

Whole of Government – The Search for a True Joint Interagency Approach to Military Operations

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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The 21st century security environment poses challenges to military paradigms that have existed for generations. Events around the world demonstrate how military forces are increasingly assisting in a variety of civil crises and national emergencies using different methods and working with agencies with which there was limited or no interaction in the past. Joint and interagency operations are becoming the norm and an integral part of successful operations across the spectrum of conflict, and will continue into the near future. The ability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to work across organizations, leveraging and promoting interoperability across the community has been the focus of an unprecedented effort to gain a truly “Whole of Government Approach” for over thirty years. The crux of whole of government operations lies in achieving interoperability between the highly-structured military organizations staffed by trained professionals and less-rigid civilian agencies focused around individual motivations. A look at the synthesis between the organizations involved within the Australian whole of government approach in comparison with the United States’ unified action doctrine demonstrates an increased operational flexibility practiced by this relatively small organization.

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Introduction

The Commander...will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the U.S. Government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support...

—LTG Daniel R. Schroeder, USA

Today's increasingly complex operations are not new or entirely unique, but are ones that U.S. military and other allied forces neither trained for, nor planned to fight.¹ Military operations and interactions with foreign governments in today's contemporary security environment differ from the Cold War. Western forces equipped with advanced weaponry and unsurpassed technology have met a determined threat that is not state sponsored yet has global reach with an ability to challenge nation states. The growth and change of adversarial forces [fundamentalist extremists] occurred while western powers focused on technology capable of defeating a conventional long past, largely ignoring the emerging extremist threat.²

The use of military force in pre-planned contingencies³ or in the event of crises is inherently complex. This increase in technological complexity demands a whole of government approach to operations in domestic and international settings. The 21st century security

¹ Since the end of WWII, Korea, Panama and the Gulf War were wars fought between states. The Philippine War, Banana Wars, Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan were wars that pitted states against armed groups of irregulars. Operations in Iraq began as a traditional war, but quickly became irregular with U.S. and allied forces attempting to understand continuously changing tactics of an enemy they had not yet recognized as an insurgent force. Between the end of the Vietnam war and the start of Operations in Iraq there was little professional growth or instruction on irregular / guerilla type warfare. Further, though U.S. forces had fought insurgencies from South America to the Philippines in the recent past none of these lessons were applied to the forces initially fighting in Iraq.

² *The Sling and The Stone*, prologue.

³ Contingency planning — The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities that occur in non-crisis situations. The Joint Planning and Execution Community uses contingency planning to develop operation plans for a broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or other planning directive. Contingency planning underpins and facilitates the transition to crisis action planning. (JP 5-0).

environment is full of shifting trends and tensions that will increase the complexity further challenging military forces in the future⁴. These complexities are driven by the shift from industrial ‘total war’⁵ to ‘fourth-generation’ warfare⁶, globalism and a twenty-four hour nonstop media.

The changes in the operating environment⁷, from conventional to irregular, nation state to ideological actors over the past fifty years have increased the complexity of military operations. Fourth generation warfare, as introduced in *The Sling and The Stone*⁸ identifies the contemporary operating environment of the 21st century as one shaped by actors not aligned with any specific state. This clash of nation states and extremists increases the level of mastery needed by senior military commanders. Days when the commander in war chiefly focused on understanding and coordinating effects of the battlefield operating systems (BOS)⁹ are gone.¹⁰ In addition to the

⁴ *Joint Operating Environment Document*, DEC 07, ch.2, pgs. 7-36.

⁵ Total war is a conflict of unlimited scope in which a faction mobilizes all available resources in order to destroy their rivalries ability to defend themselves. Total war has been in use for centuries, and was identified by scholars as a separate class of warfare in the late 19th century.

⁶ Forth generation warfare (4GW) is a concept described by Col Thomas Hammes, in *The Sling and the Stone*. He describes it as a return to decentralized form of war where power no longer rests with the combat forces among nation states. In its simplest form 4GW represents crises, conflict and war where one of the participants is not a nation state instead it is an ideological threat.

⁷ The future joint operating environment (JOE) describes a world in which rich and prosperous states represent a smaller and smaller portion of humanity, while the poorest and least economically dynamic societies on earth grapple with rapid population growth, explosive mega-cities, and cultural and environmental change that stresses already-fragile social and political structures. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) *Joint Operating Environment Document*, DEC 07, ch.2, pg. 4.

⁸ Hammes, Thomas, *The Sling and the Stone*, pg. 2.

⁹ Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) are an aggregate of soldiers, equipment, material and procedures organized as an entity to perform the core functions in battle. Described as maneuver, fires, mobility/survivability, air defense, recon, surveillance and intelligence, and information operations these were replaced by warfighting functions with the introduction of the latest army operations manual *FM 3.0*. The warfighting functions attempt to bridge gaps identified through use of BOS, which focused primarily on a military solution. Today’s operating environment demands an understanding / integration at all levels.

¹⁰ First generation is generally regarded as sociologically-driven Napoleonic War and levee en mass. Second generation warfare is a technological revolution applying industrial means to warfare (as represented by the First World War experience) Third generation warfare is seen as maneuver warfare that carefully arranges and exploits these technological and industrial advances through organizational and tactical means, and is represented by blitzkrieg and Airland Battle concepts.

high level of expertise in military strategy, the leader must be adaptive, able to integrate, influence and if necessary persuade and protect multiple entities from numerous organizations that are in the commander's operational space.

The U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual attributes success across the battlefield to leaders agile enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change... able to shift through the spectrum of conflict from unstable peace to combat and back again in the course of days or hours.¹¹ The level of uncertainty that exists and ambiguity of the environment is increased by the presence of civilians throughout the breadth and depth of the battlefield. The idea of asymmetrical 'war amongst the people'¹² is another example of the intricate nature of crises, conflict and war in the 21st century and the complexity that forms the parameters of modern warfare.

Globalism has implications not unlike the 'butterfly effect'¹³ where one butterfly flapping its wings can have a far-reaching ripple effect. The interconnectedness of the world means that instability anywhere can have influence everywhere. This interconnectedness exists between multiple actors over a broad range of activities, including military, economic, environmental, religious and cultural communities.

As an example, the U.S. and Chinese economies are interconnected and dependant on each other. There is high demand for inexpensive Chinese products in the U.S. to maintain the lifestyle to which Americans are accustomed. The purchasing of these products fuels China's

¹¹ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 7-3. DEC 06.

¹² The Utility of Force, comments from the author, GEN. Sir Rupert Smith (Ret.), UK Army, during a conference to the Australian Command and General Staff College 2006-2007.

¹³ The phrase refers to the idea that a butterfly's wings might create tiny changes in the atmosphere that ultimately cause a tornado to appear (or prevent a tornado from appearing). The flapping wing represents a small change in the initial condition of the system, which causes a chain of events leading to large-scale phenomena. Had the butterfly not flapped its wings, the trajectory of the system might have been vastly different. This theory initially based on sensitive dependence on initial conditions was first described in 1890.

growth further enabling development that could be used to threaten the U.S., both economically and militarily. However, this symbiotic relationship is increasing the level of interaction and likely will result in prosperity for both through continued interconnectedness. Globalism will continue to dictate the nature of affairs and is expected to be the lead shaping effort in world events in the next decade.¹⁴

The nonstop media and 24 hour news cycle gave rise to the ‘CNN effect’¹⁵ in the nineties. This effect combined with increasingly available technologies enables the transmission of images from distant locations directly to the viewers television or computer monitor. The instantaneous ability to transmit the images of militaries and governments while operations are in progress is significant to the outcome of those actions.

*In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests -- the Strategic Corporal.*¹⁶

—GEN Charles Krulak, USMC

The media and the “strategic corporal” continue to evolve through the use of videos posted to the internet by several mediums and by iReporters¹⁷ around the world. These immediately captured, unrehearsed events usually provide just enough detail to be damaging. As

¹⁴ National Intelligence Council. *Mapping the Global Future 2020*. DEC 04, pg. 10. Accessed at: www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html.

¹⁵ The ‘CNN Effect’ as described by John Rendon is the effect the media plays on world opinion. The ability to instantaneously place in mages and commentary inside the living room of any person with a television or computer allows viewers to interpret the news or action as it is happening.

¹⁶ General Krulak, Charles. *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*. Marines Magazine, JAN99. Accessed on 11 JAN 08 at : www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.

