psychological operations field admitted that they were ineffective, but leaflets of this type continued to be used. <sup>147/</sup>

#### Problem Areas - Operational Level

The most pervasive problem in psychological operations is a problem shared by other operations in SEA--the problem of reinventing the wheel. One senior psychological analyst saw his own mistakes of a previous tour being repeated. What has been called the "lack of institutional memory" was particularly obvious. Persons in charge of psychological operations knew very little about previous efforts in their field. The written background material was scanty, and there was a general mistrust of abstract theory in behalf of knowledge learned directly in the field. Unfortunately, very few of the personnel charged with expediting psychological operations had any training in psychological activities and few understood or could justify their own program. Those within sight of return to the USA were particularly nonchalant. <sup>148/</sup>

Perhaps related to the failure to transmit lessons learned to the next man was the problem of inadequate coordination and planning for psychological operations. Without proper planning, leaflet supplies were exhausted. <sup>149/</sup> The wrong leaflets were sometimes delivered and dropped. <sup>150/</sup> Aircraft which were supposed to be available for psychological missions were elsewhere. <sup>151/</sup>

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Priorities were confused. Planning agencies were unaware of flight information which would have modified their programs if they had known. <sup>152/</sup>

There were other operational problems which caused minor difficulties. Crew members were required to lift many leaflet boxes weighing 100 pounds. Major wind shifts frequently occurred between flight altitude and the ground, causing leaflet targeting problems. There were problems of storage and loading because of rain. There was the concern of the men who flew leaflet missions without the faintest idea that their efforts and the risks they took were ever justified. This inadequate understanding of results created a less than serious attitude about the mission.

#### Withdrawal and Psychological Operations

U.S. support of psychological operations was declining as of May 1971. Manning spaces were being eliminated and the burden of airborne support for psychological operations was being shifted from U.S. forces to the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and Thais. Assets such as aircraft and printing presses were also transferred. The extensive training of foreign nationals in the techniques of preparing, scattering, and evaluating leaflets or other psychological materials had been completed. By May of 1971, the cutback in resources had begun to show. At a time when the authorities on psychological exploitation recognized a need for expanded effort, the cutback in U.S. support was reducing the effort, shifting the burden to governments without the resources to give psychological operations the needed priority.

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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

*Words without deeds are sooner or later falsified  
even as deeds without words are often misunderstood.*

--H. D. Lasswell

The goals of psychological operations--to encourage enemy defection, undermine enemy troop morale, counter enemy propaganda and bolster support for the noncommunist governments by publicity and information--are goals which defy explicit formulation in terms of precise objective measurements. The goals can be stated, but whether a particular psychological effort does in fact achieve the stated goal remains the major problem of justifying psychological operations. Previous sections of this study have attempted to point out the criteria which might be used to measure the success or failure of these operations. This conclusion will review these attempts and discuss the justification of psychological operations in terms of the need for justification, the recognized indicators of justification, and the dilemma of justification.

The Need for Justification

The first question asked by the aircrew members who flew PSYOPS missions was, "What are the positive results of these missions?" This reflected an understandable concern because many PSYOPS aircraft flew unescorted missions and some took hits from enemy ground fire. Furthermore, in 1971, there was a growing concern for the responsible expenditure of funds with an accompanying tendency to cut programs which could not be fully justified. This

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produced a careful examination of the claims and results of any program; psychological operations were no exception. Unfortunately, an ironclad justification of PSYOPS effectiveness suffers some of the same weaknesses and limitations the clergyman faces when he attempts to scientifically justify and produce concrete evidence which proves the success of prayer. To the man who has faith in psychological operations, no justification is necessary; to the man who is skeptical, no justification is sufficient. But this admission has not mitigated the need for justification.

This need for justification of allied psychological operations in all Southeast Asia led to a continued monitoring of each program. Special surveys, questionnaires, and other types of feedback were sought to justify the programs. Leaflet messages were pretested and post-tested by panels of psychological and cultural experts who evaluated their credibility. Most of these evaluations of psychological effectiveness were grounded on principles and established indicators long recognized by authorities on psychological techniques of persuasion.

#### Indicators of Justification

The need for justification generated principles which it was hoped would lead to concrete evidence which then could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of particular psychological programs. PSYOPS effectiveness was evaluated by two general types of evidence, direct indicators and indirect indicators. <sup>153/</sup> Direct indicators were grounded on evidence from reports of prisoners, defectors, and persons who were exposed to

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the PSYOPS program as the target audience. These indicators also included the captured documents or intercepted messages of the target audience. Indirect indicators were actions by the enemy authorities which were admissions that they considered the psychological programs harmful to their activities. These efforts were often restrictive such as censorship, jamming, or countermeasures such as reactive propaganda.

