

A model to transform NATO's operational level military capabilities

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, provided security and defense as an organization against the threat perceived through the ideology and military power of the Soviet Union and its expansionist politics. With the paradigm change in 1991, the Alliance shifted mission focus from defending its member nations against a main threat perceived from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to an Alliance that provides collective defense and security to its members through power projection. The purpose of this monograph is to present a model for transforming the military operational level of NATO from a twentieth century Cold War alliance into an effective twenty-first century alliance that provides security for its member nations.

NATO has rephrased its mission based on a new threat assessment. This assessment is coherent with the evaluation of a possible future environment and includes current topics such as terrorism and WMD whilst continuously providing security and defense for its members. Therefore, NATO has defined its “ends” within the geostrategic setting called “context”. Thus, the challenge is to define and build the supportive “ways” and “means” within an effective alliance. Continuously, doctrine, organization, training, civil military relationship and unity of command and effort are mentioned as strengths and opportunities. Nevertheless, these areas hold within themselves a distinct weakness if not achieved by the Alliance as a whole. That is where a concept or model is required to link those elements “into a coherent whole” and present a holistic and coherent approach.

In order to achieve this holistic approach, NATO produced a comprehensive political guidance in 2006 in order to develop capabilities in the fields of military forces, C2, planning and standardization. The purpose of that guidance is to guarantee the continuous usability of NATO military forces to sustain deployment and achieve operational effectiveness. It is coherent with the author’s depiction of unity of effort and unity of command as prerequisite for an effective security Alliance. The development of a coherent force and organizational structure, standardization in training and leadership as well as current doctrine can achieve unity of effort.

With the focus of transforming NATO’s military capability on the operational level, the author concludes that transformation must address doctrine, organization, command and control, civil-military relationship, education and training. A holistic approach to transformation includes adapting on a continuous path of technological and non-technological capabilities. Those non-technological capabilities include the establishment of headquarters with an internal structure that represents current operational needs and mutually complement each other at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Furthermore, the complexity of the contemporary and future environment requires NATO to develop a planning doctrine that offers the operational level with planning tools for designing campaigns in an interagency and multinational headquarters.

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Introduction¹

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, provided security and defense as an organization against the threat perceived through the ideology and military power of the Soviet Union and its expansionist politics.² With the paradigm change in 1991, the Alliance shifted mission focus from defending its member nations against a main threat perceived from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to an Alliance that provides collective defense and security to its members through power projection.³ NATO based its existence on one main threat and collective security for its members based a mutual defense alliance. The purpose of this monograph is to present a model for transforming the military operational level of NATO from a twentieth century Cold War alliance into an effective twenty-first century alliance that provides security for its member nations.

Background

NATO officials speak of a changing Alliance to reflect the post Cold War security environment evolving for almost two decades. In the 1990s, the Alliance took on peace

¹ Author's Footnote: This paper is to an interest for the author since the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Experimentation at the Allied Command of Transformation (ACT), a brigadier general of the German Army and former brigade commander of the author introduced him to this topic. The German Ministry of Defense (MOD) has expressed its interest in this paper while heavily engaging themselves in the development of new strategies in support of NATO Transformation.

² NATO, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, 2006), 16-18.

³ *Ibid.*, 15.

enforcement missions on its geographic periphery, i.e. Balkans.⁴ During the same decade, NATO expanded its membership to include states from the former Warsaw Pact and holds special relations with Russia and the Ukraine in order to dissolve a perceived threat by Russia and the Ukraine with NATO expanding and operating closer to their borders.⁵ Since 9/11, the Alliance has embraced missions to counter the terrorist threat as well as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and to stabilize failing states, including the conduct of protracted operations.⁶

Therefore, NATO remains a dominant political-military Alliance for Europe and North America connecting 26 countries from North America through Europe with a combined military force of roughly four million soldiers.⁷ In 2006, the European members spent an average of 1.9% of their GDP whilst the United States spent 3.8% of its GDP for the defense budget.⁸ Apart from other factors, this leads into the challenge on providing a military across the Atlantic that has forces conducting operations based upon the same technological standard. The fact that independent but interdependent national interests dominate the overall political environment, a military mission for NATO still derives from the strategic setting. In the wake of 9/11, NATO has redefined its military mission and its military capability requirements in the summits of

⁴ Ibid., 22 and 143-148.

⁵ Ibid, p.209-220, and NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO in the 21st century* (Brussels: NATO, 2005), 3 and 13.

⁶ NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, (Brussels: NATO, 2006), Part 1, paragraph 2.

⁷ According to NATO, *NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data relating to Defence*, Table 6, p.10,

⁸ Ibid., Table 3, p.7.

Prague (2002) and Riga (2006) and in the subsequent release of the Comprehensive Political Guidance by the Heads of State of all member nations in November 2006.⁹ Those redefining changes are occurring whilst NATO conducts standing as well as protracted military operations.¹⁰ The challenges of change for NATO are internal as well as external.¹¹ Internally, NATO faces a new mission that counters multidirectional threats as well as the enlargement of the Alliance.¹² Externally, each nation battles with a strain on its force due to commitments as well as a battle over a shortage of resources to fund their armed forces restructuring and equipping.¹³

The described challenges are the geostrategic settings in which transformation occurs. Since a holistic approach is required to bridge strategic, operational and tactical requirements, only an open mindset of all participants bridges the differences to produce a coherent approach.¹⁴ Therefore, NATO transformation requires a model to smoothen the interdependence in order to achieve results for being an effective security alliance. NATO's political and strategic leadership,

⁹ NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, (2002); NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, (2006); and NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, (2006).

¹⁰ Standing military operations are, for example, standard naval surveillance operations in the Mediterranean with the established Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. Protracted operations are, for example, the naval operations of a Naval Task Force (TF) under NATO members lead at the Horn of Africa in support of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) by a Naval TF in the Mediterranean.

¹¹ NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, (2006), Paragraph 8-10

¹² Ibid, Paragraph 7. NATO describes the capability to conduct the full range of missions.

¹³ Ibid, Paragraph 8.

¹⁴ Jack Kem, "Military Transformation – Ends, Ways and Means," *Air & Space Power Journal*, (Fall 2006), 87.

working by a consensus in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), will seek to meet all posted requirements for its member nations.¹⁵

This paper will focus on the translation of strategic guidance into capabilities to execute a military mission at the operational level by critically reviewing projected capabilities and assessing its suitability for current and future operational requirements in an evolving operational environment.¹⁶

Hypothesis

This study will address the framework connecting the given mission statement, military capabilities including the commitment of nations at the Prague NATO summit, as well as ongoing transformation efforts of the NATO led by Allied Command Transformation (ACT). A specific mission statement from the political leadership, the NAC, is the strategic guidance for NATO's operational military forces.¹⁷ Therefore, the ways and means are required to execute a stated specified mission. Those ways and means develop over time in order to adapt to the anticipated changes in the future operational environment. The process of transformation needs to focus on a full spectrum of threats and requires NATO to develop military capabilities even though the use of military force continues to be subject to national political approval.

¹⁵ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 47.

¹⁶ The U.S. Department of Defense defines in *US Joint Publication 1-02* the operating environment as follows: "A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander".

¹⁷ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 47.

The proposed model must address ways to optimize distinct military capabilities by creating effective organizations and command and control conventions. With the approved NATO Prague Capability Commitments (PCC), actual implementation of the PCC, and a new command structure including the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO demonstrates means to transform a twentieth century Alliance into an effective military capability on the operational level for global military operations in the twenty-first century. Despite the struggle for resources, a viable model reflected on benchmarks for military effectiveness shall provide parameters to ensure momentum and provide room for initiatives without diminishing the desired end state. NATO's primary military challenge is to create and sustain an operational level capability for effective command and control of NATO military task organizations in the conduct of NATO missions. Therefore, the model includes changes in doctrine, force structure, organization, command and control (C2), civil-military relationship, leadership and training.

Limitation

The monograph will exclude the area of NATO and inter-alliance politics as a defining but hard to predict dynamic as this area would exceed the scope of a monograph. The author defines the operational level in this monograph as the level that links the military-strategic level guidance from the Allied Command for Operations (ACO) with the tactical level, being either a multinational force like NRF or a force under the leadership of a framework nation.¹⁸ The

¹⁸ The operational level is the linkage of the strategic level to the tactical level according to NATO *Guidelines for Operational Planning*.

strategic level receives political guidance from the NAC and transfers it into strategic guidance. The operational level transfers the strategic guidance via campaign plans into tactical missions and tasks.

Research Question and Methodology

The research question is: What is required to develop NATO into an effective military alliance at the operational level for the twenty-first century in order to counter the multidirectional threats to the security of its member nations? Sub-questions are: What frames the development of NATO on the operational level? How do theories depict operational transformation and /or institutional change on the operational or strategic level? Which elements are required for a model to transform NATO on the operational level?