¹⁷ iReports / iReporters are reports and commentary from events that are happening or have just taken place. These are a popular way for everyone to get involved in the news cycle and have the potential to make anyone with a video capable camera or other similar device capable of catching any action. Also called iWitness accounts (based on the media outlet).

in General Krulak's original definition of the strategic corporal these instantaneously transmitted and received actions can have unforeseen and damaging consequences. The abuses of the prisoners in the Abu Ghraib scandal are an example of this. Undoubtedly the activities of Al Qaeda have been demonstrably more abusive but the humiliating images from Abu Ghraib have had far more negative effects on coalition operations and national interests.

Problems arising from past complex situations cannot be blamed on the military commander alone. Long term success is dependant on an integrated approach by all elements of national power. The 9/11 Commission noted that favoring the use of one tool while neglecting others, will result in a weakened and vulnerable national effort.¹⁸ An inability at the national and international level effectively to integrate all elements of national power can result in failure. The position of the commander in the field is greatly diminished in today's operating environment without access to these other tools of national power. Conversely the chances for success increase when the commander implements a whole of government strategy rather than a strictly military plan. Such was the case and remains the difference between the approach to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 and the unity of effort occurring in OIF today.

In Australia the term for achieving integrated operations is whole of government (WOG); while in the U.S. it is termed unified action. Both are a means to achieve a unity of effort in operations that synchronizes all the elements of national power. The primary reason unity of effort across government has not been achieved is due to the hierarchal nature of most government organizations. How can a hierarchal structure expect to best the cellular form of the adversary faced in the 21st century operating environment? The vertical "stovepipe" information conduits that exist in current organizations do not lend to the rapid sharing of information

¹⁸ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States*. In the executive summary, pg. 17.

necessary to defeat today's adversary. The U.S. has recognized the problems with its interagency process for a number of years:

Operation Restore Democracy (1994) in Haiti was the genesis of the interagency coordination and planning initiative. Senior policy makers observed that agencies had not sufficiently coordinated their planning efforts. Specifically, they found gaps in civil-military planning, disconnects in synchronization of agency efforts, and shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment.¹⁹

The United States Department of Defense noted the practicality of the approach utilized by the Australian Defence Force in a report by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in 2006. This report stated that a whole of government approach to prevent, resolve and transform conflict is necessary and the United States should adopt this type of approach.²⁰ U.S. joint doctrine describes this type of comprehensive government approach as unified action²¹ and professes a desire to move towards this type of approach in current and future operations. **The thesis of this monograph is that a whole of government approach towards the conduct of military operations is essential to success in the 21st century security environment.** In the 21st century, militaries continue to define their role in conflicts. In Australia, the military contribution to WOG is predominately support. Operations in East Timor,²² the Solomon Islands,²³ and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq²⁴ demonstrate Australia's ability to conduct military operations in a joint-interagency environment. Recent successes in their region, and where the ADF have conducted WOG

¹⁹ *The Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Crises Operations*. ThoughtLink Inc., 1998, pg. 3.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, 2006.

²¹ Unity of Effort, defined by U.S. JP 1-02 as coordinated and cooperation among all forces, not necessarily part of the same command structure, toward a commonly recognized objective.

²² Operation UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor, 2002 - 2006).

²³ Operation RAMSI (Relief Assistance Mission Solomon Islands, 1999 - ongoing).

²⁴ Operation ENDURING AND IRAQI FREEDOM (2002 – 2008).

operations globally has demonstrated an understanding of complex situations and are a clear break from past military operations.

The United States continues to develop doctrine to establish a link between military, government and nongovernmental agencies. Within the context of humanitarian assistance missions, the military is getting better. However, the success of interoperability between agencies is primarily at the tactical level with little strategic coordination.²⁵ It is clear from recent changes in doctrine that the U.S. is moving towards a better understanding and desire to conduct whole of government operations. The ADF's depth and breadth of knowledge across government bears further attention.

This paper has three parts. The first examines the background and existing doctrine for the Australian whole of government approach and U.S. unified action. The second part looks at recent success in operations where unity of effort was reached through a whole of government / unified action approach. Case studies on The Solomon Islands and Operations in Iraq demonstrate success and failure, and provide analysis of where improvements will assist in future operations. The last part proposes a way forward with thoughts on the actions necessary to achieve a true comprehensive approach towards the conduct of military operations.

Part I: Background

Military forces throughout the world have their own approach to warfighting. The differences in the American Way of War²⁶ and the Australian Way are cultural, as well as strategic. Though allied partners in previous operations across the globe, the cultural differences

²⁵ Mansager, Tucker B., *Interagency report on Lessons Learned in Afghanistan*, pgs. 80 – 84.

²⁶ The American Way of War, first popularized in 1973 by military historian Russell Weigley has come to be known as a strategy of attrition: The New American Way of War, a phrase coined by Max Boot in 2003 suggests truly combined arms operations such as the case in Afghanistan. The purpose of the American Way of War in this paper suggests that U.S. cultural differences influence our doctrine and give credence to what the U.S. population expects from its military in operations.

and regional diversity between the two nations present significant differences in the operational and national identities. U.S. government publications state “the American people expect the military to accomplish its missions in compliance with national values ... expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties ... and prefer quick resolution of conflicts ... In the end, the people will pass judgment on the appropriateness of the conduct and use of military operations. Their values and expectations must be met.”²⁷ Australia has a set of conditions specific to their region and a national identity that gives it a distinctive philosophy of command that lends to a WOG approach. This same ideology applies to the nature of policy through strategic culture bound by regional and global factors.

Martin van Creveld, in *Command in War*, relates the essence of command as ‘the ability to deal successfully with uncertainty, to function effectively in the absence of complete information.’²⁸ This translates well in today’s global and complex security environment, and lends to the study of how best to conduct whole of government operations. The nature and complexity of the role Australian Defence Forces play in their region and globally requires a review of the Australian strategic environment in order to grasp the situation that surrounds the organizational and cultural factors of the ADF. The amendment of *Defence 2000*, did not foresee the level, scale or intensity of conflict with military and civilian forces interwoven on a battlefield “amongst the people.”²⁹ Operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands found the ADF securing objectives in population centers. As a regional actor, Australia has taken the lead in several small-scale relief efforts; globally the ADF is still limited in the size and scope of the operations in which it plans to become involved.

²⁷ FM 100-5, pg. 1-2 – 1-3. (This reference *Army Operations* has been replaced by FM 3.0 *Operations*; however, it accurately reflects U.S. populace expectations of the U.S. military in operations.

²⁸ *Command in War*, pg. 73.

²⁹ *The Utility of Force*, comments from the author, GEN. Sir Rupert Smith (Ret.), UK Army, during a conference to the Australian Command and General Staff College 2006-2007.

Since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, Australia's capabilities have been tested in alliance with the U.S. and several regional partners. The foremost factor in shaping Australia's strategic environment is its relationship with the U.S. and the Australian – U.S. bilateral arrangements.³⁰ The United States economic and political policies influence the balance within the Asia Pacific region and Australia.

Recent events have strained the Australian – U.S. relationship. Following the defeat of the John Howard administration in late 2007³¹ there is a new Australian government. The new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, though outspoken in the U.S. handling of the Iraq War, has stated its commitment to the Australia – U.S. alliance. The relationship Australia shares with the U.S. is described by former Secretary of State Colin Powell as "...one of America's 'very, very best friends in the world' partly because the United States has regularly drawn on Australian support over the years."³² Statements such as this reflect the nature of a relationship that continues to grow interconnected militarily and economically. The United States' position in the region will continue to affect the strategic and operational decisions of the ADF into the future.

The term "whole of government",³³(WOG) is the way the government of Australia describes the close cooperation necessary between its departments of Defence, National Intelligence Services, State and Federal Police, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other agencies involved in internal and external security operations. Australian government and Defence updates repeatedly use the term whole of government to describe their methods in

³⁰ *The Other Special Relationship: The U.S. & Australia at the Start of the 21st Century*, pg.1.

³¹ CNN 2007 – Eye on Australia.

³² Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, CNN series of interviews, 2001.

³³ Whole-of-government denotes public services agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal or informal. They can focus on policy development, program management, and service delivery.

operations at home and abroad. This whole of government theme permeates all Defence Force operations.

Through “unified action”,³⁴ the United States government seeks a whole of government approach or comprehensive effort. To be successful and efficient in planning for, reacting to and solving conflict, governments must ensure a cross-governmental “unity of effort”³⁵ that coordinates all actors in the employment of the elements of national power. Past operations in Haiti and the Balkans are examples of crises where the U.S. employed successful unified action, reaching across government organizations to achieve unity of effort.³⁶ Although numerous U.S. joint doctrinal publications cover nongovernmental and interagency interaction for the coordination of a comprehensive³⁷ approach, the effectiveness of U.S. doctrine is only recently apparent in U.S. operations. This section is divided into two parts and examines the whole of government methodologies of Australia and the United States.

