

The Role of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Stability Operations: Reality and Potential

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE ROLE OF THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS: REALITY AND POTENTIAL by MAJ Paul J. Salmon, U.S Army, 50 pages.

The United States Government established provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in early 2003 with the intent of spreading ISAF effects throughout Afghanistan. The mission of the PRTs was and is to increase economic and governance capacity in a province to stimulate growth and stability for the people in Afghanistan. This PRT concept did not end in Afghanistan. Civilian and military leaders in the US saw that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) could benefit from leveraging the capabilities of the PRTs. Consequently, the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and MNF-I established the PRTs in Iraq with Cable 4045 in October 2005.

This monograph explores the effectiveness of PRTs in Iraq by evaluating the criteria of resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. These criteria were derived by the author who provided a unique perspective from his field experience in Iraq as a theater observer for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and a liaison officer for Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) located at the embassy in the International Zone. This monograph assesses the Afghani PRTs against these criteria during the Joint Reconstruction Team (JRT) period and the PRT period. Next it examines the same criteria in Iraq against the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) period, Provincial Support Teams (PST) period, PRT period, and the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) period. All of which supports the thesis, if PRTs are going to have effectiveness in stability operations, then they need adequate resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. Finally, this monograph offers a conclusion and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of Iraqi PRTs in the future.

The PRTs in Iraq require the necessary resources to fulfill their mission, and sustain itself for the short and long term. The Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) should consistently adjust these resources based on demands and changes in the system or environment over time. In addition, the presence of good leadership structure with competent and professional individuals, over time, has enabled the PRTs to observe their surroundings, obtain situational awareness, orient resources in the proper direction with the appropriate strength, decide on critical actions, and act in an efficient and logical manner. Lastly, operational focus, in the form of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) provided guidance and direction for assigned and attached elements with objectives, goals, and the appropriate binding documentation to attain unity of effort.

From their creation in Afghanistan to the arrival of the ePRTs in January 2007, various organizations such as DOD, DOS, and non-profit groups have criticized the effectiveness of the PRTs, but these same organizations understand the importance of PRTs and offer assessments to justify the PRTs existence and improve their effectiveness. All of this input has helped the DOD and DOS realign and reengage the PRT programs to make them more efficient. Americans and the international community must continue to support the PRT program to ensure this final goal is reached. Additionally, the PRTs must continue to embrace positive and negative feedback, and more importantly learn from their shortcomings and provide courses of action that will help maximize the utility of their organization and ultimately provide and stable, safe, and secure environment in which the Iraqi population can reside in peace.

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Introduction

“Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.”
—President George W. Bush, February 26, 2003

September 11, 2001 (9/11) forced the United States (US) to change its perspective on global terrorism more than ever before. Prior to 9/11, the United States Government (USG) could not envision a majority of their military resources concentrated on a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Until 9/11, the US military focused on conventional war scenarios similar to those in Operation Desert Storm 1991, smaller operations requiring special operating forces such as Operation Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu, Somalia, and stability operations that assisted in international humanitarian relief efforts such as Kosovo Forces 1999.¹ After 9/11, the USG adjusted its national security policy and developed strategies that focused a majority of their attention to defeat this newly defined threat.²

The USG strategy focused on two primary geographic locations, Afghanistan and Iraq. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) commenced in Afghanistan on 7 October, 2001, the US toppled the Taliban regime in two months. As a result, Afghanistan showed signs of instability that directly affected the Afghan people. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 established an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on 20 December

¹ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (White House: United States Government, 1998), 1. In the 1998 NSS, President Clinton stressed the need to embrace a strategy of enlargement focused at protecting America’s national interests. Clinton stated in the NSS the following: “our strategic approach recognizes that we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors.”

² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (White House: United States Government, 2002), 4. In the 2002 NSS, President Bush focused on how our strategy must address radicalism and technology in a policy of preemption towards our adversaries. According to President Bush, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.”

2001 to help the Afghan Interim Authority maintain security in and around Kabul.³ In addition to the ISAF, the USG believed that Afghan stability could be restored with the use of civil affairs specialists that could identify some of the basic needs and essential services of the community. Originally, established as Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (Chiclets), these small teams were established by military civil affairs soldiers as part of the commander's concept of operations. Soon after their inception these teams became known as Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). "In November 2002, President Karzai of Afghanistan personally requested the title be changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)."⁴ President Karzai commented, "Warlords rule regions; governors rule provinces."⁵ Finally, the PRTs were established in early 2003 with the intent of spreading the ISAF effects throughout Afghanistan. The mission of the PRTs was to increase development in the economic and government sectors of a province to stimulate growth and stability to the people in Afghanistan. According to Bill Wolpin, a writer for *American City and County*, "the PRT's core structure was simple: they are multidisciplinary and involve civilians, government agencies and the military, and the PRTs gather information, analyze problems, and bridge communication between local, provincial and national governments."⁶ This PRT concept did not end in Afghanistan. In the summer of 2004, both civilian and military leaders in the U.S. saw that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) could benefit from leveraging the capabilities of the PRTs because forces failed to address Phase IV in the original operational plan.

Regarding Iraq, in the face of increasing violence and insurgency, National Security Presidential Directives 36 (May 11, 2004) and 44 (December 1, 2005) provided the policy and organizational framework for U.S. civilian-military organizations to implement nation-building

³ Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 35 no.4 (2005): 32.

⁴ Colonel John D. Drolet, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Afghanistan vs. Iraq- Should We have a Standard Model?* (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 4.

⁵ *Ibid*, 5.

⁶ Bill Wolpin, "The Secret Weapon" *American City and County* (Prism Business Media, 2007): 6.

programs.⁷ In October 2005, Cable 4045 issued jointly by the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and Multi National Force- Iraq (MNF-I), established the PRTs.⁸ According to Cable 4045, the mission of PRTs was “to assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promote increased security and rule of law, promote political and economic development and provide provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.”⁹ The purpose of the PRTs was to increase the economic and governance capacities to stimulate growth and stability for Iraq.

[The goals that the Department of State envisioned as essential to the evolution of a stable democracy in Iraq were] provincial governments (PG) that had a stabilized transparent process for identifying redevelopment needs throughout their province, and a solid program to address redevelopment issues; PG that were confident and transparent in the execution of their duties and responsibilities; PG that had the support of their citizenry; PG that had increased efficiency and capability in the delivery of services to their citizens, and that were increasingly self-sufficient; PG that had regularized mechanisms for citizen participation in governmental decision making processes; PG that had increased core competencies (public administration , finance and budgeting, urban/municipal planning) and accountability; and enhanced reporting and assessment on political and economic developments, and strategic activities at the local level, and advocacy of Coalition political and economic policy goals.¹⁰

The mission, purpose, and goals were the foundation to start integrating a reconstruction and stability effort in Iraq. Consequently, these goals embody the post conflict reconstruction task framework established in May 2002, which outlined the mission sets for PRTs.¹¹ The post conflict reconstruction task framework was developed by a joint project of the Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (AUSA/CSIS) in May

⁷ Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq* (Arlington: SIGIR-06-034, 2006), i.

⁸ Ibid, i.

⁹ Baghdad Cable 4045, Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Government (American Embassy Baghdad, 2005), 2.

¹⁰ Baghdad Cable 4045, 3.

¹¹ Association of the U.S. Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post -Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework* (AUSA/CSIS, 2002), 3.

2002. Current doctrine supports this framework. According to JP 5-0 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 which stated later in 2005 and 2006, stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values.¹² The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.¹³

The five missions in the post conflict reconstruction task framework are derived by presenting the range of tasks often encountered when rebuilding a country in the wake of a violent conflict. This framework is designed to help indigenous and international practitioners conceptualize, organize, and prioritize policy responses. The five missions are: security, humanitarian assistance and social well being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.

According to AUSA/CSIS, “Security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions.”¹⁴ Security is both individual and collective. Consequently, it is also the precondition for achieving success in all the other missions.¹⁵ The security environment could be compared to the foundation of a house. The foundation must be safe and secure in order for the additional infrastructure and essential services to function properly.

Again AUSA/CSIS states that humanitarian assistance and social well-being “includes programs that relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic

¹² United States Department of Defense, *JP 5-0: Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, D.C., 2006, GL-22.

¹³ Gordon England, DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2.

¹⁴ Association of the U.S. Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post -Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework* (AUSA/CSIS, 2002), 3.

¹⁵ Ibid.

conditions such as human suffering, disease, or privation that might represent a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.”¹⁶ A nation suffering from the impact of warfare needs humanitarian assistance. Providing rudimentary needs in a timely manner helps to establish a good working relationship and can assist in planting a seed of hope with the indigenous population.

The Department of State (DOS) along with International Government Organizations (IGO), Non Governmental Agencies (NGO), and other implementing partners are responsible for economic stability and infrastructure. These organizations help a host nation restore employment opportunities, reestablish commerce, initiate market reform, mobilize domestic and foreign investment, supervise monetary policy, and rebuild public structure.¹⁷ Moreover, according to the PRT handbook, “infrastructure restoration consisted of reconstituting power, transportation, communications, health and sanitation, fire fighting, education systems, mortuary services, and environmental control.”¹⁸

The next mission is justice and reconciliation. The primary objective of this mission is to help the host nation establish a self-sustaining system of public law and order that operates in accordance with internationally recognized standards and respects internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.¹⁹ It is imperative that a viable security framework is functional to allow justice and reconciliation initiatives to occur. Ultimately, the USG wants the host nation’s face supervising, managing, and providing labor for the reconstruction efforts. Credible reconciliation initiatives help provide additional manpower to fuel these reconstruction projects.

Governance and participation addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a representative

¹⁶ CALL, PRT Playbook, 38.

¹⁷ CALL, PRT Handbook, 41.

¹⁸ Ibid, 40.