The author will use the following methodology in order to outline an answer to the above-mentioned research questions. After the introduction, a theoretical exploration of related literature will inform the reader and address key linkages and gaps. Following the literature review, it is necessary to frame the environment in which NATO will transform its operational level capability. This requires the depiction of the contemporary and future operating environment, a depiction of the challenges of transformation as well as a description of the discourse between the political and military leadership. Additionally, NATO member nations' struggle for resources has a definite and limiting influence on the future development of an effective military alliance. The following paragraph presents benchmarks¹⁹ for military

¹⁹ Benchmarks are standards to measure progress in the future. (Webster's College Dictionary)

effectiveness on the operational level. Those benchmarks are part of an evaluating change based on the current military role as part of the ongoing NATO transformations efforts.²⁰ Finally, the author will summarize those changes into a possible model for continuous NATO transformation based on the established benchmarks.

²⁰ Part of change management is reengineering corporate transformation or business transformation. It is a form of change management, since it challenges all elements of processes or structures that have evolved over time. Oliver Recklies, “Managing Change – Definition und Phases in Change Processes”, www.themanager.org.

Literature review

The literature relevant to problems of military transformation generally and to that of NATO's military capability in particular takes the form of scholarly articles, commentaries, or research papers and projects. Overall, it is valid to summarize the available literature for that topic into the field of the NATO process of enlargement, the field of political transformation, the field of military transformation. Additionally, the literature depicts case studies of NATO missions in Afghanistan or on the Balkans that influence amongst others transformation on political level, capabilities, the gap between the US and major European allies or force structure. The majority of the researched literature upholds the necessity for a future existence of NATO even though the challenges for this security alliance exist in a changing political and defense environment. The process of enlargement is a continuous and well-covered political issue. Even though the topic is especially relevant for the integration of new member nations, the process of enlargement is less dominant for transformation on the operational level. Nevertheless, this monograph will include it in the summary of political transformation.

Stephen E. Else, in his dissertation at the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver, defines transformation based upon an ongoing process that occurs in an economic environment. Transformation is defined as "...an ongoing process that permeates an entire organization and represents a sharp break with the past. It differs from 'reform' efforts in

that transformation involves the development or discovery of entirely new paths.”²¹ The described sharp break that constitutes a revolution exists according to Admiral Giampaolo di Paolo, Chief of Defense Staff in Italy, and requires from NATO a conceptual shift based upon a holistic approach.²² This holistic approach is more than just the adaption of a technological signature as the path for transformation.

Political Transformation

Michael Ruehle, the Head of Policy Planning and Speechwriting for the NATO Political Affairs Division, has substantially published on NATO. In his article in *Parameters*, “NATO after Prague: Learning the lessons of 9/11”, Ruehle looks back two years on the events following the September attack and integrates the argument of the expanded mission by adding two additional pillars of NATO transformation. One, he calls on the European Union (EU) to go forward with its build up of an independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in order to add the EU military capability to the NATO military capability. Two, he stipulates that the enlargement of NATO to 26 members would require an organization less bureaucratic and more flexible than that which was built on the basis of the 2002 NATO Prague summit. In conclusion, Ruehle argues for the necessary cooperation across the Atlantic amongst all member

²¹ Stephen E. Else, “Organization Theory and the Transformation of large, Complex Organizations: Donald H. Rumsfeld and the U.S. Department of Defense, 2001-04,” (Dissertation Paper, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2006), vii.

²² Giampaolo di Paola, “Transforming our Vision of Security,” *NATO Review*, (2006).

nations to work with consensus and achieve visible results.²³ This enhanced cooperation leads to a mission change for NATO.

David Hughes writes as the Senior Editor of *Aviation Week & Space Technology* in his article “NATO Transformation”, that there exists a requirement for NATO to adapt the mission set for the Alliance to cover the threats of terrorism as well as those from WMD, and deal with the challenges of destabilized countries.²⁴ These changes lead to the definition of the NATO mission by its political leadership with the approval of the Heads of States of each member nation at the Riga and Prague summits.

Pierre Lellouche, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and member of the French Parliament, addresses NATO’s future. In “Where’s NATO headed?”, Lellouche sees NATO in a state that depicts its success as a surviving security alliance with a multitude of successful missions whilst acknowledging the fact that the future role is unclear. In this environment, he provides a framework for ad hoc coalitions to take on a more global role. The first depicted political challenge is the requirement for a unity of the democracies to withstand the dangers in the world. Lellouche considers the European-American link as vital and advises both sides to work strengthening the integration and development of its capabilities. Another political challenge is the involvement of NATO in the resolution of the struggle of ideas or clash of cultures that occurs between the Western World and Islam, whilst other conflicts need further

²³ Michael Ruehle, “NATO after Prague: Learning the lessons of 9/11,” *Parameters*, (2003), 89.

²⁴ David Hughes, “NATO Transformation,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 159, no. 16, (10/2003), 78-79.

attention in order to get over a very unstable status quo to an enhanced process of stability. The challenge for the Alliance in the future will be that to provide an answer in order to protect from terrorism as well as from the proliferation of WMD. This answer requires the use of the military embedded in the political process for stability and good governance.²⁵

Allen G. Sens, chairman of the International Relations Program at the University of British Columbia, deals with NATO's transformation in the post-Riga period. In his article "Riga and beyond: The political transformation of NATO", Sens depicts the issue of a broader transformation including the political aspects. He focuses on the political challenges in the socio-economic environment and calls upon the political leadership to use all elements of national power in a coalition to provide solutions.²⁶ Due to the global challenges, NATO has a requirement to achieve global partnerships either on a permanent or ad hoc basis with partners in values and goals. Sens links effective results to an analysis of future conflicts in order to take into account the complexity involved in a full spectrum mission. This analysis must address the challenges and possibilities facing the political leadership and foster the development of a consistent plan throughout all levels of the security alliance. The outcome for the military transformation is the requirement that enables the forces to conduct Stability and Reconstruction²⁷ missions by advancing its doctrine and capability.²⁸

²⁵ Pierre Lellouche, "Where's NATO headed?" NATO Review, (Winter 2006).

²⁶ Elements of National power are Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy. *US Joint Publication 1-02*.

²⁷ The goals in reconstruction and stabilization operations include security, economic recovery, social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and public participation in governance. Jean Durfourcq and

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier are two academics that publish to the enlargement process of NATO in *Foreign Affairs*. Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute whilst Goldgeier is a Professor of Political Science at the George Washington University, as well as an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. In their article “Global NATO”, they discuss the idea of a global alliance. They put NATO’s success as a security alliance in a historic perspective. Their conclusion is that the enlargement of NATO outside Europe will address global problems with the partners based on similar challenges and ideas. With this enhanced global capability, the Alliance would continue as a building block for future missions or as an Alliance that operates with the legitimacy of consensus providing security once threatened globally.²⁹ Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and Ronald Asmus, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Center in Brussels, counter this argument in their article “Next step for NATO”.³⁰ They require NATO to redefine in more detail its “raison d’être”, in order to ensure that NATO will carry out missions that counter threats to the Alliance and its members. Overall, a global outreach for NATO would not mean an automatic membership but most certainly an enhanced partnership.

David S. Yost, “NATO-EU Cooperation in Post Conflict Operations,” (Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome, 05/2006), 5.

²⁸ Allen G. Sens, “Riga and beyond: The political transformation of NATO,” *NATO Review*, (Winter 2006).

²⁹ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” *Foreign Affairs*, (September 2006).

³⁰ Ronald D. Asmus and Richard Holbrooke, “Next Step for NATO,” *The Washington Post*, (March 14, 2006).

Celeste A. Wallander is Director and Senior Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and published in *Foreign Affairs*. Wallander presents an interesting viewpoint to the enlargement of NATO and its new members in the article “NATO’s Price: Shape Up or Ship Out”. Wallander wants to retain NATO as a “unique and invaluable Alliance” as well as “the single most important international organization serving U.S. interest” that keeps the major ally in the organization. With that comes the obligation to uphold legitimacy due to the perceived and accredited values of the Alliance. In order to uphold those credentials, NATO needs to police itself and its members in order to live up to the expected standards of an alliance built on consensus and adhere to democratic principles.³¹ Therefore, she calls for an enforcement of those standards in order to have the legitimacy to engage in other regions or countries where violations of those principles and standards occur. Values form a basis not only for the deployment of military force but also on the structure of the military and for the common understanding of the use of force.

An overarching issue is the further existence of NATO in the context of the build up of an independent military capability by the European Union (EU) under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Dr. Matthias Dembinski leads a project “The International Organization for a Democratic Peace” funded by the German Society for Peace Research. In this project, he evaluates and compares regional security organizations. In his paper “Eine Zukunft fuer die NATO?”, he asserts that NATO would continue to develop a difficult but necessary relationship

³¹ Celeste A. Wallander, “NATO's price: Shape Up or Ship out,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6, (Nov/Dec 2002), 2.

connecting Europe and North America.³² With the developments since the Cold War, the differences between the US and the EU have become more obvious. This period has raised issues because Article 4 of the NATO Treaty requires cooperation and consultation once a member nation sees its security threatened whilst Article 5 applies in case of an attack towards one or multiple members requires defensive support.³³ In times where attacks occur from terrorist organizations or through cyberspace, the EU has difficulties in formulating one opinion that either accepts or denies the US position.³⁴ Furthermore, the EU itself identifies the need to build up an independent military capability that allows the use at the lower end of the armed conflict spectrum³⁵ in order to be an equally strong partner to the US.³⁶ NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer calls this a strategic partnership between two strong partners within NATO. Due

³² Martin Dembinski, *Eine Zukunft fuer die NATO*, (Frankfurt, Germany: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2005), 5. Title in English: „A future for NATO?“.