³⁴ Unified action is defined as a broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. *U.S. Joint Publication 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. 10 JUL 01.

³⁵ Unity of effort is defined as the successful synchronization and/or integration of joint and single-service operations with the actions of supporting combatant commands (COCOMs), other military forces, (multinational operations), and non-military organizations (government agencies; host nation agencies; intergovernmental organizations; and nongovernmental organizations.) *U.S. Joint Publication 5.0. Planning for Operations*. 26 DEC 06.

³⁶ FM 3-0 Historical Vignette, *Unified Action in Haiti* pg. 2-2.

³⁷ Comprehensive is defined as covering completely or broadly. For the purpose of this monograph the terms comprehensive, unified and whole of government approach are interchangeable.

The Australian Whole of Government Approach

There will be increasing tensions between the services and strains on the joint community, that training for high-intensity war and adjusting for low-intensity is not the right answer, that there is a pressing need to embrace multi-agency operations, and that the West needs to adjust further to the realities of US leadership. Otherwise, we are destined to maintain and upgrade our high-end, industrial-age square pegs and be condemned for trying to force them into contemporary and increasingly complex round holes.

—Brigadier Michael G. Krause, ADF

Whole of government is not a new term in military / government circles; however, it is the term of choice when discussing the synergy necessary between organizations applying elements of national power. A whole of government approach is one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government's agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives. This definition is interchangeable with U.S. joint doctrine definition of unified action, discussed in detail in the next section.

Since the end of the Cold War, democratic states now face a new security paradigm that includes many non-state players. A web of interconnected threats and vulnerabilities including traditional state-on-state tensions, and nebulous groups of rogue states, terrorist organizations and criminals characterizes the environment. The military must meet this threat within its capabilities and understand the capabilities of organizations and agencies involved in the conduct of WOG operations. A truly joint –interagency effort requires years of interaction with the supporting and

supported agencies in the same way that a military division or combat brigade forges relationships within its unit over time and through training. A military unit's cohesiveness, relationships and interoperability improves only after time and training together. So is the nature of the relationships garnered over time and extensive interaction within organizations outside of the military.

The change that occurred within the ADF came out of the experiences learned in the Vietnam War, where the lack of a coordinated effort by military, government and nongovernmental entities served as the leading reason behind the Australian governments push toward reorganization. This reorganization aimed to coordinate and integrate the efforts of all entities in a whole of government approach. The Australian military leadership [in conjunction with their civilian masters] has gone to the extent of stating that the Australian Defence Force is a force for achieving specific aims. However "it cannot be a panacea..." therefore the ADF "will work from a whole of government approach and often in collation with other countries and militaries to provide the outcomes that are needed to meet modern security challenges."³⁸ There are many other agencies "intimately involved in preserving our security, be they law enforcement, border protection, intelligence or other civil authorities and a comprehensive, that is, an enduring solution to global terrorism requires using all aspects of national power, including legal, economic, diplomatic intelligence and military capability." These comments by General Peter Cosgrove (Ret.) are based on his experience as the commanding officer International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999, where he led a contingent that assisted the failing state. He kept it from complete collapse through his skilled use of force complemented by a keen sense of diplomatic reality. This top down level of resolve and attitude toward a WOG approach was instrumental in the achievement of successfully integrated comprehensive operations. Australian involvement in INTERFET showed that a whole of government approach, directed by

government and senior leadership and given time (to take hold in organizations not accustomed to this type of interaction) would be successful.³⁹

The Australian Defence Force has deployed twice in major combat operations against terrorism since September 11, 2001. Non-combat, security missions continue to be a mainstay for this capable force. Law enforcement agencies are in a good position to disrupt terrorist activities. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is Australia's lead law enforcement agency and has a critical role in implementing Australia's regional counter-terrorism strategy. The formation of an AFP International Deployment Group strengthened the involvement of Australia in security operations, missions to restore law and order, and the delivery of capacity-building initiatives in the region.⁴⁰ Just such government-led initiatives have given Australia's whole of government approach the boost necessary to support efforts in the event of tragedy.

The AFP has worked over a number of years to establish solid working relationships with regional police services. This groundwork paid dividends in the successful joint investigation into the Bali bombings. The foundation of the investigation was a bilateral counter-terrorism arrangement with Indonesia signed in February 2002, and an arrangement between the AFP and the Indonesian National Police signed in June 2002. The AFP also helped the Philippines police

³⁸ Cosgrove, 2006, pg. 3.

³⁹ Cosgrove, *My Story*, pgs. 151-153.

⁴⁰ The Australian Federal Police offer a range of capacity-building programs to assist law enforcement agencies in Asia and the Pacific through its Law Enforcement Cooperation Program, which include: specific counter-terrorism programs as well as programs designed to strengthen skills in conducting transnational crime investigations that are also relevant to terrorism investigations. Key areas for attention and assistance include crime scene management, forensic investigation, and the collection of intelligence for law enforcement purposes. The AFP is helping a range of countries establish Transnational Crime Centers that strengthen their ability to investigate transnational crimes, including terrorism. The AFP is making the provision of "...targeted counter-terrorism assistance to police services in Indonesia and the Philippines as part of broader Australian assistance packages with these two countries. A key initiative with Indonesia is the establishment of a Transnational Crime Coordination Centre. In another major new initiative, Australia and Indonesia recently agreed to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation Malaysia has, for many years, been a strong and reliable partner of the AFP in fighting transnational crime, with a long record of participation in AFP training and capacity-building programs." Cosgrove, 2006. Comments adapted from his remarks to the Fulbright Symposium and the book *My Story*.

investigate a series of terrorist bombings in the southern Philippines in 2003. AFP officers deployed to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Spain in response to terrorist attacks in those countries in recent years.⁴¹ The relationship with the Australian Federal Police and the Defence Force continues to become interconnected through operations abroad and increased combined training at home, further bridging cultural and organizational gaps. The close relationship developing between the ADF and AFP enables smooth transition between security and law enforcement operations in the region. The aim is reaching a point where transition between military and law enforcement is easier.

To what extent does Australia serve as the model for western militaries and law enforcement with their continued focus on whole of government operations? The ADF have been progressive in operations that are not traditionally in their mission profile. The ability to cross over into other government and nongovernmental sectors provides increased opportunities for success in WOG operations. The differing roles and tensions introduced into the environment in the process of integrating traditional defense functions with law enforcement and civil authorities makes it necessary to understand the different requirements of various entities.

Australia has announced and put into place action to bolster the traditional capabilities employed to defend its people against the threat of terrorism.⁴² Some of these actions include whole of government memoranda of understanding on counter-terrorism between Australia and Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, East Timor, India and Papua New Guinea. These memorandums of understanding between governments are not enough to stop transnational crime and terrorism, but they do provide the increased opportunity for prevention or a means to interact and solve these problems should they arise. This type of agreement provides

⁴¹ *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, 2004. pg 17.

⁴² *Ibid*, pg.4.

the base that the Australian government can utilize when conducting or planning an eventual operation. Such was the case in the Solomon Islands through the execution of an established plan.

Numerous statements to the interaction among agencies and departments of the government reinforce the WOG approach. While it is necessary for the Australian Defence Force to adapt and be flexible to meet the diverse possible scenarios in modern conflict, these words must equate to action to achieve success. The U.S. understands the necessity of unified action in operations and has doctrine to this extent. U.S. military operations in the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom⁴³ show a demonstrable lack of unified action, or at least non-adherence to doctrine. Unapplied doctrine with no understanding of its application during operations is useless.

The Australian Defence Update of 2007, the most recent Australian Government review of its national security policies takes a collective look at the region and global activities that will shape Australian actions in the future. This document states that because of the increasing complexity of the international security environment, Australia must prepare for a range of possible events, both close to home and further abroad, with little forewarning of crises. To meet these events the ADF must be capable of acting independently within Australia's region to deter or defeat threats to Australia's territory and interests. This includes possessing a capability to conduct military operations at short notice and potentially unilaterally in defense of Australia and its interests in the region.

⁴³ The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which began on March 20 to May 1, 2003, led by the United States, backed by British forces and smaller contingents from Australia, Poland and Denmark. The invasion launched the Iraq War, which is ongoing. May 1 2003 is considered the demarcation between the conclusion of the invasion and the beginning of what some consider the occupation.