The principles of justification seemed to provide the evidence needed to make the investment and effort in PSYOPS defensible. But in spite of this movement toward solid evidence, sophisticated analysts of PSYOPS programs were very cautious about their justifications, and they were extremely wary of making sweeping claims which they considered difficult to defend. They continued to emphasize the large number of intangibles and variables which accompany the assumed achievements of most PSYOPS activities, and they advanced their conclusions with major qualifications. Just how the principles were applied to particular programs and just exactly what claims resulted from the quantitative evaluation of PSYOPS activities that made their efforts productive must be examined.

The major attempt to justify psychological operations was that made by linking the number of Chieu Hoi ralliers directly to the numbers of leaflets distributed and the number of aerial propaganda broadcast within a certain area over a certain period of time. Concrete evidence like the figure of 177,000 ralliers between 1963 and February 1971 from support of the communist to support of the GVN seemed to justify the entire

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psychological operations effort. This significant number of ralliers has been interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, a briefing of the program given to the Fulbright committee in the spring of 1970 asserted "it has been calculated that the armed members of the Viet Cong who came in during 1969 could have, at prevailing kill ratios, killed about 7,000 GVN/Free World soldiers had they remained with the VC."<sup>154/</sup> Earlier estimates based on 27,178 defectors who rallied in 1967 suggested "a potential saving of more than 6,700 allied lives" based on a kill ratio of four to one.<sup>155/</sup> If these ratios are applied to the total of 17,000 ralliers in the same way they were applied to the 1967 figures, the results are an impressive 44,000 allied lives saved through the Chieu Hoi Program. This relationship between the number of ralliers who defected to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi Program and the results of these defections in estimated allied lives saved has never been established. But aside from this, the more basic claim that psychological operations, like leaflet drops, influenced the ralliers to defect to the GVN must first be established.

Numerous studies were conducted using the comprehensive interrogations of Hoi Chanh to determine if their decision to rally to the GVN was influenced in any way by leaflets which were dropped from aircraft or by PSYOPS broadcast they had heard. The Hoi Chanh and POWs were asked standard questions about their exposure to leaflets, clarity of the message, and influence of the leaflet on their decision to rally. They were asked which leaflets had the greatest influence and if the leaflets reduced their willingness to fight.<sup>156/</sup>

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The results of these comprehensive interrogations showed a high correlation between psychological operations and the Hoi Chanh's decision to rally. For example, during Operation Round-Up in Kien Hoa Province, RVN, between 1 October and 31 October 1970, 500 Hoi Chanh were interrogated about the influence of PSYOPS messages on them. "Ninety percent of those who rallied stated that they had read the leaflets developed for the campaign and 30 percent indicated they knew individuals whose photographs and testimonials appeared on the leaflets."<sup>157/</sup>

Another evaluation completed in March 1971 by MACV Psychological Operations Division J3-11 of programs underway showed that the ralliers had seen, read, and were influenced to rally by the leaflets. The evaluation concluded that:<sup>158/</sup>

*Eighty-seven percent of the Viet Cong ralliers had seen Allied leaflets and rally testimonials. Of those who had seen the messages, 75 percent had read them and believed the contents. Nearly the same (70%) of Viet Cong ralliers reported that the messages induced thoughts of surrender or rallying, and more than half (52%) stated that the Allied Psyop messages reduced their fighting spirit.*

Similar evaluations were made elsewhere in SEA. For example, on 17-18 June 1970 in Laos a U.S. PSYOPS officer and two FAR PSYOPS officers visited the FAR Ralliers Center in Sayaboury to evaluate the influence of psychological leaflets which had been disseminated throughout the Pathet Lao area. Interviews were conducted with 10 Pathet Lao selected as typical of the persons whom leaflets were intended to influence. The interviewers concluded:<sup>159/</sup>

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*All ralliers interviewed stated that they had seen many leaflets in their areas of operation. Two ralliers said that they were afraid of being discovered picking up leaflets and, therefore, had not read leaflets even though they saw the leaflets being dropped by airplane. Others stated that they had read leaflets and they were able to describe contents of some leaflets they had seen. These ralliers stated that the messages carried in our leaflets were easily understood.*

Substantial numbers of these interrogations of Hoi Chanh supported the assumption that leaflet drops and propaganda broadcasts had a direct effect on decisions to rally to the GVN. Consistently, they replied to the interrogator's questions in the same way. These comments about a particular Hoi Chanh interrogated on 19 February 1970 were typical. <sup>160/</sup>

*The leaflets were the biggest single motivating factor which caused him to rally. Source believed that most personnel, except cadre did not have hardcore political beliefs and could be persuaded to rally to the GVN cause.*

The conclusion reached after considering this type of evidence was that leaflet drops and broadcast were effective techniques of causing NVA/VC members and supporters to rally to the GVN. The expenditures and efforts for psychological operations appeared to be fully justified.