³³ **Article 4, North Atlantic Treaty, 04 April 1949:** “The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty, 04 April 1949: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently agree that , if such and armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area. ..”

³⁴ Dembinski, 5.

³⁵ The EU sees the use of military in the lower end of the spectrum of armed conflict ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping operations.

³⁶ Dembinski, 12.

to the reality of modern conflicts, a holistic solution requires the use of military capabilities in a wide spectrum and thus has a use for all military forces.³⁷

Military transformation

Prague in 2002 and Riga in 2006 were two decisive summits that NATO conducted in order to finalize the work on establishing stages in the military transformation of NATO. The Prague summit ended with a declaration that, in the aftermath of 9/11, the threat of terrorism is the single greatest challenge of the security environment.³⁸ This threat required NATO to establish the PCC in order to provide an effective military force as an essential part of the overall political strategy to safeguard freedom and security.³⁹ The Riga summit identified the threat as coming from the three sources; terrorism, the proliferation for WMD, and failed or failing states.⁴⁰ The declaration acknowledges the necessity to conduct a military mission with a broad array of answers coming from the application of civil and military instruments. Thus, it requires the Alliance to develop a proposal that integrates its own crisis management as well as those of partners based on recent experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo.⁴¹

Karl-Heinz Kamp has written research papers in the field of security politics for the German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, an institution that is a think tank for the Christian Democratic

³⁷ Japp de Hoop Scheffer, "Ist die NATO fuer die Zukunft geruestet?" *Europaeische Sicherheit* 55, (5/2007), 29.

³⁸ NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, (2002), Paragraph 3

³⁹ Ibid., Paragraph 4.

⁴⁰ NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, (2006), Paragraph 2.

Union, the current majority party of the Federal Republic of Germany. He published a pessimistic view prior to the Riga summit, which became part of the summit agenda. Kamp sought to pose questions that would lead to progress and set the stage for the future path of transformation. Thus, the agenda includes the tasks for streamlining the international organization of NATO to achieve results even with more voting members in the different councils without compromising the principle of unanimous decision. Additionally, the implications of a comprehensive political guidance lead to advancing the next two years of transformation with an idea of improving and enhancing global partnership with other organizations or states in order to enhance the capabilities to act globally.⁴²

Sophia Clement-Noguier, Professor of International Relations at the Institute D'Etudes Politiques in Paris and formerly a staff member of the Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defense, wrote an article "New challenges, though choices" in the run-up to the Riga summit. In her article, she states that NATO needs to use the Riga summit to construct a path for the future development of the Alliance. She describes three major challenges for the Alliance being the ability to match its political ambitions with its means, match its military capabilities with the requirements of protracted conflict dealing from war fighting to nation building, as well as to deal with other security organizations in order to avoid duplications. The described challenges will lead the Alliance into two options either to remain a primary defense

⁴¹ Ibid., Paragraph 10.

⁴² Karl Heinz Kamp, *NATO Gipfel 2006. Das Buendnis auf Themensuche*, (Sankt Augustin, Germany: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Arbeitspapier Nr. 156/2006, February 2006), 14. Title in English: "NATO Summit 2006. The Alliance in the search for topics".

organization or to develop into a broader security organization. Her call is on NATO to develop into the security provider that once engaged has the ability to deal with the complexity and diversity of future conflicts. In order to develop into a broader security organization it is necessary for NATO to define security as a holistic task that widens NATO missions to include civilian tasks, increase its capabilities to address the wide spectrum within a crisis and continue to build common funding for the build up of common assets.⁴³

Dr. Hans Binnendijk is Director of the Center for the Study of Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP). He published the following article with two distinguished Professors of the CTNSP being Dr. Kugler and Dr. Gompert⁴⁴. The approach to a force pyramid⁴⁵ is the authors' answer to NATO's progress in 2003 and 2004 in order to deliver a holistic approach to needed capabilities. In order to be able to deal with the challenges of future conflict scenarios and the wide spectrum of missions to NATO, transformation according to the authors need to represent a force capable of dealing with the challenges of the information age. According to Binnendijk, Gompert and Kugler a SOF capability represents the top of the pyramid of forces that exemplifies NATO force capability.

In order to achieve a truly deep transformation, a paper by the Atlantic Council of the United States asks for changes in multiple fields including interoperability. This demand for

⁴³ Sophia Clement-Noguier, "New challenges, though choices," *NATO Review*, (Winter 2006).

⁴⁴ Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler, "A New Military Framework for NATO", *Defense Horizons*, (US National Defense University, CTNSP, Number 48, May 2005).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5.

interoperability is in first place a technology issue that requires experts to solve whilst technology transfer requires a political solution in order to overcome the difficulties of exchange between national defense industries. On the other hand, the quest for interoperability requires improving in areas that require a combined effort including concepts, capabilities, organizations and people.⁴⁶

Case Studies

The available literature uses the current NATO missions either in the Balkans or in Afghanistan as well as the development of the NRF as references to NATO transformation. A common cause leads to the build-up of NRF or to the deployment to crises regions. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer as the head of the Planning Section in the NATO's Operation Division refers in his article "The enduring influence of operations on NATO's transformation" to the missions in the Balkans as well as in Afghanistan as the "driver for continuous adaptation of NATO's military capabilities, command and force structure, and consultation, planning and decision making processes".⁴⁷ The use of multiple capabilities provides multiple lessons learned from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since NATO member nations deployed strategically outside their own countries for the first time in the Alliance history. The implementation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the use of NATO's planning

⁴⁶ Andrew J. Goodpaster, and Arthur K. Cebrowski, NATO transformation: Problems & prospects, a compendium, (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2004).

⁴⁷ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "The enduring influence of operations on NATO's transformation," *NATO Review*, (2006), 1.

capabilities from a framework nation HQs, has transformed the involvement of civil affairs in the solution package as well as the reach back capability for planning. The presence of NATO in neighboring countries enables political and high-level military dialogue that creates influence and enhances the relationship outside NATO's historical sphere of influence.⁴⁸ NATO will continue to be involved in international crises management and has to be flexible in adapting its structure due to operational challenges as well as due to new global partners. Ruiz Palmer concludes in an article published prior to the first mentioned article that the engagement of NATO in Afghanistan is "truly a transformational event".⁴⁹

Summary

NATO continues to develop in complex times with new threats emerging and its members' common values and democracy challenged mostly by non-state actors. Politically, the challenges for unity and consensus exist since NATO agreed upon the emerging threats and the overall mission to the military arm of the Alliance. The question of burden sharing is highly disputed in the political environment since the EU is building a military capability that has to serve as part of the available single set of force. NATO faces the necessity to transform its military capabilities to fit the contemporary and future operating environment. Next to demanding technological development of capabilities, multiple authors advise a change in thinking. Thus, a percentage figure of a nation's GDP spent for defense purposes does not only

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁹ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Afghanistan's transformational challenge", *NATO Review*, (2005), 4.

define military transformation, but it needs also the acknowledgment of the development of new ideas. Outlined by authors are development of new doctrines, a new approach to force capabilities, and changes in training and education. The quest for interoperability is a major task and requires an outline for technological capabilities in future scenarios in order to focus on achieving unity of effort and unity of command. Technological means by itself cannot achieve unity since those primarily focus on achieving communication and control. However, unity of effort derives from a common understanding of the operating environment and a common perception of the threat defines NATO's mission. NATO will learn as an organization through missions and training. These experiences will enhance the understanding for national caveats, foster the conduct of missions in a politically sensitive environment, and achieve a better collaboration of the involved personalities.

The Frame

The 21st century operating environment

The contemporary and future operating environment shapes future military capabilities. A simple statement like that is only valid if the identified threats are commonly agreed upon. Scholars identify three major future threats for NATO: international terrorism and its goal to strike worldwide; the proliferation of WMD; and failing states throughout the world.⁵⁰ Instable countries or regions demonstrate the possibility for wide spread instability, terror or human suffering, and require engagement well in advance to prevent spreading further crises.⁵¹ A global security alliance, NATO has committed itself to defend its members not only by safeguarding its territory but also by engaging problems wherever they occur expeditionary with the primacy of judgment laying with the United Nations Security Council.⁵² This approach is in line with the ESDP and has its historic cases in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. This expeditionary approach to problem solving requires the Alliance to enhance security or enforce peace among populations. General Rupert Smith defines this as “war amongst people”.⁵³ Thus, the requirements for those missions are not exclusively military but require the involvement of all elements of national

⁵⁰ Michael Ruehle, “NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11,” *Parameters* 33, no. 2 (Summer 2003), 89.