The ADF is also responsible for contributing to coastal surveillance and responding to emergencies. The most notable was the ADF's actions after the Boxing Day Tsunami⁴⁴ in 2004. A final priority for the ADF is to contribute to international coalitions of forces outside of Australia's immediate neighborhood where Australian interests are involved. The creation of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) greatly enhanced Australia's criminal and law enforcement capabilities offshore and in the peripheries. The U.S. Coast Guard has similar law enforcement capabilities but does not duplicate the role of the AFP in the U.S. The ADF maintains capabilities to enable it to make a significant contribution to international coalition operations outside Australia's region, but do not expect to operate independently outside its region.

The ADF demonstrated its capabilities in regional security operations in East Timor. The ADF rapidly executed and successfully transitioned operations from military to civil control. Beginning through the United Nations and then through the Government of Timor-Leste with appropriate support from the global community. In the Solomon Islands, the ADF provided a strictly supporting role of security and logistics to the Australian Federal Police-led operation to bring law and order to that place. In Afghanistan, the ADF contributed to a multi-national coalition to attack al Qaeda sanctuaries and depose the regime that was supporting them. In Iraq, the ADF contributed to the war-fighting coalition and then to the rehabilitation of the country. Australians consider Operation RAMSI in the Solomon Islands the ADF's best efforts at whole of government operations.

⁴⁴ Boxing Day is a public holiday recognized in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, as well as many other members of the Commonwealth of Nations. It is an old holiday based on the tradition of giving gifts to the less fortunate members of society, and said to date back to the Middle Ages originally intended as a day of giving gifts to employees or people of a lower social class. Boxing Day is usually celebrated on 26 December, the day after Christmas. The Tsunami that occurred on Boxing Day in 2004 resulted in 176,459 confirmed dead and 49,956 missing and more than 2.3 million people were displaced. Operation Sumatra Assist was the Australian Defense Force's (ADFs) contribution to disaster relief in Indonesia following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake. ADF personnel were deployed within ours of the earthquake. They served mainly in Aceh province of Indonesia. Army medical staff were prominent, with Air Force helicopters and cargo aircraft, supported offshore by naval assets.

United States Unified Action

The U.S. describes its comprehensive approach as “Unified Action”,⁴⁵ and defines it as:

A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.⁴⁶

Success in unified action, as is the case with success in a whole of government approach results in a unity of effort. Unity of effort is similar to unified action except it encompasses all elements of national power. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, establishes the fundamental principles to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense and other agencies. This document advances the discussion of the challenges facing the military and the joint task force commander in achieving unity of effort in coordinating the elements of national power.

Unity of effort in this publication is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.⁴⁷ This publication, released in 2007 is an attempt to bridge the gap between military and non-military capabilities used in an effort to reach the same results as is the ADF’s whole of government approach. The reality is that unified action doctrine is also described as “a fine idea with a prominent place in DoD doctrinal publications;

⁴⁵ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. JUL 01.

⁴⁶ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5-00. *Joint Operation Planning*. DEC 06.

⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, 14 May 2007, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm>, GL-11.

unfortunately, no one else in government pays much attention to DoD's doctrine."⁴⁸ Realities such as this continue to plague the efforts for interagency cooperation throughout all levels of government. This problem is not limited to the United States.

One more facet of DoD joint interagency doctrine that acts as an inhibitor to the process is the clear delineation of the military command over other agencies. This places the agencies in a subordinate position rather than integrating them. The doctrine further points out that civil authority remains in charge of their respective areas of responsibility, military commanders retain the ability to:

...clarify the mission; determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and personnel provided for the interagency effort; and assume seamless termination under conditions which assure that identified national objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation.⁴⁹

This doctrine does nothing to support an integrated approach by placing interagency organizations in a subordinate rather than a partnership role. Using U.S. joint publications as the authority to which all the services subscribe, a WOG approach or unified action within U.S. operations is already defined in doctrine.

Joint doctrine has acknowledged that effective organizational policies and procedures are not part of the current doctrine:

There is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies... There is no oversight organization to ensure that the myriad of agencies, departments and organizations have the capabilities to work together.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Thompson, Mitchell J. *Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power*. Parameters. Winter 05-06, pgs. 61-74.

⁴⁹ Joint Publication 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. NOV 00, pg. VI-4.

⁵⁰ Joint Publication 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Cited by Thompson, Mitchell J. *Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power*. Parameters. Winter 05-06, pgs. 61-74.

This integration problem exists in the U.S. and among the Australian whole of government effort as well. The unified action concept is under development with JFCOM staff focused on continued integration of organizations not normally associated with military operations. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld made reference to the level of interagency cooperation in October of 2006. He stated that “challenges remained” but “we’re better at it now than we were five years ago.”⁵¹ Getting “better at it” will not be good enough to achieve success in the 21st century operating environment. Lead U.S. government officials with an open disdain for the interagency process do nothing to secure a whole of government approach for future operations.⁵²

Observations of the Australian and U.S. governments clearly reflect a high priority by the militaries of both to design doctrine that will function across government. This desire to achieve an integrated approach resulting in unity of effort will continue to challenge both the governments and organizations operating with them, especially if the significance of cooperation and interaction is not realized at all levels.

Part II: Whole of Government in Action

This part of the paper will look at success and failure in whole of government operations by Australian and U.S. forces. A case study on ADF operations in the Solomon Islands best demonstrates the involvement of the Australian military in WOG operations. A case study of U.S. involvement in the initial phase of the Iraq War looks at the U.S. approach to WOG operations,

⁵¹ Bay, Austin. Washington Times. *Commentary...with forecasts*. OCT06. Reporting on comments made by U.S. SecDef Rumsfeld. Accessed on 9 APR 08 at: www.washtimes.com/commentary/abay.htm.

⁵² Woodward, Bob. Washington Post. *Commentary ... Should He Stay? The biggest question mark was Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld*. NOV06. During the long run-up to the war, Rumsfeld made little attempt to disguise his disdain for what was called "the interagency process" -- coordinating policy with the State Department under Powell and the National Security Council under Rice. Accessed 9 APR 08 at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/01.

serving as a negative example and potential learning point in the conduct of WOG operations. The differences between the two case studies, a security operation and combat cannot be overstated; however, these examples best demonstrate recent applications of the whole of government approach.

Case Study – Australian Defence Force in Operation RAMSI

The Solomon Islands are located almost 1,900 kilometers northeast of Australia and consist of a chain of mountainous islands and hundreds of coral atolls. The nation stretches almost 1,500 kilometers from the northwest, where it borders the Papua New Guinea province of Bougainville, to the southwest where the Coral Sea meets the Pacific Ocean. The significance of the islands today has not changed much from the time early explorers first set foot on the archipelago. Europeans visited the Solomon Islands sporadically from the 16th century until Britain assumed a protectorate over the islands in the 1890s.

During World War II and the Japanese battles in the Pacific, the Japanese attempted to establish naval bases in several locations around the Solomon Islands for their thrust into Australia. The ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea on 7 and 8 May 1942 marked the first Japanese naval defeat of the war. Although the Japanese only lost one ship, the battle, considered a victory for the allied forces, marked a turning point in the Pacific War. By preventing the Japanese from securing a landing at Port Moresby, Australia defied the Prime Minister of Japan, General Hideki Tōjō, who days before had threatened both New Zealand and Australia with the same fate as the Dutch East Indies.⁵³ The Japanese landed troops on the Solomon Islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi to establish airfield and seaplane bases. The allies responded with Operation

⁵³ On March 12, the Prime Minister of Japan, General Hideki Tōjō, said: “Australia and New Zealand are now threatened by the might of the Imperial forces, and both them should know that any resistance is futile. If the Australian government does not modify her present attitude, their continent will suffer the same fate as the Dutch East Indies”. Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, pg. 92.

Watchtower,⁵⁴ an amphibious operation to gain a foothold in the Solomon Islands. After victory at Guadalcanal the establishment of a permanent American base began. After the war, the Solomon Islands became a protectorate of Britain until granted independence in 1978. Today's Solomon Islanders largely speak English, and are a primarily Christian population with a democratically elected government.

The Solomon Islands remained largely peaceful until significant ethnic-based violence erupted in late 1998. The underlying cause of ethnic unrest between the Gwales and the Malaitans,⁵⁵ the two significant ethnic populations that comprise the Solomon Islands, emerged during World War II when a large number of Malaitans moved to the new capital. Honiara became Malaitan-dominated and the southern coast of Guadalcanal became the cultural heartland of the Gwales. Consequently, although Malaitans comprised only a quarter of the total Solomon Island population, they dominated political and ethnic affairs that led to strong resentment among the Gwales.