¹⁹ Ibid, 39.

constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies.²⁰ More often than not, military forces must be prepared to conduct temporary governance in the short term independently or in conjunction with fractured host nation participants. Long term goals aim to relinquish control of the local, provincial and national governments to competent, professional, dedicated and respected Iraqi leaders.

All five missions in the post conflict reconstruction task framework apply to both OEF and OIF PRTs despite the differences in the operating environments. Afghanistan presents both tribal and infrastructure challenges. According to Mick Ryan from the US Army War College, in many regions, intertribal rivalry is present, and these rivalries required a conscious effort to ensure that reconstruction support was divided evenly to avoid accusations of favoritism.²¹ Another factor adding to the level of complexity was poor governance as a result of corruption and illiteracy. Furthermore, according to Mitchell Shivers, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia affairs, Afghanistan had endured decades of war and nearly complete destruction of its infrastructure, economy and political institutions.²² In contrast, Iraq presented different challenges. According to the Iraq Study Group Report, the sources of violence identified in Iraq were the Sunni Arab insurgency, Al Qaeda and affiliated Jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality.²³ In Iraq, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd are the primary ethnic groups and the physical infrastructure of the country was intact but in dire need of repair or renovation.

²⁰ AUSA and CSIS, 3.

²¹ Mick Ryan, "The Military and Reconstruction Operations," *Parameters*, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 2007), 5.

²² Agency Group 09, "PRTs Showing Progress in Afghanistan, Iraq; Civilian Reserve," *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2007), 2.

²³ James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward--A New Approach* (Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), 16.

The mission that the PRTs were asked to do in Iraq in order to meet the stated goals was developed under the assumption that the PRTs would have the appropriate resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. However, this was not the case, and PRTs initially found themselves struggling to achieve their missions because of deficiencies in these areas. Resources, leadership structure and operational focus are the necessary ingredients to ensure accomplishment of PRT work, and they provide good criteria to determine if PRTs are effective in stability operations in Iraq.

These criteria (resources, leadership structure, and operational focus) provide ideal structure to evaluate the effectiveness of PRTs in stability operations because all of the mission sets rely on them for feasibility and relevance. In addition, these criteria were derived from the author who had a unique perspective based on his field experience in Iraq. He was deployed to Iraq from January 2007 - June 2007, and the author was assigned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) with the task of helping update the CALL PRT Handbook and PRT Playbook. His official job title was a theater observer for CALL. Upon arrival to Iraq, Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) assigned the author to Civil Military Operations (C9). MAJ Salmon worked as an LNO for MNC-I C9 in the IZ on PRT issues while developing observations, insights, and lessons learned (OIL) reports for CALL as his primary duties. In his dual-hatted capacity, the author was able to observe interactions between MNF-I and the Department of State (DOS), the daily battle rhythm of the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) (formerly known as the National Coordination Team), the operational tempo of the Dhi-Qar PRT, Al Muthanna Provincial Support Team (PST), Maysan PST, Basra PRT, Baghdad PRT, and talk to other PRT team leaders and members from other provinces.

According to Field Manual 5-0, criteria are defined as standards, rules, or tests by which something can be judged.²⁴ The first criterion, resources, is the collective means that enables an organization to properly function. These means include personnel, materials, finances, assets or capabilities. Organizations require the necessary resources to fulfill their mission, and the appropriate level of resources to sustain itself for the short and long term. Organizations should consistently adjust these resources based on demands and changes in the system or the environment over time. According to Craig Cohen, fellow in the International Security Program of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, “decision makers must allocate adequate resources for assessing progress and integrate the results into their planning process.”²⁵ In addition, standards for resources involve having the adequate logistical support for PRT survivability. This survivability entails having sufficient food and water, medical care, shelter, and security that is comparable to the military force in the area of operation. Furthermore, standards for resources includes adequate transportation to access and engage the population. Not every member of the team needs to have access to a vehicle, but key functional elements for engagement with local populations in the areas of governance, economics, and leadership need transportation on their own terms. However, they do not necessarily need organic transportation assets. Next, appropriate communication is also a standard for resources in PRT headquarters. Each PRT needs to have a computer with Internet accessibility to dialogue with Iraqis and to report findings to coalition forces, agencies, and the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA). In addition, communications involve having basic office supplies that include paper, pencils, dry erase boards and other items that facilitate discourse. The last resource standard is personnel that can function in their job description. Each PRT needs to have individuals that address functional

²⁴ Headquarter, Department of the Army, *FM 5-0: Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, D.C., 2005), 2-9.

²⁵ Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” *USIP Stabilization and Reconstruction Series*, (Washington, D.C., 2006), 1.

areas of governance and economics along with a military liaison, and all of these personnel need to receive awareness training on the asymmetric threats within their operational environments.

The second criterion, leadership structure is the arrangement of key individuals, both DOS and DOD, within an organization that influence personnel by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.²⁶ The presence of good leadership structure with competent, qualified, and professional individuals enables a group or organization to observe its surroundings, obtain situational awareness, orient resources in the proper direction with the appropriate strength, decide on critical actions, and act in an efficient and logical manner. Standards for leadership structure involve having a DOS or DOD leadership capable of accessing and engaging the military, state department entities, and provincial leaders. Consequently, security is a vital piece to this criterion. If security is within tolerance, than a DOS lead is an appropriate standard. The dictionary defines tolerance as the act or capacity of enduring.²⁷ In this situation, the capacity of enduring is associated with the level of violence affecting the population. If security is above tolerance, than the DOD lead is an appropriate standard. Lastly, both leadership structures need individuals with professional courage to operate in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

The last criterion is operational focus. According to JP 5-0, command and control or operational focus is the exercise of authority, guidance and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.²⁸ In addition, operational focus provides the appropriate binding documentation to attain success in a mission. Operational focus affects the force in all areas. Without operational focus, an

²⁶ Headquarter, Department of the Army, *FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C: 2004), 1-110.

²⁷ Dictionary.com, "Definition of Tolerance," <http://dictionary.reference.com>, (accessed May 19, 2008).

²⁸ JP 5-0, GL-7.

organization has an unclear understanding of their mission and the tasks they are asked to execute. The standard for operational focus is the establishment of unity of effort from both the DOS and DOD. A written agreement or contract must exist to ensure a unified understanding of lines on authority, responsibility, and coordination between civil and military personnel.

Ultimately, if PRTs are going to have effectiveness in stability operations, then they need adequate resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. First, PRTs in Iraq concentrate more on capacity development. The term “capacity in the context of Iraq reconstruction refers to the transference of skills and knowledge from coalition forces to the Iraqi people, so they can develop their own provincial government and stimulate or grow their own economy.”²⁹ Second, the word reconstruction in PRT is somewhat of a misnomer in respect to Iraq because the internal infrastructure, communications, roadways, and essential services are intact but are in dire need of repair. In contrast, reconstruction as it applied to Afghanistan is appropriate due to the desperate state or lack of internal infrastructure. Lastly, according to JP 3-0, stability operations are defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.³⁰

Many agencies have conducted assessments on the effectiveness of the PRTs in Iraq. Some of the organizations have included the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). These reports have shaped the opinions and perceptions of coalition forces, American policy makers, and the American public. These organizations were seeking to improve

²⁹ Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Handbook: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq* (Leavenworth: CALL, 2007), 1.

³⁰ US Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S Gov printing office, 2006), GL 28.

the PRTs by providing information that will help them better understand their role in the operational environment and, more importantly, make timely changes to increase effectiveness.

This monograph explores the effectiveness of PRTs in Iraq by evaluating the criteria of resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. In addition, it assesses the Afghani PRTs against these criteria during the Joint Reconstruction Team (JRT) period and the PRT period. Next it examines the same criteria in Iraq against the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) period), Provincial Support Teams (PST) period, PRT period, and the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) period. Finally, this monograph offers a conclusion and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of Iraqi PRTs in the future.

Situation Background for PRTs

The present operating environment has changed how our nation must view war as a marathon and not a sprint to the finish line. Before 9/11, Americans were accustomed to engaging into decisive battles that would end all conflict and re-establish supremacy in a fairly swift and efficient manner. This is very reminiscent of a strategy of annihilation. Annihilation is the strategy of choice because it implies superiority over an adversary. One side is seeking (or is capable of) the complete destruction of the other.³¹ This form of war is typically shorter than a war of attrition because it does not try to exhaust resources over a long period of time. Before 9/11, Americans had an appetite for decisive victories that enabled them to transition home quickly.

Post 9/11 has awakened the concept of a strategy of attrition for America's adversaries. "Attrition warfare seeks victory by exhausting the enemy in time, space, energy, and supplies. Because attrition warfare rarely leads to a quick, decisive victory, it is an unappealing choice for a

³¹ MAJ Jason Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Strategy for the Present," *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1993, 1.

war strategy.”³² Many adversaries realize that a strategy of annihilation against the global superpower (United States) would be suicide. Consequently, our adversaries have learned that they must take an anticipatory view of the US to slowly degrade US combat power.

In order to posture the forces for attrition warfare, the US needs to consider the second and third order effects of this strategy. Perhaps one of the most important aspects is a robust stability and reconstruction effort after the dominate phase.³³ Against unconventional adversaries, the dominate phase is characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a combination of conventional, unconventional, information, and stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase in order to relieve suffering and to provide hope.³⁴ Stability operations begin to reestablish economic and governance capacity which assists in nation-building. According to Michael E. O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at Foreign Policy, “the failings of the economy fosters resentment, and thus support for the insurgency, among the Iraqi people.”³⁵ Therefore, stability operations are needed upon arrival into a theater of war even if forces were still conducting Phase III operations.

According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “[during the stabilize phase, the] complex operational environment requires an integrated civilian-military operation focused on achieving sufficient stability to allow reconstruction and development to begin.”³⁶ The PRT was America’s answer to reconstruction and capacity development in OEF and OIF. The combination of civilian and Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on PRTs gave them an

³² MAJ Jason Barlow, “Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Strategy for the Present,” *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1993, 1.