⁵¹ Giampaolo di Paola, “Transforming our Vision of Security,” *NATO Review* (Autumn 2006), 4.

⁵² NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, (2006), Part 1, paragraph 2.

⁵³ Rupert Smith, *The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world*, (New York: Knopf, 2007), xiii.

power in order to transform successfully a crises or conflict region to peace. The direct approach of defeating an adversary correlates to the indirect approach of creating an environment that allows a change in behavior by the population integrated in the contemporary operating environment.

A future battlefield will show a multitude of actors in a conflict area that require coordination of all elements of national power including different concepts for a concerted effort.⁵⁴ The complexity of such an environment highlights interdependent variables that require actions amongst a multitude of variables. Due to the increase in numbers of players, the future will demand a large capacity to gather information, integrate assessments into a plan, design an effective operation, as well as achieve assigned missions.⁵⁵

The challenges of change

Transformation needs a holistic approach in order to enable an organization like NATO to adapt to future threats. As Dr. Kem developed in his article “Military Transformation”, transformation requires changing an organization in its environmental context - its ends, ways and means.⁵⁶ Thus, the holistic approach requires a broader view on NATO’s changes since the end of the Cold War. In the environmental context, NATO has established itself as a viable security

⁵⁴ Michele A. Flournoy and Tammy S. Schultz, *Shaping U.S. Ground Forces for the Future: Getting Expansion Right*, (Washington, D.C: Center for a New American Security, June 2007), 15

⁵⁵ Dietrich Doerner, *The Logic of Failure*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 38.

⁵⁶ Jack D. Kem, “Military Transformation: Ends, Ways, and Means”, *Air & Space Power Journal* 20, no. 3, (Fall 2006), 85-93.

alliance in its political as well as in its military role.⁵⁷ NATO developed from the most successful security alliance during the Cold War period into a successful contemporary security alliance by adapting to conditional changes such as the missions in Bosnia. Additionally, the involvement in Afghanistan after 9/11 has added to those changes.⁵⁸ NATO has appreciated the emergence of Eastern Europe and successfully integrated new members in its Alliance. Thus, NATO has defined a role that defends its members whilst addressing global threats.

Dr. Kem argues that transformation occurs out of the existence of a need to transform derived from the geo-strategic setting. This future role of NATO in the geopolitical and global military sphere was not self-chosen. Thus, the geo-strategic provides the frame for transformation as a holistic approach. The approach includes ends, ways and means that execute a change in the organization. The “ends” is the purpose of the organizations, the “ways” depict the methods with which the organization achieves those ends, whilst the “means” are the resources required to fulfill the ways.⁵⁹

NATO in its 1999 Strategic Guidance defined the “ends” in terms of the threats facing the Alliance and derived its mission for the use of the military. Therefore, context and ends are established parts of the overall transformation process. Developing ways and means needs to be a

⁵⁷ Doug Bereuter and John Lis, “Reorienting Transatlantic Defense,” *The National Interest* 76, (Summer 2004).

⁵⁸ William A. Bulis, “NATO Transformation: Giving the Old Alliance New Teeth,” (Master thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, Joint Military Operations Department, Newport, RI, 2005), 2.

⁵⁹ Kem, 87.

synergetic approach to the use of tools of political, socio-economic and military power.⁶⁰ Due to its immediate availability for deployment, the military is usually the available element of national power applied initially to create effects that lead to security and stability. Mission success is thus based upon the ability to create a holistic approach with all available capabilities operating amongst the population. Consequently, this will influence the transformation of ways and means in all sectors of the military including doctrine, organization, training and interoperability.⁶¹

NATO's continuous role as an Alliance

The threats to the Alliance or Alliance members are “multidirectional and often difficult to predict” and range from acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime with international effects, to the threat of proliferated WMDs.⁶² A threat example can be as specific as an attack to the computer networks of Estonia in the Spring of 2007. Furthermore, the disruption of the flow of vital resources as well as the unlikely but still possible conventional attack onto the territory of any NATO member still needs attention.⁶³ The technology gap that exists between the technologically advanced nations and the lesser developed world creates tensions that influence

⁶⁰ Giampaolo di Paola, “Transforming our Vision of Security,” *NATO Review* (Autumn 2006), 2.

⁶¹ Ibid., 4.

⁶² NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO in the 21st Century*, (2005), 4.

⁶³ NATO, *Strategic Guidance* (1999), and NATO, *Summit Declaration of the Heads of States*, Prague (2002) and Riga (2006).

the safety of our population.⁶⁴ In a changing world, those only set parameters for changing a military alliance.

Future scenarios can start out as a conventional war and evolve into a counterinsurgency or small war as well as vice versa and requires any security organization to be prepared to conduct a wide range of operations. A future NATO must be capable of addressing threats that develop globally. These threats may be comprised of a multitude of players ranging from state actors, nongovernmental actors, armed groups and super empowered individuals.⁶⁵ The approach of multilateralism requires the integration of capabilities and requires NATO to take the lead on transporting stability.⁶⁶ Thus, the given strategic guidance sets the conditions for the military to succeed operationally in that environment. However, in the future environment the strategic level might judge success in a conflict regardless of the progress achieved by the military on the operational level.

The NATO strategic level guidance is dependent on the political will to use the Alliance to counter future challenges. Nevertheless, the multitude of challenges requires an Alliance with a wide range of capabilities. The mission can range from actively defeating terrorism, countering the proliferation of WMD whilst securing the flow of resources and providing security to vital infrastructure. The wide spectrum of operations requires NATO to provide stability and

⁶⁴ di Paolo, 1.

⁶⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes*, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2002), Prologue.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 2.

reconstruction to failing states in the twenty-first century. This mission set requires a type and number of forces, which according to the former SACEUR⁶⁷, General James L. Jones, are not available in sufficient numbers in a single country.⁶⁸ This interdependence out of requirements upholds the necessity for the future existence of the Alliance as a political and military alliance. Nevertheless, the use of military force will respect that each nation will act according to its own sovereign decision.

Thus, the EU with the military capabilities developed under ESDP is an opportunity to widen the range of political influence and military capability of NATO. It allows the member nations of the EU to allocate forces that provide a very specific military as well as a political strength, and leads to further accepting the necessity of NATO. The EU with its own security and defense policy covers the lower end of the spectrum of conflicts. Thus, the EU ensures that those capabilities are available as a single set of forces useable for itself and NATO.⁶⁹ This new strategic concept of the EU strengthens not only the EU but allows a transatlantic dialogue for a global strategy under equal partners being the EU and the US.⁷⁰ This global strategy develops into an active strategy that derives a holistic approach from civilian and military capabilities.⁷¹

⁶⁷ SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe

⁶⁸ James L. Jones, "Die Rolle der NATO im 21. Jahrhundert," *Europäische Sicherheit* 55, (7/2006), 8-10.

⁶⁹ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "Transforming European Forces," *Survival* 44, no.3 (Autumn 2002), 117-132.

⁷⁰ Ibid., Equal partners will include those nations with a political leadership that will pursue either an agenda in favor of the transatlantic Alliance, in favor of the EU or simply as focused on their own Nation.

⁷¹ Erich Reiter, "Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie," *Europäische Sicherheit*, (10/2003), 14.

Thus, NATO needs to integrate that specific EU approach in order to enhance its capabilities as well as the willingness of the European nations to commit forces to future scenarios.

NATO members struggle for resources

Future military forces need to be able to defeat an irregular force as well as a traditional conventional adversary. Therefore, transformation not only tied to technology but also rather to the understanding of a constantly changing operational environment and an adaptable threat must occur. The modern military force must therefore “be capable of thriving across the entire spectrum of operations, from conventional war fighting on a larger scale to a predominately small war against irregular forces.”⁷² Even though it looks like an issue of capabilities that can require prioritizing resource distribution, it is a fact that the military needs to be able to conduct the overall spectrum of operations in order to be successful in achieving its mission.

With the identified diversity in the future operational environment, the political level is required to incorporate further the military leadership and its professional advice in its decision making due to the grown complexity of the operating environment.⁷³ The environment requires expertise and systematic work in order develop the needed knowledge for strategic guidance. The military is one asset that fulfills the role of information gathering and initial fact finding in the theater of operations in order to clarify the operational environment. However, this knowledge leads to a gap between the political and military leadership and requires

⁷² Michael R. Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War capabilities,” *Parameters*, (US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Autumn 2006), 34.

communication in order to develop a common understanding. This discourse occurs from the military with gained expertise and requires the military to participate with an active role without ignoring the political leadership in order to form a national perception and opinion including the public.⁷⁴

Summary

NATO has rephrased its mission based on a new threat assessment. This assessment is coherent with the evaluation of a possible future environment and includes current topics such as terrorism and WMD whilst continuously providing security and defense for its members. Therefore, NATO has defined its “ends” within the geostrategic setting called “context”. This security and defense needs to include a military posture to secure the societies based on the needs of the information age. Thus, the challenge is to define and build the supportive “ways” and “means” within an effective alliance. Whilst military use and capabilities are critical to an ongoing struggle for resources, a concept that includes a holistic approach to the challenges of change will offer a multitude of possibilities not solely dependent on financial resources. The military as the Alliance or within each single member nation holds the expertise to engage the political leadership and each member nation’s society in a discourse. This discourse needs to

⁷³ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, (2007), 377.