By late 1998, this resentment between the various ethnic groups erupted into armed conflict as militants forced approximately 20,000 Gwales from their homes in Guadalcanal. A rival militant force emerged in early 2000, raiding police armories and staging an armed coup in June of the same year. At that time, Australia and New Zealand assisted in brokering a cease-fire

⁵⁴ The Battle for Guadalcanal, (August 1942-February 1943).

⁵⁵ For decades, there has been tension between the Gwales and Malaitans. During World War II, the United States captured an airstrip in Guadalcanal from Japan. Many people from Malaita moved to Guadalcanal and worked for Americans to build the airstrip. After the war, the Malaitas stayed in Guadalcanal, becoming the island's business and political elite. When the Solomon Islands gained independence in 1978, Malaitas continued to move to the island of Guadalcanal to secure jobs in Honiara. Many Malaitan people have now resided in Honiara for two or three generations, a constant irritation to the Gwales. Many Gwale people want to keep the islands segregated. Jobless Gwales attacked Malaitan villagers during the summer of 1999 after feeling that the Malaitas were given special employment treatment.

that led to the signing of the Townsville Peace Accords, or TPA,⁵⁶ in October 2000. The deployment of an unarmed International Peace Monitoring Team was part of the agreement and was in place until June 2002. The official position of Australia towards intervention up to this point was providing aid in the form of money and investment, utilizing economic aspects of soft power.⁵⁷ Australia was not willing to interfere directly with the government of another sovereign nation.

The Solomon Islands do not have a defense force, and the Solomon Island's government relies on the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) force for law and order tasks. The lack of Australian or any sort of regional response led the criminal elements inside the Solomon Islands to increase their activity plunging the state into further turmoil. This surge of criminal activity and the ineptitude of the government of the Solomon Islands made the specter of a failed state in the region more likely.

In response to these activities, the Australian government initiated the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The force consisted of a 2,225-strong deployment of police, military and civilian personnel drawn from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji for Operation HELPEM FREN.⁵⁸ The primary objective of the first phase of this mission was to restore law and order by removing weapons from the gangs and militias. The operation involved 325 police including 155 Australian Federal Police and 90 Australian Protective Service officers. A large military contingent of around 1,500 Australian as well as other military personnel from the region supported these police forces. Within this

⁵⁶ The Townsville Peace Agreement: An agreement made in Townsville, Australia on 15 October 2000 for the cessation of hostilities between the Malaita Eagle Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement and for the restoration of peace and ethnic harmony in Solomon Islands.

⁵⁷ The Australian Government was prepared to use incentives to get the political and domestic outcome it desired. However, it soon found out that not unlike the initial American experience in Vietnam, more than soft-power would be necessary to correct a state showing all the warning signs of failure.

⁵⁸ Operation HELPEM FREN: The Pidgin English original mission title for Operation RAMSI.

military contingent, approximately 450 were combat troops while the rest held logistical, engineering and medical support positions. The role of this military contingent was to provide logistical support and to provide protection to the police should the circumstances on the ground so require.

The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI)⁵⁹ demonstrates Australia's shift in strategic policy in the South Pacific region⁶⁰ where the government intervenes in response to potential or perceived state failure in order to prevent weak states from further slipping into failed state status.⁶¹ The response in the Solomon Islands derived from the necessity for Australia to act as the regional lead in affairs, which had the potential to impact significantly on Australia or her closest neighbors in the region. A failing state in such close proximity would not only do harm to the region through the economic and political instability but also has the potential to boil over into larger regional issues with other weak states.

Before the Australian-led intervention in July 2003, the Solomon Islands bore many hallmarks of state failure; the government, surrounded in a sea of criminality and corruption, looked to be on the brink of complete chaos. While it had not yet collapsed entirely, a political crisis loomed in the Solomon Islands. Law and order had broken down, the economy had collapsed, and institutions were weak. The government was paralyzed after losing legitimacy in the eyes of many Solomon Islanders. The Solomon Islands provided the perfect testing bed for Australia's newly implemented whole of government policies. For twenty years, the Australian

⁵⁹ Operation RAMSI is the Australian-led United Nations chartered mission to restore order in the Solomon Islands.

⁶⁰ The South Pacific region for the purpose of this paper is the 16 members of the Pacific Islands Forum: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

⁶¹ A failed state is a state whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory. The level of control required to avoid being considered a failed state varies considerably amongst authorities. Furthermore, the declaration that a state has "failed" is generally controversial and, when made authoritatively, may carry significant geopolitical consequences.

government demanded that its military, government and nongovernmental organizations configure and coordinate their actions in order to facilitate interoperability in future operations. RAMSI provided the testing ground for this approach.

The ADF willingly took the “backseat” in this operation as the major support effort to assist the ANP and other regional police in order to deal with what was primarily as a criminal / law enforcement problem. This was not the first time the ADF deployed and utilized skills other than those trained nor was it the first operation where the need for predominantly military skills was unnecessary. However, operations in the Solomon Islands were the first time the ADF deployed well aware of the secondary support role it would play as a security base for the ANP and other governmental agencies. The role of the ANP and the fact that the Australian government placed a civilian authority in charge of operations are significant to the conduct of this operation.

The mission also included a number of officials from Australian government departments such as the Treasury and the Departments of Finance and Administration. These government officials were crucial to what was at stake in the Solomon Islands: governance. Simply sending in a contingent of purely military forces without the specialized training or knowledge of the culture, financial institutions and society would not produce the results realized in the Solomon Islands. When compared to the lessons of past pure military efforts where the benefits were less and the cost much greater, this mission proved a significant advance in WOG operations.

After establishing security and opening lines of communications, the second phase of the mission began. This involved broader state reconstruction, including capacity building and institutional strengthening, where nongovernmental experts could assist with greater capacity than their military counterparts could. The government also started a state building and development program with elements that included law, justice, economic and financial advisory assistance. The objective of this phase was to assist Solomon Islanders in rebuilding their country and to provide an environment in which Solomon Islands’ democratic processes and institutions

could effectively function. Properly trained military can effectively reproduce the functions of outside agencies. However, the whole of government approach provides for the appropriate specialties and organizations best suited to achieve the mission.

The sizeable military contingent in the Solomon Islands provided logistical backup and support for the police as they restored law and order and generally worked to restore public faith in the government. The mission was police-led because addressing the climate of criminality and impunity in the Solomon Islands was specifically a task for a police force, and is a departure from traditional military intervention operations. It is more usual for the police role to increase once the security situation has stabilized, such as efforts by NATO in the U.S. military-led Balkans intervention.

The achievement of stability is the prerequisite for the successful functioning of all other elements of Solomon Islands society. However, the fulfillment of the second phase is equally critical for the future success of Solomon Islands. Nation building includes working with Solomon Islanders to rebuild their political and security institutions, to ensure effective government services, functioning democratic processes and a healthy economy. This will involve endowing Solomon Islands with the institutions and the capacity to maintain its own rule of law without external assistance. Building a robust Solomon Islands law and order sector—police, judiciary and correctional system—started out as and remains a long-term commitment for both Australia and the region.

The operation could not have taken place as seamlessly without the request and consent of the Solomon Islands Government. The unambiguous support by the Government of the Solomon Islands led to the majority of the populace supporting the mission and allowing for the fears in regional nations to subside, seeing Australia as a regional actor supporting other nations in need. A failing state is a regional issue and often requires a regional solution. This regional support and participation played an important part in operation RAMSI. The mission in the Solomon Islands drew on expertise from around the region and worked to lessen concerns in the

region and beyond about Australian heavy-handedness. There has also been support for the intervention from beyond the region, including from Australia's allies. The U.S. has been supportive—and confidant—in Australia's leadership role in the Solomon Islands. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage observed, "We realize failed states can reach out and touch us badly, and Australia is reaching out to produce a better future for the region."⁶² The Solomon Islands campaign represents a regional response with regional support.

Military planners understand the importance of establishing security before state reconciliation and economic stability and prosperity can begin. Successful transition of security from military to law enforcement enabled operations in the Solomon Islands. In the Solomon Islands, the police element has remained to maintain law and order and to build the capability of the local island police institutions. The civilian component is present and will remain for the longest period, in order to assist with state reconstruction. This could last a number of years. The monetary cost to Australia is an investment in Australian and regional security.

The whole of government approach in RAMSI allowed for direct interaction with supporting agencies and organizations resulting in faster action on the ground. Identification of the problem as criminal in nature and better suited to professional law enforcement agents enabled the planners to build a force structure that suited this particular operation. The ability of Australia to perform an operation such as this executed to the high standards of a military operation, but conducted in synchronization with all aspects of government, support and external agencies has set a standard in the 21st security environment.

⁶² U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in response to Australia's activities in the Solomon Islands, 2004.