³³ The three operational planing phases are the following: Phase 0 - Shape, Phase I -Deter, Phase II - Seize the initiative, Phase III - Dominate, Phase IV - Stabilize, Phase V - Enable Civil Authority. *JP 5-0*, pg. IV-34, December 2006.

³⁴ Ibid, IV-37.

³⁵ Michael E. Hanlon, “We Can’t Stop Rebuilding Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, January 24, 2006.

³⁶ Center for Army Lessons Learned, PRT Playbook: Tactics, Tecnhiques, and Procedures (Leavenworth: CALL, 2007), 2.

interagency capability. OEF had DOD personnel in primary chain of command positions while OIF had Department of State (DOS) personnel in key positions. In both cases, the presence of civilian personnel has shown the USG's commitment to stabilize fractured states to enable a peaceful world order. However, this partnership between DOD and DOS did not happen overnight.

The concept of reconstruction efforts was seen as far back as War World II, 1941-1945. Army Chief of Staff, General George Catlett Marshall recognized the need for reconstruction and governance in liberated and conquered territories. "Still using the military hierarchy and discipline, Marshall designated General Lucias Clay to establish reconstruction and governance teams which would become the precursor of today's PRTs."³⁷ General Clay took considerable care to find the right type of experts. He often commissioned these civilians directly into military service, which allowed the military to have primary command and control. In addition, members of these teams were able to make effective use of the expertise from a number of US government agencies, notably the Department of State, Agriculture, and Justice.³⁸ The recognition of the importance of nation building in combat operations has been evident in American history during the 20th Century.

Vietnam provided a good opportunity to combine the efforts of civilians and military personnel to exercise a reconstruction initiative that would become a template for the PRTs in Afghanistan.

It is widely acknowledged that the PRTs in Afghanistan were modeled on the success of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program used extensively in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972. Under this program initiated by Robert Komer during the Johnson Administration, a civilian Provincial Senior Advisor was subordinate to the senior military commander in a province. This advisor controlled an organization with embedded civilian

³⁷ John Koivisto, Increasing Effectiveness of Interagency Provincial Reconstruction Teams, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College 2007), 5.

³⁸ John Koivisto, Increasing Effectiveness of Interagency Provincial Reconstruction Teams, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College 2007), 5.

experts from the DOS and other government agencies as well as military personnel responsible for the security of the reconstruction efforts. This was carried through all 44 provinces of Vietnam. From its inception, CORDS met with success as it brought clean water, education, and economic prosperity to each of the provinces.³⁹

The CORDS provided the initial model for PRTs in Afghanistan, but this model evolved and adapted to the operational environment of Afghanistan. The Afghani PRTs would be the first major reconstruction effort deployed after 9/11 with the intent to assist in nation building.

Afghanistan PRTs

Irregular warfare consists of “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”⁴⁰ Operation Enduring Freedom, which began on 7 October 2001, was a clear example of this classification of warfare.

According to Mitchell Shivers, Afghanistan had endured decades of war and nearly complete destruction of its infrastructure, economy and political institutions.⁴¹ The only construct of order and stability was established by the Taliban. Eventually, the Taliban’s iron grip on the population was defeated and the task of rebuilding and reconstituting the infrastructure and Afghanistan’s political, economic, military, social, and information systems lay in the hands of the Afghanistan Interim Authority and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led security and development mission in Afghanistan. As political and economic conditions changed within Afghanistan because of the absence of the Taliban, the USG saw the need to inject reconstruction efforts with civil military teams. The USG strategy gave way to the emergence of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in early 2003.

³⁹ James Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: COIN Lessons from Vietnam for the Future”, *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, KS October 2006), 77-91.

⁴⁰ DOD, Irregular Warfare (IW): Joint Operation Concept, version.1.0, (Washington D.C.: DOD, 2007), 6.

⁴¹ Agency Group 09, “PRTs Showing Progress in Afghanistan, Iraq; Civilian Reserve,” *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2007), 2.

The mission of these PRTs was to increase capacity development in the economic and government sectors of individual provinces to stimulate growth and stability for the people in Afghanistan. Overall, the objective of these PRTs has been to extend the influence of the Afghanistan government throughout the country with the assistance of ISAF. The PRT objectives were to monitor, assess and report on developments in the regions, facilitate information sharing, contribute to the reconstruction process, and closely coordinate with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, non-governmental organizations and international associations.⁴² The PRTs also tried to assist the population in acquiring, sustaining and maintaining essential services and critical needs while fostering active citizen involvement for their community.

As of June 2007, twenty-five PRTs were in operation during OEF, and both DOD and DOS officials had plans to establish one in each of the thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. The US turned over a significant number of these PRTs to partner countries, and nearly all the PRTs are now under ISAF control. Different participating nations took the lead based on geography. Appendix two shows the location and lead nation of the PRTs in Afghanistan. A total of twelve PRTs are led by the US and thirteen PRTs are led by partner or coalition forces. This appendix reinforces the variety of international participation in OEF.

In February 2006, US officials in Kabul told the Congressional Research Service (CRS) that there was a move to turn over the lead of the PRTs to civilian control.⁴³ These individuals were DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel. However, as of December 2007, the security situation did not establish adequate conditions for civilian control given the reemergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. ISAF and the Afghanistan security forces needed to ensure there was an enduring umbrella of security in order to allow the PRTs to accomplish their mission and meet objectives.

⁴² Department of Defense, "Into Afghanistan: Rooting Out Terrorists OEF Marks 3 Years," <http://www.defenselink.mil/home/articles/2004-10/a100107b.html> (accessed October 17, 2007).

⁴³ Ibid, 29.

Assessment of Afghani PRTs

Army problem solving is a systematic way for military leaders to determine the solution to a problem. This process is divided into seven steps, which is executed with continuous assessment throughout all phases.⁴⁴ Assessment allows individuals to define the problem, system, and conditions. Most importantly, assessments develop situational understanding and allow implementation of changes. Assessments are also necessary to examine the effectiveness of PRTs.

The analysis of the reconstruction experience in Afghanistan is best divided into two distinct periods to show the incremental effectiveness of the PRT program. These periods are the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell (also known as Joint Reconstruction Team) period and the PRT period. The Joint Reconstruction Team (JRT) period began early in 2002, during OEF, and ended in the fall of 2002. The PRT period began November 2002 to the present time, February 2008.

The criteria of resources, leadership structure and operational focus are applied differently in Afghanistan than in Iraq by virtue of the operational environment. In regards to resources, the standard focuses on logistical support that consists of survivability, transportation, communication, and personnel. The leadership structure should be DOD because the security situation is above the level of tolerance. Lastly, the standard for operational focus examines the ability to clearly define the mission and delineate the lines of authority, responsibility, and coordination between civilian and military personnel in some type of an agreement.

In the JRT period, resources had no significant effect on reconstruction efforts or economic and governance capacity building. Large quantities of resources were not a

⁴⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production*, JAN 2005, 2-6. The seven step problem solving model is as follows: 1-ID the problem; 2- Gather Information; 3- Develop criteria; 4- Generate possible solutions; 5 -Analyze possible solutions; 6- Compare possible solutions; 7- Make and implement the decision.

requirement for JRTs success because the operational focus did not mandate an overwhelming focus on rebuilding a nation.⁴⁵ The JRT members had adequate accommodations for survivability that was comparable to the force. Each member was allocated sufficient amounts of food and water along with twenty-four hour medical care and a place to sleep that was provided by the DOD. In addition, the JRT had access to vehicles to travel throughout the province. However, they did not have communication assets to properly execute their job. They did not have a computer with internet access in their headquarters that they could use on their own accord. Lastly, the JRTs were significantly degraded in personnel. The JRT was a small military organization manned by civil affairs soldiers.⁴⁶ They had no personnel assigned as governance and economic specialists. Overall, the JRTs were significantly below the resource standard in all areas except survivability and transportation.

The leadership structure in JRTs was led by a military contingent with little or no civilian involvement.⁴⁷ The leadership structure was a civil affairs commander who provided command and control to approximately twenty to thirty personnel. In addition, the precarious security situation at the time caused limited reconstruction to occur. Even though the JRTs were small, they met the leadership structure standard by having a military structure in place with the presence of civil affairs soldiers.

Lastly, in regards to operational focus, the JRTs focused on assessing humanitarian needs and conducted small reconstruction projects and established relations with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).⁴⁸ There were no overarching objectives or goals

⁴⁵ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, United States Institute of Peace, October, 2005, 2.

⁴⁶ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, United States Institute of Peace, October, 2005, 2.

⁴⁷ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, United States Institute of Peace, October, 2005, 2.

⁴⁸ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, United States Institute of Peace, October, 2005, 2.

communicated to them from any higher level organization. Ultimately, the JRTs were not designed or equipped to be a major reconstruction effort during the time period of early 2002 until the fall of 2002. Changes in operational focus along with an official name change introduced the beginning of the PRT period.

In the PRT period (November 2002- February 2008), resources, leadership structure and operational focus were initially challenged until the PRTs received better-defined guidance and direction. In addition, PRTs were able to understand and work more cohesively with their civilian PRT components.