⁷⁴ Rupert Smith, 377, and Michael Kobi, “The Israel Defense Force as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual challenge in the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (2007), 426.

occur about the resources that are required to provide the necessary tools in order to build an effective security alliance.

An effective security alliance

Millet and Murray define military effectiveness as the process by which a military converts its available resources into fighting power. Contemporary, this fighting power is seen as military capabilities to successfully complete military missions.⁷⁵ Viewing military effectiveness as a process allows reviewing relationships between the contributors. Therefore, it is a dynamic relationship between national strategic resources, its conversion capabilities, and its military capabilities. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness, the military needs to exploit its strategic context and maximize military capabilities from the strategic resources as well as from its physical availability.⁷⁶ Military effectiveness encompasses strategic, operational and tactical effectiveness in order to cover the military's achievements on all three levels of warfare across the wide range spectrum of military operations.⁷⁷

Dr. Epstein developed elements of military effectiveness through evaluating the military forces in the Napoleonic Era. In addition to evaluating Napoleon's campaigns in 1813 across Europe against the "Allied Forces" partnered against France, Dr. Epstein evaluated the education of the officers and soldiers on both sides. The effectiveness of each nation's forces in this era was comparable if viewed as single nation. However, the operational effectiveness of an alliance against France was decisive for the outcome since the French Army was still dealing with the

⁷⁵ Allen R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations" in *Military Effectiveness: The First World War* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 2.

⁷⁶ James W. Wright, "Military effectiveness in the Long War," (Master thesis. US Army Command and General Staff College, School for Advanced Military Studies, 2007), 4.

influence of the 1812 campaign in leadership, education, organization and training. Therefore, it is valid to consider doctrine, organization, training, leadership and command as benchmarks to evaluate military performance.⁷⁸

In a monograph written at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Major Wright argues to military effectiveness. This chapter uses those ideas in order to translate them for NATO. This allows an assessment of NATO as a security alliance based upon established criteria for a military operating in the same operating environment. National strategic resources are the means including National Resources, moral forces, Governmental Structure and social, cultural and ethical forces.⁷⁹ NATO, as an Alliance, has similar strategic resources, which translate into the members' national resources dedicating to the Alliance a political leadership that allows for transparency and checks and balances. Unity of the members gives a greater justification to the use of force and ensures the integration of each member's ethical values into the Alliance.

The conversion capabilities depict the linkage between the strategic resources and the military power. Grand strategy, the civil-military relationship, the institutional characteristic as well as the military leadership are four of the described conversion capabilities in Major Wright's monograph. A national strategy continues to be important even though a multinational Alliance

⁷⁷ Introductory Lecture to "History of Warfare" by Dr. Robert Epstein, School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth on 09 October 2007.

⁷⁸ Lecture "History of Warfare" Dr. Robert Epstein, SAMS, Fort Leavenworth on 09 October 2007. Epstein, "Military Effectiveness of the individual armies of 1813," 1 and 108-109.

⁷⁹ Ashleigh J. Tellis and others, *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 140.

achieves mostly through compromises in their strategy. The influence that the military can provide is a clear indicator of a good civil-military relationship and thus this role continues to be part of the respective NATO institution.⁸⁰ Whilst military leadership is less dominant in a multinational environment, the interesting aspect is the development of institutional characteristics.⁸¹ Since they derive from experience and from the intellectual study of military warfare, each nation in an alliance handles those characteristics differently. Thus, a common understanding develops by passing on experience through vehicles like lessons learned, but it is an absolute requirement for the Alliance to derive its own understanding of military warfare conveyed to its members.

Military capabilities are the means in the overall process of achieving a stated political goal. Out of a long list of military capabilities, force structure, doctrine, training, deployment, readiness, and command and control (C2) structure, are elements of transformation.⁸² Military effectiveness divides comparable to the different levels of war, but the author will mainly focus on reviewing military effectiveness on the operational level.⁸³ As defined earlier in the monograph, the author views the operational level as the linkage between the strategic level with the defined aims to the tactical level with its deployed military capabilities. Thus, the ability to employ the military in order to achieve the strategic objectives by employing a synchronized

⁸⁰ The main NATO institution that integrates civil and military leadership is the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

⁸¹ Wright, "Military Effectiveness in a Long War", 13.

⁸² Ibid., 14.

⁸³ Levels of War: Strategic, Operational, Tactical. *US Joint Publication 1-02*.

operation with the force from the tactical level is the basis for operational effectiveness.⁸⁴ The military dominates this level and uses doctrine, forces, organization, training, command and leadership of an operational plan to achieve its objectives.

Major Wright in his monograph researches the question of military effectiveness in a protracted war. The recent missions of NATO in the Balkans, Afghanistan as well as the NATO Training Mission in IRAQ (NTMI) all demonstrate operations within the context of a protracted war. Thus, Major Wright's layered analysis requires evaluating operational level effectiveness in the three key tasks being legitimacy, endurance and deterrence.⁸⁵ The interesting questions raised with this approach from Major Wright's monograph are those concerning the key task of deterrence. Do NATO operations deter the enemy or does the enemy adapt due to NATO's use of military force? Is NATO planning doctrine visible for reality?⁸⁶ Is NATO adaptable to the enemy – is NATO a learning organization? Do NATO's military strengths enable a defeat by overmatching the enemy in his weaknesses?⁸⁷

Thus, a review of the history of NATO shows that the Alliance was effective in enduring the Cold War and most certainly supported the final fall of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact by showing a unity of effort as well as a unity of command.⁸⁸ The question that remains is to qualify that effectiveness through Measurements of Effectiveness (MoE) and establish

⁸⁴ NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3*, (September 2002), 1-1.

⁸⁵ Wright, 22-23.

⁸⁶ For this monograph, the author will refer to doctrine as a planning doctrine.

⁸⁷ Wright, p.24. The questions raised are translated from Figure 2 in Major Wrights monograph.

⁸⁸ Celeste A. Wallander, "NATO's price," (Nov/Dec 2002), 2.

benchmarks for further evaluation. The development of NATO from its beginning showed steps of evolution, which finally proved a success since the opposed threat dissolved for multiple reasons with the fall of the USSR and the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact. The initial step was the build up of conventional industrial based forces to counter the threat perceived by the numbers of forces from the later formed Warsaw Pact. Secondly, due to technological development, the industrial based force led into a development of the strategy of mutual assured destruction as a balanced strategy of nuclear forces.⁸⁹ Thirdly with the development of the Air Land Battle Doctrine, the major NATO ally, the US, transformed the planning in defense of Europe from the threat out of the east.⁹⁰ Common to all three steps of evolution are a common understanding of the force requirements; a shared use of capabilities unified by one threat; and the unity of command due to a clear hierarchy in organization upholding operational roles for training and deployment. Additionally, doctrine matched the operational plan and both achieved unity of effort. Furthermore, lessons learned and development of an operational plan showed the effectiveness of a learning organization. With the change from the Cold War to the contemporary operating environment, the requirements to be successful in these conflicts have changed even though the categories in which changes occur hold true. Therefore, operations like the Balkans or Afghanistan will be models for measuring operational effectiveness.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Lawrence Freedman, "The first two generations of nuclear strategists", (1986), 735 – 779.

⁹⁰ Michael Carver, "Conventional War in the Nuclear Age", (1986), 779 – 814.

⁹¹ Steve Sturm, "Military matters: Matching capabilities to commitments," *NATO Review* (Spring 2005), 1.

Summary

Continuously, doctrine, organization, training, civil military relationship and unity of command and effort are mentioned as strengths and opportunities. Nevertheless, these areas hold within themselves a distinct weakness if not achieved by the Alliance as a whole. That is where a concept or model is required to link those elements “into a coherent whole” and present a holistic and coherent approach.⁹² In order to achieve this holistic approach, NATO produced a comprehensive political guidance in 2006 in order to develop capabilities in the fields of military forces, C2, planning and standardization. The purpose of that guidance is to guarantee the continuous usability of NATO military forces to sustain deployment and achieve operational effectiveness.⁹³ It is coherent with the author’s depiction of unity of effort and unity of command as prerequisite for an effective security Alliance. The development of a coherent force and organizational structure, standardization in training and leadership as well as current doctrine can achieve unity of effort. The technical requirement of sharing and communicating agreed as part of the PCC is a deployable C3 system, which needs to enable a deployed force to have a reach back capability to the standing headquarters in order to exchange via all levels of war.