#### The Dilemma of Justification

Fortunately or unfortunately the airborne leaflet dissemination and propaganda broadcasts were most often evaluated as were most other psychological programs in Vietnam in terms of the number of Hoi Chanh (defectors or ralliers) such programs produced. Leaflet drops which

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produced substantial rises in defections were considered successful and the comments of ralliers about the leaflets' influence were always considered as evidence of the program's success. Other less optimistic studies of VC ralliers, NVA defectors, and GVN propaganda showed the unwieldiness of the evidence and the troublesome aspects of justification which were neglected or minimized in the studies offered by personnel responsible for psychological programs.

Rand Corporation studies raised questions about the evidence obtained through interviews. They pointed out that four aspects of interrogations should be recognized as posing difficulties in assessing the answers of the source.<sup>161/</sup>

1. Interviews are conducted by different persons.
2. The majority of the subjects are poorly educated.
3. There is considerable encouragement to give the expected answer.
4. There is a native willingness to please.

A Rand study which considered the effects of the Chieu Hoi Program on the NVA based on a control group of 100 NVA defectors and 100 POWs discovered that "only five percent of the Hoi Chanh and none of the POW admitted to having heard Government of Vietnam (GVN) radio broadcasts."<sup>162/</sup> But another result of the study was more difficult to explain.<sup>163/</sup>

*The greatest difference was that 20 percent of the prisoners claimed that they had never seen or heard*

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*of any propaganda. This is strange because the Ho Chi Minh Trail is reported to be two feet deep in leaflets!*

A different study evaluated GVN PSYOPS assertions and suggested that they were not always credible or persuasive because "after many years of often glaring disparity between the government's words and its actions (or inactions), many in South Vietnam have probably learned to discount GVN assertions and promises."<sup>164/</sup> Some comments abstracted from interviews with returnees and POWs, while not offered as conclusive evidence, but merely suggestive of general conclusions which a more detailed evaluation could produce, support the questionable credibility of some PSYOPS messages.

One interrogation of a returnee reported, "Yes, leaflets did induce source to rally, but not very much. Source was going to rally to Allied forces even if he had not seen any leaflets."<sup>165/</sup> Another rallier who rallied because of the shortage of medical supplies and desire to return home said that he did not believe the leaflets, and the leaflets neither induced him to consider rallying nor caused a reduction in his spirit or morale.<sup>166/</sup> One source stated that "the leaflets, however, seemed less plausible than Communist propaganda,"<sup>167/</sup> and furthermore, he "did not believe the leaflets and was not fully convinced of the sincerity of the messages until he rallied."<sup>168/</sup> Some stated flatly, "No, allied propaganda leaflets did not induce source to rally."<sup>169/</sup> There was often skepticism as revealed in the interrogation of a captured communist. "At no time did source ever

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believe any of the leaflets or the broadcasts. There was never anything in any of the propaganda to convince him that the Chieu Hoi program actually existed, and he could suggest nothing which could establish the truth of the program."<sup>170/</sup> One POW explained why he had two leaflets in his possession at the time of his capture--they were "carried as paper with which source could roll his cigarettes."<sup>171/</sup>

Another source explained that everyone in his unit "including the cadre, used leaflets as toilet tissue."<sup>172/</sup> Soldiers in some units collected the leaflets as souvenirs.<sup>173/</sup>

Questions have also been raised about the type of person who becomes a Hoi Chanh. The program claimed that it sought "to win over a tough communist audience; leaders as well as rank-and-file of the hardcore Viet Cong organized in well disciplined units."<sup>174/</sup> But the briefing given before the Fulbright committee admitted that a "substantial portion of the returnees" were low level guerrillas, lesser infrastructure members and "part-time workers or porters for the enemy."<sup>175/</sup> Furthermore, the briefing admitted that the Chieu Hoi Third Party Inducement Program paid rewards "to people who did not induce hardcore VC, but friends who had remote VC connections."<sup>176/</sup>

Another aspect of the program which deserved more careful attention was the influence of promised material benefits on a person's decision to rally. Maybe anticommunist or strongly pro-GVN propaganda had little effect and the change in belief had an economic base. Such changes might

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last only as long as the benefits. The Chieu Hoi Program was extremely costly and this expense resulted in substantial benefits to the Hoi Chanh. The briefing before the Fulbright committee gave these costs:

DOLLARS		PIASTERS		
AID	DOD	COUNTERPART	DOD	GVN
1966	78,763	204,000,000		123,000,000
1967	1,130,199	750,000,000	1,242,352	200,000,000
1968	902,000	834,000,000	21,571,750	229,000,000
1969	1,526,000	1,073,570,000	117,000,000	210,000,000
1970	1,626,000		1,242,000,000	224,000,000