In the PRT period, resources were initially challenged based on conditions inherited in the previous period. Consequently, the level of survivability remained comparable to the military force. Each member was allocated sufficient amounts of food and water along with twenty-four hour medical care and a place to sleep that was also provided by the DOD. In addition, the accessibility to transportation and communication were adequate to meet the standard. Every PRT had access to some form of transportation for individuals within the different functional areas, and computer access with internet capability was provided by DOD entities. Perhaps, the most reiterated shortage in resources addressed personnel. According to Colonel Vincent M. Dreyer, a student from the U.S. Army War College in March 2006, a major deficiency of PRTs was the lack of resources dedicated to them. Dreyer specifically referred to subject matter experts (SME). “One of the civil affairs teams and the military police [were] routinely missing, as was the Department of Agriculture representative...furthermore, most of the USAID representatives [were] contractors rather than professional USAID officers.”⁴⁹ SMEs are crucial in training and educating workers, managers, and supervisors. In addition, these SMEs need to possess

⁴⁹ Colonel Vincent Dreyer, *Retooling the Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: USAWC, 2006), 6. COL Dreyer interviewed Mr. Hank Nichols, former USAID employee and PRT member, 12 December 2005. He claimed that initially the PRTs were severely under-resourced in terms of reconstruction funds and equipment, such as radios and computer software and noted

competency in their given field and have the necessary resources to accomplish assigned tasks. Initially, this was not the case in the PRT period. According to Colonel John D. Drolet, "... civilian agencies often sent junior personnel with little or no resources which gave the military commanders cause for discouragement."⁵⁰ Eventually, the DOS learned from these initial assessments regarding SMEs. More focus and dedication has been given to the PRTs to ensure they are resourced and have the required skill-sets. The PRTs were able to meet the standards in the areas of survivability, transportation, and communication, but they did not meet the standard for personnel.

The leadership structure for PRTs in Afghanistan was established by the military because of the unstable security situation. A hostile or fragile security situation is more conducive to a DOD lead for PRTs. Having a military commander allowed continuity with DOD assets along with responsive and coordinated security escorts to assist engagement with the population. Based on the level of tolerance, the DOD leadership structure was the appropriate standard in Afghanistan.

In the fall of 2002, operational focus for the PRTs was vague and unspecific. According to Michael J. McNerney, the director of international policy and capabilities in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, the general feeling was that the PRTs were observing and facilitating everything but not actually accomplishing anything specific.⁵¹ The goals and objectives were not clearly defined, and the PRT guidance varied based on the sponsoring country. Robert M. Perito, the coordinator of the Afghanistan Experience

that there were more USAID Foreign Service Officers deployed in Vietnam than USAID currently employs world-wide.

⁵⁰ John D. Drolet, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Afghanistan vs. Iraq - Should We Have a Standard Model?*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 5.

⁵¹ Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?", *Parameters*, (Winter 2005-06), 36.

Project at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the UK Department of International Development

(DFID) commented as follows:

Americans focus on quick-impact reconstruction projects and internal force protection; British teams concentrate on security sector reform and are willing to intervene in warlord confrontations; German teams are much larger (up to 300 personnel) with a large civilian contingent.⁵²

A British study notes that the lack of common operating protocols and objectives weakens unity of effort and leads to confusion among national and international actors who cannot predict from one PRT to the next what to expect in terms of expertise, level or sustainability of engagement, or focus.⁵³

Both observations show that there were no common operating procedures that created a unity of effort for the PRT program in Afghanistan. Perito stated that the American PRT focused on reconstruction projects while British teams concentrated on security sector reform. Both examples show a difference in possible goals and objectives. Standard goals and objectives are a must in order to guide and direct the PRTs. The ways to achieve these goals can vary based on cultural, religious, and social aspects within each unique province; however they must be managed by a unified leadership structure. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) noted the following about the operational focus in Afghanistan:

Military and civilian representatives needed to act in partnership to achieve the full potential of the PRT. In practice, this was a challenge. While initial guidance gave civilians decision-making leadership on reconstruction and governance issues, many military officers viewed civilians as more advisory and believed the commander had final authority over all PRT activities, especially when security challenges seemed paramount...In the absence of broadly accepted guidance, the importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate influence on the effectiveness and impact of the PRT. In places where PRT commanders worked closely with the civilian and military team members, the PRT developed as a team with a

⁵² Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, United States Institute of Peace, 2006, 6.

⁵³ Dylan Hendrickson, Michael Bhatia, Mark Knight, and Annabel Taylor, *A Review of DFID Involvement in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan*, Report Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (London: King's College, 8 July 2005), 7.

common vision and sense of aligned purpose. In other cases, the PRT effort was fragmented.⁵⁴

Unity of effort was best achieved when both DOD and DOS personnel had explicit guidance and direction from an appointed and accepted authority. No province is exactly the same, and there is not one exact PRT template that can have an affect on all thirty-four provinces in the same capacity, but all need to have an understanding of common goals and objectives. By January 2003, the mission of the PRTs became better defined with guidance and direction from DOD. The PRTs had clear objectives which included: extending the authority of the central government beyond Kabul, monitoring and assessing developments within the regions, facilitating information sharing, contributing to the reconstruction process, and closely coordinating with the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, clearly defined operational focus contributed to the increased effectiveness of the PRTs to execute reconstruction missions.

In summary, the effectiveness of the PRTs evolved using the criteria of resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. Initially, the PRTs were not able to meet all standards developed from the criteria. The resources were not adequate in logistical support, and they did not have competent and qualified personnel. Leadership structure which consisted of DOD leadership was adequate. Lastly, there was no overarching agreement or understanding that delineated authority or responsibility to give the PRTs operational focus. As time progressed, the PRTs learned from mistakes and negative feedback received from others to become more effective in stability operations during OEF and eventually met all criteria standards by late 2003. The PRTs have been instrumental in beginning to stabilize the Afghani community, but they still have more work to do. Internalizing assessments and constantly making necessary changes based on the changing operational environment will allow the PRTs to accomplish their mission more

⁵⁴ USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency assessment, 2007, 13.

efficiently in the future. Ultimately, OEF is still fertile ground for establishing a whole of government approach.

The next challenge for the PRTs would be the operational environment of OIF. Mark Kimmitt, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, commented as follows:

PRTs in Iraq have a different function and role than those in Afghanistan and are achieving different effects. Their mission is to help Iraq's provincial and local governments by promoting security, rule of law and political and economic development. Meanwhile, they also help the government provide provincial administration necessary to meet the people's basic needs.⁵⁵

The model of the Afghani PRTs would have to evolve once again to adjust and adapt to this complex and very different theater of war.

Iraqi PRTs (2005-2007)

As OIF unfolded it became apparent that a significant challenge existed to balance synergy between DOD personnel and USG organizations after Phase III. "What was missing was a comprehensive blueprint to administer and restore Iraq after Saddam was deposed and identification of the US organizations that would be installed in Baghdad to carry it out."⁵⁶ Synergy should include both military and nonmilitary resources for all phases of operations to ensure a degree of readiness, predictability, accountability, and survivability for fighting forces, supporting agencies, and the local populace. In OIF, the PRTs became one of the efforts to establish synergy between the DOS and DOD.

The PRT concept was one of America's solutions to reconstruction and capacity development in OIF to assist in the continuity of engagement with the local population after

⁵⁵ Agency Group 09, "PRTs Showing Progress in Afghanistan, Iraq; Civilian Reserve," *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2007), 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 138.

Phase III. OIF began on 15 March 2003.⁵⁷ The reconstruction periods were broken down into four periods that consisted of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period, PST period, PRT period, and the ePRT period. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period was established in May 2003 and ended in June 2004. The CPA was responsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the reconstruction effort. Eventually, the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) with oversight from the US Mission in Baghdad's Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). From July 2004 until September 2005, IRMO conducted reconstruction efforts with PSTs that became the precursor to PRTs.⁵⁸ The PST period was a transitional period for the emergence of PRTs. The PSTs were small reconstruction teams under IRMO that engaged the population by directing DOD and NGO initiatives to assist in nation building. Eventually, the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and MNF-I established PRTs on October 2005 with Cable 4045.⁵⁹ The PRT period extended to February 2008. The combination of civilian and Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on a PRT gave them an interagency face that attempted to improve synergy. The PRTs were larger teams who had the enablers to begin economic and governance capacity building that could directly affect the population. The PSTs still existed when the PRTs were developed, and over time, PRTs started to assist and support the smaller PSTs because they did not have the manpower or resources.⁶⁰ Lastly, the ePRT period emerged into Iraq in February 2007 thru the present time of February 2008. The ePRTs were also large reconstruction teams that had the enablers to begin economic and governance capacity. However, the unique difference with the ePRTs was that they were collocated with brigade combat teams (BCT) upon arrival into OIF. In addition, the ePRTs were separate entities from PSTs and PRTs,

⁵⁷ United States Government Accounting Office, *Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues* (Washington, D.C.: June 2004), 1.

⁵⁸ US GAO, 1.

⁵⁹ Office of SIGIR 06-034, i.

⁶⁰ Julie Nutter, interview by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

but all of these reconstruction teams reported to the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) as their higher headquarters. Lastly, all of these PRTs had varying degrees of resources that they were allotted along with different leadership structures and operational focus to guide and direct actions.

The security environment in Iraq significantly influenced the organizational operations and effectiveness of the evolution of the PRTs. According to Steven Metz, “Iraq has shown the US that the ‘one size fits all’ approach to insurgency, which is codified in joint and service doctrine, no longer works in the modern world.”⁶¹ The US military had a current PRT model as a basis for its efforts during OEF. However, the cultural, political and governmental dynamics of Iraq challenged the preexisting template designed for the Afghanistan context. The type and origin of the threat in Iraq constantly engaged the population and prevented a safe and secure environment in Iraq. According to the Iraq Study Group Report the sources of violence in Iraq were the Sunni Arab insurgency, Al Qaeda and affiliated Jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality.⁶² Compared to the threat in OEF, this was fundamentally a different operating environment in Iraq in and a significant challenge for understanding how the PRTs would respond.

According to AUSA/CSIS, “security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions.”⁶³ Security was also the precondition for achieving success in all of the other missions. According to Anna Prouse, the Dhi-Qar team leader, both PRTs and ePRTs capitalized on the ability to engage the local population and this is only achieved when the security situation

⁶¹ Steven Metz, *Learning from Iraq Counterinsurgency in American Strategy*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 80.