Case Study – The U.S. Military in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Academic scholars and professional military writers have reviewed operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The scope of this monograph does not provide for an additional review of the mistakes in planning and execution of OIF. However, a brief case study of OIF's initial campaign and planning demonstrates a lack of unified action in OIF, and offers a potential way ahead for a future U.S. whole of government strategy.

*The administration, Congress and the entire interagency, especially the Department of State, must shoulder the responsibility for this catastrophic failure and the American people must hold them accountable ... Since the start of this war, America's leadership has known that our military alone could not achieve victory in Iraq.*⁶³

—LTG Ricardo Sanchez, USA (Ret.)

In October 2007, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former commanding general of Coalition Forces Iraq, spoke candidly at a Washington luncheon in reference to both his personal and the United States' failures in the war effort in Iraq. Subjected to peer-criticism⁶⁴ and cast as a disgruntled former military officer, he addressed the lack of national effort. One only needs to look to the past to see the future. The necessity for whole of government operations is vital to the success of future American endeavors. Today the U.S. is repeating many of the mistakes made in Vietnam, where military and civilian operations were in many cases disjointed

⁶³ Sanchez, Washington luncheon, remarks, 12 OCT 07.

⁶⁴ "We do not believe that it is appropriate for active duty, or retired, senior military officers to publicly criticize U.S. civilian leadership during war." This statement by two three-star generals, John Crosby and Thomas McInerney, and a pair of two-star generals, Burton Moore and Paul Vallely, was in reference to former generals speaking out about the Iraq war. Following Sanchez's comments at a Washington luncheon he was cast as disgruntled or holding a grudge against the administration.

and in some non-existent.⁶⁵ The U.S. understands the necessity of unified action in operations and has supporting doctrine. There is a call in recent U.S. publications for a better integrated whole of government approach to operations across the full range of conflict.⁶⁶ However, U.S. conduct in the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom⁶⁷ shows a demonstrable lack of unified action, or at least non-adherence to doctrine.

General Omar Bradley stated, “Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, and the artillery and air teams, by soldiers living in the rains and huddling in the snow. But wars are won by the great strength of the nation—the soldier and the civilian working together.”⁶⁸ He said this more than sixty years ago; however, the doctrine supporting this ideology is less than a decade old. This concept of unified action to American forces is not new. Using U.S. joint publications as the authority to which all the services subscribe, a WOG approach or unified action within U.S. operations is already defined in doctrine. Unified action as part of the military lexicon saw doctrinal application as early as 2000, long before the Iraq invasion. Unified action developed out of necessity and practice during years of coordinated efforts with government and nongovernmental agencies in operations throughout the Balkans.

After conducting a successful military campaign to remove the regime of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, the U.S. remains locked in a campaign to defeat a growing insurgency. Today

⁶⁵ In 2006, Democratic Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi and Democratic Congressional leader Harry Reid called the failures by the Bush administration to change the strategy in Iraq a “dereliction of duty.” This statement suggests the failures of the Vietnam era administration, highlighted by Colonel H.R. McMaster’s book “Dereliction of Duty”, were being repeated by the current administration. The sentiment was taken up by the media and continued until the announcement of the resignation of the secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

⁶⁶ *Joint Operating Environment Document*, DEC 07, ch3, pgs. 43 & 45.

⁶⁷ The 2003 invasion of Iraq began on March 20, 2003, and was led by the United States, backed by British forces, Australia, Poland and Denmark. The invasion launched the Iraq War, which is ongoing. May 1, 2003 is considered the demarcation between the conclusion of the invasion and the beginning of what some consider the occupation.

⁶⁸ General Omar N. Bradley. Quote accessed 21 APR 08 at: www.leader-values.com/Content/quotes.asp.

the United States strategic objectives in Iraq of: A unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.⁶⁹ These now appear unrealistic. In early 2003, many strategists outside of the Bush administration considered the aforementioned objectives ambitious. A majority of the international community considered it unreachable, taking a stance against U.S. efforts to bring a final United Nations resolution authorizing the use of military force.⁷⁰ The Bush Administration believed that the achievement of this objective would bring result in democracy and prosperity throughout the Middle East, is now not the case. In the months following the end of major combat operations,⁷¹ the United States had difficulty effectively coordinating all of the instruments of national power at its disposal to achieve these strategic objectives. As the United States moves forward, it must examine how it can effectively employ its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power to achieve its national objectives.

The first U.S. administrator in Iraq undertook a task without specific guidance, no real understanding of the problem and lots of authority. “I had clear instruction from the President to report through Rumsfeld,” Mr. Bremer said. “I was following the chain of command established by the President. It was not my responsibility to do inter-agency coordination.”⁷² This comment

⁶⁹ *The Iraq Strategy Review*, National Security Council JAN 07.

⁷⁰ Global protests expressed opposition to the invasion. In many Middle Eastern and Islamic countries there were mass protests, as well as in Europe. On the government level, the war was criticized by Canada, Belgium, Russia, France, the People's Republic of China, Germany, Switzerland, the Vatican, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, the Arab League, the African Union and many others. Though many nations opposed the war, no foreign government openly supported Saddam Hussein, and none volunteered any assistance to the Iraqi side. Leading traditional allies of the U.S. who had supported Security Council Resolution 1441, France, Germany and Russia, emerged as a united front opposed to the U.S.-led invasion, urging that the UN weapons inspectors be given time to complete their work. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud said the U.S. military could not use Saudi Arabia's soil in any way to attack Iraq. After ten years of U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, cited among reasons by Saudi-born Osama bin Laden for his al-Qaeda attacks on America on September 11, 2001, most of U.S. forces were withdrawn in 2003 According to the New York Times, the invasion secretly received support from Saudi Arabia.

⁷¹ May 1, 2003 is recognized as the end of major combat operations in the Iraq War.

⁷² Michael R. Gordon, *Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Debate*, in the NY Times, 17 MAR 08, pg.1.

by Paul Bremer,⁷³ the first U.S. administrator in Iraq, represents a lack of understanding in the necessity of unity of effort or whole of government operations. His relationship with the President and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld further encumbered a comprehensive approach, with normal channels bypassed in day-to-day communications and decision-making. This immediate line to U.S. senior leadership allowed Bremer to react quickly, but left agency coordination, or for that matter notification of decisions that effected operations throughout Iraq almost nonexistent. This management style further exasperated the effectiveness of coordination between military, government and nongovernmental agencies and organizations, through its inadequate size and ability to deal with Phase IV operations in Iraq.

Paul Bremer's tone set the stage for the next several years of operations in Iraq. His authority and responsibilities were commensurate to that of an Ambassador as the director of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A review of an online definition will explain that one of the many responsibilities of an ambassador, whether direct or indirect is interagency coordination. As the representative from one country to another, in an incredibly challenging environment his remarks concerning his role in coordination are naïve and irresponsible. All elements of national power on the ground in Iraq were singularly focused on their mission; there was little effort to coordinate an overwhelming task. Additionally, decisions in the purview of the U.S. Department of State and reviewed by the Secretary, Colin Powell or his staff were not, nor was there a courtesy review normally extended between organizations within the same government.⁷⁴ As recent as March 2008, Paul Bremer again defends his decisions in Iraq as decisions made with the complete approval of the administration and that the CPA, specifically his office informed all

⁷³ Paul Bremer, was the U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands during the Regan administration and has spent a lifetime in service of the U.S. government. His management ability led to this assignment though it proved a task that was far more complex then the administration understood.

⁷⁴ Michael R. Gordon, *Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Debate*, in the NY Times, 17 MAR 08, pg.1.

parties of pertinent decisions. He suggested that the lack of foreknowledge of his decisions was a failure of the interagency process in Washington and not his concern.⁷⁵ This last statement is another confirmation of his lack of understanding of how doctrinal unified action operations coordination should occur.

Clausewitz warns of the dangers of approaching war with reckless zeal, “War is no pastime; It is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts.”⁷⁶ Bob Woodward states in his book *Plan of Attack* that “in planning for OIF, the war planners at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, acted like ‘irresponsible enthusiasts’, spending far more time and energy considering how to implement military means than how to win the peace in the war’s aftermath.”⁷⁷ This type of statement comes after many interviews with planners and those on the planning staff of military and government agencies. Carl von Clausewitz would not be impressed with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) planning effort in Iraq. The very reasons for embarking on this path without full consideration of all the elements of national power are cause for concern.