This is what the Hoi Chanh received:

1. The Hoi Chanh and his family were paid 40¢ for each person over 15 for each day of the 60 days they were required to remain in the Chieu Hoi Center.
2. The Hoi Chanh was given two sets of clothes or a clothing allowance of \$13 U.S.
3. The Hoi Chanh was given \$2.50 U.S. spending money each month.
4. The Hoi Chanh was given \$10 U.S. as a resettlement allowance.
5. The Hoi Chanh was provided training opportunities in 17 skill areas.
6. The Hoi Chanh could settle in a Chieu Hoi hamlet where he would get a small plot of land, government supplies to build a home, and a rice allowance for six months. 177/

These difficulties have been considered merely to show that there has always been a major problem in providing definitive justification for leaflet and loudspeaker PSYOPS. This limitation was shared by most other justification for leaflet and loudspeaker PSYOPS. This limitation was shared by

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most other psychological programs. Perhaps one approach to the effectiveness of PSYOPS would be to imagine what difference it would make if we had no PSYOPS program. Critics of PSYOPS would argue that it would not really make much difference in our dealing with the NVA, because 99 percent of the NVA have been unaffected by our extensive leaflet drops on their territory.<sup>178/</sup> Reasoning from the lack of contrary evidence, the defenders of PSYOPS would counter, "PSYOPS must be effective because no one has ever conclusively proved that it is ineffective." Furthermore, the nature of PSYOPS makes it unlikely that anyone will, in fact, ever disprove its effectiveness. To say that only a very few NVA have rallied, though true, does not discount the assumed effect of leaflets and broadcasts on their morale and their will to fight. Also the saving of human life when one fights a leaflet war need not be great to justify expenditures of large sums of money for PSYOPS. How many leaflets are equivalent to one soldier's life?

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APPENDIX I

QUARTERLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY ILLUSTRATING AIRBORNE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
BY THE 9TH SQUADRON USAF

<u>O-2B</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>1970 YEAR TOTAL</u>
Total hours	1284.3	1190.7	1440.0	18,911.1
Psyops hours	1185.3	1077.3	1354.8	17,766.6
Speaker hours	506.0	477.8	623.8	7,713.9
Other hours	99.0	113.4	85.2	1,144.5
Leaflets	10,157,500	9,087,500	12,103,000	128,394,900
Missions fragged	437	424	435	5,260
Missions flown	375	318	363	4,896
Sorties	697	620	667	9,753

<u>C-47</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>1970 YEAR TOTAL</u>
Total hours	464.0	405.5	506.1	5,972.5
Psyops hours	391.2	368.8	459.0	5,381.2
Speaker hours	38.9	55.2	74.5	554.9
Other hours	72.8	36.7	47.1	591.3
Leaflets	165,167,000	132,017,000	142,347,000	2,963,898,100
Missions fragged	187	181	193	2,358
Missions flown	140	119	142	2,058
Sorties	187	162	194	2,559

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APPENDIX II

TYPICAL ACTIVITY OF THE 9TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON, USAF

QUARTERLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY

	JULY 1970		AUGUST 1970		SEPTEMBER 1970	
	<u>0-2B</u>	<u>C-47</u>	<u>0-2B</u>	<u>C-47</u>	<u>0-2B</u>	<u>C-47</u>
TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	1647.0	518.0	1640.7	468.6	1477.4	491.7
PSYWAR HOURS FLOWN	1572.2	478.3	1551.0	429.1	1386.0	451.4
SPEAKER HOURS FLOWN	696.9	65.6	699.1	45.5	775.6	35.5
OTHER HOURS FLOWN	74.8	39.7	89.7	39.5	91.4	40.3
LEAFLETS DROPPED	9,445,500	236,129,000	10,223,000	234,303,100	8,581,400	244,249,000
MISSIONS FRAGGED/FLOWN	437/413	186/180	434/416	186/169	422/406	182/170
SORTIES FLOWN	973	250	941	230	768	216
HOI CHANHS	*		*		*	

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## GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ACS	Air Commando Squadron
ACW	Air Commando Wing
AMEMB	American Embassy
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of Republic of Vietnam
CAS	Controlled American Source
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACOM	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
DOLS	Delayed Opening Leaflet System
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FY	Fiscal Year
GKR	Government of Republic of Cambodia (Khmer Republic)
GPWD	General Political Welfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
JUSPAO	Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
KC	Khmer Communists
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MR	Military Region
NLF	National Liberation Front
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
POLWAR	Political Warfare
PL	Pathet Lao
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
Psywar	Psychological Warfare

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RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SEA	Southeast Asia
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SOW	Special Operations Wing
TAD	Tactical Air Departure
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
USMACV	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
VC	Viet Cong
VHF	Very High Frequency
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force