⁶² James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward--A New Approach* (Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), 16.

⁶³ Association of the U.S. Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post -Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework* (AUSA/CSIS, 2002), 3.

was adequate to protect both types of PRTs and the community.⁶⁴ The security environment was the keystone that kept all the other criteria together.

The office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted that the PRT Program's effectiveness depended on regular interaction of PRT members with local Iraqis in their respective seats of government, and the security challenges constrained the PRT members' ability to meet regularly with their provincial counterparts to perform the teaching, coaching, and mentoring that form the core of the PRT capacity development mission.⁶⁵ This was true in the early assessment conducted in August and September 2006. The two PRTs unable to achieve consistent engagement were located in Basrah and Al Anbar. During this time period, the PRTs were constrained by the need to consider their force protection and security measures. Greg Grant interviewed a State Department official recently returned from Iraq [DEC 2006], who asked not to be identified, he said most military commanders viewed PRTs as an unwanted burden because they had to provide scarce troops for security.⁶⁶ Ultimately, some of the PRTs had to utilize MNF-I assets to secure PRT members while others utilized contractors for their personnel security detachments which enabled them to interact with the Iraqi community.

Proper security for the PRT was ensured by having the appropriate operational resources to complete the mission. In 2006, some PRTs lacked coordination with BCTs, other MNF-I organizations, and DOS agencies. According to Anna Prouse, Dhi-Qar team leader, a lack of a DOS-DOD Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which would have outlined the PRT objectives, lines of authority, lines of coordination, and requirements / resources, caused a lot of the

⁶⁴ Anna Prouse, interviewed by author, Dhi-Qar PRT Headquarters, Dhi-Qar, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁶⁵ Office of SIGIR 06-034, 5.

⁶⁶ Greg Grant, "Tensions Builds in Iraq," *Government Executive*, (Washington: National Journal Group, 2006), 2.

confusion.⁶⁷ As time progressed the security situation got better. In December 2007, COL Kehrer, the MNC-I C9 from late 2006 through 2007, observed the following in Iraq:

Obviously there is a connection between improved security conditions and greater opportunity for PRTs to affect governance capacity enhancement, set favorable economic conditions, and improve services. PRTs work all these areas and have benefited from the significant security gains. Not only are PRTs/ePRTs engaging provincial and municipal leadership, they are also now able to engage local informed leaders and power brokers such as tribal leaders and imams. They are also more out and about talking with Iraqis “on the street” that gives them more situational awareness. Lastly, with the success of COIN efforts, the Iraqi populace is far more willing to approach both CF and PRT personnel as seen in the far increased tips against insurgents and IEDs.⁶⁸

Security was the foundation for which all other aspects of the PRTs capabilities could thrive and help the community. The improved security situation in early 2007 allowed the PRTs in Baghdad to engage the community.⁶⁹ According to Daniel Korski, the Basra team leaders, the PRTs finally received the majority of their intended resources and were able to access their provinces in varying degrees.⁷⁰ For example, the Baghdad, Basra, and Dhi-Qar and PRTs had frequent contact with Provincial Council members during the first six months of 2007, and they were able to initiate and monitor governance and economic capacity projects. However, other provinces in AL Anbar and Maysan continued to remain challenges for the PRT because they had no access. The key point to bring out was that progress was being made in varying degrees within the eighteen provinces of Iraq with the help of PRTs engaging the populous and encouraging Iraqi ownership of their provinces.

The ePRTs observed some of the same challenges that faced the PRTs in their initial stages of operation. Some of these challenges contributed directly to the ability of ePRTs to protect themselves as well as assisting the population. In addition, the signature of an approved

⁶⁷ Anna Prouse, interviewed by author, Dhi-Qar PRT Headquarters, Dhi-Qar, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁶⁸ COL William M. Kehrer, interviewed by author via email, December 27, 2007.

⁶⁹ COL William M. Kehrer, interviewed by author via email, December 27, 2007.

⁷⁰ Daniel Korski, interviewed by author, February 23, 2007.

MOA helped delineate lines of authority as well as lines of coordination and resources.

According to Daniel C. McCarroll, the ePRT operations officer at OPA, the ePRTs also linked up with BCTs and began a crash course in Iraqi situational awareness and situational understanding.⁷¹ Members started with four core personnel until the rest of the manpower arrived into theater after June 2007. Nevertheless, the ePRTs had operational issues that did not correct themselves overnight. Consequently, the ePRTs were not key player as of June 2007. However, as of 15 December 2007, MNF-I officials stated that violence has subsided in Iraq considerably and both types of PRTs had made a tremendous impact on accessing the community and reconstructing Iraq.

The observations of SIGIR made from 2006 to 2007 seemed to show a cycle of positive performance for the both types of PRTs in terms of security. A PRT, in its initial stages, had an undetermined time-period in which to obtain its operational foundation and gain situational understanding, relevance, and adaptability in this complex Iraqi environment. After that was obtained, the PRTs were able to exploit good security conditions and access the population to stabilize and reconstruct the community.

Assessment of Iraqi PRTs and ePRTs

If PRTs are going to have effectiveness in stability operations, then they need adequate resources, leadership structure, and organizational focus. A look into these areas as criteria applied to the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), PST, PRT and ePRT periods will aid in verifying this statement. The analysis of the reconstruction experience in Iraq was best divided into four distinct periods to show the incremental effectiveness of the PRT program. The CPA period began in May 2003 and it ended June 2004 when it transferred power to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) with oversight from the U.S Mission in Baghdad's Iraqi Reconstruction

⁷¹ Daniel C. McCarroll, interviewed by author, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad Iraq, March 30 2007.

Management Office (IRMO).⁷² The PST period started in July 2004 until September 2005, under the direction of IRMO.⁷³ The PRT period began October 2005 and it continues to the present time, February 2008.⁷⁴ Lastly, the ePRT period began February 2007 and it also continues to the present time of February 2008.⁷⁵

The criteria of resources, leadership structure and operational focus are applied differently in Iraq than in Afghanistan by virtue of the operational environment. According to the Iraq Study Group Report, the sources of violence identified in Iraq were the Sunni Arab insurgency, Al Qaeda and affiliated Jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality.⁷⁶ In regards to resources, the standard focuses on logistical support that consists of survivability, transportation, communication and competent and qualified personnel. The standard for leadership structure consists of a DOS lead if the security situation is within tolerance, and a DOD lead if the security situation is above tolerance. In addition, the leadership structure needs to possess the professional courage amidst a counterinsurgency environment. Lastly, the standard for operational focus in Iraq is some agreed upon documentation that clearly defines the mission and delineates the lines of authority, responsibility, and coordination between civilian and military personnel.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period was established in May 2003.⁷⁷ According to the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), the CPA was the UN recognized coalition authority led by the US and the United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary

⁷² United States Government Accounting Office, *Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues* (Washington, D.C.: June 2004), 1.

⁷³ US GAO, 1.

⁷⁴ SIGIR 06-034, 1.

⁷⁵ SIGIR 07-015, 5.

⁷⁶ James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward--A New Approach* (Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), 16.

⁷⁷ United States Government Accounting Office, *Rebuilding Iraq, Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues* (Washington, D.C., June 2004), 1.

governance of Iraq, and the CPA was responsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the reconstruction effort.⁷⁸

The CPA period had significant challenges in the areas of resources, leadership structure, and operational focus because of the security situation in Iraq from 2003-2004. GAO stated that “instead of engaging in post-conflict nation building, the US and its partners have been rebuilding the country in a wartime environment. The deteriorating security situation [had] generally hindered the implementation of economic reconstruction and political transition efforts.”⁷⁹

Within the CPA period, resources were challenged from the start. Despite the volatile environment, the CPA members had sufficient survivability that was comparable to the force. However, they did not have the required transportation assets because the priority was for security operations, and their communication capabilities were undercut as well. The most significant issues in resources regarded personnel.. According to GAO,

The CPA had generally operated with about one-third of its direct positions vacant. U.S. and CPA officials most frequently cited the hardship of the posting and the budgetary implications as the reasons for this situation. The hardship of the posting has affected some civilian agencies’ abilities to meet their staffing requirements. The security situation in Iraq has also made it difficult to attract and retain personnel. For example, USAID officials cited the security situation as a reason for the early return of some staff and the difficulty in filling direct-hire positions in Iraq.⁸⁰

The CPA period also faced significant challenges in leadership structure because many of its direct positions were vacant. The leadership structure was led by DOS officials that had little if any impact on the Iraqi population because of the inability to engage them amidst a growing insurgency.⁸¹ It was apparent that the security level was above the level of tolerance. Given this

⁷⁸ United States Government Accounting Office, *Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues* (Washington, D.C. : June 2004), 1.

⁷⁹ US GAO, 51.

⁸⁰ US GAO, 40.

⁸¹ US GAO, 40.

observation, a DOD lead should have orchestrated command and control of the CPA period, but that was not the case.

In addition, the CPA was further derailed with the lack of operational focus because they were trying to understand their operational environment. Instead of focusing the reconstruction efforts on all five missions of post reconstruction (security, humanitarian and social well being, economic stability and infrastructure, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation) the CPA was forced to address security and governance which it focused a majority of its time by becoming the temporary authority governing Iraq during the period of transitional administration.⁸² Reconstruction efforts had no real direction or guidance on how and who would address the other missions of post reconstruction in a volatile and unpredictable operating environment.

The CPA period experienced challenges in resources, leadership structure, and operational focus because of a lack of security and no comprehensive nation building plan. The CPA period ended June 2004 when it transferred power to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) with oversight from the US Mission in Baghdad's Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO).⁸³ From July 2004 until September 2005, IRMO conducted reconstruction efforts with PSTs that became the precursor to PRTs.⁸⁴ According to Joseph Gregoire, Baghdad PRT Team leader, some of these PSTs would reemerge as PRTs while others remained PSTs with limited personnel and capabilities based on their resources.⁸⁵ The PST was a transitional period that saw many of the identical challenges of the CPA period.