⁷⁵ Bremer, Paul III. “*The Dismantling of Iraq’s Army: An Ex-Envoy’s View*,” New York times, 24 March 2008. “Two weeks before the decision was made, I sent a draft order based on these discussions to Mr. Rumsfeld, copied to Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the Central Command, and other senior defense officials. A copy went to Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq. All had ample opportunity to comment on this and subsequent drafts of the order before it was issued on May 23. Defense Department civilian leaders and military staffs provided only minor suggested revisions. On May 22, I briefed the president at a National Security Council meeting attended by Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser; Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage; Secretary Rumsfeld; and General Myers. No one raised concerns or objections. Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, says he was unaware of the plan; that is regrettable. But this suggests a problem with the interagency process in Washington.” Statements made by Paul Bremer III, on 24 March 2008 in the New York Times Article as a reply to an article titled “Mission Still Not Accomplished,” and published by the same paper on 20 March 2008. Mr. Bremer has been a flashpoint for the debate of how the post-invasion Iraq operations were conducted. Mr. Bremer continues to defend his decisions, but has recently suggested that the interagency coordination that should have been in place in Iraq or at least in Washington D.C., were not. The potential significance of his argument is a confirmation of lack of coordination in both Washington and where it should have been, in Iraq.

⁷⁶ *On War*, pg. 86.

⁷⁷ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, pg. 76.

The initial invasion of Baghdad was a military success accomplished by the planning efforts of military and civilian leaders. This success was short lived. Assumptions made about government and nongovernmental agencies were considered unimportant. The U.S. never validated or considered unimportant at the time of planning, and would negatively influence the first four years of OIF. The administrations inability to understand the whole picture in the early stages of the insurgency created a problem that the military alone could not solve. The coordination that should have taken place between government and nongovernmental agencies tended to take place in Washington, far removed from the reality of operations on the ground in Iraq. It is apparent from recent articles written by former CPA leader Paul Bremer that this coordination was not happening in Washington either.

The State Department led postwar efforts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and are set up for this type of “nation building” work. The military can achieve success in what it calls post conflict operations with limited success, but the scale of rebuilding and expertise necessary in Iraq was beyond that of the military. The opportunity for the U.S. Department of State (DoS) to assist in an operation that is typically within its purview never arose. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assured DoS that the success he had in the initial phase of the Iraq War would remain his in the reconstruction phase. “As Rumsfeld would have it in Iraq, the Department of Defense would have direct authority for the administration and rebuilding of an occupied country for the first time since World War II. The Pentagon had the resources but not the experience for the work it was undertaking.”⁷⁸ The failures continued to mount as the DoD set its course in direct contradiction to the design or purpose of military operations. The Secretary of Defense, once having gained the Presidents approval to his plan and an affirmation of his authority, allowed the

⁷⁸ *Cobra II*, pg. 141. These conclusions, drawn from the book, *Cobra II* are those of the author and are not unlike those of many other books on the subject.

Phase IV planning effort to become little more than an annoyance without a serious planning effort. Rumsfeld was sure the Iraqi's would take care of the actions necessary in Phase IV.⁷⁹

In its early actions in Iraq, the U.S. did not achieve unified action or properly consider this methodology in the initial efforts in Iraq. The lack of unity occurred at the highest levels of the government and was the result of many political failures. However, senior leaders of the U.S. military are not exempt from sharing some of the blame for the early failures. Much of the experiences and lessons derived from a career of service were lost in a plan driven by civilian leaders with little experience in operations.

The forcefulness of the personalities involved bears much of the responsibility in the lack of unified action. The abrupt retirement of one of the military's most respected and experienced officer's during the early planning stages of the war established unwritten rules for how the administration would deal with dissenting opinions. When General Eric Shinseki, then the Secretary of the Army, expressed his professional and candid opinion of the forces necessary to carry out successful operations in Iraq he was going against the lead civilian planners and Rumsfeld himself. After General Shinseki's retirement the silence was deafening as the senior military leaders watched plans burdened with inaccuracies and bad assumptions continue into the execution phase. Better planning for reconstruction during Phase IV is now cliché, and an obvious oversight by military and civilian leadership. Unified action or a whole of government approach takes years of practice, training and is driven from the top of government. The personalities involved in the planning and early stages of Iraq did not allow for this type of interaction, nor had the military expected the need for this type of whole of government operation.

Finally, the interagency task force (IATF) is an example at an effective organization already operating successfully across government boundaries. Within the U.S. military, Joint

⁷⁹ Ibid, pg. 123.

Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S) exists to perform an anti-narcotics mission and works seamlessly with numerous government, nongovernmental and coalition organizations. They are a small unit under the command of U.S. Southern Command.⁸⁰ Due to the specialized nature of the mission conducted by JIATF-S it was not focused on during the writing of this monograph.

However, this organization merits further review as an example of successful U.S. WOG operations because of its detailed understanding of the coordination and complexities of unified action / WOG operations.

Part III: The Way Ahead

The Australian Defence Force's whole of government approach and the United States unified action doctrine share complimentary attributes. Examining historical information and two recent case studies provided an understanding of the potential unrealized benefits of a further integrated U.S. approach to operations. This potential exists because the U.S. has shown willingness to change, such as the surge effort in recent OIF operations. This potential is unrealized because the U.S. military and government have not fully implemented or emphasized its unified action doctrine. The solutions to these problems require further refinement of doctrine and implementation across organizations not accustomed to working together. The resource that is the shortest and the one that the ADF used the most of developing its WOG approach is time.

The U.S. government acknowledges the significance of a whole of government approach during operations and has the doctrine to facilitate this methodology. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. John Hamre, the President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed that U.S. military forces can win the

⁸⁰ Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) conducts counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.

combat phase of wars decisively, but military operations themselves are rarely, if ever, sufficient to achieving the U.S.'s overall strategic objectives. Further stating that to win decisively, an immediate and sharper focus on developing and institutionalizing the civilian and military capabilities the United States requires for complex operations.⁸¹ This statement, directed at U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is precisely what the Australian government concluded shortly after the Vietnam War and guided the efforts to in developing the whole of government approach. Today the U.S. military is adjusting the way it operates with other organizations, all while re-examining its role and conducting combat operations in two theaters of war.

In the not so distant future, the unstable governments in many South Pacific countries may turn several countries in Australia's region into failed states. Such failed states may require military-led interventions to restore civil government.⁸² However, as demonstrated by Operation RAMSI in the Solomon Islands, other government contributors and even private enterprise will likely replace the large military presence of the past. Private contractors and organizations are as plentiful in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as are the soldiers.⁸³ The influence these contractors bring to future evolutions of WOG operations will likely be a shift from military to contractor engagement, utilizing military forces only when absolutely necessary.

The ADF has developed policies to respond to Australia's changing strategic environment and population base. These policies include expanding the ADF and introducing new equipment in order to increase Australia's 'strategic weight'. To enable Australia's qualitative lead over neighboring states the ADF intends to introduce new technologies and maintain the high quality of Australian military training. The ADF is also seeking to develop and implement improved military tactics based upon the integration of technology and better cooperation between the

⁸¹ Hamre, John J., Post-Conflict Nation Building, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3 MAR 04.

⁸² Australian Department of Defense (2007). Pages 13–23.

services.⁸⁴ This series of technological improvements, carried under the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) plan began implementation in 2006 and address interoperability issues across the force and with coalition partners. Both American and Australian forces in the Iraqi theater of operations understand the best technology alone is not a match for the cunning of a determined enemy.

Over the past decade policy writers and strategic thinkers in Australia and the United States continue to cite the necessity of a whole of government approach. Today the demand for change in the conduct of operations is growing. The whole of government theme permeates ADF Defence white papers and policy decisions and is becoming a common theme throughout U.S. military and government operations as well. The U.S. should grasp, and capitalize on, the post-11 September 2001 rise of a whole of government approach. Doctrine updates and recent government publications indicate an acknowledgement and growing understanding on issues such as the globalization of security, the indivisibility of threats, the strategic threat of mass-casualty terrorism and the necessity of all elements of national power in a whole of government solution to operations. Key factors that enable the ADF's success in WOG operations are the relatively small size of the Defence Force and the less encumbered interaction it has with government. Success in the WOG approach realized today is a theme in Australian government that began thirty years ago.

As the U.S. enters its sixth year of operations in two separate theaters policy makers and officials within the current political administration are beginning to understand the power and flexibility realized in a whole of government approach towards the conduct of military operations. "...When security conditions improve, a narrow focus on survival opens up ...the surge helped

⁸³ *A Bloody Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq*, pgs. 26-27.