Referring to the chapter “The challenges of change”, military needs play a lead role in a future discourse between itself, society and the political leadership. Only the military’s expertise allows a valid discussion about the military role in society, its organization, equipment and deployments. Therefore, the strategic level of NATO needs to ensure strategic effectiveness by

⁹² Ibid., 1, see also Kem, 87.

demanding political guidance that matches the given mission. This ensures the employment of the military according to political guidance and a stated aim of the political leadership.

Consequently, the political aim defines the military aim and the employment of the military meets the given political objectives. Those objectives need to be achievable. In order to validate their achievability the military with its expertise and as an organization conducts planning that incorporates feedback after a thorough analysis of a given mission to the political leadership.⁹⁴

This element of discourse is part of framing a problem within a complex environment in order to ensure the synchronization of the military use within all elements of national power.

⁹³ Sturm, 2-3.

⁹⁴ Smith, 375.

NATO's current military role

NATO's military purpose is to provide collective defense for its members and to provide security by addressing instability caused by regional and ethnic conflicts. Additionally, the Alliance builds security partnerships with democracies across Europe through the Caucuses into Central Asia. Therefore, NATO confronts the security challenges of the twenty-first century.⁹⁵ During the Cold War, a unity of command and unity of effort significantly contributed to NATO's success.⁹⁶ An identified unifying threat is different from the contemporary and future threats that each member nation's leadership views differently. The threats derive mostly from international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Due to the predominately-asymmetric character of contemporary and future challenges, the Alliance needs to transform constantly in order to meet the challenges of the rapidly changing security environment.⁹⁷ A shortage in capabilities, a limited commitment of nations to a wide range of operations and the struggle for interoperability on each level of war as well as in the mindset of the leadership endanger the quest for unity of command and effort as well as the success of the Alliance.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, (2006).

⁹⁶ Bradley A. Seipel, "NATO Transformation: Beyond the Prague Summit Initiatives", *NATO Review*, (2003), 5.

⁹⁷ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "Transforming European Forces", *Survival* 44, no.3 (Autumn 2002), 117-132.

⁹⁸ Seipel, 6.

Forces

The challenges of achieving the same mindset required NATO to redefine its new mission statement on the political leadership level. In order to meet that mission, NATO and its member nations need to either enhance national capabilities and its collective assets. This has been an ongoing issue since NATO signed the Defense Capability Initiative at the 1999 summit in Washington. The evolution of NATO's means developed further in the following summits. Since the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO decided to enhance the following capabilities in order to react quickly and flexibly to the newly evolved challenges:

- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense;
- Intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
- Air-to-ground surveillance (AGS);
- Deployable and secure command, control and communications (C3);
- Combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions (PGM) and suppression of enemy air defenses;
- Strategic air- and sealift;
- Air-to-air refueling; and
- Deployable combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units.⁹⁹

Prague was the initial step to transform the member's military from territorial defense to a more expeditionary military. The following summit in Istanbul took that transformation a step

⁹⁹ NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, (2002), paragraph 4c.

further by agreeing upon a percentage of the member's land forces being ready for deployment or commitment to deploy. This has worked for most member nations or has the rest at least on its way to meet those objectives.¹⁰⁰

The development of a military concept against terrorism is part of NATO's mission as well as the stated will of the Alliance to support the international community in ongoing and future missions. The newly created NRF enables the Alliance to react quickly with a deployable joint task force either as a building block for a bigger commitment in the form of a combined joint task force or as a force commitment to achieve a limited objective ranging from humanitarian assistance to show of force missions to counter terrorism.¹⁰¹ Thus, the NRF is a high quality force element that is quickly deployable and adaptable to any crisis. It will therefore enhance capabilities and provide input to catalyze transformation.¹⁰² The NRF filled a capability gap for NATO but most other following member nations' military forces are High Readiness Force (HRF) billed for conventional combat missions. Even though some nations have adjusted to that need of creating a Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) Force, an overall agreement on the amount of forces needed to cover the aspects of contemporary and future operations is missing. Furthermore, the spread of capability will ensure the effective implementation of a comprehensive approach synchronizing the use of all elements of national power. Otherwise, the

¹⁰⁰ Sturm, Steve, "Military matters: Matching capabilities to commitments", *NATO Review*, (Spring 2005), 2.

¹⁰¹ NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, (2002), paragraph 4a.

¹⁰² NRF, "Key element of NATO transformation," *NATO's Nations & Partners for Peace* 50, (II/2005), 44-49.

enemy will continue to adapt faster to military actions by NATO and deny NATO by overmatching with its capabilities the enemy.

Organization and Doctrine

Nevertheless, force generation for ongoing missions occur in a recurring manner for specific missions and on a short-term basis.¹⁰³ Thus, the Alliance has committed itself to continue the ISAF mission by providing its Graduated-Readiness Force (GRF) Headquarters on a rotational basis. These GRF HQs share the burden between member nations but its short-term rotation cycle and its traditional setup as a Land Force Headquarters brings shortfalls to the mission.¹⁰⁴ From the author's personal experience, this force generation works to a certain extent but the operational environment requires a structure that allows for an interagency approach on the operational level.¹⁰⁵ With the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) sharing the burden of work in Afghanistan, the corps level headquarters hardly represent the approach of integrating civilian aspects of the environment in order to provide a stringent approach to the use of all elements of national power. The Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Brunssum (NLD) represents the operational level for a mission like the one in Afghanistan. Even though not deployed, it links strategic guidance to the tactical level but never represents a true interagency approach.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁴ Diego A Ruiz Palmer, "The enduring influence of operations on NATO's transformation," *NATO Review*, (Winter 2006), 3.

¹⁰⁵ Personal experience emerged from my deployment to AFG in Jan 05 until July 05, the preparation of another contingent to conduct the Regional Command North as of September 2006, as well as constant dialogue with General Staff Officers of the German Army deployed since 2005.

Therefore, a mission like ISAF requires the representation of the interagency approach on all levels of war for the Alliance.¹⁰⁶

The question the political leadership of NATO needs to answer is the role of NATO in missions comparable to Afghanistan and the like. If NATO lead forces are supposed to coordinate with all elements of national power or at least consider their impact and provide liaison to other organizations, it needs to depict that capability for assessment and planning at all levels and throughout the force. The doctrine used to plan and execute operations like the one in Afghanistan are the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) whilst NATO still struggles with including other planning tools, like Effects Based Approach to Operations, in order to clarify a new operating environment. In summary, NATO has not yet adapted its planning doctrines to new models.

Interoperability through C2, Leadership and Civil-military relation

Interoperability can exist by technology providing a functioning C2 system. The political and military leadership can ensure interoperability by using the same vocabulary in defining missions. Therefore, leadership, command and control as well as civil military relations need a critical review in the current military role of NATO.

A limited commitment of NATO nations to the wide range of operations has occurred in recent theatres of operation. This involves support with certain capabilities like rotary and fixed

¹⁰⁶ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Afghanistan's transformational challenge," *NATO Review*, (Summer 2005), 4.

wing assets, as well as limitations on use of force due to national caveats. Unity of command and unity of effort are required to provide the commanders the flexibility to use forces once deployed to the theatre in order to ensure mission success.¹⁰⁷ Technically, C3 capability continues to challenge NATO forces under its command due to national differences in capabilities. This hampers effective communication by requiring adaptation of different systems that continues to endanger unity of command and effort.¹⁰⁸ The PCC requires the rapid build up of a secure and deployable C3 capability. In ongoing missions, nations compensate for this lack through individual solutions but its effectiveness depends on the lead nation's capability. Temporary solutions hamper an effective integration of subordinate units.¹⁰⁹

The above-mentioned deficiencies lead to political and military leadership struggles within the Alliance, as well as within the population of each member nation. The cultural gap that exists in the use of force between the US and most European Nations adds to the strain of operational commitment by the Alliance. National caveats and a different military philosophy hinder unity of effort. Furthermore, a slowly adapting force structure within the European forces hinders the ability to deploy at the same speed and with the same determination. The military language used between the different nations military leadership is different and affects the ability

¹⁰⁷ John McCain, "NATO's Litmus Test in Afghanistan," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly*, (15 Apr 2007), 30.

¹⁰⁸ Own experience in KMNB VII, KABUL Afghanistan. A different C2 structure between NATO and national systems existed without established links. During the handover period a complete exchange of the system occurred. Integration of the subordinate units into the TOC occurred over secure as well as insecure C2 structures.

¹⁰⁹ Tony Skinner, "Deficiencies in C4I plague ISAF operations," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, (23 May 2007), 6.

to determine a common vision, aim and objective. Although limited combined training at NATO institutions achieves unity in selected areas, the professional education of soldiers outweighs this selective experience. This requires a change from the US and many European nations. The US forces need to embrace a concept of continuing an operation beyond war fighting. European forces need to achieve a force package that embraces capabilities of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but adds the ability to operate within the Alliance in high intensity missions.¹¹⁰ Otherwise, adversaries will exploit NATO weaknesses to regain strategic and operational advantages.