⁸² US GAO, 40.

⁸³ US GAO, 1.

⁸⁴ US GAO, 1.

⁸⁵ Joseph Gregoire, interviewed by author, Lewis and Clark Cafeteria, Leavenworth, KS., April 9, 2007.

According to Julie Nutter, the Maysan PST team leader, the PSTs were smaller organizations that had less operational reach within their provinces because they did not have the resources or authorization to conduct certain activities.⁸⁶ A PST typically consisted of six personnel or less. These individuals included the PST team leader, rule of law coordinator, USAID coordinator, locally employed staff, Iraq transition assistance office provincial program manager, and an Iraqi provincial action officer.⁸⁷ Many times a PST was located near a PRT to assist in resource needs and reporting requirements.

For example, the Muthanna PST was located southwest of the Dhi Qar province. This PST was not a PRT and therefore had some restrictions in the type of support and resources it had obtained. The Muthanna PST had four personnel and was co-located with the Maysan PST at Camp Adder as of February 2007.⁸⁸ An Nasiriyah was the closest city to both PSTs. According to Wade Weems, the Muthanna PST team leader, the PST had access to Muthanna by use of the Australian mobile movement team (MMT). In addition, Triple Canopy, a private contracting company, assumed duties as the personnel security detachment for the PST to move individuals throughout the province.⁸⁹ Consequently, many resources, support, and work-arounds were managed through the Dhi-Qar PRT. In regards to command and control, a PST received guidance and direction from the Chief of Mission conveyed through the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) and conducted coordination with the closest PRT and local commander at the FOB.⁹⁰ The forward operating base (FOB) commander had responsibility for security and movement throughout the province that coincided with the commander's area of operation.

⁸⁶ Julie Nutter, interview by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁸⁷ Julie Nutter, interview by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁸⁸ Wade Weems, interviewed by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁸⁹ Wade Weems, interviewed by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁹⁰ Wade Weems, interviewed by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

The PST period (July 2004-September 2005) had many of the same resource challenges as the CPA period because the security situation began to change creating additional demands for a counterinsurgency. PSTs still had an adequate standard for survivability that was comparable to the force. Each member was allocated sufficient amounts of food and water along with 24 hour medical care and a place to sleep. However, the PSTs were still hampered by not having transportation to use on their own terms and inadequate communication assets to engage the population or the National Coordination Team (renamed OPA- May 2007).⁹¹ In addition, the PSTs continued to have difficulties in obtaining competent and qualified personnel in this hostile environment.

In the PST period, the leadership structure was not much better. The level of security continued to exceed the above level of tolerance causing many civilian personnel to vacate their billets. IRMO did its best to address reconstruction efforts, but the small footprint of the PSTs coupled with the subpar security conditions prohibited them from producing results. Again, a DOD lead should have orchestrated command and control of the PST period.

The final criterion of operational focus was also nonexistent in the PST period. The National Coordination Team did not coordinate efforts with MNF-I to gain an understanding of what the PSTs would do and how they would do it. In essence, cables said one thing and operation orders said another. There was no synchronized or consolidated effort to capture and identify responsibilities and authorities for civilian and military personnel.⁹² This lack of operational focus continued during this transitional period and overlapped into the PRT period, and also caused friction in resources and leadership structure.

The PRTs were established in October 2005 with Cable 4045.⁹³ They consisted of approximately fifty-eight to eighty-seven personnel. These personnel included USG civilian

⁹¹ Wade Weems, interviewed by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

⁹² Wade Weems, interviewed by author, Baghdad, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

contractors, locally employed Iraqi staff members, bilingual and bicultural advisors, and DOD personnel from the CA teams and other sources. By 31 December 2006, ten PRTs were in operation during OIF. Seven of these PRTs were US and three belonged to coalition forces (Korea, Italy, and the UK).⁹⁴ Appendix three shows the location of the PRTs in Iraq.⁹⁵ This appendix also shows the location of US regional embassy offices (REO), and it shows which locations were full operational capability (FOC) and initial operational capability (IOC).

The mission statement of the PRTs according to Cable 4045 was “to assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security, and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.”⁹⁶ In addition, the PRTs in Iraq concentrated more on capacity development rather than reconstruction efforts because infrastructure and essential services were not as degraded as those in Afghanistan.

The objectives of the PRTs centered on the provincial governments and coalition initiatives. The objectives were as follows:

Facilitate achievement of coalition goals in Iraq by enhancing the capabilities of provincial governments, with emphasis on capacity building and sustainability; promote government reform at the provincial level and develop self-sufficiency; assist provincial governments and local ministry representatives with developing a comprehensive strategy that results in a capable and accountable local government; develop the ability of provincial governments to identify and prioritize the needs of their citizens and to address those needs via Iraqi government, coalition, donor, NGO and private resources; develop the ability of provincial governments to devise short and long-term strategies for economic programs, and provide training and mentoring that will assist with their

⁹³ Office of SIGIR 06-034, i.

⁹⁴ Jared Kennish, “NCT: PRT Newcomers Brief” (Lecture, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, February 6, 2007).

⁹⁵ MG (R) Eric T. Olson, Lecture in Baghdad Iraq , February 6, 2007. I received permission from MAJ Glenn Hendrickson, OPA desk officer, who updated this slide for OPA.

⁹⁶ Baghdad Cable 4045, Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Government (American Embassy Baghdad, 2005), 2.

implementation; assess and report political and economic developments at the local level, and advocate Coalition goals and objectives; develop a phased plan for transition from full PRT presence to local governance program (LGP)-centric presence, to traditional USAID development activities, and to self-reliance; and coordinate with Coalition Forces to synchronize governance efforts with stability operations.⁹⁷

In the PRT period (October 2005- February 2008), resources were a significant challenge that initially hindered the mission of PRTs. The standard for survivability in 2005 was not adequate for the PRTs. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, (SIGIR) life support and facilities were not settled upon which caused some PRTs to not have conditions comparable to the force until all parties reached an understanding.⁹⁸ In addition, the standard for transportation varied and was not constant in all PRTs. SIGIR noted, “[that] according to PRT team leaders and deputy team leaders, an inordinate amount of their time and attention was devoted to solving internal team issues as opposed to substantively engaging with their Iraqi counterparts.”⁹⁹ For example, in Al Anbar the military commander did not support the PRT mission, would not provide resources, such as transportation, and excluded PRT members from attending meetings with other government officials.¹⁰⁰ However, this was not the case in every PRT. The Mosul PRT was generally well supported in its operations because the BCT commander saw the PRT as a force multiplier and would help him succeed in his non-lethal stabilization efforts.¹⁰¹ The resource standard for communications was equally hampered in the PRT period. SIGIR observed these support problems after the first year of the PRTs:

During the visits to the PRTs at Ninawa, Ta’imim, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, [SIGIR] catalogued recurring support problems. These include inadequate office space; limited phones, computers, printers, copiers, Internet

⁹⁷ MG (R) Eric T. Olson, Director NCT, “NCT: PRT Newcomers Brief,” (Lecture, Baghdad, Iraq, February 6, 2007).

⁹⁸ Office of SIGIR 06-034, 8.

⁹⁹ Office of SIGIR 06-034, 12.

¹⁰⁰ Office of SIGIR 06-034, 10.

¹⁰¹ Office of SIGIR 06-034, 10.

access, and information technology support; and shortages of such basic office supplies as printer cartridges, paper, pens, and pencils.¹⁰²

The PRTs had significant problems trying to focus on their mission because they spent considerable time and effort fixing logistical issues internal to the PRT. Lastly the personnel situation in the early years were also debilitating for the PRT because they had vacancies in positions such as the development specialists for USAID.¹⁰³ In addition, some of the existing personnel on staff were not competent and qualified personnel within governance and economics.

Ultimately, the PRTs had success in some areas and significant challenges in other areas. Adequate resources allocated before mission receipt postured some PRTs for success. “But like so much of the endeavor in Iraq, PRTs were starved of money and competent people and crippled by the assumption that oil revenues would cover reconstruction costs,”¹⁰⁴ according to Greg Grant, an author for the Government Executive. Resources must need to be standardized for all PRTs to ensure productivity as a unified effort.

The DOS established the leadership structure in the PRT period, even though the standard called for a DOD lead considering the security situation. The PRTs tried to establish DOD deputy team leaders to establish organizational connection. Again, some PRT’s deputy team leaders responded and others did not. SIGIR noted the following about deputy team leaders:

A contributing factor to obtaining military support was whether the PRT’s deputy team leader (a military billet) had an organizational connection with the brigade or subordinate command that was co-located with the PRT. Deputy team leaders in Mosul and Baghdad, for example, reported that they often utilized their informal networks to obtain needed support, such as transportation and communication equipment. Conversely, the Salah ad Din PRT, which had a Navy Captain serving as deputy team leader, was struggling to carry out its work plan.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Office of SIGIR 06-034, 12.

¹⁰³ Anna Prouse, interviewed by author, Dhi-Qar PRT Headquarters, Dhi-Qar, Iraq, February 5, 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Greg Grant, “Tensions Builds in Iraq,” *Government Executive*, (Washington: National Journal Group, 2006), 1.

¹⁰⁵ SIGIR 06-034, 10.

The mixture of both DOS and DOD in the leadership structure is the right recipe when the security situation is stable to allow the PRTs to work. However, the situation in OIF was still unstable and called for a competent and qualified DOD lead.

