Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building
Abstract
The summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war demonstrated that Israel views the problem of Hezbollah geostrategically, as a proxy military challenge supported by its long-term enemies Syria and Iran. This view led the government of Israel to attempt the eradication of Hezbollah through the application of overwhelming military force, an effort that was flawed in design and failed in execution. Similarly, the United Nations has viewed the problem as a conflict between two warring military entities, a problem it has unsuccessfully sought to mitigate since 1978 with the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Colored through the lens of the global war on terrorism, the United States also views the threat created by Hezbollah geostrategically, the influence of a top-tier terrorist organization financed by Iran and supported by Syria. Together, these views led to the delayed implementation of a ceasefire in 2006 and the misguided belief that Israel would be successful in its efforts against Hezbollah. After 34 days of air and ground engagements the Hezbollah continued to fight, delivering what some have termed a strategic victory. Meanwhile, the state of Lebanon was once again decimated, with more than 1,200 civilians killed, 130,000 homes destroyed, and damage to the economy and infrastructure totaling over $7 billion. The post-war response of the United Nations and the United States continues to focus on the symptom (Hezbollah), rather than the root cause that allows such an organization to exist; the weakness of the Lebanese government.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA485997
Entities
People
- William K. Mooney Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College