The experience of member nations with integration of interagency capabilities needs to provide the operational level an ability to plan and coordinate with civilian organizations. The NATO operational level cannot lead civilian organization, but can offer the opportunity for the political leadership to improve civilian military relations with interagency teams for mission planning. In summary, NATO learned the integration of interagency coordination on the tactical level whilst still missing its conceptual integration in doctrine, civil-military relation and in its operational level C2 structure.

Summary

Achieving success in military missions requires NATO set the conditions for unity of effort and unity of command on the operational level. Synchronizing efforts and adapting to challenges of future requirements will overcome those difficulties. A NATO mission can only

¹¹⁰ Sir Ian Forbes, "Minding the Gap," *Foreign Policy*, no. 141, (2004), 76-77.

achieve its strategic end state after setting the conditions for reaching operational effectiveness in its military operations. The development of specific NATO organizations involves structuring its headquarters and forces. NATO operational level headquarters need to reflect the needs for the future operating environment in its internal organization in order to ensure a continuous effective effort to implement strategic guidance to an operational level campaign plan. Additionally, NATO member nations need to create military that fulfill the requirements of the future operating environment. Tailoring forces must allow for flexible and sustainable force packages that follow a commonly employed lead element like the NRF. Once contingency campaign plans institutionalize standard force packages, these tailored organizations must train and exercise in specific mission scenarios. However, none of that is effective unless the civil-military relationship allows for an interagency approach that is coordinated between the military and employed civilian organizations. The quest for interoperability is, next to a technical issue, one of human mindset. This is especially true in the conduct of military operations. The ongoing language difference requires a common ground within the military. Therefore, a common planning doctrine is one basis that can set the tone for the future of NATO military operations. In summary, all this requires a change in organization, doctrine, training, leadership, C2, and civil-military relationship.

A Model for Transformation on the Operational Level

NATO's military mission is drafted out of the strategic concept and requires NATO to transform into an effective security alliance on the operational level with its military capability by meeting the benchmarks for operational effectiveness. Furthermore, the operational level needs to adapt to the challenges of the contemporary and future operating environment. This environment requires NATO to operate within the comprehensive approach integrated as part of the use of all elements of its member's national power. However, due to its availability, the military will be predominately the first elements ready for deployment and used as a political signal to show determination of the Alliance. Therefore, a planning capability is required to fill the needs within the operating environment from the beginning and must have the ability to initialize and integrate the use of all elements of national power.


Doctrine, Organization, Forces and C2

Doctrine

With the complexity of the contemporary and future operating environment, doctrine needs to suit this complexity of conducting operations amongst people. The operational level commander needs to have the flexibility to use different approaches or elements in designing his campaign. The elements of operational design require a NATO approved methodology. In light of future challenges in the operational environment, the Israeli and Australian Armed Forces have developed a new campaign design methodology that enable their operational level HQs to design

operations that are flexible, adaptive and holistic whilst operating amongst people with a learning organization.¹¹¹

The principles of **Systemic Operational Design** allow a commander with his design team to achieve a campaign design through discourse after framing the problem. The campaign design requires an in-depth knowledge and situational awareness of the environment that a systems analysis achieves using PMESII.¹¹² Whilst data is information as a Knowledge Base, a **System of System Analysis (SoSA)** depicts relationships between the different nodes within the system. The **Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)** identifies and creates the effects on the variables in order to achieve



* GOP/JOPP: NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning; and US Joint Operational Planning Process
Figure 1: Model for an Operational Level Campaign Design Team

the required objectives. Finally, the operational planning process allows for planning the use of military force in a synchronized way to achieve the effects that meet the operational objectives.

Internal Organization

¹¹¹ Instruction by BrigGen (R) Huba Wass de Czege and Col Banach, Director United States Army School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) during SAMS Seminar on Systemic Operational Design (SOD), 05 September 2007.

¹¹² The author acknowledges that the implementation of SOD in the Israeli Army has drawn criticism for its deep intellectual theory, see Matt M. Matthews, *We were caught unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, US Army CAC, Combat Studies Institute, 2008.

NATO on the operational level needs to depict the necessity already implemented on the tactical level by using the models of PRTs to integrate non-military players.¹¹³ The operational level headquarters need to incorporate the ability to plan and coordinate the employment of the military synchronized with all elements of national power. This requires an operational level headquarters to open billets for the integration of civilian organizations and other governmental agencies. Therefore, a headquarters structure needs to include the elements that are capable of developing and conducting operations. The complexity of the problem requires a **campaign design team** at the operational level HQs with the capability of engaging the commander in a discourse in order to frame the problem. Thus, this team analyses the relationships between the PMESII variables and identifies the impacts of optimizing all elements of national power. Those impacts define the objectives of the military campaign in support of the Alliance political aims. Campaign design teams are effective in a size that allows discourse whilst including the commander and open-minded planners. Once the operational level has a campaign design approved by the strategic level, the tactical level requires the ability to feed its requirements in a collaborative planning process and during the continuation of operations. Therefore, the different levels of strategic, operational and tactical need to represent capabilities that guarantee parallel planning with interagency coordination. This parallelism is required for the military strategic level, the NATO ACO, in order to have the ability to make the necessary recommendations to the

political strategic level after evaluating the input from the operational level. Finally, the ability to conduct campaign design coordinated with interagency partners allows military organizations to be more responsive and discriminating by focusing on shared desired end states or mission termination criteria. The military can offer billets for interagency representation but it requires political will to employ those on a permanent basis. The employment can occur based on the models of employed civilians as POLAD/LEGAD on all levels of HQs. Permanently employed and deployed civilians will ensure a NATO identity with a specific expertise.

Headquarters and C2




Figure 2: Proposed Operational Level Command structure

The complexity of the problem and the diversity of tools require permanent standing and deployable headquarters in order to work effectively. The deployment of such a complex structure with a multitude of capabilities requires an established command and control structure that allows for reach back capabilities as well as

secure connectivity to the above and lower headquarters ensuring global reach. NATO's command structure as of today shows two JFCs and a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). A specialization of either the JFC or JFHQ seems contrary to the reality of a constant change in the

¹¹³ The author's personal experience includes the use of PRTs in Afghanistan that even though under national command employed their respective elements of national power. This included a substantial contribution of non-military players.

operational environment. Therefore, both JFCs need to preserve the capability of planning and executing the operational level in the complexity of conflict, and gain the ability to deploy a forward element to the theatre based on a SJFHQ principle. This enables the operational level to establish and maintain a NATO operational C2 link into the theatre, and establish coordination with all other elements of national power.

Forces



Figure 3: Force Pyramid

The forces required to conduct the military role, integrated within all elements of national power, need to resemble the model that Hans Binnendijk and his co-authors call the “five level pyramid model of forces”.¹¹⁴ This model include as the top three tiers forces consisting of Special Operation Forces (SOF), the NRF, and a selective type and numbers of

HRF with the capability for initial entry into a theatre. This requires a build up of forces with the top of the pyramid being a small, fast and diversely deployed force as SOF. The following tier, the NRF, represents a joint force based on a network centric capability in order to be a credible combat force for forced entry into a theatre of operations or a limited engagement force. The

¹¹⁴ Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler, “A New Military Framework for NATO,” *Defense Horizons*, (US National Defense University, CTNSP, Number 48, May 2005), 5.

NRF creates the conditions to defeat an enemy and shape the environment for follow on forces and with the capability to coordinate with other elements of national power.¹¹⁵ Additionally, due to the integration of technology the NRF exemplifies transformation to NATO members according to the needs of the information age. The HRF are required to transform into a force that is network enabled to fight the full mission set requiring deployment and sustainment far away from the members' countries. In order to achieve a long-term effect in future conflict scenarios, Binnendijk and his co-authors suggest that NATO builds a uniquely configured Stabilization and Reconstruction Force that would enable NATO to participate in the reconstruction of conflict-devastated countries. Follow on forces, or under certain conditions, the lead forces include the capabilities of Stability and Reconstruction Forces and Forces with a "Defense and Security Sector Development" capability. The requirement for mission termination requires the build up of stability into a sustainable peace environment. Therefore, political as well as economic reconstruction requires a "Defense and Security Sector Development" capability. Thus, the need for NATO remains to continue its involvement within all elements of the political process in order to avoid failure, even though it is primarily a political task.¹¹⁶

The information age enhances global reach via the internet. The overall dependence on the internet and information technology demands specialized attention to ensure continuity of

¹¹⁵ The author agrees with the statement that a soldier, in a long-term conflict, cannot do combat missions and stability operations as stated by authors like Thomas Barnett in *The Pentagon's New Map* and C. Richard Nelson in "How should NATO handle Stabilization Operations and Reconstruction efforts".

¹¹⁶ Dr. Thomas Barnett refers to this division of forces in his book *The new Pentagon Map* as the leviathan force and the force that does everything else.

operations when attacked. Whilst information operations contain a range of core activities, computer network operations have an immediate strategic effect if successful.¹¹⁷ Whilst NATO has included the threat of possible proliferation or employment of WMD in its mission statement, it still needs to state the real possibility of a computer network attack disrupting a national economy or the functions of government.¹¹⁸ Since security of NATO's member nations depends on the integrity of its information system and a computer attack can disrupt a nation's capability, NATO has a responsibility to act and ensure the security of its members. In conclusion, the creation of an Information Warfare Task Force as a NATO Command Force enables the protection of national or multinational means that are part of our national capabilities in the information age.