The last criterion to address the PRT period was operational focus. According to Joseph Gregoire, the Baghdad team leader, the PRTs in Iraq lacked operational focus in regards to guidance and direction in the first two years of existence from October 2005- January 2007.¹⁰⁶ The main reason for this mis-direction was a lack of an approved and signed MOA between DOD and the DOS. A MOA would have clearly defined the mission, and delineated the lines of authority and coordination between the civilian and military personnel. SIGIR also commented in its assessment report (OCT 2007) that [OPA] needed to develop clearly defined objectives and performance measures to guide PRT activities and to measure their accomplishments was discussed in previous reports.¹⁰⁷ However, the DOS and DOD showed limited progress in addressing this issue at the time. Observance and enforcement of the MOA will require close monitoring from the Embassy and MNF-I.¹⁰⁸ The PRT era produced considerable programs that enhanced the stability of the Iraqi community, but there was no unity of effort between all 18 provinces. In addition, according to SIGIR, the lack of a MOA also impacted the operational support mechanisms such as facilities, life support, communications, management services, and supplies that the PRTs were dependent upon at military bases, and they were not settled upon.¹⁰⁹ Ultimately, operational focus did not exist for the PRTs until a MOA was signed in February 2007 which also coincided with the arrival of core ePRT personnel to OIF.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph Gregoire, interviewed by author, Lewis and Clark Cafeteria, Leavenworth, KS., April 9, 2007.

¹⁰⁷ SIGIR 07-015, ix.

¹⁰⁸ SIGIR 07-015, 34.

¹⁰⁹ Office of SIGIR 06-034, 8.

In January 2007, the President issued his “New Way Forward” plan which introduced the ePRT’s concept into OIF. The ePRTs differed significantly from the ten original PRTs set up in October 2005. According to Major General (Retired) Eric T. Olson, director of NCT, the ePRTs were manned primarily with DOS personnel with augmentation from DOD, and these ePRTs were embedded with BCTs targeted with surge priorities in Baghdad, Al Anbar, and Babil.¹¹⁰ ePRTs had nineteen personnel that were considerably smaller than the PRTs who had thirty-six to fifty-one personnel. Each ePRT received its political and economic guidance from the COM through the OPA. However, the BCT commander took responsibility for security and movement for the ePRTs.¹¹¹ Together the ePRTs and BCTs coordinated and implemented political and economic policies in a synergistic effort to help the Iraqi community.

On 10 April 2007, the initial ten ePRTs arrived in Iraq and started undergoing theater specific training that included embassy situational awareness briefs and training at the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence located in Taji.¹¹² These ePRTs consisted of four core personnel: a DOS team leader; a development specialist from USAID; and two individuals from the DOD, assigned to the CA officer and the Bi-lingual Bi-cultural advisor (BBA) billets.¹¹³ On 25 April 2007, the OPA and MNF-I started developing plans to create five more ePRTs, which brought the total number of ePRTs to fifteen in support of OIF.¹¹⁴ Appendix four shows the location of the fifteen ePRTs, ten PRTs, and five PSTs in Iraq. This appendix also shows the location of US regional embassy offices (REO) and which PRTs belonged to coalition forces and US forces.

¹¹⁰ Eric T. Olson, “PRT Conference” (Lecture, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007).

¹¹¹ Eric T. Olson, “PRT Conference” (Lecture, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007).

¹¹² Eric T. Olson, interviewed by author, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007.

¹¹³ Jared Kennish, Deputy Director of National Coordination Team, “PRT Conference” (lecture, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30 2007).

¹¹⁴ Eric T. Olson, “NCT BUA” (BUA, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, April 25, 2007).

Like their predecessor, the ePRTs had similar resource issues. The standard for survivability was adequate for the members of the ePRT even though some of them would have disagreed. This is because some of the DOS personnel did not understand the extent of COIN operations even after their awareness training at the COIN Center for Excellence in Taji. In regards to transportation the ePRTs were collocated with BCTs and had more than enough transportation to access and engage the population. However, all was not good in the ePRT period. In the first six months of existence, the ePRT did not have the adequate communication assets to do their job. For example, computers and office supplies were not readily available in the Baghdad ePRT until agreements and clearances were approved through the bureaucratic nature of the embassy. In addition, according to Dan McCarroll, some of the critical core personnel did not exist in some of the ePRTs from April - June 2007.¹¹⁵ An example of this was the development expert from USAID. This personnel shortage impacted the nucleus of the ePRT by delaying their ability to engage their province immediately on matters of governance and economics.¹¹⁶

Despite resource problems exhibited in the ePRTs, they have been able to acquire the means over time (approximately 1 year) to execute their prescribed mission. The USG along with DOD must continue to ensure that any additional ePRTs are properly resourced prior to deployment to optimize their potential and set them up for success. In addition, OPA must ensure adequate SMEs are available and then assigned with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to complete assigned missions. Perhaps, funding and approving additional SMEs would solve the issue of some ePRTs not having SMEs and other provinces that do not have any type of reconstruction team. According to MG Bobby Wilkes, the Joint Staff's Deputy Director of

¹¹⁵ Daniel C. McCarroll, interviewed by author, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007.

¹¹⁶ Daniel C. McCarroll, interviewed by author, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007.

Politico-Military Affairs in Asia, “a reserve of civilian experts, civil engineers, retired local government officials, business executives, water and sewer managers, comptrollers, public health administrators and other specialists would give the US a surge capability that does not exist today.”¹¹⁷

The ePRT met the standard in regards to the leadership structure. A hostile or fragile security situation is more conducive to a DOD lead. Even though the ePRTs have a DOS structure, it is intricately connected to its organic BCT. Therefore, the BCT takes the lead on the actions for which the ePRT conducts. According to MG Eric Olson, the arrival of the ePRT was joined with the arrival of additional BCTs in response to deteriorating security conditions.¹¹⁸ These BCTs and their partnership with ePRTs gave MNF-I the capability to saturate the high-risk areas with more security forces. In addition, the ePRTs received political and economic guidance and direction from the COM through the OPA, and the BCT commander took responsibility for security and movement that allowed accessibility to the province. This relationship was very efficient and harmonious. According to Dan McCarroll, the BCT and ePRT team leader were able to form organizational connections and together they built and synchronized ePRT programs with commander’s emergency relief programs (CERP) to contribute to the mission of nation building in Iraq.¹¹⁹ If the security situation is fragile the ePRT organization is the answer to leadership structure.

According to MG Eric Olson, the publishing of the MOA in the ePRT period, February 2007, enabled DOS and DOD to delineate the responsibilities and understand the capabilities of ePRTs, and the MOA enabled both types of PRTs to work more effectively with the DOS, DOD,

¹¹⁷ Agency Group 09, “PRTs Showing Progress in Afghanistan, Iraq; Civilian Reserve,” *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2007), 3.

¹¹⁸ Eric T. Olson, “PRT Conference” (Lecture, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007).

¹¹⁹ Daniel C. McCarroll, interviewed by author, Baghdad, Iraq, June 1, 2007.

and with other PRTs because of common objectives and goals which were understood by all.¹²⁰ However, the MOA is not the end all to synergistic efforts between agencies and complete understanding to all participants. The Embassy and MNF-I must continually inform, educate and mentor the coalition forces, DOS, and the Iraqi population about the mission of the PRTs in order to maximize their capabilities and effectiveness, and to ensure continuity of operational knowledge given the periodic change-out of personnel.

In summary, the CPA, PST, PRT, and ePRT periods have shown how the effectiveness of PRTs evolved using the criteria of resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. Initially, the PRTs were not able to meet all standards developed from the criteria. The resources were not adequate in the areas of survivability, transportation, communication, and personnel. Leadership structure varied from DOD to DOS lead based on the level of tolerance within the theater of operation, and productivity also seemed linked to the level of professional courage those leaders possessed. In regards to leadership structure, the ePRT model is the right mix of DOS and DOD partnership to execute the reconstruction mission. Lastly, operational focus was nonexistent in the CPA and PRT period because of the lack of an agreement or understanding. As time progressed, the PRTs and the ePRT were able to create a unity of effort and achieve the standards for the criteria in the form of a MOA. Colonel Mike Garrett, commander of the 4th BCT (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division commented as follows:

I originally had doubts about the effectiveness of the ePRT in my area because of the group's small size. But I tell you, what I found almost immediately as I was introduced to the team leader who was a senior Foreign Service officer, he was focused on the right level. He was focused at the local levels of government here, and he brought with him and his very small team expertise, that we quite honestly, did not have.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Eric T. Olson, "PRT Conference" (Lecture, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007).

¹²¹ Agency Group 09, "Civilian Surge Key to Securing Self-Sufficient Iraq," *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, (Washington, D.C: DOD, 2007) 1.

The existence of a MOA allowed the PRTs and the ePRTs to obtain an understanding of objectives and goals to work more effectively for the Iraqi community.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In Iraq, it has been essential to initiate projects to stabilize the community and reconstruct essential services and basic needs to prevent the population from joining the insurgent movement. The key was to provide governance, commerce, security and hope to the population. PRTs in Iraq have worked through initial setbacks with varying degrees of challenges and successes to emerge as credible and effective reconstruction teams.

Initially, PRTs exhibited slow progress because of limitations and challenges with resources, confusion and resentment in leadership structure, and a lack of operational focus. Over time, these resourcing issues have been identified and addressed in OIF. Leadership structure has evolved and must continue to change based on the security situation. The mixture of both DOS and DOD in the leadership structure is the right recipe if the security situation is above the level of tolerance. Therefore, the ePRT model is the right template for the success of reconstruction efforts in Iraq. This leadership structure lends to better transition to civil authority once DOD elements depart the area of operation. Lastly, operational focus has also evolved with the signature of an approved memorandum of agreement (MOA) which helped delineate lines of authority as well as lines of coordination and resources. In light of the successes of PRTs over time, recommendations can assist in assuring optimal effectiveness in the future.