⁸⁴ Australian Department of Defence (2006). Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Inquiry into the Economic, Social and strategic Trends in Australia's Region and the Consequences for Our Defense Requirements, Pgs 11-14.

set the stage for progress in governance and economic development...⁸⁵ Military action is credited by LTG Odierno for setting the conditions that enabled success in Iraq by the Iraqi's. Without a continued military commitment, the outcome in Iraq is unclear. What is clear is that the solutions provided by the military will not solve the problems faced by the government of Iraq. LTG Odierno identified the need for unified action and the tremendous role that whole of government operations played in the Iraqi surge of 2007. These comments show the type of support role the military has taken in OIF and should follow to future success.

In order to understand how to chart the best path to the future the U.S. should reflect on the past. The lessons from Vietnam, Haiti and Somalia should not be forgotten because of the success or failure of more recent operations. The complex environment that is part of the daily routine in operations across the globe will continue to change and require forces with an ability to adapt to an ever-changing threat. These threat adaptations will not take place over weeks, months or years, but rather in the span of days, hours and minutes. The U.S. leadership has seen the need for adaptive leaders and changes to the institutional and operational military. The changes necessary to understand and implement a whole of government approach through U.S. unified action doctrine will take time, patience and resolve. As in the case of the ADF's approach the leadership of the military, the government and nongovernmental organizations must support it in order to be effective in application.

Conclusion

The 21st century security environment poses significant challenges for governments and their militaries'. The need for governments to operate in an effective manner, incorporating all elements of national power is recognized by the Australian and U.S. governments. Both

⁸⁵ Comments to the Heritage Foundation on 13 MAR 08, in a lecture series entitled *Leadership for America*. Heritage Lecture #1068 by Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno.

governments have the desire to implement the changes necessary to achieve a whole of government approach. The argument that a whole of government approach towards the conduct of military operations is essential to success in future operations seems obvious. How to implement the changes necessary across government and nongovernmental agencies to achieve this approach is the challenge.

The United States military, an institution with over two hundred years of cultural, organizational and operational bias, provides a perplexing challenge. However, it is a challenge that should be overcome in order to achieve unified action. The intricacies involved in changing the vast military cultures and agencies with which they interact is another. In Douglas A. Macgregor's *Breaking the Phalanx*, he finds that there is a great level of resistance to change. He describes this change as an evolutionary concept:

Change in military affairs can be evolutionary or revolutionary. For it to be implemented quickly, however, the direction of organizational change must be more revolutionary than evolutionary. This is because most of the arguments against change are not based on disputes about warfighting; opposition is usually rooted in established, peacetime, bureaucratic interests ... changing the organizational structure and strategic focus of the U.S. Armed Forces will require not only pressure and influence from above and outside the services, but also anticipation of how the prior experiences ... will lead them to slow otherwise misdirected change.⁸⁶

The cultural aspects of these changes present significant challenges. As an example of the difficulties in integration in government organizations the recently created U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a good example. DHS is attempting to consolidate 130,000 people from twenty-eight agencies into a single operating department. It must work with its many different agencies with intricate cultures and long histories. The major problem is that the cultures

⁸⁶ *Breaking the Phalanx*, pg. 229.

in the twenty-eight agencies are quite different.⁸⁷ The culture of each of the agencies has been refined in their respective roles over the course of many years.⁸⁸

There are more similarities than differences between the Australian whole of government approach and United States unified action doctrine. The desire to achieve a whole of government approach is growing in today's operations where military action alone cannot resolve the existing problem. Australian Operations in the Solomon Islands was an example of military, government and nongovernmental agencies working together to achieve a common goal. There are several reasons for the success of this operation, not the least of which was the ability of the ADF to interact and to transfer operations to the AFP. The success of Australia's whole of government approach relies on the involvement of senior government officials. The Prime Minister ensures that the government agencies work to implement this comprehensive approach. The Australian government believes an integrated response results in greater success than one by individual agencies. The Australian view on management resulted in the combining of eight government health and social welfare agencies into one new agency (Centerlink)⁸⁹. The Australian constitution focuses on the good of the whole not the individual; this is a key factor in enabling its whole of government approach.

⁸⁷ DHS facts and figures accessed on 11 APR 08 at: www.dhs.gov/index.shtm.

⁸⁸ The United States Coast Guard traces its history back to August 4, 1790, when the first Congress authorized the construction of ten vessels to enforce tariff and trade laws, prevent smuggling, and protect the collection of the federal revenue. Eight of these vessels were built for \$1,000 each. The two that had to face severe winters off the New England coast cost a little more. The Secret Service protects the President and holds a special position of trust and access. The Secret Service originated on July 5, 1865 to suppress counterfeit currency. After the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 the Service was legislated by law to protect the President. These agencies are unlikely to relinquish their proud heritage and cooperate easily with latecomers with spotted reputations. ⁸⁸ USSS historical data accessed on 10 APR 08 at: www.secretservice.gov/history.shtml & USCG Department of history at: [//www.uscg.mil/history/](http://www.uscg.mil/history/).

⁸⁹ Centrelink is the name of the Commonwealth Service Delivery Agency (CSDA) a statutory authority responsible for delivering human services on behalf of agencies of the Commonwealth Government of Australia. The agency combined the efforts of eight separate service agencies and some 25,000 personnel across government.

It is more difficult to achieve a whole of government approach in the United States, where the Constitution focuses on the individual.⁹⁰ The U.S. Legislative branch focuses on maintaining jobs and contracts for its constituents, and increasing federal funding for their individual district or state. The Legislative branch focuses first on individual needs, and only second on national government priorities. Historically it has taken an economic or national crisis, along the lines of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, to get the U.S. government to operate with a single focus.

The initial failures in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can be linked to the strong personalities within the U.S. executive branch, in particular the DoD that increased tensions and inhibited the sharing of information and cooperation across government. These are essential parts of a whole of government approach. When the DoD choose to take charge of Phase IV operations in Iraq, sidestepping the DoS it began a cycle of non-cooperation and infighting among agencies that resulted in multiple failures. Four years after the initial invasion, the administration replaced the Secretary of Defense and initiated “the new way forward” that comprised the troop surge.⁹¹ The presidential change in U.S. policy led to initial success. The surge, led by General David Petraeus proved effective in securing Baghdad and bringing relative calm to the surrounding provinces. However, in recent Congressional hearings General Petraeus made it clear that the security gains made through the troop surge were not irreversible.⁹² The military commander understood that the solution to the problem in Baghdad required a comprehensive approach

⁹⁰ David Walker, the Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) from 1993 - 2008, said that “the US government does not have a strategic plan and never has.” This makes it difficult for the U.S. to take a whole of government view.

⁹¹ The "troop surge" describes U.S. President George W. Bush's plan to increase the number of American troops deployed to the Iraq War to provide security to Baghdad and Al Anbar Province. The two operations in which these troops are participating are called Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (otherwise known as the Baghdad Security Plan) and Operation Phantom Thunder. On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced changes in the administration's political and military strategy. This new policy was titled: "The New Way Forward."

employing all agencies of government. The continued efforts of all the elements of U.S. and Iraqi national power are instrumental to maintaining and increasing the security gains to achieve the goal of a self governing and secure Iraq.

Twenty-two years after enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act,⁹³ the U.S. still hasn't achieved military "jointness". In 2005, a report titled *Beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase II*⁹⁴ recommended drastic revision of government to allow a whole of government approach to complex problems. The report points out that the level of change necessary to achieve this goal requires Congressional legislation, extensive training and education. The successes of a comprehensive approach, realized in recent operations in Iraq have increased the desire and renewed U.S. government interest in a whole of government approach.

Certainly, the Australian Defence Forces' have shown prowess in the area of whole of government operations, while understanding the need for continuous improvement. The whole of government approach provides a more likely chance of success through comprehensive interaction. Gaining a whole of government approach requires years of interaction between and among supporting and supported agencies in the same way that a military division or brigade forges relationships within its unit over time and through training. In recent operations, the U.S.

⁹² General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq. Transcript of comments in his Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, 8-9 April 2008, pg.1

⁹³ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 caused major defense reorganization. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders. Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and Joint Vision 2020 (2000) are part of the jointness implementation strategy. They emphasize that to be the most effective force we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future.

⁹⁴ The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides world leaders with strategic insights on – and policy solutions to – current and emerging global issues. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, formerly U.S. deputy secretary of defense. BGN reports, a series of three available online at [//www.csis.org/isp/bgn/](http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/) accessed 10 APR 08.

has realized the importance of unified action through a comprehensive approach. The future is hard to predict. However, if there is doubt that U.S. and allied forces must adapt to change and institute a whole of government approach, the recently updated U.S. Army Operations manual makes the point quite clear in its opening paragraph:

America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged throughout the world for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation and eradication as a society.

—FM 3-0 Introduction

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