Education, Training and Leadership¹¹⁹

Parts of interoperability at the operational level are technology and a common understanding of the operating environment, planning doctrine and employment of forces by the military. A common understanding of the civil-military relationship compliments interoperability within the military and the political environment. Therefore, NATO requires unity of effort and unity of command by integrating training and leadership with education as part of its operational

¹¹⁷ US *Joint Publication 3-13*, Information Operations (2006), Figure I-3, I-7

¹¹⁸ Computer attack in Estonia, John Schwartz, "When Computers Attack", *The New York Times*, 24 June 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/weekinreview/24schwartz.html> (accessed 15 January 2008).

¹¹⁹ Ideas based on a discussion with Dr. Jim Cruppi during the seminar "Adaptive Leadership" at the US Army SAMS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, USA 03.-04.12.2007.

level military capability in order to execute military operations successfully. Integrating NATO training and leader development based upon a professional military education can inculcate, overtime, doctrine and NATO principle of operational planning. Education is an external influence that is part of the professional soldiers at NATO's operational level. Internally, it is leadership and training that allow for a process to achieve unity. Leadership is required to state the mission and objective within the framework of campaign design by using discourse modeled along the understanding of systemic operational design. Since leadership creates the environment for communication and observation, it is the reflection based upon observation that adds changes within the training. Training the organization is a necessity in order to align the process to solve complex problems. Additionally, the speed of change in the operating environment will hinder the change of doctrine based on a functional process. Even though doctrine is the basis for unified actions, it is up to the leadership based on training that close the gap between existing doctrine and fast changing reality. This leads to a learning organization and needs to be implemented in NATO as a standard for all headquarters in its preparation and deployment cycle. The Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway is the organization that needs to ensure that training whilst leaders must use training to create a skill base and ensure social engineering in its organization. The integration of or coordination with civilian planning capabilities on the operation level will ensure an enhanced civil-military relation if training allows for integration through social engineering. Therefore, NATO needs to ensure a mandatory operational level training for its SJFHQ that allows through repetitions integrating civilian organizations for common understanding and an exchange based on common knowledge. Due to this process, a composite headquarters initiated for a specific mission is starting with a deficiency compared to a standing headquarters that is suited for the complexity of training, education and leadership.

Recommendations and Conclusions

Conclusions

With the focus of transforming NATO's military capability on the operational level, the author concludes that transformation must address doctrine, organization, command and control, civil-military relationship, education and training. A holistic approach to transformation includes adapting on a continuous path of technological and non-technological capabilities. Those non-technological capabilities include the establishment of headquarters with an internal structure that represents current operational needs and mutually complement each other at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Furthermore, the complexity of the contemporary and future environment requires NATO to develop a planning doctrine that offers the operational level with planning tools for designing campaigns in an interagency and multinational headquarters. The Guidelines for Operational Planning need to be part of the planning process but other planning tools like EBAO, SOSA and Systemic Operational Design are available and offer opportunities. Additionally, their implementation requires the internal structure of headquarters to depict the structure to work with those doctrines. This aspect is especially true in the creation of a campaign design team that integrates the capability of all elements of national power.

With the adaption of doctrine and changes to the internal structure of the organization, comes the necessity to plan and restructure available military forces. Identifying new capabilities and establishing priorities for future force structure implementation are equally important. With the establishment of priorities, NATO needs to identify the capabilities to conduct S&R operations and define those missions as a priority for selected forces. Sharing those capabilities throughout all member nations allows for burden sharing in the wide spectrum of operations and for integrating the diversity of member nation's cultural and social ideas. Once the identification of those forces occurs, technological capabilities as well as the deployment of standing headquarters ensure unity of command and unity of effort. Additionally, training and exercising

these forces according to a common planning doctrine and guidance from the operational level will improve unity of effort. Furthermore, the integration of elements of a learning organization throughout the NATO command and force structure ensures a constant adaptation. Therefore, this adaptation ensures that transformation is a continuous process.

Recommendations

In a short-term approach, NATO needs to immediately establish and integrate the use of planning doctrine that allows operational level campaign planning with a set of tools like Effect Based Approach to Operations, System of System Analysis and Systemic Operational Design. The evaluation and integration of these tools occurs on the principal of member nation consensus whilst the doctrine drafts can circulate beforehand in order to establish a common understanding.

Campaign design in the contemporary and future operating environment will call for forces designated to conduct specific missions. This requires an identification of the organizational structure of forces. Once NATO approves, a protocol must develop a path to designate force ratios per member nation. A case study of the transformation of the armed forces of Germany, Italy and the US provide insights on recent innovation and lesson learned.

In a mid-term approach, the operational level headquarters must restructure in its amount of deployable elements and establish capabilities that provide reach back connectivity within theatre or back to the NATO operational level headquarters.

Long-term, research needs to identify and program for the tactical needs for NATO. Based on an operational level model, many questions require answers. For example, comparison on use of a single headquarters for the wide range of operations compared to use of one headquarters for high intensity conflicts and another headquarters for stability operations. This analysis will quantify the needs within tactical level headquarters in the Alliance.

Further research should occur on three additional topics. A strategic concept is the basis for a model of transformation on the operational level. A Strategic Concept released in 1999 and


multiple NATO summit declarations since then formed the foundation for this study. A valid research question is: does NATO need a new strategic concept? If so, how will campaign design incorporate a comprehensive use of all elements of national power? This is especially true since part of the holistic approach to transformation must incorporate multiple political leadership documents in the alliance's strategic setting.

In addition to providing a holistic model for transformation, technology afterwards needs to create the conditions to successfully implement and arrange for unity of effort and unity of command. Therefore, the part of technology that links all levels of war needs further research.

As part of improving a civil-military relationship, an interagency approach on coordination future military missions is part of the operational level. However, a political discourse needs to be established in which the military in a multinational organization shares its ideas with the respective national populations as part of their national responsibilities. Therefore, a research question is to identify how to implement a candid military voice in the political interagency deliberation on future commitment of NATO military forces.


Appendix 1: Current NATO Command Structure¹²⁰

The Structure of the Allied Command Operations



The Structure of the Allied Command Transformation

¹²⁰ NATO website, Brussels, <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/aco.pdf> and <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/act.pdf> (accessed 17 November 2007)



Appendix 2: NRF mission and force structure¹²¹

Purpose of the NRF is to provide NATO with a robust and credible high readiness force, which is fully trained and certified as a joint combined force, and is able to deploy quickly to participate in the wide spectrum of NATO missions when required. As well as to act as a catalyst for collective allied focus on capability development. Furthermore, to act as the engine for providing the Alliance with an expeditionary capability. In addition to act as the medium for longer term capability development in tandem with Prague Capabilities Commitment.

¹²¹ NATO ACO website. http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm (accessed 18 November 2007)

NRF mission is, deployed as a stand-alone force, to prevent conflicts from escalating into wider disputes; as an initial entry force, to facilitate the arrival of follow-on units; and as part of a larger force, to contribute to the full range of Alliance military operations.

The mission of NRF will mirror primarily the requirements of rapid response in the initial phase of a crisis deployed as a stand-alone force for crises response such as:

- Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO),
- Support Consequence Management (CBRN events and humanitarian crisis situation),
- Crisis Response Operations, including Peacekeeping,
- Support Counter Terrorism (CT) operations,
- Embargo operations,
- Deployed as an initial entry force to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces in a Joint Operation Area from a benign up to a hostile environment, with or without host nations support (e.g. Peace Enforcement),
- Deployed as a demonstrative force package in order to show the resolve of member nations (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).

NRF force is led by a Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters, with Component Commands coordinating a Joint Logistic Concept and a 20000 soldier strong joint force existing of a Naval TF, a Army Brigade Combat Team and 200 Combat sorties per day provided through the Air Force.

Appendix 3: Prague Capability Commitment (PCC)¹²²

“Approve the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. Individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of

- chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence;
- intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition;
- air-to-ground surveillance;
- command, control and communications;
- combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
- strategic air and sea lift;
- air-to-air refueling; and
- deployable combat support and combat service support units.

Our efforts to improve capabilities through the PCC and those of the European Union to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities Action Plan should be mutually reinforcing, while respecting the autonomy of both organizations, and in a spirit of openness.

We will implement all aspects of our Prague Capabilities Commitment as quickly as possible. We will take the necessary steps to improve capabilities in the identified areas of

¹²² NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, (Brussels: NATO, 2002), paragraph 4c.

continuing capability shortfalls. Such steps could include multinational efforts, role specialization and reprioritization, noting that in many cases additional financial resources will be required, subject as appropriate to parliamentary approval. We are committed to pursuing vigorously capability improvements. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to report on implementation to Defence Ministers.”

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