Three recommendations will assist the PRT's effectiveness in meeting their stated goals and objectives for their future progress. The first recommendation requires the DOS to establish a budget to fund and appoint additional competent and professional SMEs in the areas of government and economics to cover down on the larger provinces and those provinces that do not have PRT coverage. According to Jared Kennish, the PRTs need to have competent and credible

SMEs within designated billets.¹²² These SMEs would assist PRTs that are challenged, due to their large area of operation, to meet and engage with key provincial personnel and assist as needed. In essence, the US could establish a reserve of civilian SMEs according to MG Wilkes. In addition, these extra SMEs will be able to access provinces that have no real PRT influence. The SMEs can start the discourse to get those provinces the attention and services they need to reduce human suffering and provide hope to prevent disengaged communities. Lastly, OPA must identify and replace those SMEs that lack the knowledge, skills, abilities and motivation to operate in a counter insurgency environment. Their deficiencies are causing a strain to the PRT system.

The second recommendation centers on the operational or logistical support needed for the PRTs to successfully complete their mission. Like any unit deployed in a less than stellar security environment, the PRTs must have all the necessary equipment to do their job. According to Daniel C. McCarroll, “the PRTs need the appropriate resources to effectively execute their wide range of missions.”¹²³ This ranges from billets, computers, personnel, supplies, communications, transportation, medical support, finances, and eating accommodations. The DOS in conjunction with DOD should establish a standard table of organization and equipment (TOE) based on the ePRT model in Iraq. This TOE will allow PRTs to have an equipment list that would prevent some discovery learning. In addition, a standard TOE will allow the PRTs to focus on other items that are specific to their operational region that need to be added to their TOE.

The third recommendation would be to incorporate the model of the ePRT leadership structure and the idea of an agreed upon MOA into our military doctrine. The ePRT leadership structure allows the DOD and the DOS to exploit organizational connections, and it also allows

¹²² Jared Kennish, interviewed by author, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007.

¹²³ Daniel C. McCarroll, interviewed by author, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, March 30, 2007.

for better transition of military forces out of theater. Because of its interagency flavor, DOS and DOD should also document and educate future planners on the process of ePRTs and provide insight on the appropriate time-period to integrate these assets. Planners should posture the ePRTs in the dominate phase to enable full exploitation of their capabilities in the stability phase of operations. According to Mick Ryan from the US Army War College, “The key to any successful counterinsurgency campaign is the commencement of reconstruction activities from the very beginning of the campaign.”¹²⁴ A prime example of not doing this would be OIF one. MAJ Ray Eiriz of CENTCOM stated that “from an operational perspective our main focus was on the first three phases and Phase IV was something we were planning but there were many intangibles and we didn’t focus much as time on it as we should have.”¹²⁵ In addition, these ePRTs should become organic to any planning scenario that involves military conflict and nation building. COL Kehrner, the MNC-I C9 in December 2007, had the following comments on the ePRT model. “For PRTs, the greatest area of improvement will be to tie their operations more closely to their partnered coalition forces (CF) entity for engagement and project development. ePRTs and BCTs develop joint common plans. PRTs and paired CF elements should adopt this model and also conduct joint assessments.”¹²⁶

The above recommendations indicate that there is still work that can be done in order to optimize the effectiveness of PRTs in OIF. COL Kehrner also offered the following comments of PRTs in Iraq:

PRTs and ePRTs have been very effective especially during the surge. ePRTs were new this year (2007) and played a key role in COIN ops enabling key engagement with moderates that heretofore was not possible. In some areas, this turned the corner on the populace rejecting AQI and militant JAM. ePRTs are an unqualified success. As for PRTs, they are “paired” with their respective BCTs and MND/MNF. Success is mostly a function of personalities and the

¹²⁴ Mick Ryan, “The Military and Reconstruction Operations,” *Parameters*, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 2007), 2.

¹²⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II*, Pantheon, NY, 2006, 139.

¹²⁶ COL William M. Kehrner, interviewed by author via email, December 27, 2007.

ability to work the interagency process. They conduct provincial level engagement and capacity building, and when linked to locally focused ePRTs, it becomes a very effective combination. PRTs have also been very effective linking provincial officials to the central government, especially in the second half of 2007.¹²⁷

Overall, if PRTs are going to have effectiveness in stability operations, then they need adequate resources, leadership structure, and operational focus. In addition, their effectiveness can be optimized if they continue to evolve with changes in the operational environment. According to the Woodrow Wilson School of Graduate Workshop on PRTs: “[they] conclude that the U.S. and coalition partners should continue to use PRTs and fund their activities.... PRTs do appear to be making progress (albeit slow and uneven) towards the establishment of security, governance and reconstruction in certain areas of Iraq....”¹²⁸

The assessments of the criteria (resources, leadership structure, and operational focus) show that PRTs are effective in stability operations when they are properly set up. In addition, security must also factor into the equation. Security is a prerequisite that must exist for the criteria to have relevance in assessing the effectiveness of PRTs. The PRTs required the necessary resources to fulfill their mission, and the appropriate level of resources to sustain itself for the short and long term. The DOS and DOD should consistently adjust these resources based on demands and changes in the system or environment over time. “Resources earmarked specifically for measuring progress must be allocated from the initial assessment phase through the life of an intervention,” according to Craig Cohen. In addition, the presence of good leadership structure with competent and professional individuals over time enables the PRTs to observe their surroundings, obtain situational awareness, orient resources in the proper direction with the appropriate strength, decide on critical actions, and act in an efficient and logical

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop on PRTs, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, Princeton University, January 2008, 15.

manner. Lastly, operational focus, in the form of an MOA provides guidance and direction for assigned and attached elements with objectives, goals, and the appropriate binding documentation to attain unity of effort.

From their creation in Afghanistan to the arrival of the embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) in January 2007, various organizations such as DOD, DOS, and non-profit groups have been critical on the effectiveness of the PRTs, but these same organizations understood the importance of PRTs and offer assessments to justify the PRTs existence and improve their effectiveness. All of this input has helped the DOD and DOS realign and reengage the PRT program to make them more efficient. Ultimately, the PRTs final goal is to transition all host nation resources and facilities to a competent, responsible and accountable host nation.

If an organization is not operating at its optimal capacity, an examination of different parts of the system can identify areas of concern that are negatively impacting the system. The PRTs have been able to adjust and adapt over time to become more effective. However, the work of the PRTs is hardly complete until coalition forces have completely handed over control of the country to civil authorities. Early signs show that the ePRTs are succeeding, according to Mark Kimmitt, and he expressed hope that the teams will work themselves out of a job.¹²⁹ Therefore, Americans and the international community must continue to support the PRT program to ensure this final goal is reached. Additionally, the PRTs must continue to embrace positive and negative feedback, and more importantly learn from their shortcomings and provide courses of action that will help maximize the utility of their organization and ultimately provide a stable, safe, and secure environment in which the Iraqi population can reside in peace.

¹²⁹ Agency Group 09, "PRTs Showing Progress in Afghanistan, Iraq; Civilian Reserve," *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2007), 2.

Appendix One: Abbreviations

AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
BBA	Bi-lingual, Bi-cultural Advisor
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BUA	Battle Update Assessment
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CENTCOM	Central Command
CERP	Commanders Emergency Relief Program
CF	Coalition Forces
CHICLET	Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Support
DFID	Department of International Development
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
ePRT	Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FOC	Full Operational Capability
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GOI	Government of Iraq
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGO	International Government Organization
IIG	Iraqi Interim Government
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IRMO	Iraqi Reconstruction and Management Office
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JAM	Jaish-AL Mahdi
JRT	Joint Regional Team
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MMT	Mobile Movement Team
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
NCT	National Coordination Team
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPA	Office of Provincial Affairs
PMESII	Political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PST	Provincial Support Team
RC	Regional Command
REO	Regional Embassy Office
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction


SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOSA	System of Systems Analysis
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

Appendix Two: Afghani Provincial Reconstruction Teams¹³⁰

Location (City)		Province/Command
US-Lead (all under ISAF banner)		
Gardez		Paktia (RC-East, E)
Ghazni		Ghazni (RC-E)
Bagram A.B.		Parwan (RC-C, Central). Assisted by 175 troops from South Korea
Jalalabad		Nangarhar (RC-E)
Khost		Khost (RC-E)
Qalat		Zabol (RC-South, S) with Romania)
Asadabad		Kunar (RC-E)
Sharana		Paktika (RC-E)
Mehtarlam		Laghman (RC-E)
Jabal o-Saraj		Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
Nuristan		Nuristan (RC-E)
Farah		Farah (RC-W)
Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner)		
PRT Location	Province	Lead Force/Other forces
Qandahar	Qandahar (RC-S)	Canada
Lashkar Gah	Helmand (RC-S)	Britain (with Denmark and Estonia)
Tarin Kowt	Uruzgan (RC-S)	Netherlands (with Australia)
Herat	Herat (RC-W)	Italy
Qalah-ye Now	Badghis (RC-W)	Spain
Mazar-e-Sharif	Balkh (RC-N)	Sweden
Konduz	Konduz (RC-N)	Germany
Faizabad	Badakhshan (RC-N)	Germany
Meymaneh	Faryab (RC-N)	Norway
Chaghcharan	Ghowr (RC-W)	Lithuania
Pol-e-Khomri	Baghlan (RC-N)	Hungary (as of October 1, 2006)
Bamiyan	Bamiyan (RC-C)	New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF)
Maidan Shahr	Wardak (RC-C)	Turkey

¹³⁰ Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy," CRS Report for Congress, June 21, 2007, 28.


Appendix Three: PRT Laydown



(As of 31 December 2006)¹³¹

¹³¹Jared Kennish, "NCT: PRT Newcomers Brief" (Lecture, Baghdad Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, February 6, 2007).

Appendix Four: ePRT Laydown



(As of September 07)¹³²

¹³²MAJ Glen T. Hendrickson, OPA Desk officer, ePRT slideshow, September, 2007. I received permission from MAJ Glenn Hendrickson, OPA desk officer, who created this slide for OPA.

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